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Algemeen Ambtsbericht Libië Van Juni 2020

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Algemeen Ambtsbericht Libië Van Juni 2020 Algemeen ambtsbericht Libië Datum Juni 2020 Pagina 1 van 81 Algemeen ambtsbericht Libië – juni 2020 Colofon Plaats Den Haag Opgesteld door Directie Sub-Sahara Afrika Afdeling Ambtsberichten (DAF/AB) Pagina 2 van 81 Algemeen ambtsbericht Libië – juni 2020 Inhoudsopgave Colofon ..........................................................................................................2 Inhoudsopgave ...............................................................................................3 Inleiding .........................................................................................................5 1 Politieke situatie ......................................................................................... 7 1.1 Recente politieke ontwikkelingen .......................................................................7 2 Veiligheidssituatie ..................................................................................... 15 2.1 Algemeen ..................................................................................................... 15 2.2 Beperkingen in de bewegingsvrijheid voor burgers als gevolg van de strijd ........... 17 2.3 Burgerslachtoffers ......................................................................................... 18 2.3.1 Algemeen ..................................................................................................... 18 2.3.2 Burgerslachtoffers Tripoli en Tripolitania ........................................................... 19 2.3.3 Burgerslachtoffers Murzuq .............................................................................. 21 2.3.4 Migranten ..................................................................................................... 21 2.4 Controlegebieden en strijdende partijen ........................................................... 22 2.4.1 Algemeen ..................................................................................................... 22 2.4.2 De GNA in Tripoli ........................................................................................... 22 2.4.3 Het LNA en het HoR in Tobroek ....................................................................... 23 2.4.4 Overige controlegebieden ............................................................................... 25 2.5 Veiligheidssituatie in de provincies ................................................................... 26 2.5.1 Algemeen ..................................................................................................... 26 2.5.2 Provincie Tripolitania ...................................................................................... 26 2.5.3 Fezzan ......................................................................................................... 29 2.5.4 Cyrenaica ..................................................................................................... 30 2.5.5 Vliegvelden ................................................................................................... 32 2.5.6 Grensposten ................................................................................................. 33 2.5.7 Rekrutering .................................................................................................. 34 3 Documenten en nationaliteit ..................................................................... 36 3.1 Documenten ................................................................................................. 36 3.2 Nationaliteit .................................................................................................. 38 4 Mensenrechten .......................................................................................... 41 4.1 Algemeen ..................................................................................................... 41 4.1.1 Algemeen ..................................................................................................... 41 4.2 Toezicht en rechtsbescherming ....................................................................... 41 4.2.1 Wetgeving .................................................................................................... 42 4.2.2 Familierecht en strafrecht ............................................................................... 42 4.2.3 Bewegingsvrijheid en in- en uitreisvoorwaarden ................................................ 43 4.2.4 Aangiftes en de rol van politie ......................................................................... 43 4.2.5 Rechtsgang en situatie van arrestanten in verhoor en detentie ............................ 44 4.2.6 Bescherming burgers ..................................................................................... 46 4.3 Naleving en schending ................................................................................... 47 4.3.1 Internet en mobiele telefonie .......................................................................... 47 4.3.2 Doodstraf ..................................................................................................... 48 4.3.3 Geweld en ontvoeringen door gewapende groepen ............................................ 48 4.4 Specifieke groepen ........................................................................................ 50 4.4.1 Algemeen ..................................................................................................... 50 Pagina 3 van 81 4.4.2 Opposanten .................................................................................................. 50 4.4.3 Demonstranten ............................................................................................. 50 4.4.4 Journalisten en mensenrechtenactivisten en -advocaten ..................................... 51 4.4.5 Leden van het justitieel apparaat ..................................................................... 52 4.4.6 Afvalligen, niet fundamentalistische moslims en tot het christendom bekeerde moslims ....................................................................................................... 53 4.4.7 Personen die te maken hebben met eerwraak en bloedwraak .............................. 54 4.4.8 Qadhafi-loyalisten of vermeende Qadhafi-loyalisten ........................................... 55 4.4.9 Ibadi’s en soefi’s ........................................................................................... 56 4.4.10 Tawergha’s ................................................................................................... 57 4.4.11 Palestijnen en Syriërs .................................................................................... 58 4.4.12 Lesbiennes, Homoseksuelen, Biseksuelen, Transgenders en Interseksuelen (LHBTI) ................................................................................................................... 59 4.4.13 Vrouwen ....................................................................................................... 59 4.4.14 Minderjarigen ................................................................................................ 61 4.4.15 Libische werknemers van internationale organisaties in Libië .............................. 61 5 Ontheemden, migranten en vluchtelingen ................................................. 63 5.1 Migranten- vluchtelingen- en ontheemdenstroom .............................................. 63 5.2 Ontheemden ................................................................................................. 64 5.3 Vluchtelingen en migranten ............................................................................ 67 5.4 Terugkeer ..................................................................................................... 69 6 Bijlagen ..................................................................................................... 70 6.1 Gebruikte openbare bronnen ........................................................................... 70 6.2 Lijst van afkortingen ...................................................................................... 79 6.3 Kaart van Libië .............................................................................................. 81 Pagina 4 van 81 Algemeen ambtsbericht Libië – juni 2020 Inleiding Dit ambtsbericht is opgesteld aan de hand van de gestelde vragen en genoemde aandachtspunten in de Terms of Reference (ToR) van het Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid van 18 december 2019. Een geanonimiseerde versie van deze ToR is tezamen met het ambtsbericht gepubliceerd op de website van de rijksoverheid. In dit algemeen ambtsbericht wordt de situatie in Libië beschreven voor zover deze van belang is voor de beoordeling van asielaanvragen van personen die afkomstig zijn uit dit land en voor de besluitvorming over terugkeer van afgewezen Libische asielzoekers. Dit ambtsbericht is een actualisering van het algemeen ambtsbericht Libië van april 2019. De verslagperiode beslaat de periode april 2019 tot en met mei 2020. Dit ambtsbericht betreft een feitelijke, neutrale en objectieve weergave van de bevindingen gedurende de onderzochte periode en biedt geen beleidsaanbevelingen. Dit ambtsbericht is opgesteld aan de hand van openbare en vertrouwelijke bronnen waarbij gebruik is gemaakt van zorgvuldig geselecteerde, geanalyseerde en gecontroleerde informatie. Bij de opstelling is onder meer gebruik gemaakt van informatie van niet-gouvernementele organisaties, vakliteratuur, berichtgeving in de media en relevante overheidsinstanties. De passages in dit ambtsbericht berusten op meerdere bronnen, tenzij anders vermeld of in het
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