Report 1978 Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
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COLDLABORATORY SPRING HARBOR ANNUAL REPORT 1978 COLD SPRING HARBOR LABORATORY COLD SPRING HARBOR, NEW YORK Cover: Participants at 1978 Symposium (top to bottom) G. Selzer, F. Stahl, and J. Strathern; A. Kornberg, A. Falaschi, and R. Holliday; W. Arber and D. Nathans; W. Udry, A. Bukhari, and D. Baltimore Picture credits: Cover, 82, 90, 140, Ross Meurer; 14, Cindy Carpenter; 19, W. Udry; 11, 12,13, 17, 20, 67, 136, 142, 143, 153, Robert Yaffe COLD SPRING HARBOR LABORATORY COLD SPRING HARBOR, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK OFFICERS OF THE CORPORATION Dr. Harry Eagle, Chairman Edward Pulling, Vice-Chairman Dr. Bayard Clarkson, Secretary Clarence E. Galston, Treasurer Robert L. Cummings, Assistant Treasurer William R. Udry, Administrative Director BOARD OF TRUSTEES Institutional Trustees Albert Einstein College of Medicine University of Wisconsin Dr. Harry Julian Davies Columbia University Wawepex Society Dr. Charles R. Cantor Bache Bleecker Duke University Dr. Walter Guild Individual Trustees Long Island Biological Association Emilio G. Collado Edward Pulling Robert L. Cummings Massachusetts Institute of Technology Roderick H. Cushman Dr. Herman Eisen Norris Darrell Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center Walter N. Frank, Jr. Dr. Bayard Clarkson Clarence E. Galston Mary Lindsay New York University Medical Center William S. Robertson Dr. Vittorio Defendi Mrs. Franz Schneider Princeton University Alexander C. Tomlinson Dr. Arnold J. Levine Dr. James D. Watson The Rockefeller University Dr. Rollin Hotchkiss Honorary trustees State University of New York Dr. H. Bentley Glass at Stony Brook Dr. Alexander Hollaender Dr. Joseph R. Kates Officers and trustees listed are as of December 31, 1978 DIRECTOR'S REPORT The collective decisions of knowledgeable men go sourone likes to advertise that we may have no meaningful more often than we want. We should not be surprised,guide for what tomorrow will bring. Psychologically this however, that blue ribbon solutions like those proposedis hard to accept, and our sanity almost demands plac- several years ago for recombinant DNA research fre-ing more faith in experts than the facts warrant. So when quently go astray. High-level committees are generallywe bring authorities together, we have already half called into action only when a problem arises that has committed ourselves to following their advice. We no simple response, or maybe no answer at all. know that if we don't, we may have to make the deci- This was the case when in 1973 Herbert Boyer andsion ourselves and shoulder the criticism if the wrong Stanley Cohen came upon a method for rearrangingmoves are made. DNA molecules in the test tube to create hybrid Of course, if our experts recommend action that looks molecules ("recombinant DNA"), which might be de- as though it will block what we want to do tomorrow, rived, say, partly from mouse DNA and partly from we may need much persuasion before we even consider bacterial DNA. Their ability to put these recombinedgoing along. Most smokers, for example, are unlikely to molecules functionally back into cells had possiblystop puffing in public no matter who advises the action. opened the way to the creation of novel life forms thatOn the other hand, most Americans would accept a ban might alter the course of evolution. Moreover, the pro-on supersonic airliners since we would not notice their cedures for making recombinant DNA were simple and disappearance. Only those who directly want to use the cheap and if uncontrolled were likely to be universallyConcorde would cry "murder" and employ our legal taken up and exploited throughout the world within asystem to the full to try and block what they would year or two at most. So it was natural that concern regard as capricious nonsense. They know that once a should develop as to whether we should just plungerecommendation has been codified into administrative ahead and hope for the best or whether we should try torules, the subsequent backpedaling needed to nullify block the momentum of recombinant DNA researchthem may be very hard to bring off. until we could be sure that we were not doing ourselves We should thus be very careful not to push for regula- in. tions which we cannot logically defend. We do not But whom to turn to was not at all obvious, sinceknow, for example, whether we are entering a warming recombinant DNA research was so open-ended that noor cooling period for the earth. So it would be a bad one person was clearly qualified to point the way. Thismistake to say we should cut down on the burning of oil, unsettling fact should have warned us that there mightgas, and coal because if too much CO, is released, the be no logical response to the existence of recombinantatmospheric temperature will rise to unacceptable DNA and that we had no recourse but to move ahead.levels (the so-called greenhouse effect). In fact, we may Our civilization had reached its present highly ad-want warmer weather to reduce our winter fuel needs. vanced state only by facing the unknown, always hop-The point here is that if too many variables exist, predic- ing that we could generate enough ingenuity to get ustion becomes impossible and we should back away out of any jams that might arise. from decisions that give the impression that we know Instead, the National Academy of Science made what more than we do. then looked like a prudent response. It put together a In particular we mustn't overreact by assuming the high-level committee of scientists who worked withworst possible outcome and settling into a siege re- DNA with the hope that they would do more than throw sponse that prevents the possibility of progress if in fact dice-that somehow their past experiences would nothing catastrophic happens. For example, we would equip them for a logical response. The truth in such destroy any chances of maintaining our national pros- situations, however, is often just the opposite. But noperity if all our governmental actions were predicated 5 upon the belief that the Russians were about to engagework with disease-causing agents that the micro- us in a nuclear war. And almost equal senseless panicbiologists have been carrying out for decades without would result if, say, six months of almost no rain led ussignificant harm to themselves, much less to the public to half-starve ourselves because of the fear that we wereat large. about to enter a decade of no rain. For example, experiments with tumor virus genes Likewise, we shall only harm ourselves by assuming inserted into E. coli instinctively appear safer than work- that the newly developed recombinant DNA technol- ing with the viruses themselves. Yet there are no firm ogy poses a credible threat to our civilization. The good regulations governing tumor virus research-the pre- that can come out of its use is immense-it can revolu- cautions to be taken being left to the individual inves- tionize our understanding of human chromosomes, givetigator to decide. This seeming indifference to public us a practical way to make vaccines against difficult-health is not that at all. Without knowing the level of to-grow viruses like hepatitis, and yield unlimited risk, if any, it is impossible to know what precautions, if amounts of now scarce drugs like the antiviral agentany, are necessary. Any rigid rules governing tumor interferon. Nonetheless, there is opposition to its usevirus research are bound to appear capricious to many, based on the conjecture that our blessings might indeed and the only practical recommendation is a prudent be mixed and that recombinant DNA procedures might respect for commonly accepted microbiological safety also generate new disease agents or modify preexistingprocedures. organisms so as to badly upset the earth's ecology. Why then did we react so much more cautiously to. Not even hints exist, however, that any of these dour recombinant DNA? A major reason was that the re- events would be plausible outcomes of totally unre-combinant DNA procedures were not yet a necessary strained DNA research. Infectious-disease experts tell ingredient for our day-to-day research. Until they be- us that pathogenicity is not easy to generate, and the came so, we did not see the need to appear possibly illegitimate interspecies DNA transfers mediated in na-indifferent to the public good by unilaterally ignoring ture by viruses have probably already tested the ecolog- those who said that science was now out of control. ical consequence of any DNA transfer that we can now Moreover, Watergate was still with us and the national do in the laboratory. We should thus not get into a tizzy mood was very much to come clean with what one was because we can't now, or even in the far distant future,up to. So we saw no harm and possibly some consid- have a way to disprove implausible hypotheses abouterably credit in so attracting public attention.It was how we may meet our doom. Instead we should pushthought best to overestimate rather than underestimate recombinant DNA research and development as fast asour concerns. Later, when more experiments had been our resources permit, while keeping alert to the highlydone and no one had taken ill because of recombinant improbable event that one or more lab workers will DNA, we could seriously downgrade, if not forget, the come down with a disease that we have not seen before. whole matter. Then no one could accuse us of keeping Unfortunately, we are not now acting with such bold back even our most paranoid ideas. intelligence. We are badly held back by a morass of Unfortunately, none of us seriously questioned bureaucratic regulations that are seen by most of thewhether we might be alerting the public unnecessarily scientists they affect as having no intellectual validity.and by doing so give recombinant DNA doomsday Alas, I was one of those who helped bring about thesescenarios a credibility they didn't deserve.