Geneva Initiative” 2010 – 2020
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Eidgenössisches Departement f ür auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA Politische Direktion PD Abteilung Menschliche Sicherheit: Frieden, Menschenrechte, Humanitäre Politik, Migration Terms of Reference External Evaluation of the “Geneva Initiative” 2010 – 2020 1. Background and context Historical and political context The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the world’s longest-running contemporary disputes. In the early 1990s, the Oslo Peace Process sought to find resolution based on the two-state paradigm and through a step-by-step approach, whereby the most difficult issues such as borders, security, settlements, Jerusalem and refugees (hereinafter final status issues) would be negotiated after a five years interim period in 1999. However, when the 2000-Camp David Summit failed and violence broke out with the beginning of the Second Intifada, the peace process reached a deadlock. In this context, prominent Israeli and Palestinian officials and individuals negotiated behind the scenes the details of all final status issues. With the support of Switzerland, they concluded after two years a 50-page document which came to be known as the Geneva Accords (GA) – the very core of the Geneva Initiative (GI). Definition, goal and history of the Geneva Initiative (GI) Launched in Geneva in 2003, the GI is a political initiative that was developed to serve as a model for a permanent status agreement to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In essence, the GI aims at contributing to a political solution to the conflict in three ways: 1) by providing a reference document that can serve as a basis for future negotiations; 2) by connecting relevant political figures on both sides to dialogue and prepare the ground for track-one negotiations and 3) by educating and mobilizing members of both societies to guarantee public support for a negotiated two-state solution. To follow up on the accords and their spirit, two cooperating NGOs were created in 2003 (Heskem/H.L. Education for Peace (HELP) on the Israeli side and the Palestine Peace Coalition (PPC). Ever since, they have been promoting the GI through a series of activities at the local, regional and international level. Furthermore, throughout the years, the GI has regularly adapted its approaches and activities, for instance by supporting the intra-Palestinian reconciliation process as part of its efforts to contribute to the realization of the two-state solution. During its first years of existence, the GI constituted one of the most elaborated and recognized model agreements, offering a detailed blueprint for mutually acceptable solutions to the core issues of the conflict. Between 2009 and 2011, the original accord was further supplemented with different annexes outlining concrete measures required for a potential implementation. However, with a growing lack of public acceptance on a variety of issues and the loss of political influence of the two leading figures behind the GI – former Israeli minister Dr. Yossi Beilin and former Secretary General of the PLO Yasser Abed Rabbo – the GI also progressively lost its momentum and convening power. Relationship with Switzerland Switzerland has been a firm supporter of the GI since its early days both financially and non- financially. It started with the logistical and financial support leading to the conclusion of the Accords and the public launching ceremony in 2003 in Geneva and has continued ever since with the financial and political support given to the two Israeli and Palestinian NGOs for their activities, projects and programs. In 2009, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has commissioned an external evaluation of the activities fostering the GI. As an overall conclusion, the evaluation confirmed that the support of the program activities was justified. Regarding future cooperation, a majority of the evaluators suggested the FDFA to gradually phase out their financial support within the years to come. Based on these results, the FDFA has gradually decreased its yearly contributions (i.e. from CHF 1 million in 2009 to CHF 370’000 in 2018) and has increasingly targeted its contributions to specific projects/thematic areas. To Eidgenössisches Departement f ür auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA Politische Direktion PD Abteilung Menschliche Sicherheit: Frieden, Menschenrechte, Humanitäre Politik, Migration illustrate, between 2014 and 2019, Swiss support was mainly directed towards the issue of reconciliation and ‘dealing with the past.’ Finally, in 2020, the FDFA has ended its project funding and only supports the GI with core contributions of CHF 180’000, equally divided among the two organizations, for their day-to-day operations related to the articulation and promotion of a realistic vision of the two-state solution. Throughout the years, Swiss support to the GI has been based on the FDFAs foreign policy objectives in the Near East and the priorities of the Human Security Division, which is to contribute to a negotiated two-state solution. More specifically, the current support for the GI is embedded in the FDFA’s Cooperation Strategy for the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) 2015-2018 (extended to 2020) and the HSD-civilian peace promotion strategy in Israel and the oPt 2015-2018 (extended to 2020). The strategic and operational orientation of Switzerland’s engagement in the Near East is currently being reviewed and reoriented. At the time of writing, a new MENA strategy with an updated cooperation program for Israel/oPt is being drafted – based on Switzerland’s 2020-23 foreign policy strategy adopted by the Federal Council in the beginning of the year. Against this background, the FDFA is also reassessing its support to its partners in the Near East, including the GI, while also exploring support to new initiatives.1 2. Purpose Against this background, the purpose of this evaluation is twofold: 1) accountability: to assess the socio- political impact of the GI and 2) learning: to generate lessons for improvement. The emphasis is on the learning side, with the view of informing the FDFA’s decision on future engagement/disengagement with /from the GI. More specifically, and based on the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, the evaluation shall critically assess the: 1) Impact of the GI on the promotion of peace in the Near East 2) Relevance of the GI to the socio-political context (local, regional and international) and to Swiss foreign policy in the region 3) Effectiveness of the GI in achieving significant results and of Switzerland in maximizing this political initiative 3. Objectives a) Type of evaluation The external evaluation of the GI shall be both retrospective and prospective. As such, the evaluation should be critically reflective of the past and provide the basis for a constructive outlook into the future engagement/disengagement of Switzerland with/from the GI. It shall also provide a learning opportunity for Switzerland regarding its engagement in political initiatives and partnerships. b) Scope The external evaluation of the GI should cover the period from 2010 to 2020 (from the finalization of the last external evaluation to the present). c) Questions for the evaluation General - What work has the GI conducted during the evaluation period (with and without FDFA-support)? - How have the overall strategy, approach and working assumptions of the GI evolved since 2010? - What are GI’s strategic priorities and goals for the next five years? 1 In response to the parliamentary Motion submitted by Parlamentarian Christian Imark titled «burying the Geneva Initiative» in September 2018, the Federal Council announced that it w ill review its support to NGOs and think tanks, incl. the Geneva initiative, in line w ith the development of a new MENA-strategy. Eidgenössisches Departement f ür auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA Politische Direktion PD Abteilung Menschliche Sicherheit: Frieden, Menschenrechte, Humanitäre Politik, Migration Impact On the political context - What impact did the GI have on conflict resolution/peace promotion in the Near East? - What impact did the GI have on public opinion in Israel and the oPt? - What impact did the GI have on decision-makers, locally, regionally and internationally? - To what extent have these effects/impacts been sustainable over time? On Swiss foreign policy in the Near East - To what extent did GI’s results contribute to the fulfillment of Switzerland’s foreign policy objectives? - To what extent did the GI inform relevant peace policy developments and/or political decisions/statements conducive to peace promotion and dialogue? - To what extent did Switzerland maximize this partnership, how and what were the results? - To what extent did Switzerland become an acknowledged actor in the region through this partnership, why and how? Relevance To the political context - To what extent has the GI been relevant to the political context of the Near East conflict? - Is the GI blueprint still realistic/implementable given the developments since it was established (settlement expansion, fragmentation of the Palestinian territory, Palestinian political division etc.) - To what extent did the GI demonstrate a capacity for innovation to the changing political context during the evaluation period? - To what extent is the GI relevant to key stakeholders in the conflict on the local, regional and international levels? o Which decision-makers and relevant political figures support the initiative in ISR and the oPt? o Which decision-makers and relevant political figures at local and international