Nations and Nationalism 15 (2), 2009, 319–339.

The fluidity of nationalistic and ethnic aspirations in

CHANINTIRA NA THALANG Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand and University of Bristol, UK

ABSTRACT. Peace negotiations between the Indonesian government and the (GAM) have resulted in the signing of the Memorandum of Under- standing (MoU) ultimately ending a three-decade-long struggle for independence. Through a historical comparative analysis, this article explores the changing nature of Acehnese nationalism. It explores how Acehnese ethnicity and nationalism are constructed and how they have transformed over the decades in conflict with the Indonesian government. Acehnese ethnicity and nationalism, which are political in nature and ethnic in character, have ideologically shifted throughout time. Historical junctures and myths were utilised to legitimise these changing ideological goals. Despite the transformation of Acehnese nationalism and consequent changes in its ideological basis, a strong Acehnese identity still remains a constant.

KEY WORDS: Aceh; Acehnese nationalism; constructing identity; .

Introduction

The aim of this article is to illustrate that Acehnese nationalism is fluid and to chart its changing trajectory since the late nineteenth century. I show that this fluidity is best understood as changes in the ideological expression of Acehnese nationalism by elite leaders rather than diminished, or heightened, mass sentiments. Although the ideological basis of nationalism fluctuates, the sense of national identity is not necessarily weak. I also stress that hazy and vague definitions of what constitutes identity do not necessarily make the

For the sake of consistency, this article will use the Indonesian spelling of Aceh. In some original texts included in this article, the authors have preferred the nineteenth-century English version of Aceheh. Other ways of spelling include Atjeh which is the Dutch version. As far as possible, I have also tried to use a standard form of the 1972 transliteration in the Indonesian and Malay languages in my study. Unless the old spelling is preferred in the original text, this study follows the 1972 standardised spelling.

The author thanks Adam Burke, Duncan McCargo, Andrew Wyatt, Nelson Vaz and two anonymous reviewers for their comments.

r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 320 Chanintira na Thalang bond between the people as a community and their identity weak or less real to them. Not all nationalist movements achieve the apparent goal of independence. In some cases, nationalists may demand or settle for a political deal short of independence such as asymmetrical autonomy, thus transforming the original goal of independence. To accommodate such changes in nationalism, the Acehnese have used history and myths to glorify the nation. Their construc- tions of history and myths are altered to legitimise new ideological goals within a changing ethnic or nationalist project. As ideological goals change, various historical events are selected and others are concealed to legitimise certain goals of the political movement (Breuilly 1996: 166). The objectives of Acehnese nationalists have included delegitimising the Indonesian state from which they sought to separate, and also gaining support from external forces such as foreign states. Most importantly, the construction of myths and history are aimed at creating a sense of unity within the nation. However, this is not to imply that Acehnese nationalism and ethnicity is uniform. Within Aceh, there are various social groups amongst the Acehnese and ethnic groups such as the Gayo and Alas that do not subscribe to the expressions of Acehnese identity. Rather than analysing different discourses of nationalism within Aceh, the article will analyse dominant expressions of Acehnese identities at various junctures. Through a historical comparative analysis, my narrative of shifting constructions of nationalism will be illuminated by accounts of how the Acehnese have constructed ethnicity and nationalism at several key junctures. These expressions are taken from the literature or declarations of nationalist elites from five different periods: (1) The 1873 Sabil War against the Dutch. Though a sense of nationalism had occurred on the elite level, it was absent at the mass level. However, the sense of cohesion and consciousness amongst the Acehnese was evident; (2) The 1945 Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch. A sense of nationalism emerged to support the Indonesian nationalist elite to declare independence for Indonesia, not for Aceh; (3) During the phase, beginning in 1953, the Acehnese religious leaders (ulama) sought to change the basis of the Indonesian nation but not the Indonesian state; (4) The Free Aceh Movement (GAM)’s Redeclaration of Independence of 1976 was an important restatement of nationalist ideas; (5) The 2005 Helsinki Peace Process. Acehnese ambitions were restated in a more modest way when GAM accepted concessions that fell short of independence for Aceh.

Nation, nationalism and national identity

Despite claims made by modernisation theorists that nationalism would inexorably decline, nationalist sentiments have continued to disrupt and have profound effects on security, and at times can even transform the territorial boundaries of the state. Though nationalism is not a new social r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 Nationalistic and ethnic aspirations in Aceh 321 phenomenon, it was adopted as a topic of academic interest only with the upsurge of anti-colonial movements in the 1960s (Hutchinson and Smith 1994: 3). Contemporary debates began searching for explanations for the origins, causes and types of nationalism, yet there remains very little consensus on these issues, nor on defining the boundaries of the concept itself. In fact, defining nationalism is difficult, because the term is used to cover an array of social phenomena that widely differ in terms of objectives and characteristics. Hence, like many other concepts, nationalism cannot be reduced to a single meaning. When defining the boundaries of nationalism that appropriately fits the Acehnese case, it is best to talk about the concept in relation to ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic group’. Both terms are often used interchangeably. It is crucial to establish boundaries between the two because Acehnese nationalistic and ethnic aspirations are fluid. Distinguishing the two concepts is no easy task as both share a number of characteristics. Both are collectivities whose members presume a particular identity and draw boundaries vis-a` -vis ‘the other’. Equally, both are often viewed as political acts. As both concepts may overlap in many ways, the boundaries of a nation and ethnic group become clearer once the nation is referred to in respect of its relationship with the state. As Ernest Gellner holds: ‘Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner 1983: 1). Taking Gellner’s definition of nationalism, Acehnese nationalism emerged during its call for independence under ’s rule. At various other junctures, Acehnese aspirations have fallen short of claims for statehood. As such, Acehnese aspirations change according to time. Whether these aspirations are ethnic or nationalistic depends on the context, hence the usage of both terms in the title of this article. The many definitions of nationalism agree that nationalism predominantly is ideological. In the broadest sense, nationalism ‘builds on people’s awareness of a nation (national self-consciousness) to give a set of attitudes and a programme of action’ (Kellas 1991: 3). Nationalisms can also be ethnic or civic in nature. The type of nationalism crucial to examining Acehnese nationalism is ethnic and political. It is ethnic because the constructions of Acehnese nationalism draw on history, myths and a land shared amongst the Acehnese. It is political because it essentially involves a struggle over power (Breuilly 1993: 1), first with the Dutch and then with the Indonesian government. However, the ideological basis of Acehnese identity has fluctuated between the revolution against the Dutch and the recent peace deal signed after the December 2004 tsunami. It is a dispute over what should constitute the boundaries of the ‘national’ that has led to conflicts between the government and the secessionist move- ments such as in Aceh and Papua, two longstanding secessionist movements in Indonesia. The Indonesian government holds that the nation encompasses all groups within the geographical boundaries of the former Dutch Indies.

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This view is consistent with ‘civic nationalism’ or territorial nationalism that is equated with post-independence movements seeking to integrate a population of diverse ethnic groups of a former colony (Smith 1991: 82). Because these groups are bound together by a common homeland, civic nationalism could encourage the participation of the people in the state and civil society institutions, which in turn would generate a national character and civic culture, regardless of the diversity of ancestry amongst the people (Brown 1999: 283). By contrast, secessionism in areas such as Papua and Aceh would fit the definition of ethnic nationalisms that coincide with an ethnic group. Nationalism is commonly constructed on claims to ancestral territories, ancient language, religion, myth or a recent common past (Eriksen 1993: 67–75). Differences in constructions of what constitutes the same nation tell us that nationalism is a subjectively constructed principle. Nationalist elites play a critical role in defining the boundaries and construction of a nation. Not only can the ideological basis of nationalism transform over time, but also the form nationalism takes is not always a constant. The use of the term ethnic nationalism should by no means imply that the term ethnic is biologically fixed or primordial. However, when the conceptions of the nation are constructed, the members of the nation may give a faint or hazy picture of the constructions of the nation. This has led some modernists such as Gellner or Eric Hobsbawm to make claims that constructions of the nation are fabricated or artificial (Gellner 1983: 1; Hobsbawm 1990: 9). However, this has been disputed by Benedict Anderson who claims that ‘imagining’ or constructing nationalism does not necessarily imply that it is any less real (Anderson 1991: 7). The key to national identity is dependent on an existing sense of togetherness. As Anderson convincingly argues:

. . . regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings (Anderson 1991: 7).

Even though there are different ideas of how groups and localities within Acehnese society would construct their nation (Aspinall 2003: 141–2), what binds all these different constructions is that they have a conception of what it is to be Acehnese. National identity is simply a matter of asking the question, ‘Who am I?’ (Guibernau 1996: 72). It involves a process which enables a member of a group to distinguish who are members of that particular group and who are not (Spencer and Wollman 2002: 58). As Smith quite rightly notes: ‘National identity involves some sense of political community however tenuous’ (Smith 1991: 9). It should be noted that having a faint idea of the conceptions of the nation does not correlate with the intensity of nationalist sentiment or of a nationalist movement, as long there is a sense of belong- ingness (Hewitt 2002: 129). This sense of belongingness binds the people r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 Nationalistic and ethnic aspirations in Aceh 323 together despite not knowing every fellow-member of the community (An- derson 1991: 6–7). National identity becomes important when it is threatened by the processes of modernisation such as migration and economic change (Eriksen 1993: 68). As such, the process of constructing or reproducing the nation will continue. Though events such as war and conquest may transform expressions of national identity, a sense of identity still remains (Hettne 1993: 72).

The basis of Acehnese nationalism

It is common for nationalists to draw on a glorious past and myths to accentuate the nation as a rallying point. Acehnese nationalists are no exception. Acehnese nationalists throughout time have often drawn on the greatness of Aceh’s golden past. Other elements such as ancestral territories, ancient language, religion or a recent common past have been glorified to create a sense of pride and bond between the Acehnese. Aceh, a region situated at the most northern point of the island of , has a rich historical past and an abundance of sources to construct a sense of nationalism. Aceh rose as Malacca fell under the Portuguese influence in 1511. Trade brought wealth and prosperity to Aceh as it claimed dominance over the pepper trade within the region (Siegel 1969: 14; Tate 1971: 233). Aceh was also the point where Islam allegedly first entered the sub-region of Southeast Asia giving it the label of ‘Mecca’s Verandah’ (Serambi Mecca). As such, Islam is deeply intertwined with Aceh’s history and culture. As a regional power and an important trading centre in Southeast Asia, its influence expanded to major ports throughout North Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula (Siegel 1969: 14–15; Sulistiyanto 2001: 437). Aceh’s involvement in the pepper trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and during the period of 1800–70 resulted in strong trade links to Turkey, India, England, America, France and Italy (Reid 2004: 302). Western powers such as the British and the Dutch, who had a great interest in the region, had recognised Aceh-Sumatra’s sovereignty through the Treaty of Aceh of 1819. In this, the rulers of Aceh saw it as legally and rightfully independent which enabled it to embark on diplomatic negotiations and alliances (Reid 2004: 302). Literature written during seventeenth and eight- eenth centuries also accentuated Acehnese wars and alliances with Sumatran and Peninsula ports such as Malacca. Works such as Hikayat Aceh illustrate Sultan Iskandar Muda’s diplomatic relations with other entities such as Turkey and Siam (Reid 2005: 54). This recognition remained for at least the first three hundred years after the Dutch occupied . However, the Dutch had clear ambitions to expand their influence within the archipelago and it was apparent that Aceh would have to face the dominant Western power in the region. Anticipating the inevitable, Aceh sought protection from Turkey. As early as 1852, Aceh established an embassy to France, and turned

r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 324 Chanintira na Thalang to the Italians and Americans through representatives in . However, all these efforts at diplomacy were in vain (Tate 1971: 229–31). Eventually the Dutch invaded Aceh in 1873. Resistance lasted for thirty years until Aceh was finally brought under Dutch control. This strong resistance took the form of Perang Sabil, or a war in the way of God. When the ulama became militants, the masses were rallied to fight their war against the Dutch. The struggle against the Dutch had an enormous symbolic significance in the later history of Aceh. The prolonged war made the sultanate a primary exemplar for enduring resistance (Christie 2000: 144). This continued resistance justified the proud assertion that ‘Aceh never surrendered to the Dutch’. Despite falling under Japanese control during World War II, Acehnese nationalists such as GAM leaders argue that resistance continued until the Japanese came to Aceh by invitation to fight along with the Acehnese against the Dutch. Aceh’s past as a regional power in the 1500s, and a centre of trade with the capability and independence to establish diplomatic relations and conduct its own foreign policy, has shaped a sense of belongingness to an entity or negri (Reid 2004: 303). Wars against foreign nations from the Portuguese to the Dutch also heightened a sense of national pride and reinforced Acehnese identity. This identity was further strengthened under Dutch rule that separated Aceh administrative affairs from the rest of North Sumatra (Sjamsuddin 1985: 38). This begs the question whether 1873 should be considered a starting point for Acehnese nationalism. John Breuilly argues that it is impossible to study nationalisms in the pre-modern era due to the lack of information on what nationalism would mean to the majority of people (Breuilly 1996: 166). It is certainly true that there is a lack of literature or accounts of a sense of Acehneseness at the mass level. However, at the very least the Acehnese elite had considered Aceh as a nation prior to 1873. Diplomats were sent out to negotiate and ensure Aceh’s sovereignty. Such tasks could not have been carried out without an awareness of the nation they claimed to represent. Though historical events point to a strong possibility that a sense of national identity occurred at the elite level, the same cannot necessarily be concluded at the mass level. Hobsbawm has noted that the emphasis on the emergence of nationalism at the elite level has meant a neglect of ‘the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of the ordinary people’ that might otherwise be termed protonationalism (Hobsbawm 1990: 10). However, it is the sentiments that occurred at the mass level prior to the inception of an identifiable nationalism that is crucial to understanding the emergence of Acehnese nationalism. Though there is a lack of accounts of how popular sentiments defined the nation, it can be deduced that the Acehnese at the mass level at the very least had a sense of kinship and belongingness. The ulama of Aceh became guerrilla fighters, resisting the Dutch as well as the Japanese during the World War II. It was the resistance against these subsequent foreign invasions that created r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 Nationalistic and ethnic aspirations in Aceh 325 an identity combining religious and local elements (Salim 2004: 43). The ability of the ulama to muster the support of the population derived from stressing the importance of the unity of men as Muslims. The symbolic appeal was paradise. How one leaves the world for paradise is detailed in the popular epic of the war, Hikayat Perang Sabil (Siegel 1969: 73–4). The Dutch realised the literature’s effectiveness to mobilise the Acehnese and burned all the copies they confiscated (Sulaiman 2006: 113). However, though this war against the Dutch had all the trappings of anti-imperialist resistance, it was waged in the name of God and not in the name of the nation. Thus, protonationalism was inextricably rooted in religion. This war lasted for thirty years and cost 10,000 lives. The human sacrifice is evidence enough that the war had mustered the sentiment, consciousness and cohesion that was real enough for an Acehnese to risk his/her life in the war waged against the Dutch, but given the presence of religious motivation it is not at all clear that it was a war that involved a nation in the modern sense.

Revolution against the Dutch

It was only until the revolution against the Dutch in 1945 that the Acehnese ulama clearly associated their homeland with the territory that coincided with the former and declared the intention of forming a state. During the revolution, the central government of the Republic of Indonesia had very little control over Aceh. At the time, the young Republic was still struggling in its war against the Dutch. As such, internal rule was the last of the concerns of the Indonesian nationalist elite (Sjamsuddin 1985: 2). After the Dutch had captured most of the republican leadership, Aceh remained one of the areas free from Dutch troops. Since the Dutch made no attempt to reoccupy Aceh (apart from Pulau Wei), the region was left to its own devices. Though autonomous at the time, the Acehnese remained loyal and consis- tently supported revolution against the Dutch. Though ethnically different, even the Gayo area joined in the struggle against the Dutch and did so in the name of the sultanate (Reid 2005: 339). Not only did the Acehnese emotion- ally support the Indonesian revolution, they also supported it financially through revenue from its exports to Malaysia and Singapore (Bertrand 2003: 165; Sulistiyanto 2001: 439). At this juncture, it is crucial to note that the Acehnese expressed no intentions of becoming sovereign. On 15 October 1945, four well-respected ulama in Aceh, Teungku Hadji Hasan Kroeeng Kale, Teungku M. Daud Beureueh, Teungku Hadji Dja’far Sidik Lamdjabat and Teungku Hadji Ahmad Hasballah Indrapoeri, declared in the name of all ulama and called on all Acehnese to unite behind to defend the new nation:

The very destructive Second World War has just ended. Now, in the West and in the East, four big kingdoms are managing everlasting world peace for the safety of Allah’s creatures. And Indonesia, our homeland, has declared its independence to all the

r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 326 Chanintira na Thalang world, and the Republic of Indonesia has been established under the leadership of our respected, great leader Ir. SOEKARNO . . . The ideological basis of nationalism at this juncture was independence. More precisely, it was the independence of Indonesia (formerly the Dutch East Indies) and not that of Aceh. As such, this was Indonesian nationalism. The leadership in this nationalist struggle was Sukarno and not a well-respected ulama of Aceh. However, there were also expressions of pride in Acehnese heroes and its distinct history. As the announcement continues:

According to our belief, this struggle is a noble struggle that is called SABIL WAR. Therefore, believe, all our people, that this struggle is a continuation of the previous struggle in Atjeh led by the late Tgk. Tjhi’ di Tiro and other national heroes. That is why all our people must stand up, unite shoulder to shoulder, move forward and follow the steps and struggles of our ancestors. Heed with respect all the orders from our leaders for the safety of our Homeland, Religion and Nation.1 At this juncture, Acehnese nationalists did not aim to secede from Indonesia but were focused on uniting with Indonesia’s nationalist elite against the Dutch. Like the previous struggle against the Dutch, this was to be performed in the shape of a Perang Sabil, a continuation of earlier struggles led by Acehnese heroes. However, it differed from the pre-revolutionary context in that the Acehnese were also fighting for a state. United behind Sukarno to defend ‘our homeland’, the Acehnese had pledged loyalty to the Indonesian nationalist elite. This separate history was formed due to the continued resistance against the Dutch, the Japanese and then again the Dutch, resulting in the formation of a distinct identity from that of Indonesia (Bertrand 2003: 163; Reid 2004: 302). Yet this identity, though distinct, was not seen as incompatible with that of the newly constructed Indonesia. In theory, Indonesian identity and nationalism celebrates ‘secularism’ and diversity. A hostile reaction to the Dutch in the form of the revolution for independence was not the only reason why the diverse nation came together. As Michael Leifer notes: ‘. . . Indonesian nationalism developed not only in a characteristically negative reaction to the colonial rule but also a positive reaction to the territorial bounds of the colonial state which were assimilated wholesale into nationalist claim’ (Leifer 2000: 158). The basis of what brought a multiplicity of peoples together was Pancasila, the state ideology, which comprises five principles. The third principle or ‘sila’, unity in diversity, places the emphasis on unity rather than diversity. Paradoxically, though the Acehnese were united with the Indonesian nationalists, the announcers of the Acehnese declaration still retained a separate history and ancestry from that of the newly formed Republic. In this context, Acehnese ethnic nation- alism was not antithetical to Indonesian civic nationalism. This instance shows that ethnic and civic nationalisms do not necessarily have to be on opposing sides. Acehnese consciousness of a separate history as exemplified by the glorification of previous struggles in Aceh by Acehnese national heroes is r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 Nationalistic and ethnic aspirations in Aceh 327 clearly evident. In other words, the Acehnese and Indonesian nationalist elite were united by a common goal but not by a common identity or nationalism. What united the Acehnese with the Indonesian nationalist elite to fight for an Indonesian state and not for an Acehnese one was Islam. The first and foremost goal of the ulama was to drive out the colonial infidels. Therefore, any political ambitions were sidelined for more religious goals. Furthermore, the ulama remained divided over whether the sultanate should be restored (Siegel 1969: 127). In sum, Acehnese support for Indonesian independence was a means to an end. After Indonesia’s struggle against the Dutch, the Acehnese accepted Sukarno’s offer of autonomy for the region. However, in order to unite a new state inhabited by 300 groups, nationalist elites including Sukarno sought to create the basis of the new nation on Pancasila, thus contradicting the Acehnese aim to fight in the way of God. Consequently, the announcement that Islam was not to form the basis of the nation created a sense of discontent among the Acehnese, especially the ulama. Furthermore, plans for the autonomy promised by Sukarno never materialised. Soon after independence, Aceh was absorbed into the province of North Sumatra as opposed to being a province in its own right. Consequently from 1953 to 1965, Darul Islam or the House of Islam movement campaigned in support of a federal Islamic State of Indonesia. Here, the ideological basis of Acehnese nationalism had changed from seeking independence from the Dutch to transforming the basis of the new Indonesian nation from secularism to Islam. In 1953, Daud Beureueh led Aceh to join forces with other provinces in Indonesia but ‘he did so in the name of Darul Islam of Indonesia, not Darul Islam or Darul Islam Aceh’ (Siegel 1969: 336). It is crucial to make clear that, as in previous statements, the Acehnese still identified themselves as a part of the Indonesian state though retaining a sense of identity as they referred to themselves as ‘the people of Atjeh’ and not the people of Indonesia. This is illustrated in the Manifesto of the Atjeh Rebels (1953): In the name of ALLAH, we the people of Atjeh have made new history for we wish to set up an Islamic State on our native soil . . . If we now establish a State, this does not mean we shall be setting up a state within a state, because in our hearts and souls we have always regarded the State of the Republic of Indonesia as but a golden bridge leading to the creation of a state that we with have long been yearning.2 The aim and struggle of the Darul Islam movement in Aceh was in effect a continuation of the revolution against the Dutch. Though the Indonesian nationalist elites declared victory over the Dutch and claimed independence, the Acehnese had not yet fulfilled their goals. As noted earlier, Acehnese aims had more to do with religion and claiming independence became a means to the end of establishing an Islamic state. Furthermore, there was a sense of resentment among the Acehnese that the Indonesian government failed to acknowledge their contribution to the revolution against the Dutch as

r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 328 Chanintira na Thalang depicted in a statement by Daud Beureueh in April 1954. Similar to the reasons for Acehnese support during the revolution, achieving autonomy was not the main goal of the Acehnese ulama. Rather, autonomy was a means for the Acehnese to protect and maintain Islam within Acehnese society (Sjam- suddin 1985: 8). However, despite the overt religious tones, a sense of Acehneseness also became a rallying point for unity. As such, Acehnese identity was a marriage between religious goals and ethnic overtones:

If you are really descendants of the heroes and martyrs of Aceh, who were martyred defending the Islamic religion and their bangsa [group or nation] . . . Let us together defend the religion of Allah. Let us together defend the religion of Allah and the Land of Aceh (cited in Aspinall 2006: 158).

It is evident that a consciousness of a separate Acehnese identity existed and the leaders of Darul Islam did not go to great lengths to emphasise national greatness or Acehnese glorious past as depicted in later GAM statements. Such efforts were unnecessary for Darul Islam which was not yet a fully fledged nationalist movement aiming for sovereignty but a movement rallying for Islam’s dominance in the Indonesian nation. In other words, though there was a process of maintaining separateness and otherness, this did not go as far as severing ties with the Indonesian nation. Religion was not the only factor that drove the Acehnese to rebellion. It was the central government’s move to dissolve Aceh’s provincial status and transfer administrative matters to non-Acehnese in Medan that violated the Acehnese sense of belonging to the Acehnese bangsa (nation). In the past, Acehnese leaders had expanded their control to neighbouring areas, thus the Acehnese found it hard to accept the authority of those who had historically been subjugated by their predecessors (Sjamsuddin 1985: 39). In the eyes of the Acehnese, Aceh had been a single entity, and shifting its kiblat (focus of orientation) from Kutaraja to Medan would disturb its sense of kesatuan (the idea of an Acehnese single unity) (Sjamsuddin 1985: 43). Under the circumstances it was not difficult for the ulama, who enjoyed a special status within Acehnese society, to muster the support of the Acehnese masses. The abolition of Aceh’s provincial status had economic implications that affected the masses. Support was mostly in villages where the people provided tax contributions and intelligence. Although the towns were under the government forces, they were not entirely free from Darul Islam influence either. Support in the areas of south and west Aceh was sparse. This area was less affected by the government’s policies (Sjamsuddin 1985: 165) and Acehnese identity was less apparent in contrast to the areas on the northeast coast of Aceh. With the movement gaining increasing support, the central government made Aceh a ‘special region’ (daerah istimewa). These concessions meant granting autonomy in the areas of religion, customary law and education. This had pacifying effects on many sections of Acehnese society who formerly supported Darul Islam. r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 Nationalistic and ethnic aspirations in Aceh 329

Acehnese nationalistic aspirations for independence

There were no nationalistic attempts at independence until the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) emerged in 1976. GAM is otherwise known as the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), the title preferred by its leaders. As a region rich in natural resources, perceptions of economic exploitation played a crucial role in igniting a sense of ethnic discontent towards the centre. Furthermore, promises for political decentralisation in the 1950s never materialised. Soon after Suharto took over the reigns of power, signs of promised autonomy diminished as the consolidated and became more centralised. Dr Teungku Hasan Muhammad di Tiro, a prominent businessman and former representative of the Darul Islam rebellion at the United Nations, founded GAM. Initial support for nationalistic aspirations was marginal. There are two explanations for this. Despite having an anti-corporate, anti- elite tone, the movement was confined to a handful of the Acehnese elite which included intellectuals, businessmen, and technocrats (Bertrand 2003: 171). It is crucial to note that at the time of GAM’s emergence, di Tiro had lost out on bids for oil exploration contracts in Aceh and not all the Acehnese elite supported the movement. At this juncture, Acehnese nationalism changed from seeking Indonesia’s independence from the Dutch to supporting its own independence. In previous periods, the Acehnese perceived their fate to be tied to that of the Indonesian nation as it had supported Indonesian nationalism in the revolu- tion against the Dutch. This begs the question: why the shift from Islamism to nationalism? In previous periods, the Acehnese ulama that played a crucial role in mobilising the masses behind an Islamic cause had been incorporated by state-sponsored bodies such as the provincial branch of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council). Furthermore, as GAM statements show, nationalistic expressions rejected any links with Indonesia. By severing all ties with Indonesia, whether cultural, religious or territorial, GAM was making a conscious move to strengthen the Acehnese claim that it was never a part of Indonesia and therefore should be sovereign. As such, Acehnese nationalism wedded with Islam would defeat the purpose of detaching itself to Indonesia. The aims of GAM as posted on its official website are ‘the survival of their political, social, cultural, and religious heritage which are being destroyed by the Javanese colonialists; the continued existence of their national homeland which is being confiscated and divided among Javanese . . .’. GAM leaders, such as di Tiro, claim that Aceh has been a long-standing independent sovereign state ‘for thousands of years’ that has been ‘recognised interna- tionally’.3 By this, GAM leaders are referring to the Treaty of Aceh of 1819 assuring Aceh’s sovereignty. This ultimately rejects any claims that the Dutch had successfully brought Aceh under colonial rule. In other words, GAM sees its struggles as a continuation of the anti-colonial rebellion in 1873 when the

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Dutch invaded Aceh. This contradicted the earlier announcement made by the four ulama during the revolution against the Dutch which declared the anti- colonial struggles as a Perang Sabil. GAM claims that it was later illegally incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia, as noted in its redeclaration of independence on 4 December 1976: the transfer of sovereignty meant ‘by the old Dutch Colonialists to the new, Javanese colonialists’. Hence, GAM claims its cause is legitimate, as it is not a matter of ‘separatism’ as branded by the Indonesian government but an issue of decolonisation according to interna- tional law (di Tiro 1976). This rhetoric is continuously echoed in GAM literature and in statements by GAM leaders: ‘The Redeclaration of Inde- pendence of Acheh,4 Sumatra’, 4 December 1976: To the peoples of the world:

Our fatherland, Aceh, Sumatra, had always been a free and independent Sovereign State since the world begun . . . . However, when, after World War II, the Dutch East Indies was supposed to have been liquidated – an empire is not liquidated if its territorial integrity was preserved – our fatherland, Acheh, Sumatra, was not returned to us. Instead, our fatherland was turned over by the Dutch to the Javanese – their mercenaries – by hasty fiat of former colonial powers. The Javanese are alien and foreign people to us Achehnese Sumatrans. We have no historic, political, cultural, economic or geographic relation- ship with them . . .(di Tiro 1976). The ideological basis of Acehnese nationalism from the revolution against the Dutch to the Darul Islam rebellion had transformed into Acehnese national liberation. History and myths specific to Aceh or the Acehnese continued to play a role in the construction of nationalism. Though national liberation was the foremost goal at this juncture, at certain times indepen- dence goals did expand to incorporate the whole of Sumatra. Expressions accentuated ‘the destiny of Sumatra is together with Acheh – as it has been throughout our history’, envisioning a confederation similar to Switzerland (di Tiro 1991). Though the boundaries for territorial separation varied slightly, the goals for independence during this period were consistent. As such, Acehnese nationalism expressed by GAM leaders exemplified a more ethnic exclusive tone with the purpose of accentuating distinctness and separateness from Indonesia. We the Achehnese are not Indonesian. We have no historic, political, cultural, economic or geographic relationship with them. Since the world begun there never was a people, much less a nation called by the name of Indonesia. It is merely a new label which has nothing to do with the Achehnese language, with our history, culture or our interests. ‘Indonesia’ was a fraud: a cloak to cover up Javanese colonialism against the nations outside Java in the former colonial territories of Dutch East Indies and in East Timor, the former Portuguese colonial territory (Hasan 1999). GAM’s portrayal of Acehnese nationalism is appealing to the international community and international law for the Acehnese right to self-determination in which it tries to sever all cultural historical links to Indonesia. By r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 Nationalistic and ethnic aspirations in Aceh 331 illustrating separateness from Indonesia, GAM is not only appealing for the right to self-determination but also creating a sense of pride in Aceh’s sovereignty and long history by contrasting it with the new and fraudulent identity of Indonesia. This differs from the previous two periods – the revolution against the Dutch and Darul Islam – where Acehnese nationalism and the representation of history, myths and heroes had only gone as far as to demonstrate a sense of pride in Acehnese history as a rallying point for the masses to unite behind a common cause. It is not uncommon for nationalists to construct histories to epitomise the roots of a nation. Fortunately for GAM leaders, Aceh has a rich history which can be drawn on to illustrate myths, ancestry and the glory of its golden past independent of Jakartan rule. Aceh’s historical past stretches back to the early seventeenth century. To draw on major historical events is to ignite a sense of pride and collectiveness within the nation (Calhoun 1997: 50). Furthermore, appealing to proud historical moments and primordial ethnicity can also be instrumental in claims to nationhood (Calhoun 1997: 53). However, a separate history does not ensure sovereignty. Economic exploitation and human rights abuses, which have fuelled secessionism in Aceh, cannot guarantee indepen- dence either. Economic exploitation or marginalisation of minorities can be remedied through various forms of decentralisation such as federalism or autonomy arrangements (Aspinall and Berger 2001: 1016). Though history is invoked to simulate a sense of pride within a nation, how nationalists construct their history is often a case of selectiveness. This is to select historical accounts that are favourable and that will enhance pride within the nation but also to conceal certain historical junctures that may weaken the cause for independence. The weakness in GAM’s claims for independence is the historical point where the Acehnese joined the nationalist elites in their struggle for independence against the Dutch. Thereafter, the Acehnese wholeheartedly became a part of the new republic. Both sides were united with the common goal of creating a single state formerly known as the Dutch East Indies (Bertrand 2003: 165). The support for the new republic was seen as a continuation of Aceh’s struggle led by Teungku Cik di Tiro and others. The declaration dated 15 October 1945 by four prominent ulama had called for all to unite in support of Sukarno against the Dutch. The revolution was also supported by Hasan di Tiro himself who made the point that Aceh and Indonesia shared not only the same boundaries but also the same history (Reid 2004: 305). The Acehnese role in the revolution is often emphasised in Indonesian history books. The Indonesian military also constructs its own version of history to influence public sentiment. Acehnese resistance to the Dutch also legitimised the claim that the former Dutch East Indies had survived a Dutch reoccupation (Sjamsuddin 1985: 30). On the other hand, GAM leaders mention little about Aceh’s involvement in the revolution against the Dutch. As such, though nationalism is emotionally charged, how nationalism is constructed is tactical. GAM premise their claims for a separate state on the grounds that they were wrongly colonised by the Javanese. Not only are these claims countered

r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 332 Chanintira na Thalang by the Acehnese involvement in the revolution but also the continued recognition of its part in the Republic of Indonesia. The Acehnese bid for independence started in the mid-1970s. Therefore, Achenese nationalism was not a response to a foreign invasion as stated in GAM literature but rather came as a response to the state’s policies that ignited a sense of discontent amongst the Acehnese. Discontent ignited a sense of nationalism that was constructed to be irreconcilable with that of Indonesia. From the earlier expressions of Acehnese ambitions, the masses were rallied by the Acehnese ulama to fight a Perang Sabil. In this period, what direction did proto-nationalism take? Though popular support was minimal to begin with, it gradually increased throughout the two decades under the New Order. The evolution of GAM’s strength can be divided into two periods. In the initial phase, from the birth of GAM in 1976 to 1982, the movement proclaimed independence and attempted to popularise its agenda. It was still early days and the effects of economic exploitation had not been widely perceived. Mass support for GAM’s cause for independence gradually increased from 1989. The Indonesian state responded to Acehnese nationalism by imposing a Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operation Zone or DOM) under which mass human rights abuses were committed on a wide scale. The sustained use of force by the state against a secessionist movement can ignite a sense of anger and in turn muster support for independence (Gurr 1993: 138). Bringing together a community that suffered common grievances under Jakarta’s rule, the Acehnese sympathised with the movement. By the mid-1990s, support had expanded in the areas of Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh (Sulistiyanto 2001: 441). It was also during this period that divisions between the Acehnese and ethnic minorities within Aceh began to intensify. Gayo and Alas communities began to feel alienated by the Acehnese and became supporters of the central government. The military also promoted this division. Their support was also manifested in the elections, as support for the military-dominated party, GOLKAR, was strongest in areas where ethnic minorities were concentrated (King and Rasjid 1988: 924). Despite the heavy military response to crush a relatively small secessionist movement, GAM was far from defeated and only returned with wider support from the Acehnese population after the downfall of former dictator, Suharto. The downfall had a direct impact on Acehnese aspirations. Essentially, a strong sense of nationalism coincided with the opportune movement of a weakened regime. There were hopes that independence was within reach as reflected in popularised slogan of the time: sebatang rokok lagi, or only a cigarette away (Aspinall 2005: 9). In addition to GAM, other groups began to emerge. Student groups such as Student Solidarity for the People (SMUR) along with the Aceh Referendum Information Center (SIRA) had successfully organised protests which attracted widespread support. In November 1999, an estimated amount of more than half a million to two million people took to the streets in support of SIRA goals in a peaceful demonstration (Fan 1999; r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 Nationalistic and ethnic aspirations in Aceh 333

Human Rights Watch 2001: 10). Though some sources give a lower number while others claim that support was much higher, there is no doubt that there was substantial support for independence. A year later, similar efforts were made to organise the same rally. While the previous crowds were much larger, the security forces had felt the need to prevent the rally which enjoyed the overwhelming support of the population (Tapol 2000). A sense of nationalism continued to grow and expand into the rest of Aceh. Support for nationalistic aspirations became so intense that in certain areas the Indonesian government at the village and sub-district levels was practi- cally non-functioning. This literally meant that state officials abandoned their administrative posts or came to an arrangement with GAM (ICG 2001: 13). Though Acehnese nationalism emerged only in modern times and the constructions and expressions have contradicted those of earlier times, this is not to imply that a sense of identity, kinship and belonging is any less real. False consciousness alone cannot explain why many Acehnese were willing to die for their nation. For the next three years, GAM experienced the loss of its fighters (Aspinall 2005: 7). Furthermore, support for the movement also began to wane after the imposition of martial law in 2003. Some leaders within GAM soon felt that fighting against the government had reached a stalemate (Aspinall 2005: vii). This coincided with the 2004 elections that brought a subsequent change of leadership at the national level. Also, the loss of East Timor and calls for independence from other parts of the archipelago compelled the government to take action in managing the conflict in Aceh. As a result, this ushered in important changes to the conflict which in turn transformed its goals.

The changing dynamics post-tsunami

The tsunami of 26 December 2004 had shattered a region already mourning the loss of lives on a daily basis through conflict with the Indonesian military. It has been estimated that in the tsunami roughly 167,000 people lost their lives and 500,000 were internally displaced. The human catastrophe prompted the two sides to rethink their positions and to resolve the conflict through negotiations, though steps to resurrect negotiations had started before the tsunami occurred. The post-tsunami context encouraged both sides to push for peace talks especially for those in the government supporting a peaceful resolution to the conflict (Aspinall 2005: 21). After three decades of fighting for independence, GAM agreed to set aside its demands for independence. This signifies a shift in Acehnese nationalism that had been adamant about its claims for independence. According to GAM literature and the 1976 redeclaration, such claims were based on Acehnese historical assertions that they were illegally colonised by the Javanese. Diverging from the 1976 declaration, there is little mention of Javanese colonisation. Rather, the emphasis is on the need to rectify the injustices of the

r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 334 Chanintira na Thalang past. Again, this illustrates a selective history as GAM leaders had previously done in the 1976 declaration of independence. Instead of speaking of Javanese colonisation which would run against ‘self-government’, Acehnese national- ists talk about the exclusiveness of Indonesian nationalism. As GAM Prime Minister in exile, Malik Mahmud notes: For too long, Indonesia’s diversity has been allowed only so long as it conformed to a narrow nationalist interpretation. This interpretation tried to force one identity on Indonesia’s diversity. This has failed. And where this has failed it has been followed with repression. This narrow nationalist interpretation did not allow justice. It did not allow real democracy. And it did not allow peace (Mahmud 2005a). While accepting Indonesian sovereignty, a strong sense of national identity still remains. This shares similarities with the declarations announced by the four ulama which called on the Acehnese to unite behind Sukarno against the Dutch and by the leaders of the Darul Islam movement. Pride in Aceh’s history and sovereignty is also celebrated as had been done in previous expressions of ethnicity and nationalism. What differs from previous GAM statements is that there is mention of the historical juncture of the Acehnese brotherhood in supporting the revolution against Dutch oppression. For- merly, this part of history was omitted in the 1976 redeclaration of indepen- dence to justify GAM’s claims for independence. As Prime Minister Mahmud speaks on behalf of di Tiro: Undeniably, Acheh has a long and proud history as a sovereign state recognised by world powers since the 16th century, and never accepted its incorporation into the Dutch East Indies. Our struggle against the Dutch, along side our other brothers in the vast Malay archipelago now called Indonesia (Kepulauan Melayu) fighting against colonial oppression, was for self-rule. Acheh has never accepted rule by outsiders. This historical context forms the basis of our struggle (Mahmud 2005b). The acceptance of the MoU indicates that nationalism has been ideologi- cally transformed. GAM nationalists envision a ‘plural and democratic future’ in Aceh which transforms their construction of national identity which was narrowly based. As Prime Minister Mahmud continues: ‘For there to be a sustainable peace in Acheh, the people of Acheh must be allowed to choose their own representatives from their own political parties to stand for their own government’ (Mahmud 2005b). It is not uncommon for nationalism to emerge, disappear and re-emerge in later times. While nationalism is emotionally charged, how nationalism is constructed and how history and myths are selected is a matter of strengthen- ing particular ideological goals. How an ethnic conflict is played out is ‘contextual, situational and relational’ (Hettne 1993: 72). The mobilisation of ethnic identity changes, or what Hettne terms ‘ethnicization, de-ethnicization and re-ethnicization’. As such, whether a group identity emerges and mobilises against the state is fluid. There are many reasons why support for nationalism died down. The optimism about achieving independence, which once ran high during 1999– 2000 at the time of the civil protests against the government, was now r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 Nationalistic and ethnic aspirations in Aceh 335 wavering (Aspinall 2005: 9). Declining popular support crucial to guerilla warfare also deprived GAM of its necessary supply of food, supplies and intelligence (ICG 2005: 4). Not only did GAM experience a loss in personnel and morale, international attention for the conflict had also waned during the martial law period. This was due to a number of reasons. As mentioned earlier, international concern for the conflict in Aceh never matched the attention that East Timor received. The war on terror prioritised state security. Furthermore, international support for Acehnese independence was unlikely, as self-determination was reserved for peoples colonised under Western rule. Because GAM had always craved international attention, lack of global attention during this period pushed the movement to consider other options. This begs the question: what shape will Acehnese ethnicity take? While the potency of Acehnese nationalism has subsided and the Acehnese and the Indonesian government have come to a peace agreement, conflicts between rival ethnic groups within Aceh have emerged in recent months. In fact, ethnic animosity between the Acehnese majority and other minorities is nothing new. Groups such as the Gayo and Alas are linguistically and culturally different from the Acehnese. These minority groups of Aceh’s central highlands have long been alienated by the Acehnese majority, and during the years of conflict these groups were known for their loyalty to the government. In recent months, the minorities have renewed the call to split from Aceh to form a province of their own. Such demands are nothing new and are predominantly pushed forward by businessmen and politicians. Following plans for decen- tralisation after the downfall of Suharto, there were rumours of splitting Aceh in two in an attempt to weaken the independence movement at the time (Jones 2002). Though the campaign to split the province exists, it is still contained and so far has failed to ignite substantial instability. Secondly, proto-nationalism which supported independence had increased since 1989. In recent years, up until the peace deal, the Acehnese population have been divided by ‘two devils’. On one hand, the Acehnese have been taxed, assassinated and kidnapped by GAM. On the other, the Acehnese have endured mass human rights abuses committed by the Indonesian military.6 Consequently, many have noted that the conflict has divided the people and many Acehnese distrust both the military and GAM. However, against this observation, GAM affiliated candidates have done remarkably well in the recent 2006 and 2008 local elections. Despite such success at the polls, intra- GAM tensions have emerged resulting in local incidents of violence. While these incidents are still localised, they may have the potential to exacerbate if not addressed properly, especially when peace is still young. Thirdly, since many prominent scholars have argued that the foreign invasions the Acehnese have faced from the Portuguese, Dutch, and Japanese to Indonesia have strengthened a sense of Acehnese identity, it does beg the question how Acehnese identity and nationalism will take shape in the absence of foreign aggression. While the evidence it not yet conclusive,

r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 336 Chanintira na Thalang anecdotal accounts seem to suggest that the absence of a common enemy has fragmented a sense of Acehnese identity. Instead, many have identified themselves more with their localities as opposed to Aceh. Though the recent signing of the MoU is an indicator that the Acehnese have accepted that Aceh is part of Indonesia, this is not to undermine the meaning of earlier expressions of Acehnese nationalism. From the revolution against the Dutch, to the Darul Islam movement, to the 1976 redeclaration of independence of Aceh, North Sumatra, the Acehnese have continued to express a nationalism that is ethnic in character. The Acehnese nationalist elite have tactically selected and omitted various historical junctures, myths and the celebration of Acehnese heroes not only to unify the nation but also to legitimise their ideological goals that have fluctuated throughout time. Although Acehnese nationalism is fluid, it cannot be assumed that nationa- listic sentiment is any less real.

Conclusions

The aim of this article is to show that although Acehnese nationalism is in constant flux, a sense of being Acehnese still remains. Nationalism is strategically constructed but emotionally charged. It also tells us that the human psyche is not always consistent and may not be fully understood. The statements of the Acehnese nationalist elite throughout the period from the revolution against the Dutch to the Helsinki peace deal post-tsunami have shown the various ideological transformations of Acehnese nationalism. What has remained constant is the sense of belongingness to Acehnese identity. This is shown in the pride drawn from Acehnese history, its glorious past and its heroes, regardless of whether the ideological basis of Acehnese nationalism aims for, independence from the Dutch, an Islamic state during the Darul Islam rebellion, independence from Indonesia exemplified by GAM, or a political deal short of national liberation as in the present day. Despite certain junctures where the Acehnese have accepted Indonesian rule, the Acehnese nationalist elite has still celebrated Acehnese myths, a common history and ancestry. At these junctures, the glorification of these elements of Acehnese nationalism has not been utilised to construct an identity that is irreconcilable with Indonesian civic nationalism. As the ideological basis of nationalism shifts, so does the construction of the nation. This reinforces the existing literature that suggests that national- ism is socially constructed. Acehnese nationalist elites have played an important role in constructing Acehnese nationalism and in turn have contributed to the fluidity of Acehnese nationalism. More specifically, various historical points were used not only to unify a nation but also to accentuate and glorify some junctures in history that could benefit a nationalist cause. Likewise, various points in history are deliberately omitted. The purpose of selectiveness is to strengthen a particular cause or ideology to which that r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009 Nationalistic and ethnic aspirations in Aceh 337 nationalism might subscribe at the time. However, this does not make nationalism any less real for the nationalist elites or the Acehnese masses. Numerous sacrifices have been made and lives have been lost during the wars in the name of the Acehnese nation. Despite the fluctuation of nationalist goals and the changes in the selection of history to form the basis of the construction of nationalism at a particular time, a strong sense of Acehnese identity and pride in its historical past still remains a constant.

Notes

1 The complete text of the announcement by the four ulama can be found in ‘The History of Aceh’, http://www.aceh.net/acehinindonesiahistory.html, accessed 5 September 2006. 2 Selections of the Manifesto of the Atjeh Rebels in Christie (2006: Appendix 5, p. 225). 3 ‘The Aims of ASLNF’, http://www.asnlf.net/topint.htm, accessed 22 September 2008. 4 Hasan Mohammed di Tiro rejected everything Indonesian, hence he used the nineteenth- century English spelling, Aceheh as opposed to using Aceh. See Siegel (1969: 336). 5 Interview with NGO based in Jakarta, Jakarta, 29 June 2005; Interview with Acehnese Academic, Jakarta, 25 July 2005.

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