QUESTIONS for DISCUSSION (WEEK 6) Ngo Dinh Diem [Young

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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION (WEEK 6) Ngo Dinh Diem [Young, et al., The Vietnam War, 48-50]: Why did Ngo Dinh Diem seem appealing to American policymakers? How did Dwight Eisenhower, in his September 1954 letter to Diem, refer to the Viet Minh and their international allies? What was the purpose of Eisenhower’s offer of support to Diem? What did it entail? How did this conflict with the final declaration of the Geneva conference? Saigon Military Mission [Young, et al., The Vietnam War, 50-53]: What was the Saigon Military Mission? Who was its leader? In what other capacity has this leader’s name arisen in this class? What actions did the Saigon Military Mission undertake to achieve its objectives? Truong Nhu Tang’s Memoirs [Young, et al., The Vietnam War, 53-56]: In what ways does Tang say Ho Chi Minh was different from Ngo Dinh Diem? How were these differences reflected in the lives of people in southern Vietnam? National Liberation Front [Young, et al., The Vietnam War, 56-58]: Why did the National Liberation Front emerge in 1960? What were its stated political goals for southern Vietnam? What were its economic goals? What were its cultural goals? How might this have been a response to the American presence in the south? What did the NLF founding program say about the coalition’s foreign policy objectives? What did this mean in the context of the Cold War? What was the NLF’s “dearest desire”? How did this conflict with American objectives in Vietnam? John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address [Young, et al., The Vietnam War, 58-60]: How did Kennedy’s commitment to the “survival and the success of liberty” mesh with U.S. policy in Vietnam? Why did the president pledge America’s “best efforts” in aiding Third World peoples? Who in southern Vietnam actively opposed the Diem government? Why did the United States grow disenchanted with Ngo Dinh Diem? What did they do about it? What happened as a result? [See Young, et al., The Vietnam War, 60-65] .

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