The development and functions of the army in new Spain, 1760-1798 Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Peloso, Vincent C. Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 23/09/2021 10:56:36 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/319751 THE DEVEIOPMENT AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY IN NEW SPAIN, 1760-1798 Vincent Peloso A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 1 9 6 5 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduc­ tion of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of schol­ arship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author. SIGNED: APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR This thesis has been approved on the date shown below: • >SELL C. EWI Date Professor of Hisstory TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page Io INTRQLU CTION eo»*eeaoe6*oeee®eeeooooo 1 II. NEW SPAIN AND THE LOUISIANA FRONTIER,, 1760-1798: ILLUSIONS AND REALITIES OF CONFLICT . ............ 3 III. EFFECTS OF POLITICAL CONFLICT OVER NORTHERN INDIAN WARFARE UPON MILITARY REFORM IN NEW SPAIN, 1760-1783 ....... ho IV. NORTHERN INDIAN WARFARE AND THE RENEWAL OF VICEREGAL MILITARY POWER: 1783-1798 ................ 72 SUMMARY . oooeeoooooooooooooeeooeooo89 APPENDIX . oeooooeoooeeoooooeoooooooo92 BIBLIOGRAPHY oooQooooooooaeooooooooo 93 ill ABSTRACT Spain’s efforts to retain her empire in the latter half of the eighteenth century caused notable revisions in her colonial policies which came in part from unjustified fears in Madrid, New Orleans and Mexico City of enemy political designs upon the colonies of Louisiana and New Spain* These changes took form in New Spain most dramatically in the creation of a colonial arny. The army came into being ostensibly to protect the colony from English military invasion through Veracruz after the Seven Years War, American invasion of and through Louisiana after the American revolu­ tion, and American and British invasion after the French revolution* Consequently, the military forces, raised largely among the colonials, were, dispersed throughout the realm and even in the vulnerable northern borderlands* Instead of repelling foreigners, however, the army grappled with nomadic hostile Indians who wanted booty, sustenance and ammunition from Spanish towns and haciendas, and who refused to retire to sedentary living. The Indians in the borderlands thus formed a genuine opposition to local military and religious aims* Ineffective as it was, the army became a tool of the crown to block threats to its political power, then a device to thwart the potential power of New Spain’s viceroys, and finally an instrument by which the viceroys themselves concentrated their power despite the efforts of the Spanish kings* Through it all the army increased steadily in size so that where it had stood at a mere cadre of about iv lf>00 professional soldiers in 175»8, it rose to a formidable corporative body of 32,000 amateurs and professionals by 1798. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Evidently the ideas of ’’enlightened despotism” penetrated Spain at least with the crowning of her third Bourbon king, Charles III. Indeed, reforms were attempted in all spheres of Spanish domestic life, for the vigorous and austere king worked hard to lift the country out of the morass of control by private corporations and the nobility5 in a sense, he worked to put the king back on the throne o His grandiose hopes included bringing Spain back to the eminent European position from which she had gradually fallen since the six­ teenth centuryo To do this he was forced to contend with England, a douhtry -which had earned his undying enmity when he was the Prince of Naples in 1739» Meanwhile, by the implications of the treaty ending t:hd War of Spanish Succession in Ehrope, Spain was politically related, to Prance, and the tie was formally sealed in two agreements before 175>9<> Charles would not, or could, not, easily' hreak the strongest, link in his opposition to; Great Britain* ; . In the imperial sphere, the reforms characterizing ’’enlighten­ ing, despotism’’ meant -ip' part that the American colonies had to be brdu'ght once more under the sway of Spain after the long hiatus of economic control through various means by foreign merchants* At the same time, the colonies were permitted freer, 'trade among themselves" and. with the mother country to win the favor of their most powerful citi­ zens * Internally they also faced reforms, among which was the notion that citizen soldiers with their informal approach to military life could no longer suffice as the needed source of power upon which the king could rely; for citizen soldiers did not take military life seri­ ously, or were satisfied merely to take advantage of its benefitso When he turned to the colony of New Spain, however, Charles III faced the fearsome prospect that the army could become a power base for the viceroy, for whatever purposeo Consequently, while he assumed that an army was a necessity in New Spain for defense against foreign rivals as well as internal threats to his power, Charles III did not want it turned against himself« The working out of these assumptions and aims of regal policy with reference to Louisiana and New Spain are consid­ ered in this essay in light of their implications for the growth of an army in New Spain, 1760-17980 CHAPTER II N W SPAIN AND THE LOUISIANA FRONTIER, 1760-1798: ILLUSIONS AND REALITIES OF CONFLICT Near the close of the Seven Years War the Duke of Choiseul, France's foreign minister, began to devise a scheme to win a decent peace from England with minimal losses to France s One way to soften the blow was to divert England's attention to Spain and her colonial possessions by somehow inducing Spain to enter the war® Charles III was urged by his own ministers and Choiseul to enter the conflict, but he hesitatede England solved Choiseul's problem by capturing Havana in May, 1762, forcing Charles III to act upon the renewed Family Compact, a reciprocal guarantee of aid in case of war= Through this compact, Spain had become the owner of western Louisiana, though in the peace of 1763 she lost the Floridas to - Great Britain® The shift of Louisiana to Spain created more problems that it solved® At the end of the war Charles III decided to reform his colon­ ial armies in New Spain, swelling the professional ranks with militia­ men® For the future Louisiana raised the possibility of an imperial war, but for the present Louisiana raised economic problems for Spain® Though in the 1760s Spaniards did not control the fur trade directly in the new colony, nevertheless French trappers kept their English compet­ itors out and consequently kept them from contacting the Indians in the Red River area and southward, Indians whom Spanish missionaries wanted to convert and with whom secular administrators wanted to trade® In the 1770s western American immigrants clamored increasingly for use or control of New Orleans mostly because of their frustration over lack of convenient markets for their furs* These cries opened up the possibili­ ty of American trespass upon Arkansas and Texas5 with the consequent disturbance of the delicate Indian relations which Spain retained there and in other border provinces * Spanish ownership of Louisiana was thus gradually tied to the problem of military reform in New Spain, for the militia placed in the borderlands were needed to keep the Indians sep­ arate from English and American traders, to protect the provinces from filibustering expeditions, and to create a monopoly of the Indian trade in the'sparsely settled northern provinces0 Before the late 1760s, the need to defend Mexico from an attack by sea through Veracruz or Acapulco had,filled the thoughts of Spanish authorities, primarily because it had proved difficult to distinguish piratical raids from conquering expeditions Certainly in 1760 there was still reason to assume that a foreign power might attempt to take advantage of the weak defenses in the Caribbean» England held several islands in the lesser Antilles from which South Sea Company ships abused the asiento by trading on Spanish coasts0 French contrabandists from Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Santo Domingo competed in these illic­ it operations and the very same bases might, in Spanish eyes, serve as points for both powers to launch military expeditions against New Spain, Furthermore, French ambassadors in Madrid, such as the Marquis d ’Ossun, 1„ Peter Gerhard, Pirates on the West Coast of New Spain (Glen­ dale: The Arthur He Clark Co,, I960), 139-Hs.l, 231i,-237| Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (London: Frank Cass Company, 1963), & 6 - & 9 o : ; ; stressed the notion that Spain might soon have to oppose English ag­ gression in the Western Hemisphere, and Charles III seemed willing to listen to these arguments despite the pro-English sympathies of his 2 foreign minister.