Digitally Networked Feminist Activism in China

Digitally Networked kommunikation.medien Open-Access-Journal Feminist Activism in China für den wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchs ISSN 2227-7277 Nr. 12 | 2020 http://eplus.uni-salzburg.at/JKM The Case of Weibo DOI: 10.25598/JKM/2020-12.1

Wentao Lu

Abstract

Digital networks in China, especially the microblogging site Weibo, have provided a rare space for political participation. China has been strengthening its monopoly of public opinions on the internet in recent years. Consequently, increasing grassroots public opinion leaders have left popular digital networks. However, activists striving for women’s rights are still popular on Weibo. How do Chinese feminists use digital networks to serve their goal? What does the increasingly strict internet control mean to them? This paper takes the perspectives of individual feminist microbloggers on Weibo, using qualitative interview as the research method, to deepen the understanding of digitally networked feminist activism in an authoritarian context and feminists’ use of digital networks. It focuses on the following aspects: China’s digital feminists’ relationship with the digital networks that they use, their digital feminist identity and their experiences with the authoritarian system.

Keywords digital feminism, digital activism, Weibo, social media, microblogging, China

1. Introduction

After the student movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989, China’s National People’s Congress promulgated the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Assemblies, Processions and Demonstrations”, which made any kind of assemblies, processions and demonstrations unlaw- ful without permission from the authorities in advance (Hu 2011). Hu deems that this is not a

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law protecting the rights of assemblies, processions and demonstrations, but one that prohibits these activities and almost exterminates the protest culture (ibid.). Protest and activism in China are difficult and risky in such a political context. Such conditions also apply to feminist activism. In March 2015, for example, five feminist activists were detained due to their intent to circulate information against sexual harassment in public transportation (Tan 2017).

Under such circumstances, offline activism is not the ideal means for Chinese feminist activists. Digital networks function in an environment that is less hindered by either state censorship or other gatekeepers compared to the environment in which traditional media function (Chang et al. 2018). China’s leading microblogging site Weibo, for instance, has become a major digital platform for political participation and online protest (Sullivan 2014; Yang 2014). Users of Weibo are very diverse – from government departments to media organisations, from private companies to regular citizens (DeLisle et al. 2016). They represent various social seg- ments and have different agenda, but all of them are striving for the formation and populari- zation of their narratives, competing for attention and creating various levels of influence (ibid.).

Weibo has mobilised numerous online protests, social movements and political discussions in the last decade that are related to a wide spectrum of topics, including food safety (Hu & Yueh 2019), air pollution (Yang et al. 2019), corruption (Feng & Wu 2018) and migrant workers’ welfare (Kidd 2014). However, the Chinese authorities have imposed a strict control of public opinions on the internet, and the situation has worsened in recent years after the new leader- ship took office in 2012 (Yang 2014). In addition, the Chinese authorities have been incorporating state media and government entities on a variety of popular social media platforms for years, as the state wants to reclaim the power of public discourse in the digital age (Zhou 2013).

Similar to other types of activists, feminist activists take advantage of Weibo to serve their aims. There is a rich amount of literature concerning feminist groups (Han, X. 2018; Wang & Driscoll 2019) and digital collective actions (Han & Lee 2018; Lin & Yang 2019; Zhang & Kra- marae 2014) on the platform. However, few studies have focused on individual Chinese feminist activists and their endeavours and experiences. How do feminist activists use digital networks to realize their goals in an authoritarian state? In particular, as the Chinese government tightens its grip on public opinions on the internet, how does this affect Chinese digital feminists and what are their experiences with the Chinese authorities? This paper – a qualitative research with semi-structured interview as the method and the microblogging site Weibo as the case – explores Chinese feminist activists’ digital identity, and their relationship with digital platforms and with the Chinese authorities.

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2. Theoretical framework and literature review

One must not neglect the cultural context of the country when learning about digital feminist activism in China. This chapter starts with the traditional position of women and feminism in China. The cultural lens helps us to understand where this is all coming from – why do these feminists want to change? The subsequent two sections surround the core theoretical concept, i.e. digital activism. It particularly examines what digital technology means to feminism and feminist activism. The digital space is where digital activists take actions, therefore, a free and secure digital environment is crucial for digital activism. This leads to the last part of the chapter that focuses on China’s strict regulation of its cyberspace.

2.1 Women and feminism in China

Women in old China were trammelled by the principles known as “The Three Obediences” and the “The Four Virtues”, which were documented in various Confucian classics. “The Three Obe- diences” was first recorded in Yi-li (Etiquette and Ceremonial) and Li-ji (Book of Rites). They required every woman to be obedient to her father before marriage, to her husband after marriage and to her son after her husband’s death (Yang 2001). “The Four Virtus”, first documented in Zhou-li (Rites of Zhou), refers to propriety in “(sexual) morality, proper speech, modest manner and diligent work” that women need to obey (Gao 2003: 116; Yang 2001). Un- der such principles, women were taught to be “obedient, unassuming, yielding, timid, respect- ful, reticent and unselfish in character”, written by woman scholar Ban Zhao in her book Nü Jie (Precepts for Women) in the first century AD (Croll 1978: 13).

Buddhism and Taoism were two other prominent philosophical and ethical systems in pre- modern China that competed with Confucianism (Zhou 2006). They also had a misogynist nature and deeply influenced women’s status (ibid.). These two religions and Confucianism, together with other Chinese folk religions and beliefs, have constantly affected and shaped each other throughout Chinese history, and they contributed together to the misogynist tradition and culture in East Asia (ibid.).

The women’s emancipation movement started in China in roughly the late 19th century, during the reign of the last feudal Qing dynasty (Li 2005). After China embraced communism, promoting gender equality became one of the basic policies of the state. In communist China, “the integration of feminism with socialism” has required that the women’s movement arouses “an awareness of class interests and responds to all forms of oppression”, apart from improving women’s status (Croll 1978: 3). Critics point out that such a form of state-sponsored feminism

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overemphasises the class struggle while blurring the structural inequalities that women face in their daily life (Evans 2008; Hershatter & Rofel 1994).

During the period of the ten-year Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, China’s state propaganda depicted women as “sexless and androgynous” (Tan 2017: 174). After China embraced the global economy following the Opening and Reform policy, the image of women has since changed to be “economically successful, consumerism-friendly, feminine, and sexually attrac- tive” (Evans 2008; Zhang & Sun, cited in Tan 2017: 174). Moreover, the concept of gender dimorphism and traditional gender roles revived after its abatement during Mao’s era (Tan 2017).

2.2 Digital activism

Information and communication technologies “promote individual participation in collective action and protest diffusion” and prolong the communication between “physically dispersed communities and organizations” over long periods (Cernison 2019: 32). Melucci (1996) pro- posed that a strong collective identity is vital for successful collective actions. Bennett and Segerberg (2012) identify two logics of digitally networked action: collective action and connective action. The former is presented by the “modern social order of hierarchical institutions and membership groups” and emphasises the “organizational dilemma of getting individuals to overcome resistance to joining actions where personal participation costs may outweigh marginal gains” (ibid.: 748). Resource-rich organisations play a central role in mobilising collective actions, but organisations cannot expect individuals’ participation just because they share the same goal (ibid.). In comparison, people are more self-motivated to participate in cases of connective action, mainly for self-validation (ibid.). However, individuality and collec- tivity are not incompatible at all – they are concomitant. Farro and Lustiger-Thaler argue that (2014: 3), “The collective is becoming more and more of an individualized phenomenon in its projected sentiments, expressions, practices, techniques, memories, and most importantly the personal values upon which individuals base their commitments.”

“Personalized commitment” is crucial for the expressions of collective actions (Farro & Lustiger-Thaler 2014: 4). In the course of engagement, each unique individual shares the “experience of each separate actor, which is different from that of others, with whom this individual is co-participating in acts of mobilization and protest” (ibid.: 4). Individuals strengthen a “given public commitment” pertaining to their “own subjective experiences” via “inter-subjective relations” with others (ibid.). Therefore, individual activists including their personal experiences are important for the scholarship of digital feminist activism.

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Vegh (2003: 72) classifies three types of internet activism: “awareness/advocacy” (activists are able to raise the awareness of a certain topic if the public see a relevance to themselves), “or- ganization/mobilization” (activists use the internet for public organising or mobilising in offline activities); and “action/reaction” (represented by hackers that proactively and progres- sively use the internet to reach a certain goal). There has been increasing interplay between online and offline actions: social media’s rising relevance especially contributes to “situate online communication in other, previously existent practices” (Cernison 2019: 29).

Although digital networks provide new opportunities for activism, critics suggest that domi- nant values are still prioritized in the greater part of the web (Hill 2013) and digital networks often form “their own hierarchies and privilege certain voices” (Murthy 2018: 2). In addition, Morozov (2011: 190) warns that digital networks might make digital activists “feel useful and important while having preciously little political impact”, and he refers to this kind of content- ment as “slacktivism”. He argues that “slacktivism” is dangerous in the context of authoritarian states, because it might make young people believe that their cool, tech-savvy or angry virtual actions are feasible and preferable to the conventional oppositional movements that they re- gard as “ineffective, boring, risky, and, in most cases, outdated” (ibid.: 201). According to Mo- rozov, the internet provides a haven for young people to “escape the gruesome and boring political reality of authoritarianism”, which might “make the next generation of protesters less likely to become part of traditional oppositional politics” (ibid.: 201). In addition, digital platforms also raise concerns about privacy, polarization and the spread of false information (Mar- ichal 2012; Robertson 2018).

2.3 Feminism on the digital space

Is feminism dead? There have been voices about the relevance of feminism and feminist activism in the so-called “postfeminist” era in which the notion of “wave” is reckoned contentious and the feminism, subtle (Genz & Brabon 2009; Reger 2012); while some others argue that we are entering a “fourth wave” of feminism (Rivers 2017) that is closely associated with technology. The boundaries in the fourth wave of feminism are obscure due to “the ever-changing geographies of digital culture, communication, work, sexuality, and the commodification of femininity” (Parry et al. 2018: 6). Aside from the classification of waves in the history of feminism, there are many other dualistic or trinary distinctions in the feminist scholarship: “first- wave” vs. “second-wave”, “humanistic” vs. “gynocentric”, “egalitarian” vs. “evangelical” vs. “socialist”, and “liberal” vs. “Marxist” vs. “radical” feminisms (Offen 1988: 132).

However, Haraway (1991: 154-160) suggests that those previous approaches of feminism ap- pear partial and view things in “deepened dualism”, (such as mind/body, animal/machine, 5

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male/female). Communication technologies and biotechnologies are “recrafting our bodies”, affecting the “social relations of both sexuality and of reproduction” and breaching the boundaries of many forms of dimorphism, including human and machine, and men and women (Har- away 1991: 164-169). Digital networks offer women a new soil in which to address feminist topics, such as the female body and rape culture, and disseminate them to a wide public in a timely and economical manner. The female body has always been one central focus of feminist activism, which, in the digital era, has been accentuated by neoliberal discourse as not only “a site of empowerment via self-fashioning, personal improvement, and individual choice” but also as one “in need of constant surveillance, monitoring, and discipline” (Baer 2016: 23).

Optimism towards digital feminism is salient in related literature. Some scholars have seen digital networks as a central element for the arrival of the fourth-wave feminism (Guillard 2016; Munro 2013). Baer (2016) argues that digital networks provide a lot of potential for the widely propagating feminist concepts, forging new discourses about gender politics and creating new means of protest. By contrast, others question the effectiveness of digital feminism. Carstensen (2013), for instance, suggests that, despite the opportunities emerging for feminist politics, digital networks have turned into “male domains” where gender stereotypes and inequalities are amplified. Turley and Fisher (2018) demonstrate that the use of the internet is inadequate for the demarcation of a new surge of practice. Fotopoulou (2016: 37) is concerned that the construction of digital infrastructures within organisations leads to the consequence of “prioritizing processes of on-going change, training and innovation, at the expense of other, more sustained forms of engagement”. Jane (2016) focuses on the widespread presence of online misogyny on the digital terrain.

2.4 China’s growing internet control

Political expression in the cyberspace can be very risky in China because it challenges the state’s information monopoly (Han & Lee 2018). The Chinese government has been successful so far in weaving and guarding a “sophisticated authoritarian web through various means of censorship” (Boas, cited in Jiang 2010: para. 2). Public deliberation in the Chinese political context is classified as authoritarian deliberation by Jiang (2010). He recognizes four kinds of cyberspaces of authoritarian deliberation: “central propaganda spaces, government-regulated commercial spaces, emergent civic spaces, and international deliberative spaces” (ibid.: para. 23). According to this categorization, Weibo is a government-regulated commercial space.

The Chinese government is insistent on “asserting its authority over a massive network of users and public discourses within its jurisdiction”, which is actualized by “extensive means of sur-

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veillance and manipulation”, including “configuration of internet gateway infrastructure, fil- tering, internet policing, regulation of internet service providers, suppression of dissident use and discipline of cyber cafes” and the employment of “web commentators” to shape and guide public opinions (Jiang 2010: para. 22; King et al. 2017). State-sponsored commentators, dis- guised as ordinary users, are utilised to lead public opinions and attack and denigrate popular opinion leaders who hold critical views of the state (Han, R. 2018). Popular opinion leaders who comment on politics and current affairs are referred to in China as gongzhi, (literally, public intellectuals) (Han, R. 2018). After years of state-led campaigns against gongzhi on cyberspace by repeatedly depicting these people as harmful to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the state, the term gongzhi became largely stigmatized in late 2011 and has since become a swear word (Han, R. 2018).

The Chinese government can track the identity of users behind the screen because everyone is required to register with their real-life identity if they want to use any social network, and this affects the users’ online behavior directly (Sun & Fichman 2018). Under such circumstances, Chinese cyber activists and dissidents adopt “creative strategies” to allure public attention to their campaigns and “prolong the survival of their voices” on the cyberspace (Han & Lee 2018: 16). They use “innovative cyber language and narrative genres” or “hidden transcripts”, for example, to avoid state censorship instead of defying state power directly (Han, R. 2018: para. 8).

Existing literature on digitally networked activism in China focuses on how Chinese citizens use social media for political participation and protest. It seems to suggest that Chinese internet users use digital infrastructures to effectively counter official discourse and power. This might have been true some years ago when the state was less involved with the internet. How- ever, in the last ten years, the CCP has been incorporating state media and government entities on popular social media platforms as the government intends to reclaim the dominance of public discourse in digital space (Zhou 2013). The monopoly of the public opinion and information source is of great significance to the CCP, which, if lost, could challenge the legitimacy of the party’s rule and state security. One of the most active government entities on social media is the Communist Youth League of China (CYLC), which is present on various popular web- sites, such as Weibo, WeChat, Bilibili, Zhihu and Tik Tok. The CYLC is different from other more conservative government entities online because it uses humorous and witty language, such as internet slang terms. It also follows a variety of topics that young people are interested in, such as celebrities (Wang 2016). Using these strategies, the CYLC attempts to construct an image that is close to young people’s identities in order to effectively indoctrinate the thoughts of the CCP in the youth (Wang 2016).

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3. Method and data

Seven semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with seven feminist activists who are active on Weibo. These interviews were conducted between 16 August and 17 September 2019. The interviewing medium was primarily audio calling (telephone interview) via different applications, including WeChat, FaceTime and WhatsApp, based on the availability and preference of each interviewee. One interviewee rejected using either audio call or video call, therefore, texting on WeChat was used according to her preference. Video calling was not employed because most interviewees declined showing their faces due to different concerns, such as privacy and anonymity. Some studies show that there is no apparent difference between the responses received from telephone interviews and face-to-face interviews (Sturges & Hanrahan 2004). These interviews lasted between 47 to 107 minutes. The language used was Chinese, and the researcher translated the interview transcripts himself.

Due to the lack of information and difficulty in identifying feminist activists on Weibo, the sampling for this work is largely based on availability. In the beginning, the researcher read through the main Weibo pages of some prominent feminist activists that he already knew. Dur- ing the process of reading through the Weibo pages, Weibo recommended similar microbloggers. Weibo has a Social Interest Graph Recommendation Engine that allows users to find relevant accounts based on a database of the users’ social interest graphs resulting from the activities which have taken place on the platform, such as “post, repost, comment, like, follow, social relationships, and demographic data such as age, gender and geography” (Weibo Cor- poration 2019: 55). In the end, after all the measures of finding potential interviewees, the researcher identified 28 feminist microbloggers on Weibo and sent them messages through the direct messaging function on the site or email if present on their profile. He received positive responses from seven of them. The respondents all have at least 10,000 followers on the platform. The interviewees are addressed by pseudonyms in this work out of privacy concerns and they are: Anan, Bei, Chen, Hui, Jian, Lili and Yun.

Interview questions include aspects regarding their general usage pattern of Weibo (e.g. frequency of use, interaction with others, creating trending topics and online traffic they create), their experiences of becoming feminist activists on Weibo (e.g. their motivations, aims and offline activities), the main issues and topics they focus on (e.g. what they do to participate in these issues and topics, controversial topics in their opinion), their experiences of using Weibo (e.g. their attitudes toward it, Weibo’s pros and cons, the relationship between Weibo and feminist microbloggers and other platforms) and their experiences with the Chinese authorities (e.g. the sensitivity of online activism, their personal experiences, self-protection and self-censorship). 8

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The author developed a three-stage approach for the analysis. In the first stage, he read through the interview transcripts, highlighted relevant content, left short preliminary comments, and defined and refined descriptive codes. In the second stage, he clustered the descriptive codes identified and interpreted the meaning of the clusters regarding the research questions and the theoretical framework. The author then applied the interpretive codes to the whole data set. In the last stage, the author identified some overarching themes that charac- terized key concepts in the analysis, which include the following categories: the relationship with Weibo, types of feminist activism and experiences with the authorities.

4. Findings

This chapter presents the findings regarding the research questions. First of all, it demon- strates the conflicted relationship between digital feminists and Weibo. It then explores the digital identity of these feminists, especially the divide and confrontation exhibited between them. Finally, it sheds light on their individual experiences with the authoritarian political system and tries to explain the rationale behind the oppression of digital feminist activism.

4.1 A love-hate relationship with Weibo

Most interviewees use Weibo frequently, and some even describe themselves as “full-time” microbloggers. Their experiences with and attitudes towards Weibo are quite varied. The favour- able features of Weibo they have experienced can be concluded as its openness, interactivity, as a channel for political participation and inclusiveness of the feminist discourse.

“The only platform where feminists have conquered a field”

The first three features have been well-documented in existing literature, such as Kuang (2014) and Sullivan (2014). The last feature is, however, rarely seen. These feminist activists attribute this honour to Weibo because the feminist discourse is generally largely visible and even popular on the site. This is unlike many other social networking sites in China, such as Hupu, Zhihu and Tianya, that are deemed misogynist and phallogocentric by these interviewees. Based on their experiences, feminism is unpopular on the latter platforms and is seen as a rebellious concept. Feminists are ridiculed, derogated and bullied. According to interviewee Chen,

Weibo is the only platform where feminists have conquered a field. This field wasn’t there naturally – we fought for it. The public opinions about women on Weibo are obviously different from those on other platforms. Users on Weibo generally have a stronger feminist awareness, and some stereotypes or discrimination against women are clearly politically incorrect on the site, such as the term “female drivers” (a stereotype that women have bad driving skills) and slut shaming. 9

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Interviewee Anan shared her experience of using Zhihu, a question and answer service site,

Zhihu is a super misogynistic platform. It is misogynist to the extent that it has banned the word clitoris on its site. But male genital parts, such as penis or foreskin, are not banned there [...] Therefore, it is not simply a problem that users are misogynistic, those platforms are also misogynistic.

“Not a place for activism as it used to be”

In spite of these positive comments about Weibo, Interviewee Jian’s experience with the site is rather negative, and now she uses the platform much less frequently than before. To her, Weibo is not a friendly place for activism as it used to be. The other interviewees agree with this. Ac- cording to them, a lot of previously popular feminist activists have left the platform. The inef- fectiveness of digital activism on the platform and the CCP’s intensified opinion control on the internet are two main reasons. They feel like that they are free digital labourers because they create internet traffic for Weibo but receive little back in terms of effect.

Most interviewees agree that feminists can bring a lot of traffic to Weibo, i.e. feminist topics can easily trigger online discussions and sometimes conflicts. However, some interviewees are not so keen on generating online traffic and even criticise this behavior. They argue that the pursuit of online traffic does not simply stem from the wish to spread feminist ideology, but it is often intertwined with commercial interests as well.

One thing that these feminist activists share in common is their experience of censorship by Weibo. This has occurred in various ways: deletion of a post, limiting viewability of a post to only its author, temporary suspension of an account, permanent blocking of an account and manually censoring each post before it can be posted, among others.

This shows Weibo’s dilemma. On the one hand, it needs a large number of users, especially opinion leaders, to increase participation and sustain profitability. On the other hand, it has to conduct thorough and painstaking censorship activities on politically sensitive content (Sulli- van 2014). Applying Jiang’s (2010) typology, Weibo is a commercial social network functioning in an authoritarian context. Thus, Weibo has no choice but to implement censorship, although it is very aware of the reality that such a strict censoring mechanism demotivates its users (Benney & Xu 2018). That is probably why, according to interviewee Lili, Weibo is shifting itself from the former environment that was more tolerant of online activism to an entertainment-oriented platform, because entertainment news and celebrity gossip is less politically sensitive and still able to attract online participation.

However, Weibo is capricious in terms of its decisions on exercising censorship, argues interviewee Yun. No clear logic or pattern to Weibo’s censorship seems to exist. What determines

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whether a post gets censored or not is very much uncertain. However, one thing is acknowl- edged by many interviewees: the intensity of online censorship is generally dependent on the overall political environment in China. In other words, when there is domestic turmoil, big political scandals, or tensions between China and other states, Weibo usually intensifies its censorship. Many of the interviewees mentioned, for instance, that they had experienced censorship more frequently during the 2019 protest in Hong Kong from the city’s anti-extradition law amendment bill movement (BBC 2019).

4.2 A collective digital feminist identity?

All interviewees share a common interest in advocating against sexual harassment, misconduct against women and gender discrimination in everyday life. However, they differ substantially in not only their feminist thinking but also in the way in which they participate digitally and the goals they aim to achieve with it. Based on the analysis of the interviews, the author has tried to identify two general categories of feminist activism on Weibo, namely, the awareness- raising type and the mobilising type. The distinction between these two types is also recognized by some interviewees.

“We talk about values”

The first group of bloggers devote themselves to the enhancement of the public’s (especially women’s) feminist awareness by discussing feminist topics and propagating feminist concepts. They emphasise the importance of raising awareness because they think a large proportion of Chinese women still have not awakened from China’s traditional misogynistic culture. Hence, the primary goal for them is to awaken Chinese women with their feminist knowledge. Inter- viewee Lili is one of them, and she explained:

We talk about our values. We do not act as conventional activists who adopt a bottom-up strategy and confront the authorities by organising and mobilising the public for specific demands. On the one hand, this is not what the state is happy to see because it does not want distracting voices to interrupt its policy-making. On the other hand, feminist activism is not like other forms of activism that need confrontation with the government, but it is more about changing people’s minds. When more and more women accept the feminist ideology, our demands will be naturally achieved.

However, this type of feminist activist has received criticism for a number of reasons. Firstly, they are criticised for focusing on topics that are not closely related to most women’s everyday life, such as the legality of surrogacy and sex work. Therefore, they are regarded as belligerent but not effective. Some commented that, although these feminists can create trending posts

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and make the public aware of gender inequality and women’s suffering, this does not help with the problems that women experience in everyday life.

Secondly, they are criticised for focusing too much on online traffic. It is regarded that they overemphasise and take advantage of women’s suffering to gain more likes, views and followers that can be transformed into commercial interests. Interviewee Jian shared a story:

I did an interview for a #MeToo exhibition with a friend of mine who is a rape victim. One feminist microblogger, who has over 100,000 followers, went to the exhibition. But she just posted a video of herself seeing the exhibition and repeating what was talked about in the interview. She didn’t mention the information about the exhibition (she didn’t care about telling her followers to visit the exhibition) and didn’t seem to have the intention of seeking justice for the victim. The only thing she probably wanted to express was how empathetic she was. Her behaviour was taking advantage of the victim’s painful experience just for her online traffic.

Thirdly, these feminist activists are accused of being class-biased. Some interviewees criticised that many of these bloggers, who are young, middle-class and educated urban women, do not have enough life experience and are not aware of the living status of economically and socially vulnerable women. The concepts they advocate, such as anti-marriage and anti-reproduction, are regarded as impractical, unrealistic and radical. Interviewee Hui argued that marriage for some women from impoverished rural areas can be a chance to improve their living conditions, though she agreed that the current marriage system is indeed more advantageous to men.

Notably, these feminists with a more radical discourse seem very popular and enjoy high visi- bility on Weibo. They tend to believe that their discourse is mainstream and widely accepted on Weibo. That being said, other activists warn that this is not the mainstream feminist thinking in China and probably not even on Weibo. Interviewee Chen explained that because the radical discourse is eye-catching, it can attract a lot of attention and stir up discussions, which then leaves people with an impression that it is the mainstream opinion.

“We don’t talk about concepts, we demand”

Contrary to the first type, activists of the second type concentrate more on specific cases related to women and providing help. They use digital platforms for policy changes for women’s welfare, and to organise and call for participation in offline events. The offline activities they have organised include exhibitions about the #MeToo Movement in China, organising speeches by famous feminists and street protests against sexual misconduct. To them, solving women’s problems in everyday life is truly helping, while promulgating feminist concepts is not really effective and might even push people away from feminism. As interviewee Jian described:

I feel like we are like patches – we follow actual problems and try to solve them […] I don’t want to spend a lot of energy arguing with people on topics that do not relate much to people’s lives,

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such as whether surrogacy or sex work should be legal. I would care if I saw a surrogate mother who has problems with her rights. But if it’s only about the discussions of this topic, I am not interested.

She believes that although concepts are important, and feminists need to learn them, Weibo is not a platform for discussing concepts but more for civic engagement and social movements. Likewise, interviewee Chen shared similar opinions:

Feminism is constituted of each demand, such as equal parental leave [...] I do not believe in ideologies. Everyone has different ideas about ideologies, but we only look at specific demands.

They focus on each specific case and aim for gradual improvement in the legal, social and eco- nomic systems of China. Interviewee Jian, for instance, said that she and her friends have suc- cessfully facilitated changes in a number of cases that led to improving women’s rights by doing both online and offline activism. Her efforts include legislation of law against domestic violence and the increase in women’s lavatories in some institutions.

Some feminists cyber-bully other feminists

Apart from the differences mentioned earlier, another phenomenon showing their disaccord is the cyber-bullying activities particularly by radical feminists. As has been mentioned, feminist microbloggers of the first group tend to be absolutely against surrogacy, sex work, (heterosexual) marriage and reproduction (in a heterosexual marriage). People who support these things or do not openly oppose them might even face cyber-bullying. Interviewee Jian, for example, mentioned that no one dares to debate surrogacy on Weibo nowadays, because “if you do not show your stance against surrogacy, they (feminists who advocate against surrogacy) cyber- bully you”. Interviewee Chen shared another experience:

A while ago, there were discussions on Weibo about parental leave and marriage. The debaters formed two teams, and some women insulted others in very awful ways, such as the term hun lü (“married donkey”, a derogatory term for women married to men; the Chinese word for donkey and woman share a similar pronunciation) and mu chang (“mother-whore”, a derogatory term for mothers in a heterosexual family).

Comparatively, feminist activists of the second group tend to be more tolerant of women’s choices in these topics. To them, the existing system is undoubtedly unequal for women, but they are not aiming at dismantling it but rather fixing problems in women’s everyday lives by means of political demands, as has been discussed previously.

The categorization of these two types of feminist activists might seem rather simplistic, yet, it shows the somewhat conflictual relationship between feminist activists on Weibo and high- lights the problem of cyber-bullying by some radical feminists against those with different

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opinions. However, fragmentation, boundaries and contestation are part of the forming process of collective identity (Melucci 1995; Taylor & Whittier 1992). Therefore, it might be too risky to say that these feminist activists do not share a collective identity. However, the discussion indeed manifests some feminist activists’ lack of communication and negotiation with others.

4.3 Experiences with the authoritarian system

Weibo’s censorship mostly stays on the digital space, but some interviewees have made contact with the Chinese authorities offline, which includes but is not limited to: the interruption or cancellation of offline activities, receiving unexpected calls and visits from the authorities, and physical violence from the state’s public security authority. Feminist activists who have experienced such treatment from the authorities are usually those who organise offline activities and mobilise the public.

Individual experiences with the authorities

According to interviewee Chen, she and her friends usually create a digital leaflet for the activ- ity they organise and post it on social media to call for people’s participation. But recently, one of their reading meetings was cancelled because they were warned that it was risky. This warning was indirectly delivered by the authorities through a friend of the activist. When asked why reading meetings are sensitive, she replied, “because the words ‘equal rights’ appeared in the name of the meeting we organised. It crossed the line”. When asked which authority it was exactly, she said that it was not a local provincial authority but of a higher position.

Online feminist activists who make posts criticising specific government divisions, officials and CCP members can also get suppressed by the authorities. Interviewee Yun, for instance, once made a post on behalf of the victim publicly accusing a well-known public university’s dean of sexual harassment. This caught the attention of China’s Ministry of Education, who found their way to the university where she worked, and she was warned by her leaders that she needed to stop talking about this case.

Interviewee Jian, who has been doing feminist activism both online and offline for a long time, has experienced the most oppression by the authorities among all interviewees. She used to do various offline activities promoting gender equality and calling for policy changes related to women’s welfare. She caused a lot of public attention and was closely watched by a public security authority local to the city where she was living. The interviewee said:

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They talked to me in both a soft and aggressive way. But they have always been threatening me, not only mentally, but also materially – my life, family, job and income. Threatening is their common strategy. They came to my flat many times, and sometimes they would just talk to me and other times they would implement physical violence.

Therefore, once feminist activists on Weibo use the platform to organise and mobilise offline activities or online campaigns against public institutions or officials, they are subject to a higher probability and frequency of direct contact from the authorities. In addition, the Chi- nese public security authority might force activists to cease their activism by coercion and intimidation if a notice or warning does not work.

The rationale behind the suppression of digital feminist activism

Based on the interviewees, there are various perspectives that explain the censorship and suppression targeting feminist activism. First of all, most interviewees believe that feminism itself is not sensitive, as gender equality is a fundamental policy of China and it conforms to socialist values. It only becomes sensitive when political demands are involved, such as changes to certain policies. Many interviewees believe that digitally networked activism in China has become increasingly difficult in recent years. According to Jian, in the very beginning, Weibo was a platform more tolerant of political discussions and participation. At that time, the platform was applauded for its openness and its tolerance of activism. Now, however, she said that many prominent opinion leaders on Weibo have been removed from the platform and some even arrested. She explained why the Chinese authorities are cracking down on feminist activists:

Other types of activists were all arrested or silenced, such as (human rights) lawyers, liberals and online public intellectuals. The existing ones are mostly activists for women’s rights and LGBT rights. The public security authorities have a big budget from the government. Now, after all the other types of opinion leaders have been removed, they have nowhere to spend the budget, so they switch their attention to women’s rights and LGBT rights activists.

Apart from the overall clampdown on digital activism, interviewee Yun offered a second explanation regarding the sensitivity of feminist activism that is related to China’s #MeToo Move- ment. According to her, many of the men accused of sexual misconduct are professors and scholars of public universities, journalists of state-owned media and leaders of state-owned organisations.1 As a communist state, many of China’s institutions and organisations are state- owned and the important personnel are members of the CCP (Zheng 2009). When the power- ful men working in these state-owned institutions and organisations commit sexual crimes or

1 This is a claim from the interviewee, and can be supported by the page: https://metoochina.me/. It is a website collecting the information of men in China who were publicly reported to be committing sexual misconduct. 15

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face sexual allegations, the top concern of the CCP is not justice for the victims. They are concerned that if their image is damaged, then their ruling legitimacy might be questioned. There- fore, to avoid such potential risks, the party’s security department censors the information of those accusations. In 2018, for instance, Zhu Jun, a well-known TV presenter of China Central Television, was accused of sexual misconduct by a former intern for one of Zhu’s shows (Ma 2018). Similar to other famous state media personalities who are CCP officials, Zhu is not just a TV presenter but also a member of the 11th and 12th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a political legislative body of the state (CCTV 2017). After the woman reported the case to the police, the latter advised her to withdraw the accusation because Zhu had “too much ‘positive influence’ on society” (Ma 2018: para. 1). Besides, although the woman sued Zhu, the court has suspended the trial and not given any explanation to the plaintiff so far (Xianzi 2019).

The third explanation is concerned with some feminist activists’ agenda of the rejection of marriage (to men) and reproduction (in heterosexual marriage), according to some interviewees. The agenda is contradictory to official discourse. China abrogated the one-child policy and in- troduced the two-child policy in 2016, hoping to raise the fertility rate (Myers et al. 2019). But the result has not yet met the expectation of policymakers (ibid.). Therefore, this agenda adds more sensitivity to feminist activism on China’s cyberspace.

Due to the prevalence of censorship on Weibo, feminist activists apply censorship to themselves in order to avoid scrutiny by the platform or incur attention from cyber security authorities. Self-censorship is largely common among the feminist activists interviewed. They particularly reduce the discussion of topics related to human rights and politics, especially during sensitive periods of time when the political environment in China is tense. Some of them try to build a friendly relationship with the authorities, for example, by praising the government for the efforts and improvements it has made for women’s rights.

5. Conclusion

With qualitative interview as the method, this paper explores how Chinese feminist activists utilise digital infrastructure to actively participate in the feminist agenda. Just as approaches to feminism are diverse, feminist activists on Weibo also vary in their feminist thinking and in the way they use digital networks. In particular, Weibo exhibits a contested dominion where feminist discourses compete and activism exists in plurality.

Two major contrasting types of feminist activism on Weibo can be discerned from this research: the awareness-raising type and the mobilising type. The first type comprises feminists

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who use Weibo primarily as a platform to enhance the awareness of gender equality and advocate their feminist beliefs, hoping for gradual ideological changes in the public especially among women. In comparison, the latter type is devoted to helping women facing difficulties in their life and mobilising the public for offline activities. In addition, it is found that some radical feminists on Weibo cyber-bully those with different opinions on topics, such as women’s bodies and their relationship with men.

Feminist activists on Weibo are struggling with China’s increasingly unfriendly digital environment for political participation and protest. Their experiences with digital networks, Weibo in this case, demonstrate their love–hate relationship with new communication technologies. On the one hand, they appreciate the openness, the opportunities for political participation, the space for protests and the inclusiveness of the feminist discourse that Weibo offers. Ac- cording to the feminists interviewed who actively use Weibo, it is the most open social media platform in China, and its interactive features makes it stand out. In particular, the most pre- cious thing is that the feminist discourse is accepted and even popular on Weibo – and only on Weibo. On the other hand, they have experienced very frequent censorship on the platform. Functioning as a commercial website in an authoritarian context, Weibo has to implement China’s strict internet regulations, despite the fact that it has already demotivated a lot of activists and opinion leaders.

Challenges for feminist activists are not only limited to the cyberspace. They have also trans- gressed to offline life, especially for those who organise offline activities and demand policy changes. Individual experiences with the Chinese authorities vary greatly – some reported receiving unexpected calls or visits and some have experienced threats and intimidation. But to many of them, the worst part is not these challenges mentioned, but that feminist activism in China’s cyberspace has gradually lost its effectiveness and that they have endeavoured in vain.

There are limitations regarding this paper. It has been previously pointed out that the categorization of the two types of digital feminist activism on Weibo might be oversimplifying and generalizing the complexity of feminist activism on the platform, especially considering the limited number of participants. But this paper does not aim at generalization but offers perspectives of individual feminist activists’ experiences on contemporary China’s digital space. In addition, the author raises a question whether these feminist activists share a collective digital identity on Weibo. However, fragmentation and contestation are common in the process of fostering a collective identity. Does cyber-bullying or cyberhate make a collective identity impossible? This question is left unanswered. It is suggested that researchers further explore this topic in the future.

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Short biography of the author

Wentao Lu, is a graduate from the joint master’s programme “Erasmus Mundus Journalism, Media and Globalisation” at Aarhus University and Ham- burg University. Before his academic journey in media and journalism, he studied English for his BA at Macao Polytechnic Institute and Beijing Language and Culture University. His research interests surround digital communications and democratization. Contact: [email protected]