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2021 Assar Lindbeck ·· ekonomiskdebatt lösnummer 75 kronor www.nationalekonomi.se/ed årgång 49 Utgiven av Nationalekonomiska Föreningen med stöd av Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius stiftelse, Bankdirektör J H Palmes Stiftelse för Ekonomisk Upplysning och Ekonomisk Forskning samt Swedbank. BEGRÄNSAD EFTERSÄNDNING. Vid definitiv eftersändning återsänds försändelsen med uppgift om ny adress. TEMANUMMER debatt Assar Lindbeck 2 | 2021 – penningteoretikern, forskaren, forsknings- entreprenören, opinionsledaren, reformatorn, konstnären, privatpersonen carl bildt lars calmfors pierre guillet de monthoux thorvaldur gylfason magnus henrekson ulf jakobsson mårten palme ekonomisk mats persson edmund phelps claes-henric siven dennis j snower debatt NÄSTA NUMMER birgitta swedenborg hans tson söderström (red) bengt assarsson 2 jörgen weibull Ekonomporträtt: Ingemar Hansson 1951–2018 2021 solveig wikström ekonomisk ED 2 2021 omslag r.indd 1 2021-03-15 12:39:54 ekonomiskdebatt 2 2021 3 mikael elinder Temanummer och lovisa persson till Assar Lindbecks minne 6 Assar Lindbeck-medaljen 7 Milstolpar i Assar Lindbecks liv 9 hans tson söderström Mentorn Assar Lindbeck – ett personligt porträtt 26 mats persson och Assar Lindbeck som penningteoretiker claes-henric siven – doktorsavhandlingen 1963 36 magnus henrekson Forskaren Assar Lindbeck – en biblio metrisk analys 43 lars calmfors Forskningsentreprenören Assar Lindbeck 55 magnus henrekson Assar Lindbeck och IFN och ulf jakobsson – en sextioårig relation 64 jörgen weibull Att forska med Assar 71 mårten palme Assar, sjukskrivningar och löntagarfonder 77 edmund phelps En hyllning till Assar Lindbeck 80 dennis j snower Att arbeta med Assar – ett livsavgörande möte 91 thorvaldur gylfason Så minns jag Assar 101 carl bildt Opinionsledaren Assar Lindbeck 107 birgitta swedenborg Reformatorn Assar Lindbeck – Lindbeckkommissionen och dess uppföljare 117 pierre guillet Konstnären Assar Lindbeck de monthoux – om konst och vetenskap 120 Ett urval av Assar Lindbecks målningar 123 solveig wikström Privatpersonen Assar Lindbeck – från outsider- till insider-perspektiv 129 assar lindbeck ”Assars testamente” – ekonomernas roll i framtida samhällsekonomiska kriser ekonomiskdebatt – utgiven av nationalekonomiska föreningen REDAKTÖRER WEBBPLATS Docent mikael elinder http://www.nationalekonomi.se/ed Fil dr lovisa persson Nationalekonomiska Föreningens stadgar finns på webbplatsen. REDAKTIONEN Docent göran bostedt, Umeå universitet och SLU TEKNISK REDAKTÖR Professor anna dreber almenberg, Handelshögskolan kristina holm, e-post: i Stockholm [email protected]. Professor dick durevall, Göteborgs universitet Professor johan eklund, Entreprenörskapsforum ADMINISTRATIV REDAKTÖR / ANNONSER Docent lisa laun, IFAU elisabeth gustafsson, Institutet för Näringslivsforskning, Docent magnus lodefalk, Örebro universitet och Ratio Box 55665, 102 15 Stockholm. Tel: 08-665 45 03, Docent johanna palmberg, Södertörns högskola e-post: [email protected]. Docent emma von essen, SOFI och Århus universitet ANNONSPRISER ANSVARIG UTGIVARE 1/1-sida 5 300 kr, 1/2-sida 3 200 kr, 1/3-sida 2 300 kr, Docent niclas berggren 1/4-sida 1 900 kr för svartvita annonser i inlagan. REDAKTIONSRÅD PRENUMERATIONSÄRENDEN OCH LÖSNUMMER Professor ali m ahmed Prenumeration: Ekonomisk Debatt kommer ut med 8 nummer Docent niclas berggren (ordförande) per år och en prenumeration kostar 800 kr. För prenumeranter Professor per-olof bjuggren bosatta utanför Sverige tillkommer 300 kr för att täcka porto- Professor tore ellingsen kostnaden. Prenumeration kan påbörjas när som helst under Professor bengt kriström året. På www.nationalekonomi.se/medlemskap-och- Universitetslektor agneta kruse prenumeration/priser finns information för att påbörja en Civilekonom/journalist louise andrén meiton individuell prenumeration. För agenter: Kontakta Civilekonom/journalist johan schück [email protected]. Lösnummer: Kontakta [email protected]. REDAKTIONENS ADRESS Priset är 90 kr plus porto. mikael elinder, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Medlemmar i Nationalekonomiska Föreningen får tidskriften Uppsala universitet, Box 513, 751 20 Uppsala, e-post: som medlemsförmån. [email protected]. För vidare information om medlemskap, se www.nationalekonomi.se. lovisa persson, Högskolan Kristianstad och Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN), Högskolan Kristianstad, 291 88 Kristianstad, e-post: [email protected]. Grafisk form Sture Balgård, Dagmar Forsberg Tryck ljungbergs tryckeri ab, klippan 2021. christina lönnblad, e-post: [email protected]. issn 0345-2646 Artikelförslag sänds som Word-fil tillEkonomiskDebatt@ Nr 2 2021, årgång 49 gmail.com. För instruktion om stilregler och formatering, Medlem av se längst bak i tidskriften. Temanummer till Assar Lindbecks minne nr 2 2021 nr 2 Professor Assar Lindbeck avled den 28 augusti 2020 i en ålder av 90 år. Han LEDARE spelade under hela sitt vuxna liv en viktig roll för svensk nationalekonomisk utbildning, forskning, opinionsbildning och debatt. Under sin tid som ord- årgång 49 förande i Nationalekonomiska Föreningen tog han initiativ till skapandet av denna tidskrift, som nu är inne på sitt 49:e utgivningsår. Han verkade under många år som ordförande i redaktionsrådet och var ansvarig utgivare från starten fram till i fjol. Han var därtill en av tidskriftens flitigaste med- verkande med ett stort antal artiklar och inlägg. Mot denna bakgrund har det framstått som naturligt att hedra Assar Lindbeck – eller Assar som alla kallade honom – med ett särskilt minnes- nummer som skildrar hans liv och gärning. Vi har vänt oss till docent Hans Tson Söderström, mångårig medarbetare och nära vän till Assar samt där- till redaktör för denna tidskrift 1977–78, att vara gästredaktör för detta min- nesnummer. Resultatet är en samling mycket spännande och intressanta bidrag från personer som på olika sätt stått Assar nära. Vi får en unik inblick i Assars liv, hans bidrag till vårt ämne och till svensk ekonomisk politik. Vi hoppas att detta minnesnummer kan utgöra en värdig tribut till Assar, som under det senaste halvseklet blivit den svenska nationalekono- mins ”grand old man”. Mikael Elinder och Lovisa Persson ledare 3 ASSAR LINDBECK 1930 – 2020 Foto: Pierre Guillet de Monthoux 5 Assar Lindbeck-medaljen Nationalekonomiska Föreningen instiftade 2007 priset Assar Lind- beck-medaljen på initiativ av föreningens dåvarande ordförande Gabriel Urwitz. Priset tillkom för att uppmärksamma Assar Lindbecks föredöm- liga och banbrytande insatser som forskare, forskningsledare och ekono- misk-politisk debattör och för att stimulera yngre forskare. Det består f n av en prissumma på 250 000 kr samt en medalj i silver som väger 750 debatt gram, formgiven av konstnären Annie Winblad Jakubowski med ett egen- händigt självporträtt av Assar Lindbeck. Priset delas ut vartannat år till en yngre ekonom som på ett framstående sätt bidragit till ekonomiskt ekonomisk tänkande och kunskap om ekonomi i vårt land. Mottagare av Assar Lindbeck-medaljen sedan starten: 2007 Tore Ellingsen, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm 2009 Jakob Svensson och David Strömberg, Institutet för internationell ekonomi 2011 Per Strömberg, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm och SHoF 2013 Mariassunta Giannetti, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm 2015 Oskar Nordström Skans, Uppsala universitet 2017 Petter Lundborg, Lunds universitet 2019 Anna Dreber Almenberg, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm 6 ekonomisk debatt Milstolpar i Assar Lindbecks liv ¾ Född i Umeå den 26 januari 1930 som andra barnet till fattigvårds- och barna- vårdskonsulenten Carl Ulrik Lindbäck och folkskollärarinnan Laura Eugenia Sundelin. Äldre systern Carin född 1925. nr 2 2021 nr 2 ¾ Skolgång i Luleå, där fadern blev ordförande i stadsfullmäktige. Studentexa- men från Luleå högre allmänna läroverk 1948. årgång 49 ¾ Studier i statskunskap, nationalekonomi, sociologi och statistik vid Uppsala universitet från 1948. Ordförande i Laboremus 1951–52. Pol mag 1952. ¾ Utträder ur statskyrkan 1951. ¾ Erbjuds assistentjobb av Tage Erlander 1953. Avböjer och föreslår Olof Palme. ¾ Militärtjänst vid Arméstaben och Försvarsstaben i Stockholm med deltids- tjänst i finansdepartementet 1953–54. Samarbetar med Olof Palme. ¾ Gift med farmaceut Dorothy Nordlund 1953. Barnen Dan, f 1959, och Maria, f 1962. ¾ Amanuens i finansdepartementet 1954–56 med avhandlingsarbete om statsbudgetens verkningar på konjunkturutvecklingen. Fil lic vid Stockholms högskola 1957. ¾ Två års forskning och studier i USA med stipendium från Rockefeller Foun- dation 1957–59. Första året vid Yale University, andra året vid University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. ¾ Ändrar vid återkomsten till Sverige efternamnet från Lindbäck till Lindbeck 1959. ¾ Antagen som docent i nationalekonomi vid Stockholms högskola 1962. ¾ Disputerar för filosofie doktorsgrad vid Stockholms högskola med avhand- lingen A Study in Monetary Ananlysis, 1963. Erik Lundberg försteopponent, Lars Werin andre. ¾ Innehavare av A O Wallenbergs professur i nationalekonomi med bankvetenskap vid Handelshögskolan i Stockholm 1964–71. ¾ Rådgivare till Sveriges riksbank (Per Åsbrink) 1964–68 och 1972–74. ¾ Ledamot av OECD:s s k Hellerkommission 1966–68. ¾ Gästprofessor vid Columbia University och University of California, Berkeley, 1968–69. ¾ Ledamot av Kungl. Vetenskapsakademiens priskommitté för Sveriges Riks- banks pris i ekonomisk vetenskap till Alfred Nobels minne 1969–94, ordförande där 1980–94. milstolpar i assar lindbecks liv 7 ¾ Ledamot av Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien 1970 och Kungl. Vetenskaps-
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