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Consciousness and the Attention Schema: Why It Has to Be Right

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Consciousness and the Attention Schema: Why It Has to Be Right Cognitive Neuropsychology ISSN: 0264-3294 (Print) 1464-0627 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pcgn20 Consciousness and the attention schema: Why it has to be right Michael S. A. Graziano To cite this article: Michael S. A. Graziano (2020): Consciousness and the attention schema: Why it has to be right, Cognitive Neuropsychology, DOI: 10.1080/02643294.2020.1761782 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2020.1761782 Published online: 20 May 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 17 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=pcgn20 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2020.1761782 ARTICLE COMMENTARY Consciousness and the attention schema: Why it has to be right Michael S. A. Graziano Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY This article describes some aspects of the underlying logic of the attention schema theory (AST) of Received 27 January 2020 subjective consciousness. It is a theory that distinguishes between what the brain actually, Revised 19 March 2020 physically has, what is represented by information models constructed in the brain, what higher Accepted 17 April 2020 cognition thinks based on access to those models and what speech machinery claims based on KEYWORDS the information within higher cognition. It is a theory of how we claim to have an essentially Consciousness; awareness; magical, subjective mind, based on the impoverishment and reduction of information along that attention; theory of mind; pathway. While the article can stand on its own as a brief account of some critical aspects of social cognition AST, it specifically addresses questions and concerns raised by a set of commentaries on a target article. Introduction own words, I’ve collapsed the arguments into three In the target article for this issue (Graziano et al., 2020), main categories. These three concerns about AST my colleagues and I suggested that several current were especially well represented and I hear them theories of consciousness are compatible with each often. other, and that the connectivity between them First, some ask how an attention schema can poss- becomes especially clear in the context of the atten- ibly explain a subjective feeling. How could having a tion schema theory (AST), the mechanistic theory of bundle of information in the brain – information that subjective experience that we proposed. I warmly describes attention – cause anyone to be subjectively thank everyone who contributed commentaries aware of anything? For example, one argument is that responding to that article. Every response presented consciousness – subjective experience, the what-it- a useful, well-reasoned point of view, some agreeing feels-like component – is something we really do with our primary arguments, some directly opposed. have, not something we merely think we have or say In every case, I value the comments and the pointers we have. Consciousness is not an illusion but an actu- to a larger literature, and I hope the overarching dis- ality. Yet AST appears to be an explanation for how a cussion has been helpful to everyone. machine “thinks” and “says” it has consciousness, not Many of the commentaries supported our argu- an explanation for how a brain actually is conscious. ments or amplified them by adding new ideas to the (Comments that make this point or a similar point larger story (e.g., Blackmore, 2020; Dennett, 2020; include Brown & LeDoux, 2020; Gennaro, 2020; Lane, Frankish, 2020; Prinz, 2020; Romo & Rossi-Pool, 2020; 2020; Masciari & Carruthers, 2020; Rosenthal, 2020). Vernet et al., 2020; Yankulova & Morsella, 2020). Second, and in contrast to the first point, some Some of the commentaries presented counter-argu- argue that consciousness is, indeed, an illusion (Black- ments mainly centred on AST itself. If AST is incorrect more, 2020; Dennett, 2020; Frankish, 2020). Yet the or seriously incomplete, then it cannot contribute sig- target article seems to describe AST coyly, refusing nificantly to a standard theory of consciousness. The to call it an illusionist theory when it obviously is best way I can respond to these commentaries, there- one. Why not admit that consciousness is an illusion? fore, is to explain why AST makes sense. Rather than The third, and most common concern about AST is: address each commentary separately, repeating the why focus on attention? Surely consciousness is much arguments that the authors expressed better in their larger than attention, encompassing many more CONTACT Michael S. A. Graziano [email protected] Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2 M. S. GRAZIANO processes hosted by the brain. Why not propose a Physical Model/ Higher Speech more general “mind schema” or other related Reality Schema Cognition schemas instead of only an attention schema? (This Arm Arm Schema question is represented in many of the comments, including: Frankish, 2020; Lane, 2020; Metzinger, Blood Flow 2020; Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2020; Prinz, 2020). All of these concerns about AST can be addressed Burger Visual by carefully considering the building blocks of the Model theory. Here I will explain the theory from a new Attention Attention angle, laying out certain aspects of the underlying Schema logic that address these three specific concerns. In Figure 1. How the brain might model, gain cognitive access to, the final two sections, I will also address two questions and speak about, objects or processes in the real world. (A) The about AST raised in the commentaries that are not arm schema represents a real arm and allows us to think about concerns so much as requests for clarification. and talk about our limbs. (B) The complex pattern of blood fl I am aware that I’ve titled this reply in a provocative ow in the brain lacks a model in the brain and thus we cannot directly introspect and report about it, though we can way, but I will try to argue that an attention schema, learn about it intellectually. (C) Visual objects such as hamburgers when properly understood, has an intrinsic logic that are modelled in the visual system. Information from the visual is hard to escape, and it is likely to be a crucial part model can reach cognition and speech. (D) In the attention of the larger system we call consciousness. schema theory, the physical process of attention is represented in the brain by a model, allowing us to directly introspect about, think about, and talk about it. When we do so, we describe it as subjective awareness. The model can make mistakes, hence Real objects and models of them awareness can sometimes dissociate from attention. [To view this figure in colour, please see the online version of this journal.] To start, I will put consciousness aside and discuss an analogy that should be uncontroversial. The analogy will allow me to discuss the difference between about. The purpose of an internal model is not to be having something and thinking you have it. I’ll focus physically accurate or complete, but to be useful. Some- on the body schema, and in particular the arm times the arm schema makes mistakes, especially if we schema – a topic that I studied for many years. trick it with laboratory manipulations. For example, the You have an arm, a part of physical reality (see the arm may be in one position while the model registers left side of Figure 1A). The brain constructs a model of it as somewhere else. These mistakes are typically the arm – the arm schema (also shown in Figure 1A). called illusions. Usually, however, the arm model tracks The model is information – a simulation of an arm. It the arm closely. is based partly on sensory information coming from Higher cognitive systems such as working memory the arm, but much of it is internally generated. One can receive at least some of the information from the demonstration of its internally generated nature is arm model (see Figure 1A). From higher cognition, at that if your arm is amputated, the model can linger least some of the information can be used by on – a phantom limb. language machinery and turned into speech (again, The arm schema is rich in detail, but not complete. It see Figure 1A). includes information about the joint degrees of Because of the pathway diagrammed in Figure 1(A), freedom, the overall shape and structure of the arm you can close your eyes, thereby blocking any visual and hand, inertia, viscosity, how the arm might interact confirmation, and still introspectively know about with other body parts (e.g., if you move in a certain way your arm, think about your arm, and talk about it. your hand will hit your stomach), and predictive infor- You can accurately say, “My arm is at my side. Now mation about how internally generated commands it’s up in the air”. will make the arm move here or there. The model is This account of the arm schema and its relationship lacking many details of the arm – it doesn’tcontain to cognition and speech is no doubt oversimplified. information about individual muscle attachments, or The boundaries between processes in the brain are bone shape, or the proteins that cause muscle contrac- more continuous and less modular than indicated in tion – information the brain doesn’tneedtoknow Figure 1(A), and there are a lot more processes than COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 3 are represented here, but the overarching description arm. When I say that you “intuit” something, I use is essentially correct. Note that I have said nothing the word in an extremely narrow sense, and mean about consciousness so far.
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