United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Iraq/Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons Learned
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United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Iraq/Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons Learned INTERVIEW #173 Interviewed by: Marilyn Greene Interview date: June 24, 2011 Copyright 2011 USIP & ADST INTERVIEW SYNOPSIS Participant’s Understanding of the PRT Mission The interviewee, who previously served in Afghanistan as a USAID implementing partner in Helmand province in 2007 and as a USAID officer on a PRT in Ghazni province from 2008 to 2009, most recently served on a PRT in Wardak province in 2010. The interviewee saw mission of the PRT to provide stabilization and development activities in preparation for transition to Afghan governance. Relationship with Local Nationals Observations: Afghan local deputies were invaluable, introducing him to locals concerned with USAID projects. Afghan National Development Strategy priorities were at times in conflict with U.S. priorities. Current Afghan leadership determines the leanings of a province. In Ghazni, it is difficult to know who is really in control or whether PRT programs are effective. In Wardak, an effective governor helps the military. Insights: As required by the U.S., Afghans had to contribute a percentage of a project’s value in money or in-kind services. Sometimes they went above this on their own. If one team said no, Afghans went from to another, looking for answers they wanted. Having Afghans come to the base put them in a situation of possible danger and retribution. However, that often worked better, in this kinetic environment, than U.S. civilians going out. Lessons: Partner with local Afghans on projects. Did the PRT Achieve its Mission? (Impact) Observations: Success is difficult to gauge. A program to form a farmers’ cooperative and to export apples from Wardak province to India and Dubai was launched and continues today. Insights: PRT tours are not long enough, since it takes months to become acclimatized, months to set up programs and more time to see them through. Also, the frequent movement of local officials leads to instability. 1 Lessons: Freedom of movement is an important element of success. Longer terms of duty – for both PRT teams and local officials -- enhance continuity and sustainability. Overall Strategy for Accomplishing the PRT Mission (Planning) Observations: Weekly meetings were held so that all team elements were aware of what was going on. Insights: True coordination was elusive, as each element of the PRT had individual priorities. The military was over-interested in spending money and short-term measurability. Lessons: Be transparent with colleagues on what you are doing. Realize we cannot do everything the Afghans would like us to do. What Worked Well and What Did Not? (Operations) Observations: There was no hand-off to a successor. Insights: Lack of contact with incoming team left gaps in knowledge and continuity of programs. High and frequent team turnover undermines long-term achievement. Lessons: In pre-deployment training, pair up people who are going to the same destination, so they are familiar with each other in advance. Train civilians with their military unit when possible. Arrange for adequate handover in the field. Stagger departures; team arrivals and departures should be tied to the Afghan seasons (for example, do not switch staff at the start of the annual fighting season or around long holidays.) Send people with appropriate skill sets for the job, noting that stabilization expertise is distinct from development expertise. Every activity should be small enough to monitor and measure. THE INTERVIEW Q. Can you tell me how long have you been there and when you will be coming back? A. I started in Afghanistan in July of 2007 in Helmand province, in southern Afghanistan. In 2008 I was a PRT officer for USAID in Ghazni province in the southeast. I was there for a year. Then in 2009-2010 I was a PRT officer in Wardak province, just southwest of Kabul, the capital. Q. So you’ve worked in several capacities on more than one PRT. Could you try to generalize all of your experiences when answering these questions? What was your understanding of the missions of these PRTs? A. My sense of the mission was to provide stabilization and development activities to areas that myself, as a civilian, and the military colleagues that I worked with deemed it was necessary; the 2 strategic areas, to make sure we could stabilize those areas so that Afghan governance could extend to those areas. Q. Were most of them equally secure or insecure? Or was there a difference in how you could operate physically? A. Sure, in all three locations the area that the PRT was located in was sort of like the capital city of the province and those areas were where we focused most of our efforts. And so a place like Helmand which had—some were very far off, just you really couldn’t pay attention to any of those far off districts at that time—then again this was 2007 when the Iraq War was very much the focus. In 2008 we focused on a few districts along the major highway, which is Highway 1. In Wardak we only really focused on the areas that were considered key. They were called higher-priority, and were the districts mainly along Highway 1. We tended to ignore the farther-away westernmost districts. We really focused on the areas that were capital cities and surrounding that. Q. Were you the USAID person in all three situations? A. In 2007 I was the implementing partner for USAID and when I was at the PRT in Ghazni and Wardak I was the USAID civilian. Q. What kind of relationships and interactions did you have with local nationals? A. I had local deputies in those locations—who’d I’d call my deputies or program officers—and he was invaluable he really introduced me to a lot of the locals folks that our projects worked with or impacted. Whenever we went out to survey a site or look at a project that was ongoing or completed, he made sure that were a number of beneficiaries or Afghans that were there that we could speak to. How often, that varies, but we tried to get out maybe three to four times a week. Q. Did you have to travel with convoy? A. That’s correct, a military convoy at all times. Q. How did you find the Afghans? Did you feel that they had goals in line the U.S. Government goals in working with them? A. Not really. The Afghans we worked with, the government, had their Afghan National Development Strategy, so those were their priority and sometimes it was in conflict with what we thought were priorities. It’s a little tough sometimes because what they think is a priority we think is a wish list of projects that they want. So it was sometimes difficult determine whether their Afghan national priorities jived with our U.S. priorities and just trying to clear all that up. It was a little tough to do, tough to defend. Q. Where there some agreements involved when you did a project with them? Was there a promise of contribution by the Afghans? 3 A. Yes, for some of our USAID projects we mandated a commitment, like a 10 percent of project value buy-in. If the project cost $1,000 they would have provided $100 worth of either labor or something to buy into it. What we tried to do then was if the community was happy with what we did, we upped the percentage. The first time I did 10 percent, the next time we would have said, “Okay, well how about 15 percent?” In some cases it worked, in some cases it didn’t, in some cases we would mandate 10 percent of the work done and they were so excited about doing the work that they would actually do more. On their own—they would do it themselves. In all places it varied. In some places if we explained it was to build jobs, they could not provide 10 percent of labor cost. Q. Did you hand off some of these programs in the end? A. In one particular program yes, we did. It was with the export of apples from Wardak province to Dubai and India to help to form a cooperative of the farmers in the area and we got them registered with the Ministry of Agriculture and they’re continuing to export apples today, on their own, and so that’s a good thing. In other cases it’s a little difficult to hand things over. Q. What would have helped to make your interactions with the Afghans more productive or easier for you? A. Because it’s the war zone it’s tough to tell, because every move that we had to make had to go with the military -- whether to the governor’s office, which was maybe 500 kilometers, or to a distance 20-30 kilometers away. Sometimes we would tell Afghans, “Please come to the base" because it was a lot easier for them to come to the base than for us to see them. I’m not sure what obstacle that created for them because that certainly would’ve made them a security threat, as they would be seen by others as associated with the PRT. So looking back now it really would’ve been nice to have a little more freedom of movement for the civilians to get out more and talk to the Afghans about the projects and some of their ideas. When you’re a civilian and you’re living on a base, and everything is controlled by the military on the base, you sort of fall in line and just say, “Okay,” and move with the military.