An Exploration on Why and How Syrian Refugees Settle Down in Diyarbakır City Looking at Social Networks and Livelihood Strategies

An exploration on why and how Syrian

refugees settle down in Diyarbakır city

Master thesis Ilva Veul

An exploration on why and how Syrian refugees settle down in Diyarbakır city Looking at social networks and livelihood strategies

Name : Ilva Veul

Student number : 900624887110

E-mailadres : [email protected]

Supervisor : Joost Jongerden

Second reader : Bram Jansen

Program : Master International Development

Chair group : Sociology of Development and Change

Course code : SDC 80733

Date : 17-12-2015

The cover photo was taken by Joost Jongerden in the ‘old city’ of Diyarbakır where I conducted part of my research.

Abstract The number of refugees is increasing worldwide, largely due to mass displacement caused by the Syrian War. Turkey currently hosts the greatest number of Syrian refugees, estimated at 2.2 million. Increasingly, refugees are tending to flee to non-camp settlements, while Turkish refugee policy is mostly focused on hosting refugees in camps. The aim of this research is, therefore, to contribute to urban refugee policy. To do so, information is needed on the current situation of urban refugees, as previous research has mostly focused on ‘camp’ refugees. This research examines why Syrian refugees prefer non-camp settlement in Diyarbakır city and what kind of livelihood strategies they employ. To answer this, I have analysed relevant literature and completed first hand fieldwork over three months in Diyarbakır city, a Kurdish city in the South-East of Turkey. I used a qualitative data method which consisted of interviewing, observing and conducting informal talks with twenty Syrian families. I also had informal talks with Syrian refugees, non-government organizations, the local municipality and governmental organizations. The results demonstrate that social relations, ethnic background and a desire for self-reliance are three important factors in explaining both why Syrian refugees prefer non-camp settlements in Diyarbakır city and which livelihood strategies they use. The Syrian refugees had come to Diyarbakır city because of chain-migration, meaning that they had followed family members and co-nationals with the same ethnic background who had previously moved to this place. Other reasons that were mentioned as influencing the decision of the interviewees to relocate to Diyarbakır city were the availability of economic opportunities and social services. These were all factors that they perceived as unavailable in the camps, of which they had a negative view. The interviewees expressed a desire to be in a place where they would be able to be self-reliant. Once they arrived in the city, family and co-nationals with the same ethnic background and the local community seemed to serve as important networks in finding a house and a job and engaging with economic and social opportunities. Existing institutions (such as the local municipality and governmental organizations) only seemed to be engaged from time to time, as this was dependent on the refugees’ ability to find these institutions and the willingness of the institutions to assist. Besides making use of social networks, another livelihood strategy used by the respondents was making use of policy inconsistencies and regulation loopholes. Although refugees are forbidden to formally work or receive education in Turkey, those individuals interviewed had found ways to access income and education through other means. While this enabled the respondents to be self- reliant and to survive in the short-term, the ways in which they did so are not ethically justifiable. Besides, these survival strategies did not seem useful for the long-term. It is therefore important to create an urban refugee policy for Turkey that offers durable and ethical solutions. The main recommendation of this thesis is that the Turkish government reform existing legislation to grant refugees working permits and ensure that Syrian children can receive a formal education. In this way the needs of refugees are better fulfilled and the host-country can also profit from the human and economic potential of refugees.

Keywords: Syrian refugees, non-camp settlement, livelihood strategies, social networks, chain- migration, self-help, self-reliant, urban refugee policy, Diyarbakır

Acknowledgement In the winter of 2010 I was in Ankara, Turkey for a university exchange program and got the chance to visit both Syria as well as the Eastern part of Turkey. Both of these places impressed me because of the beautiful landscapes and the friendly people who were so hospitable. I am therefore grateful that I was once again able to go back to Eastern Turkey in the summer of 2014, in order to conduct qualitative research for my thesis. Talking with people from Syria reminded me of my amazing trip in their country. It is sad to hear what has happened to Syria, a country with so much beauty. Even though my respondents had experienced horrible things and were deprived from home, they were all willing to tell their stories about their lives then and now. Sometimes these stories were told with tears and sometimes with a smile, but one thing these stories had in common was that they were told by friendly and hospitable people. I would like to thank all of my respondents for their stories, warmth, coffee and tea. I wish you all the best for the future, inshallah.

Besides my respondents I also would like to give a big thanks to Erhan, my translator, who really was of great help. Without him I would have been hopelessly lost in the narrow streets of Diyarbakır city. Besides being my translator and guide, he also became a friend with whom I liked to talk and play a nice game of backgammon. Erhan, zor sipas.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Murat, Dilan and Atalay, my colleagues at DISA, who made it a lot easier for me to do my research in Diyarbakır. Firstly, because they offered me a place at their office so I could do my daily work, but also because they had some contacts to which they could introduce me. Special thanks go to Atalay and Dilan, who really did their best to make me feel at home. I had a great time living together with Atalay, meeting all his lovely friends, and going on trips to places such as Mardin, Hasankeyf and Suruç. Also Dilan introduced me to all her friends and family, and took me along to several wedding parties and pubs. Without them, my time in Diyarbakır probably would have been quite lonely, since there were hardly any other people with whom I could communicate. I am therefore grateful for the nice talks and moments I shared with them.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my supervisor Joost Jongerden. It was nice to have a supervisor who was familiar with the place and culture I was living in. He therefore was able to give me some valuable contacts that led me to, for instance, my translator and DISA, which proved very important for both my research and for me personally. Next to that, he also could give me good advice on what to do when the situation in Diyarbakır became a bit unsafe. It gave me a safe feeling to know that he had gone through similar situations before. Thank you for all your time, help and patience.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents and Zoran for supporting me from back home. During my time in Diyarbakır I would Skype with Zoran almost daily and tell him all my stories. I really appreciate that he took the time to listen to me. I know my parents were worried from time to time, especially during my trips to Suruç and when the situation in Diyarbakır became unstable. But still, they supported my decisions and had faith in me. Zoran, mom and dad, thanks for being there for me and for your unconditional love and support.

Table of contents

Abstract ...... i Acknowledgement...... ii 1. Introduction ...... 3 2. Problem statement and theoretical background ...... 7 2.1 Research aim and questions ...... 10 2.1 Choosing a place to settle down ...... 11 2.2 Livelihood strategies ...... 12 2.3 How refugees perceive their living conditions ...... 13 3. Method of data-collection ...... 15 3.1 Research design and participants ...... 15 3.2 Data-collection ...... 17 3.2.1 Orientation phase ...... 18 3.2.2 Interview phase ...... 18 3.3 Data-processing and data-analysis ...... 19 3.4 Limitations and reflection ...... 20 4. Results ...... 23 4.1 The migration stories of Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır city and the choice for non-camp settlement ...... 23 4.1.1 Reasons for choosing a non-camp settlement over a camp settlement ...... 27 4.1.2 Pull factors for Diyarbakır ...... 28 4.2 How Syrian refugees settle down and get access to economic and social factors in Diyarbakır ...... 30 4.2.1 Finding a place to settle down ...... 31 4.2.2 Settling down with the help of others ...... 32 4.2.3 Getting access to income ...... 34 4.2.4 Getting access to social services...... 36 4.2.5 The role of gender and its implications for survival in Diyarbakır ...... 38 4.3 The perception of Syrian refugees on their living conditions in Diyarbakır ...... 39 4.3.1 Living conditions in Diyarbakır ...... 40 4.3.2 Ethnic differences ...... 42 4.3.3 Perception on local community and institutions ...... 44 5. Discussion and conclusion ...... 47 5.1 Discussion on why Syrian refugees prefer non-camp settlement in Diyarbakır ...... 47 5.2 Discussing the livelihood strategies used by Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır ...... 48 5.3 Discussing the perception of Syrian refugees on their living conditions ...... 51 5.4 Conclusion and recommendations ...... 53 5.5 A reflection on this research ...... 55 6. References ...... 57

1. Introduction This research identifies the variables to explain why refugees choose for non-camp settlement and how they survive in such settlements. A lot of research has already been done on refugees before, but most of this research has focused on ‘camp’ refugees. It appears, however, that many refugees also flee to non-camp areas (UNHCR, 2014a) – a trend that has been notably underresearched. This thesis aims to explore why and how Syrian refugees settle down in Diyarbakır city. The reason why Diyarbakır is scientifically interesting is that it has not been a focus of such research before and the United Nations High Commissioner for Research (UNHCR) does not have any data on this place at present. Another reason for the particularly interesting dynamic in Diyarbakır is the Kurdish background of the city. Diyarbakır is seen as the capital city of Kurdistan and most inhabitants are Kurd, which brings in an ethnic aspect to my research. In this research I will therefore take this ethnic dimension of non-camp settlement into consideration which might yield interesting and new results. I will start this chapter by discussing the relevance and outline of the thesis.

As Figure 1 shows, global forced displacement has Figure 1. Displacement from 2000 - 2014 been growing and has currently reached the highest number on record. At the end of 2014 more than 59.5 million people were forcibly displaced, which is 8 million more than the previous year (UNHCR, 2015). Figure 2 shows that this increase in displacement numbers is caused by different wars such as those in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, but predominantly by the war in Syria (UNHCR, 2015). Syria is a country located in the Middle-East and shares borders with Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon. Syria has approximately 22 million inhabitants which are ethnically and religiously diverse (Fisher, 2013). The population are mainly Arabs, but also Kurds, Armenians, Yezidis and Turkmen (CBC news, 2014). These ethnicities follow different religions of which the majority is Sunni Muslim. Others identify as Christians, Jews or Druze, and the country is run by members of a minority group known as Alawites (also Muslim, but they follow a smaller branch of the Islam) with Bashar al-Assad as leader (Fisher, 2013). In March 2011, some of these different ethnic groups started peaceful protests against the minority and Alawi dominated Figure 2. Major source countries of refugees regime of Bashar al-Assad, because they felt deprived of their democratic and social and economic rights. The movement for political reform eventually escalated into an armed conflict, which has been growing in intensity and scope for almost five years now. Several hundreds of groups are thought to be fighting against the al-Assad regime, although the war is

increasingly characterized by sects and the opposition is dominated by Sunni radicals. In June 2014, Islamic State (IS) entered the conflict, not only fighting the regime but also fighting other parties. This war has thus far caused 4.3 million people to flee Syria and 7.6 million people to become internally displaced, as of December 2015 (UNHCR, 2015a). The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights counts more than 230 000 casualties in this same period.

Most of the Syrians who fled the country Figure 3. Major refugee-hosting countries moved to Turkey. Because of this enormous influx, Turkey became the biggest refugee-hosting country worldwide (UNHCR, 2015). As can be seen in Figure 3, at the end of 2014 Turkey hosted around 1.6 million refugees. The statistics of 2015 indicate that there has been an increase and that currently Turkey hosts almost 2.2 million displaced Syrians. This is 1.1 million more than Lebanon, the second largest Syrian refugee-hosting country (UNHCR, 2015a). Of these Syrian refugees, around 250 000 live in the 25 government camps (see Figure 4 for a map of these camps). The majority of the Syrian refugees in Turkey (around 1.9 million) stay in non-camp settlements (see Figure 5 to see where most Syrian refugees are settled). From the start of the Syrian war until the present, the Turkish government has spent more than €6 billion on the Syrian refugee crisis (Human Rights Watch, 2015). While Turkey used to refuse outside assistance, since April 2012 they have been part of the UN Regional Response Plan in the hope of receiving some extra aid (Amnesty International, 2014). They required around $ 624 million for 2015, through the Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience plan (3RP), a UN led plan, of which 35% is covered up till now1. This aid money, both from the Turkish government as from the UN, is mainly spent on camps. Refugees in non-camp settlement are excluded from formal methods of assistance and often have limited access to public services like education, healthcare and employment (European Commission, 2014). Thus, it is important to also consider this refugee crisis from an urban point of view. This research aims to explain why Syrian refugees have chosen for non-camp settlement despite the lack of formal assistance, and what kind of strategies they then use to survive. The core question therefore is: Why do Syrian refugees prefer non-camp settlement in Diyarbakır city and what kind of livelihood strategies do they use?

In Chapter two, I discuss my problem statement and theoretical background. I state the importance of this research, define my research questions and discuss what is already known on this topic. In the third chapter, I give an explanation of my method of data-collection. In Chapter four, I set out the results of my research which are then discussed in the final chapter, where I conclude that social relations, ethnic background and being able to be self-reliant are the three variables which explain why and how refugees choose for non-camp settlement in Diyarbakır. I conclude with recommendations on how to improve urban refugee policy and on the need for future, focused research.

1 https://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R3prov_A1090___18_November_2015_(16_08).pdf, retrieved on 9 December 4

Figure 4. Syrian refugees registered in camps in Turkey2

Figure 5. Syrian refugees (both camp and non-camp) in Turkey3

2 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-build-new-refugee-camp-for-55000-syrians- .aspx?PageID=238&NID=85102&NewsCatID=338, retrieved 9 September 2015 3 https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/08/when-i-picture-my-future-i-see-nothing/barriers-education-syrian- refugee-children, retrieved on 9 December 2015 5

2. Problem statement and theoretical background This chapter outlines the importance of the research conducted in this thesis, by explaining the problem statement and aim of this research. This is followed by an examination of the existing academic literature concerning refugees’ choice of settlement and their livelihood strategies. This literature study is divided in three parts: part one will look at the reasons why refugees settle down somewhere; the second part looks at livelihood strategies used by refugees; and the final part looks at how people can perceive certain things.

The concept of ‘refugee’ is defined in the Geneva Convention of 1951 and refers to:

“any person who[,]...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.

Often a refugee is only formally recognised as such if it receives this official status. In this research however, the term ‘refugee’ will refer to both people with or without an official status. This paper defines ‘refugee’ as any person who had fear for their life due to war and therefore decided to flee their country. Many governments seem to distinguish different types of refugees. They, for instance, see camp refugees as prima facie refugees and urban refugees as economic migrants (Jacobsen, 2005). The label prima facie is given to refugees who did not have the chance to get an individual asylum interview but of whom the reason for fleeing is evident. Often these are refugees who moved during mass movements, as a result of conflicts or generalized violence.4 Because of these different labels (camp and urban refugees), the two groups are often treated differently which results in the situation where camp refugees often have more entitlements than urban refugees. Camp refugees mostly receive assistance and services from host communities and humanitarian actors because these refugees are seen as unable to make meaningful choices about their own lives (UNHCR, 2014a). UNHCR assumes that urban refugees are more able to support themselves since they otherwise could have gone to the camps where they would be provided with humanitarian assistance. Many governments and international organizations do not formally recognize urban refugees, and without recognition from the host government and assistance from international organizations it becomes difficult for urban refugees to survive in such places. This compromises the credibility of the refugee label, as international organizations that are supposed to give legal protection and material aid do not seem to play a role in the lives of urban refugees (Malkki, 1995).

This is consistent with the situation in Turkey, where there seems to be a lack of recognition of urban refugees. The Turkish government, with the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), has mainly focused their financial means towards camp refugees. Normally it is the mandate of UNHCR to protect refugees and search for long-term solutions (UNHCR, 2015), however the refugee crisis in Turkey is coordinated by the AFAD. AFAD is an institution within the Turkish government which works to prevent disasters, minimize disaster-related damages, coordinate post-disaster response, and promote cooperation among various government agencies. In the past few years they have established 25 refugee camps, hosting around 250 000 Syrian refugees, at a total monthly cost of €2 million (European Commission, 2015). Although most national and international non-

4 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html, retrieved on 8 July 2014 7

governmental organizations are not allowed to enter these camps, credible sources have confirmed that these camps are of good quality, offering shelter, health, education, food security and social and other technical services (Amnesty International, 2014; European Commission, 2015). The majority of Syrian refugees, though, are staying in non-camp settlements where they often are left to survive under very challenging circumstances, with less assistance from the government and other humanitarian organizations (European Commission, 2015).

As the above analysis shows, the Turkish government offers different treatment for camp and urban refugees. The government also offers different treatment for registered and unregistered refugees and for European and non-European refugees. After the commencement of the Syrian war, Turkey implemented a ‘temporary protection regime’ for Syrians (see Textbox 1 for an explanation of this concept). This implies that Turkey has an open-border policy in which Syrian refugees cannot be sent back (non-refoulement). In reality, however, it appears that refugees without Syrian passports are regularly denied access at official border crossings (Amnesty International, 2014). If the refugees are granted access, the authorities are supposed to support them, but only inside the borders of the camps (Özden, 2013). This temporary protection status is quite different from an official refugee status, since the refugees are not legally allowed to apply for resettlement, nor to participate in the work force (Jessen, 2013). The reason why these refugees cannot apply for full refugee status is because “the Turkish state grants refugee status and the right to asylum only to persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe” (Özden, 2013). People who are not from Europe should be assessed by the UNHCR, who is supposed to resettle these displaced people in other countries. Until this time, they are granted temporary protection. Therefore, Syrian refugees in Turkey are seen as ‘guests’ who are only meant to stay for a short term. Naturally, however, UNHCR has difficulty in efficiently resettling such an overwhelming number of people and thus, many of these ‘guests’ remain in Turkey (Özden, 2013). The Turkish government has only come up with short- term solutions to what is proving to be a long-term problem. It is therefore important to think about long-term solution for Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Various long-term solutions which can be considered are voluntary return to the country of origin, integration in the host country and resettlement in third countries (UNHCR, 2014). As already stated, resettlement in third countries has become more difficult: firstly, because Syrian refugees with temporary protection status are not allowed to apply for resettlement through the Turkish government and; secondly, because UNHCR has difficulties in efficiently resettling these refugees. This can be explained by the failure of non-neighbouring countries to honour their resettlement commitments (Amnesty International, 2014). Resettlement options have become scarce, especially in Europe and America where, because of the ongoing crisis and rising xenophobic discourse, migrants are refused entry and many borders have been closed (Amnesty International, 2014; Voruz, 2012). Up until November 2014, less than 7000 Syrian refugees had been resettled outside of neighbouring countries (Oxfam, 2014). Looking at voluntary return, statistics show that worldwide 6.4 million refugees were in a protracted situation by the end of 2014, with an average duration of 25 years (UNHCR, 2015). In 2014, only 126 800 refugees returned to their countries of origin which was the lowest level of refugee returns since 1983. It is ironic to see this number fall so low, since many refugees flee to neighbouring countries with the idea of returning as soon as this becomes possible. Syria’s civil war can be called protracted as well, with extensive destruction within the country (Judson, 2014). Voluntary return to Syria has become almost impossible due to the dangerous living situation in the country. Local integration is realized when refugees integrate as members of the host

community through legal, economic, social, and cultural processes. This places obligations on both refugees and host governments (UNHCR, 2015) - refugees need to accept different norms and values, while host governments also need to give the refugees the same rights as the local population. Existing research shows that integrating refugees seems to be a difficult process, especially for urban refugees since they are often perceived by the local population as an economic burden on the city (Campbell, 2006). This perception creates resentment and hostility from locals towards the urban Syrian refugees (Judson, 2014).

Textbox 1. Temporary protection status5

The Law on Foreigners and International Protection in Turkey, which entered into force in April 2014, has the following subcategorizations: refugees, conditional refugees, subsidiary protection and temporary protection. In this Turkish law, a refugee is defined as someone from Europe who “shall be granted refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process” (Article 61). A conditional refugee is a person from a non-European country, “who shall be allowed to reside in Turkey temporarily until they are resettled to a third country” (Article 62). Subsidiary protection is given to a foreigner or stateless person “who is unable or for the reason of such threat is unwilling, to avail himself of the protection of his country of origin or country of former habitual residence” (Article 63). Temporary protection is the legal status for the Syrian refugees in Turkey. It “may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection” (Article 91(1)). With this temporary protection, it is not possible to be resettled through the Turkish government, except when refugees face “multiple layers of discrimination” and when they are marginalized in society and isolated from their homes, such as in the case of lesbians, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) refugees (Dromgold, 2015). The ‘temporary protection’ status has been granted towards all Syrian refugees, however it is unclear what exactly is meant with this. According to Article 91 (2), “the reception of such foreigners into Turkey; their stay in Turkey and rights and obligations; their exit from Turkey… shall be stipulated in a Directive to be issued by the Council of Ministers” (Dromgold, 2015). On the 22nd of October 2014, the first Directive regarding the rights of Syrian refugees in Turkey was issued. In this Directive it was regulated that Syrian refugees with a temporary protection status had “admission to Turkish territory as unobstructed, forced returns as not permitted and Syrians’ rights to access to basic needs – including shelter in camps, food and medical support and psychosocial services, education and the possibility to apply for work permits in certain sectors and regions” (Dromgold, 2015). The regulation did indicate the possibility to apply for work permits, however the Turkish government never introduced an explicit right to work (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Research also shows that many of these rights are actually still unknown among the Syrian population and in some cases have not yet been (completely) implemented (Dromgold, 2015). For instance, it appears that 75% of non-camp refugees still do not receive any formal education due to language barriers, economic hardship and a lack of social integration (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

Overall, it seems as if the situation for urban Syrian refugees is becoming precarious. While there is an increase in the number of urban refugees there seems to be a decrease in places where they can settle and the Turkish government, nor international organizations, seem to focus adequate aid on these urban refugees. Syrian refugees cannot go back to Syria because of the war and because of the prohibition on resettlement through the Turkish government. They are willing to integrate, which can be identified from the fact that 87 percent of both camp and outside camp refugees are very willing

5 My research was conducted before the Directive on the 22nd of October 2014 came through and therefore my results might be different then if this research would have been conducted today. The rights of Syrian refugees might have been improved. 9

to learn the Turkish language (AFAD, 2014). However, they are not granted with certain rights, which makes the integration process more difficult. This is worrisome, since “the Syrians in Turkey are no longer refugees waiting for a war to end but rather immigrants who are ready to write a new chapter in their lives” (Kirişci & Salooja, 2014). A refocus of protection and programming strategies from institutions and the Turkish government is required so these urban refugees are, indeed, able to write these new chapters and effectively integrate. If this is not reconsidered and this group of urban Syrian refugees is left aside by the Turkish government, a consequence might be that more and more refugees will illegally move to Europe in the hope of finding a better place to write this new chapter (Kirişci, 2015). Another consequence, both for those refugees who stay in Turkey as well as those who move to Europe, might be that they become outsiders whose lives are “wasted” (Bauman, 2003). This would not only be a significant cultural and humanitarian loss, but also, as earlier research has shown, an economic loss for the host country as refugees can have a positive effect on a countries economy (Alix-Garcia, 2009; Brees, 2010).

2.1 Research aim and questions The aim of this research is answering the main question “why do Syrian refugees prefer non-camp settlement in Diyarbakır city and what kind of livelihood strategies do they use”? To answer this question, I have devised three sub-questions:

- What are the migration stories of Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır city? - How do Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır city settle down and get access to economic and social factors? - How do Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır city perceive their living conditions?

By answering these questions, the aim is to obtain more information on the situation of non-camp, and in this case urban refugees, in Diyarbakır. This information gives insights into important considerations such as what Syrian urban refugees needs are, what goes well, but also which problems are faced. If it is known why and how Syrian refugees settle down in an urban area, an indication can be given on the best way to manage and support these refugees. This is important for both international organizations and the Turkish government, in order to consider if a refocus of their protection and programming strategies is required, and if so, how such reform can meet the needs of refugees in their diverse locations (UNHCR, 2013). By doing this research, this thesis aims to contribute to the creation of a better urban refugee policy. According to Campbell (2006) “no clearly defined urban refugee policy has ever been developed”, which also accounts for Turkey. With such a written policy, it becomes easier to structure and maximise aid from NGOs, governments and other institutions which, in turn, might contribute to better integration between host and guest community, offering refugees a long-term solution.

Developing an urban refugee policy which can structure aid from NGOs, governments and other institutions involves difficult considerations. Firstly, it appears that aid agencies have a declining funding level since most aid goes to emergencies instead of protracted refugees situations. Secondly, aid agencies are often required to follow host government policy, which often requires them to only provide assistance in camps. Thirdly, urban refugee policy is context specific, meaning that for every city the (political) situation is different (Jacobsen, 2006). In practice, urban refugee policy often follows one of the following coexisting approaches: “one based on government’s official restriction and control policies, the other making use of policy inconsistencies and regulation loopholes to cater

for illegal, mostly poor, migrants” (Jacobsen, 2006). The aim of a clearly defined urban refugee policy is to reduce the need for refugees to search for such loopholes or to be dependent on the good will of local authorities.

2.1 Choosing a place to settle down When refugees decide to flee from their home place they often do so in search for security (AFAD, 2014; Chaterlard, El-Abed & Washington, 2009). Other reasons might be political, economic or health related (AFAD, 2014). These refugees might not always have a full plan in mind of where to go, or how to get there. This is particularly true of asylum seekers in Europe, who often just follow the routes used by the agents whom they have paid to take them to Europe (Crawley, 2010). In that sense, some refugees might just end up in a place by coincidence instead of making a fully aware choice for a particular country, land or area. Others are able to make a deliberate choice and save money for this journey. Most refugees seem to move to neighbouring countries (Czaika & Mayer, 2011). Neighbouring countries often have cultural similarities and most refugees do not have enough money to make the journey to more remote countries. The same accounts for Syrian refugees, most of whom are hosted in neighbouring countries. The main reason why Syrian refugees choose Turkey over other countries is because of ease of transportation (AFAD, 2014). Other reasons include the perception that Turkey offers better conditions, a level of trust towards Turkey and religious reasons.

Looking at the literature, it appears that social networks are an important pull factor for a certain place (Chatelard, E-Abed & Washington, 2009). Refugees prefer to go to places where family or co- nationals have moved to before, in a process called chain-migration. This seems to happen in Turkey as well; Syrian refugees try to find residence with family members in Turkey (Jessen, 2013; Kirişci & Salooja, 2014). Next to family networks, refugees might also use co-national networks for chain- migration (Jacobsen, 2006). This means that refugees flee to places where community or country members have moved to before. In the case of Syrian refugees, these co-national networks might consist of different ethnicity networks. Syria’s population consists of several ethnicities such as Arabs, Kurds and Armenians (CBC news, 2014). Kurdistan is the land of the Kurds and consists of parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Since their land has never been formally recognized, Kurds have a history of regular migration. For instance, during the 1920s, thousands Kurds from the Turkish part of Kurdistan fled to Syria since the government had a plan to move and resettle all Kurds (Vahé, 2005). Also during the first Gulf War (1991), around 450 000 Kurds from the Iraqi part of Kurdistan had to flee to Turkey (Galbraith, 2003). This suggests that Kurds seem to flee to parts where other Kurds live and receive help from them. As Diyarbakır is known as the capital city of Kurdistan it is possible that many Kurds have fled to this city, following Kurds who have moved to this place before. Syrian Arabs, on the other hand, might have a lower density in this city while preferring places where more Arabs are staying. Earlier research for instance, shows that camps in Turkey are often under control of people with a Sunni background. Therefore certain groups such as Christians, Alawites, Kurds, Romans etc. are afraid for ethnical or religious discrimination in these camps and thus might choose for settlement in non-camps, while people with a Sunni background feel more comfortable to go to such camps (Taştan, n.d).

Besides having access to social networks such as family and co-nationals, there seem to be several other pull factors for refugees to move to a certain place. The most important reasons why Syrian refugees in Turkey choose to live in a camp are economic, security and accommodation; a camp ensures having a shelter and food (AFAD, 2014; Jacobsen, 2006). It is interesting to see that

economic reasons are mentioned as a pull factor for camp refugees, as it appears that this might also be a reason for others to choose urban settlement. Earlier research states that access to economic resources and opportunities, such as jobs and education, and social services such as healthcare, are reasons to move to an urban area (Jacobsen, 2006).

Once refugees have found a place to settle down, it does not mean that this is the only place they have settled, or will settle in the future. Mobility is a strategy used by refugees to secure their livelihoods (Campbell, 2006). Some refugees move from one place to another, in search of a better life. Refugees might first move to another place within the home country, then go to a neighbouring country, and from there, maybe to a third country, taking high risks by employing the services of human smugglers in the hope of settlement in a new place (Kirişci, 2015). This is currently a regular occurrence with the refugees from Syria – places within the country are becoming more unsafe and the situation protracted, and therefore many refugees have decided to flee to neighbouring countries. These countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey are becoming crowded and the governments cannot provide the necessities to survive, such as healthcare, education and working permits. Therefore more and more refugees decide to flee to Europe in the hope of a better life (Kirişci, 2015). By looking at the migration stories of Syrian refugees, this thesis aims to better understand why they choose to live at certain places. It will also answer why they have chosen to migrate to Diyarbakır. The first sub-question therefore is: “what are the migration stories of Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır city”?

2.2 Livelihood strategies Livelihood strategies are often defined as “how people access and mobilize resources enabling [refugees] to increase their economic security, thereby reducing the vulnerability created and exacerbated by conflict” (Jacobsen, 2003). For the purposes of this thesis, ‘livelihood strategies’ do not only refer to economic security, but also strategies used to secure the basic necessities of life, such as food, water, shelter and clothing. It also refers to strategies used to access public services such as healthcare and education. When looking at the existing literature concerning the livelihood strategies of refugees, it appears that “transnational family networks are among the most frequent means among displaced people to mobilize financial resources” (Neidhardt, 2013). Such resources can be in the form of remittances, social capital or information which circulates between the host country, the home country and third countries. Jacobsen (2006) does not only look at the importance of family networks, but also at the importance of the social network in general and relations of co- nationals to secure livelihoods. There are several ways in which people make use of these networks and relations - for instance, through chain-migration and by self-help (Jongerden, 2007). As already discussed earlier, chain-migration seems to happen in Turkey as well and may be a reason why certain Syrian refugees chose to settle in Diyarbakır in the first place. Secondly, self-help means that refugees can live somewhere without state assistance through informal support of these social or co- national networks. By creating community structures, refugees can find financial and other support (Jacobsen, 2006). By accessing social or co-national networks it therefore becomes easier for refugees to find housing, employment and other ways of earning money and also to integrate into the host community. Another way in which refugees can receive livelihoods is by making use of the locals or institutions who seek to help refugees for personal reasons (Jacobsen, 2006). These networks are more likely to be established in urban areas and might give access to a wide range of resources. Obtaining this access depends on various factors such as knowing how the system works and the political position of these refugees. In the case of Diyarbakır, it is imaginable that Syrian

Kurds can get access more easily than Syrian Arabs, due to the fact that Syrian Kurds share the same language and culture as the majority of the local population.

Friends, clan networks and relatives who are resettled or who have moved to third countries (diaspora) can also be a source of income, since they often send cash (Campbell, 2006; Horst, 2008; Jacobsen, 2005). These remittances do not necessarily have to go from host or third countries to the home country, but sometimes also go from home country to host or third country (Neidhardt, 2013). Also, mobility is used as a strategy in securing livelihoods (Campbell, 2006). Through mobility, refugees can, for example, commute between a camp and a city. In this way they can have the benefits of both a shelter in the camp where they can safely leave their family, and the city where they can go for trade or work to pursue livelihoods (Jacobsen, 2005). Some people also make use of cross-border mobility meaning that they go back and forward between their host and home country. In this way, they can keep in touch with their families and get access to resources in both areas (Chaterlard, El-Abed & Washington, 2009). Another livelihood strategy might be to obtain employment. Although some refugees might find a job in the formal sector, most refugees often engage in the informal sector in which they earn money through trade and services. This is clearly reflected in the research of Campbell (2006) in which she looks at mechanisms of survival for urban refugees in Nairobi. She compares refugees with transnational corporations which have widespread networks which they use for business. Refugees are therefore called “transnational individuals engaging in global trade and commodity networks” (Campbell, 2006).

Through my research, I would like to better understand which livelihood strategies play a role in the survival of Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır. The second sub-questions therefore will be: “how do Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır city settle down and get access to economic and social factors”? To give an answer to this question, this research will also consider the influence of different people within the possible network of a refugee such as family, co-nationals with the same ethnic background, locals, aid actors, the local municipality and the government.

2.3 How refugees perceive their living conditions The AFAD has done a profiling survey on the Syrian refugees in Turkey with the aim of obtaining demographic socio-economic and socio-cultural information about both the refugees living in and out of the camps. Although this research is conducted by the AFAD itself, and must therefore be treated with due caution, some interesting results have emerged which seem to suggest that camp refugees might perceive their living conditions as better than non-camp refugees in Turkey.

This research from AFAD shows that 41 percent of the camp refugees in Turkey stated that they received aid from humanitarian agencies, in contrast to only 13 percent of non-camp refugees (AFAD, 2014). It appears that 83 percent of the camp refugees between 6-11 years old attend school, while this figure is only at 14 percent for the same age-group of non-camp refugees. Looking at the accommodation conditions refugees are living in, it seems that these are often better for camp refugees. Camp refugees live with an average of 5.6 people, while non-camp refugees live on average with 8.6 people (AFAD, 2014). Non-camp refugees therefore live under more crowded conditions. It furthermore appears that one out of four of these non-camp refugees lives in a ruin or plastic coverage in which they can hardly fulfill their basic needs such as having sleeping materials, heating, basic foodstuff, kitchenware and clothing materials. Other non-camp refugees who live in a house, apartment or flat can better fulfill these basic needs, though still they consider their basic needs

worse than camp refugees (AFAD, 2014). It also appears that camp refugees can more readily access health services since field hospitals are based in their camps (Jacobsen, 2006). Therefore they make more use of these services compared to non-camp refugees (respectively 90 and 60 percent). The low percentage of non-camp refugees can partly be explained by the fact that many of them are unregistered and therefore lack an identification number, which is necessary to make use of Turkish hospitals (AFAD, 2014). Despite this, it appears that these non-camp refugees are helped through other ways when they need hospital services, and that the quality of the health care is rated more highly among the non-camp refugees than among the camp refugees (AFAD, 2014).

Overall, the research conducted by AFAD suggests that camp refugees are living under better conditions than most non-camp refugees and that they also perceive their living conditions better. It therefore is interesting to see in what kind of conditions these non-camp refugees, in this case Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır city, are living and how they perceive these conditions. The last sub-question, therefore, is: “how do Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır city perceive their living conditions”? The answer to this sub-question might give an indication as to what extent the Turkish government and other institutions are protecting and taking care of urban refugees.

3. Method of data-collection In this chapter, I explain how I obtained my research data. This chapter is divided in four sub- chapters, of which the first examines the research design (ie. how I did my research in general and how I found my respondents). In the second sub-chapter, I explain which data-collections I used in more detail (ie. how I actually received my data). The third sub-chapter then explains how I did my data-processing and data-analysis. It shows how I transformed my raw data into usable quotes. In the last sub-chapter, I reflect on my method of data-collection and discuss some limitations.

3.1 Research design and participants To give answers to the research questions, I made use of an ethnographic approach in order to obtain insight into how Syrian refugees live their daily lives in Diyarbakır, Turkey. Through ethnographic research, it is possible “to document the culture, the perspectives and practices, of the people in these settings. The aim is to get an inside in the way each group of people sees the world” (BMJ, 2008). Unfortunately, I was not able to follow my respondents on a regular basis since I constantly needed a translator, which I had to pay for at my own expense. For this reason, I could only meet most of the Syrian families once or twice, and by exception a third time.

I was able to get access to these families through two important people – my translator, Erhan and a civil servant at the local municipality in Sur, Selman. First, I got to know Erhan, a 24 year old Kurdish man who had been studying English and who was now an English teacher. I obtained his contact through a contact I received from my supervisor. Erhan was living in Diyarbakır and had done some translation work before for a Dutch and Greek journalist. The first day we met, we discussed my research and what he would earn for his assistance. We came to an agreement and the second time we met, he took me to Sur municipality. Here we met with Selman, a man in his fifties, who was responsible for social issues in the Sur district. This meant that he dealt with the poor people of Diyarbakır, including refugees. Selman, who did not speak English, knew some Syrian families and was willing to take Erhan and myself to them. The next day I met ten Syrian families in Sur district who were all willing to help me with my research. Erhan had remembered where they were living, and later we went back to five of the families for an interview. Selman also brought us in contact with the muhtar of one of the neighbourhoods in Yenişehir. The muhtar is a ‘head’ of a neighbourhood – the person who is governing the area. This muhtar also knew some Syrian families, and introduced us. One of these families then introduced us to their extended family network and thus I made use of this ‘snowball’ method, in which I interviewed 5 different families who were all related to each other. Some of my other meetings with Syrian families occurred more randomly. While Erhan and I were walking on the streets we would ask some beggars about their situation. Also, Erhan sometimes heard people speaking Arabic of Kurdish and then asked them if they were from Syria. In this way, I was able to meet even more refugees.

I made use of qualitative data collections, which included participant observation and interviewing. The data-collection took place with Syrian Arabs and Syrian Kurds in Diyarbakır city. Diyarbakır city is the administrative capital of Diyarbakır province and is one of the largest cities in southeastern Turkey. Diyarbakır province consists of 17 districts of which Sur, Yenişehir, Bağlar and Kayapınar form the city. Diyarbakır city has a population of a little less than 1 million people6 (excluding refugees) of which more than 90 percent are Kurd. However, these official numbers may not be accurately

6 http://www.citypopulation.de/php/turkey-Diyarbakır.php, retrieved on 27 October 2015 15

representative and it appears that the real number of inhabitants is significantly higher. Different local people estimated the number as 2 million excluding refugees. It appears that many people are not officially registered or still registered in other districts. My interviews were conducted in Sur and Yenişehir. These two districts were chosen since they were close to my apartment and therefore easy to reach by foot. Kayapınar and Bağlar were a bit further away, and I was told by my translator that Bağlar was not so safe due to high crime rates. In total, I conducted twenty in depth interviews which had a total length of 24 hours, of which the shortest lasted 28 minutes and the longest 145 minutes. Sometimes these interviews were with one person, but often other family members were in the room joining the conversation or just listening. I did not always make notes, so as not to disturb the flow of the interview and actively listen, and therefore in my results I might attribute certain quotes to two persons or a family. My respondents were between the ages of 22 and 55 and the majority was Kurd. Mostly the household of the respondents would consist of a family with a mother, a father and children, and sometimes an aunt, uncle or grandmother or grandfather. In a few cases, there were households in which the family was taking care of the bride of their sons, while their sons were fighting in Syria. In one case a woman and her children were living with a family friend while her husband was fighting. For an overview on the background of my participants see Table 1. In addition to these in depth interviews I also had more informal talks with some Syrian families, beggars and street sellers. I also had talks with several people from the local municipality in Sur and with two persons working with the government in Yenişehir. Furthermore, I spoke with Göz-Der and Göc-Vakfi – two NGOs operating in the area. I talked with some local friends and my translator about the situation. I also visited a camp in Diyarbakır which was built by the local municipality for the Yezidi refugees from Iraq, and a camp in Suruç which was hosting Syrian refugees from Kobane.

Table 1. Background information of participants Interviewee Gender Living place Living with Flee from Age Ethnicity

Bahar Woman Sur 6 people Qamishli 24 Kurd

Mehmet Man Sur 11 people Aleppo 48 Kurd

Samira Woman Sur +/- 10 pple Aleppo 55 Kurd

Omar (1) & Man + Sur 6 people Aleppo 45 & 39 Kurd Hude woman

Old man Man Sur 12 people Aleppo - Kurd

Selwa Woman Sur 5 people Deir El-Zor 40 Arab

Fedwa & Aniy Woman Sur 5 people Aleppo 22 & 23 Kurd

Zeheyya Woman Yenişehir 6 people Aleppo 47 Kurd

Family Men and Yenişehir +/- 15 Hasseke - Kurd Suleyman women people

Kobane family Woman Sur 18 people Kobane - Kurd

Nariman Woman Yenişehir 8 people Hasseke 30 Kurd

Minas Woman Yenişehir 7 people Hasseke 31 Kurd

Serivan Woman Sur 5 people Amuda 21 Kurd

Muhammed & Man + Sur 5 people Hasseke - Arab/Kurd Feriah Woman

Seyhmus Man Sur 9 people Aleppo 41 Kurd

Kamiran Man Sur 9 people Aleppo 47 Kurd

Aliye & Munfed Women Sur 10 people Aleppo 35 & 25 Arab

Omar (2) Man Sur 8 people Aleppo 55 Arab

Aliy Man Yenişehir 7 people Qamishli 49 Kurd

Emina Woman Yenişehir 5 people Hassake 38 Arab/Kurd

3.2 Data-collection For the data-collection in this research I used a qualitative approach. The reason for choosing this approach is that qualitative data is known for best capturing the perceptions and experiences of participants because they can tell their own story and can be observed in their natural setting (Cambré & Waege, 2001). Within the qualitative approach, there are three methods to choose for data collection. These are examining records, use of self-report measures and/or conducting observations (King, Morris & Fitz-Gibbon, 1987; Cambré & Waege, 2001). For this research the last two methods were used. The method of self-report involved asking key figures, in this case Syrian refugees, what their daily life looked like. This can be done in the form of a questionnaire, through interviews or a combination of both (King, Morris & Fitz-Gibbon, 1987). For this research, I used interviews with open questions because then the participants could tell their true perceptions and experiences without interruption. Although the method of self-report is valuable, it also has drawbacks, such as the fact that answers provided by respondents are interpreted through the interviewer, which may have implications for the validity and reliability of the information (Cambré & Waege, 2001). For this reason, I also used the observation method. Observation can be valuable because the observer can also watch the participants, and gain a more integrated and holistic understanding of their daily lives (King, Morris & Fitz-Gibbon, 1987), making the data more reliable.

The data-collection for this thesis took place in Diyarbakır city, Turkey. This city was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, because earlier research on Syrian refugees has not focused on this city or province, despite the fact that many Syrian Kurds fled to this Kurdish city, as one of the largest cities in southeastern Turkey. Secondly, research in this city is thus particularly interesting due to the Kurdish influence. Diyarbakır has also been chosen because of the possibility to work together with Diyarbakır Institute for Political and Social Research (DISA). DISA is an NGO that aims to “conduct in- depth research on the economic, social, political and cultural problems in Turkey, first and foremost the Kurdish issue in Diyarbakır, a city with a distinct identity and a shared significance for the Kurds”.7

7 http://disa.org.tr/, retrieved on 22 July 2014 17

DISA has also undertaken limited research on Syrian Kurdish refugees before and therefore, have been helpful in providing relevant contacts.

The qualitative data-collection can be divided in two phases. The first is an orientation phase, focused on understanding the backgrounds of the Syrian refugees. The second is an interview phase, in which the expectations, perceptions and experiences of the Syrian refugees on Diyarbakır are examined. The aim of having these two phases is to first establish a trust relationship with the respondent before interviewing them, in the hope that they feel free to speak the truth. In a few cases, I did the orientation and interview phase simultaneously, again due to the fact that I constantly needed a translator whom I had to pay for myself.

3.2.1 Orientation phase I usually had only one prior meeting with most of the Syrian families I spoke with, prior to interviewing them. At the first meeting, I confirmed that they would agree to be interviewed and then proceeded to gather some background information. This information was collected both by asking them some questions and by observing the participants in their houses. These questions were mainly concerning the number of people in their household, their backgrounds and origins, age and ethnicity. Through observation, it is possible to register information about what happens at the setting, providing a greater insight into where Syrian refugees exactly stay at the moment and what they do (King, Morris & Fitz-Gibbon, 1987). After obtaining this information, I decided if the respondent would fit in to my research, and if so, I made an appointment for the second meeting. In some cases I would immediately start with the interview phase. There were some cases in which I decided not to start the interview phase, mostly for reasons such as being unable to communicate well with the respondent or because I already had enough respondents from that area or ethnicity.

3.2.2 Interview phase During the interview phase, it was important to gain knowledge about the expectations, perceptions and experiences of the Syrian refugees and to ascertain what they thought the facilitating and limiting factors of the city were. To obtain this information, I interviewed twenty families. Through interviews, it is possible to understand “the lived experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience” (Seidman, 2013). There are several ways to conduct an interview, however for this research, I chose to follow the format of an in-depth interview. In the in-depth interviews, I asked Syrian refugees to reconstruct a day in Diyarbakır, to talk about their relations with others and their perceptions and experiences towards their lives in Diyarbakır etc. (Seidman, 2013). A negative consequence of interviewing is that the validity of the results obtained may be affected. People can give answers that they feel the interviewer wants to hear, instead of giving their true opinions and feelings. Alternatively, the interviewer might misinterpret the answers of the respondents. To ensure the reliability of my findings, I made observations of participants as well, which expanded and validated the information obtained through the interviews. In most cases, I conducted only one interview with my respondents, though in two cases I also had the chance to talk with the husbands of the primary respondents. I asked them some questions to check if the information I obtained earlier was correct, which appeared to be the case. In this way, I could validate the data obtained earlier.

3.3 Data-processing and data-analysis In this ethnographic research, the data has been obtained through participant observation and interviewing (in-depth interviews). In all cases, except one, interviews were recorded to ensure that no information would be lost or forgotten. These interviews were transcribed afterwards. One of the respondents refused to be recorded, and therefore I wrote his answers down and, immediately after the interview, tried to re-write the whole interview using the notes I had made. All these interviews eventually were analyzed by using the program ATLAS.ti. This is a program that can be used for analyzing qualitative data by sorting through large quantities of data and highlighting relevant parts. The program also helps with coding and grouping codes. While analyzing the recordings, the privacy of the participants was considered. Data was only used if the participants had given permission. After coding the interviews, a total of 40 codes were created. Not all codes appeared to be useful for this research and therefore these codes (including the quotes) were removed. In the end, 32 codes remained to use for the results. A list of these codes can be found in Table 2. Some of these codes overlap with each other.

Table 2. Codes used to categorize the quotes of the respondents Able to cope? Hardship in Diyarbakır Negative perception towards Arabs

Changing circumstances Healthcare as pull factor for Negative perception of camps between arrival and now Diyarbakır

Conditions to go (or not) to a Help because of ethnicity Neighbourhood conditions camp

Discrimination Help from family Perception of local community

Education Help from government Perception of local municipality

Ethnicity Help from local municipality Perception of NGOs

Ethnicity as pull factor for Help from NGOs Perception of Turkish Diyarbakır government

Family as pull factor for Identification in Diyarbakır Possibilities as pull factor for Diyarbakır Diyarbakır

Fleeing stories Lived in Diyarbakır before Remittances

Future Livelihood strategies Social life

Gender Mobility

Besides these recorded interviews, I also had some unrecorded talks with people from the local municipality, governmental organizations, NGOs and some local friends. I tried to make notes during these talks, but sometimes these talks were spontaneous and informal, and therefore I was not

always able to write things down. In these cases, I tried to remember the information and write it down as soon as possible.

Observations took place constantly, especially when my respondents were answering in Arabic or Kurdish. Since I could not understand what they were saying, I tried to pay particular attention to what was happening while they were speaking and made notes of these observations. During the conversations I had in English, I was often busy writing down the answers and therefore it became more difficult to also record my observations. I tried to remember my thoughts and write them down afterwards. I also kept a diary in which I wrote my thoughts and feelings, sometimes about a particular interview, but often more generally about my daily life in Diyarbakır. These notes are also used in my results.

3.4 Limitations and reflection During this research there were some constraints, including the need for a translator. I had been in Turkey (Ankara) and Syria before and many people I talked with were able to speak some English. Therefore, I thought that when I would go to Diyarbakır it would be possible to do most of my interviews myself in English. This soon proved to be overly optimistic. From all the interviews and talks I conducted, there was only one Syrian man and three Turkish persons who were able to talk with me in English. All the others spoke Kurdish, Arabic or Turkish. For this reason, I had a translator who knew Kurdish, English and Turkish. A translator can bring some disadvantages to research. One of these disadvantages is that the validity of the answers cannot be checked. Although my translator was competent, his English was sufficient, he knew what my research was about and I trusted him to be honest, it is possible that he misinterpreted some of the answers of the respondents. He also admitted that he sometimes had difficulty understanding the Kurdish of some of the respondents. For the interviews I did with Arabic speaking respondents, I often had an extra translator who we would find at the spot and who translated the Arabic part in Kurdish to my translator, who then translated it to me. Clearly this had even greater disadvantages as now it was not only me who was not sure about the validity of the information, but also my translator could not guaranty the validity either. This was one of the biggest limitations of this research method. I tried to safeguard the validity of the answers by also observing the situation. After my interviews, I would also evaluate the interview together with my translator, and often we had similar feelings about the interviews. Although we mostly had a positive feeling after an interview, there were some cases where we both felt the interviewee did not understand the question or that the second translator was not giving the right translations. I have carefully picked out my quotations in the results chapter (Chapter 4) so that the particular statements were not used. Another disadvantage of having a translator is that people might have lied about certain things because they did not feel comfortable to talk with a translator or because they thought the translator wanted to hear certain things. My translator was a young educated Kurdish man. This might in some cases have resulted in a situation where women hid certain information about, for instance, prostitution or personal concerns. Similarly, the Arabic respondents may have felt uncomfortable to talk about ethnic aspects. I myself am obviously a European, blonde, young woman and could have caused equal constraints. Certain respondents might have had the idea that since I was from Europe I would be able to help them. Therefore they may have made their living conditions look worse than they truly were. Although it is difficult to control if people are telling the truth, I tried to safeguard this by also using observations. I also tried to create an atmosphere where people felt comfortable to talk freely about anything. I did so by

introducing myself and my translator, explaining why we were there and that the information would be used anonymously. Most respondents liked talking to us and were happy that we would listen to them. In a few cases, there was a situation in which respondents did not want to give an answer or where my translator did not feel comfortable to ask something. In these cases, I would simply continue to the next question.

Another constraint was that I was not able to meet my respondent on a regular basis as I had suggested in my proposal. This, again, was because of the fact that I constantly needed a translator and that I had to pay for this translator myself. Once I went to the local market on my own and coincidently met one of my respondents there. We tried talking with each other, but were not able to communicate effectively. She invited me for tea, but because of the struggles during our communication I decided not to do so. This shows the extent to which I was dependent on my translator to talk with people. Because of a lack of money to pay the translator constantly, I decided to only meet the respondents once or twice, and exceptionally three times. If it had not been necessary to pay for the translator, it would have been possible to get a more comprehensive picture on the situation of Syrian refugees and their daily lives in Diyarbakır. This said, I believe my data gives sufficient information to give answers to my research question and sub-questions.

The third and last constraint of this research is that I was only able to do three interviews with Syrian Arabs and two with families consisting of both Syrian Arabs and Syrian Kurds, while the other fifteen were with Syrian Kurdish families. I wanted to examine whether there would be a difference in how Syrian Arabs and Syrian Kurds were treated in the Kurdish city of Diyarbakır. It was difficult to get in touch with Syrian Arabs for several reasons. Firstly, my translator did not speak Arabic and I was unable to find an Arabic-English translator. If we would meet Arabic speaking people on the street it was quite difficult to understand each other. Often we were able to understand where the person was from and how long he or she was in Diyarbakır, but making an appointment for an interview seemed to be impossible. Of the five Syrian Arab respondents I talked with, three were able to speak Kurdish and for those two who were not able to speak English, we used a second translator. We found most of these respondents through the snowball method. A second reason why it was difficult to get in touch with Syrian Arabs was because there were not many Syrian Arabs known in the neighbourhoods where I conducted my research. When I asked people if they knew any Arabs most would reply that they did not. They told me that there were more Syrian Arabs staying in the Bağlar district, but because of the distance to this district, the fact that I could not find an Arabic-English translator and because my translator told me it was a bit dangerous there, I decided not to conduct research in this place. The information on ethnic differences is therefore limited.

4. Results In this chapter I will set out my results, in answer to my research questions. I will do so by using quotes from the interviews with respondents and constructing a story out of these quotes. In addition to these quotes, I will add some of my observations. The chapter is divided into three sub- chapters, of which each can again be divided into different parts. Part one will elaborate on the migration stories of my respondents and will consider why Syrian refugees chose for a non-camp settlement such as Diyarbakır, instead of going to a refugee camp. Part two shows how my respondents have settled down and found access to economic and social factors in Diyarbakır. Part three elaborates on the conditions the respondents are living in and on how they perceive their lives.

4.1 The migration stories of Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır city and the choice for non-camp settlement Listening to the respondents’ stories on how they had fled from their home areas to Diyarbakır, it became clear that most had made a conscious choice to come to Diyarbakır. Many respondents had planned this trip before leaving and had been saving money. They were informed and knew where to find the right person to bring them to their destination.

Kamiran: “We came from Gaziantep, the border there, I was working first for saving money to come here [Diyarbakır]. With the bus we just passed the border gate. We did not come illegal, we all had passports. Because of this, we did not came illegally. I had enough money for the traveling. With the bus we just traveled from Aleppo to Gaziantep. In Gaziantep we just asked some people that we wanted to go to Diyarbakır, and then with the bus we came to Diyarbakır”.

As the previous quote shows, Syrian refugees who have a Syrian passport can simply cross the border legally at the crossing points (see Figure 6), though refugees without these Syrian passports need to do this illegally. These illegal trips need considerable planning since they are dependent on several factors, such as police controls and sometimes human traffickers who have to take them to the other side of the border. Traveling from their hometown to Diyarbakır, therefore, might be more expensive, take extra time and come with risks. Despite this, my respondents were more than willing to accept these circumstances, since staying in Syria was often not an option.

Minas: “At first my husband told us that we will go to Turkey. But we said no we do not want to go to Turkey, we do not want to come. Later when I saw there is war, they are killing each other, there is no water and there is no electricity, and my husband could not work anymore, he could not earn any money, and there was not anything that we could buy or we could eat. That is why we decided to come and later my husband went to that guy [human trafficker] and they talked to each other and made the price. We paid about 15.000 Syrian Pound [for the whole family] for the passing. Later we came with a bus, we took a bus and came to a village near the border. There we waited till the night and the guy told u to wear black clothes and also not to take anything with us. And with our family, there were about 30 other people, in total about 40 people. We came to the village and from that village we walked till the border. We just passed the Syrian border and between Syrian border and Turkish border there is a railway. And when we came to the railway the Turkish soldiers saw us and shot us, firing on us. So we went back that night. That night when we returned it was December or January, it was cold and we waited there outside till 10 PM, we thought that the soldier would go

away and [we could] pass the border, but at that night we could not pass and we returned back to the village. In the morning that guy came to us and told us we will try in the evening again, and in the evening we left home, we left the village again we walked to the border. On that evening no one could see us and we passed the border. Also we walked through the river, the Tigris River, after passing the river the soldiers saw us again and the guy told us lay down, and when the soldier was gone again we stand up and we run. We run to the cornfield. We just waited there, hide there, till the car, the bus came and took us to Kiziltepe and from there we came to Diyarbakır”.

The previous story shows the problems Syrian refugees face while trying to cross the Turkish border. They had to pay high prices to the human traffickers, while still being at high risk of getting caught by the police. The Turkish police were instructed to make sure that people were not able to cross illegally, with permission to shoot if they did. A report of Amnesty International (2014) confirms these shootings of Turkish police, which in some cases unfortunately have caused casualties. This contradicts Turkeys’ open-border policy in which they are supposed to accept all Syrian refugees. In the case of Turkey, there seems to be different treatment for Syrians with and without passports. Many Kurds (both Turkish as Syrians) also thought the Turkish government had purposely closed the border crossings with Kurdish cities, thereby allowing less Syrian Kurds to come to Turkey. It also appeared that Syrians who need healthcare are more easily allowed to enter Turkey, than those who are healthy. Due to the fact that some Syrian refugees were not able to cross at official border crossings, and because some Syrian refugees fear certain parties occupying these border crossing points on the side of Syria, these Syrian refugees are forced to take high risks by crossing the border illegally.

Mehmet: “I went to Urfa, but before going to Urfa we stayed on the border for three days. We came to Turkey illegally me and my family, because we could not go to the border in Hatay, the IS and Al’nusra people were there, that’s why we could not go there. The gate near the Kurdish place, in Nusaybin, there is a gate, but it is closed. Turkey closed it for not letting Kurdish people come to Turkey. Almost all of these people came illegally. We had to pay for passing to Turkey to the people, they asked ten thousand Syrian money [Syrian pound]. We went by foot to the border, at the border we stayed for two days. At first we tried to pass the border at 1 AM illegally but the soldier saw us and fired on us. We went back and slept there. The second day, again we tried to set, but then the commander just told us to go back, we cannot help you, you have to go back. On the third day we were able to pass. When we passed the Turkish side the man who took us to the border called a friend of him, they were working with each other. That man took us with the car to a village, we slept there till the morning and then we went to Urfa”.

Though most of my respondents made a conscious choice to come to Diyarbakır, it was not always the first destination that they had fled to. Some respondents had first fled from their home areas to other places in Syria (see Figure 6), looking for a safe place with opportunities. Eventually they moved to Turkey because it became too unsafe within the country and there were hardly any opportunities left.

Omar (2): “Firstly I was living in Aleppo and there we were selling some goods, some things on the street and some people made some lie about us and that is why some government

people, Assad’s people, detained me and took me in jail. I stayed there for 15 days, and later they understood I had nothing with the government or nothing with the others, I was just innocent, later they released me and I just took my children and family and went to another place, there I stayed a while, but there were also bombs and no work. That is why we went to Ragga, and we stayed one year in Ragga, also we could not work there, there was not work. I had a pickup there and I was firstly working in Ragga, I was carrying people’s goods. Later the war began there because IS attacked there and that is why we went back to Aleppo, and from Aleppo we came to Turkey. Firstly the people against Assad, the opposition, they said we will take you to Turkey we will help you to pass the border, and they took 2000 Syrian money [Syrian pound] for each person, and also 2000 for each bag, and they took us to near the border and there they stole our bags and also our money and we were just alone there, near the border, and we walked to the wire. There the soldiers saw us and the soldiers did not let us pass. We went back and stayed a while, later we tried again, and still we could not pass. Another time we went to the soldier, and she [his wife] has some problem with her hart and she was ill, and she lay down and then the soldiers were afraid so we could pass quickly and then with a car we came to Diyarbakır”.

Even if someone had made a conscious choice for a certain place, this decision still could be interrupted due to unforeseen circumstances. One respondent had actually planned to go to Istanbul, but because of illness was forced to stay in Diyarbakır. Other respondents had family members or heard stories about people who were sent to camps by Turkish soldiers, while planning to go somewhere else. Turkey has a policy in which they want Syrian refugees to stay in the government hosted camps and therefore they send refugees to these places.

Omar (1): “also when soldiers of Turkey saw them [Syrian refugees] on the border, sometimes they just get them and they put them in the camp”.

When asking them about their future plans in light of the continuing conflict in Syria, a few respondents replied they were willing to go back to Syria or to Europe, since they did not see much hope or opportunities in Diyarbakır.

Seyhmus: “I want to go to Europe, to Sweden. My wife’s elder sister is living there and one of my uncle’s son is in Holland If we can, if we have a chance to go to Europe, we will go to Europe”.

I later discovered that the family of Bahar, was eventually able to move to München, Germany around April 2015. This shows that, even though some chose Diyarbakır consciously, this was not intended to be the final destination for all respondents. However, most respondents did state they would stay in Diyarbakır as long as the war continued in Syria. For those Syrian refugees who were able to make a conscious choice and to follow it, it appeared that this choice for Diyarbakır was mainly based on chain-migration. Social networks such as family and ethnicity played an important role. Other factors that were mentioned by respondents were job opportunities and public services such as healthcare and education. These were services that they thought they were not able to get in a refugee camp and therefore they preferred non-camp settlement to camp settlement. I will elaborate on this in the following two sub-chapters.

Figure 6. Movement of respondents

4.1.1 Reasons for choosing a non-camp settlement over a camp settlement When asking the respondents if they had ever considered going to a refugee camp, the majority replied with a convincing ‘No’. They generally had a very negative perception of these camps and some even stated they would rather go back to Syria and fight there or die, than go to a refugee camp. Although the Turkish camps are often stated as ‘five-star’ camps by the Turkish government and media (European Commission, 2015), the perception of the Syrian refugees I spoke to was clearly different. Most respondents must have heard negative stories from other people, since almost none of them had actually ever been to a camp themselves. Reasons for not choosing the camp were mainly that the respondents had heard the conditions and services were bad. For instance, many mentioned that living in a tent would be too cold during the winter, that the healthcare was perceived as insufficient, that the camps were dirty and that there were snakes and scorpions.

Mehmet: “The conditions are bad, first of all the health problem is not clean. You have to live in a tent for a long time, and it is not clean at all. And also there are lots of immoral things, both soldiers and people there, the family cannot live there”.

The idea that there were ‘immoral things’ happening in the camps was stated often. What these ‘immoral things’ exactly were was not clear. Some mentioned the fact that women and men were not separated and that a lot of people had to sleep together. One respondent explicitly talked about sexual things. Especially for those respondents who had young daughters, these ‘immoral things’ were a reason for not going to a camp.

Omar (2): “we did not think of going to a camp. We hear it is not a good place, it is not healthy it is not clean. …also the people against Assad [are there], Turkey helps them and they are also staying in the camps, some of them, and they are getting the beautiful girls for their wives or some sexual things”.

Another reason for not going to a camp that was often mentioned, was the lack of freedom within the camps. They feared they could not go outside and had to live a passive, ‘prisoner-like’ life in which they were only able to eat, drink and sit in a tent.

Fedwa: “it will be a problem to stay in a camp because we would get bored and we do not want to stay in that place too long. We want to see the other place outside, we want to walk away, and be free. That is why I do not want to stay in there I will be like in jail that is why I will not go to there”.

Besides the freedom, many of my respondents stated that they wanted to earn their own living. They thought a camp was a place without opportunities, and that people who were unable to make an own living went to such places.

Omar (1): “I do not want to live in a tent. …when I came to here [Diyarbakır], I thought I will work, I will have a home, but I will not go to live in a camp. Maybe that people do not have enough money to live in Turkey, or maybe they cannot work, they cannot earn their own money. That might be why they choose to go to camp”.

Another argument I heard from a few of the Syrian Kurdish respondents, was that there were only Arabs living in the camps and that they therefore would not want to go there. A lack of people from the same ethnicity was a reason for choosing another place. The same accounts for family, with some

respondents stating that they would not go to a camp because they did not have any family living there.

Aniy: “We never thought of going to a camp. Generally Arab people are living in the camp almost all of them are Arab. Kurdish people generally do not go there. Because they are Arab, they know each other, they can understand each other, all of these reasons”.

Some respondents were not so negative about the camps, but just went to Diyarbakır because their husbands or family had told them to do so. They otherwise would have gone to a camp if they had got that instruction. When asking whether there would be certain circumstances in which they would consider moving to a camp, two respondents said that they would, however, again the majority stated that they would not.

Bahar: “If the camps were not in a tent, that we will not live in a tent, there will be like homes like this, and the foods are good and also they have toilet and bathroom, then we would go there because here still we do not have jobs. We do not have any warranties, but there the government or municipality will take care of us”

Overall, it became clear that most of the Syrian refugees I spoke with did not want to go to a camp. The camp was seen as a dirty place with a lack of sufficient services and conditions, for those who have no other choice and who cannot take care of themselves. This shows that my respondents thought they were able to make their own living in a non-camp settlement, indicating they are active persons willing to invest in a new life. The question which still remains, however, is why they chose to do this in Diyarbakır.

4.1.2 Pull factors for Diyarbakır During the interviews, it appeared that the main reason for choosing Diyarbakır was because of family. Of the twenty families I spoke with, twelve stated that they had come because they had family living in Diyarbakır. This varied from family who had moved to Diyarbakır earlier in the Syrian conflict, to family who had lived there prior to the start of the war. Kurds have a history of migration and therefore families are often spread over Kurdistan.

Samira: “The people who are leaving Rojova (the Kurdish part of Syria), generally they have some relatives in Turkey, some relatives in those [Kurdish] regions. That is why they are coming to these neighbourhoods”.

I also spoke with a respondent who had a family member who had already married a Turkish Kurd before the war. Now that the Syrian war had forced them to move, it was a logical step to come to a place where they knew someone.

Minas: “From Syria we directly came to Diyarbakır because my husband’s sister’s husband was living here and also my husband’s sister was living here because my husband’s sister was married to a Turkish guy, a Kurdish from Turkey”.

Other respondents were invited by family who had already moved to Diyarbakır before the conflict.

Samira: “One of my daughters has two children, she came here in Diyarbakır eight months before we came. When my daughter came here she had some problems with her heart, and

later she heard that her brother was killed in Syria and she was trying to find us, and she called us: what are you doing now there, now I just have one brother, so come here”.

Some had also heard positive stories about the opportunities in Diyarbakır from family who had already been living in Diyarbakır for a while, and therefore decided to go to Diyarbakır.

Nariman: “My sister came here one year ago, and my family came here one year before me, and my other sisters family came here three months before me. Both my family and sisters told me Diyarbakır is nice, and they are friendly and here you can find work, you can work and earn your own life and that is why we came here”.

The second most stated reason to come to Diyarbakır was ethnicity. Eight respondents said they came because of ethnic reasons such as language and being Kurdish. They thought it would be easier to survive in a place where they could communicate and they had heard good stories about the city back in their hometowns.

Old man: “We were talking to the people there in Aleppo, both they were Kurdish and people were here, people here in Diyarbakır are Kurdish. That is why they told us it was good here, and later we came here. …that is why we came here, we do not have any relatives, no friends as well”.

Family and ethnicity seem to be important factors in a refugees’ choice of settlement. As explained in Chapter 2, this process is referred to in the literature as ‘chain-migration’ - moving to a place where family or community members are already living. The lack of these social networks in the camps appeared to be a reason for most respondents not going there. The presence of social networks in Diyarbakır seemed to be a strong pull factor for this city. Besides social networks, there were also a few other reasons mentioned for settling down in Diyarbakır such as safety, economic opportunities and public services.

Omar (1): “I [also] have some relatives in Egypt, in Iraq and in countries around Syria, but Turkey is the more peaceful one. Here we are better than in those other countries, that is why we chose to come here”.

It must be mentioned however, that these reasons were in all the cases stated together with the social network reasons. For instance, people came to Diyarbakır because of the cheap renting prices, or as showed in an earlier quote from Nariman (on this page), because they heard that there were jobs in Diyarbakır, but in conjunction with these reasons, that they also had family living there or were attracted due to ethnical reasons. One respondent, for example, came to Turkey because he needed good healthcare for his son. Even though good healthcare is available in other places, he chose for Diyarbakır due to ethnic reasons.

Mehmet: “First we went to Urfa to the hospital and they checked my sun. They said he has cancer, he has a tumor at his brain. They said we could not, cannot fix him here, you have to go to either Diyarbakır or Elazig but they said Diyarbakır will be better for you because you will understand each other easily. But in the other place most people are talking Turkish that is why you will not be able to understand them and they would not understand you, you will not have a good life there”.

Another respondent came to Turkey because of the educational opportunities for his children, though the reason for settlement in Diyarbakır was because he had family living there. It therefore seems that factors such as safety, opportunity and public service were stated as more general reasons to come to Turkey, while factors such as existing social networks and ethnicity were the decisive factors to choose for Diyarbakır.

Aliy: “that is also why I came to Turkey, for my children that they could get accommodation [permit]. I had a good job in Syria, but because of the war my children could not go to school anymore, that is why we came to turkey and asked for permission”

In this research it appears that most Syrian refugees choose for a non-camp settlement in Diyarbakır because of the social networks available to them there. Chain-migration means that Syrian refugees move to places where family or co-nationals, and in this case people with the same ethnicity, have moved to before. Besides family and ethnicity networks, people also chose for Diyarbakır because of safety, economic opportunities and public services. Diyarbakır is not always the first place, nor the last place where refugees have settled down, as refugees are often mobile. In the following chapter, I will elaborate on how Syrian refugees used their social networks once they had arrived in Diyarbakır.

4.2 How Syrian refugees settle down and get access to economic and social factors in Diyarbakır Often refugees are portrayed as people who are poor, needy and dependent on aid. The way in which a traditional refugee camp is set up fits and sustains this perception. Refugee camps are often a demarcated area, which refugees can only enter if they are registered, and in this way they can be controlled. Once they are inside the camp, they are not allowed to work and although they probably make use of alternative strategies, they are reliant on the aid provided to them by different actors. In this way they become dependent as described by UNHCR (2014a): “Living in camps can engender dependency and weaken the ability of refugees to manage their own lives”.

Refugees who are settling down in Diyarbakır show a different picture. Diyarbakır is not demarcated and refugees can enter from different sides. Refugees live amongst the local population and are therefore more anonymous and less controllable. There is less aid available in Diyarbakır, or at least not in the traditional form offered in camps, where people receive shelter, food and services for free. The Syrian refugees I spoke with had to look for their own houses and had to pay their own rent.

Seyhmus: “Every day we are saving 5 lira’s for the rent and 1.5 lira for the electricity and water. Like each day we are saving it and at the end of the month we are just getting it at giving it to the owner of the home”.

Since the Turkish government does not allow refugees to work, they were forced to work in the informal sector or come up with other creative ways to earn some money. There were, of course actors who were helping them informally, such as the local municipality and others, but this was not on a regular basis and was not a guarantee. It became clear that Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır do not conform to the needy and dependent stereotype described above.

Omar (1): “We do not want to disturb people, we just want to find a job and then we will earn our own money and start up a new life”.

Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır want to start up their own lives and do so by making use of self-help strategies; they are self-reliant and know how to use their agency. In this chapter, I will elaborate on those actors who have been providing assistance to Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır and show how Syrian refugees made use of these actors to get what they need and how they use smart livelihood strategies themselves. Subsequently, I will examine whether gender plays a role in the survival of Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır.

4.2.1 Finding a place to settle down The first thing the respondents tried to arrange when arriving in Diyarbakır was housing. Many respondents were assisted in this endeavor by relatives already living in Diyarbakır. They could, for instance, stay a few days or weeks with their relatives and from there, could search for another place themselves or with the help of their families. This shows how my respondents made use of family networks.

Minas: “Earlier we were living in another house, and in that house we were living with three families, about twenty people. They were also relatives of us, and later we found this home. Earlier we were living in another part of Diyarbakır and just one week my husband is not working, later he begun working. After saving some money we asked some renters, landlords, and later we found this home and we moved here because we thought it would be cheaper in this neighbourhood”.

As the previous quote shows, Minas’ husband already started working within a week of their arrival. By saving some money, it became possible for them to pay for their own house. They went to some real estate agents and asked them if they had a home. This is how they found their current living place. During my research, Minas took me to this real estate agent in Yenişehir. The agent told me that the number of Syrians visiting his shop had increased. There were some housekeepers who explicitly did not want the real estate agent to rent their houses to Syrian families and thus, it sometimes was difficult to find a place for these families. But the agent insisted on helping to find a place for these Syrian families and did not ask any fees for his services. More of my respondents found their house themselves through these kinds of real estate agents.

Emina: “Earlier we came to another home, my husband relatives were already living in Diyarbakır and my husband’s uncle gave us his home and we stayed in that home for six months for free. It was not comfortable for us, it was a crowded place, …that is why we left that house. We went to a house-renting place and that guy helped us to find this place”.

There were also respondents whose relatives had already found a house or who gave their own house to them during their arrival.

Aliye and Munfed: “Earlier my brother in Yenişehir came before us in this house, he took this house firstly, and when we came he gave this house to us and he left for another place in Yenişehir. He came one year before us”.

Not only family was providing assistance, but also some local people took refugees into their homes or helped them with finding a new house.

Samira: “My daughter was staying with an old women, we stayed there for two days. Later the old women told us you are with too many people, you are with fifteen people, so there is no place for you. And the old women found the house for us”.

Most of the local people in Diyarbakır are Kurd, but since I did not always ask the respondents about the ethnic background of the people who were helping them, I cannot state that it was only Kurdish local people helping the Syrian Kurdish families. Though in some cases, it indeed seemed to be explicitly Kurdish neighbours helping Syrian Kurdish families. This, however, does not say that these Kurdish neighbours would not help Syrian Arab families, but it does show how Syrian Kurdish families make use of the Kurdish networks available in Diyarbakır.

Zeheyya: “That guy is the owner of this house. We came to Diyarbakır and firstly we came to a hotel and later we asked the people show us the Kurdish place, Kurdish people’s place, and we came to this neighbourhood. We just asked some people we are searching for a rental house and we saw the guy, the owner of this house. He said us he had a house and we just rented it. …and the owner of the house does not force us to pay the rent. We can stay one month and not pay rent.

Syrians who had already fled the war also seemed to be helping out each other, again in the form of taking other Syrian refugees in to their homes or by helping them to find a place to stay.

Omar (1): “Both Kurdish people here in Diyarbakır, and both people from Syria, if there will be someone outside who do not have a house, than we will take them to our house”.

Family from Kobane: “Earlier a family from Rojova, Kobane was living here. And when we came to Diyarbakır we talked to each other that we were searching for the house and when they returned back to Kobane we moved here”.

The main way in which my respondents found a house was through family and ethnicity networks. Through family, local neighbours and other Syrians, it became possible to stay somewhere at least temporarily and from there, to find a new place to settle down by themselves or again with the help of these networks. Once these Syrian families were settled down, they tried to make these places feel a little bit like home.

4.2.2 Settling down with the help of others While searching for respondents, I visited several families in Sur district. Most of my interviews also took place in the homes of the respondents in both Sur and Yenişehir, and therefore I could get a good glimpse of some parts of their houses. Most of these houses were around 40m2 and very basic, mostly consisting of a living room with a carpet and some pillows on the ground and in some cases a couch. Sometimes they had a separate bedroom with a bed, and a small kitchen where they could cook on gas and where there was running water. A common feature of these houses was a television, on which the families tried to follow the news in Syria. In a very few cases, the respondents had a computer or smartphone with internet, and most had a normal phone to keep in contact with family in Syria or in other parts of the world. A few of the houses also had some birds as pets, which reminded them of their homes in Syria. The size of the families living in these houses were between 5 and 11 people. When asking them how they obtained all their furniture, it appeared that the local community played an important role. Neighbours, for instance, gave their furniture to Syrian families

when moving to another place. The neighbours not only helped with furniture, but also with clothes and food items.

Fedwa: “all those furniture like the television and other goods, the neighbour helped us, he gave them. Since we came to Diyarbakır the people are good to us, they are treating well to us. For example, for two months a pharmacy paid our rent, for two months. And his [translator] father is helping us with the gas. Each month I come to their shop and he is giving me one tube for free. And in the evenings of Thursdays, in that night generally the neighbour is helping us with some food, for example with some flower. When they see we are Syrians they are treating us better”.

The local community did not only give these things directly to Syrian families – they also donated different items to the local municipality, who would then distribute these items to those in need.

Bahar: “Generally municipality does this job, and for example a rich donates some money or some other material to municipality, and municipality gives it to poor people, not only Syrian people, but poor people in general, poor people in the district”.

Sometimes the local municipality also donated goods to Syrian families, though this was rare. Those who received help received this only occasionally. There were many respondents who never received any help from the local municipality, simply because they never had any contact with someone from the municipality and therefore they were unknown to them.

Hude: “Just one time municipality helped us with food. They brought olive oil and some macaroni’s, those things, just for food”.

During my research I visited one of the deposits of the local municipality in Sur. At that moment there were a lot of donations coming in since the Yezidi crisis in Iraq had just taken place. Many Yezidis had fled the country due to the presence of Islamic State. The local municipality therefore opened a refugee camp only for Yezidis a few kilometers out of Diyarbakır city. A consequence of this crisis was that those Syrian refugees who were already in the city received less help. A few respondents also mentioned they had not received any help for a longer time now.

Mehmet: “Sometimes municipality is helping with food, but it is once a month and it has been three months that they are not helping us”.

The most respondents I spoke with also were able to buy some things themselves. They had been saving some money back in Syria with which they could make the trip all the way to Diyarbakır and often buy some furniture or food.

Omar (2): “Yes, we were getting money, we were saving money and when we came we sold our car, the pick-up. With that money we came to Turkey. I sold the car for 400.000 Syrian pounds and with that money we could come here and we took it to home and we rent the house and did some renovations. Also we bought some furniture, television, and a heater”.

It appears that once the Syrian families had found a place to settle down, the neighbours were the main source of help with making the place more comfortable. No matter how basic the houses might have originally been, all the respondents, both Kurds and Arabs, had received furniture from their

neighbours to decorate the place. Most of the neighbours would also help out with some other basics like clothes and food. Besides the neighbours, there were a few respondents who received some food and clothes from the local municipality and some other local institutions. Through self- help, Syrian refugees were able to receive informal support. It appeared, however that to receive this support, the respondents had to know about these institutions first. Those Syrian families who were not aware of these institutions, would simply not receive any aid from them. Here again, networks play an important role, with some respondents clearly better informed on when the municipality was handing out items than others. Those Syrian families who had a bigger social network and who knew their way around in Diyarbakır were able to receive more aid, even though they might not have needed it as much as those families who did not have these networks.

4.2.3 Getting access to income Although all respondents received some kind of help when settling down in Diyarbakır, this was not enough to sustain their lives. They had their daily and monthly expenses such as the rent, gas, electricity, water and food. The rent was between 150 and 650 TL a month, and costs for gas, water and electricity were between 50 and 150 TL a month (1 Turkish Lira equals 0.3 Euro). Sixteen out of the twenty families I spoke with therefore had one or more family members working in the informal sector. This varied from the husband, to the wife, to the older children and in some cases even younger children around 12 years. They were, for instance, working in the construction of houses, in shops, in restaurants, at coiffeurs, as tailors and as carriers of goods. Most of them had to work 12 hours a day, working six days a week, earning only around 30 TL a day (and in the case of the children, only 50 TL a week). Finding a job was not easy, since Syrians often did not have any working permit and therefore employers would prefer to hire a local. Though, with some help from neighbours, family and other Syrians, most of my respondents were able to find a job.

Minas: “The place he is working now, about ten or fifteen Syrian males are working there as well and when he was working in the junk dealing job, the family, our relatives, was here, and later he told I want to work in another place and we just contacted the other Syrian guys. And they said yeah we have work for you as well. If you want to work there we can give you the work, and later he worked with them”.

Omar (1): “Our local neighbours are trying to find us some jobs. They say we know these people, they are good people, they will not make any bad things. That is why they are letting them to work there, but if we, on our own, go there to find work, they will not let us work”.

Though the last quote states that Syrians could not find work themselves, I spoke to some Syrians who were able to find their own job. They would just ask for it in different shops and restaurants. While this approach mostly failed, once in a while they would have success. Those Syrians who were not able to find any work, or who needed some extra income, tried to find alternative ways of gaining income. One of these alternatives was begging. This, however, is forbidden by the Turkish police and so those who are caught doing so are sent out of Diyarbakır to the camps. Even though it was forbidden, it was rare to not pass a beggar during my walks in Diyarbakır. This is also where I met one of my respondents, sitting at a corner on my way from home to the local municipality in Sur. He had two of his daughters with him and just held his hand up. Later that day, my translator and I met him again and he took us to his house. His wife worked three days at a farm, but he himself was asthmatic and therefore was not able to do heavy work. He was very ashamed of the fact that his

wife had to work and he could not, and tried to help a bit by begging on the streets. Through begging, he was able to get some extra income to sustain the family.

Seyhmus: “Sometimes I am going outside for begging. Earlier I was earning more, but now I am earning between ten and fifteen Lira’s. But mostly, at most, I could earn seventeen Lira’s. I am just trying to buy for dinner, like things for dinner, or give some money to my children to buy something that they want from me. Sometimes one guy is coming and giving like ten or fifteen Lira’s, but it is so rare”.

Three of my respondents also stated that there was nobody working in their households. Two of these families had just arrived one month earlier and therefore probably did not know there way in the city yet, and had not yet built up a social network to assist them with finding a job. They had up till then survived with some savings from Syria. The third family has been living in Diyarbakır already for nine months and had all been quite well educated back in Syria. They could not find any jobs and therefore came up with alternative strategies to get some income.

Zeheyya: “None of us is working, our neighbours help us with the rent and sometimes some people are helping us with some foods, also for example with some closed bags of the food and some of them give us money. We sell some of these goods to the other people and also we safe the money the neighbours gave us and in that way we pay the rent”.

Other alternatives mentioned to earn some income were selling goods such as jewelry or small begs of henna. One woman also stated she had a place where she could sell some things, though when the police came and found out she did not have a Turkish passport, she had to leave. While walking on the streets of Sur and Yenişehir, I sometimes saw some Syrians selling goods. Once I tried talking to a woman who was selling some earrings in Sur. She was talking Arabic and therefore my translator and I could not really understand her. What we understood was that she had fled from Syria with her family and that she earned around 10 TL a day through selling these goods. Although this is not a lot of money, it at least could bring in some income. A last alternative for getting income that was mentioned was getting remittances, although it was just one respondent whose daughter sometimes sent some money from Lebanon. All the others were not able to help each other.

Nariman: “No we cannot help each other, they can only earn according to their family, just enough for their own family. They cannot give money to others”.

There was also one respondent who had an official job. He was an English teacher at a private school and earned around 1500 TL a month working around 38 hours a week. He was able to receive a working permit since he received a residence permit during his arrival. Five months prior to conducting these interviews, legislation changed so that such permits were thereby refused for Syrians. None of my other respondents were able to get this permit since they are quite costly and probably they were not aware of its existence. This respondent was able to earn quite a sum of money compared to other respondents, but there was a big chance he was not able to extend the permission for his family for another year.

Aliy: “Well probably most Syrians do not know about this accommodation [permission] or maybe they cannot afford it. At that time we paid 200TL per person to stay here, but now we

need to extend it soon, but it is 330 TL per person. I cannot pay this amount of money with my monthly income. The school I am working will pay for me, but not for my family”.

Other advantages of this residence permit were that his children could go to school, that the family got free healthcare and that he received a little money from the government. The government sometimes gives some money to poor people through its Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation. During my research, I went to a government building in Yenişehir where this Foundation was located. The uncle of my translator was working there and was able to explain to me how the process worked. People who were poor were able to request some money from the Foundation, but only if they had a passport, a residence permit and if their residence was registered. Most Syrians do not fulfill these requirements and therefore do not receive any assistance from the government. When my translator’s uncle looked in to the data, he could see that there were only 3 Syrian families helped in Yenişehir. In the district of Sur and Bağlar there were no Syrians at all receiving assistance, since there were already many poor local citizens who needed to be helped.

Aliy: “Sosyal yardimlasma [welfare] gives me once in a while, like after three months around 200 or 250 Lira, but of course that is not enough. They gave me 200 TL last month, what can I do with 200 TL?”

It appears that most of the Syrian families I spoke with were able to sustain their own lives, either through working in the formal sector, the informal sector or through alternative strategies. With this income they paid their rent, gas, water and electricity bills and food. Some received some extra help from neighbours and some institutions.

4.2.4 Getting access to social services In the previous sub-chapter it was mentioned that one of my respondents was able to get a working permit, receive free healthcare and let his children go to school as a result of his residence permit. All the other respondents did not have such a residence permit and probably most were not eligible for one either, since they did not have a passport. As already stated previously in Chapter 2, Syrian refugees could apply for temporary protection status. With this status, they could receive free public healthcare and get medicine for free, though they were not allowed to apply for resettlement, participate in the work force, or enter formal education. The majority of my respondents got this temporary protection status as soon as they needed healthcare.

Minas: “When we first went to doctor, the doctor told us that there is such situation that you can go to police and get that ID-card with that you can get healthcare as well. Also we talked to some of our neighbours and they also told us about this, and so then we got the ID-cards”.

There were also a few families who did not have this ID-card. Some because they did not know about it, some because they had a different identification (Turkish passport or residence permit) and some because they were trying to be resettled in Europe and therefore they could not have this ID-card since it forbids applicants to apply for resettlement. As a consequence, this one family was not able to get healthcare.

Wife of Kamiran: “I have migraine. In Syria I could go to hospital, but here, when I went to hospital they told me I needed the ID-card, and because of that I do not have it, they did not help me”.

Kamiran: “We do not want to get that ID-card because we are planning to go to another country, most probably a European country. We went to Istanbul and applied for some procedure, to go there, some countries ask for refugees, that is why we say we do not want to give our fingerprints to Turkey, that is why we are not applying for it. But sometimes she gets really bad headaches”.

If you did not have this ID-card, there were some alternative ways to be helped at the hospital for free. Once I needed to go to the hospital myself. After registering with my passport the woman told me that since I did not have a Turkish Identification (no residence permit, or temporary protection status) I had to pay for my treatment. ‘But’, she told me, ‘if you go to the doctor over there and show your passport maybe he wants to help you’. The doctor looked at my passport and gave me permission. In this way, I was able to receive free treatment and medicine even though I could have paid for it myself. Some of the respondents I spoke with had experienced the same. They went to the hospital and showed their Syrian passports. In that way they received free treatment.

Omar (1): “With a Syrian passport they [Syrians] can also go to hospital for free. I went to hospital with my passport, before I got that ID-card, and I went for free”

Other alternatives mentioned were using the passport of someone else.

Samira: “Before we had the card, for example the baby of her [daughter in law] got ill and she was looking for some medicine and a guy talked to her that all those medicine is not healthy for her, that is why he took the baby to hospital as if it was his own baby, with the ID-card of his children at 10 P.M. And also when we came from border I had some problems with my knee and a women took me to hospital with the ID of her mother”.

Except for the one respondent who was able to get a residence permit, none of my respondents were able to send their children to school, or at least, not officially. There were some respondents though, who went to a school and asked the school principal for permission to let their children go there. Mostly the principals would accept these Syrian children, but they would not get a formal diploma. Once these children went to school they had a hard time understanding the lectures since most of the lessons were in Turkish, but still they enjoyed it.

Berhan: “The children are really bored, that is why I took my children to school and I talked to the principal and he said if they do not have an ID we cannot register them. But I said I just want them to stay here like a guest. They may play here, they might not learn much things but they will play with fiends and have some time outside”.

Due to the temporary protection status which Syrian refugees get in Turkey, it becomes possible to get free healthcare. In this sense, the Turkish government does spend some of its money and efforts on non-camp refugees. However, formal work and education were at that moment still forbidden for these ‘guests’. Even though this was forbidden, most respondents found a job in the informal sector and some of the respondents sent their children to school, knowing that they would not get an official diploma. In this way, they are trying to build up their lives in Diyarbakır knowing that the war in Syria probably will continue for a while. By only granting refugees a temporary protection status, the Turkish state forces refugees to be passive beings. Despite this, my respondents showed they are anything but passive. They are active and self-reliant beings, trying to make the best of their situations.

4.2.5 The role of gender and its implications for survival in Diyarbakır All the Syrian families I spoke with had both women and men in their households. In these households, it was mainly the men who were working. Mostly this would be the father but occasionally also the older sons. There were, however, two families in which the women had a job (coiffeur and working on a farm) and were earning the main income. One family also had young daughters who had jobs in a shop. Also some women were earning income through alternative means such as selling jewelry or henna begs. This made me wonder if there actually would be a difference for women and men to survive in a city, since some literature suggests that this is the case for camp refugees. This literature states that camp refugees largely consist of women who need to take care of their children, and therefore get into illegal marriages or into prostitution (Jessen, 2013).

I asked the respondents if they had heard about women who were earning money through prostitution. Talking about this topic was quite difficult and my translator did not always feel comfortable to ask this question. In those cases, I did not pursue the topic. If I did mention the topic, most respondents said they had never heard of it and did not want to talk about it. This is striking, since a journalist who I talked with had found that many Syrian women in Diyarbakır were working in the prostitution industry. Some of my respondents replied that they had heard about it but that they did not know anything about it themselves. Also some would reply that such things were already happening before the war, but that Syrians did not do those things, implying that it was Gypsies who were working in this sector.

Omar (1): “The people who are doing that prostitution thing, generally they were doing it in Syria as well. So it is their job, they are doing it everywhere, for example if she goes to Australia, still she will do this same thing, if she goes to another country, she will do the same thing. But if she is in a really bad situation, that she cannot find anything to eat maybe she can go for begging. That is how she might earn some money”.

One respondent stated that prostitution happened as a result of war, but only in the camps, not in the city.

Mehmet: “It is a result of war. Earlier in the Kurdish part there were a tradition like generally women were marrying before 20 years old, when they were 18 or 17. But now it is almost finished, they are marrying after 20. But in these camps, they are selling women and women are doing sexual acts with the males for money”.

When asking the respondents about marriages between young Syrian women and older men in Turkey who had passports, most of them had indeed heard about it and said it happened a lot also in Diyarbakır. Some respondents even knew some families personally or had themselves a family member who gave their daughter to a Turkish man. These marriages are often non-official.

Serivan: “My uncle’s daughter, he gave his daughter to a Turkish guy, actually a Kurdish guy living in Diyarbakır, in Bağlar. Like he is selling her. He got about like 10 000 Turkish Lira. It happens a lot”.

A few respondents understood why women would get into these marriages, it was seen as a way of survival. Some thought it was just about love which suggests these were voluntary marriages.

Fedwa: “We heard about this, they are generally marrying to the Turkish guys and generally they do not have families, they cannot go anywhere. For saving themselves from the war, they are marrying, and actually those men are helping them. Because if they will not marry them, maybe they would do some bad things like prostitution or some other bad things, so it is good to them”.

Others did not approve of these kind of marriages, because they thought the girls were forced into these marriages. They said it was not about love, but was just so the family could earn some money.

Minas: “Sometimes when I went to municipality I met some Syrians and those families told us that they gave their girls to Turkish guys. For example some of the families were in Syria, when they have to marry they have to pay a bride price to the girl’s parents, it is cheaper in Syria, that is why they choose Syrians. It is not about love. It might be maybe for the money, maybe the girl’s family forced her that the family would get money and that she has to go. Some are just selling their girls”

It is difficult to draw any conclusions on the implications of gender on survival in Diyarbakır. Those families I spoke to had households that included both men and women. The fact that more men were working is not particularly remarkable, as this was traditionally the case in Syria as well. However, women seemed to be able to work in the informal sector as well, mostly in more traditionally female jobs such as cleaning or tailoring.

Serivan: “Generally our relatives is working as a tailor, or at tailor places. We do not let them to work any other place, just a place with women and a clean place”.

So the fact that most of the men were working in the informal sector does not mean that the women were not able to do so. Actually, my results show that some women were able to earn their own income and not as a sex worker. Most women were dependent on their husbands or children voluntarily but therefore did not have a harder time to survive. They were in a position that they were able to stay at home. To know if women have a harder time in surviving in Diyarbakır, interviews should be conducted with Syrian families without men in the household. There were some respondents that knew women in Diyarbakır who did not have a family and therefore had to marry Turkish men for survival. For those women, it might indeed be more difficult to survive in Diyarbakır if they do not get in such marriages than for men who come alone, since a lot of work in Diyarbakır is physically heavy. However, this should be investigated before drawing any conclusions.

4.3 The perception of Syrian refugees on their living conditions in Diyarbakır The interviews for this research were conducted in Sur and Yenişehir, two districts where the majority of inhabitants have a Kurdish background. The number of refugees who had entered these districts is unknown, though Selman estimated that in the Sur municipality there are 6200 Syrian refugees. This number is much lower than in many other border cities and lower than in for instance Istanbul. Most of the Syrians who came to Diyarbakır were Kurd and so were most of my respondents. There were also a few Arabs living in these places and I was also able to undertake several interviews with Arab families. In this chapter I look at how the Syrian refugees perceived their living conditions in Diyarbakır in general and how they perceived the help they received from both locals as institutions. By getting this information, conclusions can be drawn on the extent to which these Syrian refugees feel protected and taken care of. I also was interested to see whether there

was a difference in how Syrian Kurds and Syrian Arabs felt treated by locals and if this had an influence on how they perceived their lives.

4.3.1 Living conditions in Diyarbakır The areas where big parts of the Syrian families were staying were often areas where the poor locals were living as well. The houses were old and small, and mostly consisted of the necessities such as water and electricity. The prices the respondents had to pay for rent were normal, compared with local prices. The neighbourhoods were not the safest, especially in Sur district. One of the families I spoke with had been robbed and some other respondents were living in the streets where the police and Kurds got into fights. Therefore, they were sometimes living in fear, frightened that another war would come.

Feriah: “Yesterday some, again some guys had guns, they were fighting with the police. We had dinner here in this place, not in the [dining] room, we were afraid that the windows would blow up if they throw some bombs, that is why we eat here”.

Although this fear existed, most respondents considered the neighbourhoods they were living in to be acceptable and felt welcomed and helped by the locals and institutions, especially compared to other places they had been living before.

Mehmet: “Firstly we were living in Besteklat, it is a neighbourhood in Diyarbakır. It was the AFAD home. In AFAD homes generally people from village are living there, the once who are affected from earthquakes and those people are not open minded, they were people from village. That was why they were treating us badly and sometimes immorally, they were doing something immoral to my daughters, we were disturbed that is why we came here. Here we are good, the neighbours are good. They are Kurds.

One of my respondents had family living in another part of Turkey and realized that compared to them, their neighbourhood conditions were actually quite good.

Bahar: “Here local people are helping us, also municipality is helping us. But my relatives in Mersin, 3 families who are living in the same house, and the local people are not helping them because they are Kurdish people. Also the rent are high, and the electricity, they have to pay [a lot] for electricity and water… their situation is worse in Mersin”.

The fact that most respondents accepted their neighbourhood conditions does not mean they were having a carefree life. Rather, it was that they were trying to make the best of their situations. Many respondents, for instance, had a hard time finding a job, which may also be a result of the high unemployment rate within the city. Also even when Syrians have good diplomas, it is difficult to find jobs. Some did have a job but knew they would be unable to continue the job as soon as winter came, and therefore they were worried about their future.

Omar (1): “I could not do my own job here, working on my own job here. Sometimes I went to some restaurants and when they looked at my passport or ID card it is written Syrian and they do not want me to work there. Even if I would work there they would only pay me like 20 TL or 25 TL”.

Those Syrian refugees who were able to find a job often settled for heavy and dirty jobs for which they were overqualified and underpaid. Most of the respondents would earn around 30 TL for each day they would work, while locals would earn double that income.

Samira: “if the boss is paying to local people 50 TL per day, he is paying to him [her son] 20 TL per day. So 50 or 60 percent less”.

Underpayment seems to be also the case for the respondent who was able to get a formal job as an English teacher. When he stated his income, my translator, an English teacher himself, was shocked.

Aliy: “I earn 1500 TL a month. Last week I worked around 38 hours” Translator: “That is so little, if I would work 33 hours I would be paid around 3000 TL a month”.

There were even stories from respondents in which they had family members who were not paid at all for work they had done.

Samira: “My son was earlier working in a factory, that carrying cement, his boss did not pay him for two months and for one month it was 150 TL.

The working conditions were often quite heavy as well. Most respondents were working six days a week and twelve hours a day. They need to work this much to be able to pay their living expenses. They were very much dependent on their job.

Fedwa: “But now for ten days I have not been working because of demonstrations and Bayram. Up here is the owner of the home and one of her sons is dead, was shot in those demonstrations. She just told us to give her the money for the rent so I am trying to work as much as I can and pay the rent. It is not important rather we are eating something or not, we are just trying to pay the rent”.

Since almost none of my respondents had a working permit, they were forced to work in the informal sector. This meant they were not insured and, thus, if something would happen with them the consequence would be that they would not get any income. One day, I went to the real estate shop in Yenişehir. Here I met with the husband of Minas, one of my respondents. He told me how his heavy work had injured his back and that he therefore could not work anymore that day. He got the next day off as well, but that meant that he would not be paid. Despite the high likelihood of further injury, he had to go back to his work otherwise there would not be any income. This shows the struggles Syrians face when they do not have a working permit and therefore are forced to work in the informal sector in heavy and difficult circumstances. The Syrian families had to work hard to just earn a little. Many of these families were living poor lives just having enough money to pay the rent and some simple foods, buying new clothes or other luxurious things was often not possible.

Nariman: “My husband cannot earn enough money for a better life. We cannot buy better clothes, we cannot cook better meals. I asked my husband to leave his work and find another one, but my husband says there is no work, I cannot find other work so he keeps working there. It is so-so. Of course I want better life but actually what if we could not get this one, this conditions, his work, this house, then it would be worse”.

Although some realized that their conditions could have been worse and were grateful for what they had, others felt frustrated. Especially compared to their lives in Syria, many had to give up a lot and did not feel at home in Diyarbakır.

Seyhmus: “Now I cannot do anything, I have no chance, no option. I am begging, my wife is working. I do not want all of this. Here it is a new city for me and I cannot work, I cannot find a job. In Syria my neighbours all of them were knowing about me, I had good conditions there, my life was good, but here I am not happy”.

During my interviews I noticed that most of the respondents’ family members were home, except for those who were working. When asking about their social lives it appeared that most of them did not have much of a social life. They mostly stayed at home doing some household work and only went out to buy some food or to visit family members. Some sons went out to look for jobs.

Emina: “I am generally at home and it is too boring to stay at home, but I am just doing home works and also sometimes I am going outside to my sister and also when I need something some foods, some vegetables, some bread or anything else, I am going outside to buy. As my husband is in the work and he is coming late, that is why I am doing all this work. Watching television, doing house work, taking care of children, yeah about those things”.

They had little contact with their neighbours. Mostly they would only greet each other and talk a bit, but it was very rare that they would visit each other. During a few of my interviews however, there were local neighbours visiting while I was at their homes. They then would tell me that those were the only people they had contact with. They told me they knew some locals and other Syrians, but that they only would greet each other on the streets.

Kamiran: “If we see each other we are talking to each other. Both Arab and Kurdish refugees are talking with each other and also with the neighbours, with the local people. But we are not going to each other, just on street we are greeting each other”

Clearly, some of the families did not feel very integrated. Although most families stated they were planning to stay in Diyarbakır if the war continued, some had still hope that the war would end so they could go back to their old lives. This indicates that not all Syrian refugees are ready yet to write a new chapter in their lives. This might be why they do not visit others much – a lack of commitment to invest in a new social life. Another reason seems to be that not all respondents were treated kindly by the locals, and therefore found it difficult to integrate. There was a difference in treatment between different ethnicities, as I will explain in the next sub-chapter.

4.3.2 Ethnic differences When asking if the respondents felt a difference in how Syrian Arabs and Syrian Kurds were treated by the local community, it appeared that the majority of both ethnicities felt equally treated. Some felt that Syrian Arabs were slightly more helped, because they did not speak Kurdish.

Samira: “They are treating us equally. But sometimes behaving them [Syrian Arabs] better, because they think they even do not know our language so they will have more difficulty here so they are helping much. Especially our neighbours”.

Although the previous quote would suggest that Syrian Arabs are helped a bit more by locals, a Syrian Arab respondent actually stated that she had to pay higher prices because she could not speak the local language. She did not have the feeling she was helped more, but in fact encountered some negative consequences because of her Arab background.

Selwa: “They are generally good to me, both Arab and Kurds. Only sometimes. For example my husband knows Kurdish, so when my children and their father are going to Bazaar or somewhere else to buy something the people sell cheaper, but when the children alone or with me they sell it for more because we do not know the language. They just say the prize and you take it or not, if you buy it is up to you”.

Most of the Arab-speaking Syrian respondents encountered difficulties in their daily lives due to the fact that they did not speak Kurdish. Some of the Syrian Kurds also stated that they had difficulties in communicating with locals because these locals would not speak Kurdish but Turkish, or sometimes they did speak Kurdish, but this would be different from that of the Syrian Kurds.

Minas: “The Turkish ones are good as well, but most of them does not understand me, my language. Even if they are Kurdish, they are not talking Kurdish. Most of them are humiliated, they just forgot their language, their mother tongue. When I came here firstly we used body language. Even though they are Kurdish they could not understand me”.

Three out of the five Syrian Arab families whom I interviewed, noticed that Syrian Arabs were treated more negatively than Syrian Kurds. One, for instance, encountered more difficulties in finding a job.

Omar (2): “Generally the people who are letting us work with them, generally they do not believe us or they do not count on Arab people, they do not want to work with Arab people. Instead of Arab people they choose the Kurdish one. So in general it is okay, but with working they do not count on us”.

The reason why these Syrian Arabs in some cases encountered more negative reactions, is due to prejudices towards them. During my research, I regularly heard that both locals and Syrian Kurds thought that Arabs were supporters of Islamic State, or that Arabs are beggars and unable to work. Conversely, Kurds were seen as good people.

Kamiran: “Local people of Diyarbakır, they generally do not like the Arab Syrians because they are like begging. Instead of working they are mostly begging, that is why they do not like them. But Kurdish people, most of them are working.

This prejudice is due to the fact that many people who beg speak Arabic, though these people are not necessarily Syrian Arab refugees. Some respondents told me these were Gypsies who were probably already begging before the war in Syria had started.

Omar (2): “Some people are begging and that people make our [Syrian Arabs] name bad. That is why the people are looking to Arab people as beggars. It is not moral to beg, we do not want them to do things like this, but the people who beg are Gypsy people and they are also begging in Syria as well, and that is why when people see us they say you are also beggars, when we say we are from Syria, or when we speak Arabic, the local people thing we are also beggars”.

However, it appears that locals do not always differentiate between those two groups. They see Arab- and Kurd-Syrians just as one group, namely as Syrians. There are some more general prejudices towards Syrians as well, such as that Syrians are filthy people who are begging. Syrians are therefore sometimes treated as outsiders.

Aliy: “I consider myself as a refugee, I am deprived from house and job. People here also look at us Syrians as strange, we are outsiders. When I tell people I am from Syria they do not

believe me because I am clean. I am a respectable man, a teacher, and they think all Syrians are bad and dirty”.

Therefore both Arab and Kurd-Syrians sometimes feel discriminated against by the local community and therefore encounter difficulties such as finding a job or a place to rent.

Kamiran: “Our situation here is very difficult, they do not trust us mostly. When we ask about renting house, they mostly say no, when we ask about something else they say no, they do not trust us and they do not like us”.

Some of the Syrian refugees first had to ‘prove themselves’. They had to win the trust of the local community to be accepted and treated better.

Muhammed: “When we first came, they were looking down on us, like they were afraid for us and they did not like us. They thought we were Gypsies and that we are begging, like the Syrians are all time begging. Later, when we said we are from Rojova, we are Kurds, and we are not begging, we are like normal people, later day by day they believed us and they are now good to us”.

It appears that most respondents felt that both Syrian Arabs and Syrian Kurds are treated equally, which in most cases meant being treated positively. There were some cases though, in which this treatment was negative, where Syrians were seen as outsiders and consequently, have more difficulty in finding a job or a house. In a few cases, respondents thought that Syrian Arabs were treated more negatively. Syrian Arabs are often seen as Islamic State supporters or beggars and therefore, receive a negative attitude from locals and sometimes from Syrian Kurds. Furthermore, they do not speak Kurdish and thus have a harder time with, for instance, finding a job. 4.3.3 Perception on local community and institutions All Syrian families I talked with had, in one way or another, received help from the local community. This was mostly in the form of furniture, but also with finding a job or a house. Most Syrians were thankful for this help and perceived their local community positively.

Omar (1): “People of here are really good, they are treating us very nice. When we are going to hospital, for example we do not know Turkish, some people know both Turkish and Kurdish, they just help us, they say come to us and we will help you. Yeah, they are helping”.

The respondents especially received help from the local community when they had just arrived. Despite this, looking at the social relationships between the respondents and the local community, it appeared that they would rarely visit each other. The fact that they had been helped in the beginning often did not establish a social relationship. Some of the respondents might have even forgotten that they were helped by the local community. A few respondents would, for instance, tell me they had not received any help from the local people, however when I would ask them how they received the furniture in the living room, it appeared it would be from the local people.

Serivan: “In two or three months, just one time the Kurdish party is helping us with the food. Local people are not helping to us. The priest [probably higher Imam] of Diyarbakır, sometimes he helps us”. Ilva: “And the furniture, how did you get that”? Serivan: “All of the goods were given by the local people, neighbours”.

In general it seems as if the respondents perceive the local community as acceptable and are grateful for the help they received or were receiving. They mostly liked the neighbourhoods they lived in, but tended not to establish social relationships with others outside the family. This might be because of the negative prejudices some locals seem to have.

When asking how the respondents perceived the local municipality, most were neutral. They had heard the municipality donated some things to refugees, but they themselves were mostly unable to receive this help as often they did not know how to find the municipality, or because the municipality had told them they could not help them. In the latter case, this often led to confusion about the role of the municipality.

Zeheyya: “Twice we talked to municipality. Once on the night of the Bayram. We heard that municipality is distributing some help, some materials to the Syrian people. I went and they told me that it was finished, that they do not have our families name and contact number and address. That is why they did not give us anything. Later I gave my number to the municipality and a few days ago they were distributing again, but distributing mattresses and some clothes maybe. Again, they said it is finished and they did not give us anything.

Those respondents who were able to find the municipality and receive help from them, were happy with this help and had a positive perception of the municipality.

Bahar: “The municipality is pretty good, whenever I ask for something to Selman, he is helping us with the commissions of, with the opportunities of municipality”.

None of the Syrian respondents I spoke with had received help from a NGO. A few had had contact with certain institutions that they thought were NGOs and had asked for help, but were never helped.

Omar (1): “None of NGOs helped us. Once we applied somewhere, they said we will come to look your house, your situation, we will just check it and maybe we will help you. But it is for six months, but they never came here”.

Aniy: “No, we did not get help from NGOs. Once I applied to a place which is giving help to poor people, it is working with the government, once I went there and they said now we are not helping to Syrian, we are helping to people from Şengal, and they said after three months you may come here again and we will write our names and maybe we will help you”.

Apparently NGOs in Diyarbakır are not that common, or at least not NGOs focused on Syrian refugees. I also talked with Nurcan Baysal, a woman who had done some work for DISA and who knew a bit about the NGOs in Diyarbakır. She told me that there are no big NGOs in the city and that while there are some small institutions that help poor families in general, none of them are specifically focused on Syrian refugees. One organization she named which she indicated could possibly give me some more information on the aid given to refugees in Diyarbakır was Göc-Vakfi, a migration foundation. I made an appointment with Rusen, a girl working at Göc-Vakfi, who told me about a few big NGOs who are focusing on refugees. It appeared that these NGOs were focused on aid for unofficial camp refugees, but not for city refugees. Currently the help for refugees in Diyarbakır city comes mainly from local initiatives, the municipality, and some small NGOs, but there is no real overarching coordination. It therefore sometimes happens that aid coming from locals ends

up in Suruç or Şengal camps, because the municipalities and NGOs do not know where to find the Syrian city refugees. From the quote above, it also appears that even when Syrian refugees know to find NGOs, they rather provide aid to camp refugees. The same accounts for the Turkish government.

Minas: “I went to governorship, governorship of Diyarbakır. They told us we are not helping people living here, we are helping to people living in camp”.

When looking at how the respondents perceive the Turkish government, mixed reactions were given. Some appreciated the fact that they are receiving healthcare (if they have an ID-card) from the government.

Family Suleyman: “The Turkish government is good for us. Before we did not had that ID-card, we could not go to hospital, they wanted money from us otherwise they would not look. And after getting the ID-card we can go for free, the police is not asking for us, they did not do anything bad to us, so they are good”.

Others did not have much trust in the government. They did not necessarily perceive the government as bad, but they felt ignored by the government and felt that they should have done more to help them.

Bahar: “When we came here they did not help us much and because we do not have any passport, almost no help. Also Erdogan, the president, he met with Barzani, he is a Kurdish singer, they met each other and he said I will give ID card to Syrian people, I will pay them some money, but he never did it, he just lied”.

Mehmet: “I could not talk to the local governor. I tried, but I could not. The police had my number, also my address, but they never called me if you have any problem, if you need anything. They are also doing nothing”.

A perception that I also heard a few times, was that respondents felt that the situation in the neighbourhoods was changing. More Syrians were coming to Diyarbakır and therefore they were receiving less help from both locals and institutions.

Omar (1): “Earlier they were better, they [locals] were helping us more. But now they are not helping much. When we first came there were about three or four houses [with Syrians], but now there are about twenty houses, that is why they are not talking to us much, and they are not treating us as in the earlier times”.

Overall, it seemed as if the respondents were quite neutral towards locals and institutions. They expressed appreciation for the help they have been given but at the same time, could have used more help. It seems as if Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır were better helped upon arrival, but once they had settled down, this help was reduced and slowly faded away. Especially with more refugees entering the city, the attitude from locals seemed to be changing. Also, institutions seemed to focus more on camp than on non-camp refugees.

5. Discussion and conclusion The aim of this research was to contribute to the creation of a clear urban refugee policy in Turkey – a policy that fulfills the needs of refugees and which can ensure that the lives of Syrian refugees are not wasted. In this thesis, I therefore examined why Syrian refugees prefer non-camp settlement in Diyarbakır city, what kind of livelihood strategies they use, and how they perceive their situation. To answer these questions, I conducted ethnographic research on the livelihood strategies and social networks of Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır. Some of the results seem to correspond with earlier literature on this topic, however there are also some differences and new insights. All this will be discussed in the following section, by going through the different sub-questions of my research. Following this discussion, I will give the conclusion of my research followed by some recommendations on what should be included in an adequate urban refugee policy and what future research should focus on. I will end this chapter by giving a short reflection on this research.

5.1 Discussion on why Syrian refugees prefer non-camp settlement in Diyarbakır Earlier research shows that the main reason Syrian refugees choose Turkey over other countries is because of ease of transportation (AFAD, 2014). Most of the respondents in the research for this thesis came from areas near the Turkish border and had to travel relatively short distances. Although their homes were already near Turkey, it appeared that many of them had experienced difficulties passing the border. Many crossing points were in hands of parties they feared, such as IS, and therefore some respondents did not dare to cross these borders. Even if they found official border crossings which were in the hands of parties that they did trust, the respondents were often denied access at the Turkish side, because the majority did not have a Syrian passport. This goes against the Turkish temporary protection regime in which they are supposed to have an open-border policy. Some of the Kurdish respondents also accused the Turkish government of purposely closing certain crossing points near Kurdish areas, in order to prevent Syrian Kurds from coming to Turkey. Whether these borders were truly closed for political reasons is unknown – certainly the Turkish government itself denies this and stated that this was done because of safety reasons. Regardless of the actual justification, it seems undeniable that Turkey indeed has different border treatment for different people, and therefore many respondents were forced to pass the Turkish border illegally, which brought extra risks such as being stopped or even shot by Turkish police and being dependent on human traffickers. However, due to the unsafe and protracted situation within their own country the respondents were willing to take these risks with the hope of finding a safe place to settle down. Some had first fled to places within Syria, but once the war commenced, they also decided to continue to Turkey.

From the migration stories of Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır offered by the respondents, it appeared that most of the respondents had deliberately chosen for non-camp settlement in Diyarbakır, mainly due to chain-migration. All had family or knew co-nationals, or in the case of most respondents, Kurdish communities, who had moved to this place or from whom they had heard positive stories and therefore decided to come as well. Other reasons for coming to Diyarbakır that were mentioned in the interviews, were economic opportunities and public services, however these reasons were given in addition to the main reason of family or ethnicity. It is interesting to see that economic opportunities were mentioned as a factor in choosing to come to Diyarbakır. Existing literature on this topic examined in Chapter 2.1, also acknowledged this trend and explained that a reason for choosing to settle in a more urban area might be that there are more economic resources and

opportunities available (Jacobsen, 2006). However, earlier research from AFAD (see Chapter 2.1) also demonstrated that the most important reasons for choosing to stay in a camp are economic, security and accommodation reasons; a camp guarantees shelter and food and also offers more humanitarian aid than non-camp areas (AFAD, 2014). Thus ironically, it seems that some refugees make a deliberate choice to go to a camp, knowing that they will be taken care of, while the respondents featured in my research deliberately chose not to go to such camps exactly because of this. The respondents perceived a refugee camp as a last option, even though they knew they would be guaranteed care of by the government. None of my respondents even considered going to a camp and aimed to go to Diyarbakır city from the beginning. They saw a camp as a place where passive people go who do not have anybody to take care of them and are therefore dependent on the aid in a camp. This again emphasises that the Syrian refugees whom I spoke with are active people who want to be self-reliant.

Another interesting finding was that most respondents had negative perceptions of camps. None of them ever went to a camp or had family living there, but some still stated that they would rather fight and die in the war than go to a camp. Most of them had heard bad stories, such as that the facilities in the camps were bad and that immoral things were happening to women. A few Kurdish respondents also mentioned that there are only Syrian Arabs in these camps and that they suspected these Arabs to support IS. They feared being amongst these people and therefore had a bad view of camps. The bad stories they had heard were not even necessarily about Turkish camps, but they did influence their view on camps in general. Interestingly, even if they had heard positive stories about the quality of the camps in Turkey, most respondents stated that they still would not go. This negative view of camps is quite contradictory to that of the Turkish government and media, who maintain that Turkish camps are five-star camps of good quality, offering shelter, health, education, food security and social and technical services (Amnesty International, 2014; European Commission, 2015). Potentially, this divergence of views can be explained by the fact that my respondents were used to certain living standards while they lived in Syria. When they talked about their lives in Syria, it became clear that they were not in the lowest socio-economic class, but the middle-class. They wanted freedom and independency, just as they were used to in Syria. Apparently this was something they did not expect to find in a camp, and therefore they chose to move to a non-camp settlement. Thus, even though the quality of Turkish camps might be good, it was not perceived as adequate or appropriate for my respondents who prioritised freedom.

5.2 Discussing the livelihood strategies used by Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır Looking at how Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır settle down and get access to economic and social factors, it appeared that their networks seemed to be of great importance. Not only family and relations of co-nationals were important networks, but the local community was also of substantial assistance in finding a house and a job and even helping with furniture, food and clothes. Respondents seemed to make use of the locals and institutions that were willing to help them, as was suggested in the literature by Jacobsen (2006). However, the institutions seemed to be only sporadically helpful. If respondents were aware of how the aid system worked and what institutions were available to assist them, they were sometimes helped by the municipality. However, some respondents knew how the system worked but still were unable to receive any help. Through self- help measures, the respondents tried to make use of these different social networks to find housing, employment and to receive information about available opportunities. Some respondents were more

successful in this process than others. The bigger the network, the more chance of getting access to such opportunities. However, this does not mean that without these networks people were unable to survive. Some refugees also found housing, jobs, income and social services independently, although they had more difficulties in succeeding.

To get access to certain economic and social factors, the respondents also made use of policy inconsistencies and regulation loopholes as suggested earlier by Jacobsen (2006). These strategies did not seem to be very sustainable however, nor ethically justifiable. This can be explained by using two examples. Firstly, during the period of my research, Syrian children were prohibited by the Turkish government from receiving a formal education. Some parents, however, asked the primary school principal if their children could attend school despite this prohibition. Most of them got permission from the school principal, which made it possible for Syrian refugee children to receive some basic education. They were, however, dependent on the good will of local authorities. Receiving this kind of informal education is effective in the short term, as the children have an opportunity to form local social friendships and learn the language. However, they will not receive any official diploma at the end of their education, which makes it impossible to study further and difficult to find work. Secondly, Turkey formally does not grant working permits to Syrian refugees, and therefore refugees are forced to look for work in the informal sector. This shows there are loopholes through which they can find work, however this type of work is often very heavy and underpaid. They are also not insured, meaning that if they cannot work because they are ill or injured, they will not be paid at all. Since they are so dependent on this income, not working is often not an option as it is necessary to purchase food and to pay rent. In the short term, these informal jobs are acceptable since they provide refugees with a moderate income, however in the long term, the situation is unsustainable. The refugees are unable to save money and therefore become dependent on others to provide for them. These two examples show that although refugees have found short term strategies to survive in a place without a clear urban refugee policy, these strategies are ultimately unsustainable and not ethically justifiable.

Looking at livelihood strategies of specific female respondents, it appeared that women have opportunities to gain income as well, though some of these opportunities seem not only unethical, but also exploitive. A first strategy mentioned by some respondents was working in the informal sector doing ‘normal’ jobs. There were two cases in this research in which the women were the ‘breadwinners’ for their families, gaining income through agricultural work and being a coiffeur. Another strategy for survival for women which was mentioned, were marriages between young Syrian women and older Turkish men. These marriages can be divided in three categories. The first category consists of voluntary marriages between Syrian women and men from Turkey, which were seen by the respondents as based on love and therefore, acceptable. Through such marriages, Syrian women could find protection and financial security through which they could survive (Judson, 2014; Neidhardt, 2013). The second category of marriages mentioned by the respondents, were non- official marriages between Syrian women and men from Turkey, in which the Syrian women became the second or third wife. These marriages can also offer protection and financial security, however it appears that this is often not the case. Syrian women are being sold into these marriages involuntarily. By selling young females into marriage, poor families try to generate some income by receiving a dowry (Jessen, 2013). This process has become a business, a ‘marriage sector’, in which there are people who arrange these marriages and earn a commission. In 2014, the price for a Syrian woman ranged between TL 2000 and TL 10 000 in places with a high refugee population (Todays

Zaman, 2014). This is much lower than the bride prices before the war and so sexual exploitation is often the consequence. Since these marriages are non-official, these Syrian women do not have any rights and therefore are dependent on their husbands. The third category of marriages are illegal, non-official marriages between Syrian children and men from Turkey. According to Turkish law, the age limit for marriage is 17 for both women and men. However, it appears that non-official marriages under this age take place in Turkey (Jessen, 2013). Especially in the Eastern Anatolian part of Turkey, child marriage is relatively common, since this area has ethnically and culturally a lot in common with Syria where the legal age of marriage is also 17 but where judges may authorise a marriage at the age of 13 (OECD, 2012). So although such marriages are illegal, previous research claims that in and outside many Turkish camps, child marriage is still occurring. Although none of my respondents were in marriages such as those mentioned above, many respondents knew Syrian women who were.

Another strategy I expected women to use to earn income was working as a prostitute. A journalist I spoke with had looked at the topic of prostitution in Diyarbakır before, and found that many Syrian women were working in this sector. It was therefore interesting to hear that hardly any of my respondents knew someone working in this sector. Many respondents saw prostitution as a taboo subject and did not want to talk about it at all. I do believe that the majority of respondents indeed may have not known anyone working in this sector, but it is also possible that those who did were not prepared to disclose this to me, especially if they worked in this sector themselves. This has probably to do with the fact that my translator was male and I was a European student who they had only met once or never before. They may not have trusted us and therefore concealed certain information. Altogether, my results seem to show that women, like men, have found strategies to survive in Diyarbakır, however, these strategies are not only unethical but also exploitative. This conclusion should be accepted with caution, as my data on this topic was limited. The respondents’ households all included men and thus, most of the women voluntarily chose to stay at home while their husbands or children were working. As mentioned above, none of the respondents had used the strategy of marriage with Turkish men or entered the prostitution industry (or at least, did not disclose this). To discover what the implications of gender are for survival in Diyarbakır city, further research should be also conducted at households with only women or with women who were in non- official marriages or who work in prostitution.

Livelihood strategies such as engaging in global trade and commodity networks, receiving or sending remittances or mobility were not mentioned frequently in this research. Most of my respondents were working in the informal sector, not in the trade sector. To earn some income they were mostly working for a boss in restaurants or in construction. They had networks within Diyarbakır, but not many ‘transnational networks’. Most respondents were living near their family. Some also had family in other countries or other places within Turkey, but it appeared they did not have much contact with these relatives. When asking if they could seek assistance from such extended family networks, it appeared that this was not possible because they also barely earned enough to sustain themselves. There was only one family whom I interviewed who was receiving remittances from a daughter in Lebanon. Furthermore, it appeared that the refugees I interviewed were mobile, in the sense that Diyarbakır probably was not the first, nor the last destination that they would settle down. However, while they were staying in Diyarbakır they did not move back and forward between other places.

5.3 Discussing the perception of Syrian refugees on their living conditions In the last section of this thesis, I looked at how Syrian refugees in Diyarbakır perceived their living conditions. In general, the respondents perceived their living conditions as acceptable, especially if they compared it to the conditions of family members in other places. However, they did have to give up much compared to their lives in Syria. The respondents seem to rate quality of a settlement place and their current situation, by reference to other settlement places and their situation in Syria. The same account for the Turkish government, in the sense that they rate the quality of the Turkish camps by comparing them with other camps. As already discussed earlier, this might explain why the Turkish government perceives the quality of their camps to be much better than my respondents, but it might also explain why AFAD’s research concluded that camp refugees perceived their situation to be better than non-camp refugees. If refugees compare their new settlement place with their original lives and AFAD sees that camp refugees perceive their current situation better than non-camp refugees, this might be because the situation of the non-camp refugees indeed is much worse than the situation in camps. Alternatively, it may be that the situation of non-camp refugees has changed in a negative or neutral way, while the situation of camp refugees has changed in a positive way compared to their situation before.

The first scenario does not seem to apply to my respondents, who perceived the camp as a dirty place where they would be locked up and they deliberately chose to go to a non-camp settlement. Therefore, the second scenario seems to be more logically applicable. This means that my respondents might actually live under better circumstances than camp refugees, but perceive it to be worse due to what they were used to back in Syria. Camp refugees on the other hand might have already lived under difficult circumstances in Syria, and coming to the camp has made their lives easier. In the camps, they can receive aid and therefore, they perceive their situation better than their situation in Syria. In this way a more positive perception of camp refugees on their living conditions does not necessarily mean these conditions are actually better than those of urban refugees, but may simply demonstrate that compared to their previous conditions, their situation has improved while the situation of urban refugees have stayed the same or declined. If my respondents had gone to a camp, they probably would have felt a huge decline in their living conditions and would have perceived their living conditions a lot worse than they do in Diyarbakır. The above analysis rests on the assumption that urban refugees are generally people who were of the middle- class back in Syria and camp refugees as generally from the lower-class. This assumption is based on the perception of my respondents but, of course, should be accepted with caution. Not all urban refugees come from middle-class backgrounds, nor do all camp refugees come from poor backgrounds. It would be interesting, therefore to conduct further research to better understand the demographics of Syrian refugees who end up in camp and non-camp settlements and their respective socio-economic situations.

When looking at ethnicity differences between how Syrian Kurds and Syrian Arabs in Diyarbakır perceive their living conditions, it appeared that most respondents felt that they were treated equally, which mostly meant being treated positively. Some Syrian Arabs, however did feel a difference in the way they were treated compared with Syrian Kurds. They had experienced negativities such as having difficulties finding a job or a house due to prejudices from Kurds and because they did not speak the Kurdish language. Because they could not speak the language, they were identified as ‘Arabs’ and consequently, often labeled as IS supporters or beggars. These

prejudices did not only account for Syrian Arabs though, with some Syrian Kurdish respondents also mentioning that inhabitants of Diyarbakır had prejudices towards Syrians in general. Syrians were seen as outsiders and associated with gypsies and beggars. According to the integrated group threat theory of Stephan and Renfro (2002) autochthonous groups can feel threatened by immigrants in terms of economic position, social status, identity or culture. The integrated group threat theory distinguishes four types of threats that lead to prejudices about the ‘out-group’. The first type is the realistic threat, which concerns economic threats in which there is increased competition for scarce resources such as jobs, houses and income. The second type of threat is the symbolic threat, which points out the differences in culture, religion, norms and values. People who have a different view are seen as a threat to the ruling group identity. The third type is called intergroup anxiety, where people feel personally threatened in intergroup interactions because they are concerned about negative outcomes for the self. The last type is negative stereotypes and refers to the individual fears of people from the in-group, because of the expectation of certain negative behaviours from the stereotyped out-group (Stephan & Renfro, 2002). It seems as if locals feel a ‘symbolic threat’ from Syrian-Arab refugees and that negative stereotypes create a general fear amongst locals. Overall, it seems as if Syrian Kurds perceived their living conditions more positively in Diyarbakır than Syrian Arabs. However, it should be noted that this research was based on only five interviews conducted with families of Syrian Arab background, of which only three were fully Arab. The other fifteen interviews were with Syrian Kurds, and so this ratio is out of balance.

When looking at how the respondents described the help they had received since coming to Diyabakir, some interesting points came up. Firstly, some respondents initially stated that nobody had been helping them, but later in the interview it appeared they had in fact received help through various channels. It might be that the respondents were portraying themselves as victims, so as to gain aid and other assistance. “It is only when the refugees interact with faceless organizations or governments which they consider rich, powerful, corrupt and unaccountable (to them) that they resort to whatever means available to maximize material benefits without any consideration of the interest of such organizations” (Kibreab, 2004, p. 13). The refugees may have tried to sketch their situation as worse than it actually was, in the hope of gaining more. It is possible that the respondents also saw me as a ‘faceless presenter’ of some organization or government. Even though I explained who I was and why I was there, and that I was not there to provide assistance, it is very possible that they did not understand exactly who I was. Secondly, none of the respondents had received aid from NGOs. There seemed to be number of NGOs in Diyarbakır, but none of them had focused programs for urban refugees. Thirdly, aid from both the municipality and from the government seemed to have declined over time due to the occurrence of other emergencies, such as the influx of new refugees from Sengal and Kobane, near Diyarbakır city. Thus, the already existing urban refugees are no longer seen as an urgent priority and therefore NGOs, the municipality and the government divert their focus from them. Lastly, most respondents were greatly appreciative of the help they had received from locals, however, they were not engaged in any social relationships with them. The help received by the locals also seemed to decline over time. It seems as if the local community is important while initially settling down, but that once the refugees have become established, there is little continuing interaction between these two groups. Although the refugees might work with locals and live in the same areas, these two groups seem to live their lives separately. They greet, but do not visit each other.

There are several reasons that could explain this lack of interaction. Firstly, there were some respondents who thought the war in Syria would end soon and that they then could go back home. This might have been a reason why some Syrian refugees did not invest in social relationships. Secondly, most of the lives of my respondents, or their partners, consisted mainly of working and therefore, they did not have time to meet socially with locals. A third reason might be the lack of interest from the locals themselves. It appeared that some locals indeed had prejudices towards Syrians and therefore, the locals might be the party who were not willing to socialise. In integrated group threat theory, this is called negative stereotyping - negative stereotyping of Syrian refugees by locals in Diybakir, such as perceiving that all Syrians are beggars, created fear towards these Syrians. These prejudices were even stronger towards Syrian Arabs. A last reason that may have contributed to the lack of integration between Syrian refugees and the local community may be the urban policy of the government. By not granting refugees with a working permit or facilitating education, the Turkish government separates the refugees from the locals and therefore stimulates segregation instead of integration. A lack of integration makes it difficult for refugees to ‘write a new chapter’ in their lives in Diyarbakır. This is problematic since most respondents want to stay in Diyarbakır for an extended time. It appears however that most external parties such as NGOs, the municipality, the government and the local community, treat urban refugees in Diyarbakır as a group who are there for a temporary period only.

5.4 Conclusion and recommendations Looking at why Syrian refugees prefer non-camp settlement in Diyarbakır city and what kind of livelihood strategies they use, it appeared that social relations, ethnic background and being able to be self-reliant are three important variables. The refugees in this research seemed to move to places where family and people from the same ethnicity had moved to before, in a process of chain- migration. The fact that the respondents were not able to find these social relations and same ethnic backgrounds in the camps, was mentioned as a strong reason for choosing not to go to a camp. Additionally, it appeared that the respondents were looking for a settlement place where they were safe, free and able to earn their own money. They wanted to be independent of others and the city was seen as a place where they could be self-reliant – something they perceived as impossible in a camp. By making use of the networks of their family and co-nationals with the same ethnic background, and by making use of policy inconsistencies and regulation loopholes, these refugees found ways to survive in the city. It appeared, however, that the ways in which they survived were not always ethically justifiable or sustainable. These refugees had to work uninsured in the informal sector for many hours, earning just enough to pay for rent and food, and with no opportunity to save money. They were also dependent on the good will of local authorities to receive education and often could only get temporary education without receiving a recognised diploma. Alternative ways to survive seemed to be begging or, in the case of women, marriage to a man with Turkish citizenship. In conclusion, this research has shown that an adequate urban refugee policy, which is responsive to the needs of urban refugees and offers a durable solution, is missing.

Currently refugee policy is focused on the creation of camps where refugees receive short-term aid. Traditionally, aid organizations give this aid to people in need without getting any return on this investment. This can create a relation in which the receiver, in this case the refugee, becomes dependent on this aid. This type of aid can therefore cost a lot of money, while also creating a situation where refugees are passive actors who cannot or do not take care of themselves. However,

in the research conducted for this thesis, research I have seen that Syrian refugees are not passive actors. They are often educated and are more than willing to work and create their own lives. They are active actors who want to be self-reliant, but due to the fact that they are formally not allowed to work and have difficulties in receiving education, this becomes difficult. It is, therefore, the recommendation of this thesis that refugee policy should not only focus on short-term aid to camp refugees, but also consider ways to stimulate an environment in which urban refugees truly can be self-reliant. Governments are likely to reject this at the moment, because of the fear that if refugees get too many rights or opportunities, they will never go back to their home country. Whether this is true or false, it seems more important to consider how refugees can actually contribute to a host country. If a government believes that refugees are actually potentially useful, they might be more willing to create better circumstances for refugees. I will return to this point in my recommendations.

I do agree that the kind of passive, emergency aid currently provided by the Turkish government towards mainly camp refugees should remain available for those in need, since these people require this type of assistance in the short-term. However, it is also important to stimulate these people to become self-reliant, so that they can earn their own money and live with more dignity in the long term. Granting rights such as working permits and investing in education for children can contribute to the self-esteem and success of Syrian refugees. By offering Syrian refugees working permits, they are able to work in the formal sector, receiving insurance and a higher income. This insurance and income is what they need to become truly independent, both in the short and long term. Furthermore, by investing in education, it becomes possible for Syrian children to continue their studies which helps them in the long term to find a job. This also has an economic advantage for aid organizations, which can save money on aid-giving and for the Turkish government, who can profit from possible economic growth through Syrians who are then working in the formal sector and through educated Syrian children who can be part of the future tax-paying work force. Additionally, these changes would stimulate integration between the host and ‘guest’ communities.

Finally, I have four recommendations on what future research should focus on. Firstly, as already stated in Chapter 5.2, my data appeared insufficient to draw any conclusions on the implications of gender in the survival of Syrian refugees in Diyabakir. It would therefore be interesting for future research to better understand whether families with a female head of household have the same opportunities to survive as families with a male head of household, or if urban refugee policy should have a specific focus or provisions for women, if appears that women are dependent on sex-work and illegal marriages. Secondly, my research suggested that ethnic background is important for refugees, as Syrian Kurds seemed to have more possibilities to survive in a Kurdish city then Syrian Arabs. However, the data requires further validation and corroboration, as most interviews were conducted with Syrian Kurds. It is therefore important that future research focuses on this ethnic aspect, to see if urban refugee policy also needs to have a specific focus in this regard. Thirdly, it appeared that the respondents perceived camps as places where people go to be taken care of, while the city was perceived as a place where individuals could be self-reliant. This suggests that my respondents saw camp refugees as poor and dependent people, while refugees in the city tend to be middle-class and active people. It would be interesting for future research to discover whether this truly was the case, or if this view is based on unsubstantiated prejudices and perceptions, and if so, why and how these perceptions originate. Finally, the current view of many people, and even of some of my own respondents, seems to be that refugees are needy. They are seen as fortune seekers who want to profit from social services and therefore, represent an economic burden. Consequently,

many people do not want their governments to accept more refugees. In the current climate, anti- migration parties seem to be gaining increasing support in Europe, showing that some politicians also hold this belief that refugees are a burden towards a national economy. Because of this widely supported view, refugee policy in Europe is generally quite intolerant, often making it very difficult for refugees to survive and integrate into a new society. As stated earlier, some governments do not want to create an environment in which refugees can be self-reliant, because they fear these refugees will then not return to their home country. The problem, however, is that this policy is based on unsubstantiated assumptions. It is not necessarily true that refugees try to profit from social services and therefore are only an economic burden for a country. In this research, it has been clearly demonstrated that refugees want to be self-reliant and earn their own money. Most of them found jobs within a week of arriving in Diyabakir in the informal sector, working many hours a week. This proves that the assumption that all refugees are fortune seekers only willing to profit is overly generalised and, in many cases, false. Refugees are often hard working people whose primary aim is survival. If this potential was recognized to a greater extent by politicians and European society, countries might realize that they can actually profit from incoming refugees. The fear that refugees might not go back to their home country might then decrease, or be considered secondary to their economic and human potential. This realization may, in turn, lead to a more tolerant refugee policy such as described above, whereby the refugee is allowed to earn their own income with dignity and the government can profit from them as tax-payers. Unsubstantiated and prejudicial perceptions of refugees, seems to directly contribute to the development of ill-informed and unsustainable policies. Therefore more research needs to be conducted on the potential human and economic contribution of refugees to a host country, so that a better and more realistic perception can be fostered amongst politicians and the wider community, and consequently, the creation of a more responsive refugee policy.

5.5 A reflection on this research Looking back on this research I am quite satisfied with the data I conducted and how the process of writing this thesis proceeded. The three months I have spent in Diyarbakır city were fruitful, having interesting conversations with people who were willing to talk with me. Although I had difficulties understanding people due to the language barrier, and I therefore needed a translator, I feel that what I have written in this thesis truly reflects the stories, experiences and the situation of my respondents in Diyarbakır city. I do think though, that if I would have been able to speak the same language as my respondents this could have led to even better data. I then would have been able to immediately pick up on remarkable information. I tried to do so now as well, but sometimes my translator was unable to translate the whole story of a respondent because this respondent would say a lot. My translator therefore summarized the most relevant things which would give a direct answer to my question. However, what might have looked as irrelevant to my translator might have actually been an opening to an interesting conversation. Certain information might therefore have stayed on the surface instead of getting into details. The fact that I needed a translator though was also very useful, not only because of the translations, but also because he knew the norms and values, and cultural habits. He therefore was for instance able to instruct me on how to greet or say goodbye. Besides being my translator he also was my guide showing the way around. Even if I would be able to talk with the respondents myself, I guess I would not have been able to get such an easy access to all my informants without him. Overall, if I had to conduct such a research today I might have chosen to do my research in a place where I would be able to speak English, or I would try to

learn the local language, but I still would look for a local person who would be able to help me from time to time. In this way I would not be fully dependent on this person but still can make use of the knowledge and contacts of such person.

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