The American Liberty League, 1934-1940 Author(S): Frederick Rudolph Source: the American Historical Review, Vol

Home , American Liberty League

The American Liberty League, 1934-1940 Author(s): Frederick Rudolph Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Oct., 1950), pp. 19-33 Published by: American Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1840619 Accessed: 06/07/2010 21:45

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aha.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

American Historical Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review.

http://www.jstor.org The AmericanLiberty League, 1934-1940

FREDERICK RUDOLPH

IN March,1934, the New Deal was a yearold. The economiccollapse which had provokedit and the confusedbut determinedactivities of the New Deal had become,by then,profoundly disturbing to men whosegods wereAdam Smith and HerbertSpencer. For them both the depressionand Franklin Roosevelt'ssolutions contained unwholesome quantities of uncertaintyand change. Correspondence,reflecting despair and anger, flowed from one citadelof economicpower to another,most of it destinedto remainin the privatefiles for which it was intended.Some of it, however,found its way into the chambersof Congressand eventuallyinto the public press.There the anguish of what has come to be called the AmericanWay was from time to time documentedand recorded.Of such a characterwas the ex- change of lettersbetween the Du Pont Building in Wilmingtonand the Empire State Building in New York in March, 1934, betweenR. R. M. Carpenter,a retiredDu Pont vice-president,and JohnJ. Raskob, a retired chairmanof the Democraticparty but a stillactive vice-president of the Du Pontorganization. "Five negroeson myplace in South Carolinarefused work this spring. . . sayingthey had easy jobs withthe government,"Carpenter wrote. "A cook on mryhouseboat at Fort Myersquit becausethe government was payinghim a dollar an hour as a painter."What Mr. Carpenterasked of Mr. Raskob was thathe, who mighthave the ear of thePresident for the asking,inquire of Mr. Rooseveltwhether he knew wherethe countrywas going; his own experiences,at his place in South Carolina and on his houseboatin Florida, had convincedhim thatthe directionswere altogethercontrary to American promise.Mr. Raskob was inclinedto agree,but, he said, he was now out of politicsand, besides,he had a betteridea. "You haven'tmuch to do," he wroteCarpenter, "and I know of no one thatcould bettertake the lead in tryingto inducethe Du Pont and GeneralMotors groups, followed by other big industries,to definitelyorganize to protectsociety from the sufferings whichit is bound to endureif we allow communisticelements to lead the people to believethat all businessmenare crooks."Raskob went on to sug- gest thatthere was a need for"some verydefinite organization that would come out openlywith some plan foreducating the peopleto the value of encouragingpeople to work; encouragingpeople to get rich." He feltthat

I9 20 FrederickRudolph R. R. M. Carpenter,and his friendsPierre and Ireneedu Pont,were es- peciallyequipped to takeon thattask, for they were "in a positionto talk directlywith a groupthat controls a largershare of industry. . . thanany othergroup in theUnited States."1 Of suchbeginnings was theAmerican Liberty League. On AugustI5, 1934, an organizationsuch as Raskobhad contemplatedwas charteredin Washington,D.C., dedicatedto "teachthe necessity of respect for the rights ofpersons and property ... and ... theduty of government toencourage and protectindividual and groupinitiative and enterprise,to foster the right to work,earn, save and acquireproperty, and to preservethe ownership and lawfuluse of propertywhen acquired."2 And fromits birth until its death, its mostfaithful financial backers were the Du Pontand GeneralMotors groupsupon whom Raskob had counted.3 The LibertyLeague was as indigenouslyAmerican as the New Deal whichit was determined todestroy. Its unsuccessful efforts tounseat Franklin Roosevelt,its philosophy and program, the techniques which it usedin order to surviveas longas it did-theseare notthe materials of an un-American movement.They are the compound of a setof emphases which, although they foundlittle support in theNew Deal, areas mucha partof the structure of Americanvalues as are thosewhich have been carried along in succeeding Democraticadministrations since 1932. The LibertyLeague representeda vigorousand well-stateddefense of nineteenthcentury individualism and liberalism,a more explicit and determinedelaboration of thatposition than willbe foundelsewhere in Americanhistory. It wasorganized at a timewhen byand large the philosophy of rugged individualism had stopped performing in Americansociety, but thatis not to saythat it had lostall function-it stillretained, for example, a stronghold upon the imaginationsof men whoseexperiences supported its promises. Although the New Deal and the historyof Americanpolitical preferences since I932 hardlyargues for the survivalof theposition which the Liberty League maintained, there was too muchof a thoroughlyAmerican character in themovement to permitthe

1 New York Times,Dec. 2I, I934. The correspondencewas disclosedduring the Nye muni- tionshearings in the Senate.When JouettShouse, president of the League, informedthe press of the formationof the organization,he disclosedthat Raskob was one of its primemovers. Ibid.,Aug. 23, I934. 2 AmericanLiberty League, AmericanLiberty League: A Statementof Its Principlesand Purposes(Washington, I934). '3 The League made periodicreports to Congresson the stateof its financesand the source of its income.These may be foundreported in the New York Times forJan. II, I935; Jan.26, I936; Mar. I7, I936; Apr. 9, I936; JuneI2, I936; Sept. I2, I936; Oct. 22, I936; Jan.8, I937; Mar. I2, I937; JuneI2, 3937; Sept. II, I937; Mar. II, I938. A studyof the reportsindicates thatthe League spentover a milliondollars; that Shouse, in I936, was the highestpaid political organizerin the UnitedStates, at a salaryof $36,ooo and $i8,ooo forexpenses; and thatof the $483,000 collectedin I935, over one thirdwas contributedby membersof the Du Pont family. The American Liberty League, I934-40 2 1 conclusionthat it was an unimportant,flash-in-the-pan combination of un- dercoverpolitical party and overtpressure group. The AmericanLiberty League was much more than that.Indeed, it symbolizedessentially old and establishedtraditions and valuescoming face to facewith new social,political, and economicfacts. In such a case, new facts,however unalterable, do not immediatelysucceed in overcomingold values. At least until now, it has been the natureof civilizedsocieties that men have complicatedtheir lives by seekingto reconcilethe irreconcilable;such, in a way, was the aim of the AmericanLiberty League. It emphasizedthe values which,by its lights,de- servedencouragement and protectionfrom new factsat whichit balked,and from certainother values in the societywhich it chose to ignore or de- emphasize. At a time when the Republicanparty was bankruptof leadershipand purpose,the AmericanLiberty League becamethe spokesmanfor a business civilization,and a defenderof that civilizationfrom the attacksof the ad- ministrationin Washingtonand of lessergroups from the rightand the left, thefollowers of FatherCoughlin, the Townsendites, the Socialists, the Share- the-Wealthmovement of Huey Long. "Businesswhich bears the responsi- bilityfor the paychecksof privateemployment has littlevoice in government,"it complainedin itsStatement of Principlesand Purposes,proceeding then to become in the mid-thirtiesthe mouthpieceof organizedAmerican conservatism.4At a time when economicdistress encouraged an increasing emphasisupon the forgottenman and the commonman, it came to the defense of the uncommonman who stood at the pinnacle-the uncommon man, whose freedomto followthe bentof his naturaltalents, unfettered by governmentregulation and control,had long been an ingrainedtenet of the Americanfaith. The rosterof itsofficers and of itschief financial contributors is a rosterof the uncommonmen of the time,the men whose ambitionsand abilitieshad been rewardedwith the success,the power,and the prestigeto whichAmericans of everybackground have been traditionallyconditioned to aspire: Irenee,Pierre, and Lammot du Pont, controllersof a vast industrial empire;Ernest T. Wier, steelman; Will L. Clayton,Texas cottonbroker; AlfredP. Sloan, presidentof GeneralMotors; Edward F. Hutton,chairman of GeneralFoods; J.Howard Pew, presidentof Sun Oil; William S. Knud- sen,also of GeneralMotors; Joseph E. Widener,Philadelphia transportation magnate;Sewell L. Averyof MontgomeryWard; GeorgeH. Houston,presi-

4 AmericanLiberty League: A Statementof Its Principlesand Pturposes.From August,1934, untilNovember, 1936, the League made the firstpage of the New York Times thirty-fivetimes; in the absenceof organizedRepublicanism, the presslooked to it for oppositionsentiment on New Deal legislativeproposals. 22 FrederickRudolph dentof Baldwin Locomotive. And withthem were corporation lawyers, pro- fessionalpoliticians, some academicians, and others who represented a mixture of businesswith politics or businesswith academics. They were men who subscribed,out of convictionor experience,to thatcombination of social Darwinismand Americanexperience which evoked a constantstream of leaflets,pamphlets, radio addresses, and pressreleases from the offices of the LibertyLeague.5 Its spokesmenincluded Alfred E. Smith,1928 presidential candidateof the Democraticparty, whose biography was a storyout of HoratioAlger; John W. Davis,I924 presidentialcandidate of the Democratic partyand chiefcounsel for J. P. Morgan;Bainbridge Colby, Secretary of Stateunder Woodrow Wilson and attorneyfor William Randolph Hearst; Neil Carothers,director of the College of Business Administration atLehigh; EdwardW. Kemmerer,professor of internationalfinance at Princeton;Al- bertG. Keller,professor at Yale and studentof WilliamGraham Sumner, whoconstructed a Science of Societywhich was shotthrough with the trans- ferof Darwinian analysis to socialinstitutions; and SamuelHarden Church, headof the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburgh.The membershipofits national advisorycouncil was drawnlargely from the successful business interests of theindustrial states of theNorth and East,whose contributions permitted theLeague to spendover a milliondollars to defendits construction of the AmericanWay-a businesscivilization in whicha concernfor individual liberty,romantic individualism, the worshipof success,the highvalue of personalpower and prestigewere embedded in a traditionof economicin- dependencewhich survived in America,less as a realitythan as a dreamto be fulfilled. The cloakin whichthe Liberty League dressed itself in orderto promote itsposition and itsprogram was madeof respectable generalities, partial self- delusion,intense sincerity, and frequentlyembarrassing hypocrisy. It sup- portedwith worshipful intensity the Constitutionof theUnited States; it placeditself on theside of theindividual and of libertyin oppositionto an encroachinggovernment bureaucracy; it respectedthe judgmentof the foundingfathers who had so wiselyincorporated the separation of federal powersand therights of thestates into the great national document; it de- fendedthe American right to enjoythe sweat of one'sown laborand the rewardsof one'sability.6 With its announced purposes few could find fault,

5Reportingon theactivities of the firstseventeen months of the League, Shousemaintained that 1,363 weeklynewspapers were acceptinga specialLeague news service.New York Times, Jan.26, I936. In addition,each monthsaw the publicationof pamphlets,consisting of speeches and radio addressesof League spokesmen,as well as speciallyprepared studies of New Deal legislationby League researchersin Washington. 6 For the main directionsof LibertyLeague thought,use was made of its seriesof Bulletins The American Liberty League, I934-40 23 but as FranklinRoosevelt told his pressconference on the day followingthe announcementof the formationof the organization,the League reminded him of a grouporganized to uphold two of the Ten Commandments.7Wil- liam E. Borah, said a headline in the New York Times, "Backs Plan of LibertyLeague," yet deep in the column of the storyitself one could find Borah, facingup to the question of industrialmonopoly, declaring, "The powerwhich closes the door of opportunity. .. in the businessworld leaves me cold to all theirpanegyrics about liberty.... There is no libertyworthy of the name withouteconomic freedom and social justice."8It was thisab- sence of any concernfor the social and economicdislocations of the 1930's which documentedthe League's great skill at self-delusion.It sincerely thoughtthat it had somethingvital to sell, but it miserablymisjudged the consumerswhom it hoped to win. Frantically,it triedto save a people who wouldnot be saved. However well it representedcertain American values, the Liberty League ran counterto othervalues in Americansociety which found more fertile soil in the economicdistress which followed the stockmarket crash of I929. Americanbenevolence and humanitarianism,when called upon to face the greatestunemployment problem in the nation'shistory, could findno solu- tion in the well-roundedphrases of the foundingfathers or in the fearsof the AmericanLiberty League. R. R. M. Carpenter'sanxiety over the behaviorof his farmhands in Carolinaand of thechef on his Florida houseboat was not the kind of anxietywhich Americansociety in generalwas experi- encing.For mostAmericans, as successiveRoosevelt victories demonstrated, it seemedaltogether more importantto look afterthe ill-fed,the ill-clothed, and the ill-housedthan to pay heed to Mr. Carpenter'sdespair; and, in the process,it seemeda lesserevil thatthe governmenttake on a greatand all- encompassinghumanitarian function than thatthe veryAmerican value of humanitarianismbe thwartedby a too rigiddevotion to a past way of doing things.If therehad been a streakof benevolencein theannouncements, pub- lications,and radio addressesof the LibertyLeague, one wonderswhether anyonewould have taken them seriously,but, even so, it is an inescapable conclusionthat the absenceof any humanitarianconcern was a seriousdraw- back to its growth.When one of its academicspokesmen described the de- pressionas somethingof a healthtonic intended to rid the economicsystem of harmfulpoisons, it displayedits lack of a warm appreciationof the social and Documents(1934-36), in whichthe basicposition of the League is carefullyand frequently expoundedby itsspokesmen and staffwriters. 7 NewYork Times, Aug. 25, I934. 8 Ibid.,Sept. 25, I 934. 24 FrederickRudolph and economicillnesses which had attendedthe eradication of those economic poisons.9Its attackupon the NLRA provisionfor union representation ac- cordingto majorityvote as an "illegalinterference with the individual free- domof theworker . . . to sellhis own laboron hisown terms" could only be takenas a refusalto admitthe social and economicfactors underlying the growingunion movement.10 When the chairman of itsIllinois division remarked,"You can'trecover prosperity by seizingthe accumulationof the thriftyand distributingit to thethriftless and theunlucky," the League was explicitlycharging the American people with careless living habits or asking themto acceptall thebad luck reflectedin unemploymentstatistics with patienceand good humor.11When the League founda farmer,one Elmer WillisSerl, Route One, Delavan, Wisconsin, who would say for publication that"the farmer without anything North or Southof hisneck . . . needsa prodin thepants and not a paton theback," American humanitarianism was unimpressed.Partly because the League either did notcare to or foundno wayto enlist on itsside this well-developed and characteristic American senti- ment,it invited failure.12 And if it did notcare to makeuse of thestrength which might be de- rivedfrom an ingrainedhumanitarian impulse, neither could it depend upon humoras a weaponwith which to attackthe New Deal and its works. Laughteras an instrumentof politicalwarfare in Americaperhaps reached itsrefinement in the homely political speeches of AbrahamLincoln, but the valueof humorin theart of persuasionmay be recognizedas a constantin Americanlife, from the witticisms of Ben Franklin through Franklin Roose- velt'sremarks about his dog Falla beforethe Teamsters Union in I944. Yet, humorcould not be putto workfor the American Liberty League. It sought laughsin an enumerationofthe activities of the Works Progress Administra- tion:rat extermination campaigns, music lessons, art projects, library cata- loging,and dancesby SallyRand, the fan dancer.The laughter,however, was hollow,for whatever one mightsay aboutthe New Deal, theunder- lyingproblems with which it was confronted could not be laughedat.13 Quite thereverse was trueof theLiberty League. Senator Borah, a yearafter the Timeshad mistakenlyannounced that he was a backerof theLeague, de- claredof theDu Ponts:"They were deeply moved about the Constitution 9 AmericanLiberty League, Document28, Governmentby Experiment,NBC speechof Apr. I7, I935, by Dr. Neil Carothers,director of the Collegeof BusinessAdministration, Lehigh Uni- versity,p. 6. 10 Bulletin2 (September,I935), p. I. " Document29, Ralph M. Shaw, chairmanof the IllinoisDivision of the AmericanLiberty League,speech before the Georgia Bar Association,Sea Island,May 3I, I935, p. I3. 12 Leaflet5, A FarmerSpeaks (1936?). 13 Document78, WorkRelief (November, I 935), p. I5. The AmericanLiberty League, 1934-40 25 of the UnitedStates. They had just discoveredit."14 In Richmondan as- semblymanaddressed the Virginia legislature, defining a Liberty Leaguer as "a manwho is a Republicanbut ashamed of it, [or] a manraised as a Demo- cratwho's become able to buyflour by the barrel and sugar by the sack, made one tripto New Yorkand boughta forked-tailcoat and stove-pipehat."15 FranklinRoosevelt, selecting Wilmington as thescene of his last address out- side New York in the I936 campaign,took the opportunityto speakon "Liberty,"recounting an old tale of Lincoln'sabout the wolf who, having beentorn from the neck of an innocentlamb by a shepherd,complained to theshepherd that he was beingdeprived of his liberty.16 For better or worse, thecomplaints of the wealthy in timesof economic distress are a bettersource ofhumor than are the discontent and themisery of the many. The effective- nessof LibertyLeague humorwas limitedto the alreadyconvinced-the economicallywealthy and powerfuland theirapologists and defendersin thebar associations,universities, and themajor political parties. In the 1930's an organizationwith "sound" American principles might havebeen expected to attaina membershipof morethan I50,000 at itspeak, withoutthe assistance of a humanitarianimpulse or thesanction of humor. Butit couldnot go muchbeyond I50,000 ifit turnedits back upon the common man or insincerelyused the cult whichhad enthronedhim. Jouett Shouse,president of the League-onetimechairman of the Democratic party'sexecutive committee and formerhead of theAssociation against the EighteenthAmendment, when interviewed in August,1934, on theambi- tionsand intentionsof his organization,told reporters that he expectedto enlisttwo to threemillion people in thecrusade.17 The nextday the Times reportedthat his estimates had been revised upward to fourmillion.18 Repre- sentativeJames W. Wadsworth,one ofthe first officers of theLeague and a formerRepublican senator from New York,announced that "the first step willbe organizationinto several divisions, organizing farmers, laborers, the investingpublic and othergroups that are all in thesame boat.19 The chairmanof theMissouri division of the League, in November,I934, tolda radio audiencethat the organization was createdto givethe citizens of the country "themeans for collective expression of publicopinion"; a similarsentiment had beenexpressed in the platformof theLeague, which declared that it

14 New York Times,Apr. i i, I 93 6. 15 Ibid.,Feb. 27, I1936. 16 Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papersand Addressesof FranklinD. Roosevelt,V (New York, 1938), 557-58. Wilmington, Delaware, Oct. 29, I936. 17 New York Times, Aug. 23, I934. 1" Ibid.,Aug. 24, I 934- 19 Ibid. 26 FrederickRudolph would"provide for the rank and fileof the American people . . . an opportunity. . . to offsetthe influence of anyand all groupsworking for selfish purposes."20Thus, the Liberty League presented itself to the American people as a popularmovement, designed to givethem a voicein theaffairs of their government;to thisdegree the American Liberty League bowed to thecult of thecommon man. In Moscow,Izvestia reported, "The League doesnot intendto limititself to theupper strata of society;it aimsto conquerthe masses."21 The record,however, is sufficientevidence of the degreeto whichthe commonman failedto respond.No laboror farmdivisions of theLeague wereever formed; indeed, the League's only interest-group subsidiary was its NationalLawyers Committee, composed largely of corporation lawyers. Fur- thermore,its suggestion that the American people needed the American Lib- ertyLeague to representthem ran counter to a trustin theeffectiveness of populargovernment.22 For an organizationwhich had n8 membershipfees or dues,75,000 members in itsfirst seventeen months was not a verycon- vincingshowing despite Shouse's feeling that the receiptof one and two dollardonations meant that the League was reaching "far down into the mass of American people."23At a luncheon meetingof the AmericanLiberty League of New York,held in theEmpire State Building, Shouse told his listenersthat he was "delightedto havethe opportunity to address this club which. . . representsin itsmembership and itsaffiliations an excellent cross sectionof thegreat metropolis of America."24Eighteen months later in an officialpublication the League declared that it would"continue to emphasize theprotection of therights of the masses."25 Whether these statements were bornof hypocrisy or ofignorance is notso importantas thefact that they all werea tributeto thecommon man whomthe League somehowhoped to win by defending,its protestations to the contrary, the privileges of wealth and position.The League,like the values which it upheld,was in a sense trappedin a complexof annoying facts and prevailing values which could not

20 Document74, The National Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty League, radio addressof EthanA. H. Shepley,chairman of theMissouri Division, broadcast over Station KMOX, St. Louis, Nov. 6, I935, p. 2. Also,American Liberty League: Its Platform (Washington,I934). 21 P. Lapinskiin Izvestia, quoted in "A Russianon the A.L.L.," Living Age, vol. 347 (No- vember,I934), 277-78. 22 PatrickJ. Hurley,Herbert Hoover's Secretaryof War, refusedto join the group. "I am opposed,"he said, "to minoritiestrying to rule the nation.It is ridiculousfor any class to come forwardwith the statementthat it is not represented.Every district elects a Congressmanand everystate two Senators."New YorkTimes, Aug. 30, I934. 23 Ibid., Sept. 8, I934. 24 Document25, Congress at the Crossroads, JouettShouse to the AmericanLiberty League Club of New York,Mar. 30, I935, broadcastby CBS, p. 2. 25 Bulletin,Aug. I5, I936, p. I. The AmericanLiberty League, 1934-40 27 be shovedaside; its trials were made more apparent by the necessity of mas- queradinga defenseof propertyand wealthas a popularmovement. A re- curringtheme in its publicationsand its sponsoredradio addresses was a fearof the redistributionof American wealth, an embarrassingfear for a popularmovement. In its activeyears it agreedwith Franklin Roosevelt exactlytwice: in his oppositionto thesoldier's bonus and to thethirty-hour week. Caringno morefor the common man than the minimum requirements of publicrelations demanded, the Liberty League, nonetheless, could have built a largerpopular following had it adoptedthe techniques of the demagogues who wereamassing a moreimpressive membership in suchgroups as the Townsendclubs, Share-the-Wealth clubs, and in theUnion for Social Jus- tice.Its appeal,however, was pitchedon a levelwhich placed its emphasis uponthe defense of somethingwhich most Americans had verylittle of- property.The trulypopular movements of the decade,the New Deal in- cluded,promised something specific for the common man, for the aged, for theeconomically underprivileged, while the Liberty League offeredrather to protectproperty holders from the people and fromtheir government in Washington.That theLeague's ambitions grew out of a misreadingof the Americantemper becomes rather apparent when one considersthat the un- toldefforts of an elaborateWashington headquarters and staff offices through- out thecountry and theexpenditure of overa milliondollars went into a movementwhose results were so pitifullydisappointing; the League, after all,turned its guns on theNew Deal in I934 onlyto see it overwhelmingly returnedto officein I936. The emotivesymbols which it used-theConstitu- tion,the Supreme Court, the Declaration of Independence-andthe Ameri- can heroesto whomit appealedfor sanction-Jefferson, Washington, and Lincoln-havegenerally been extremely useful in manufacturingmass opin- ion in theUnited States, but the symbols and thesanctions must also have beenput to use forsomething the people wanted. In the1930's thecult of thecommon man had becomesufficiently embedded in Americansociety to makeclear that any pressure group or politicalorganization must disregard itat itsown peril; the American Liberty League learned the very hardest way thatthe commonman, who startedon his way up underthe auspices of AndrewJackson, had replacedthe industrial leader in givingthe directions inAmerican life. Withsimilar peril, it ignoredthe emphasis which Americans had placed uponequality. Freedom and libertywere part and parcelof theAmerican Way,but as thedefenders of a freedomwhich, when fostered by giant cor- 28 FrederickRudolph porations,at leastlooked like license,the League was evenmore suspect becauseof itssilence on thecompelling American value of equality. The potentialLeague member might listen to itsspokesmen on theradio or read its profusionof pamphletsand bulletinswithout discerning any awarenessof theequalitarian strain in Americanthinking. Few Leagueoffi- cialswere as outspokenlyantiequalitarian as Frederick H. Stinchfieldin an addressat Salt Lake City,where he quotedgenerously from Alexis Carrel, whoseobservations were so completelycontrary to Americanaspiration. "The democraticideal has alreadydetermined the predominanceof the weak,"Stinchfield quoted from Carrel. "The onlyway to obviatethe dis- astrouspredominance of theweak is to developthe strong. . . . Today the weak shouldnot be artificiallymaintained in wealthand power.... Each individualmust rise or sinkto thelevel for which he is fittedby the quality of histissues and ofhis soul."26 Yet, if few went so faras Stinchfield,none showedmuch more concern for equality than Raoul E. Desvernine,chairman of theLeague's lawyers division, who wentno furtherthan the expression ofa commonLeague platitude in Chicagowhien he insisted,"All have equal- ityof rightsunder the Constitutionand beforethe law."27Actually, the League'sinterest in equalitywas a somewhatobverse one: it was willing thatChristian ministers direct themselves toward the businessof building Christiansof equal character,so longas theyceased "wasting time on the superficial"social and economicproblems of thetime;28 it was eagerthat a greaterequality of taxation be introducedsince "interest in goodgovernment wouldbe heightenedif a largernumber of personswere required to pay sometax."29 But it had no seriousinterest in openingwider the avenues of socialand economicopportunity by means of education or thevarious legis- lativemeasures of theNew Deal. The League mighthave convinced some one thatit was seriouslyconcerned about equality of economicopportunity had it rememberedat anytime during the course of itshistory the position whichits first statement of principlesand purposeshad takenon monopoly. At thattime the League had announcedthat it was opposedto thespread of monopolies.By subsequentlyignoring the question it gaveeloquent testi- monyto theinsincerity ofthat position. The League,indeed, had cutout an impossiblejob foritself, when one considersthat it ambitiouslyhoped to 26 Documentgo, The Constitution-WhoseHeritage? (Salt Lake City,January, I936), p. 6. Stinchfieldfound further sanction in quotationsfrom The Federalistand fromJohn Marshall. 27 Document88, Americanismat the Crossroads,speech of Raoul E. Desvernine,before the RepublicanRound Table Luncheon,Hamilton Republican Club, Chicago,Jan. I5, I936, p. 7. 28 Document43, The Duty of the Churchto the Social Order,speech of S. Wells Utley, memberNational AdvisoryCouncil, American Liberty League, beforeMichigan Association of CongregationalChurches, May 2I, I935. 29 Document83, A Programfor Congress (December, I935), p. 12. The AmericanLiberty League, I934-40 29 accomplishits purposesby ignoringthe commonman and by refusingto call upon eitherthe humanitarianor equalitarianvalues in Americanso- ciety.The LibertyLeaguers either did notknow their country or theywere unusuallyadept at planning failure. Perhapsthe most curious facet of theLeague's history was thefiction of nonpartisanship,maintained and nurturedfrom its originsuntil its dying day.Shouse, for instance, disclosed the plans and intentionsof the League in a visitto theWhite House in earlyAugust, 1934, askingif the President ob- jected.30When he toldthe press of the new organization on August22, I934, he remarked,"It is definitelynot anti-Roosevelt."31 In April, I936, and later duringthe presidential campaign of that year, League officials reiterated that theirgroup was a "nonpartisanorganization founded to defendthe Constitu- tion."Only incidentally, they said, do we findourselves opposed to Franklin Rooseveltand theNew Deal.32The lengthsto whichnonpartisanship could be takenwas demonstratedby JamesM. Beck,League officialand former solicitorgeneral of theUnited States, when he askedin a speechwhether it couldpossibly be that"the American people will abandon the faith of Wash- ingtonand Franklin,of Jefferson and Hamilton, of Marshall and Lincoln, of Clevelandand McKinley. . ." " When the electorateof everystate but Maine and Vermontreturned Franklin Roosevelt to theWhite House in November,I936, theLeague began to pruneits staff and gaveup itscustom of issuingperiodic press releases; Washington observers then predicted that, in linewith the League's history of pseudononpartisanship, "after a decent intervalhas demonstratedthat the League's career was notcoeval with the campaignagainst President Roosevelt, sustenance will be withdrawnand the League will disappear."34Whatever the reasons, the League actedac- cordingly. Strategically,there were two serious handicaps in theposition of virtuous nonpartisanshipwhich the League pretended to maintain.It fooledno one; and it amountedto a self-imposedlimitation on thekind of attackwhich couldbe madeupon the New Deal andFranklin Roosevelt. Americans prefer to attackmen rather than issues, a preferencewhich may be a functionof theirdevotion to individualismor of theirwariness of ideas; in anycase, however,the League couldnot and did notinvolve itself in concertedper-

30New York Times, Aug. 25, 1934. Rooseveltresponded that it was none of his business, but,even so, he had no objection. 31 Ibid.,Aug. 23, I934. 32 Ibid., Apr. 20, I936. See also Document6, Progressvs. Change,speech of JouettShouse beforeBond Club of New York,Nov. 20, I934. 33 Document22, WhatIs the Constitutionbetween Friends?, speech of JamesM. Beck,Mar. 27, I935, p. 8. 34 New YorkTimes, Dec. 20, I936. 30 FrederickRudolph sonalattacks upon thePresident or uponthe personalities of theadminis- tration.On the otherhand, the New Dealersthemselves had no qualms abouttheir own partisanship,and the LibertyLeague, for them, became synonymouswith Du Pont,economic royalists, and moneybags; indeed, evenafter its expiration, the League was a symbolof selfish greed and special interests.The fact,moreover, that all six of the originalofficers were de- terminedopponents of the New Deal destroyedthe effect of nonpartisanship whichits mixedRepublican and Democraticmembership was supposedto convey.35For a whilethe League did appearto be composedof more Demo- cratsthan Republicans, but by January, 1936, when the League sponsored a well-publicizeddinner in Washingtonat whichAl Smithattacked the New Deal, ArthurKrock was writingin the Timesthat the "membersof the League mightbe classedas themost conservative group in thecountry today.... The League is dominatedby Republicans." Considering what the LibertyLeague appearedto be-"a conservativegroup, inimical to the Presidentand his policies,political in personnel,financed by theDu Ponts andcreated for the sole purpose of bringing back the Old Deal"-it is under- standablewhy the backersof the League expectedthat a rational"nonpartisan"position might be advantageousto itsgrowth.3" The Leaguehad triedto adoptthe protective coloration of a popularmovement without tak- ing veryseriously the problems of thecommon man and by ignoringthe equalitarianemphasis in Americanvalues; when it soughtfurther to disguise its backingand itspurposes by calling them nonpartisan, it opened itself to thecharge of gross hypocrisy. The New Deal, on theother hand, found ready ideological and psycho- logicalmaterial in itsattack upon the depression and uponits critics in the manifestdivergence between theory and practicein Americanlife, as well as in a growingpopular frustration which had grownout of unrealisticex- pectationsnurtured by the nationalfaith. The League's devotionto the Americansuccess story was probablyof moreassistance to itscritics than to itself.For, althoughit mightinsist that "equality of opportunityhas pre- vailedunder the Americanform of government"and that"

35 The firstsix officersof the League were JouettShouse, Democrat and politician;John W. Davis, Democratand politician;Alfred E. Smith,Democrat and politician;Nathan I. Miller, Republicanand politician;James W. Wadsworth,Republican and politician;and Iren6eedu Pont, Democratand industrialist. 36 ArthurKrock, New YorkTimes, Nov. I0, I 934. The AmericanLiberty League, 1934-40 3 I very real disparitybetween promise and performancein American life.37 JohnJ. Raskob, using the storyof his risefrom rags to richesas an argument forjoining the League, was, in the I930's, too farremoved from the experience of mostAmericans to do much morethan remind them that times had surelychanged.38 The League was not interestedin the economicand social realitieswhich confrontedthe Americanpeople; its concernwas with the ideologyand the constitutionalframework which, with otherfactors, had enabledyoung men in the past to amass greatfortunes and to arriveat sta- tionsin lifewhich carried prestige and power.In bettertimes, its thoroughly Americanphilosophy might have had greaterdevotion; in bad times,however,other values which the League could notsuppress were bound to flourish -humanitarianism,equalitarianism, and concernover the malfunctioningof thenational ideology. The performanceof the League was littlebetter designed to bringthe desiredresults than was its approach.Its firstand almostonly practicalal- ternativeto theNew Deal was to suggestthat the Red Crossbe commissioned to handle all directrelief.39 The effectof its pronouncementson the uncon- stitutionalityof the National Labor RelationsAct was to encourageindus- trialiststo disregardthe collectivebargaining provisions of the legislation, throwingstruggling unions into courts all over the countryand leading eventuallyto the sit-downstrikes of I936.4? It discoveredthat Thomas Jeffer- son provedto be a moreeffective symbol for the leftthan for the right,even thoughhe once had said that"were we directedfrom Washington when to sow, and when to reap, we should soon want bread."41The presenceof twelveDu Ponts at its I936 dinnerat whichAl Smith spoke destroyedthe desiredeffect of the presenceof the boy fromthe streetsof the East Side; indeed,when Smithspent the summerof I936 in a moreconcerted attack on the New Deal, he carefullyrefrained from accepting Liberty League spon- sorship.In I936, too,the Republicanparty asked theLiberty League, by then a politicalliability, to "stay aloof fromtoo close alliance with the Landon campaign": the League co-operatedby announcingthat it would remain nonpartisanduring the campaign,and it neverdid endorseLandon.42 When

37 WhatIs the Constitutionbetween Friends? p. I 8. 38 New YorkTimes, Feb. I, 1936. This was a page-I story. 39 Ibid., Dec. 9, 1934. The suggestionwas made by Shouse in a speechbefore the Beacon Societyof Bostonthe night before. 40 Ibid.,Apr. 21, I937. 41 Document58, The Imperilmentof Democracy,radio address of FitzgeraldHall, president of the Nashville,Chattanooga, and St. Louis RailwayCo., underauspices of KentuckyDivision of theAmerican Liberty League, July i8, 1935. 42 New York Times,July I, I936. The front-pageheadline of the Times declared:" 'Non- partisan'Fight on RooseveltIs Openedby theLiberty League." 32 FrederickRudolph theLeague sponsored a six-day institute at theUniversity ofVirginia on "The Constitutionand theNew Deal," VirginiusDabney, the Richmond editor, reportedthat "the audiences were so openlyhostile to theLeague and its spokesmenthat the round table proved something of a boomerang."43Con- gressionalinvestigations disclosed that the guiding figures of the League were largecontributors to all and sundryanti-New Deal groups;the Du Pont brothers,Alfred Sloan, and JohnJ. Raskob were the principal financial backers,for instance, of theSouthern Democratic convention at Maconin I936, whenEugene Talmadge made his bid for the presidency, with the assistance ofGerald L. K. Smith,inheritor of the toga of Huey Long; lesserright-wing groupslike the Crusaders, Sentinels of the Republic, National Conference of Investors,and theFarmers' Independence Council-most of them masthead organizations,operated by professionalpublicists and lobbyists,many of whom,like the principal officers and backers of the League, were veterans of theprohibition repeal movement-owed substantial financial backing to the same smallgroup of industrialistswho sponsoredthe LibertyLeague. A Timeseditorial observed at thetime that the League's founders were making somerather poor investments.44 In an imaginaryconversation between a FutureHistorian and a Future Historian'sWife, Hamilton Basso in theNew Republicin I936 causedhis historian'swife to ask: "There'sone thingI'd liketo know.Why was the LibertyLeague founded?" The FutureHistorian answered: "That's another mystery.It is as if a band of menjoined together to assassinatetheir best friend.It comesunder the head of abnormal psychology. My friend Jones has writtenan excellentmonograph on thesubject . . . called'An Investigation intothe Behaviorof MillionairesWhen Affectedby a SevereCase of the Jitters.'. .. In answerto yourquestion, however, it is fairlysafe to saythat theLiberty League was formedto defeatRoosevelt II."" Basso,his Future Historian,and thehistorian's friend Jones were all quiteright as faras they went,but a lookat theLiberty League is morethan a casestudy in opposition to theNew Deal or in millionairejitters. It is,as well,a studyof the anguish of Americanvalues in a timeof severeeconomic collapse. Both the League and theNew Deal wereconstructed ofAmerican materials, but those which wentinto the New Deal, giventhe facts with which they were intended to cope,built a moredurable structure. On September24, I940, theNew York Times, in a smallitem on page 20,

43 Ibid.,July 2I, I935. "4Ibid., Apr.I7, 1936. 46 HamiltonBasso, "Tle LibertyLeague Writes,"New Republic,XXCVII (July22, I936), 319-21. The AmnericanLiberty League, I934-40 33 announcedthat the AmericanLiberty League, afterfour yearsof silence, had expired;it statedsimply that "Recently. . . the officesin the National Press Club were closed."Four yearsearlier a Yale professorhad prematurely concludedthat "had it not been for the AmericanLiberty League with its constantexposition, exposure, and panning,the New Deal would have set its rootsand claws moredeeply into our nationalflesh and it would have taken yearsto extricateit."46 Professor Westerfield's misreading of the timesand of thepossibilities of theLeague had been symbolicof theLeague's approach and performance.It had misreadAmerican history and character;it had mis- judged contemporaryopinion, drawing on the developmentof a business civilization,romantic individualism, concern for liberty, and the worshipof successand power and prestigeas the sole ingredientsof its constructionof the AmericanWay. It had maintainedthe obviousfiction of nonpartisanship long afterit was apparentto everyonethat its aims werepolitical. It became a symbolof greed,reaction, and coldheartedconstitution worship; while it defendedliberty, it scornedequality-at a time when economicand social factsprovided more fertilesoil foran equalitarianemphasis. It failedto de- velop into the mass movementit had anticipated,permitting all that was Americanabout humanitarianism, the cult of thecommon man, equalitarianism, and concernfor ideologicalperformance to be poured into the edifice which the New Deal was constructingon the ruins of nineteenthcentury individualismand liberalism. WilliamsCollege

46Leaflet 4, The AmericanLiberty League. Dr. Ray BertWesterfield, professor of political economy,Yale University,reprinted from the New Haven Register,Jan. 27, 1936.