BRIEF POLICY

SHOOTING IN THE DARK? EU SANCTIONS POLICIES Konstanty Gebert

Sanctions are becoming one of the European Union’s SUMMARY Over the last two decades, the EU has engaged favourite foreign-policy tools. For a political entity that (with in a surprisingly active policy of use of a few exceptions) lacks the capacity to project military power, sanctions. In particular, it sanctions countries is devoid of a consistent and binding foreign policy, and is in response to particularly egregious human generally considered a “soft power”, the EU has, over the rights violations or democratic backsliding or to deter countries from actions that have last two decades, engaged in a surprisingly active policy of negative security consequences for the EU. use of sanctions. As of June 2012, it had in force sanctions However, although such sanctions seem to directed at 26 states including North Korea and the United be applied with increasing frequency, it is States, one no longer existing country (Yugoslavia), and a extremely hard to tell how effective they are. host of different terrorist organisations, from al-Qaeda to Inadequate monitoring means we do not know how far member states implement EU the relatively lesser known Movement for Islamic Reform sanctions. Nor do we know whether sanctions in Arabia, as well as some 20 other entities and dozens of contribute to reaching the desired objectives. individuals such as Milica Gajić-Milošević, the daughter- In short, it is like shooting in the dark. in-law of the deceased former Serbian president Slobodan Milošević.1 Above all, there is an urgent need for better monitoring of the implementation and impact of EU sanctions. However, short of The use of sanctions by the EU has increased sharply in the war, sanctions are the only coercive foreign- last few years from 22 decisions in 2010 to 69 one year later.2 policy instrument the EU has at its disposal. Though most focused on a small group of outlaw countries This means they will continue being used, such as Iran, Syria and, until recently, Libya and Burma, they regardless of criticism of their implementation and questions about their effectiveness. The target an increasing number of countries, from 16 in 2002 to EU should therefore apply sanctions as smartly 28 nine years on. Stefan Lehne is of the reasonable opinion as possible. In particular, it should set limited, that this increase is due to a growing self-perception by the achievable goals when imposing sanctions; EU as an active agent on the international scene, and to its be realistic about its own capacity to impose tendency to add new sanctions if old ones seem not to work. sanctions and about what they can achieve; loosen or suspend sanctions as a reward for compliance; and communicate effectively with the public and, in particular, the opposition in 1 European Union, Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force, updated on 4 December the target country. 2012, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf. 2 Stefan Lehne, “The role of sanctions in EU foreign policy”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 14, 2012, available at www. http://carnegieeurope.eu/ publications/?fa=50378. 2 ECFR/71 January 2013 www.ecfr.eu SHOOTING IN THE DARK? EU SANCTIONS POLICIES “establishing a sanctions coordinator, or a special adviser, adviser, special a or coordinator, sanctions a “establishing “sanctions” refers to a range of different policy instruments, policy different of range a to refers “sanctions” While effectiveness studies have become quite common in in common quite become have studies effectiveness While 6  5  4  3 2003 of a report that recommended “measures to enhance to “measures recommended that report a of 2003 (for example, the sanctions following the Andijan massacreAndijan the followingsanctions the example,(for This brief looks in more detail at two kinds of EU sanctions:EUkindsThisbriefmoredetailtwoof looksinat EU sanctions countries for directly violatingdirectlypoliticalvaluessanctionscountriesfor EU The Stockholm Process of 2001, which focused on the the on focused which 2001, of Process Stockholm The This sharp increase in the use of sanctions decisions is rather But other factors, such as disillusionment with problem problem with disillusionment as such factors, other But among sanctions committees and monitoring bodies” and and bodies” monitoring and committees sanctions among acts it considers a security threat. However, although such although However, threat. security a considers it acts academia (as a sub-section of peace studies), little research littlestudies), peace of sub-section a (as academia damage, but it would help a great deal if we knew whether knew we if deal great a help would it but damage, effectiveness of targeted sanctions, led to the publicationin the to ledsanctions, targetedeffectiveness of countries’ capacity to mend their ways through internal internal through ways their mend to capacity countries’ our bullets were flying in the right direction – or, indeed, indeed, or, – direction right the in flying were bullets our with security threats. security with whether we were firing live ammunition, or just blanks. we know the target is out there somewhere, and with enough recommendations. response to particularly egregious human rights violations violations rights human egregious particularly to response remarkable, for sanctions are not a “soft” policy act. Rather,act. policy “soft” a not sanctionsare remarkable,for reform probably also play a role. which makes their systematic study extremely difficult. difficult. extremely study systematic their makes which mechanisms”. However, the EU essentially ignored these these ignored essentially EU the However, mechanisms”. those connected with political demands and those connected the desired objectives. In short, it is like shooting in the dark: the planning, monitoring, reporting and coordination coordination and reporting monitoring, planning, the targeted party, in order to force it to undertake, or prevent or undertake, to it force to order in party, targeted they are coercive measures, designed to cause damage to the to the general law-enforcement agencies of the member member the of agencies law-enforcement general the to the EU considers central to its identity or to deter them from to further improve and support the coordination among among coordination the support and improve further to implemented,whetheror theyfactincontribute reachingto in Uzbekistan) or to punish democratic backsliding backsliding democratic punish to or Uzbekistan) in it from undertaking, certain behaviour. certain undertaking, from it states. Thus we do not really know to what degree they are they degree what to know really not do we Thus states. is extremely hard to tell how effective they are. they effective how tell to hard extremely is sanctions committees, expert panels and monitoring monitoring and panels expert committees, sanctions sanctions seem to be applied with increasing frequency, it it frequency, increasing with applied be to seem sanctions has been done within the EU institutions. firepower we may be relatively sure we have inflicted some inflicted have we surerelatively be may we firepower  News/Press/docs/2003/sc7672.doc.htm. meeting oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil, availableathttp://www.un.org/ Statement byHansDahlgren,StateSecretary forForeignAffairsofSweden,at4713th their impact. critics routinelycallthem“warbyothermeans”orthe“nuclearoption”,tounderscore reasons, thereisnodoubtthatsanctionsareaverypowerfulpolicyinstrument.Their percent ofGNP).Eveniftheassessmentsquotedmighthavebeeninflatedforpolitical them (e.g.LatviaassessesthatEUsanctionsonBelaruscostit€500mayear,or2–3 the sametime,sanctionsaffectnotonlytargetparty,butalsothosewhoimpose deaths (e.g.asmany5millioninIraqduringthe1990s,accordingtoUNICEF).At In extremecases,sanctionscancreatewidespreadeconomichavocandevenmass 2010). Sanctions andForeign Policy:WhenandWhydotheyWork? For asystematicoverviewofEUsanctionspolicy, seeClaraPortela, available athttp://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/sanctions-timeline.cfm. International Economics,Summaryofeconomicsanctionsepisodes,1914–2006 , 2006, therateofevenpartialsuccesswas34 percent.SeethePetersonInstitutefor In theclassicalPetersonInstitutestudyof115 sanctionsimposedbetween1914and 5 Monitoring of sanctions is usually left left usually is sanctions of Monitoring 6 First, the EU sanctions countries in in countries sanctions EU the First, 3 In particular, the the particular, In (London:Routledge, European Union 4 The term term The Belarus: frombadtoworse 9  8  7  2008 as a positive reaction to real or anticipated political political anticipated or real to reaction positive a as 2008 The EU first imposed sanctions on Belarus in 1996 – two two – 1996 in Belarus on sanctions imposed first EU The Thesanctions onBelarus arespecific andtargeted, with 243 In particular, this brief will focus on democracy sanctions sanctions democracy on focus will brief this particular, In However, the impact of sanctions against Belarus is is Belarus against sanctions of impact the However, Libya. On the basis of these three cases, the brief draws draws brief the cases, three these of basis the On Libya. and started transforming the country into “Europe’s last last “Europe’s into country the transforming started and among many factors influencing Belarus at that time. that at Belarus influencing factors many among against Burma and Belarus and security sanctions against against sanctions security and Belarus and Burma against and encourage a movement towards more democratic democratic more towards movement a encourage and visas to EU monitors. New sanctions in the form of a visa visa a of form the in sanctions New monitors. EU to visas power took Lukashenka Alyaksandr President after years governance – what might be called “democracy sanctions”. “democracy called be might what – governance confrontation over diplomatic residences was seemingly seemingly was residences diplomatic over a confrontation after 1999, in suspended were Sanctions dictatorship”. can plausibly argue that sanctions were, at best, only one one only best, at were, sanctions that argue plausibly can one Yet sanctions. of effectiveness the of proof as quoted been has prisoners, political of release the by exemplified 2008–2010,of politicalrelativethaw Theassess. difficultto turned hopes as re-imposed and – Belarus inside changes conclusions about how the EU can apply sanctions smartly. sanctions”. “security called be might what – community exceptional in being the only Eastern Partnership (EaP) (EaP) country Partnership subject to EU sanctions. Eastern only the being in exceptional Since2010. inprotestingmarchers electoralfraudon down with the president are under trade sanctions. Furthermore, sanctions. trade under are president the with were dashed, however, when the regime brutally cracked cracked brutally regime the when however, dashed, were the 32 companies32 linkedthree tycoonstheto closely connected to disappointment. These are, therefore, very fine-tuned fine-tuned very therefore, are, These disappointment. to to join the EaP while being under sanctions. targeted sanctions were temporarily suspended again, that it again, willing to start cooperating suspended with the West. Expectations temporarily were sanctions targeted then, sanctions have gradually been expanded. Belarus is is Belarus expanded. been gradually have sanctions then, individuals from the innermost circles of the regime barredregime the of circlesinnermost the individualsfrom sanctions were temporarily suspended in 1998 and again in againand 1998temporarilysanctionsweresuspended in solved, but then re-imposed after Minsk refused to grant grant to refused Minsk after re-imposed then but solved, security consequences for the EU and/or the international international the and/or EU the for consequences security liberalisation of the regime and an end to repression. have they it, of face the on yet, and – instruments policy political repression in subsequent years. Yet in 2008 most 2008 in Yet years. subsequent in repression political Second, the EU imposes sanctions in order to deter countries from entering the EU and having their assets frozen, while frozen, assets their having and EU the entering from failed to bring about the intended political results – that is, a from actions that have, or may have, seriously negative negative seriously have, may or have, that actions from following the Russo-Georgian war and signals from Minsk Minsk from signals and war Russo-Georgian the following blacklist and asset freezes followed the intensification of of intensification the followed freezes asset and blacklist embargo duetotheKarabakhconflictof1988–94. separatism, andArmeniaAzerbaijanare underanEU-respectedOSCEarms Transnistria, aseparatistterritoryofMoldova, isunderEUsanctionsforits Europe See JanaKobzova,“Much AdoaboutMinsk,TooLittleBaku”, msz.gov.pl/en/foreign_policy/europe/eastern_partnership/partnership. Polish MinistryofForeignAffairs,“EasternPartnership”, availableathttp://www. , 7May2012,available athttp://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/308. 7 In fact, Belarus was invited 8 New Eastern 9 Bad relations with Moscow, due to issues unrelated to sanctions, blacklist) in return for the regime meeting a precise target made the regime more vulnerable, while the deteriorating (e.g. the release of all political prisoners, with the proviso economic situation forced it to apply for an IMF loan – which that the restrictions will be automatically reinstated in case it would not have obtained had political prisoners remained of backsliding). in jail. This illustrates the difficulty of establishing a causal relationship between sanctions and policy change, or the The case of Belarus also shows that sanctions can be lack of it, in the target country. undermined if the regime has a viable alternative to the ways and means that sanctions are supposed to deny it. Russia The official position in Minsk is that sanctions have no and Ukraine, which have repeatedly condemned the EU impact on Belarusian policy and should be dropped. sanctions, give the regime in Minsk substantial economic Lukashenka has called them a “road to nowhere”.10 Some breathing space. In particular, a trade embargo would not civil-society activists support the sanctions. For example, in work, as Belarus has access to alternative trade routes via March the families of political prisoners published an appeal Russia – and Russia has a political interest in bringing for sanctions in order to “bankrupt” the regime.11 However, Belarus closer. But this also means that the sanctions others suspect that sanctions may have made the situation themselves should not contain loopholes that defeat their worse, because Lukashenka sees them as a challenge and purpose. If implementation is discretionary, effectiveness needs to show that he has not caved in.12 In particular, they will be limited. For example, Slovenia tried to block the new see the execution of the two alleged perpetrators of the metro round of EU sanctions against Belarus in the spring of 2012, bombing in Minsk in 2010 as a consequence of the new as Slovenian company Riko Group was heavily involved in a sanctions. Lukashenka has confirmed that he might increase €100 million hotel venture with Belarus tycoon Yuri Chizh, repression in response to sanctions.13 He also threatened one of the three businessmen close to Lukashenka who were to retaliate against the West as well and, in particular, to to be blacklisted.15 ease controls on people leaving Belarus and thus facilitating an influx to the West of illegal immigrants.14 The case of While Slovenian resistance was finally overcome, Latvia Belarus illustrates the importance of a clear and unanimous made no secret of its opposition. “The effectiveness of these opposition constituency inside the country that supports proposed sanctions is what worries Latvia the most. We have sanctions policy and actively contributes to it. on many occasions asked our EU partners what they believe these sanctions will lead to and what we will achieve,” said There must also be an acceptable political perspective for economy minister Daniels Pavluts. “It would be very sad if forces supporting the regime if it complies with demands. these sanctions harm the people of Belarus, businessmen not This means not only that sanctions need to be calibrated, associated with the ruling regime, as well as EU members rather than being of the all-or-nothing variety, but also themselves, including Latvia,” he added.16 Latvia does not their goal, stated or implied, cannot just be regime change. have a system for monitoring compliance with EU sanctions, Some opposition activists argue that sanctions should be nor does it have the money to set one up; it does, however, as intensified in order to “break” the regime. But not only would noted, expect to incur heavy losses because of them. It seems it be very difficult to “break” a regime that has commercial reasonable to predict that its compliance might therefore be alternatives to trading with the EU, but also the cost to the less than complete. population would necessarily have to be huge – Saddam Hussein succeeded in clinging to power even under such a Other member states have also played fast and loose with sanctions regime. The formulation of a sanctions goal policy other aspects of sanctions policy. In January 2012, the that would not be unacceptable to the regime or alienate Belarusian interior minister, Anatoly Kulyashou, was the opposition is clearly the most important – and the most allowed to travel to France for a conference at Interpol in tricky – aspect of this method of bringing about political Lyon, even though he is on an EU visa ban list because of change. This would necessarily imply trade-offs: lifting his role in the crushing of the Minsk demonstrations in a predetermined number of restrictions (e.g. on the visa late 2011. EU law does allow member states to grant visas for the goal of “participating in meetings of international organizations”, but this does not mean that such exemptions should be automatic. Neither France nor Interpol, however, have seen fit to explain why it was in the interest of the 10 “Lukashenko believes EU understands that sanctions have no prospects”, Kyiv Post, 26 April 2012, available at http://www.kyivpost.com/content/russia-and-former- common good to have the Belarusian interior minister hone soviet-union/lukashenko-believes-eu-understands-that-sanctions--126670.html. his professional skills. 11 The petition was published on the “Belaruski partisan” website. It stated: “We call … for the support of all sanctions which will lead to the rapid bankruptcy of this system”. 12 During a GMF seminar in Warsaw, two opposition voices argued that the strength of the sanctions is in their threat, not their implementation. Aleh Hulak (Belarusian Helsinki Committee) and Aleh Bahucki (Belarus Social-Democratic Community) both stated that sanctions may [make the regime] refrain from repression if they were used as a threat, and not as reality. If sanctions were to become a reality, the Belarusian authorities may increase repressions regarding “Europe’s agents” inside the country (i.e. against civil society). 15 Kamil Kłysiński and Rafał Sadowski, “Belarus’s diplomatic war with the European 13 “Lukashenko threatens West ‘with taking hostages’”, Unian, 23 April 2012, available Union”, Eastweek, Center for Eastern Studies, 9 February 2012, available at http:// at http://www.unian.info/news/499437-lukashenko-threatens-west-with-taking- www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-02-29/belaruss-diplomatic-war- hostages.html. european-union. 14 Denis Lavnikevoch, “Belarus weakens border control with EU, Lukashenko shows 16 Nina Kolyako, “Daniels Pavluts doubts whether sanctions against Belarus will achieve his ‘adequate response’ to sanctions”, Gazeta.Ru, 20 April 2012, available at http:// their purpose”, the Baltic Course, 3 March 2012, available at http://www.baltic- en.gazeta.ru/news/2012/04/20/a_4557593.shtml. course.com/eng/analytics/?doc=54005&ins_print. 3 4 ECFR/71 January 2013 www.ecfr.eu SHOOTING IN THE DARK? EU SANCTIONS POLICIES Burma: successafterall? While there was much self-congratulation in Europe Europe in self-congratulation much was there While While sanctions imposed on Belarus for more than 15 years 15 than more forBelarus on sanctionsimposed While $180 million in 1996 to a peak of $490 million three years three million $490 of peak a to 1996 in million $180 18  17  01 hr to hwvr a eln eetal followed. eventually decline a however, too, here 2001; Exports to the EU also rose, from a pre-sanction level of of level pre-sanction a from rose, also EU the to Exports Europe, David Lidington, said they were “part of the mix mix the of “part were they said Lidington, David Europe, the in investedheavily remained Total giant energy French In view of the spectacular changes on the Burmese politicalBurmese the onspectacular changesthe of view In In short, while sanctions imposed on Belarus clearly are are clearly Belarus on imposed sanctions while short, In Kyi, the leader of the opposition to the Burmese regime, regime, Burmese the to opposition the of leader the Kyi, Lukashenka regime, there is little evidence that they produce Burma (Myanmar): the regime, long a target of extensive extensive of target a long regime, the (Myanmar): Burma about $100 million in 1996 to over four times as much in in much as times four over to 1996 in million $100 about fact,foreignbusinessdirectallandIndealingsEU. thewith political all of release the 2012; October in confirmed and although not yet irreversible, has led to sweeping changes. changes. sweeping to led has irreversible, yet not although governmentrepression andwere later extended toinclude a goals such as the release of political prisoners, assuming assuming prisoners, political of release the as such goals goals being achieved would be seen as a major defeat. exploitation of gas fields and Lloyd’s continued to provide provide to continued Lloyd’s and fields gas of exploitation one year; only an arms embargo, imposed in 1990, still still 1990, in imposed embargo, arms an only year; one consistently supported sanctions and said they had a subtle, a had theyconsistentlysaid supportedsanctions and of international pressure” – most observers do not think think not do observers most – pressure” international of outcome, a breakthough was finally achieved in the case of case the in achieved finally was breakthough a outcome, other circumstances are favourable. However, given the the given However, favourable. are circumstances other optimisticobtainingusefulnesstheirlimitedpolicyaboutin regime personalities. However, the sanctions did not stop stop not did sanctions the However, personalities. regime reviewed was sanctions the of lifting The place. in remains when the sanctions were lifted – the British Minister for for Minister British the – lifted were sanctions the when reinsurance to a local insurer. the military regime, and a visa ban and asset freeze of 491 of freeze asset and ban visa a and regime, military the h sntos a mc o a impact. an of much had sanctions the the desired effects – that is, a revision of the regime’s policies, investment actually increased from a pre-sanction level of of level pre-sanction a from increased actually investment scene, the EU decided in April 2012 to lift its sanctions for sanctions its lift to 2012 April in decided EU the scene, in reaction to the egregious human-rights violations of the of violations human-rights egregious the to reaction in its opponents, and are proof that the EU is “doing something” sanctions, has initiated a liberalisation process which, which, process liberalisation a initiated has sanctions, have to date failed to bring about the desired political political desired the about bring to failed date to have heavy political investment the EU has made in its sanctionsits in madehaspolitical heavy investmentEU the hurting some elements of the regime, give comfort to some of later; they then dropped to and below pre-sanction levels. levels. pre-sanction below and to dropped then they later; preconditions for a definitive removal of the sanctions. the of one is jails)Burmese in remain 500 (someprisoners policy, any major lifting of sanctions without the desired desired the without sanctions of lifting major any policy, more be can One change. regime to leading ultimately Sanctions were initially imposed in 1996 in reaction to to reaction in 1996 in imposed initially were Sanctions ban on trade with more than 800 companies connected with Campaign UK,March2004. The EuropeanUnionandBurma:Case forTargetedSanctions,Burma davidlidington/2012/04/25/what-has-been-the-effect-of-eu-sanctions-on-burma/. and CommonwealthOffice, 25April2012,availableathttp://blogs.fco.gov.uk/ David Lidington,“Whathasbeentheeffectof EUsanctionsonBurma?”,Foreign 18 Aung San Suu Suu San Aung 17

1995 and 2005 with cumulative FDI worth $1.8 billion; in in billion; $1.8 worth FDI cumulative with 2005 and 1995 20 19  21  2005, while the US was top investor from North America. America. North from investor top was US the while 2005, The sanctions were also riddled with loopholes. BIA said said BIA loopholes. with riddled also were sanctions The This failure was in part because the sanctions against Burma In other words, the EU imposed sanctions in a way that that way a in sanctions imposed EU the words, other In investment the of itself availed China particular, In Ultimately, only the top members of the Burmese junta junta Burmese the of members top the only Ultimately, Burma Independence Advocates (BIA), a British think-tankBritish a (BIA),IndependenceAdvocates Burma um, o sa cuty atcptd n h sanctions. the in participated country Asian no Burma, Norway, and Switzerland all imposed restrictions and bans andrestrictions imposed all Switzerland and Norway, and allowed China to become the country’s major arms arms major country’s the become to China allowed and cost the regime significantly.” comparison, the total FDI from ASEAN member countries countries member ASEAN from FDI total the comparison, deal with Burma’s crisis” and that investment by sanctioning do know what role, if any, EU and other sanctions played played sanctions other and EU any, if role, what know do whose regime the of interests economic the to cause could debate whether the sanctions accomplished much beyond beyond much accomplished sanctions the whether debate exception of Japan, which for two years suspended aid to to aid suspended years two for which Japan, of exception of Westerncompanies,of hugelyits extendedand scopeofthe sanctions-imposedwithdrawalthe by opportunities created out of work,notablygarmentwomenemployedthetrade,ofout in of the country”, she said. ills the for responsible are sanctions that propaganda, own was about half this. The UK and France were the major major the were France and UK The this. half about was would limit the damage they would do to its own economic own its to do would they damage the limit would wrote that “[a]dvocates of democracy in Myanmar heatedlyMyanmar in democracy “[a]dvocatesof that wrote were not imposedmultilaterally.Canada,Australia,notUS,were The making the sanctioners feel useful. Critics say the sanctionsthe sayCriticsuseful.sanctioners feelthe making that the presence of Western energy companies in Burma Burma in companies energy Western of presence the that trade with Burma and its direct investment in that country. their country. After recent talks with both President Thein President both with talks recent After country. their that supports the opposition, bluntly stated that “sanctions that stated bluntlyopposition, the supports that investors in Burma for the same ten-year period of 1995– of period ten-year same the for Burma in investors betweenBurma investorinlargest the wasEurope place. in in their decision to initiate the restoration of democracy in democracy of restoration the initiate to decision their in theydamage the limited also this say, interests.toNeedless sanctions could be made successful if they were targeted to targeted were they if successfulmade be couldsanctions states have diluted the measures they themselves had put put had themselves they measures the diluted have states supplier and trade partner.” Thein Sein insists that they they that insists Sein Thein partner.” trade and supplier similar to those imposed by the EU. But, with the brief brief the with But, EU. the by imposed those to similar highlighted the “schizophrenic way the sanctioning states states sanctioning the way “schizophrenic the highlighted hardened the resolve of the military junta, threw thousandsthrewmilitaryjunta,the ofresolve hardenedthe had not worked”: “One failure of the Western sanctionsWesternhas the offailure worked”:“Onenot had psychological impact. “The regime started believing their their believing started regime “The impact. psychological Sein and Aung Sun Suu Kyi, American journalist Bill Keller journalistBillAmerican Kyi, Suu Sun Aung and Sein behaviour they were supposed to change. been their failure to weaken and isolate the ruling junta. The  in 2009. Revolution of2007;aid wasresumedafterthedestructionwreaked byCycloneNargis Following thedeathofaJapanesephotographer coveringtheso-calledSaffron burmaadvocates.org/Burma%20Sanctions%20Assessment.pdf. Humanitarian ConditionsunderSanctions”, 8August2011,availableathttp://www. Glass andaHumanitarianMyth.APreliminary AssessmentofPoliticaland Burma IndependenceAdvocates,“BurmaSanctions Regime:TheHalf-Full couple.html?ref=opinion. available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/opinion/keller-the-burmese-odd- Bill Keller,“TheBurmeseOddCouple”,the 19 But, in a report published in 2011, 20

New YorkTimes , 30September2012, 21 did not help nudge the generals toward reform; rather, the Libya: on, and off, and on and off again generals had planned for two decades to democratise but thought it prudent to move gradually. Libya is a very different case than Belarus and Burma – one of security sanctions rather than democracy sanctions. A Whether or not, and to what extent, EU sanctions on Burma country on which security sanctions are imposed might were effective, it seems sensible to argue that if they were, it simultaneously be in violation of basic human rights but, in was because of three factors that distinguish it from the case such situations, obtaining security compliance usually takes of Belarus. First, though the situation created by the sanctions precedence. Sanctions were repeatedly imposed on Libya to was far from intolerable to the Burmese government, they punish it for its support of terrorism, for its involvement in may have helped one that was: many observers such as the the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, and for its repression Swedish journalist Bertil Lintner believe that the growing of antigovernment opposition. Each batch of sanctions was dependence on China, produced by the investment void left then lifted after the conditions imposed were allegedly met. by the sanctions, was a factor in the decision to turn towards Given the repetitive nature of the sanctions, it is useful to the West again.22 In other words, political reform was the examine how these decisions were reached. price to pay for an alternative to China. The European Community first imposed sanctions (arms Second, the ruling group also had a way out of the quandary. embargo and diplomatic and commercial restrictions) on Sanctions were reversible and calibrated: compliance with Libya in 1986, after a series of terrorist acts believed to have EU demands did not mean outright capitulation, but rather been committed or sponsored by Colonel Gaddafi’s regime. allowed for the gradual testing of the risks and advantages After the responsibility of that regime for acts of terror against of the new policy. In particular, those who carried out civilian aircraft in 1988 and 1989 was more unequivocally the political about-turn were not expected to sacrifice established, in 1992 the UN joined in the arms embargo, but themselves, or much of their effective power, on the altar of lifted it in 1999 in reaction to improved relations with Libya. democratisation. The EU repealed diplomatic and commercial sanctions but continued to implement its earlier arms embargo. This was Third, there was also a credible constituency for sanctions lifted only in 2004, after a series of behind-the-scene deals inside the country, including Aung San Suu Kyi, whose with the regime by France, Italy, and the UK. support was crucial to maintain their political legitimacy. Her decision to call for a suspension of sanctions not only However, even when the arms embargo was in place, trade gave the EU an honourable way out, but also granted the between the EU and Libya continued. France, Germany, opposition real power in the internal political bargaining. In Italy, and the UK provided 50 percent of its imports and, Belarus, there was no figure comparable to Aung San Suu Kyi together with Greece, were the destination for 78 percent and the opposition was divided on sanctions. This creates of its exports, especially oil and gas.23 Other economic two separate difficulties: sanctions in Belarus lack internal interests such as fisheries were also at stake. Furthermore, political legitimacy, and the opposition in that country is the country was also a key player in migration issues: control deprived of the otherwise potentially powerful instrument of illegal immigration from sub-Saharan Africa across the of calling for an end to the sanctions in return for genuine Mediterranean largely depended on its cooperation. The regime concessions. There is also a risk that the population EU was therefore heavily invested in Libya. After Gaddafi’s will equate the hardships it endures with EU policy – a theme regime recognised its responsibility for the aircraft bombings, on which the government will be only too happy to develop. and gave up its quest for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), relations eased. Reports of egregious human-rights The case of Burma illustrates the need for the EU to be violations were routinely ignored, even though similar or realistic in its use of sanctions. In particular, it is important even lesser violations at the same time led to the tightening that the regime upon which sanctions are being imposed of sanctions in the cases of Burma and Belarus. has no alternative to dealing with the West or would find that alternative unbearable, that it can modify policy The situation changed dramatically when, in late 2010, the without regime change, and that there is a credible internal revolutions in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt led to large- constituency that can give legitimacy to sanctions. The EU scale anti-regime demonstrations in Libya, which were should resist the temptation of using sanctions in order brutally crushed by government forces, leading to hundreds to be seen to “do something” even if the intended result is of deaths. By February 2011, civil war had broken out, and realistically unachievable. If, on the other hand, it believes major European corporations announced that they could it can be achieved, the EU should be prepared to stick with not continue normal operations in Libya. This was when the sanctions for the long haul and to close loopholes – even EU decided to impose a wide array of general and targeted if, as in the case of Burma, the interim assessments are not economic sanctions on the country, as well as to reintroduce encouraging.

23 EU General Affairs and External Action Council, The EU’s Relations with Libya, 22 Bertil Lintner, “China behind Myanmar’s course shift”, Asia Times, 19 October 2011, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/ available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MJ19Ae03.html. dmag2005012509/dmag2005012509en.pdf. 5 6 ECFR/71 January 2013 www.ecfr.eu SHOOTING IN THE DARK? EU SANCTIONS POLICIES “bonus” obtained by the international community, the Libyan 1980s could also be seen in this light. It is striking, however, striking, is It light. this in seen be also could 1980s French and British forces, with the cooperation of other allies, The effect of the different batches of Libya sanctions is easier It took a dramatic policy shift by the regime – from routinefrom – regimethe by shiftpolicydramatic a took It Importantly, while giving up on WMD by Libya was part part was Libya by WMD on up giving while Importantly, Libya, however, and human-rights violations, this time by by time this violations, human-rights and however, Libya, alone. It took direct Western military intervention to produce largelyandconcealed repression ofactsall-out to– civil war again in the case of possible backsliding. On the other hand, the EU continued imposing an arms arms an imposing continued EU the hand, other the On actually given the Libyan regime an additional justification additional an regime Libyan the given actually then and suspended, were Sanctions rebels. the assisted Community states, the reaction was muted: no additional additional no muted: was reaction the states, Community dictators in the name of stability to endorsingstabilitydemocracytoof name in the dictators in of normal relations with its successors. It remains to be seen, It established. clearly is sanctions of effectiveness the case, the regarding demands accepted Libya until embargo continued to be enforced throughout the civil war, in which in war,civil throughoutenforced the be continuedto of the deal, it was never put forward as a specific sanctionsspecific a as forward put never was it deal, the of with the downfall of Gaddafi’s regime and the resumption resumption the and regime Gaddafi’s of downfall the with rightsviolations abounded after 2004, they were not reacted regimealsoseemshaveobtainedto bonus: athough human- regime change, but rather to concede on a specific issue. issue. specific a on concede to rather but undergo change, alone regime let democratise, to asked not was regime responsibility of the regime for the acts for which they were they which for acts the for regime the of responsibility the desired result. The eventual lifting of sanctions was a was sanctions of lifting eventual The result. desired the that objective could certainly not be achieved but by – the change regime sanctions became sanctions the of objective the the Middle East and North Africa. Thanks to this policy shift, took place within a broader policy shift, from supporting Arab to elicit a new round of sanctions from the EU. This, however, to, as noted above, with the severity seen in some other cases. to narrowly defined demands: desisting from acts of terror of acts from desisting demands: defined narrowly to that though these attacks directly targeted European European targeted directly attacks these though that the arms embargo. These sanctions were then expanded and to commit them in the future, as revenge for restrictions restrictions for revenge as future, the in them commit to to punish has not conclusively been established. While it did to assess than in the two previous cases, even if the ultimate the victorious opponents of the defeated regime, continue to in precarious remains law of Rule system. democratic a to seen as unfairly imposed. The attacks on airliners in the late have might it committed, fact in if acts such to indifferent was sanctions of series first The assess. to harder is impact however, (as in the case of Burma) if sanctions will be used be willsanctions if Burma) of case the in (ashowever, sanctions wereimposed. has to be noted, however, that it was an atypical case: the the case: atypical an was it that however, noted, be to has logical step once the technical conditions for this were met were this for conditionstechnical the once step logical policy demand. While the WMD issue might be perceived as a punishment of those responsible for the attacks. In this onethis attacks.responsiblepunishmentthoseIn the offor prove that the international community would not remain remain not would community international the that prove as assumptions, mistaken of basis the on imposed probably transition the and rebels the of victory the following lifted SanctionsLibya,therefore,on successfulwere limitedwhen be reported, albeit on a markedly lesser scale. general. limitedthanmoreconclusions aboutsanctions policyin draw to difficult it make will Iran against sanctions of producer.Eventhisifhappens, however, thesheer scale economic from involvement with the world’s withdrawal fourth-largest oil Europeans’ the from impunity with benefit others example, for if, – EU the for including impact, destructive very a have also could they crisis, the economic of time for a at do they as coming success However, EU. foreign-policy major a be could Iran against Sanctions euro. the including currencies major of rates exchange the and BRICs, the of development economictheoil,sanctions ofglobal flowaffect thealso regional EU time, most, This analysedhere). casesthree the at ofimpact or, local the to opposed (as nature in global truly is sanctions these of impact the Finally, therefore needed. effect. Well-designed counteraction – and pro-action – is in Tehran are certainly doing all they can to produce that authorities the needs; regime’s the serve therefore and interference outside against anger to lead might it that conceivablealsois demands, it US and EUcomplywith that this pain will translate into pressure on the regime to paindueto their implementation. While itcan be hoped to effort economic serious experiencing already is little which public, made Iranian the far to sanctions the of so goals the communicate has EU the However, Thus the criterion of consistency is also met. Belarus. of case the in example, for than,stricter much is monitoring implementation failure, possible their of and to its allies, and the extremely negative consequences EU the to sanctions,both the of goal the importanceof condone to temptation sanctions-breaking. theAtsame time, the given thepolitical lessens which sources), alternative find to time extra given was oil, Iranian on example,particularly(forGreece,waswhich dependent individualstatesmemberconditionsthe ofsanctions to theadapting to paid been hasattention properSecond, feasibility. political of criterion the meet sanctions the Therefore, one. has itdeniedalways has programme, itarmssince nuclear its on up give could It sanctions. EU the with some accepted opinion, the Iranian regime could comply preliminaryconclusions candrawn.be First, contrary to few Libya.However,Belarus,a Burma,oras such cases other any with comparison defy they scale sheer their of Because introduced. ever have they ambitious and comprehensive most the are treaty, non-proliferation nuclear the of violations country’s that to reaction in sanctionsIran,TheEuropeansthaton 2012 imposed in EU sanctions against Iran and handing over those held responsible for some of these its declared actions, harms not only the effectiveness of acts. This seemed to function on the basis of an unspoken sanctions, but also the very credibility of European policy. A quid pro quo: compliance with limited sanctions prevents clear regime of exemptions from applying sanctions should the introduction of broader ones. This served the political be devised and implemented. interests of the EU (it could point to a limited success) and its economic interests (there was no need to give up on lucrative The impact of sanctions on the population of the target trade). Furthermore, the broad sanctions introduced later country is also difficult to assess. It is often difficult to obtain did not bring the desired results; only subsequent war did. a representative sample of opinion from the (undemocratic) The Libya case, though arguably different from those of countries targeted by sanctions (the nature of their regimes Belarus and Burma because of different effects desired by being usually a main reason that sanctions have been the sanctioning party, suggests that limited sanctions have declared). However, this does not absolve the authors of better chances of being effective. sanctions policies from trying to assess and consider popular reactions. Unlike Poland under martial law, which had a representative and credible opposition that unequivocally The need for monitoring endorsed sanctions, Belarus today has a much weaker and less credible opposition that is divided on sanctions. This Given the disparate character of the different sanctions affects sanctions effectiveness, however defined. Even regimes, and the paucity of data both on implementation (we more importantly, sanctions may in some cases cause the do not exactly know what has been effectively put into action) population to rally round the regime, as has happened to an and impact (we do not exactly know what the consequences extent in Iraq and could happen in Belarus or Iran.24 of these actions were), general conclusions about EU sanctions are difficult to formulate based on the cases of Thus there is no conclusive answer to the question of whether Belarus, Burma, and Libya. Above all, therefore, there is an sanctions actually hurt the population of the targeted urgent need for better monitoring of the implementation country, in whose interests they are declared, more than the and impact of EU sanctions. strongmen whose behaviour the sanctions were to curb. It is accepted, however, that sanctions on Iraq, whatever their Part of the problem is the loopholes that existed in each of the impact on Saddam Hussein, caused extensive fatalities three cases. On Belarus, there was insufficient investigation among the civilian population. “The government will always of the loopholes, such as those regarding the visa ban. On find ways to feed itself”, quipped Jerzy Urban, spokesman Burma, the ban on EU investment never extended to the oil of the military regime in Warsaw, commenting on the latest sector, where British and French companies struck lucrative round of Western sanctions against the regime in the 1980s. deals, which also benefited the regime and its otherwise The subjects of such governments might not be so lucky. targeted strongmen. On Libya, the exemption of the oil industry from EU sanctions (Europe obtains a third of its oil from that country) seriously undermined their effectiveness. Customise, target, and evaluate At present, there is no procedure on the EU level to verify the implementation of sanctions. Countries differ both in However, short of war, sanctions are the only coercive the amount of economic and/or political pain they have to foreign-policy instrument the EU has at its disposal. This endure by imposing sanctions, and in the resources they means it is likely to continuing using them – despite the can allocate to implementing and monitoring sanctions. gaps in our understanding of implementation and impact. At the same time, the smaller and poorer countries often In the absence of better monitoring, the EU should therefore can do less and suffer more, creating fertile conditions for attempt to apply sanctions as smartly as it can, based on sanctions-breaking. what we can already conclude from cases such as Belarus, Burma, and Libya. In particular, the EU should: It is also clear from the cases of Belarus, Burma, and Libya that EU member states vary in their willingness to impose sanctions. Some, such as the Czech Republic and the Set limited, achievable goals Netherlands, seem to be more inclined to support sanctions policies than others. Most adapt their stance on the issue to In particular, these three cases suggest that sanctions fit their commercial interests (for example, France, which can best be expected to be more effective when their goal had invested heavily in Burma, was eager to see Burmese is limited (for example, the release of prisoners or an sanctions go) or political ones (for example, Poland was admission of past misdeeds) and achievable by the regime very much in favour of sanctions on Belarus, but not on being sanctioned without fundamental political trauma. Ukraine). Member states therefore need to produce a pan- European procedure for monitoring the implementation of sanctions. Until it is in place, only such sanctions whose 24 See, for example, Sebastian Fevock’s discussion of the impact of sanctions against Iraq: “The sanctions were almost counterproductive and strengthened the regime. implementation can be monitored through existing means The Iraqi government could always blame the hardship the society had to endure on should be imposed. The current situation, in which the EU the international community, and the people did not risk displeasing the regime it depended on.” Sebastian Feyock, “Lessons learned. The UN’s sanctions policy on Iraq is not capable of effectively assessing the consequences of from 1990 to 2003 and its implications for the future”, seminar paper, GRIN Verlag 2008. 7 The broader and more demanding the goal of the sanctions with clear descriptions of conditions for their lifting, which becomes, the more difficult it is to get there – and the more should be publicly described to the regime. difficult it also is, given the range of factors influencing the final outcome, to assess the impact of sanctions. In other words, sanctions can force a regime to do certain things, but Communicate their effectiveness decreases exponentially with the scope and depth of expected change. Just as importantly, the EU should communicate with the public and, in particular, the opposition in the target country. This should be an argument for giving up on more ambitious In particular, it should inform the public of the reasons and sanctions programmes, such as the broad sanctions nature of sanctions and the conditions attached. It is of introduced in the waning days of Gaddafi’s regime. However, crucial importance to coordinate sanctions policy with the the EU seems reluctant to admit failure. Thus both sides – country’s opposition (if a credible one exists), both to be able the power imposing sanctions and the power on which to fine-tune and target, and to empower the opposition with sanctions are imposed – find themselves at the opposite the capacity of having sanctions suspended, if the conditions ends of the same dilemma: the former will not make the are met. changes the sanctions were to bring about; the latter will not make changes to the sanctions regime. This is a recipe Sanctions, and the threat of them, are the basic staple of SHOOTING IN THE DARK? EU SANCTIONS POLICIES for a protracted deadlock, at the expense of both, but also diplomacy: if you will not do this, then we will not do that. the population in whose interests the sanctions have been Recent cases of EU sanctions suggest that, the more limited supposedly declared. their scope, and the more fine-tuned their implementation, the bigger the chances of their success. But even such custom- made sanctions need their implementation monitored Be realistic and their effects assessed. Lacking such data, both on the member state and EU level, it is all but impossible to assess The EU should also be realistic about its own capacity to the effectiveness of European sanctions policy. This is impose sanctions and about what they can achieve. It should neither an original nor a new conclusion; the fact that no acknowledge that some member states will suffer (in real or such systematic mechanism exists seems indicative of a percentage terms) more than others from the imposition of wilful blindness on the part of the European institutions. sanctions and will therefore attempt to evade them or allow their companies to do so. It is better to introduce a diversified sanctions-imposition regime, with timeouts for particularly affected states, than to see them internally undermined from the very beginning.

The EU should also recognise that no regime will commit suicide in order to get sanctions lifted. There are certain behaviours, like massive political repression of credible political threats to a regime’s survival, which, while morally and politically reprehensible, are simply not very amenable to modification through economic sanctions. In such cases, political sanctions, even if often perceived as desultory, will have to suffice. (In such a case, however, the EU should clearly show that it is reluctant to introduce economic sanctions because they will not work rather than because it is protecting its own economic interests.)

Loosen or suspend sanctions as a reward for compliance www.ecfr.eu Even where it is possible to modify a regime’s behaviour through sanctions, the threat of introducing more sanctions seems to be markedly less effective than the promise of reducing or suspending existing ones. Thus, although it may be politically easier for the EU to start small, an incremental

January 2013 increase in sanctions is unlikely to be effective. It is better to start with a rather heavy package of sanctions, and loosen or suspend them if the regime complies in tangible ways with the EU’s demands. The EU should therefore be clear about ECFR/71 what it expects from the regime. Sanctions should come 8 About the author ABOUT ECFR

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is the Konstanty Gebert is head of ECFR’s Warsaw office. In first pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, its the 1970s he was a democratic opposition activist and an objective is to conduct research and promote informed debate organiser of the Jewish Flying University, and in the 1980s, across Europe on the development of coherent, effective and under martial law, an underground journalist. He is the values-based European foreign policy. founder of the Polish Jewish intellectual monthly Midrasz, ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements and a board member of the Taube Center for the Renewal that define its activities: of Jewish Life in Poland and of the Einstein Forum in Potsdam, Germany. He has taught in Poland, Israel, and the •A pan-European Council. ECFR has brought together a US, and is the author of ten books on the Polish democratic distinguished Council of over one hundred Members - transformation, French policy towards Poland, the Yugoslav politicians, decision makers, thinkers and business people from the EU’s member states and candidate countries - which wars and the wars of Israel, Torah commentary, and post- meets once a year as a full body. Through geographical and war Polish Jewry. He has also been a reporter for Gazeta thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice Wyborcza, Poland’s biggest daily newspaper. and feedback on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities within their own countries. The Council is chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, Joschka Fischer and Mabel van Oranje.

Acknowledgements • A physical presence in the main EU member states. ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices I would like to gratefully acknowledge the extremely helpful in Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw. suggestions on successive drafts of this brief I received from In the future ECFR plans to open an office in Brussels. Our my colleagues at ECFR, in particular Jana Kobzova and Susi offices are platforms for research, debate, advocacy and communications. Dennison, colleagues at the national offices in Berlin, Paris, and Rome, Joanna Fomina of the Stefan Batory Foundation • A distinctive research and policy development process. in Warsaw, and brilliant editing by Hans Kundnani. All ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished errors, needless to say, are mine only. researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to advance its objectives through innovative projects with a pan-European focus. ECFR’s activities include primary research, publication of policy reports, private meetings and public debates, ‘friends of ECFR’ gatherings in EU capitals and outreach to strategic media outlets.

ECFR is backed by the Soros Foundations Network, the Spanish foundation FRIDE (La Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), the Bulgarian Communitas Foundation, the Italian UniCredit group, the Stiftung Mercator and Steven Heinz. ECFR works in partnership with other organisations but does not make grants to individuals or institutions.

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9 Among members of the European Council on Foreign Relations are John Bruton (Ireland) Hanzade Dog˘an Boyner Hans Hækkerup (Denmark) former prime ministers, presidents, Former European Commission (Turkey) Former Chairman, Defence European commissioners, current Ambassador to the USA; former Prime Chair, Dog˘an Gazetecilik and Dog˘an Commission; former Defence Minister and former parliamentarians and Minister (Taoiseach) On-line ministers, public intellectuals, Heidi Hautala (Finland) Ian Buruma (The Netherlands) Andrew Duff (United Kingdom) Minister for International Development business leaders, activists and Writer and academic cultural figures from the EU member Member of the European Parliament Sasha Havlicek states and candidate countries. Erhard Busek (Austria) Mikuláš Dzurinda (Slovakia) (United Kingdom) Chairman of the Institute for the Former Foreign Minister Executive Director, Institute for Strategic Danube and Central Europe Dialogue (ISD) Asger Aamund (Denmark) Hans Eichel (Germany) President and CEO, A. J. Aamund A/S Jerzy Buzek (Poland) Former Finance Minister Connie Hedegaard (Denmark) and Chairman of Bavarian Nordic A/S Member of the European Parliament; Commissioner for Climate Action former President of the European Rolf Ekeus (Sweden) Urban Ahlin (Sweden) Parliament; former Prime Minister Former Executive Chairman, United Steven Heinz (Austria) Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Nations Special Commission on Iraq; Co-Founder & Co-Chairman, Affairs Committee and foreign Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden) former OSCE High Commissioner on Lansdowne Partners Ltd policy spokesperson for the Social Minister for International Development National Minorities; former Chairman Democratic Party Cooperation Stockholm International Peace Annette Heuser (Germany) Research Institute, SIPRI Executive Director, Bertelsmann Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) Maria Livanos Cattaui Foundation Washington DC Chairman of the Board, Crisis (Switzerland) Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Management Initiative; former Diego Hidalgo (Spain) President Former Secretary General of the (Denmark) Co-founder of Spanish newspaper El International Chamber of Commerce Chairman, Baltic Development Forum; País; Founder and Honorary President, Giuliano Amato (Italy) former Foreign Minister FRIDE Former Prime Minister; Chairman, Ipek Cem Taha (Turkey) Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna; Director of Melak Investments/ Steven Everts (The Netherlands) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Chairman, Istituto della Enciclopedia Journalist Adviser to the Vice President of the Italiana Treccani; Chairman, Centro European Commission and EU High (The Netherlands)

SHOOTING IN THE DARK? EU SANCTIONS POLICIES Studi Americani Carmen Chacón (Spain) Representative for Foreign and Security Former NATO Secretary General Former Minister of Defence Policy Gustavo de Aristegui (Spain) Danuta Hübner (Poland) Diplomat; former Member of Charles Clarke Tanja Fajon (Slovenia) Member of the European Parliament; Parliament (United Kingdom) Member of the European Parliament former European Commissioner Visiting Professor of Politics, University Viveca Ax:son Johnson Gianfranco Fini (Italy) Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden) of East Anglia; former Home Secretary President, Chamber of Deputies; Member of the European Parliament (Sweden) former Foreign Minister Chairman of Nordstjernan AB Nicola Clase (Sweden) Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland) Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Joschka Fischer (Germany) Former Ambassador; former Executive Gordon Bajnai (Hungary) former State Secretary Former Foreign Minister and vice- Director, Crisis Management Initiative Former Prime Minister Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Germany) Chancellor Toomas Ilves (Estonia) Dora Bakoyannis (Greece) Member of the European Parliament Karin Forseke (Sweden/USA) President Member of Parliament; former Foreign Chairman, Alliance Trust Plc Minister Robert Cooper Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) (United Kingdom) Lykke Friis (Denmark) Chairman, Munich Security Leszek Balcerowicz (Poland) Counsellor of the European External Member of Parliament; former Minister Conference; Global Head of Professor of Economics at the Warsaw Action Service for Climate, Energy and Gender Equality Government Affairs Allianz SE School of Economics; former Deputy Prime Minister Gerhard Cromme (Germany) Jaime Gama (Portugal) Minna Järvenpää (Finland/US) Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Former Speaker of the Parliament; International Advocacy Director, Open Lluís Bassets (Spain) ThyssenKrupp former Foreign Minister Society Foundation Deputy Director, El País Maria Cuffaro (Italy) Timothy Garton Ash Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom) Marek Belka (Poland) Anchorwoman, TG3, RAI Professor, London School of Economics Governor, National Bank of Poland; (United Kingdom) former Prime Minister Daniel Daianu (Romania) Professor of European Studies, Oxford Ibrahim Kalin (Turkey) Professor of Economics, National University Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister Roland Berger (Germany) School of Political and Administrative of Turkey on foreign policy and public Founder and Honorary Chairman, Studies (SNSPA); former Finance Carlos Gaspar (Portugal) diplomacy Roland Berger Strategy Consultants Minister Chairman of the Portuguese Institute of GmbH International Relations (IPRI) Sylvie Kauffmann (France) Massimo D’Alema (Italy) Editorial Director, Le Monde Erik Berglöf (Sweden) President, Italianieuropei Foundation; Teresa Patricio Gouveia Chief Economist, European Bank for President, Foundation for European (Portugal) Olli Kivinen (Finland) Reconstruction and Development Progressive Studies; former Prime Trustee to the Board of the Calouste Writer and columnist Minister and Foreign Minister Gulbenkian Foundation; former Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Foreign Minister Ben Knapen (The Netherlands) Chairman, Prime Minister's Economic Marta Dassù (Italy) Former Minister for European Affairs Council; former Prime Minister Under Secretary of State for Foreign Heather Grabbe and International Cooperation Affairs (United Kingdom) Carl Bildt (Sweden) Executive Director, Open Society Gerald Knaus (Austria) Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey) Chairman, European Stability Initiative; Institute – Brussels Carr Center Fellow Henryka Bochniarz (Poland) Foreign Minister President, Polish Confederation of Charles Grant (United Kingdom) Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia) Director, Centre for European Reform Caio Koch-Weser (Germany) Private Employers – Lewiatan Poet and Cultural Critic Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group; Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) former State Secretary Svetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria) Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium) Founder, Communitas Foundation and Director of the Center for International Member of the European Parliament; Conflict Resolution, Columbia Bassma Kodmani (France) President of Venture Equity Bulgaria Ltd. former Prime Minister Executive Director, Arab Reform University; former Deputy Joint Special Initiative Ingrid Bonde (Sweden) Gianfranco Dell'Alba (Italy) Envoy of the United Nations and the CFO & Deputy CEO, Vattenfall AB Director, Confindustria Delegation League of Arab States on Syria Rem Koolhaas Emma Bonino (Italy) to Brussels; former Member of the Elisabeth Guigou (France) (The Netherlands)

www.ecfr.eu European Parliament Vice President of the Senate; former EU Member of Parliament and President Architect and urbanist; Professor at the Commissioner of the Foreign Affairs Committee Graduate School of Design, Harvard Pavol Demeš (Slovakia) University Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Fernando Andresen Guimarães Stine Bosse (Denmark) Marshall Fund of the United States David Koranyi (Hungary) Chairman and Non-Executive Board (Bratislava) (Portugal) Member Deputy Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Head of the US and Canada Division, Center of the Atlantic Council of the Kemal Dervis (Turkey) European External Action Service United States Franziska Brantner (Germany) Vice-President and Director of Member of the European Parliament Global Economy and Development, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Bernard Kouchner (France) Han ten Broeke Brookings. (Germany) Former Minister of Foreign Affairs

January 2013 Former Defence Minister (The Netherlands) Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary) Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria) Member of Parliament and President, DEMOS Hungary István Gyarmati (Hungary) Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal spokesperson for foreign affairs and President and CEO, International Strategies defence Centre for Democratic Transition ECFR/71 10 Aleksander Kwas´niewski Daithi O'Ceallaigh (Ireland) Stefano Sannino (Italy) Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Latvia) (Poland) Director-General, Institute of Director General for Enlargement, Former President International and European Affairs European Commission Former President Antonio Vitorino (Portugal) Mart Laar (Estonia) Christine Ockrent (Belgium) Javier Santiso (Spain) Lawyer; former EU Commissioner Minister of Defence; former Prime Editorialist Director, Office of the CEO of Telefónica Europe Andre Wilkens (Germany) Minister Andrzej Olechowski (Poland) Director Mercator Centre Berlin and Miroslav Lajcˇák (Slovakia) Former Foreign Minister Marietje Schaake Director Strategy, Stiftung Mercator Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Dick Oosting (The Netherlands) (The Netherlands) Carlos Alonso Zaldívar (Spain) Minister CEO, European Council on Foreign Member of the European Parliament Former Ambassador to Brazil Alexander Graf Lambsdorff Relations; former Europe Director, Klaus Scharioth (Germany) Amnesty International Stelios Zavvos (Greece) (Germany) Dean of the Mercator Fellowship CEO, Zeus Capital Managers Ltd Member of the European Parliament Mabel van Oranje on International Affairs; former Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Samuel Žbogar (Slovenia) Pascal Lamy (France) (The Netherlands) Germany to the US EU Representative to Kosovo; former Honorary President, Notre Europe and Senior Advisor, The Elders Foreign Minister Director-General of WTO; former EU Pierre Schori (Sweden) Commissioner Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain) Chair, Olof Palme Memorial Fund; Member of the Board, Fomento de former Director General, FRIDE; former Bruno Le Maire (France) Construcciones y Contratas; former EU SRSG to Cote d’Ivoire Former Minister for Food, Agriculture Commissioner & Fishing Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria) Monica Oriol (Spain) Member of Parliament; former Mark Leonard (United Kingdom) CEO, Seguriber Chancellor Director, European Council on Foreign Relations Cem Özdemir (Germany) Karel Schwarzenberg Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Green (Czech Republic) Jean-David Lévitte (France) Party) Foreign Minister Former Senior Diplomatic Advisor and Ana Palacio (Spain) former Sherpa to the President of the Member of the Council of State; former Giuseppe Scognamiglio (Italy) French Republic; former Ambassador to Foreign Minister; former Senior Vice Executive Vice President, Head of Public the United States President and General Counsel of the Affairs Department, UniCredit S.p.A Sonia Licht (Serbia) World Bank Group Narcís Serra (Spain) President, Belgrade Fund for Political Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Vice Excellence Simon Panek (Czech Republic) President of the Spanish Government Chairman, People in Need Foundation Juan Fernando López Aguilar Chris Patten (United Kingdom) Radosław Sikorski (Poland) (Spain) Chancellor of Oxford University and co- Foreign Minister Member of the European Parliament; chair of the International Crisis Group; Aleksander Smolar (Poland) former Minister of Justice former EU Commissioner Chairman of the Board, Stefan Batory Adam Lury (United Kingdom) Diana Pinto (France) Foundation CEO, Menemsha Ltd Historian and author Javier Solana (Spain) Monica Macovei (Romania) Jean Pisani-Ferry (France) Former EU High Representative for the Member of the European Parliament Common Foreign and Security Policy & Director, Bruegel; Professor, Université Secretary-General of the Council of the Emma Marcegaglia (Italy) Paris-Dauphine EU; former Secretary General of NATO CEO of Marcegalia S.p.A; former Ruprecht Polenz (Germany) President, Confindustria George Soros (Hungary/USA) Member of Parliament; Chairman of the Founder and Chairman, Open Society Katharina Mathernova (Slovakia) Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee Foundations Senior Advisor, World Bank Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg) Teresa de Sousa (Portugal) ´ Member of Parliament; former Foreign Iñigo Méndez de Vigo (Spain) Minister Journalist Secretary of State for the European Union Goran Stefanovski (Macedonia) Charles Powell Playwright and Academic David Miliband (Spain/United Kingdom) Director, Real Instituto Elcano Rory Stewart (United Kingdom) (United Kingdom) Member of Parliament Member of Parliament; Former Andrew Puddephatt (United Secretary of State for Foreign and Kingdom) Alexander Stubb (Finland) Commonwealth Affairs Director, Global Partners & Associated Minister for Foreign Trade and Ltd. European Affairs; former Foreign Alain Minc (France) Minister President of AM Conseil; former Vesna Pusic´ (Croatia) chairman, Le Monde Foreign Minister Michael Stürmer (Germany) Chief Correspondent, Die Welt Nickolay Mladenov (Bulgaria) Robert Reibestein Foreign Minister; former Defence Ion Sturza (Romania) Minister; former Member of the (The Netherlands) President, GreenLight Invest; former European Parliament Director, McKinsey & Company Prime Minister of the Republic of Dominique Moïsi (France) George Robertson Moldova Senior Adviser, IFRI (United Kingdom) Paweł S´wieboda (Poland) Former Secretary General of NATO President, Demos EUROPA - Centre for Pierre Moscovici (France) European Strategy Finance Minister; former Minister for Albert Rohan (Austria) European Affairs Former Secretary General for Vessela Tcherneva (Bulgaria) Foreign Affairs Spokesperson and advisor, Ministry of Nils Muiznieks (Latvia) Foreign Affairs Council of Europe Commissioner for Adam D. Rotfeld (Poland) Human Rights Former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Teija Tiilikainen (Finland) Co-Chairman of Polish-Russian Group Director, Finnish Institute for Hildegard Müller (Germany) on Difficult Matters, Commissioner of International Relations Chairwoman, BDEW Bundesverband Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft Luisa Todini (Italy) Norbert Röttgen (Germany) Chair, Todini Finanziaria S.p.A; Member Wolfgang Münchau (Germany) Minister for the Environment, of the Board of Directors, RAI President, Eurointelligence ASBL Conservation and Nuclear Safety Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece) Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (Romania) Olivier Roy (France) Professor, University of Athens and Professor of Democracy Studies, Hertie Professor, European University Institute, President, ELIAMEP School of Governance Florence Erkki Tuomioja (Finland) Kalypso Nicolaïdis Daniel Sachs (Sweden) Foreign Minister (Greece/France) CEO, Proventus Professor of International Relations, Daniel Valtchev, (Bulgaria) University of Oxford Pasquale Salzano (Italy) Former Deputy PM and Minister of Vice President for International Education Governmental Affairs, ENI 11 October 2009(ECFR/19) Jeremy ShapiroandNickWitney, A PowerAuditofEU-USRelations Towards aPost-AmericanEurope: October 2009(ECFR/18) Daniel KorskiandRichardGowan, Capacities A reviewofEurope’s Civilian Can theEUrebuildfailingstates? (ECFR/17) Nicu Popescu,October2009 Transition Supporting Moldova’s Democratic September 2009(ECFR/16) Leonard andAndrewWilson, edited byIvanKrastev, Mark What doesRussiathink? Brantner, September2009(ECFR/15) Richard GowanandFranziska UN: 2009annualreview The EUandhumanrightsatthe June 2009(ECFR/14) Nicu PopescuandAndrewWilson, the Troubled Neighbourhood European andRussianPower in The LimitsofEnlargement-lite: (ECFR/13) Anthony Dworkin,May2009 Framework forCounterterrorism Towards aNewTransatlantic Beyond the“War onTerror”: April 2009(ECFR/12) John FoxandFrancoisGodement, Relations A PowerAuditofEU-China Daniel Korski,March2009(ECFR/11) Shaping Europe’s AfghanSurge (ECFR/10) Mark Leonard,December2008 Daniel Korski,UlrikeGuerotand Re-wiring theUS-EUrelationship (ECFR/09) Pierre Noel,November2008 with RussianGas Beyond Dependence:Howtodeal Brantner, September2008(ECFR/08) Richard GowanandFranziska the UN An AuditofEuropean Power at A GlobalForce forHuman Rights? (ECFR/07) Andrew Wilson,August2008 Nicu Popescu,MarkLeonardand Georgia? Can theEUwinPeacein Nick Witney, July2008(ECFR/06) and DefencePolicy Re-energising Europe’s Security (ECFR/05) 2008 Andrew Wilson,February the PutinSuccession Meeting Medvedev:ThePoliticsof (ECFR/04) 2008 Daniel Korski,January forgotten war Afghanistan: Europe’s (ECFR/03) Paweł Swieboda,December2007 Poland’s toEurope? secondreturn November 2007(ECFR/02) Mark LeonardandNicuPopescu, Relations A PowerAuditofEU-Russia October 2007(ECFR/01) Ivan KrastevandMarkLeonard, Herbivorous Powers of SoftPowerandtheRise New World Order:TheBalance from ECFR Also available

September 2011(ECFR/38) Daniel LevyandNickWitney, Why Europeans ShouldVote “Yes” Palestinian StatehoodattheUN: July 2011(ECFR/37) Parello-Plesner withAliceRichard, François GodementandJonas The ScrambleforEurope (ECFR/36) Jacqueline Hénard,June2011 Edited byUlrikeGuérotand Europe? thinkabout What doesGermany (ECFR/35) Edited byDimitarBechev, June2011 What doesTurkey think? Pantucci, June2011(ECFR/34) Jonas Parello-PlesnerandRaffaello the ArabRevolutions China’s Janus-facedResponseto May 2011(ECFR/33) José IgnacioTorreblanca, Susi Dennison,NicuPopescuand in Morocco can supportDemocraticEvolution HowtheEU A ChancetoReform: Nick Witney, May2011(ECFR/32) Anthony Dworkin,DanielKorskiand Bolder EUApproach Egypt’s HybridRevolution:a May 2011(ECFR/31) Nicu PopescuandAndrewWilson, Neighbourhood Lessons from theEastern Turning PresenceintoPower: April 2011(ECFR/30) Ulrike GuérotandMarkLeonard, needs Europe it cangettheGermany Question:How The NewGerman March 2011(ECFR/29) 2010 European ForeignPolicyScorecard March 2011(ECFR/28) Nicu PopescuandNickWitney, Susi Dennison,AnthonyDworkin, the Transition inTunisia After theRevolution:Europe and (ECFR/27) 2011 and AndrewWilson,January Balázs Jarábik,JanaKobzova Election The EUandBelarusafterthe (ECFR/26) Godement, December2010 Thomas KlauandFrançois for theEurozone Beyond Maastricht:aNewDeal (ECFR/25) & AndrewWilson,October2010 Dimitar Bechev, JanaKobzova Ivan Krastev&MarkLeonardwith The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe Brantner, September2010(ECFR/24) Richard GowanandFranziska UN: 2010Review The EUandHumanRightsatthe Dworkin, September2010(ECFR/23) Susi DennisonandAnthony Strategy foraPost-WesternWorld Towards anEUHumanRights (ECFR/22) François Godement,June2010 A GlobalChinaPolicy Daniel Korski,May2010(ECFR/21) Heather Grabbe,GeraldKnausand Forward forEUBalkanPolicy Beyond Wait-and-See: TheWay (ECFR/20) Andrew Wilson,March2010 Dealing with Yanukovych’s Ukraine Richard Gowan,June2012(ECFR/59) Crisis Management The CaseforCo-operationin June 2012(ECFR/58) Mark LeonardandJanZielonka, Markets Regain theTrust ofCitizensand A Europe ofIncentives:Howto May 2012(ECFR/57) Jana KobzovaandLeilaAlieva, Oil The EUandAzerbaijan:Beyond May 2012(ECFR/56) Ulrike GuérotandThomasKlau, CanMakeEuropeGermany Work After Merkozy:HowFranceand Plesner, May2012(ECFR/55) Hans KundnaniandJonasParello- Matters forEurope Emerging SpecialRelationship Whythe China andGermany: (ECFR/54) Julien Barnes-Dacey, April2012 before it’s toolate Europe andJordan:Reform (ECFR/53) François Godement,April2012 China atthecrossroads (ECFR/52) Jonas Parello-Plesner, March2012 in Burma How theEUCanSupportReform (ECFR/51) Julien Barnes-Dacey, March2012 Syria: Towards aPoliticalSolution March 2012(ECFR/50) Ben JudahandAndrewWilson, The EndofthePutinConsensus 2012(ECFR/49) February Sebastian DullienandUlrikeGuérot, Approach totheEuro Crisis Ordoliberalism: Germany’s The LongShadowof 2012(ECFR/48) February 2012 European ForeignPolicyScorecard (ECFR/47) Andrew Wilson,December2011 verdict Ukraine aftertheTymoshenko Dennison, December2011(ECFR/46) Hakim DarboucheandSusi to theEU’s South A “Reset”withAlgeria:theRussia (ECFR/45) François Godement,November2011 price? Rescuing theeuro: whatisChina’s Popescu, November2011(ECFR/44) Ben Judah,JanaKobzovaandNicu Dealing withaPost-BricRussia (ECFR/43) Mark Leonard,November2011 of Europe Four ScenariosfortheReinvention Leonard, November2011(ECFR/42) José IgnacioTorreblanca andMark oftheSouth”? “Germany Spain aftertheElections: Dworkin, November2011(ECFR/41) Susi DennisonandAnthony Human Rights A NewVision forDemocracyand Europe andtheArabRevolutions: (ECFR/40) Nick Witney, November2011 of Europe How toStoptheDemilitarisation Brantner, September2011(ECFR/39) Richard GowanandFranziska UN: 2011Review The EUandHumanRightsatthe (ECFR/70) Torreblanca, December2012 Sebastian DullienandJoséIgnacio What isPoliticalUnion? (ECFR/69) Susi Dennison,December2012 Mali Question The EU,AlgeriaandtheNorthern 2012 (ECFR/68) Julien Barnes-Dacey, November deepening discontent Jordan Tremors: Elusive consensus, Witney, November2012(ECFR/67) Daniel Levy, KadriLiikandNick Hans Kundnani,MarkLeonard, François Godement, Richard Gowan, Dimitar Bechev, AnthonyDworkin, re-election meansforEurope togrowTime up:whatObama’s 2012 (ECFR/66) Edited byMarkLeonard,November China 3.0 (ECFR/65) Andrew Wilson,November2012 Elections The EUandUkraineafterthe2012 (ECFR/64) Sebastian Dullien,October2012 European SingleMarket Why theEuro CrisisThreatensthe September 2012(ECFR/63) Nicu PopescuandLeonidLitra, Transnistria: ABottom-upSolution September 2012(ECFR/62) Nick WitneyandAnthonyDworkin, Relations A PowerAuditofEU-NorthAfrica 2012 (ECFR/61) Julien Barnes-Dacey, September from Syria Lebanon: ContainingSpillover (ECFR/60) Dimitar Bechev, August2012 Crisis The WesternBalkansandtheEuro The PeripheryofthePeriphery: [email protected] SW1H 9JA,UnitedKingdom 35 OldQueenStreet,London, on ForeignRelations(ECFR), Published bytheEuropeanCouncil ISBN: 978-1-906538-71-2 © ECFRJanuary2013. Council onForeignRelations written permissionoftheEuropean use. Anyotheruserequirestheprior your ownpersonalandnon-commercial content fromthispublicationexceptfor republish orcirculateinanywaythe Relations. Youmaynotcopy,reproduce, by theEuropeanCouncilonForeign Copyright ofthispublicationisheld views ofitsauthors. Foreign Relations,representsonlythe publications oftheEuropeanCouncilon positions. Thispaper,likeall Relations doesnottakecollective The EuropeanCouncilonForeign

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