PROOF

Contents

Acknowledgements vii

Notes on Contributors viii

1 A Pluralist History of France? 1 Julian Wright and H.S. Jones

Part I The Idea of the Plural Republic

2 Liberal Republicanism after the Terror: Charles-Guillaume Théremin and Germaine de Staël 25 Andrew Jainchill

3 Liberal Pluralism in the Early Nineteenth Century: Benjamin Constant and Germaine de Staël 41 K. Steven Vincent

4 A Strange Liberalism: Freedom and Aristocracy in French Political Thought 66 Annelien de Dijn

5 P.-J. Proudhon: Pluralism, Justice and Society 85 Georges Navet

6 Pluralism’s Political Conditions: Social Realism and the Revolutionary Tradition in Pierre Leroux, P.-J. Proudhon and Alfred Fouillée 99 Michael C. Behrent

7 Utopian Pluralism in Twentieth-Century France 122 Joshua Humphreys

Part II The Plural Republic

8 Electoral Antipluralism and Electoral Pluralism in France, from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1914 141 Nicolas Roussellier

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9 Associations and Political Pluralism: The Effects of the Law of 1901 161 Magali della Sudda

10 Vision and Reality: Joseph Paul-Boncour and Third Republic Pluralism 179 Julian Wright

11 Regionalism, Federalism and Internationalism in First World War France 198 Carl Bouchard

12 State Sovereignty in Question: The French Jurists between the Reorganization of the International System and European Regionalism, 1920–1950 215 Jean-Michel Guieu

13 Pluralism, Parliament and the Possibility of a Sénat fédérateur, 1940–1969 231 Paul Smith

14 Epilogue: French Politics, History, and a New Perspective on the Jacobin State 248 Alain Chatriot

Index 264 PROOF

1 A Pluralist History of France? Julian Wright and H.S. Jones

The French exception

What makes France different? More than two decades have elapsed since François Furet, Jacques Julliard, and Pierre Rosanvallon published a much-debated book which argued that the ‘French exception’ had come to an end. Writing in the wake of President Mitterrand’s re-election, they maintained that the advent of ‘the republic of the centre’, enjoying con- sensual legitimacy across the political spectrum, marked the end of the political divisions that had afflicted France ever since 1789.1 They pre- dicted that this ‘banalization of French politics’ would also slowly erode the other central characteristics that made France different: the dirigiste centralized state; France’s sense of its universal mission as the depository of the values of enlightenment rationalism; and the republican model of citizenship, which recognizes only individual and not communal iden- tities in the public square. Their book was written with an eye to the imminent celebrations of the bicentenary of the French Revolution, in which Furet, in particular, would play a leading role: indeed, in one sense La République du Centre simply reiterated the key message Furet had propounded in a famous work published a decade before: the Revo- lution is over.2 But, a generation on, the nature of French exceptionalism continues to be debated by political scientists and commentators on both sides of the Channel and on both sides of the Atlantic, which sug- gests that Furet and his collaborators were at best premature in their analysis.3 The fact that three leading intellectuals had proclaimed that France no longer had a unique mission in the world only served to focus the minds of those who insisted that that mission must be preserved. ‘I am against Maastricht because I believe in the French exception’, proclaimed the

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2 Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France dissident Gaullist Philippe Séguin, spearheading a campaign that came within a whisker of success in the referendum of September 1992.4 On the Left, Jean-Pierre Chevènement has made his career as a neo- Jacobin defender of the French way, upholding both the republican model of citizenship and the ‘cultural exception’ against the inroads of American English and Hollywood.5 But it is significant that the defence of the ‘French exception’ has become an oppositional discourse: so Chevènement has been a serial resigner, who quit Mauroy’s gov- ernment in 1983 to protest against ‘la parenthèse libérale’, Rocard’s in 1991 to protest against French participation in the first Gulf War, and Jospin’s in 2000 to protest against the recognition of the Corsican nationalist movement in the Matignon accords. That the elderly Pierre Poujade should have supported Chevènement’s presidential candidature in 2002 simply underpinned the perenni- ally dissident quality of this personification of the Jacobin tradition today.6 So, more than two decades after the authors of La République du Centre declared the demise of the Jacobin Republic, the Jacobin tradition remains very much at the heart of public controversy. Two particular aspects of the tradition dominate the polemics: the pre-eminent role of the state in the face of the rise of the global market; and the rejection of the public representation of cultural difference, in the face of ethnic diversity and the ideology of multiculturalism.7 At the heart of the Jacobin tradition stands a high conception of the state as guarantor of the equal rights of citizens, as protector of the weak against the strong, and as the sole legitimate articulator of the public interest. That has been the standard defence of the centraliza- tion of power for two centuries or more. Since the Second World War, the importance of the state in ensuring equal and extensive social rights for citizens has acquired particular importance and indeed become a new shibboleth, defining a distinctively French ‘social model’ which since the Thatcher-Reagan era has stood in marked contrast to Anglo- American practice. Yet the role of the state has been brought into question more than ever since Nicolas Sarkozy’s election to the pres- idency in 2007. His apparent eagerness to confront the trade unions and to challenge their conquests in the field of social legislation – gen- erous public sector pensions, early retirement ages, and the celebrated 35-hour week instituted by Martine Aubry in 1998 – has given renewed life to the debate on the viability of the French social model. Beyond France, the French model of the state, which for generations has exer- cised compelling powers of both attraction and repulsion, is increasingly PROOF

A Pluralist History? 3 viewed as unsustainable; all the more so since the financial crash of 2008 and the Eurozone crisis, following which most western states started to rethink the limits of state action. Meanwhile the French state continues to strike a distinctive and con- troversial posture in resisting the multiculturalist campaign for group rights, and especially the formal public recognition of the collective rights of ethnic and religious minorities. ‘France is a country in which there are no minorities’, declared the French government, when request- ing a reservation on the article on minority rights at the time of the ratification of the United Nations International Convention on Civil and Political Rights in 1966. That position, though challenged, remains substantively in place today. In 1991, the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration reaffirmed its belief that the French constitution, based as it was on a ‘logic of equality’, excluded any possibility of ‘an insti- tutional recognition of minorities’; and for the same reason the French government rejected the 1999 European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages.8 What is the French ‘state-model’? In current debates, the term masks a cluster of diverse characteristics: a ‘large’ and over-extended state; an inflexible bureaucracy; and a particular way of conceiving the relation- ship between state and citizen which problematizes the place of ethnic communities, and other kinds of communal identity, within the mod- ern republic. But there seem to be three essential components of the model: administrative centralization; the contested legitimacy of insti- tutions of civil society; and an abstract model of citizenship, in which the citizen’s identity as a French citizen, when he/she acts as a citizen in the public space, is held to supplant other collective identities. To use two much-employed pieces of shorthand, the Jacobin model of the state is the antithesis of a pluralistic understanding of citizenship and civil society. The central aim of this book is to question the assumption that the Jacobin voice is the sole authentic voice of the French republican tra- dition. In fact, while ‘Jacobinism’ was certainly a French invention, so too, in some respects, was its antithesis, ‘pluralism’. Pluralist political thought, in Britain and elsewhere, was born of a reflection on French historical experience; but it was also, crucially, nourished by French intellectual traditions. Some of these traditions were explicitly hostile to republicanism; but French pluralist doctrine was also developed within the republican tradition. These republican pluralists sought to develop an alternative model of the French republic, one that did not imply the defence of the centralized state or the crushing of communal identities PROOF

4 Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France in civil society. The evolution of this alternative republicanism is the focus of the essays that follow.

Conceptual framework: Jacobinism and pluralism

‘Jacobinism’ and ‘pluralism’ are, then, the key concepts that frame this book; but both are problematical concepts. They are used in the aca- demic literature, but they are not primarily scientific concepts, but terms of art deployed by French political actors in their discussions of the republican model. Both terms have intriguingly complex conceptual histories. These histories cannot be divorced from the objects they pur- port to denote, and hence they form an appropriate starting-point for this book. ‘Jacobinism’ is problematical because of the gap that sepa- rates its historically specific sense, referring to a group of political actors in the period 1789–94, and the sense it bears in twentieth- and twenty- first-century polemics about the French state.9 As Mona Ozouf notes, the concept has migrated from history to political philosophy and even to collective psychology.10 Certainly, Jacobins made the case for the imper- ative of a centralized state in 1793–4, although their emphasis was rather on political than on administrative centralization, and arguably ‘public administration’ did not acquire a stable sense until after the Revolution. As Mitterrand put it in the 1970s, when accused of being a Jacobin: ‘it was Napoleon Bonaparte and not the Jacobins who shaped the stifling structures of contemporary France’.11 Jacobins also contested the free development of civil society, and asserted a conception of citizenship which left little space for the diversity of private interests. But much of this ‘Jacobin’ understanding of the republic can be found in an anti- Jacobin such as Sieyès. It was he, for example, who gave the clearest exposition of the abstract conception of citizenship. ‘Those interests by which citizens resemble one another are therefore the only ones that they can treat in common, the only ones by which and in whose name they can demand political rights or an active part in the forma- tion of the social law’, wrote Sieyès. ‘They are therefore the only ones that make a citizen someone who can be represented.’12 Subsequently, the term ‘Jacobin’ has come to be applied, somewhat promiscuously, to any proponent of the centralized state. But if we are to preserve some analytical clarity for the term, surely we should reserve it for those who defend the centralized state as an instrument for the promotion of an egalitarian civic order against ‘les féodalités’. As a latter-day Jacobin, Jean-Laurent Lastelle, puts it: ‘the state is all that the poor have; it’s therefore crucial that it should be well run’.13 PROOF

A Pluralist History? 5

Pluralism, like Jacobinism, is now a concept much used by historians of France.14 But, in its political sense, it is a relatively recent coinage, unlike Jacobinism. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the term was used, in both English and French, to denote an ecclesiastical (and, by extension, sometimes a political) abuse. It also, less commonly, came to denote a philosophical doctrine, the antithesis of monism. Only in the twentieth century did it come to acquire a political sense, denot- ing doctrines and practices which contested unitary conceptions of sovereignty and instead affirmed that the moral personality of groups within the state was real, and not a mere legal fiction. This sense of the term was, apparently, introduced into American political science by the British political theorist Harold Laski, who coined it in a lecture he gave at Columbia in 1915, which was subsequently published as the first chapter of his Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (1917). It started to take root in Anglo-American political science in the 1920s. This was certainly one trajectory by which it entered French political discourse – although Laski in turn had been inspired by the French politician and thinker Joseph Paul-Boncour’s doctoral dissertation, examined in Julian Wright’s essay.15 Laski believed that pluralism could resolve a vital prob- lem in the modern State, that of the failure of universal suffrage to satisfy the demand for greater liberty. He suggested: ‘where administrative orga- nization is made responsive to the actual associations of men, there is a greater chance not merely of efficiency but of freedom also’.16 In France, this question had a manifold relevance. French republicanism had not satisfied the desire for liberty with its electoral system based on universal male suffrage. In the Third Republic, this argument played out between republicans who trumpeted the need to defend universal suffrage, and those who argued that universal suffrage needed organising and devel- oping. ‘Conscious democrats’, wrote Paul-Boncour in 1910, ‘those for whom democracy is not simply a sonorous term to be repeated at the tribune, smiting one’s chest, but an ensemble of realities, and, in short, a new order – do they believe that it can be brought about other than by allowing the creative forces, professional and regional groupings, to exercise greater liberty?’17 Liberty and democracy depended on a sys- tem that was not just responsive to plural influences, but that was itself malleable and experimental. The other key influence – now rather forgotten – was the émigré Russian sociologist, Georges Gurvitch, an almost exact contemporary of Laski’s.18 Gurvitch – discussed in Joshua Humphreys’ essay – first used the term, in a legal sense, in a German-language article on Otto von Gierke in 1922, before he had settled in France.19 Two of the PROOF

6 Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France main influences on his early intellectual development were French: Proudhon and Bergson; and in this article he also cited the French jurists Léon Duguit and Maurice Hauriou, both of whom (Duguit in particular) caught Laski’s attention too.20 He was also familiar with the English guild socialists, among whom he cited S. G. Hobson in partic- ular. But there is no evidence that he had read Laski at this stage, and in any case Laski had only used the term a handful of times by 1922. Subsequently Gurvitch was certainly instrumental in disseminating the terms ‘pluralisme’ and ‘pluraliste’ in France, in such works as L’Idée du droit social (1932) and Expérience juridique et philosophie pluraliste du droit (1935).21 The central theme of Gurvitch’s sociology of law was that the sources of law were plural, not singular: law did not have to come ‘down- wards’ from the will of the sovereign state, but could spring from below – notably from the practices of social groups such as trade unions. For Laski, and for other British pluralists, such as the legal historian F.W. Maitland, France was the dystopia, the home of the ‘monist’ state and the unitary conception of state sovereignty. ‘[I]t is always best to begin with France’, wrote Maitland, ‘and there, I take it, we may see the pulverising, macadamising tendency in all its glory, working from century to century, reducing to impotence, and then to nullity, all that intervenes between Man and State.’22 But pluralism was not simply an alien graft into French political discourse: Laski also found in France a rich vein of critique of that state – from Royer-Collard and Lamennais in the early nineteenth century to the constitutional jurist Léon Duguit in his own day.23 By the time the former prime minister André Tardieu wrote his La Révolution à refaire (1936), it was familiar enough to contrast the Revolutionary conception of liberty with the ‘plural liberties’ that had sheltered under the protection of the ancien régime and been swept away by the Revolution.24 Certainly the political meaning of ‘pluralism’ was well-known to Jacques Maritain in the post-war period.25 Maritain had spent the war years and after in the USA, and it was in part from American political science that he picked up this usage; but it is also worth stressing that the old language of ‘corporatism’ had been dis- credited by its association with the Vichy regime, and the concept of pluralism had the advantage of sounding more progressive and hav- ing more clearly democratic credentials. So it began to be deployed by advocates of what would once have been labelled ‘corporatist’ reform of the state such as Bernard Lavergne, who is discussed in Paul Smith’s contribution to this volume.26 It was in the 1950s that the term ‘pluralism’ became common cur- rency in the language of French political science, as a study of the PROOF

A Pluralist History? 7 contents of the Revue française de science politique demonstrates. In a famous article published in 1956, Stanley Hoffmann, who had recently moved from Paris to Harvard, interpreted the Vichy regime as a ‘pluralist dictatorship’, and he drew on key figures in American political science, such as David B. Truman, author of The Governmental Process, a book which is now regarded as ‘a classic statement of pluralism’.27 In this context, the concept was ostensibly value-neutral. But at the same time it had strong filiations with Catholic thinkers such as Maritain and Mounier, and Mounier’s journal, L’Esprit, had been quick to pick up the neologism in the 1930s. The young René Rémond, himself a commit- ted Catholic, described it in 1958 as ‘a fundamental notion of Catholic thought’.28 In these circles, ‘pluralism’ had undeniably positive conno- tations. Sometimes it was assimilated with personalism, that influential movement in Catholic thought associated in particular with Mounier.29 But it also had particular connections with anti-totalitarianism. Theo- rists of totalitarianism from the 1950s onwards defined pluralist political systems as the antithesis of totalitarian or ‘monopolistic party’ regimes. In France, the foremost exponent of the concept of pluralism in this context was Raymond Aron, who first placed it at the centre of his political sociology in 1959.30 An important shift had occurred in the implications of the term ‘pluralism’. When first used in a political sense, by Laski, Gurvitch and others, it was defined against the legal concept of sovereignty, and affirmed the importance of group rights. Now it was defined in opposition to totalitarianism, and it conveyed an emphasis on the free expression of political opinion, something that had not been at all central to the concerns of first-wave political pluralists. As a political slogan, however, pluralism did not really achieve promi- nence until the 1970s. It was adopted by strands of the Left in the wake of 1968, but the first front-rank politician to foreground the concept was President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in Démocratie française (1976). This book was an attempt to equip the Orleanist tradition of liberalism to address the problems of modern society, and the concept of pluralism was at the heart of this project, notably but by no means exclusively in the chapter entitled ‘Pluralism and Liberty’. Classical liberalism, as Giscard understood it, had confined pluralism to the sphere of political institutions: a plurality of political parties competing freely for votes, the separation of powers, and decentralization. But for Giscard pluralism was indivisible, and should be extended to all domains of social life. It implied, notably, a plurality of organs of the mass media. In the economy, it implied not simply a free market, but also a vibrant and PROOF

8 Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France independent trade union movement capable of serving as a counter- weight to the power of capital.31 The foremost Giscardian among today’s political leaders, François Bayrou, has repeatedly placed pluralism at the centre of his system of political values. ‘What is at stake in this cam- paign’, he declared in the run-up to the legislative elections of 2007, ‘is pluralism in France’. Why? Because, he argued, if Sarkozy’s elec- tion to the presidency were to be followed by a presidential landslide in the legislative elections, one body of opinion would dominate the National Assembly, faced only by a crisis-ridden Socialist Party; and in such an assembly there could be no authentic debate.32 For Bayrou, pluralism meant, above all, political pluralism: a multi-party system in which smaller parties were not consumed by a presidentialist logic. The Mouvement démocrate which he founded in 2007, to replace the UDF, issued a ‘Charter of Values’ in December 2007 which declared that ‘Pluralism is the first of democratic values. Pluralism in politics and in the media guarantees freedom of thought, freedom of opinion, the emancipation of citizens and their political faculty.’33 What can we conclude from this brief conceptual history? The first point to make is that the term pluralism is itself a plural concept, embracing a diverse range of political meanings and political projects. Originally forged to defend the autonomy of associational life in the face of the unitary sovereign state, it came to denote also the defence of freedom of expression and the plurality of opinion in the face of totali- tarian regimes. Today, it also extends to cover multiculturalist challenges to the diversity-blind republican model of citizenship. Secondly, even when used by establishment figures such as Giscard, the term pluralism represents an oppositional discourse. It stands for opposition to what is presented as the orthodox doctrine of the state in France. Finally, words matter: the invention of a term with this degree of flexibility made the task of the republican opponents of the Jacobin model so much easier.

The boundaries of pluralism: liberalism, social realism, corporatism

The term ‘pluralism’ was certainly not available to the proto-pluralist thinkers discussed in Part I of this book, until we reach Joshua Humphreys’s study of Gurvitch in Chapter 7. These essays therefore all raise important questions about the relationship between pluralism and the various terms of self-ascription that were available, such as ‘liberalism’, ‘realism’, and ‘corporatism’. PROOF

A Pluralist History? 9

From the 1790s onwards, liberals have been prominent critics of the Jacobin model of the state bequeathed by the French Revolution, and proponents of the importance of a vibrant civil society as the soil in which modern freedom can flourish. ‘It is somewhat remarkable’, wrote Benjamin Constant, ‘that uniformity should never have encountered greater favour than in a revolution made in the name of the rights and the liberty of men.’34 If liberalism has a problematic place in the his- tory of France – and it is a curious paradox that the nation which has produced the richest tradition of liberal political thought has never gen- erated the kind of liberal consensus that has shaped public life in so many other western countries – then this should certainly be considered a symptom of the salience of the Jacobin myth of the republic.35 ‘French democracy has always been more Jacobin than liberal, in its essence and in its inspiration’, wrote Raymond Aron.36 An opposition to Jacobinism has been central to most forms of French liberalism, while Jacobinism repeatedly appeals to the latent suspicion of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ liberalism in French opinion.37 So it is appropriate to begin a study of pluralism with the liberal tra- dition. But liberalism, like pluralism, has been a diverse tradition in France, and its umbrella sheltered a variety of types of pluralism. At least three are evoked in the three chapters that deal centrally with the liberal tradition. French liberalism was born of a critical engagement with the legacy of the French Revolution, although liberals diagnosed the failings of the Revolution in different ways. The most famous diagnosis was that offered by Constant, in his famous lecture of 1819, ‘De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes’: the Revolutionaries betrayed their zeal for liberty by pursuing a model of liberty inherited from the ancient city-states, one characterized by collective self-rule and under- pinned by an intensely virtuous (that is, public-minded) citizenry. That conception of freedom left no space for the liberty of the private indi- vidual against the demands of the community. Since love of ancient liberty was the quintessential mark of the classical republican, Con- stant’s critique of it could easily be taken for anti-republican, but in fact the relationship between liberalism and republicanism was much less oppositional than a casual reading of Constant’s lecture might suggest. This is the central theme of Andrew Jainchill’s chapter, which focuses on the role of a largely forgotten figure, Charles-Guillaume Théremin, in the invention of modern republicanism, and on Germaine de Staël’s engagement with similar themes in her Des Circonstances actuelles... . Both Théremin and Staël recognized the possible tensions between an PROOF

10 Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France active civic life and a heterogeneous social reality; but they cherished both, and were concerned to negotiate the tension between them. Steven Vincent finds in Constant and Staël a more distinctively mod- ern kind of liberalism, one that eschews the quest for unity and shared values that characterize the republican tradition. This modern liberalism seems to anticipate John Rawls’s model of ‘political liberalism’: it offered a constitutional framework for the negotiation of difference. ‘Fanati- cism and freedom are incompatible’, wrote Constant. Both he and Staël recognized that the defects of the French political system were to be located at least as much in political culture (unwillingness to accept the legitimacy of political opposition) as in institutional forms. Théremin, Staël and Constant looked to representative institutions, appropriately designed, to preserve freedom within the context of modern social structures characterized by equality of conditions. But Annelien de Dijn’s chapter reminds us of the survival of a rival lib- eral tradition which was committed to pluralism but less optimistic about its compatibility with social equality. These liberals took their inspiration from Montesquieu, the analyst of moderate monarchy, who maintained that only a hereditary landed nobility could prevent the degeneration of monarchy into despotism. Their basic assumption was that social hierarchy offered the best guarantee of freedom against despotic power. This version of liberalism proved remarkably resilient in France: one of its last manifestations, de Dijn suggests, could be found in Bertrand de Jouvenel’s Power in 1945. If this ‘aristocratic’ understanding of liberty was the one which most French people identified with ‘lib- eralism’, then this might help explain why liberal pluralism remained marginal to the republican tradition. It was all too easy for neo- Jacobinism to portray this kind of liberalism as an enemy of democratic republicanism.38 So liberalism certainly has numerous points of contact with pluralism. Still, the two are not synonymous, and it is important to be clear why. An important aspect of this is the tension between the free market and social pluralism. Historically, the belief in the beneficence of the free market was essential for many liberals. Markets have a strong tendency to disperse power. But the particular kind of dispersal of power which the pluralist values is rooted in communities and in sub-state collective identities; these are often threatened by markets. One kind of liberal cel- ebrates this, seeing strong communal identities as obstacles to economic development and personal freedom. But liberal movements have often been grounded in locality, and liberal thinkers have recognized that strong local communities or organized associations have an invaluable PROOF

A Pluralist History? 11 role to play as barriers to an over-powerful state, even if they exercise a moral or even legal authority over the individual.39 In short, liberals usually value markets, because they are mechanisms for allocating resources without recourse to the state; and they celebrate the dispersal of power, regarding it either as constitutive of freedom or as instrumental to sustaining freedom. But there are potential tensions between these two pillars of liberalism, because the intermediate bod- ies whose powers may be dispersed by the reign of the market are also agencies of the dispersal of power. Conversely, their flattening can leave the individual, though free as an agent in the market-place, isolated in the face of the centralized state. Fundamentally, that was the reason why many pluralists regarded liberalism as their enemy. That was Pierre Leroux’s position, for exam- ple, as Michael Behrent makes clear in his contribution to this volume. As Leroux saw it, liberalism was essentially individualist and deemed human association an artifice, whereas at the heart of Leroux’s plural- istic conception of society lay a conviction that human sociability was spontaneous. Society, in other words, was real. This kind of ‘social real- ism’ is commonly identified with counter-revolutionaries such as Louis de Bonald, for whom it was the individual, not society, that was the arti- ficial entity. Republics count only individuals, wrote Bonald, whereas the French monarchy saw only families.40 What Behrent’s essay, and others in this volume, make clear is that social realism was also a fertile tradition within French republicanism. The tension between liberalism and social realism is further explored in the contributions of Georges Navet and Joshua Humphreys. Like Behrent’s protagonists, the thinkers they study – Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Georges Gurvitch – placed social realism at the heart of their teach- ings; but unlike de Dijn’s aristocratic liberals, they did not believe that social realism implied the acceptance of social hierarchy or inequality. All in different ways believed that the advent of social equality need not imply the extinction of difference. Pluralists of this ‘social realist’ kind cherished corporate life as the foundation of a healthy civil society, and for a long time ‘corporatism’ rather than ‘pluralism’ was the favoured term. But some comment is needed to distinguish our conceptual framework from that of modern political scientists interested in the relationship between state and inter- est groups. They typically see pluralism and corporatism as antithetical terms: interest-group pluralism entails free competition among interest groups in civil society, whereas corporatism implies the institutionalized representation of functional interest groups within the political system. PROOF

12 Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France

In pluralism, there is little if any interpenetration of groups and the state apparatus, whereas in corporatism such interpenetration is extensive.41 It should be said, however, that these definitions have been formulated by specialists in the study of interest group politics: they take it for granted that interest groups are at the heart of a modern polity, and dis- tinguish two different models of their impact on decision-making. But for historians of political thought and culture, it is more plausible to see pluralism and corporatism as variants of the same basic type of political doctrine and practice that rejects the myth of the sovereign state and sees groups as having a real life of their own, prior to their recognition by the state.

The state and the Republic

Many empirical studies have unpicked the notion of the ‘one and indi- visible republic’, and have demonstrated that the French state has in practice been by no means as unitary as the theory asserts. A ‘unitary norm’ coexisted with a ‘fragmented reality’.42 Jacobin ideology sus- pected associations of being incipient corporations, and the law was, until 1901, repressive of the right to associate, yet in practice it was often applied tolerantly, and nineteenth-century France saw the emergence of a wealth of new kinds of clubs and associations, from the bourgeois ‘circles’ studied by Maurice Agulhon to the choral societies, gymnastic societies, and shooting clubs that proliferated in the second half of the century. An official survey in 1900 found 45,148 associations in total.43 Whereas dirigiste myth imagined the state standing above private inter- ests in order to impose the general interest, this model in fact ‘masked a messy reality in which public and private intertwined’.44 Whether these republican critics of Jacobinism were guilty of mak- ing a straw man out of the centralized, unitary system which France developed in the modern period is not in itself the issue at stake here. Most political programmes or philosophies are the stronger for hav- ing clearly identifiable ideological opposites. They commonly construct these opposites by highlighting selected aspects of historical reality, which assume an importance in myth which they lacked in their own time. To take one example: the ‘principles of 1789’ acquired a far greater coherence in the late nineteenth-century discourse of those who set out to counter those principles than is disclosed by the messy debates of the revolutionary period itself.45 So the now infamous Le Chapelier law of 1791 that outlawed trades unions was in fact, according to Pierre Rosanvallon, barely thought about until the period in the later PROOF

A Pluralist History? 13 nineteenth century when republican legislators began to worry about whether or not greater social organization was a desirable necessity.46 In fact, however, the thinkers and activists who advocated modifications in the unitary model were often people who had close first-hand experi- ence of the workings of the unitary state. Thus De Gaulle, whose failed attempt in 1969 (studied here by Paul Smith) to adapt the constitution of the Fifth Republic to give greater status to local regional bodies, was at the same time a twentieth-century ‘Napoleon’, attempting to articulate the spiritual unity of France through the experience of Liberation and ultimately through his own political persona, and an advocate of the essential variety of French experience, to which, one may surmise, his referendum campaign might have given greater status.47 At a number of crisis points in French political history, the decentralization campaign has found a voice, almost as a ‘common-sense’ policy for rejuvenating political life. ‘Who would have thought that the idea of reorganizing France’s administration on regional lines would have seemed a novelty, or a chimera? If ever a question has been studied, discussed, elucidated over the last eighty years, it is that one.’ The journalist who made this pro- nouncement, complaining that ordinary Frenchmen knew and cared little about the question, was not writing about Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s serious exploration of the concept of decentralization in 2002–3; nor even of De Gaulle’s 1969 proposal; but rather of a set of proposals, now largely forgotten, advanced by Aristide Briand in 1910.48 There is in fact a perennial concern to develop a model of the French state that at least speaks of itself as undoing the problems of unitarism. So, whatever this ‘alternative’ model may be, one of its most impor- tant features is that it carries within its political baggage the qualities of a ‘common-sense’ reform that can reinvigorate a Republic that has become inflexible. The rhetorical ‘creation’ of an undesirable opposite in the shape of ‘existing arrangements’ is often more important, and has a fuller existence, than the practical proposals which the debate may eventually produce. This is because in many respects the reform campaign is a campaign to criticize; practical proposals give weight to the criticism, but they are not always the root of the criticism. These very aspects of the campaign for an ‘alternative’ model mean that the campaign to bring into question the unitary state and its political justi- fications finds supporters in different political camps. If, at moments of particular tension, the state is seen as the problem, then it would only be natural for anarchists, moderate socialists, far-sighted liberals, neo- monarchists or traditionalists to agree that bureaucracy was at fault and PROOF

14 Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France that a less centralized model would help. Particularly when the ‘Jacobin’ system was seen as ‘abstract’, based on the presumption that apriori political principles could act as the basis for a state-form that could not adapt to the complexities of social reality, then one could expect to find numerous examples of ‘anti-abstractionists’ or ‘realists’, arguing for a reform of the state that would rectify the abuses of the past by reconnecting French administrative and political forms with ‘reality’, whatever that might be. The contributions to this volume collectively suggest that there has been an ongoing debate along these lines within French politics, since before the birth of the First Republic. The debate has not proceeded evenly; sometimes it has receded from view; at other times it has com- manded the headlines. One moment in modern history, 1940–4, has been particularly associated with the discourse of ‘reality’, as opposed to universal principles incarnated within the Republican form. But Vichy’s insincere flirtation with a ‘realist’ politics of re-engagement with provinces and trades unions has been comprehensively shown to be, if anything, a distraction from the study of genuine, wider and more coherent reform movements, within mainstream republicanism. Whereas Part I explores the intellectual roots of republican pluralism, Part II shifts the focus away from intellectual history and towards polit- ical movements and political conjunctures, focusing on how the idea of pluralism developed under the Republic. Nicolas Roussellier begins by showing that the electoral history of the Third Republic belies the notion that a Jacobin ‘culture of generality’ hampered the expression of a diversity of currents of opinion within the political system. On the contrary: the ‘electoral anti-pluralism’ of the period of the Republic’s implantation appears in Roussellier’s account not as a symptom of the Republic’s visceral suspicion of oppositional discourses, but as a relic of an older conception of politics as the celebration of social unity. Once the Republic was established, its parliamentary regime became notably pluralistic, and its electoral regime reflected the country’s striking social and geographical diversity. If there are two features of French political culture where Jacobin anti- pluralism seemed most resilient in the Third Republic, these were the restrictive associational regime and the resolutely secular conception of citizenship. Yet Magali della Sudda’s chapter confronts the anti-pluralist interpretation of the republican tradition at precisely these strongholds. She shows, on the one hand, how the regime of associations permitted the mobilization of particular interests; and, on the other, how Catholic women’s groups articulated an alternative model of citizenship, one that PROOF

A Pluralist History? 15 built on a recognition of the particular role that women had to play in the family and in society. Indeed, the associative life that emerged here pointed subtly towards that elusive goal in the Third Republic: a way of institutionalizing opposition to the Republic through the development of alternative political forms that were nonetheless given their existence by the regime. One of the conclusions to be drawn from all these studies is that by placing pluralism at the centre of the study of French political cul- ture, we are able to see connections between a range of movements which, because they achieved only partial and ambiguous success, tend to be marginalized in most political histories of modern France. Carl Bouchard’s and Jean-Michael Guieu’s contributions both draw impor- tant connections between internationalist movements and critiques of the Jacobin model of the Republic. Bouchard illuminates the sig- nificance of the short-lived Société Proudhon of 1917 as the hinge which joined pre-war regionalism with post-war internationalism. That Proudhon should posthumously serve as the patron of these traditions demonstrates the power of his name and reminds us of the weight of the past in French political practice. Guieu’s essay takes a broader chrono- logical frame, and traces the journey that led jurists from the critique of state sovereignty in the work of Léon Duguit and other pluralists of the belle époque to support for European integration in the wake of the Second World War. Pluralism – whether or not it was named as such – provided a rich source of ideas for the renovation of the republican tradition at a num- ber of key moments in the history of the French republic. The career of Joseph Paul-Boncour, studied in Julian Wright’s chapter, is illuminat- ing in demonstrating how a lifelong critic of the Jacobin state could also situate himself comfortably at the heart of the centre-left republi- can leadership. The ‘reform of the state’ was a slogan which came to be tainted by association with the far right, as leading exponents such as the jurist Joseph Barthélemy came to occupy influential positions at Vichy.49 But it often had authentically republican roots, and as Paul- Boncour’s career demonstrated, it did not imply a necessarily rightward trajectory. Finally, Paul Smith’s contribution demonstrates the durabil- ity of a particular kind of pluralist project of state reform, namely the reform of the Senate to include an element of corporatist representa- tion, or representation of social interests on a basis other than territory. A project of this kind could appeal to, and in the end bring down, even such a personification of the republican state as Charles de Gaulle. Equally, however, Smith’s narrative reminds us of the longevity of state PROOF

16 Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France forms in modern France, even those, such as the territorially-based Senate, whose legitimacy and utility have been so widely contested. By choosing to bring together these reform movements, and the ideas and theories that underpin them, under the term ‘pluralism’, we are hoping to articulate the idea that the ‘alternative’ model which we are interested in has a value and quality to it that makes it worthy of study as a political theory or set of concepts in its own right. Indeed, what the contributions to this volume collectively demonstrate is that French republican discourse has at its command within its own history a pow- erful set of tools for considering in theoretical terms the problems of the present state-system. The difficulty of adapting republican principles of equality to the exigencies of ethnic minority monitoring in employ- ment law, for example, needs to be addressed through a more mature awareness that the ‘republican principle of equality’ is not a cut-and- dried affair, resolved once and for all at some point in 1789, and thus non-negotiable. Laski’s friend and colleague, the historian of political thought Roger Soltau, wrote in 1931:

Federalism, Regionalism, Autonomism – call it what you will, as long as it involves the abandoning of the chimera of an unrealizable tran- scendent unity, conformity to which is to be enforced. ... Hence the extraordinary importance of the work of Federalists, Syndicalists, Regionalists, Autonomists and the like; all in very different ways are threatening the idol of France one and indivisible which is but the perpetuation of old strifes.50 The idea that economic federalism, regional federalism, and the cam- paign to enshrine intermediary groups as legally viable aspects of the constitution, can somehow been seen as interconnected is vital for our current project. Not that the union of such diverse projects is in itself the answer; it is the common principles that these projects share that mat- ter. We are not convinced, in other words, that the practical proposals of any particular political movement in favour of pluralism will contain the seeds of future successful re-organization. Public debate in France has in the past accepted, and could once more today, that republican democracy is not under threat from such proposals; and that the implied pluralism that is contained within proposals such as greater regional autonomy or greater legal status for associations is itself something that could renew political discourse. There are too many projects or ideas that could be seen to be infused with some degree of Laski’s ‘pluralist’ spirit to analyse in one volume. PROOF

A Pluralist History? 17

The issue of faith communities in the unitary French Republic is one which is clearly of colossal relevance to contemporary debates, and has inspired a great deal of comment, much of it amply informed by his- torical reflection. The issue of whether gender creates sub-sets within the Republic has also been of huge importance since the Second World War. The essays collected here focus in particular on how a ‘pluralist’ model of the Republic might throw up ideas or projects in the realm of territorial organization and administration; in the sphere of social pol- icy, particularly in the philosophy and the politics of trades unionism in France; in the world of associations; and in the world of political organi- zation understood in its stricter sense, in terms of the growth of political parties. In many ways, these essays suggest startling new interpretations – so startling, in fact, that we may need to offer a note of caution. If we are right, and there are in fact connections and filiations that draw the anti- dirigiste liberals of the 1830s together with the syndicalists of the 1890s or the jurists of the 1920s, then one may begin to wonder why the ‘uni- tarist’ mindset has so often been seen as typically French. Nevertheless, however much one stresses this alternative way of thinking about the French state, we are left with a problem in current discourse. Educated opinion in France continues to ask, anxiously, whether a review of the way in which the state conceives of ethnic communities will not cause a collapse of republican principles. The moral force of this argument remains powerful. Indeed, in her subtle personal reflection on the theme of multiple identities, Mona Ozouf leaves questions such as this open, unable to find an easy answer in her own mind to the problem of repub- lican unity.51 The idea that there is one solid republican Jacobinism, by comparison with which other forms are an aberration, remains in public discourse today. In fact, the stark imagery of a divide between ‘Jacobin’ and ‘Girondin’ discourses is not in the final analysis appropriate here. The ‘plural’ tra- dition is more of a junior, dissident partner in the republican family; it is in some ways a transformation of Jacobinism in times when self- criticism is more of a priority. There is a closer relationship between the two than one might think. Indeed, just as Laski’s own interest in pluralism evolved into a more statist concept of the ‘brain state’, in which intermediary associations would be encouraged, but only as con- sultative bodies, to enhance the efficiency of the state itself, so French pluralism has sometimes been drawn into a reinforcing of the Jacobin tradition.52 As Julian Wright argues, the federalist Joseph Paul-Boncour saw the 1901 law on associations as an opportunity for a vigorous attack PROOF

18 Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France on Jacobinism; but even before the arch-Jacobin Émile Combes used it to attack clericalism, Waldeck-Rousseau, the reform’s author, had firmly articulated it as a means to strengthen the state in a time of social uncer- tainty. Jacobinism and pluralism have a far more intimate relationship than is sometimes understood. Pierre Rosanvallon has suggested that the blending of pluralist ideas into the theory of a revitalized ‘general interest state’ has led to the thwarting of anti-statist hopes. ‘If the initial Jacobin organization has been strongly corrected,’ argues Rosanvallon, ‘the political culture of the generality remains in people’s heads, with consequences in terms of the conception of sovereignty or general interest. The political world’s pretensions to be the very incarnation of social interest has continued to weigh heavily.’ In spite, or perhaps because of the widespread nature of pluralist arguments throughout the last two hundred years, decentral- ization, syndicalism or associationism has often been led away from its purest form, where public law could potentially arise from intermediary bodies. Often, pluralist theories have taken on a cultural significance, adding colour and flesh to the theory of the sovereignty of the state, rather than actually unpicking the very rationale of that theory. Misun- derstandings and theoretical crossed wires have thus abounded in many areas, not least the debates about internationalism that often fascinated French pluralists, as Jean-Michel Guieu and Carl Bouchard both empha- size in their contributions to this volume. Because historians have a vital role to play in the untangling of these debates, we have invited Alain Chatriot to contribute an epilogue that points to a host of new avenues for research. His essay will stimulate historians outside France to engage with much of the revisionist work in social history presently under way in France, and to push harder at the revision of French political history that so many of them are developing in more precise projects. Although we are not generally as pessimistic as Pierre Rosanvallon about the disconnection between the ‘political culture of the generality’ and the reality of the French state, there are still misunderstand- ings, simplifications and unfortunate stereotypes that abound in the way in which the political and thinking Frenchman considers the Republic and its genesis. It is partly to address this that our collec- tive project has been conceived, conscious of the fact that the time is now ripe for the new political historians of France to come together to seek a new understanding of the history and future of the French Republic. PROOF

A Pluralist History? 19

Notes

1. François Furet, Jacques Julliard and Pierre Rosanvallon (eds), La République du Centre. La Fin de l’exception française (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1988). 2. François Furet, Penser la Révolution (Paris : Gallimard, 1978). 3. Emmanuel Godin and Tony Chafer (eds), The French Exception (Oxford: Berghahn, 2005); Jill Lovecy, ‘Comparative politics and the Fifth French Republic: “la fin de l’exception francaise”’, European Journal of Political Research 21 (1992), 385–408; Jill Lovecy, ‘The end of French exceptionalism?’, West European Politics 22 (1999), 205–24; Sylvain Allemand (ed.), L’Exception française: mythe ou réalité?, Sciences Humaines Hors-série no. 46 (Sept. – Nov. 2004); Gilles Lazuech, L’Exception française: le modèle des grandes écoles à l’épreuve de la mondialisation (Rennes : Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1999); ‘La France est-elle un pays d’exception?’, Le Monde 15 April 2002. 4. Sue Collard, ‘The elusive French exception’, in Godin and Chafer (eds), The French Exception,p.37. 5. Christine Garin, ‘M. Chevènement défend l’exception culturelle’, Le Monde,5 Apr.l 2002. See also Michelle Vovelle, Les Jacobins: de Robespierre à Chevènement (Paris: La Découverte, 2001). 6. Nicolas Weill, ‘Mort de Pierre Poujade, précurseur d’un nouveau populisme’, Le Monde 28 Aug. 2003. 7. Rod Kedward, La Vie en Bleu: France and the French since 1900 (London: Penguin, 2006), ch. 20 (titled ‘The Challenge of Plurality’). 8. Quoted by Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 38. 9. Matthias Waechter, ‘Le Jacobinisme: la fin d’une tradition politique?’, L’Europe en Formation 2007 nos 3–4, 100. 10. Mona Ozouf, “‘Jacobin”: fortune et infortune d’un mot’, in Ozouf, L’Ecole de la France. Essais sur la Révolution, l’utopie et l’enseignement (Paris : Gallimard, 1984), p. 75. 11. J.E.S. Hayward, Governing France: the one and indivisible republic,2ndedn (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p. 22. 12. Sieyès, ‘What is the Third Estate?’, in Political Writings: including the debate between Sieyès and Tom Paine in 1791, ed. and trans. Michael Sonenscher (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), p. 156. 13. ‘Les mots de la rose’, Libération, 8 Jan. 2010, http://www.liberation.fr/ politiques/0101612556-les-mots-de-la-rose, accessed 16 Apr. 2010. 14. Many examples could be cited; for example, Stefano Mannoni, Une et Indivis- ible. Storia dell’accentramento amministrativo in Francia, 2 vols (Milan: Giuffrè, 1994–6), where vol. 1 part 1 deals with ‘Unification and pluralism: the strat- egy of the monarchy and its contradictions’; and Jack Hayward, Fragmented France: Two Centuries of Disputed Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 10, 77. 15. Harold J. Laski, ‘The pluralistic state’, The Philosophical Review 28 6 (Nov. 1919), 570, fn 1. 16. Laski, ‘The pluralistic state’, 571. 17. Joseph Paul-Boncour in Le Journal, 16 June 1910. 18. Laski was born in 1893, Gurvitch in 1894. PROOF

20 Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France

19. Georg Gurwitsch [sic], ‘Otto v. Gierke als Rechtsphilosoph’, Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur Bd XI (1922), 92–3. 20. For the influence of Proudhon and Bergson on Gurvitch: see Phillip Bosserman, Dialectical Sociology: An Analysis of the Sociology of Georges Gurvitch (Boston, Mass.: Porter Sargent, 1968), pp. 9, 11–12; for Gurvitch’s references to Duguit and Hauriou: Gurwitsch, ‘Otto v. Gierke’, 131. Laski introduced American political scientists to the work of Duguit: Harold J. Laski, ‘A note on M. Duguit’, Harvard Law Review, 31 1 (1917), 186–92. Harold and Frida Laski translated one of Léon Duguit’s key works: Law in the Modern State (New York: Huesch, 1919). 21. Cécile Laborde, Pluralist Thought and the State in Britain and France, 1900–25 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 185 n. 12. 22. F. W. Maitland, ‘Moral personality and legal personality’ [1903], reprinted in State, Trust and Corporation, edited by David Runciman and Magnus Ryan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 66. 23. Harold Laski, Authority in the Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919); Léon Duguit, Law in the Modern State, translated by Frida and Harold Laski (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921). On Duguit: H. S. Jones, The French State in Question: Public Law and Political Argument in the Third Repubic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1993), ch. 6, and Laborde, Pluralist Thought, ch. 5. 24. André Tardieu, La Révolution à refaire. Le souverain captif (Paris: Flammarion, 1936), p. 126. 25. Joseph W. Evans, ‘Jacques Maritain and the problem of pluralism in polit- ical life’, Review of Politics 22 (1960), 307–23; Jacques Maritain, ‘The con- cept of sovereignty’, American Political Science Review 44 (1950), 343–57, esp. 356. 26. See also Bernard Lavergne, Suffrage universel et autorité de l’Etat: leur concilia- tion effective par le pluralisme électoral (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949). 27. Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Aspects du régime de Vichy’, Revue Française de Science Politique 6 (1956), 44–59; Robert C. Lieberman, ‘What to read on lobbying’, Foreign Affairs 26 May 2009. 28. René Rémond, ‘Droite et gauche dans le catholicisme français contempo- raine’, Revue française de Science politique 8 (1958), 535. 29. Robert Derathé, ‘L’homme et l’Etat. A propos d’un livre récent de Jacques Maritain’, Revue française de Science politique 2 (1952), 141. 30. Raymond Aron, Sociologie des sociétés industrielles : esquisse d’une théorie des régimes politiques (Paris : Centre de Documentation Universitaires, 1959). 31. V. Giscard d’Estaing, Démocatie française (Paris: Fayard, 1976), ch. 6, especially pp. 96–7, 99, 104. 32. Charente Libre, 1 June 2007, at http://www.bayrou.fr/opencms/opencms/ media/1presse/bayrou-charente-libre-010607.html, accessed 18 Apr. 2010. 33. Mouvement Démocrate. Charte des Valeurs adoptée le 2 décem- bre 2007. http://www.mouvementdemocrate.fr/evenements/telechargement/ charte_des_valeurs.pdf (accessed 14 Apr. 2010). 34. Benjamin Constant, ‘The spirit of conquest and usurpation and their rela- tion to European civilization’ [1813], in Constant, Political Writings,ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 73. PROOF

A Pluralist History? 21

35. On the curious position of liberalism in French political culture: David Howarth and Georgios Varouxakis (eds), Contemporary France: An Introduction to French Politics and Society (London: Arnold, 2003), pp. 18–23. H. S. Jones, ‘French liberalism and the legacy of the Revolution’, in Carolina Armenteros, Tim Blanning, Isabel DiVanna and Dawn Dodds (eds), Historicising the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008), pp. 189–205. 36. Raymond Aron, ‘Les intellectuels français et l’utopie’, Preuves 50 (Apr. 1955), 9–10. We are grateful to Dr Iain Stewart for this reference. 37. In saying this, we are of course aware of Lucien Jaume’s argument that an important strand in French liberalism privileged the rights of the state over those of the individual. Rosanvallon too writes of the ‘liberal recasting of Jacobinism’ by Guizot, Thiers, and others. Lucien Jaume, L’Individu effacé ou le paradoxe du libéralisme français (Paris: Fayard, 1997), esp. ch. 2, and Pierre Rosanvallon, The Demands of Liberty: Civil Society in France since the Revolution. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 8. 38. For example: Alexandre Ledru-Rollin, De la Décadence de l’Angleterre, 2 vols (Paris: Escudier, 1850); Stuart Jones, ‘Taine and the nation-state’, in Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore (eds), Writing National His- tories: Western Europe since 1800 (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 85–96; Alan Peter Russell Pitt, ‘The evolution of liberal thought under the Third French Republic c.1860–c.1940’, University of Cambridge PhD thesis, 1995). 39. On this, see the contributions to Eugenio F. Biagini (ed.), Citizenship and Com- munity: Liberals, Radicals and Collective Identities in the British Isles 1865–1931 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 40. M. [Louis] de Bonald, Observations sur l’ouvrage de Madame la Baronne de Staël, ayant pour titre : Considérations sur les principaux événemens de la Révolution française [1818] (Paris: Adrien le Clere, 1838), p. 49. 41. The distinction was developed extensively in the political science literature of the 1970s, when neo-corporatist politics were at their zenith: P. C. Schmitter, ‘Still the century of corporatism’, Review of Politics 36 (1974), 85–131; Alan Cawson, ‘Pluralism, corporatism and the role of the state’, Government and Opposition 13 (1978), 178–98; Frank L. Wilson, ‘French interest group poli- tics: pluralist or neocorporatist?’, American Political Science Review 77 (1983), 895–910; John T.S. Keeler, ‘Situating France on the pluralism–corporatism continuum: a critique of and alternative to the Wilson perspective’, Com- parative Politics 17 (1985), 229–49. 42. Hayward, Fragmented France, v; Sudhir Hazareesingh (ed.), The Jacobin Legacy in Modern France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 6. 43. Rosanvallon, Demands of Liberty, pp. 186–91; Maurice Agulhon, Le Cercle dans la France bourgeoise, 1810–1848 : Etude d’une mutation de sociabilite’ (Paris: Colin, 1977). 44. Vincent Wright, ‘Introduction: la fin du dirigisme?’, Modern and Contemporary France 5 (1997), 151. 45. For example, Th. Ferneuil, Les Principes de 1789 et la science sociale (Paris: Hachette, 1889). 46. Rosanvallon, Demands of Liberty, pp. 158–61. PROOF

22 Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France

47. For a novel approach: Odile Rudelle, ‘La gauche, les institutions et le gaullisme’, in Histoire des gauches en France, eds G. Candar and J.-J. Becker (Paris: La découverte, 2005 [2004]) ii, pp. 507–23. 48. Henry Bérenger in L’Action, 16 May 1910, quoted in Julian Wright, ‘Social reform, state reform, and Aristide Briand’s moment of hope in France, 1909– 1910’, French Historical Studies 28 (2005), 32. 49. For one example, see Gilles Martinez, ‘Joseph Barthélemy et la crise de la démocratie libérale’, Vingtième Siècle no. 59 (July-Sept. 1998), 28–47. 50. R. H. Soltau, French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Russell and Russell, 1931), p. 492. 51. Mona Ozouf, Composition française: retour sur une enfance bretonne (Paris: Gallimard, 2009). 52. Harold J. Laski, The Grammar of Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1925), p. 238. PROOF

Index

Action Française, 130, 164, 183 Bérard, Alexandre, 211 Action Libérale Populaire, 162–4, 170 Bergeron, Joseph, 211 Adam, Juliette, 185 Bergson, Henri, 6 Adam, Paul, 185, 211 Bidault, Georges, 237 Agulhon, Maurice, 12 Blanc, Louis, 108–9 Algeria/Algerians/Algerian War, 165, Bloch, Marc, 127 240–1 Blum, Léon, 235 Alvarez, Alejandro, 217, 222, 224 Bluntschli, Johann, 114 America, see United States Bourrey, Georges, 211 Annales School, 126 Brentano, Lujo, 191–2 Anarchism, anarchists, 13, 41, 91, 132 Brindejonc de Bermingham, 211 Appuhn, Charles, 211 Britain, Aristocracy, 35–7, 45, 66–84 ‘Anglo-Saxon’ liberalism, 9 Aristotle, 41 anti-suffragist women’s groups, 171 Aron, Raymond, 7, 9 Charles Cottu on, 70 Assemblée de l’Union française 239 Commonwealth, 240 Association française pour la Société des House of Lords, 71 Nations, 218 mixed constitution, 49 Aubry, Martine, 2 political parties, 151 Auclert, Hubertine, 167 pluralist political thought, 3 Augustine of Hippo, St, 105 seventeenth-century political Auriol, Vincent, 235 theorists, 41 Autonomism, 16 trade unionism, 191 Avenel, Henri, 151 Bodin, Jean, 42, 44 Bolshevism, 221 Baker, Keith Michael, 46 Bonald, Louis de, 11, 101, 130 Balladur, Édouard, 245–6 Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon, 67, 73 Barante, Prosper de, 72–4, 76–9 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 4, 13, 50–2, 58, Barrès, Maurice, 184 66, 67, 70–1, 73, 248 Barrot, Odilon, 73–4, 79 Boulainvilliers, Henri de, 47 Barthélemy, Joseph, 15, 216, 218, 221, Bourbons, 46, 66, 67, 70, 233 223–4 Bourgeois, Léon, 185, 216, 218 Barthou, Louis, 148 Bourguiba, Habib, 240 Baruch, Marc Olivier, 253 Boury, Baronne, 171 Basdevant, Jules, 218 Bousset, Jacques-Bénigne, 45, 49 Bastiat, Frédéric, 110 Boutang, Pierre, 132 Bastid, Paul, 235 Briand, Aristide, 13, 201, 223 Bayrou, François, 8 Broglie, Victor de, 73 Beauquier, Charles, 185 Bruhnès, Jean, 211 Belgium Brulat, Paul, 211 suffrage 164 Brunschvicg, Léon, 126 Benoist, Charles, 181 Buisson, Ferdinand, 211

264 PROOF

Index 265

Burke, Edmund, 36, 40n Comte, Auguste, 132 Busson-Billault, Henri, 211 Conseil économique et social (CES), 239, 241, 244, 246 Callon, Jean-Eric, 232, 236 Conseil national des Femmes Françaises, Calvinism/Calvinists, 43 166, 167 Capitant, René, 237, 243–4 Conseil de la République. 238–9 Cassin, René, 216, 218, 221 Le Conservateur (journal), 71 Castellio, Sebastian, 42 Constant, Benjamin, 9, 10, 25, 26, 27, Catholics/Catholicism, 7, 14, 42, 43, 37, 41–65, 66, 67, 71–2, 78 46, 102, 104, 129, 130, 161–78, on representation, 52–5 200, 218, 234, 250 and Rousseau, 55–6 Catholic liberals, 59 Constituent Assembly, 188, 236–7 Cartesian rationalism, 42 Constitutional Council, 241 Chanet, Jean-François, 252 Corporatism, 8, 11, 21n, 101, 106–7, La Charbonnerie (secret society), 102 181, 234, 250 Charles-Brun, Jean, 163, 180, Corréard, Jules, 211 199–205, 209–10, 211, 252 Corsican nationalism, 2 Chateaubriand, René de, 71, 78 Coste-Floret, Paul, 235, 237 Chartier, Roger, 46 Cot, Pierre, 236 Chavenon, Léon, 211 Cottu, Charles, 70 Christianity, 31, 103–7, 117 Coudenhove-Kalergi, comte, 226 Christian Democrats, 235 Couve de Murville, Maurice, 243 Citizenship Croix de Feu, 133 active citizenship, 27, 67 La Croix, 171 Catholic women’s groups’ articulation of, 14, 170 Daladier, Edouard,˙ 182, 252 models of, 13, 161–78 Debré, Michel, 239–41 republican model of 1, 3, 4 Defferre, Gaston, 240–1 and representation, 36 Democracy, 5, 9, 16, 36, 68, 71–2, women’s citizenship, 31 74–6, 78–80, 83, 122, 124–5, Charles IX, 69 131–3, 144, 161, 163, 165–6, Charles X, 67 180–1, 234, 254–7 Chevènement, Jean-Pierre, 2 Deraismes, Maria, 167 Clemenceau, Georges, 183, 196n Descartes, Rene, 130 Clémentel law (1917), 202 Deschanel, Paul, 148, 185 La Cocarde, 185 Desthieux, Jean, 210, 211 Coke, Edward, 100 Devuns, Marthe, 174 colonialism/post-colonialism, 130, Diderot, Denis, 43 133, 238–9, 256 Directory, The, 25, 33, 51 Colrat, Maurice, 181 Doctrinaires, 59 Combes, Émile, 18, 183 Doumergue, Gaston, 234 commercialism, 29 Dreyfus Affair, 163, 180, 183, 185, 200 Commissions de Développement Dreyfusards, 188 économique régional (CODER), 243 Dubasque, François, 201 Commissariat Général du Plan, 123 Dubreuil, Hyacinthe, 132 Commission Mixte Paritaire, 240 Duclert, Vincent, 253 Committee of Public Safety, 27 Duclos, Jacques, 241 Communism/communists, 110, 232, Duguit, Léon, 6, 192, 216–19, 234 236, 238 Dumay, Henri, 211 PROOF

266 Index

Dunoyer, Charles, 107 laws, 27 Dupré, Victor, 211 legacy of, 112, 117–18, 144, 188–9, Dupuis, Charles, 218 191, 193, 248–9 Dupuy, Charles, 148 liberals on, 9, 26, 66–7 Durkheim, Emile, 126, 129, 130, 132, and liberty, 6 188, 191 Paul-Boncour on, 189–90 and public instruction, 35 Education, 31, 35, 169 principles of 1789, 12, 130, 191–2, Egalitarianism, 4, 69–70, 73, 78, 87, 194 91, 93, 171, 256 Proudhon on, 85–6, 95–6, 109–11, Elections, 141–60 118 Enfantin, Prosper, 102 Staël on, 51 Enlightenment, 1, 26, 42, 44, 46, 96, state model, 9, 161, 251 98n, 130, 132 women’s rights, 164–75 Epicureanism, 102 French Revolution (1848), 73, 74 Ethnic minorities, 2–3, 16–17, 122, Fur, Louis Le, 216–17, 219, 224–5 130, 209 Furet, François, 1, 33 European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages, 3 Gambetta, Léon, 147, 237 European Union, 216, 223–4 Gaulle, Charles de, 2, 13, 15, 232, 235–7, 239–45 Farjenel, Fernand, 211 Geneva Protocol (1924), 215, 221 Fauchille, Paul, 217 Gide, Charles, 192, 233 Federalism, 16, 41, 86, 91, 98n, 124, Gierke, Otto von, 5, 99–100, 116 133, 182–4, 187, 198–214, 216, Girondins, 17 223, 225, 227 Giscard, Valéry d’Estaing, 7, 8 Ferry, Jules, 231 Le Globe (periodical) 102 Festival of Federation (1790), 86 Gouin, Félix, 236 Financial crisis (2008), 3 Gouttenoire de Toury, Fernand, 211 First World War, 124, 127–8, 147, Greeks, ancient, 28 198–214, 215, 254–5 Guichard, Olivier, 243–5 Flach, Maurice, 211 Guieu, Jean-Michel, 201 Foucault, Michel, 255 Guizot, François, 50, 67, 79, 250 Fouillée, Alfred, 99–121 Gulf War (First), 2 Fourier, Charles, 130 Gurvitch, Georges, 5, 7, 11, 122, Fournière, Eugène, 185, 188 124–34 Franks, 47 Free market 7, 10, 11 Halbwachs, Maurice, 126 French Revolution (1789) The Hague Academy of International as group of political actors, 4 Law, 215 bicentenary 1, 164 Hauriou, André, 235 centralization, 50 Hauriou, Maurice, 6 counter-revolutionaries/ Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, 3 counterrevolutions 11, 42, 86, Haute-Garonne, 235 101 Haye, Charles, 211 Declaration of the Rights of Man Hayek, Friedrich, 79 and Citizen (1789), 44, 47 Hazareesingh, Sudhir, 248 egalitarianism, 70, 73, 78 Heidegger, Martin, 124 ending the Revolution, 33 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 115 PROOF

Index 267

Hennessy, Jean, 198–214 Julliard, Jacques, 1 Henry IV, 43, 46 Justice 50, 123, 125, 193, Herriot, Édouard, 235 Proudhon on, 93–4, 111, 133 Heuzey, Charles, 211 Hippeau, Edmond, 211 Kant, Immanuel, 30, 38n, 96, 124, 126 Hitler, Adolf, 182 Kaplan, Steven, 250–1 Hobbes, Thomas, 53 Kauffman, Caroline, 167 Hobson, Samuel George, 6 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 215 Hodent, Henri (pseudonym of Klejman, Laurence, 167 Maurice Guénard), 211 Kopelmanas, Lazare, 226 Hoffmann, Stanley, 7 Kuisel, Richard, 255 Hotman, François, 45 Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, 239 La Brière, Yves de, 224 Huguenots, 43 Lally-Tollendal, comte de, 48 Husserl, Edmund, 124 Lambert, Jacques, 216 Lamennais, Hugues-Félicité de, 6, 102 Institut de droit international, 215, Lapradelle, Albert Geouffre de, 218 216–18, 222 Institut des hautes études internationales, Larnaude, Ferdinand, 216, 218, 222, 215 224 Internationalism, 15, 18, 198–214, 221 Laski, Harold, 5, 7, 16–17, 59n, 101, 180, 184, 186 Jablonka, Ivan, 256 Lastelle, Jean-Laurent, 4 Jacobins/Jacobinism, 4, 17, 18, 27–32, Lavergne, Bernard, 6, 233, 236, 243 33, 51, 53, 58, 87, 141 Lavigerie, Charles (Cardinal), 162 concept of, 5 Laws, French, neo-Jacobin, 2 Le Chapelier Law, 12, 188, 190 Jacobin Ideology/tradition, 2, 12, on Trade Unions (1884), 161 14, 153, 193, 194, 200 on associations (1901), 161–78, 184, Jacobin Republic, 2, 9 185 radical Jacobinism, 25 League of Nations, 202–9, 215–30 and Catholicism, 162 Lefort, Claude, 26 Jacobin state model, 3, 15, 133, 161, Lemercier, Claire, 251 179, 248–63 Lemire, Abbé, 170, 234 liberal critique of, 26 Le Foyer, Lucian, 203 Jansenists/Jansenism, 43, 44 Leo XIII, 162–3 Jaurès, Jean, 186 Leroux, Pierre, 11, 99–121 Jeanneney, Jean-Marcel, 243–5 Leroy, Maxime, 124 Jeanneney, Jules, 235, 237 Lévy-Bruhl, Henri, 220 Johnson, Alvin, 127 Lewis, Mary, 128 Jones, Stuart, 100, 253 L’Esprit (journal), 7 Jonnart, Charles, 148 L’Hôpital, Michel, 42–43 Jospin, Lionel, 2 Liberalism, liberals, 8, 9, 13, 17, 21n, Jouvenel, Bertrand de, 10, 69, 25–40, 41–65, 250 79–80 aristocratic liberalism, defined, 11, Jouvenel, Henry de, 182, 193 66–84, 84n Jouvenel, Robert de, 211 critics of Jacobinism, 9, 26, 36, 67, Judaism/Jews, 60n, 106–7 124, 128, 173, 250 133, 167, 253 and the free market, 10–11, 110 PROOF

268 Index

Liberalism, liberals – continued Monarchists, 13, 43, 144, 152, 162, liberal feminism, 167 179, 183, 200 and monarchism, 26, 42 See also : Royalists and pluralism, 9–12, 50–9 Monnerville, Gaston, 238–9, 241–2, and representation, 36 244 Restoration liberals, 72 Monory, René, 232 Ligue d’action régionaliste (LAR) 202–3 Montaigne, 130 Ligues des Femmes Françaises, (LFF) Montalembert, Charles de, 78 162, 168–9 Montalembert, Marc-René de. Ligues Féminine d’action catholique 72, 78 française, 168 Montesquieu, 10, 43, 47–8, 69, 70, 80, Ligues Patriotique des Françaises,(LPDF) 123 162, 168–73 Moulin, Jean, 251 Mounier, Emmanuel, 7, 48 Locke, John, 43 Mouskhély, Michel, 226 Louis XIV, 43, 46 Mouvement démocratique,8 Louis XVIII, 42, 53, 66 Mun, Albert de, 201 Lubac, Henri de, 132 Multiculturalism, 2, 3, 8, 124 Lycurgus, 34 Mutualism, 89–91, 98n

Maastricht treaty, 1 National Assembly, 8, 48, 51, 73, 231, Machiavelli, Niccolò, 26 235, 238, 240, 242 Mac-Mahon, Patrice de, 147 Nazis, 80, 128 Madison, James, 36 Necker, Jacques, 55 Maistre, Joseph de, 102, 104–6, 108, Nicene Council, 105 117, 130, 132 Noaillat-Devuns, Marthe de, 169 Maitland, F.W., 6, 100, 111 Man, Henri de, 236 Offen, Karen, 165, 167 Matignon accords, 2 Organisation Internationale de la Maritain, Jacques, 6, 7 Francophonie, 240 Orléans, 233 Marx, Karl, 183 Opportunists, 151, 153 Maugeret, Marie, 168 Otlet, Paul, 203 Mauroy, Pierre, 2 Ozouf, Mona, 4, 17 Maurras, Charles, 132, 179, 182–3, 200 Pacifism, 218 May 1968, 7, 242, 245 Pams, Jules, 148 Medici, Catherine de, 43 Parsons, Talcott, 127 Mélinists, 151 Paul-Boncour, Joseph, 5, 15, 17, Menthon, François de, 226, 234–7 179–97, 200 Michelet, 85–9 Péguy, Charles, 132 Millerand, Alexandre, 148, 184–8, Pelagius, 105 192 Pétain, Philippe, 132, 181, 201, 235 Minard, Philippe, 250–1 Pflimlin, Pierre, 239 Mitterrand, François, 1, 4, 240 Phenomenology, 124, 126 Mollet, Guy, 239 Philip, André, 236–7 Morality, 30–1, 34–5, 59, 69 Pillet, Antonine, 216, 218 Monarchy, 10, 11, 13, 35, 44–51, 58, Piou, Jacques, 162–3, 170, 173 70, 100, 105, 132, 163 Pignot, Émile, 203–4 PROOF

Index 269

Plato, 41, 106 Restoration, the, 53, 67–68, 70, 102, Pluralism 161 British plurarlists, 99–101, 112, 117, Reuter, Paul, 132, 226 124 Revue d’économie politique, 192 and corporatism, 11 Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 126 definition 4–8, 188 Revue socialiste, 192 electoral pluralism, 141–60 Richelieu, Cardinal, 29 German pluralists, 99–101, 112, 117 Richer, Léon, 167 and Jacobinism, 2, 18, 27 Riot-Sarcey. Michèle, 165 and liberalism, 9–10, 41–65 Rivière, Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de, 26 and Proudhon, 88 Rocard, Michel, 2 Poincaré, Raymond, 148, 201 Rochefort, Florence, 167 Polybius, 41 Roederer, Pierre-Louis, 55, Politis, Nicolas, 224 Romans/Roman Republic, 28, 33, Pompidou, Georges, 241–4 104–7, 118, 217, 220 Poncelet, Christian. 245 Rondent-Saint, 211 Postel, Guillaume, 42 Rosanvallon, Pierre, 1, 12, 18, 26, 39n, Poujade, Pierre, 2 50, 62n, 141, 146–7, 161, 165, Pound, Roscoe, 127 174, 184, 248–50, 256 Protestantism, 35, 43, 44, 46, 106, 236 Rosental, Paul-André, 254 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 6, 11, 15, Rouleaux-Dugage, Abbé, 170 85–98, 99–121, 123–5, 130–3, Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 48–9, 51–2, 179, 183, 198–214 55–6, 126, 130 Pufendorf, 26 Royalists, 41, 42, 53, 68, 70–2, 76, 86, Putnam, Robert, 123 172 Royer-Collard, Pierre Paul, 6, 185 Queuille, Henri, 238 Russian Revolution, 128

Raffarin, Jean-Pierre, 13 Saint-Simon, Henri de, 101–2, 130 Rassemblement du Peuple Français, 238 Saint-Simonianism, 102–4, 106, Rawls, John, 10, 123 117–18 Referendum, 1992, 2 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 2, 8, 245–6 Regionalism, 15–16, 163, 173, 181, Sarren, Louis, 211 183–6, 192–3, 198–214, 215–30, Sarrien, Ferdinand, 148 252 Say, Léon, 192 Reille, Baronne, 169 Scelle, Georges, 216–26 Rémond, René, 7 Scott, Joan Wallach, 165 Renard, Georges, 211 Schönberg, Gustav, 192 Republicanism, 3, 4, 11, 16, 27, 28, Second Empire, 67–8, 74, 142–60 248 Second World War, 2, 15, 17, 125, 126, classical republics, 28 226, 256 early modern republicanism, 26, 37 Section Française de L’Internationale industrial republicanism, 132 Ouvrière (SFIO), 151, 153 liberal republicanism, 25–40 Senghor, Léopold, 240 model of citizenship, 8 Séguin, Philippe, 2 modern republicanism, 37 Senate, 15–16, 104, 182, 231–3, 235, ‘republican party’, 144–6 237–42, 244–5 and social realism, 101 Sénat de la Communauté, 239 and socialism, 124, 151, 153 Serpeille de Gobineau, Clément, 211 PROOF

270 Index

Seyssel, Claude de, 45 Ultramontanes, 29 Sibert, Marcel, 221 Union pour la Démocratie Française,8 Siegfried, André, 143 Union démocratique des Travailleurs Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph, 4, 27–8, 32, (UDT), 241–2 55, 87 Union de la Jeunesse Catholique du Midi, slavery, 28–9 174 Smith, Paul, 168 Union Gaulliste, 237 Socialist Party, 8 Union française pour le suffrage des Social Research, 129 femmes, 166 social realism, 8, 11, 99–121 Union juridique internationale, 215, socialists, 13, 41, 101, 103, 108–9, 222 151, 153, 188, 231, 236 United Nations International Société Proudhon, 15, 198 Convention on Civil and Political Solidarism, 112, 185, 216 Rights (1966), 3 Soltau, Roger, 16, 180 United States, Sowerwine, Charles, 165 Americanization, 122–3 Spanish Civil War, 128 comparisons with France, 254, 256 Staël, Germaine de, 9, 10, 25–40, constitution, 41, 163 41–65, 66, 72, 78 Gurvitch, 125, 127 Stanziani, Alessandro, 255 multiculturalism, 124 Steffani, Gaston, 226 New Deal, 131 Suffrage, 5, 31, 68, 74–5, 141–60, political thinkers, 48 163–5, 239, 240–1 Tocqueville, 74–8, 123 syndicalists/syndicalism 17, 18, 132, 133, 179–81, 183, 192–3, 250 Vallon, Louis, 237, 241–3 Van Kley, Dale, 46 Taine, Hippolyte, 114, 179 Veber, Pierre, 211 Tardieu, André, 6, 180–3, 201 Vergus, Anne, 165, 170 Le Temps (newspaper), 151 Vichy regime, 6, 14, 15, 125, 132, 133, Terror, the, 25, 27, 28, 33, 51, 74 201, 235, 250, 253 Téry,Gustave,211 Théremin, Charles-Guillaume, 9, 10, Villeneuve, Marquis de, 211 25–40 La Voix du Peuple (periodical), 108 Thermidor, 25 Voltaire, 26, 43, 130 Thiers, Adolphe, 250 Third Republic, 5, 14, 15, 142–60, Waldeck-Rousseau, Pierre, 18, 181, 161–78, 179–97, 235 183–8, 193 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 27, 37, 50, 57, Walzer, Michael, 123 66, 68, 74–80, 123, 249–50 Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 191 Topalov, Christian, 254 Weiss, André, 219 Totalitarianism, 7 Wilson, Woodrow, 224 Touraine, Alain, 122, 133 Wright, Julian, 100, 201, 252 Trade unions, 2, 8, 12, 17, 161, 179, Women, 14–15, 28–32, 161–78, 253, 190, 234, 235, 243, 251, 254 256 Truchy, Henri, 224 Suffrage, 31, Truman, David B., 7 Théremin on, 29–32, 39n