Introductory Remarks “Enough ink has been spilled in quarreling over femi- nism, now practically over, and perhaps we should say no more about it. It is still talked about, however, for the vo- luminous nonsense uttered during the last century seems to have done little to illuminate the problem.”1 This sentence does not originate from a recent discussion, but was chosen as the opening line in The Second Sex by Simone de Beau- voir, so as to point out from the beginning the ever-present assumption that the problem with the woman’s place in society has already been solved. Instead, according to Beauvoir, there remains only confusion. If we are to gain understanding, we should get out of these ruts; we should discard the vague notions of superiority, inferiority and equality which have hitherto corrupted every discussion of the subject and start afresh.2 More than fifty years later, we find ourselves at a simi- lar point. Why do we need any more feminist theories if everything has been said already? In this regard, writing a book about Simone de Beauvoir could seem quite superflu- ous. Against her intentions Beauvoir’s approach was shelved as equality feminism, and many feminists of our present time consider her to be outmoded, “historical heri- tage” at best. 1 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, New York: Vintage Books Edi- tion, 1989, p. 19. 2 Ibidem, p. 23. 9 Why therefore should a new book surface about the work of Simone de Beauvoir, why now an English version of the German original3? The book at hand for the first time offers a detailed in- troduction into Beauvoir’s philosophy where the focus is on her concepts of freedom and recognition and their impact on a philosophy of gender. At the same time the importance of philosophy for feminist theory as a whole will be em- phasized. It will be shown that Beauvoir is much more than a simple equality feminist and that she posed questions that are nowadays at the center of feminist interest. At the be- ginning of the book a short chapter will deal with the recep- tion of Beauvoir’s work in the English-speaking scientific community as regards discussions relevant in our context. The feminist theorists of difference reproach Beauvoir for equating being human with masculinity, for espousing a theory of equality, and for depreciating being a woman. In the period of feminist theory which followed, the subject of feminism itself, namely being a woman, was questioned. During the conflicts which then arose between essentialism and constructivism Beauvoir’s work remained unnoticed because it was identified solely with the feminist theory of equality. Both positions are being regarded here as insuffi- cient, and the thesis is evolved that it was not on any ac- count Beauvoir’s intention to create a model of equality, but also to pose the question of difference. Which ethical, social and cultural consequences would have to be drawn 3 Susanne Moser, Freiheit und Anerkennung bei Simone de Beauvoir, Tübingern: edition discord, 2002. As regards the English version I owe thanks to Michael Harlan Lyman for his ambitious draft translation and to Rebecca White as an expert proof-reader. 10 so that the “new woman” could finally manifest herself? The woman would have to shed her old skin, writes Beau- voir in The Second Sex, and “cut her own new clothes”.4 To emancipate woman would mean to refuse to confine her to the relations she bears to man and to offer her the possibil- ity to posit herself independently.5 This question of Beau- voir corresponds to the endeavors of the theories of femi- nist difference, namely to understand femininity in a posi- tive way. But, whereas feminist theories of difference take an unambiguous female identity for granted, linked to the female body, Beauvoir links being a woman to the ambigu- ity of existence. Similarly, as in post-modern feminism, existentialism rejects any fixed pre-assigned identity. Beauvoir emphasizes that, independent of how important contributions of biology, psychoanalysis, and historical ma- terialism might be, “we shall hold that the body, the sexual life, and the resources of technology exist concretely for man only in so far as he grasps them in the total perspective of his existence."6 In the following, it will be demonstrated that Beauvoir approaches the problem of existence on three different levels: on the level of the situation, of the body and of the identity, which however must not be considered separately. The body is interlinked directly with existence, it is a synthetic unity, that itself is to be understood only through the situation, its relation to the world, whereby the situation is not something given but reveals itself only in the act of existence. Beauvoir emphasizes that for the hu- man being nature has reality only to the extent that it is in- 4 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 725. 5 Ibidem, p. 731. 6 Ibidem, p. 60. 11 volved in his activity – his own nature not excepted.7 “In truth, however, the nature of things is no more immutably given, once for all, than is historical reality.”8 She does not even regard sexual difference as a necessary attribute to existence, it seems conceivable to her that “the perpetuation of the species does not necessitate sexual differentiation (...) we can imagine a parthenogenetic or hermaphroditic society.”9 But also with regard to the transgender debate, Beauvoir’s approach creates stimulus. Gender is not only something constructed, something that one is for others and through others – as it is assumed in most sociological theo- ries of gender construction – but is also connected to one’s self-perception. So Beauvoir speaks explicitly of the wom- an being a female only to the extent to which “she feels herself as such (...) It is not nature that defines woman; it is she who defines herself by dealing with nature on her own account in her emotional life.”10 Our studies rest on the assumption that Beauvoir’s exis- tentialist approach must be taken seriously, in that it pro- vides the basis for the analysis of gender relations. There- fore connections to Sartre are being established in order to show where Beauvoir is in accordance or in opposition to his philosophy, and to expel existing prejudices, for exam- ple that his for-itself represents a body-less and position- less absolute freedom. Additionally it is demonstrated that Beauvoir, contrary to Sartre, derives freedom not only from transcendence, but also from will. Beauvoir is defining the 7 Ibidem, p. 35. 8 Ibidem, p. 60. 9 Ibidem, p. 7. 10 Ibidem, p. 38. 12 notion of ambiguity not only in dependence on Sartre, but also in connection with Hegel. The human being tries to escape from his natural condition without, however, being able to freeing himself from it.11 Beauvoir emphasizes that the fundamental ambiguity of the human being must not be concealed, or as in Hegel’s work, surpassed on a higher level, yet as will be shown in the course of this study in certain places Beauvoir adheres to this very idea. Moder- nity devaluates all processes that happen by nature without free creation by the human being as a stage that needs to be overcome and mastered. Repeatedly, Beauvoir places the overcoming of life, where you “take control of the instant and mold the future”12, in contrast to a life of animalistic nature. By way of analogy she devalues the work con- nected with reproduction mostly performed by women. One of the goals of this book is to point out the conflicts in which Beauvoir is involved by making use of the eman- cipation potential of classical German philosophy, espe- cially Hegel. Building on this philosophical tradition of liberation she criticizes its misogynic tendency and yet partly falls victim to it herself. For instance she will main- tain throughout her life that one should not orient oneself on female values. Believing in female values would imply a belief in female nature, something she had always fought against.13 Regrettably, she does not arrive at the same con- clusion when referring to male values: instead of question- ing them in the same way using the existentialist and de- 11 Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, Secaucus, N. J.: Citadel Press Book, Carol Publishing Group Edition 1997, p. 7. 12 Ibidem, p. 65. 13 Alice Schwarzer, Simone de Beauvoir. Rebellin und Wegbereiterin, Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 1999, p. 58. 13 constructivistic approach, they are still approved of and taken for granted by her as a general point of reference. Using her work, also the conflicts are shown that arise when modern emancipation discourse and post-modern deconstructivism clash. In a detailed study of these con- flicting tendencies the thesis is elaborated that Beauvoir’s work can be seen as a pivot between modernity and post- modernity. The structure of the book follows the development of Beauvoir’s work from her earlier writings up to The Second Sex also including her late study on Old Age and her auto- biographies. Beginning with Pyrrhus et Cinéas14 it will be shown how Beauvoir investigates the meaning of projects, and the need to justify existence. Only the concrete realiza- tion of one's projects, not a pre-assigned order from birth onward, can determine one's place in the world. To reduce a human being to his/her15 status acquired by birth is for Beauvoir not only an anachronism, but also the highest form of suppression because here a decrease of transcen- dence into immanence takes place.