Robert Pace on the Battles for Spotsylvania Courthouse
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Gordon C. Rhea. The Battles for Spotsylvania Courthouse and the Road to Yellow Tavern, May 7-12, 1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997. xii + 483 pp. $34.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8071-2136-8. Reviewed by Robert F. Pace Published on H-CivWar (October, 1997) In this work, Gordon Rhea has set out with on the face of warfare and constituted a water‐ high expectations to provide the most comprehen‐ shed in the accommodation of military doctrine to sive account of six important days in Civil War technology" (p. 5). In the battle of the Wilderness, Virginia. He begins this account where he left off Lee's troops had learned the value of digging and in his critically acclaimed work The Battle of the building earthworks, but Grant's men had also Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864 (1994). This volume, learned how to attack them. however, is not simply a follow-up to the frst As Rhea assesses each side coming out of the book. It stands on its own and compares quite fa‐ battle of the Wilderness, he points out that Grant vorably to William D. Matter's If It Takes All Sum‐ recognized problems with his chain of command. mer: The Battle of Spotsylvania (1988), which re‐ Grant had tried to remain the grand strategist and newed interest in this important engagement be‐ allowed his feld commanders to make tactical de‐ tween the Army of the Potomac and the Army of cisions. But Grant also knew that President Abra‐ Northern Virginia. ham Lincoln had placed him with Maj. General Rhea approaches the battle within the analyt‐ George Meade to make the Army of the Potomac ical framework of the great clash of generalship more tenacious. The terrain of the Wilderness had between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. He as‐ exacerbated communications problems between serts that the battle of the Wilderness introduced the Union commanders, but after the battle of the the two generals to each other in the bloodiest of Wilderness, claims Rhea, Grant "must have har‐ fashions, but the battle of Spotsylvania proved to bored serious doubts about his feld commanders' be even more informative about how the two ability to execute his plans" (p. 10). Lee, on the men approached war and how war was to be other hand, faced a different problem. His com‐ fought from that point forward. "Lee's and Grant's mand structure was solid, but the Wilderness intricate and bloody dance from May 7 through campaign had simply gutted his numbers, seri‐ May 12," writes Rhea, "left a permanent imprint ously hampering his ability to wage any sort of of‐ H-Net Reviews fensive war. Such problems set the stage for both division west of Spotsylvania Courthouse at Lau‐ men as they entered the Spotsylvania campaign rel Hill. Union Maj. General James Wilson's caval‐ beginning on May 7th. ry division swept into Spotsylvania Courthouse Grant decided that moving south toward from the east and threatened Lee from the rear. Richmond would draw out the Confederates Rhea describes the surprise of Federal troops or‐ where they could be met on ground more favor‐ dered to charge Laurel Hill when they discovered able to the Federals. Rhea masterfully describes that Lee's cavalry was not alone. Anderson's corps the level of exhaustion and confusion among both had arrived to defend the hill and routed the Fed‐ Federal and Confederate commanders as each erals in their frst attack. The rebels had won a tried to divine the movements and intentions of footrace which they had clearly begun at the dis‐ the other. May 7th was a day of poor planning advantage. Rhea asserts that the blame for this and execution for the Federals and luck for the mistake must fall to all levels of the Union com‐ rebels. Rhea describes Grant's plan to evacuate mand. Neither Grant nor Meade had given proper the Wilderness as "workmanlike"--he sent cavalry attention to logistics. Rhea concludes: "Grant had south to clear the way to Spotsylvania Court‐ fumbled into the Wilderness. As he groped to‐ house, while the infantry was to withdraw in a ward Spotsylvania, there was no sign that he had complicated, coordinated manner designed to learned from his mistakes" (p. 59). Rhea, however, "keep a stern face to the enemy." Rhea concludes, also gives credit to Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee for however, that the plan "failed miserably in execu‐ their delaying action and to Anderson for his tion" (p. 44). Grant gave little thought to the ma‐ quick response to Fitzhugh Lee's summons for neuver's logistics, and the units moved slowly in help. The rest of the day was characterized by in‐ virtual traffic jams as they moved south. The cav‐ tense artillery duels, the arrival of a constant alry also failed to clear away Confederate Maj. stream of exhausted Federal reinforcements di‐ General J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry corps, which ob‐ rected by seemingly confused commanders, and structed the path to Spotsylvania Courthouse. the construction of increasingly formidable Rhea discounts postwar descriptions of Robert E. breastworks by the rebels. When the Federals did Lee's supposed clairvoyance in determining that finally attack that evening, the assault failed. Spotsylvania Courthouse was Grant's destination. As the Union and Confederate lines stretched From contemporary accounts, it becomes clear east and west on May 9, the rebel lines on the that Lee believed Fredericksburg to be the more right swung north to protect high ground and cre‐ likely Federal target. He did want to cover both ated an uneven curve for about a mile. The result‐ bases, but saw no need for haste. He ordered Maj. ing salient would later be dubbed the Mule Shoe, General Robert Anderson's First Corps to Spotsyl‐ and Lt. General Richard Ewell's Confederates felt vania Courthouse, but stated that they could delay uneasy about the position. May 9th brought an‐ the move until 3 o'clock the next morning. The other significant development. Union cavalry Maj. smoke and stench of the Wilderness battlefield, General Phil Sheridan began a sweeping move to‐ however, impelled Anderson to begin his march ward Richmond, and Stuart's rebel cavalry fol‐ five hours early, fortuitously placing him in a lowed. Sheridan was determined to lure Stuart footrace with Grant for Spotsylvania Courthouse into open ground and crush the Confederate cav‐ and positions for the next day's confrontation. alry, but, as Rhea points out, this action deprived By the morning of May 8, Union Maj. General the Federals of valuable reconnaissance and intel‐ Gouverneur K. Warren's V Corps encountered ligence about rebel movements. To make matters Confederate Maj. General Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry worse for the Federals, in the morning, Maj. Gen‐ eral John Sedgwick died after being shot by a 2 H-Net Reviews rebel sharp- shooter. Grant, believing that Lee point in the rebel line. But, as Rhea explains, was reconcentrating his troops to the east, de‐ Grant also left little time for preparation, and signed an aggressive assault plan against the Con‐ without the cavalry, thorough reconnaissance was federate left fank. Rhea argues that the plan impossible. In the failed assault, Union casualties failed because Lee was not moving to the east, equaled about 4,100 killed and wounded, making and Grant had not made the "vigorous nature" of May 10 the bloodiest day since leaving the Wilder‐ the assault plan clear to Meade, who "instead con‐ ness. Rhea asserts that Lee "fought a splendid de‐ ducted timid operations at odds with the spirit of fensive battle" and that he provided "a textbook Grant's aggressive plan" (p. 121). For Lee, the day example of a smaller army deflecting a larger had many concerns--most notably the safety of his one" (p. 187). The lone bright spot for the Union flanks. However, he met the assault on the left, was a brief break in rebel lines at the west end of and by nightfall he had secured them. the salient, executed by Col. Emory Upton's The morning of May 10th opened with Union brigade. Grant learned from this minor success Maj. General Winfield S. Hancock probing for and formed a new plan that entailed using a en‐ openings across the Po river on Lee's left. Lee, tire corps to assault the tip of the salient. however, had made preparations in the night for In the meantime, the cavalry faced off south such a maneuver by sending Maj. General Henry of Spotsylvania Courthouse on the way to Rich‐ Heth to fank Hancock. While Hancock's maneu‐ mond. Sheridan commanded three divisions, com‐ vers took place, Warren opened with artillery pared to Stuart's three brigades. Stuart decided to against the Confederate middle and followed with divide his force and send Fitzhugh Lee's brigade weak a assault. When Grant realized that Lee was toward Richmond, hoping for infantry support sending troops to meet Hancock, another opportu‐ from troops guarding the capital. Stuart set up his nity opened up. Believing the Confederate troops lines on May 11th with Fitzhugh Lee positioned at had to be coming from the salient and from Lau‐ a crossroads six miles north of Richmond near rel Hill, Grant decided to recall Hancock and have Yellow Tavern. At 9 A.M., he repulsed Sheridan's him attack Laurel Hill. He also realized, however, first assault. In the afternoon, however, Sheridan that Lee must not know of Hancock's movements, attacked with overwhelming success. The Confed‐ so he left one division along the Po. As the day erate line fell to the Union cavalry's superior wore on, Heth's division began enfilading the de‐ numbers.