A fateful decision was based on reports of two attacks, one of which did not happen.

Encounters

in the TonkinUS Navy photo that air strikes were on the way to USS Maddox under way during the early retaliate. Sixty-four sorties in several 1960s. North Vietnamese PT boats at- waves from the carriers Ticonderoga tacked Maddox and USS Turner Joy on Aug. 4, 1964. The attack, and an alleged and Constellation struck gunboat bases one two days later, shaped the authority Gulf and supporting facilities in North Viet- under which the war would be fought. nam, where it was already the middle By John T. Correll of the day on Aug. 5. article said. “There were at least six On Aug. 7, Congress passed the of them, Russian-designed ‘Swatow’ t was late for a presidential ad- Tonkin Gulf resolution, authorizing gunboats armed with 37 mm and 28 dress, almost midnight on Aug. 4, Johnson to “take all necessary mea- mm guns, and P-4s [PT boats]. At 9:52 1964, but the situation was dire. sures” to repel attacks and prevent they opened fire on the with ISince midmorning, the Pentagon and further aggression. Within days, the automatic weapons, this time from as the White House had been following US Air Force moved into Southeast close as 2,000 yds. The night glowed reports of a battle in which North in force. The conflict escalated, eerily with the nightmarish glare of Vietnamese gunboats attacked two and by spring the United States was air-dropped flares and boats’ search- US destroyers, USS Maddox and USS engaged in a full-scale theater war. lights. For three-and-a-half hours, the Turner Joy, in the Tonkin Gulf off the The Tonkin Gulf resolution was the small boats attacked in pass after pass. coast of North . only congressional authority given, Ten enemy torpedoes sizzled through President Lyndon B. Johnson had then or later, for the commitment of the water.” let a previous attack on Maddox two force in Vietnam. Except for the air-dropped flares, the days before in the Tonkin Gulf go by The public’s understanding of the Time story was wrong in every detail. with a stern warning. He would not Aug. 4 encounter was summed up There were no gunboats, no PT boats, refrain again. In his midnight address, vividly by Time magazine. “Through no torpedoes, no three-and-a-half-hour Johnson called the second attack “open the darkness, from the west and south, battle. The Aug. 4 attack never hap- aggression on the high seas” and said the intruders boldly sped,” the Time pened. It was not until years later that AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2012 69 US Navy photo “torpedoes” heard were in fact echoes from from echoes fact in were heard the “torpedoes” that believe to come would Herrick 1964. August in the on mander, Ogier, Herbert Cmdr. and commander, DeSoto (l), Herrick John Capt. Sharp, G. S. U. Adm. said Vietnam,” in case we had to operate against North picture intelligence overall our update “to was DeSoto, code-named patrols, intelligence patrol. The mission of such signals a for Gulf Tonkin the entering within sight of passed boats patrol fast the 31, July of President. the or State, of the of Secretary the Defense, Secretary raids had to be authorized in advance by Like coastline. all the 34-A operations, raid up and down the North Vietnamese manned by South Vietnamese crews, to fast based boats, patrol at and in Johnson January 1964. One SOG by enterprise sent approved 34-A, Plan for activities under clandestine Operations cover a name bland-sounding its Group,” Observation and “Studies the was shadows the in Deeper combat missions. flying secretly were mandos and support capacity, although air com advisory an in mostly years, three for war. the of handling his for drafted by his aides, expressing support resolution, a adopt to Congress ask to moment opportune an for waiting was He firm. but moderate look to sought Johnson Vietnam, on stand stronger a in take to Goldwater by July.Challenged Convention National Republican the at nominated was who Goldwater, M. Barry hawkish the faced Johnson The First Incident Gulf. Tonkin the in night that events of emerged accounts accurate 70 Returning from a raid the morning morning the raid a from Returning US armed forces had been in Vietnam 1964, of campaign election the In Maddox , , which was just - said. He issued a stern warning that that the warning North Vietnamese should “be stern under a issued He said. he miscalculated,” had station a shore an might have mander been at fault or that that concluded overeager North Vietnamese boat com “We response. them. of one damaged had they actually, boats; PT three all they The believed had sunk Americans casualties. no and hole bullet single a safely. landed but Crusader by was F-8E slightly damaged the deck guns one fact, hit in and another; airplane one down shot had they believed Vietnamese North minutes. The 37 lasted action The went. they as torpedoes inef scattering fled, fectively boats PT The Sea. from support air summoned and guns five-inch its the destroyer. attack Americans—to the by boats PT boats—called torpedo P-4 Vietnamese 2, Division 192. On the of afternoon Aug. commander of Seventh Fleet Destroyer sion commander, Capt. John J. Herrick, of that. know not did the 34-A raids, but the North from separate Vietnamese and control were Navy under patrols DeSoto The personnel. intercept vans, operatedsignals were by ships the naval of decks security the to Lashed Command. Pacific US of head pursued. pursued. up. caught boats PT the when shore from miles 15 about was and sea open Maddox’s Maddox’s Maddox Johnson decided against a military military a against decided Johnson captain was Ogier L. Cmdr.Herbert The pursuers rapidly became the the became rapidly pursuers The Maddox outgoing sonar beams. sonar outgoing intercepted an order for North Maddox but also aboard was the mis Maddox Ticonderoga opened fire with with fire opened Maddox turned toward the Maddox in the South sustained sustained com - - - - opened fire at 9:39 p.m., eventually eventually p.m., 9:39 at fire opened not detect any torpedoes. The destroyers torpedoes. 26 of total astounding an reported sonar the as evasively maneuvered ships two The torpedo. incoming an as interpreted was which spike, noise a At At 9:37 p.m., the Joy tracked at least eight skunks and Washington. to back channels through Gulf Tonkin the from flowed also of reports blips, stream up. A steady popped aerial or bogies, Several expected. been have enemy might an approach which from direction opposite the east, the to miles 40 about contacts— surface hostile potentially “skunks”— three first the up picked the ships. US to reference no with operations” intercept directed unspecified“military the of line One boats. of refueling and towing the with mainly dealt nication commu actual the that and segment, interpretation of an intercepted Bai’s message Phu was warning the that stood attack. another of anticipation in edge on were Nerves hours earlier than in the 11 . morning, still was it where ington Wash in attention instant got It line. the forwarded promptly warning up the Herrick destroyers. the against night that operation Vietnamese North able notified Vietnam South in Bai Phu at unit intelligence Skunks and Bogies by by if again. ensue attacked they would that grave the consequences” to as misapprehension no of surface targets. surface of tracking the including range, shorter and detection long-range for set was dar The duties. radar surveillance the divided They astern. yards the Tonkin Gulf with day, of That 3-4. night Aug. the raid another conducted them. attacked destroy that vessels any to orders specific destroyers two the gave Johnson recognize. not did US the which Vietnam, North by claimed limit territorial the than less stay at least 11 miles offshore, one mile Over the next two hours, hours, two next the Over the p.m., 7:46 At under be it would later until Not 6:15 the signals About p.m., Marine Maddox The fast patrol boats from Da Nang Nang Da from boats patrol fast The Turner Joy reported four more at shorter range. AIR FORCE Magazine Magazine FORCE AIR Turner Joy’s Joy’s Turner resumed its patrol, joined joined patrol, its resumed . They were instructed . to They instructed were unr Joy’s Turner Maddox radar was tuned for for tuned was radar Maddox Turner Turner Joy Maddox Maddox sonar detected / January 2012 January / Maddox of a prob a of sonar did did sonar entered entered Maddox Maddox Turner radar radar 1,000 ra - - - - - that Secretary of Defense Robert S. Mc- Namara described as “unimpeachable.” The smoking gun was a North Vietnamese “after-action report” furnished to Mc- Namara that afternoon by the National Security Agency. It read, “Shot down two enemy planes in the battle area, and one other plan[e] was damaged. We sacrificed two ships and all the rest are okay. The combat spirit is very high and we are starting out on the hunt and [are waiting to] receive assignment. ... The enemy ship could have been damaged.” This was not the usual format for an after-action report, and inexplicably, the “two ships” in the text NSA provided had been “two comrades” in the original translation. Much later, Louis Tordella, deputy director of NSA, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara points out communist supply routes during a 1965 press conference. In his 1995 memoirs, McNamara insisted that evidence of message almost certainly referred to the the first attack was “indisputable” and that the second attack was “probable.” Aug. 2 skirmish, not to Aug. 4. The “two comrades” were most likely casualties on expending more than 300 rounds, plus The Smoking Gun one of the boats from the earlier incident. depth charges and star shells. Throughout the morning, Herrick had The Vietnamese language intercept on The night was exceptionally dark reported the destroyers under attack and which the translations were based was and visibility was hampered by in- returning fire. He soon became less cer- missing from the NSA files. termittent drizzle. However, in later tain. had only 12 torpedo During the Aug. 2 attack, there had interrogation, deck and bridge crews on boats, each carrying two torpedoes, so been numerous intercepts of boat-to-boat both destroyers said they saw torpedo the entire fleet could not have launched communications and instructions to the wakes, a searchlight, smoke, and the the 26 torpedoes identified by theMad - attacking boats. No such communications silhouette of attacking boats. dox sonar. were heard on Aug. 4. The situation looked completely Shortly after midnight, at 1:27 p.m. Johnson was champing at the bit. For different to the carrier pilots flying Washington time, Herrick sent a mes- political reasons, he dared not look weak overhead. They could see no ships sage saying, “Review of action makes or indecisive. He wanted the retaliatory other than Maddox and Turner Joy and many reported contacts and torpedoes air strikes to be delivered at 7 p.m. to the only wakes they saw were from the fired appear doubtful. Freak weather coincide with a televised address to the destroyers themselves. The aircraft effects on radar and overeager sonarmen nation, but to his dismay, the reprisals launched rockets and strafed the general may have accounted for many reports. slipped forward. Ticonderoga was short area of reported radar contacts. No actual visual sightings by Maddox. of available aircraft. A second carrier, Commander James B. Stockdale, Suggest complete evaluation before any Constellation, was pressing toward leading the fighters, said the Maddox further action taken.” , east of Da Nang, but air controller “kept giving rapid-fire, By then, the President had already was not yet in range of the targets. The blow-by-blow descriptions of ongo- reached his conclusions, and according first sorties were launched about an ing sea battles that for the life of me I to Assistant Secretary of State William hour before Johnson began his address couldn’t find on my horizons.” In his P. Bundy, “It became very clear that he at 11:37 p.m. memoirs, published in 1984 after his was in no mood for discussion.” Two aircraft were lost during the years as a POW in North Vietnam and In a telephone call to the Pentagon at strikes, one of them an A-4C Skyhawk receiving a Medal of Honor, he recalled 1:37 p.m., Sharp said many of the reports flown by Lt. j.g. Everett Alvarez Jr., that night in the Tonkin Gulf. were probably the result of “freak effects who was captured and became the first “I had the best seat in the house on radar and overeager sonarmen,” who American POW of the . from which to detect boats—if there “get keyed up with a thing like this and Future President Nixon and Repub- were any,” Stockdale said. “I didn’t everything they see on the sonar is a lican presidential candidate Goldwater have to look through surface haze and torpedo.” Even so, Sharp said there was issued public statements of support and spray like the destroyers did, and yet “no doubt” that an attack occurred. on Aug. 7, Congress adopted the Tonkin I could see the destroyers’ every move Herrick was bombarded with inquiries Gulf Resolution, giving Johnson the vividly.” There were “no boats, no boat from Washington and other levels, jump- backing and authority he wanted. wakes, no ricochets off boats, no boat ing channels and the chain of command. gunfire, no torpedo wakes—nothing but Unwilling to set aside the sightings and The Search for Proof black seas and American firepower.” inputs from his crews, Herrick certified The Pentagon, obviously uneasy with The destroyers ceased firing at 11:44 at 2:48 p.m. Washington time that the the evidence in hand, called for supporting p.m., with no casualties or damage to attacks were “bona fide.” information in a pointed message sent either ship. It was just after noon, 12:44 Any remaining uncertainty was swept to US Pacific Command Aug. 6, with p.m. EDT in Washington. aside by signals intelligence intercepts copies to the destroyers and the carriers. AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2012 71 “An urgent requirement exists for proof of “selective declassification of security After the Aug. 2 attack, NSA set up and evidence of second attack by DRV material,” but the committee released a team to collect and analyze the field [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] naval its report without stating a conclusion. intercepts. Responsibility was left to units against TG 72.1 [the destroyers] on The DeSoto commander, Herrick, told midlevel management, which probably night 4 Aug. as well as DRV plans and United Press International that he still felt the pressure to produce “proof” of preparation for the attack, for previous believed some of the sonar contacts had the Aug. 4 attack. attacks, and for any subsequent opera- been torpedoes. According to Hanyok, the NSA sum- tions,” the message said. “Material must Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf maries were “deliberately skewed to be of type which will convince United Resolution in 1970, but did so in the support the notion that there had been Nations Organization that the attack did context of the war powers of the President an attack.” In preparing its reports, NSA in fact occur.” and made no particular statement about used only 15 of the 122 available inter- The carrier pilots were “re-debriefed” the facts of the Tonkin Gulf incidents. cepts, selecting those that fit the official Aug. 7 and Aug. 11. The Department of Nevertheless, the credibility of the scenario. “US Sigint never intercepted Defense sent two high-ranking officials government’s story was hanging by a anything associated with an [Aug. 4] for the second re-debriefings: Both of thread. “I think it was a complete phony,” attack,” Hanyok said. them were lawyers. Goldwater said in 1980. “I think that Meanwhile, McNamara had recanted The JCS message drew additional Johnson plain lied to the Congress and about the Aug. 4 attack. Interviewed for confirmation that the attack had hap- got the resolution.” “The Fog of War,” a documentary film in pened, and the re-debriefings found an Further revelations appeared in books 2003, he said, “Events afterward showed A-1 crew that had seen bursts of light and articles. After reviewing the facts, that our judgment that we’d been attacked (possibly gunfire from destroyers) and Herrick told US News & World Report that day was wrong. Didn’t happen.” tracers (possibly from other US aircraft). in 1984 that most likely, there had been Edward J. Marolda, lead author of the The report sent forward amplified the no torpedoes. “It was the echo of our 1986 Navy history, changed his mind as possibility that this was a sighting of outgoing sonar beam hitting the rudders, well. In a summary done in 2005 for the the enemy. In 1968, McNamara cited which were then full over, and reflected Naval History and Heritage Command, he the crew statement in testimony and back into the receiver,” he said. “Most said, “More recent analysis of that data construed it as a significant element of of the Maddox’s, if not all of the Mad- and additional information gathered on proof of attack. dox’s, reports were probably false.” the 4 Aug. episode now makes it clear A Harris poll showed a huge jump in Herrick stated that conclusion again in that North Vietnamese naval forces did public approval for Johnson’s handling 1985 and 1986. not attack Maddox and Turner Joy that of the war. Vietnam was neutralized as On the other hand, in 1986 an official night in the summer of 1964.” a campaign issue, and in November, history, The and the Some Navy veterans insist that Moise, Johnson won the election in a landslide. Vietnam Conflict, said that the evidence Hanyok, and all the others are wrong Johnson had doubts of his own but he of a second attack in the Gulf of Tonkin and that the Aug. 4 attack did happen. did not agonize over the possibility of was conclusive. McNamara moderated Their arguments essentially boil down error. He told Undersecretary of State his position in his memoirs in 1995 but to the accusation that eyewitness sight- George W. Ball, “Hell, those dumb, stupid did not concede altogether. “The evidence ings by deck and bridge crews have been sailors were just shooting at flying fish!” of the first attack is indisputable,” he said. disregarded or discounted. Their points Later, when many in Congress criticized “The second attack appears probable but are overwhelmed by the weight of other the war, Johnson said, “Congress gave not certain.” evidence. us this authority, in August 1964, to do The misjudgments of Aug. 4-5 were whatever may be necessary.” The Missing Pieces not deliberate. For the most part, a chain Eventually, two historians finally reaction of mutually reinforcing mistakes Questions and Challenges pieced together the full story. Edwin E. built up to conclusions decision-makers Leaks and rumors about the Tonkin Moise’s Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of were predisposed to believe. Gulf continued to circulate. The Senate the Vietnam War, published in 1996, used These events did not start the war. Foreign Relations Committee, to which official documents and correspondence It had begun much earlier—instigated, a number of the leaks had been directed, to reconstruct the night of Aug. 4 in great directed, and sustained by the North managed to obtain the official logbooks detail, plotting on maps the courses of Vietnamese. Both North Vietnam and the for Maddox and Turner Joy and opened the ships and each of the radar skunks. United States were deeply committed. hearings in February 1968. The White Further information about signals Escalation was probably inevitable, but House attempted to block the inquiry, intelligence, previously secret, appeared it was the Tonkin Gulf imbroglio that but was unable to do so. in, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and determined how and when the buildup The key witness was McNamara, who the Flying Fish,” by Robert J. Hanyok of US forces took place and shaped repeated his assurance that “while sonar in NSA’s classified journal Cryptologic the authority under which the war was and radar readings may be subject to Quarterly in 2001. The article included fought. interpretation and argument because of the texts of the key intercepts and other Whatever else, a cloud hangs perma- sea and atmospheric conditions, we had details. It was declassified for public nently over the record of that amazing intelligence reports of a highly classified release in November 2005 with some night in the Tonkin Gulf and the actions and unimpeachable nature which estab- sections blacked out. related to it. n lished, without question, that the attacks took place on both Aug. 2 and Aug. 4.” John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is now Sen. J. William Fulbright, the com- a contributing editor. His most recent article, “The Bear Went Over the Mountain,” mittee chairman, accused McNamara appeared in the November 2011 issue. 72 AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2012