Homo Geographicus and Homo Economicus: the Role of Territorialization in Generating Cooperation
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University of Groningen Greek Pottery on the Timpone Della Motta and in the Sibaritide from C. 780 to 620 BC Kindberg Jacobsen
University of Groningen Greek pottery on the Timpone della Motta and in the Sibaritide from c. 780 to 620 BC Kindberg Jacobsen, Jan IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below. Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Publication date: 2007 Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database Citation for published version (APA): Kindberg Jacobsen, J. (2007). Greek pottery on the Timpone della Motta and in the Sibaritide from c. 780 to 620 BC: reception, distribution and an evaluation of Greek pottery as a source material for the study of Greek influence before and after the founding of ancient Sybaris. [s.n.]. Copyright Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne- amendment. Take-down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. -
Curriculum Vitae in Formato Europeo
ADELE BONOFIGLIO CURRICULUM VITAE INFORMAZIONI PERSONALI Nome BONOFIGLIO Adele Indirizzo Cellulare Telefono Fax E-mail [email protected] Nazionalità Italiana Luogo e data di nascita Cosenza, 14/01/1962 ESPERIENZE LAVORATIVE Dal • Periodo (da – a) Dal 05-11- 2015 ad oggi (impiego attuale) • Nome e indirizzo datore di lavoro Mibact Polo Museale della Calabria ruolo: Direttore del Museo Nazionale Archeologico della Sibaritide e del Museo Nazionale Archeologico di Vibo Valentia Dal 10.04.2017 ad oggi Direttore del Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Amendolara • Tipo di azienda o settore Pubblico • Tipo di impiego Contratto a tempo indeterminato • Principali mansioni e responsabilità Direzione del Museo Nazionale Archeologico della Sibaritide, del Museo Nazionale Archeologico di Vibo Valentia e del Museo Nazionale Archeologico di Amendolara • Periodo (da – a) Dal 23-06- 2015 al 04- 11- 2015 • Nome e indirizzo datore di lavoro Mibact Soprintendenza Archeologia della Calabria sede Sibari ruolo: Funzionario Archeologo • Tipo di azienda o settore Pubblico • Tipo di impiego Contratto a tempo indeterminato • Principali mansioni e responsabilità Responsabile Servizio Archeologico Cura e istruzione pratiche archeologiche • Periodo (da – a) Dal 17-11- 2010 al 22-06-2015 • Nome e indirizzo datore di lavoro Mibact Direzione Regionale della Calabria sede di Roccelletta di Borgia (CZ) ruolo: Funzionario Archeologo • Tipo di azienda o settore • Tipo di impiego Contratto a tempo indeterminato • Principali mansioni e responsabilità Responsabile Servizio Archeologico Cura e istruzione pratiche archeologiche Pagina 1 - Curriculum vitae di Adele Bonofiglio • Periodo (da – a) Dal 1975 a novembre 2010 • Nome e indirizzo datore di lavoro Mibac • Tipo di azienda o settore Soprintendenza ai Beni A.A.A.S. -
Gender Differences in Responsiveness to a Homo Economicus Prime in the Gift-Exchange Game
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Mertins, Vanessa; Warning, Susanne Working Paper Gender differences in responsiveness to a homo economicus prime in the gift-exchange game IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics, No. 09/2013 Provided in Cooperation with: Institute for Labor Law and Relations in the European Union (IAAEU), University of Trier Suggested Citation: Mertins, Vanessa; Warning, Susanne (2013) : Gender differences in responsiveness to a homo economicus prime in the gift-exchange game, IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics, No. 09/2013, University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU), Trier This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80863 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. -
Kranton Duke University
The Devil is in the Details – Implications of Samuel Bowles’ The Moral Economy for economics and policy research October 13 2017 Rachel Kranton Duke University The Moral Economy by Samuel Bowles should be required reading by all graduate students in economics. Indeed, all economists should buy a copy and read it. The book is a stunning, critical discussion of the interplay between economic incentives and preferences. It challenges basic premises of economic theory and questions policy recommendations based on these theories. The book proposes the path forward: designing policy that combines incentives and moral appeals. And, therefore, like such as book should, The Moral Economy leaves us with much work to do. The Moral Economy concerns individual choices and economic policy, particularly microeconomic policies with goals to enhance the collective good. The book takes aim at laws, policies, and business practices that are based on the classic Homo economicus model of individual choice. The book first argues in great detail that policies that follow from the Homo economicus paradigm can backfire. While most economists would now recognize that people are not purely selfish and self-interested, The Moral Economy goes one step further. Incentives can amplify the selfishness of individuals. People might act in more self-interested ways in a system based on incentives and rewards than they would in the absence of such inducements. The Moral Economy warns economists to be especially wary of incentives because social norms, like norms of trust and honesty, are critical to economic activity. The danger is not only of incentives backfiring in a single instance; monetary incentives can generally erode ethical and moral codes and social motivations people can have towards each other. -
The Social Side of Homo Economicus
TREE-1308; No. of Pages 3 Update Forum The social side of Homo economicus Daniel J. Rankin1,2 1 Department of Biochemistry, University of Zu¨ rich, Building Y27, Winterthurerstrasse 190, CH-8057 Zu¨ rich, Switzerland 2 Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics, Quartier Sorge Baˆ timent Ge´ nopode, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland Many recent experiments in the field of behavioural cooperatively than traditional economic theory would pre- economics appear to demonstrate a willingness of dict [1,11]. humans to behave altruistically, even when it is not in their interest to do so. This has led to the assertion that Are humans especially cooperative? humans have evolved a special predisposition towards Cooperation in public goods games is unstable and most altruism. Recent studies have questioned this, and dem- players quickly realise that not contributing maximises onstrated that selfless cooperation does not hold up in their profit (see Figure 1 for an explanation of public controlled experiments. As I discuss here, this calls for goods games). Despite this, the public goods game fre- more economic ‘field experiments’ and highlights the quently results in higher levels of contribution than one need for greater integration of the evolutionary and would expect if individuals were selfishly rational and economic sciences. 10% of participants contribute in the long run [1,12]. This has led to the conclusion that humans have a special Kto nekradne, okra´da svoju rodinu degree of cooperation, or ‘other regarding preferences’, (He who does not steal, steals from his family) that cannot be explained from a purely selfish perspec- Slovak Saying tive and that has been used as evidence that humans behave more cooperatively than theory would predict The apparent puzzle of human cooperation [1,12]. -
The Appearance of Homo Rivalis: Social Preferences and the Nature of Rent Seeking
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics Discussion Paper Series ISSN 1749-3293 CeDEx Discussion Paper No. 2008–10 The Appearance of Homo Rivalis: Social Preferences and the Nature of Rent Seeking Benedikt Herrmann and Henrik Orzen August 2008 The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics was founded in 2000, and is based in the School of Economics at the University of Nottingham. The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of Public Economics, Individual Choice under Risk and Uncertainty, Strategic Interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. Please visit http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/ for more information about the Centre or contact Karina Whitehead Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics School of Economics University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD Tel: +44 (0) 115 95 15620 Fax: +44 (0) 115 95 14159 [email protected] The full list of CeDEx Discussion Papers is available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/papers/index.html The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking by Benedikt Herrmann and Henrik Orzen University of Nottingham August 2008 Abstract While numerous experiments demonstrate how pro-sociality can influence economic decision-making, evidence on explicitly anti-social economic behavior has thus far been limited. -
Walrasian Economics in Retrospect
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert Working Paper Walrasian Economics in Retrospect Working Paper, No. 2000-04 Provided in Cooperation with: Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Suggested Citation: Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert (2000) : Walrasian Economics in Retrospect, Working Paper, No. 2000-04, University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics, Amherst, MA This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105719 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu WALRASIAN ECONOMICS IN RETROSPECT∗ Department of Economics University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts, 01003 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis February 4, 2000 Abstract Two basic tenets of the Walrasian model, behavior based on self-interested exogenous preferences and complete and costless contracting have recently come under critical scrutiny. -
Striking a Blow for Sanity in Theories of Rationality
Published in: M. Augier & J. G. March (Eds.). (2004). Models of a man: Essays in memory of Herbert A. Simon (pp. 389– 409). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. © 2004 MIT Press. Striking a Blow for Sanity in Theories of Rationality Gerd Gigerenzer I took the title of this chapter from an email Herbert A. Simon sent me in May 1999. In this email, he wrote a statement for the back cover of Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart in which he commented: “I think the book strikes a great blow for sanity in the approach to rationality [and shows] why more than minor tampering with existing optimization theory is called for.” But Herb wouldn’t be Herb if he hadn’t added “and you wouldn’t believe I had ever skimmed the volume if I didn’t fi nd SOMETHING to disagree with.” And so he continued, pointing out that he hadn’t found the expert/novice topic treated, that scientifi c discovery would have been a great example for ill-structured domains … Bringing sanity into theories of rationality was a major guideline in Herbert Simon’s scientifi c life. However, as he himself was prepared to admit, sanity in rationality entered his thinking as a negatively defi ned concept, a kind of black box that contained everything that was not optimiza- tion. What he opposed has various names: full rationality, substantial rationality, maximization of expected utility, Homo economicus, or simply optimization. What he proposed had its seeds in his revised dissertation, Administrative Behavior (1947), and eventually became termed bounded rationality, satisfi cing, or procedural rationality. -
Fully Coupled High-Resolution Medium-Range Forecasts: Evaluation
1 Fully coupled high-resolution medium-range forecasts: evaluation 2 of the hydrometeorological impact in an ensemble framework 3 4 L. Furnari1, L. Magnusson2, G. Mendicino1 and A. Senatore1 5 6 1 Department of Environmental Engineering, University of Calabria, Rende (CS), Italy 7 2 European Centre for Medium‐ Range Weather Forecasts, Reading, UK 8 9 Corresponding author: Luca Furnari ([email protected]) 10 11 12 13 Manuscript first submitted to Hydrological Processes in Febraury 2021 14 15 16 Keywords 17 Fully coupling, atmospheric-hydrological modeling chain, medium-range forecast, terrestrial 18 water lateral transport, ensemble forecast, WRF-Hydro, ECMWF ENS, Mediterranean 19 1 1 2 20 Abstract 21 Fully coupled atmospheric-hydrological models allow a more realistic representation of the 22 land surface–boundary layer continuum, representing both high-resolution 23 land-surface/subsurface water lateral redistribution and the related feedback towards the 24 atmosphere. This study evaluates the potential contribution of the fully coupled approach in 25 extended-range mesoscale hydrometeorological ensemble forecasts. Previous studies have 26 shown, for deterministic simulations, that the effect of fully coupling for short-range forecasts 27 is minor compared to other sources of uncertainty, however, it becomes not negligible when 28 increasing the forecast period. Through a proof-of-concept consisting of an ensemble (50 29 members from the ECMWF Ensemble Prediction System) seven-days-in-advance forecast of 30 a high impact event affecting the Calabrian peninsula (southern Italy, Mediterranean basin) on 31 November 2019, the paper elucidates the extent to which the improved representation of the 32 terrestrial water lateral transport in the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) – Hydro 33 modeling system affects the ensemble water balance, focusing on the precipitation and the 34 hydrological response, in terms of both soil moisture dynamics and streamflow in 14 35 catchments spanning over 42% of the region. -
WELFARE CRITERIA Witih ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES: the ECONOMICS of EDUCATION*
iNTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW Vol. 15, No. 2, Jtune, 1974 WELFARE CRITERIA WITIh ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES: THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION* BY HERBERT GINTIS1 1. INTRODUCTION "BY ACTING on the external world and changing it," Karl Marx once re- marked, "[the worker] at the same time changes his own nature." [18, (197-98)] Much of Marxist theory is a development of this basic observation. The special position in Marxist theory of economic structure, its conception of materialism, of ideology, of classes and of social change, hinge on this connection. Indeed, again to quote Marx, "the whole of history is nothing but a continual transfor- mation of human nature" [19, (160)]. It is less than happenstance that the major competitor to Marxist theory, the tradition culminating in modern neo-classical economics, is grounded firmly not merely in the abstraction from, but the negation of this insight. The Marxist observation, translated into neo-classical terminology, holds that individual pref- erence structures are products of economic activity. Or more precisely, indi- vidual preferences develop and change according to variables endogenous to the economic model: prices, quantities, and availabilities of consumption goods, jobs, and the social institutions conditioning the supply of labor. Neo-classical theory starts from the contrary position: the Walrasian system takes preferences as either fixed, or changirngonly in response to variables external to the model. In positive economics, the formationi of preferences is relegated to sociology or social psychology; and in welfare economics, preference structures are amonig the fundamiiental,unexplained data. In the words of Harrod [13], The method of procedure is to take certain elements of the structure as given-namely the preference lists of individuals for goods and services, the terms on which they are willing to contribute their assistance to production and the current state of technologyy.. -
Scavi Nell'abitato Del Timpone Della Motta Di Francavilla Marittima (CS)
The Journal of Fasti Online (ISSN 1828-3179) ● Published by the Associazione Internazionale di Archeologia Classica ● Palazzo Altemps, Via Sant’Appolinare 8 – 00186 Roma ● Tel. / Fax: ++39.06.67.98.798 ● http://www.aiac.org; http://www.fastionline.org Scavi nell’abitato del Timpone della Motta di Francavilla Marittima (CS): risultati preliminari della campagna 2018 Paolo Brocato - Luciano Altomare – Chiara Capparelli – Margherita Perri con appendici di Benedetto Carroccio – Giuseppe Ferraro – Antonio Agostino Zappani This is a preliminary report of the excavation in the settlement of the Timpone della Motta of Francavilla Marittima (CS), carried out in 2018 by the Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici of the Università della Calabria. During the second year of exca- vation, research continued on plateau II; the discovery of structures in different points of the settlement and numerous finds confirm the articulated organization of the site. Le indagini stratigrafiche La seconda campagna di scavo nell’abitato del Timpone della Motta di Francavilla Marittima, condotta dal Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici dell’Università della Calabria, si è svolta nei mesi di settembre e ottobre 2018. Lo scavo ha visto la partecipazione di un totale di 25 unità, composte da archeologi con diploma di dotto- rato, specializzandi e studenti di archeologia dei corsi di laurea triennale e magistrale. Si presentano di seguito i dati e i risultati preliminari1. Come l’anno precedente, le indagini si sono concentrate sul cosiddetto “pianoro II”, un terrazzo prospi- ciente la valle dell’attuale fiume Carnevale, che gli scavi precedenti hanno appurato essere destinato all’insediamento2. Prima delle operazioni di scavo, sulla superficie del pianoro sono state realizzate ulteriori prospezioni geofisiche, estendendo quindi l’area sottoposta ad indagine rispetto all’anno precedente3. -
Reciprocity and Overoptimism in Public Goods Games
Biased Beliefs and Reciprocal Behavior in Social Dilemmas Von der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Technischen Hochschule Aachen zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften genehmigte Dissertation vorgelegt von Dipl.-Ing. Anselm Hüwe Berichter: Univ.-Prof. Dr. rer. pol. Wolfgang Breuer Univ.-Prof. Dr. rer. pol. Christine Harbring Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 21.04.2015 Diese Dissertation ist auf den Internetseiten der Hochschulbibliothek online verfügbar. Table of Contents 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 2 Economic Experiments ........................................................................................................... 3 3 Game Theory and (Common) Belief in Rationality ................................................................ 8 3.1 Boundedly Rational Behavior ........................................................................................ 11 3.2 Biased Beliefs ................................................................................................................. 14 4 Social Preferences ................................................................................................................. 15 4.1 When Social Preferences Should Be Assumed, and When Not ..................................... 16 4.2 Evolutionary Analysis ...................................................................................................