Yalın Akçevin History of Modern China Wolf Warrior Diplomacy and Chinese Soft Power: K-Pop As a Testing Ground Increasingly In

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Yalın Akçevin History of Modern China Wolf Warrior Diplomacy and Chinese Soft Power: K-Pop As a Testing Ground Increasingly In Yalın Akçevin History of Modern China Wolf Warrior Diplomacy and Chinese Soft Power: K-Pop as a Testing Ground Increasingly in the latter half of the 20th century, authoritarianism and soft power have shown to be rather incompatible as our experiences have shown through a number of different events. In each instance, countries with authoritarian and oppressive political rulers were snubbed and denied chances – with varying degree of success – to recast themselves through the building up of their soft power. Today, the world still faces such authoritarian states and actors aiming to build up their soft power bases so as to be able to influence foreign audiences and recast their images in a better light, including the People’s Republic of China (China) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, with the opening up of a new diplomatic era of “wolf warrior diplomacy” lead by Xi Jinping and the emergence of a much more assertive, aggressive, and bellicose style of diplomacy and foreign policy, a number of questions are sure to emerge. For the purposes of this paper, two of these questions are especially important. One is the question of how this wolf warrior diplomacy will impact Chinese soft power prospects in the future and the second is the question of whether it is possible to anticipate the forms and scale of this impact through forms of soft power available to us and to China today. This is certainly no easy task, especially so because Chinese soft power is limited and there are no socio-cultural spaces created by Chinese soft power which could be analyzed for such an impact. Furthermore, if they existed it would only be possible to measure outside reaction to such spaces in the face of wolf warrior diplomacy, leaving out internal changes and community reactions to the introduction of wolf warrior style actions to their socio-cultural space. In addition, no Chinese soft power socio-cultural space could mirror the global democratic order which would be the primary target of the wolf warriors, as well as the primary reactors to their actions. However, it is possible to locate a socio-cultural space which would then act as a 1 Yalın Akçevin History of Modern China microcosm for the global democratic order over which both the impact of and reactions to wolf warrior diplomacy with regards to China’s soft power prospects can be examined and understood. The socio-cultural space in question, which I will be focusing on as part of this paper, is that of K-Pop, which could not only – as I shall discuss – act as a microcosm for the global democratic order but also is an alternative for a Chinese soft power socio-cultural space as well, since the Chinese are part of it both in its production as artists and in its consumption as a large market. Thus, in a sense, the socio-cultural space around K-Pop is a hybrid that would allow for us to examine the different pulls and impacts of different actors, and most importantly those of China and the CCP, and the global democratic order. As such, this paper will aim to use the socio-cultural space of K-Pop as a microcosm for the global democratic order and discuss the apparent and possible effects of wolf warrior diplomacy on Chinese soft power prospects, through the insights gained from an examination of Chinese participation in the socio-cultural space around K-Pop. To this end, I will be asking the question of how can the effects of wolf warrior diplomacy be on Chinese soft power be understood through an analysis of Chinese reactions to and participation in the global and democratic socio-cultural space of K-Pop. I will be arguing, that the adoption of the wolf warrior diplomacy, both by the Chinese state which reacts to K-Pop socio-cultural space and the Chinese K-Pop idols – who are performing in an increasingly global and democratic socio-cultural space – will result in the decline of both Chinese participation in this socio-cultural space and damage Chinese soft power prospects at large. By pursuing such a point, this paper will begin laying down the groundwork for discussion about wolf warrior diplomacy and soft power dynamics in the Chinese context, opening the way for more in-depth and sophisticated discussion on the state of Chinese soft power under and as managed by wolf warrior diplomats. 2 Yalın Akçevin History of Modern China The paper will be divided into three sections, geared towards exploring the key elements and topics with an eye for connections and impacts on one another. The first section will begin by exploring the state of Chinese soft power today, especially focusing on its sources and its current state of success, aiming to better understand the position of the CCP on the question of soft power and provide the contextual grounds for the ensuing discussion. The second section focuses on the wolf warrior diplomacy itself, with an eye for both what this new diplomatic style espoused by Beijing is and what its implications are with regards to the generation and maintenance of soft power. The third section will then turn towards a brief discussion of K-Pop in terms of the socio-cultural space it provides for the Chinese to react to and act within, keeping a particular focus on what aspects of this space might become problematic when met with wolf warrior diplomacy. After providing an overview, this section will then deal with brief case studies of three incidents where a clash between the Chinese and K-Pop’s socio-cultural space can be understood in the context of wolf warrior diplomacy. Chinese Soft Power in the 21st Century The CCP’s quest to build soft power has been an ongoing process – which one can stretch all the way back to 1949 by classifying propaganda pieces as an attempt to build up soft power – that has been especially pointed and accelerated with the turn of the twenty first century. The need to build up China’s prestige and soft power was recognized by Hu Jintao, who bemoaned the poor state of China’s soft power bases and called for the building up and expansion of the country’s soft power capabilities and structures.1 Thus, the leadership circles of the CCP have long been aware of the weakness of Chinese soft power and the – strategic – need to build it up 1 Nigel Inkster. "Chinese culture and soft power." Survival 60.3 (2018): 65.; David Shambaugh. "China's soft-power push: The search for respect." Foreign Affairs (2015) 94.4: 99.; Jacques deLisle. "Foreign Policy through Other Means: Hard Power, Soft Power, and China's Turn to Political Warfare to Influence the United States." Orbis (2020): 183. 3 Yalın Akçevin History of Modern China to a level that could compete with other powers, among which the US is a particularly strong benchmark to match and overtake. Furthermore, the CCP and the Chinese intellectuals who are working on the concept of soft power have come to formulate for themselves a specific conceptualization of soft power, which guides China’s policy choices and actions. In this view, soft power is conceptualized in terms of culture, which leaves other considerations such as political systems and policy choices as a minority opinion, and brings about a reframing of actions and policy so as to promote Chinese culture and then evaluate progress in terms of success of such promotion.2 This in itself brings forwards certain differences in which the CCP’s quest for a soft power is constructed different than that of its foreign counterparts. From the outset, this cultural approach presents for the CCP the challenge of defining what the Chinese culture and values it will officially sanction, cultivate, and promote across the globe for an international audience to consume. Thus, it allows for the creation of a “Chinese culture” which is hand-crafted to serve the prestige and soft power needs of the state.3 Such a purposefully constructed culture, might not only appear artificial when observed by a foreign audience but can also be full of loopholes and contradictions, as such selectively picked components across a nation’s history and culture might not sit well together. In the case of China, it can be observed that – in the absence of a contemporary and ideological foundation, as compared to an abundance of traditional sources – the construction of this soft power oriented Chinese culture borrows heavily from the traditions of Confucianism, Taoism, and Mozi among others.4 More specifically, this constructed culture is based on the ideas of “Harmony, “The 2 Wu You. "The rise of China with cultural soft power in the age of globalization." Journal of Literature and Art Studies 8.5 (2018): 764.; Bonnie S. Glaser, and Melissa E. Murphy. "Soft power with Chinese characteristics." Chinese soft power and its implications for the United States (2009): 10, 13, 16, 17. 3 Inkster, “Chinese Culture”, p. 67 4 Inkster, “Chinese Culture”, p. 68; Glaser and Melissa, “Chinese Characteristics”, p. 15 4 Yalın Akçevin History of Modern China Golden Mean”, and “Propriety” which are placed on a pedestal as the timeless essence of Chinese culture, which would now earn China its deserved soft power.5 What is being stressed here is not necessarily unpalatable to the outside observer, however, the context from which they spring and the manner in which they are pushed is problematic. This constructed Chinese culture, at the hands of the CCP which wields it, becomes a tool of justifying the form of authoritarianism and oppression with which the party has maintained its grip over China.
Recommended publications
  • The Rise and Fall of the Wolf Warriors
    THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WOLF WARRIORS Yun Jiang N 2020, the usually polite and us ‘chequebook diplomacy’ (aid Iconservative diplomats from the and investment to gain diplomatic People’s Republic of China (PRC) recognition vis-à-vis Taiwan) and attracted attention around the world ‘panda diplomacy’ (sending pandas to for breaking form. ‘Wolf warrior build goodwill). diplomacy’ is a term used to describe Wolf Warrior 战狼 was a popular the newly assertive and combative Chinese film released in 2015. It was style of Chinese diplomats, in action followed by a sequel, Wolf Warrior 2, as well as rhetoric. It is not the only which became the highest-grossing diplomacy-related term that China film in Chinese box office history. They became famous for this year; there were both aggressively nationalistic was also ‘mask diplomacy’ (the films, comparable with Hollywood’s shipment of medical goods to build Rambo, portraying the Chinese hero goodwill) and ‘hostage diplomacy’ as someone who saves his compatriots (the detention of foreign citizens in and others from international China to gain leverage over another ‘bad guys’, including American country). Previous years brought mercenaries. The tagline of both films 34 powerful counter-attack only when 35 being attacked’ is more like Kung Fu Panda, while wolf warrior diplomacy is more of a ‘US trait’.1 However it is characterised, the way Chinese diplomats operate reflects the attitude to diplomacy and foreign affairs of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The discretionary The Rise and Fall of the Wolf Warriors The Rise and Fall of the Wolf Yun Jiang power of even the top foreign policy bureaucrats and diplomats is relatively CRISIS limited in the Chinese system.
    [Show full text]
  • When Does Online Public Diplomacy Succeed? Evidence from China's 'Wolf Warrior' Diplomats
    When Does Online Public Diplomacy Succeed? Evidence from China’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomats Daniel C. Mattingly* and James Sundquist† July 29, 2021 Word Count: 3,994 Abstract Diplomats worldwide have adopted digital technologies as tools of public diplomacy. How does online public diplomacy shape global public opinion? In this letter, we theorize that positive public diplomacy that emphasizes aid and friendship works, even in the context of escalating real-world conflict. However, we argue that negative messages from diplomats that criticize ri- vals can backfire. We conduct an experiment, to our knowledge the first of its kind, that randomly exposes Indian citizens to real Twitter messages from Chinese diplomats just before and after a deadly border confrontation. We find that positive messages emphasizing aid and friendship improve perceptions of China, but that negative “Wolf Warrior” messages backfire, particularly after conflict escalation. We conclude that public diplomacy that touts aid can be a useful but limited tool for a rising power like China. *Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Yale University. †Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, Yale University. 1 Introduction In international relations, public opinion matters. Popular support can pressure demo- cratic governments — and even some autocrats (Weeks, 2012) — to agree to join military alliances (Goldsmith and Horiuchi, 2012), to open their markets (Milner and Tingley, 2011), to host military bases (Cooley, 2012), and to deescalate conflict (Kertzer, Brutger and Quek, 2019). On the other hand, hostile foreign opinion can lead to balancing, trade friction, and conflict spirals. In an attempt to shape global public opinion, governments around the world invest sig- nificant sums in public diplomacy.
    [Show full text]
  • China's BRI Diplomacy: What It Means to India and India's Rise
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Panda, Jagannath P. Working Paper China's BRI diplomacy: What it means to India and India's rise Ordnungspolitische Diskurse, No. 2021-12 Provided in Cooperation with: OrdnungsPolitisches Portal (OPO) Suggested Citation: Panda, Jagannath P. (2021) : China's BRI diplomacy: What it means to India and India's rise, Ordnungspolitische Diskurse, No. 2021-12, OrdnungsPolitisches Portal (OPO), Erfurt This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/235511 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Jagannath Panda China’s BRI Diplomacy: What It Means to India and India’s Rise Diskurs 2021 - 12 China’s BRI Diplomacy: What It Means to India and India’s Rise Jagannath Panda Abstract Despite the political differences, China and India are in an interdependent trade relationship.
    [Show full text]
  • Economy and Diplomacy: China's Two Challenges in the Post-COVID-19
    Éditoriaux de l’Ifri Lettre du Centre Asie 82 19 May 2020 Economy and Diplomacy: China’s Two Challenges in the Post-COVID-19 World Will China Rise Stronger from the Pandemic? Marc Julienne is Research Fellow, Head Marc JULIENNE of China Research at Ifri’s Center for Asian Studies A flow of media reports and op-eds have recently flourished, forecasting the decline of the West and the triumph of China on the world stage amid the The opinions expressed in COVID-19 pandemic. Some have declared the dawn of a “post-Western this text are the responsibility of the world”. China has been promoting its narrative of its own absolute success, author alone. while blaming the West for the poor management of the crisis. The US administration is fighting back against Beijing, with no restraint on ISBN : 979-10-373-0177-2 disinformation, motivated in large part by domestic electoral politics. © Tous droits réservés, Amid this battle of narratives, a cool-headed reflection on the aftermath of Paris, Ifri, 2020. the crisis is a challenge. To this aim, it is important to distinguish between two dimensions of the COVID-19 crisis. First is the management of the How to quote this health crisis itself; how to contain the virus, so to speak. On this dimension, document : China took impressive and efficient measures, notwithstanding the delayed Marc Julienne, « Economy and response and the political tightening of the population, civil servants as Diplomacy: China’s well as scientists. Two Challenges in the Post-COVID-19 Second is the way states are dealing with the side effects of the crisis – World », Lettre du Centre Asie, n° 82, economic, social, political – which in most cases are much worse than the Ifri, 19 May 2020.
    [Show full text]
  • Class:-12, Political Science Notes Chapter:- 04 Alternative Centers of Power DATE:- 8/07/21 European Union • After
    Class:-12, Political Science Notes Chapter:- 04 Alternative Centers of Power DATE:- 8/07/21 European Union • After the end of the Second World War, there was a dilemma among many European leaders over the status of Europe. • The Second World War shattered the structure on which the European states had based their relations. • The Cold War aided the integration of Europe after 1945. The European economy was revived by the extensive financial support by USA under the ‘Marshall Plan’. • The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1948 to channel aid to the West European states. Another step forward in political cooperation was the establishment of the council of Europe in 1949. • The disintegration of USSR led to the formation of European Union in 1992 which laid the foundation for a common foreign and security policy, cooperation on justice and creation of a single currency. • The European Union has evolved over time from an economic union to an increasingly political one. • The European Union has economic, political, diplomatic and military influence. • Economically, the European Union is the world’s biggest economy. It had a GDP of more than $12 trillion in 2005. Its currency Euro, can pose a threat to the dominance of the US dollar. • On the political and diplomatic ground, Britain and France, the two members of EU are permanent members of the UN Security Council. • In the defence field, the European Union’s combined armed forces are the second largest in the world. Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN] • Before and during the Second World War, the South East Asia suffered a lot from repeated colonialism i.e.
    [Show full text]
  • Emerging Powers and Emerging Trends in Global Governance
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Stephen, Matthew D. Article — Accepted Manuscript (Postprint) Emerging Powers and Emerging Trends in Global Governance Global Governance Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Stephen, Matthew D. (2017) : Emerging Powers and Emerging Trends in Global Governance, Global Governance, ISSN 1942-6720, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, Vol. 23, Iss. 3, pp. 483-502, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02303009 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/215866 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu This article was published by Brill in Global Governance, Vol. 23 (2017), Iss. 3, pp. 483–502 (2017/08/19): https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02303009.
    [Show full text]
  • Remembering George Kennan Does Not Mean Idolizing Him
    UNITED STATES InsTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org SPECIAL REPORT 1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPORT Melvyn P. Leffler This report originated while Melvyn P. Leffler was a Jennings Randolph Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. He was writing his book on what appeared to be the most intractable and ominous conflict of the post–World War II era—the Cold War. He was addressing the questions of why the Cold War lasted as long as it did and why it ended when Remembering it did. As part of the ongoing dialogue at the United States Institute of Peace, he was repeatedly asked about the lessons of the Cold War for our contemporary problems. George Kennan His attention was drawn to the career of George F. Kennan, the father of containment. Kennan was a rather obscure and frustrated foreign service officer at the U.S. embassy in Lessons for Today? Moscow when his “Long Telegram” of February 1946 gained the attention of policymakers in Washington and transformed his career. Leffler reviews Kennan’s legacy and ponders the implications of his thinking for the contemporary era. Is it Summary possible, Leffler wonders, to reconcile Kennan’s legacy with the newfound emphasis on a “democratic peace”? • Kennan’s thinking and policy prescriptions evolved quickly from the time he wrote the Melvyn P. Leffler, a former senior fellow at the United States “Long Telegram” in February 1946 until the time he delivered the Walgreen Lectures Institute of Peace, won the Bancroft Prize for his book at the University of Chicago in 1950.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Governance 2025: at a Critical Juncture
    Global Governance 2025: at a Critical Juncture NIC 2010-08 September 2010 This page was intentionally left blank. This page was intentionally left blank. Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture Inquiries regarding this report may be made to Mathew Burrows, Counselor to the National Intelligence Council, on (703) 482-0741 and to the EU Institute of Security Studies on 0033-1-56-89-19-51. NIC 2010-08 September 2010 This page was intentionally left blank. Preface The United States’ National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) have joined forces to produce this assessment of the long-term prospects for global governance frameworks. This exercise builds on the experience of the two institutions in identifying the key trends shaping the future international system. Since the mid 1990s, the NIC has produced four editions of its landmark Global Trends report. The most recent one, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, published in late 2008, noted that momentous change was ahead, with the gap between increasing disorder and weakening governance structures widening. The EUISS produced the first EU-level report on the factors affecting the evolution of the international system in 2006, The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025? The report stressed that a multipolar system is emerging and that matching the new distribution of power with new rules and institutions will be critical to preserving international peace and stability. The US and the EU do not always see eye to eye on every issue on the international agenda, but they share fundamental values and strategic interests to an extent not matched by any other partners in the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Turn to Eurasia
    CSS Policy Perspectives ETH Zurich Vol. 6/5, August 2018 Russia’s Turn to Eurasia Russian efforts to integrate some post-Soviet states into the common framework of the Eurasian Economic Union could have a lasting impact—Europe should take note. By Jeronim Perović oscow’s failure to make Ukraine part of its Eurasian economic, political and military weight in order to influ- Meconomic integration project was a severe blow to ence developments in its neighborhood. It was only from Russian foreign policy ambitions. Notwithstanding the early 2000s onwards that Russia’s position in the re- Ukraine’s turn to the West, however, Russia has continued gion was destabilizing, as Western states and organizations its integration efforts in the post-Soviet space, resulting in began to make inroads. The Baltic states became NATO the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union members in 2004, the first oil and gas pipelines circum- (EAEU) in 2015. The EAEU’s overall economic perfor- venting Russian territory were built with the help of for- mance has been modest so far, and the organization, con- eign companies, and China started to expand economically sisting of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyr- into Central Asia. gyzstan, has a long way to go before it achieves its goal of Moscow’s decision to push for regional economic forming an EU-style internal market with free movement integration was a reaction to these processes. So far, Mos- of goods, services, people and capital. But there have been cow’s primary interest has not been in the economic side of tangible achievements in various sectors, and ambitions for integration (after all, trade with EAEU members accounts the future are high.
    [Show full text]
  • Wolf Warrior Diplomacy : US – China Alaska Meet
    Wolf Warrior Diplomacy : US – China Alaska Meet March 30, 2021 The heated public encounter between Chinese and US diplomats at their first meeting since President Joe Biden came to office provides a measure of impending turbulence that will likely increase with time. It is seen as a manifestation of a newly combative and unapologetic Beijing, signalling a more confrontational and confident China. In news: China’s aggressive stance at Alaska meet suggests more confrontational posture in future Placing it in syllabus: Foreign Affairs Dimensions Interests and Differences between the two countries Chinese Diplomat Response: wolf Warrior Diplomacy Wolf Warrior Diplomacy Impact of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy Content: Interests and Differences between the two countries The meeting in Anchorage, Alaska was the first high- level meeting between the two countries under the administration of President Joe Biden, and came after more than two years of rocky relations between the two countries. The US Side expressed deep concerns with actions by China, including in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, cyberattacks on the United States, economic coercion toward our allies. Each of these actions threaten the rules-based order that maintains global stability. Chinese diplomats accused the United States of exercising long jurisdiction and suppression and over stretching regional issues. They asserted that the United States itself does not represent international public opinion and neither does the Western world. The U.S. does not represent the world. It only represents the government of the United States. They said that the United States needs to change its own image and to stop advancing its own democracy in the rest of the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Harvardasia Quarterly
    FALL 2012, Vol. XIV, No. 3 Harvard Asia Quarterly A Journal of Current Affairs Affiliated with the Harvard University Asia Center INSIDE: South Asian Perspectives in the Modern Context JHUMA SEN · The Trial of Errors in Bangladesh: The ICTA and the 1971 Interview: TARUN KHANNA · On India, China, and Innovation War Crimes Trial SANGEETA MEDIRATTA · The Affair of the Greased Cartridge: Traveling EMILIAN kavaLSKI · “Brand India” or “Pax Indica”? The Myth of Stories, Unraveling Empires, and the Sepoy Revolt of 1857 Assertive Posturing in India’s Post-1998 Foreign Policy Making SUVOBRATA SARKAR · Colonization, Technical Education, and the SHAMSUL KHAN · Middle Powers and the Dynamics of Power Shift: Bengali Bhadralok: Studies on the Politics of Knowledge, 1856-1905 Conceptualizing the Economics and Geopolitical Implications of Pax Sinica rao IMRAN HABIB & MAHDI ZAHRAA · Judicial Independence in DOUGLAS HILL · Alternative Institutional Arrangements: Managing Pakistan: A Brief Historical Account Transboundary Water Resources in South Asia Harvard Asia Quarterly FALL 2012, Vol. XIV, No. 3 EDIToR-IN-chief Allan Hsiao AREA EDIToRS China AREA Head Editor: Rui Guo Huiyi Chen Michael Chenkin oliver Kerr Florin-Stefan Morar Hannah Waight Japan AREA Head Editor: Rebecca Tompkins Alissa Murray Danica Truscott Valerie Zinner KoREA AREA Head Editor: Keung Yoon Bae Russell Burge Inga Diederich Justin Thomas SoUTH/SoUTHEAST ASIA AREA Head Editors: Erum Sattar, Jonathan Lim Leandro Angelo Y. Aguirre Jesusa Arellano-Aguda Pawat Satayanurug Ying Xia The Harvard Asia Quarterly is a journal of current affairs affiliated with the Harvard University Asia Center. LETTER FRoM THE EDIToR Dear Reader, The current edition of the Harvard Asia Quarterly represents a collection of perspectives on the issues facing South Asian society today.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Policy Research Institute
    Foreign Policy Research Institute FOOTNOTES Vol. 12, No. 5 The Newsletter of the Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education February 2007 CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY by June Teufel Dreyer June Teufel Dreyer is professor of political science at the University of warming of relations with the USSR. This had the advantage Miami and an FPRI senior fellow. This presentation was made of allowing China to play one of these powers off against the at FPRI’s Understanding China A History Institute for Teachers, other, doing so very successfully until the disintegration of held October 21–22, 2006 at Carthage College, Kenosha, the Soviet Union in 1989. Wisconsin. The Institute was co-sponsored by the Clausen With the global balance of power now unipolar, the Chinese Center for World Business and School of Professional Studies, government felt vulnerable. Moreover, the only remaining both of Carthage College, and supported by a grant from The superpower was proving difficult to deal with. Washington Annenberg Foundation. was particularly critical of China after the 1989 Tiananmen China has had many foreign policies since the founding of incident, urging it to implement human rights protections the PRC in 1949. For its first five years, the PRC followed a and to evolve into a liberal democratic state. The U.S. then “lean to one side” policy. As explained by Chairman Mao invaded Iraq in 1991 to force it to disgorge Kuwait, albeit Zedong, this meant that “whoever is not with us”--the with approval from the UN Security Council. A reluctant socialist-communist camp--“is against us.” Then from 1955- China at first threatened to veto, arguing that Iraq‟s 57 it pursued a markedly different and much more sovereign rights were being violated, but with its Most accommodative policy.
    [Show full text]