Crit Crim DOI 10.1007/s10612-017-9378-3

The Expansion and Normalization of Militarization in Canada

1 2 Brendan Roziere • Kevin Walby

Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Abstract Despite extensive analysis of police militarization in the United States (US), the case in Canada has been overlooked. Building on Kraska’s (in Policing 1(4):501–513, 2007) framework of police militarization indicators, this paper examines militarization within Canadian police forces between 2007 and 2016. Drawing from data on deployments disclosed under freedom of information law, our research shows deployment of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams have escalated in many major Canadian cities and are even higher in some cases than those reported by Kraska on militarization of US public police. We show how SWAT teams are increasingly used by public police for routine police activities such as warrant work, traffic enforcement, community policing, and even responding to mental health crises and domestic disturbances. We also analyze data on SWAT team growth, and benchmarking between police service SWAT units. We conclude by reflecting on the implications for public policing in Canada and avenues for future research on police militarization and police violence in Canada and other countries.

Introduction

Scholars have contributed significantly to knowledge on police militarization, but have relied on empirical examples from the United States (US). Frequently referenced are the Navy Seals’ training of police units (PPUs) and special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams (Kraska and Cubellis 1997; Kraska and Kapperler 1997), the amendments made to the Posse Comitatus Act (Phillips 2016; Weiss 2011), as well as the 1033 program that allows US Departments of Defense and Homeland to sell off decommissioned gear that is then used by local police across the United States (Radil et al. 2017), a

& Kevin Walby [email protected]

1 Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada 2 Department of , University of Winnipeg, Centennial Hall, 3rd Floor, 515 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg, MB R3B 2E9, Canada

123 B. Roziere, K. Walby practice restricted by President Obama but then restored by President Trump. Kraska (2007: 506) did ground breaking research to reveal trends in the creation and use of PPUs in the 1980s and 1990s. There has also been research on militarization around the world, from Britain (Hills 1995) to (McCulloch 2001). Despite the importance of these contributions they do not explain the scope or the institutionalization of public police militarization in Canada. Perhaps the lack of research on police militarization in Canada is because of common assumptions that the Canadian criminal justice system is less punitive and repressive (Meyer and O’Malley 2005). There is a related, general lack of research on police violence in Canada (but see Ross 1992, 1995). Canadian literature on police violence has had a greater focus on protest or public order policing than on PPUs. Public order policing literature may be valuable for demonstrating the influence of militarism on police responses to large public conflicts (De Lint 2005; King 1997), but it mostly ignores the other ways in which militarization presents itself. As a country with over 35 million people, 11 cities with a population over 500,000, and at least 22 police services that each employ 500 or more officers (Burczycka 2013), it is time to begin examining police militarization in Canada. Using data obtained under freedom of information laws, we show evidence that militarization has been nor- malized within Canada’s largest police services. Deployments of SWAT teams have risen in major Canadian cities and are higher in some cases than those reported by Kraska on militarization of US public police. SWAT teams are increasingly being used by public police for routine police activities such as warrant work, traffic enforcement, community policing, and even responding to mental health crises and domestic disturbances. This rise in SWAT use could have a significant impact on police violence and use of force (Jacobs 1998; Ross 1992, 1995). Our research begins to address a significant gap that exists in the publicly available data on SWAT/PPU deployments and activities in Canada. Canadian police services have largely refused to publish such data, which imposes barriers for research on police militarization, but using access to information/freedom of information (ATI/FOI) requests we make this data public for the first time. Two decades ago, Alvaro (2000) showed the average yearly number of deployments for Canadian tactical units was 60 total per unit; our FOI disclosures demonstrate that the average yearly number of deployments for Canadian tactical units is approximately 1300 per unit as of 2017. Borrowing from Kraska’s (2007) conceptualization of police militarization indicators, this paper examines the state of militarization within Canadian police forces between 2007 and 2016. First, we review literature on militarization to establish our conceptual frame- work. Second, using materials obtained through ATI/FOI requests we analyze Canadian police services’ use of PPUs since 2007. We also analyze data on SWAT team growth, and benchmarking between police service SWAT units. In conclusion, we reflect on the implications for public policing in Canada and avenues for future research on police militarization in Canada and other countries.

Militarization and Public Police

Central to arguments about police militarization is that while public police are meant to respond to internal criminal matters, and the military is expected to combat external threats, new police strategies of response to threats has conflated these roles (Salter 2014; Kraska and Cubellis 1997; Weiss 2011; Leichtman 2008). We are aware of the critiques (McMichael 2017; Shantz 2016; den Heyer 2014) claiming that police and the military

123 The Expansion and Normalization of Police Militarization in… share a repressive origin, and that the militarization of policing debate blindly assumes if police were not militarized somehow their social control efforts would be acceptable. We make no such assumptions. Our intention is to demonstrate the staggering rise of mili- taristic tactical unit use in Canadian policing and reflect on the conceptual, political, legal and ethical implications. Today the literature on has four main foci: globalization; pro- tests; community policing; and SWAT and PPUs. We will address each literature in turn. First, some scholars suggest that police militarization is a response to the pressures of neoliberal globalization. Here it is argued that globalization has weakened the state’s borders, and made way for increases in offences like drug trafficking, , and other transnational crimes and that post 9/11, the state is viewed as being at risk from numerous threats (Hill and Beger 2009). Chief among these threats is that of terrorism which is seen as unpredictable, and unlike other threats, potentially coming from within the state’s borders (Dunton and Kitchen 2014: 185). What were once seen as minor domestic threats are now framed as threats to (Hill and Beger 2009). Militarization may result in the targeting of minority groups, the restriction of civil rights, and in greater capacity for the state to interfere with the lives of citizens and to do so with force (Weiss 2011). Second, Kitchen and Rygiel (2014) suggest the blurring between police and military technologies, practices, and threat perception leads state agencies to view cities as sites for testing militarized weaponry, technology, and tactics. They further highlight how ‘mega- events’ such as the Olympics and the G20 Summit in Toronto, Canada provide opportu- nities for policing agencies to make enormous purchases of ‘security’ equipment and to use it with little public scrutiny (Kitchen and Rygiel 2014: 208). For example, after the G20 Summit in Toronto, the kept four-hundred gas masks, and four Long Range Acoustic Devices which were designed for use by the United States military. Dunton and Kitchen (2014) provide another example of how mega-events militarize the police in their consideration of the Vancouver Olympics. Prior to the Vancouver Olympics, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) created a Military Liaison Unit (MLU) to ‘‘improve the communications and training relationships between the VPD and the mili- tary’’ (Dunton and Kitchen 2014: 188). The MLU was not disbanded after the Olympics and now conducts regular training sessions with the U.S. National Guard to learn ‘‘how military technologies and tactics might assist with urban policing’’ (Dunton and Kitchen 2014: 188). Of concern is the potential for police to criminalize non-violent political demonstration and social activism (Wood 2014). Third, community police and militarization now overlap. As Hill et al. (2007) explain, the community policing model is based on the premise that police should foster a rela- tionship with the communities in which they serve. The community policing model pro- motes crime prevention, problem solving and improving public quality of life through engagement with citizens (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010; Hill and Beger 2009). The police are expected to be accountable not only to the government, but also to citizens by reaching out to community members (Hill et al. 2007). Opposing the community policing model is the military-bureaucratic model which promotes hierarchy, the use of force, and crime fighting (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010). Unlike the community policing model, the military-bureaucratic model is dismissive of ‘‘outside help’’ (Murray 2005: 352). Several scholars have noted this contradiction between the community policing model and the military model employed by police paramilitary units (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010). Not only does the model’s top-down orientation shut out perspectives external to the police, but the hostility it encourages has been criticized for intimidating communities

123 B. Roziere, K. Walby rather than fostering their cooperation (Hill et al. 2007: 305; Murray 2005). What is troubling about this finding is that such practices are likely to end up being used within already marginalized communities (Hill et al. 2007). Yet Kraska and Cubellis (1997: 624) and Kraska and Kappeler (1997: 13) found evidence of this overlap in their surveys of PPUs, as a significant number of police forces responded that they did not see any conflict between the community policing model and the use of PPUs in street-level policing. Some surveyed officers described their PPU as helping to establish order and improve ‘‘quality of life’’ (Kraska and Kappeler 1997: 13) by dealing with civil disturbances including noise complaints and parking violations. Kraska (2007: 509) explains that the community policing model’s ideal of proactive policing has realized itself through a ‘‘zero-tolerance policing model’’ which emphasizes aggressive law enforcement practices. Fourth, and most important for our focus, Kraska (2007: 506) draws specific attention to the role of PPUs and SWAT teams in police militarization. Despite the contention that PPUs are forces ‘‘confined to rare situations involving hostages, terrorism, or the maniac sniper’’ (Kraska and Kappeler 1997: 3), they have continued to grow in number and use. PPUs are distinguishable by the militaristic features that they adopt including equipment, training, and rhetoric (Hill and Beger 2009; Kraska and Cubellis 1997). PPUs may utilize an array of firearms, explosives, and other technology that is borrowed from the military or that is military-like. Frequently, PPUs are given names that use military terminology or that allude to the unit’s ‘‘elite status’’ (Kraska 2007: 502). Officers assigned to PPUs undergo additional training and the PPUs themselves are structured similarly to military units, furthering the idea that they are elite teams rather than mere groups of street-level officers (Kraska 2007: 505). Emphasis is placed on the team aspect of PPUs in that they deploy with the assumption that they are responding to incidents that require ‘‘collective force’’ (Kraska and Kappeler 1997: 4). An additional problem created by PPUs is that they create a subculture of paramilitarism which may bleed into the rest of the police force (Kraska 2007: 506). The paramilitary subculture reinforced through military-style dress, equipment, structure, ‘‘hypermasculinity, and dangerous function’’ (Kraska 2007: 506) is not only appealing to PPU members, but also to the street-level officers around them (also see Dodge et al. 2010). Hill et al. (2007: 305) argue that because PPUs are given an elite status within their departments, street-level officers become all the more likely to want to adopt similar tactics. In this way the influence of paramilitarism may spread the use military-style equipment and tactics into areas of policing that PPUs are not directly involved in (Hill et al. 2007: 306). During the 1990s, Kraska conducted two surveys; one of police forces serving rural jurisdictions with 25,000–50,000 citizens, and another of police forces serving urban jurisdictions of 50,000 or more citizens (Kraska and Cubellis 1997: 611; Kraska and Kappeler 1997: 5). Both surveys found that the number of police forces in the United States that had established a PPU was increasing and that the number of deployments of those units was also increasing. Kraska (2007: 507) found that PPUs were taking on duties formerly handled by regular street-level police officers. In jurisdictions with at least 50,000 citizens, Kraska and Kappeler (1997: 7) discovered that over 75% of PPU deployments were for the purposes of executing search warrants. Kraska and Cubbellis’ (1997) survey found that although smaller jurisdictions tended to have fewer PPU deployments, the majority of deployments tended to be for the purposes of executing search warrants. In both surveys, executing search warrants represented a growing proportion of total PPU deployments, revealing that PPUs had undergone a gradual shift toward proactive func- tions (Kraska and Cubellis 1997: 618). As we show below, PPUs are an active part of modern police departments in Canada in similar ways.

123 The Expansion and Normalization of Police Militarization in…

Research Methods

We understand police militarization using Kraska’s (2007: 503) ‘‘four dimensions of the military model’’; material, cultural, organizational, and operational. First, the material dimension refers to the physical equipment, weapons, and other technologies used by police that are military-like (Kraska 2007: 503). Secondly, the cultural dimension encompasses the outward appearance and language used by police, as well as the values that they embrace. Thirdly, the organizational dimension looks at the kinds of PPUs or groups of police officers that are structured in ways that resemble various military units. Finally, the operational dimension is concerned with the ‘‘patterns of activity’’ (Kraska 2007: 503) used by police that mimic those used by the military, particularly in terms of response to high-risk incidents. We used ATI/FOI requests to obtain information about the operational and organiza- tional dimensions of militarization. ATI/FOI requests can be made under the federal Access to Information Act, as well as under legislative equivalents at provincial and municipal levels, to obtain previously undisclosed information from public bodies (see Walby and Larsen 2012). ATI/FOI requests were sent to 10 Canadian police forces identified as having a PPU through open-sources including official police websites and media articles. Police forces were chosen with the goal of generating a diverse sample representing large and medium sized police services. The selected police organizations comprised of 8 municipal police forces, 1 provincial police force, and 1 federal police force, from across 7 different provinces. A necessary component of using ATI/FOI requests is reflexivity regarding the wording of requests and the brokering process. Both the request’s scope and its terminology con- tribute to success in obtaining data (Brownlee and Walby 2015). The brokering that occurs between the researcher and the ATI/FOI coordinator are just as important, as the initial access request and the resulting disclosure are likely to be influenced by these interactions (Luscombe and Walby 2015). Although the academic literature is consistent in its use of the police paramilitary unit terminology (Phillips 2016; Hill and Beger 2009), the Cana- dian police services captured in this research largely refer to their units as ‘Emergency Response Teams’ or simply as ‘Tactical Units’ rather than PPUs. Each request referred to the subject police service’s PPU by its name within the agency. This was achieved by searching each service’s website for information on their PPU, and for the name used to refer to that unit. In one conversation with the FOI analyst assigned to the request made to the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), it was indicated that the OPP wanted to make sure that it was understood that their Emergency Response Team is considered by the agency to be a ‘‘containment unit, not a tactical unit’’ (V. Fox, personal communication, November 2, 2016). This incident would lend credence to the notion that terminology does matter to agencies responding to ATI/FOI requests. The access requests that we filed were worded as follows: 1. Requesting all records pertaining to the (name of relevant police service and PPU’s name) frequency of deployment and type of deployment in each instance (e.g. executing search warrant, responding to call etc.). 2. Requesting all records pertaining to the number of officers assigned to the (name of relevant police service and PPU’s name). 3. Requesting all communications between the (name of relevant police service) and other police services (municipal, provincial, and federal) pertaining to benchmarking and development of police tactical units and/or emergency response teams.

123 B. Roziere, K. Walby

To obtain information in a timely manner, and to control the financial cost, each request was limited to include only the years of 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016. By doing so, it was possible to accurately track and measure the growth of the PPUs and their number of deployments while largely avoiding barriers to using ATI/FOI. Going further back than a decade with FOI can prove expensive, which is one reason for the delimitation of our sample. We acknowledge this is a limit of our research. The first two sets of information were requested so that any growth in the size or use of PPUs since 2007 could be measured. These sets were requested because they would allow for comparisons to be made with provincial and municipal crime statistics over the same period of time. The third set of information was requested in hopes of providing greater insight into the inner workings of PPUs in Canada, particularly in terms of their operation and organization. This set also serves another purpose though in that it had the potential to expose policies and practices that have been developed, coordinated, or transferred between different police agencies without full public accountability. If the community policing model is meant to emphasize the public’s role in shaping policing, then closed door inter-agency benchmarking arguably fails to meet that standard (Hill et al. 2007: 306). The initial scope of the requests was made broad for two reasons. First, the hope was that by requesting ‘all records’ for each part of the request, the police services would disclose more data than if they had simply been asked to provide only numbers on their PPU’s deployments and assigned officers, or benchmarking through only a single form of communication. Second, it prevented the requests from becoming immediately self-lim- iting, thereby leaving it to the ATI/FOI coordinators to raise the scope of the request as an issue. Five police departments released data pursuant to the ATI/FOI requests, two departments refused to release data entirely, and requests to the other three departments remain ongoing. For broader reflections on the number and size of police departments in Canada, see Carmichael and Kent (2015).

Militarization of Public Police in Canada

Calgary Police Service Deployments

The (CPS) was the first police service to respond in full to the FOI request. The data reveals that in 2007 the Tactical Unit was deployed an astounding 1556 times, but this number has dropped considerably over time from 1128 deployments in 2010, 857 in 2013, and 564 in 2016 (as of November 22)1 (Access Request #16-G-1467). The number of deployments was broken down into 28 different categories that range from responding to ‘major codes’ and 911 calls to noise complaints and traffic incidents (Access Request #16-G-1467). None of the categories distinguished between planned and unplanned calls so we requested additional information from the analyst assigned to the request. We were informed by the analyst that the Tactical Unit is often issued warrants ‘on the fly,’ making the distinction between planned and unplanned deployments difficult to determine pre- cisely (R. Wales, personal communication, November 29, 2016). However, the analyst did

1 A subsequent FOI request revealed that the CPS Tactical Unit deployed about 620 times total in 2016, though it was impossible to determine how many of the additional revealed deployments were planned or unplanned. While these additional deployments are excluded from our analysis, it is unlikely that their inclusion would significantly alter our findings.

123 The Expansion and Normalization of Police Militarization in… indicate that the vast majority of deployments that could reasonably be considered planned, predominantly fell under the ‘assist’ and ‘miscellaneous’ categories (R. Wales, personal communication, November 29, 2016). For the purposes of comparing data we assume that those two categories are entirely made up of planned deployments and that they represent the only categories with planned deployments. We believe that this produces a relatively accurate picture of the CPS Tactical Unit’s planned deployments considering both that the descriptors given to the other categories suggest fairly reactive events, and that the com- bination of the ‘assist’ and ‘miscellaneous’ categories in 2016 (190 deployments) (Access Request #16-G-1467) is consistent with a recent claim by CPS Inspector Blair White who stated that the Service’s armoured vehicle attends ‘‘[two-hundred] warrant calls per year’’ (Wood 2016, para. 4). The CPS claims on its website that the Tactical Unit was ‘‘involved in more than [three hundred] planned operations’’ (Calgary Police Service n.d., para. 5) in 2011, which is once again consistent with the combination of the ‘assist’ and ‘miscella- neous’ categories for 2010 (307 deployments) (Access Request #16-G-1467).

Unplanned vs Planned Deployments 1400 1313 Unplanned Planned 1200

1000 821 800 629 600

Deployments 374 400 307 243 228 190 200

0 2007 2010 2013 2016* Calgary Police Service Taccal Unit

*As of November, 22, 2016

The CPS Tactical Unit’s proportion of total deployments that are planned has noticeably increased from 15.6% in 2007 to 33.7% in 2016. However, they have not increased to the same extent observed by Kraska (2007: 506, 507) which was over 80%, and they have not grown as a proportion in same way. The data reveals that planned deployments have actually remained relatively stable, but that unplanned deployments have dropped signif- icantly, whereas Kraska and Kappeler (1997: 7, 9) and Kraska and Cubellis (1997) wit- nessed an increasing number of total deployments wherein planned deployments rapidly overtook unplanned deployments. While the overall number of deployments have decreased greatly since 2007, it is important to keep in mind just how large the CPS Tactical Unit’s number of deployments really is. Even at its lowest point of 564 deployments in 2016 (as of Nov. 22) the CPS Tactical Unit was deployed over six times more often than the average number of deployments of American PPUs as was recorded by Kraska and Kappeler (1997: 7) in 1995. It would also seem that the CPS Tactical Unit responds to incidents that would usually be reserved for regular street-level officers such as noise complaints, collisions and other traffic incidents, drug offences, break and enters, and mental health incidents among

123 B. Roziere, K. Walby others (Access Request #16-G-1467). The CPS Tactical Unit is quite clearly responding to a significant number of calls that cannot be considered high-risk, and that definitely rep- resent a degree of militarization in routine policing that opposes the community policing model. That being said, it does appear that the number of deployments in those areas is going down as the total number of deployments drops.

Ottawa Police Service Deployments

The (OPS) responded to the FOI request made to them by releasing an Excel spreadsheet of its tactical unit’s deployments. Each deployment provided a brief description of the reason for the deployment, any other units that were involved, and occasionally additional comments (Access Request #16-867). Because of the information that was specific to each individual deployment this data was somewhat easier to cate- gorize in terms of planned and unplanned deployments than the data provided by the CPS.

Unplanned vs Planned Deployments 140 133 126 Unplanned Planned 120 97 100 78 80

60 48 Deployments 40 29 29 26 20

0 2007 2010 2013 2016

Oawa Police Service Taccal Unit

Proactive deployments accounted for over 70% of all deployments in each of the four years (Access Request #16-867). Almost all proactive deployments were for warrant work, with the largest proportion being drug warrants which fluctuated between just over 30% to almost 65% in different years. The year 2007 marked the height of drug warrant executions at 80, and 2016 marked the lowest point at 30 (Access Request #16-867). Warrant work however, has continued to represent a substantial number of the OPS tactical unit’s deployments though. In recent years, warrants related to other kinds of crime such as child exploitation have increased, thus maintaining the tactical unit’s warrant work deployments (Access Request #16-867). Interestingly, the number of times that the OPS tactical unit deployed between 2007 and 2013 decreased at a rate that actually surpassed the decrease in crime (excluding traffic offences) in Ottawa during that same period (Access Request #16-867; Ottawa Police Service 2009: 1, 2011: 5, 2014: 1). However, in 2016 the number of deployments increased slightly, going against the overall downward trend in crime2 (Access Request #16-867; Ottawa Police Service 2017: 64, 65). Unplanned deployments decreased in each of the four

2 The crime rate in Ottawa increased slightly in 2016 over 2015, although the violent crime rate continued to drop (Ottawa Police Service 2017). Even with this increase the 2016 crime rate remained significantly lower than in previous years.

123 The Expansion and Normalization of Police Militarization in… years covered by the FOI request (Access Request #16-867). Barricaded , hostage situations, and other calls appropriate for the tactical unit remained low, hitting its highest proportion at 7.5% of all deployments in 2013 (Access Request #16-867). Calls to assist other units with mental health calls consistently represented between 20 and 30% of all unplanned deployments (Access Request #16-867). In almost all of these instances the accompanying entry noted that the initial call pertained to an invoking of s. 17 of Ontario’s Mental Health Act (Access Request #16-867). Section 17 of the Mental Health Act allows police officers to take individuals into custody involuntarily when they believe that the individual is suffering from a mental illness and poses a danger to themselves or others (Mental Health Act, s. 17). While the number of deployments related to mental health has decreased, it is concerning that they still occur given that such calls are not within the mandate of the OPS’ heavily armed and armoured tactical unit (Access Request #16-867). It is likely that the OPS tactical unit attended other calls that are not captured in the data obtained through the FOI request. In the request itself, the OPS included a disclaimer which explained that their tactical unit’s deployment information is not automatically tracked by the service, and that the information provided in the request was collected by the OPS by doing a ‘‘text browse on the Records Management System using the words ‘Tact’ and ‘Team’ in the subject line’’(Access Request #16-867). The OPS further explained that reports submitted by the tactical unit cannot be uniquely identified, and that not all assistance calls are necessarily captured in the released data because ‘‘it is all dependent upon how the officer, initiating the report, enters the subject line’’ (Access Request #16-867). Another issue with the data is that like the data provided by the CPS, the entries do not provide much in the way of description or context. It is difficult to fully understand the circumstances surrounding any given deploy- ment, which subsequently limits the ability to evaluate the tactical unit’s actions.

Winnipeg Police Service Deployments

The FOI request made to the (WPS) and the brokering process which followed, resulted in the release of two daily occurrence reports; one for 2013 and one for 2016 (Access Request #16-10-911). Each report listed the incidents that the WPS Tactical Support Team (TST) responded to, with notes detailing the incidents. The reports provided greater insight into the actions of the WPS’ TST and allowed for a more comprehensive categorization of incidents than the table provided by the CPS or the list provided by the OPS.

Unplanned vs Planned Deployments 2901 3000 Unplanned Planned Unknown 2500

2000

1500

Deployments 1000 455 500 217 267 16 0 2013 2016 Winnipeg Police Service Taccal Support Team

123 B. Roziere, K. Walby

The daily occurrence report for 2016 originally included deployments only up to the date when the access request was filed (October 24, 2016), though the remainder of the 2016 report (October 23 to December 31) was obtained through a subsequent access request filed in April, 2017. Seven times as many deployments were recorded in the 2016 report as the 2013 report (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #17-4-295) At first glance it would appear as though the TST’s number of deployments has risen dramatically over the last few years, but this finding is likely due to an underreporting of deployments in the 2013 daily occurrence report. This conclusion is a result of two operational reviews of the WPS that were commis- sioned in 2013. The first review for the City of Winnipeg was conducted by Matrix Consulting Group (Matrix Consulting Group 2013: 1), while the second review was conducted by Griffiths and Pollard (2013: 1, 11) for the Canadian Police Association. Both reviews found that the TST’s reporting standards at the time of review were inadequate (Griffiths and Pollard 2013: 398; Matrix Consulting Group 2013: 158). Matrix Consulting Group (2013: 158) recommended that the WPS TST ‘‘begin compiling statistical infor- mation’’ (Matrix Consulting Group 2013: 158) of both planned and unplanned deploy- ments to produce monthly and annual reports. Griffiths and Pollard (2013: 398) likewise found that the TST needed better reporting of its actions to properly evaluate the unit. Statistics from the CAD database cited in Griffiths and Pollard’s (2013: 398) review revealed that the TST deployed 1922 times in 2012, with 383 of these deployments resulting from the ten most common calls for service, and 815 of these being for calls for service generally. One thousand, one hundred-seven calls were described as ‘on-view’3 deployments, the vast majority of which were categorized as either special attention or traffic stops (Griffiths and Pollard 2013: 398). Given the findings of the operational reviews and the dramatic differences in reported incidents between the two occurrence reports and the CAD statistics, it seems unlikely that the TST’s number of deployments sharply dropped from 2012 to 2013, only to rebound to an even higher rate a few years later in 2016. What is more likely is that the TST’s reporting standards simply increased. It is difficult to determine what criteria if any the TST used when recording incidents in the 2013 daily occurrence report, however one possibility is that the 2013 report includes primarily incidents in which the TST was the lead unit involved, and largely excludes incidents it assisted on, as well as traffic stops and other routine patrol incidents. The rationale for considering this possibility is that in the 2016 daily occurrence report a sizeable number of incidents noted that the TST was acting to assist another unit, deploying to conduct , or to police hot spots, but by contrast very few deployments in the 2013 report gave any such indication (Access Request #16-10-911). There are no publicly available reports on the TST which could be used to verify the accuracy of the daily occurrence reports though. All things considered, the 2016 daily occurrence report is likely a relatively accurate measure of the TST’s total deployments even if the 2013 report is not. Based on the data that is available in the daily occurrence reports and supplementing it with the CAD statistics from Griffiths and Pollard’s operational review, the use of the TST does appear to have grown (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #17-4-295; Griffiths and Pollard 2013: 398). Perhaps more interestingly though is the nature of the

3 Based on comparisons that were made between ‘on-view’ and ‘caller-initiated’ deployments, and several references suggesting that ‘on-view’ deployments are officer-initiated, ‘on-view’ deployments in this data most likely represents the number of deployments initiated by the TST itself, either proactively or in response to directly witnessing an activity. See Griffiths and Pollard (2013: 250, 264, 268).

123 The Expansion and Normalization of Police Militarization in… increase in deployments. While other Canadian police tactical units have become increasingly proactive over time, the WPS TST is if anything becoming far more reactive. According to the CAD statistics and the daily occurrence reports, the TST responded to incidents such as assaults, firearm and weapon sightings, domestic disturbances, alarms, robberies, suspicious persons, non-firearm weapons, suicide threats, and well-being checks, far more often in 2016 than they had in either 2012, or 2013 (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #17-4-295; Griffiths and Pollard 2013: 398). As Goodmark (2015) has argued, there are serious problems with have a PPU respond to domestic disturbances, suicide threats, and well-being checks because these police units and aggravate these situations and traumatise victims. Violent and potentially violent calls such as fights, assaults, firearm sightings, non- firearm weapons calls, and suspicious person calls routinely initiated a response by the TST either from the start or at the request of other units (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #17-4-295). One of the most significant increases was in deployments to firearm sightings which grew from 66 recorded instances in both 2012 (Griffiths and Pollard 2013: 398) and 2013 to 433 in 2016 (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #17-4-295). These increases are indicative of a growing aversion to risk, and as Kraska and Cubellis (1997: 619) point out reinforces paramilitary subculture by supporting an obsession with danger and the elite status of the PPU. Meanwhile the number of incidents traditionally associated with PPUs such as hostage takings, barricaded suspects, and bomb threats that the WPS TST responded to in the observed years continued to represent only a small handful of deployments. The daily occurrence reports suggested that the TST responded to around four such incidents in 2013 and slightly under twenty-five in 2016, with over half of these being bomb threats (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #17-4-295). Although use of the TST in these cases would likely be seen by most as justifiable, it should be noted that in both years almost all of these calls were eventually deemed to be unfounded according to comments found within the reports (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #17-4-295). Even if the number of these types of calls has increased, there is nothing to suggest that the number of incidents actually taking place has as well. Roughly 55% of the TST’s deployments in the 2013 daily occurrence report were planned (Access Request #16-10-911). Warrant work made up the majority of planned deployments (87.6%), with drug warrants representing the largest proportion at about 65% of all warrants or 57% of all planned deployments (Access Request #16-10-911). While it is likely that proactive deployments such as warrant work represented a smaller proportion of all deployments given the high possibility of recording gaps, the number of warrants executed by the TST is not insignificant.4 The daily occurrence reports include over 150 instances of the TST executing drug warrants and over 200 warrants in total (Access Request #16-10-911). The 2016 report includes 129 drug warrants and just under 250 in total (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #17-4-295). Although the TST exe- cuted fewer drug warrants in 2016, it slightly exceeded the number of total warrants it executed in 2013, based on the data available. Both reports make numerous references to the TST’s use of ‘no-knock’ and ‘dynamic’ entries and searches of residences while

4 TST’s deployments in 2016 represented about 1.6% of the WPS’ total incidents responded to (Winnipeg Police Service 2017: 19), but the TST executed about 10% of all warrants in Manitoba, and was involved in about 15% (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #17-4-295; Levasseur and Nicholson 2017). The total proportion of the WPS’ warrants that the TST executed is unknown, though it would obviously be higher. This is concerning given that a recent study of warrants issued in Manitoba found that 1 in 7 did not meet the legal requirements to be issued in the first place (Levasseur and Nicholson 2017).

123 B. Roziere, K. Walby executing warrants (Access Request #16-10-911). As Kraska (2007: 507) highlights, such tactics create dangerous situations for both the police and for citizens. Controlling for a number of variables and extraneous factors, Delehanty et al. (2017) show use of SWAT means police are much more likely to shoot and kill citizens. Despite an apparent decrease from 2012 to 2016 in proactive hot spots and special attention deployments (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #17-4-295; Griffiths and Pollard 2013: 398), the TST has increasingly engaged in other community policing related tasks (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #17-4-295). While in other cities such as Calgary, tactical unit deployments to noise complaints, traffic incidents, domestic calls, and disturbances among other incidents have gradually decreased (Access Request #16-G-1467), the WPS TST continues to respond to more (Access Request #16- 10-911; Access Request #17-4-295). The WPS does not note a contradiction between the community policing model and its use of the TST. On December 15, 2016, the WPS announced its new downtown safety strategy entitled Centreline (Winnipeg Police Service 2016). The Centreline strategy is meant to emphasize proactive policing and community engagement and to ‘‘reduce the risk, frequency and severity of crime and social disorder’’ (Winnipeg Police Service 2016, para 4) as wells as to reduce strain on emergency services (Winnipeg Police Service 2016). Entries in the 2016 daily occurrences report reveal that as early as June, 2016 the TST was actively attending training meetings pertaining to the Centreline strategy and even deploying to police hot spots under it (Access Request #16- 10-911). The WPS’ approach is reminiscent of the aggressive community policing approach taken by many American PPUs observed by Kraska and Kapperler (1997: 13). Furthermore, it suggests a normalization of the TST as part of WPS’ routine patrol activities.

Vancouver Police Department Deployments

The deployment data received from the VPD was limited in a number of ways which made it difficult to interpret. First, the data provided included only deployments of its Emergency Response Team (ERT) that ‘‘met the threshold of a critical incident’’ (Access Request #16- 2974A). Second, this data was not broken down into any discernible categories, although it was noted that the data could ‘‘include incidents such as high-risk search warrant [sic] to a barricaded person’’ (Access Request #16-2974A). In part the results of this disclosure are likely due to limitations with the VPD’s records keeping system, and possibly with their reporting requirements. While brokering this request it was revealed that: The VPD does not retain a database with fields that are searchable for the parameters of your request and is therefore not able to accurately compile this information. The Emergency Response Team responds to varied incidents, including assisting VPD patrol, and it is unfortunately not currently possible to reasonably or accurately locate or compile this information from available records (D. Hurwitz, personal communication, January 10, 2017). Similar to the findings of the other ATI/FOI requests, the VPD’s records keeping system and reporting practices fail to capture data that accurately reflects the activities of their PPU.

123 The Expansion and Normalization of Police Militarization in…

Unplanned vs Planned Deployments 300 282 Unknown 250

196 200 161 150

Deployments 100

50

0 2010* 2013* 2016* Vancouver Police Department Emergency Response Team

*Data for all three years includes only deployments that met the ‘critical incident’ threshold.It isimpossible to

determine from the information provided exactly how many of these deployments were unplanned vs planned or

even what incidents were responded to as no further categorization was given.

Analysis of the data is severely limited by the issues noted above. From the information gathered through the brokering process it would seem that the ERT is involved in some form of routine patrol work, but nothing that was disclosed provides any way to measure this. Deployments based on the critical incident deployment data that was provided reveals little as well. From 2010 to 2016, Vancouver’s violent crime rate dropped by over 25%, while overall crime remained relatively stable up until 2016 when it increased (Vancouver Police Department 2016, 2017). Comparatively, the ERT’s deployments to critical inci- dents dropped by about 43% from 2010 to 2013, and were overall about 30.5% lower in 2016 than 2010 (Access Request #16-2974A). No obvious correlations exist between the number of ERT deployments, the crime rate, or any specific type of crime through this period. The ERT’s deployments did not follow the downward trend of violent crime, nor the upward trend of property crime, and furthermore they fluctuated more wildly than did the overall crime rate (Access Request #16-2974A; Vancouver Police Department, 2017). Any similarities that exist, such as the similar increases in property crime and ERT deployments from 2013 to 2016, carry many assumptions, and fail to rule out sheer coincidence. Another challenge to interpreting the deployment numbers is that in 2010, Vancouver hosted the Olympic Games, which may have elevated the number of deploy- ments in 2010 compared to other years (also see De Lint 2005: 180; Kitchen and Rygiel 2014: 203). Without more complete data on the ERT’s deployment numbers, it is difficult to make any solid conclusions about the unit.

Ontario Provincial Police Deployments

The FOI request received from the OPP used broad categories to sort the 2013 and 2016 data, while the 2007 and 2010 data was not categorized at all. Detailed analysis is thus difficult, but general observations could be made. The OPP’s ERT deployed an increasing number of times since 2007, though it is important to note that the unit has slightly

123 B. Roziere, K. Walby different duties than municipal PPUs. Unlike those units, the ERT is extensively involved in search and rescue, which represented about 20% of the unit’s deployments in 2013 and 2016 (Access Request CSCS-A-2016-04906). However, the ERT’s most active function was providing assistance to other police units. Approximately 30% of the ERT’s deployments were to provide back-up to the Canine Unit (Access Request CSCS-A-2016- 04906), which is involved in a range of tracking activities including evidence, explosives, and drugs searches (Ontario Provincial Police 2016). Several hundred other deployments were to assist units such as the Organized Crime Enforcement Bureau (Access Request CSCS-A-2016-04906). Other activities included prisoner escorts, and various ‘security’ deployments, representing under 10% of all ERT deployments in 2013, but over 15% in 2016. Warrant executions were the only type of deployment that decreased (Access Request CSCS-A-2016-04906). It is unclear why the decrease occurred, but one possibility is that it is the result of changes to how deployments were classified by the ERT between 2013 and 2016. The rationale would be that while warrant executions decreased by almost 100 instances in this time, ‘evidence search’ deployments simultaneously increased by a similar amount (Access Request CSCS-A-2016-04906).

Unplanned vs Planned Deployments

2000 1885 1888 Unplanned Planned Unknown 1800 1600 1495 1332 1400 1200 1000 868 800 563

Deployments 600 400 121 200 54 0 2007 2010 2013 2016 Ontario Provincial Police Emergency Response Team

PPU Growth and Benchmarking

The deployment data revealed little consistency in terms of increases or decreases in PPU deployments. There were significant drops in the CPS’ number of deployments, as well as sizable fluctuations in the OPS and VDP’s deployments. Though it may be tempting to draw conclusions about the level of militarization within each police force from this data alone, it is preferable to use multiple points of measurement for the sake of accuracy. Kraska and Kappeler (1997: 6) used deployment and PPU creation data to measure the growth of militarization in the 1980s and 90s. One way to measure growth is in cost. We know that the cost of the WPS Tactical Support Team increased from $3,878,373 CAD in 2011 to $5,098,965 in 2016 CAD (Access Request #17-03-164), and other units enjoyed a similar boost in funding across the country. It was not feasible to use PPU creation as a measure of growth for our research because the police services sampled in this research were pre-selected on the basis that they already had a PPU, and because of the difficulties of obtaining data on this topic in Canada. In place of PPU creation, as a proxy we sought information about the number of officers assigned to PPUs as this would reveal if the size of the PPUs was growing, and thus

123 The Expansion and Normalization of Police Militarization in… increasing the presence of PPU style policing, and drifting further away from community policing. Based on the data collected, it appears that PPUs have either grown or maintained their size regardless of their number of deployments. Information on the membership of the CPS Tactical Unit was initially refused by the service, citing the data’s potential to interfere with law enforcement activities or facilitate crime, though it is unclear how knowledge of this information would do so. In response to a second access request for assigned officer numbers, the CPS disclosed that their tactical unit has had 31 members consistently since at least 2007, despite the fact that the unit’s deployments have dropped (as of 2016) to almost one-third of what they were in 2007 (Access Request #16-G-1467; Access Request #17-G-0852). The reason why officer numbers were at first refused is unknown, but demonstrates the role that discretion plays in state responses to ATI/FOI requests. This difference is of note given that all other responding police departments provided officer numbers freely. The WPS for instance offered membership numbers for the TST, stating that the unit has maintained a size of 37 assigned officers for at least the last few years (Access Request #16-10-911). Though this number is reportedly larger than when the unit was first established in 2008 (CBC News 2008). The VPD’s ERT has grown slightly, although its number of deployments are as of yet unknown (Access Request #16-2974A). In each year since 2007, the OPP ERT has maintained a size of 256 assigned officers spread across OPP detachments in Ontario (Access Request #CSCS-A-2016-04906). The data did not provide any additional details that allow for greater insights to be made into any potential changes which may have occurred in the distribution of members in the province, or to the number of officers at any given location. In comparison to the other PPUs, the OPS’ tactical unit is unique in that its membership numbers indicated a decrease over time (Access Request #16-867). Still this finding requires a caveat in that the FOI disclosure suggested that the unit’s membership is not as clear cut as in other police services (Access Request #16-867). The OPS notes that ‘‘annual leave, time off, temporary transfer’’ (Access Request #16-867) and other factors may affect the number of assigned officers throughout the year. They also provided the number of assigned officers as of January, 2017 which was 31, which is clearly an increase to its membership (Access Request #16-867).

PPU Members by City 39 Vancouver Calgary Winnipeg Oawa 37

35

33

31

cers cers ffi O Assigned 29

27

25 2007 2010 2013 2016

The third set of information requested pertaining to benchmarking and development of tactical units resulted in a limited amount of data. Benchmarking in this context refers to policies, practices, and procedures being standardized or defined through communications

123 B. Roziere, K. Walby between multiple agencies. The CPS did not provide any information in regard to the final item of the request, stating that neither their Policy Division nor the Tactical Unit had any records concerning benchmarking, and that ‘‘if benchmarking has ever been done, it would have been disposed of by now in accordance with the Calgary Police Service records retention schedule’’ (Access Request #16-G-1467). According to emails obtained from the WPS and the OPP, the CPS has engaged in benchmarking (Access Request #16-10-911; Access Request #CSCS-A-2016-04906). In an email with the WPS, dated March 14, 2007, the CPS requested information from other police services on policies and procedures ‘‘concerning the situations in which there would be a consideration of deployment of a tactical team to a situation’’ (Access Request #16-10-911). A complete list of the police services who received this email was not included, but the subject line suggests the CPS were surveying a number of different services (Access Request #16-10-911). The WPS’ response is unknown as it was provided over the phone (Access Request #16-10-911). With only this single email it is impossible to know for certain why the CPS requested deployment policies and procedures. However, given that their tactical unit’s number of deployments drastically decreased in proceeding years it may be that the CPS was con- scious of the unit’s excessive use. Several emails obtained from the OPP reveal that the CPS has engaged in benchmarking recently as well. In a chain of emails dated September 1, 2016, a member of the CPS obtained a package of materials from the OPP about the standard operating procedures and duties of the OPP ERT, as well as an invitation to observe an upcoming ERT training course (Access Request CSCS-A-2016-04906). This material was meant to assist the CPS in exploring the possibility of creating ‘‘patrol containment teams’’ (CSCS-A-2016-04906) that would be deployed to situations ‘‘prior to Tactical Unit deployment’’ (Access Request #CSCS-A-2016-04906). According to the emails, the CPS has recently become interested in developing containment teams as a result of its tactical unit becoming increasingly involved in an ‘‘investigative and patrol capacity’’ (Access Request CSCS-A-2016-04906). This not only further reveals the expansion of PPUs into routine policing, but also of the possibility that the expansion may result in the creation of new layers and use of escalated force. While the data obtained from the WPS and the OPP provided insight into benchmarking undertaken by the CPS, it did not greatly illuminate these unit’s own benchmarking. The OPS denied access to the benchmarking data, but provided this statement that is in itself revealing: Communications between OPS and other police agencies are part of the OPS Operational SMEAC Plan for each year. The Operational Plans include presenta- tions, briefings, instructional videos, investigative techniques and procedures, notes, emails, etc. This information is used by the OPS Tactical Unit in the development of new procedures and/or techniques, assessment of current processes, and briefings of all Tactical Unit calls for service (Access Request #16-867). The FOI request showed that the OPS’ tactical unit frequently collaborates on warrant work with other forces such as the OPP, the RCMP, and Gatineau’s police service (Access Request #16-867). This statement though suggests that the OPS’ relationship to these forces is likely more extensive than simply cooperating on the occasional investigation. Furthermore, the OPS unwillingness to provide any access to the requested materials flies in the face of public accountability. In the eyes of the OPS, the ‘‘assessment of current processes’’ (Access Request #16-867) related to their tactical unit is not up for public debate.

123 The Expansion and Normalization of Police Militarization in…

Discussion and Contributions

While Kraska (2007: 506) found that deployments of American PPUs in the 1980s and 90s were increasing each year, the deployment data of the Canadian PPUs shows a less steady rise. Not every PPU in Canada is deploying more now than it did 10 years ago. The deployments of some units have fluctuated. This should not be taken as an indication that PPUs do not play an active role in policing in Canada or that Canadian police forces are not becoming increasingly militarized. At the time that Kraska (2007) conducted his research, many American police forces were only beginning to create and use PPUs. Two decades later, our research is taking place during a time when most of the sampled police services have had an active PPU for decades. Despite these differences, the Canadian PPUs in this research have consistently deployed at a higher rate than was observed by Kraska and Kappeler (1997: 6) of urban PPUs at their highest point in the 1990s. In terms of empirical findings, what is more significant about the findings is that there was strong evidence suggesting Canadian PPUs are routinely being used in both reactive and proactive work that falls outside their intended function, and frequently outside of what is revealed to the public as well. In some cases, the most notable being the WPS Tactical Support Team, the evidence shows that PPUs are actively being used in routine patrol work and as a part of their police service’s community policing strategy (Access Request #16- 10-911). The involvement of PPUs in such activities highlights their expanding role in policing, suggesting a high degree of normalization which is indicative of militarization (Kraska 2007). Rivera (2015) argues there is no meaningful oversight or system of checks and balances for normalization and expansion of police militarization across the United States and our findings suggest a similar trend in Canada. In terms of methodological contributions, this paper contributes to the growing body of critical criminal justice research utilizing ATI/FOI requests. The value of ATI/FOI requests to militarization research specifically and criminal justice research more generally cannot be understated (see Walby and Larsen 2012). These data presented here would not have been possible to access without ATI/FOI, and the findings would have been less revealing if other research methods had been relied on. The police services sampled are not in the habit of releasing up to date information on the activities of their PPUs (and as we noted several police services refused to release these requested data). Moreover, the data they do release proactively is often misleading (see Luscombe and Walby 2015). We call for replication of this research design in all jurisdictions where scholars can use FOI requests for research purposes. The implications of police militarization in Canada (and elsewhere) are significant. First, such policing practices are more likely to target already marginalized populations where police patrols and raids and more intense (Gamal 2016; Peak 2015). Thus one reason to investigate the expansion of SWAT teams and the expanded deployment of them is based on the issue of equity and fairness. Second, recent research has also shown SWAT use is more likely to lead to citizen and shooting deaths (Delehanty et al. 2017). Thus, a second to reason to investigate SWAT use is because it has become a matter of life and death for citizens. SWAT teams increase police violence, with seemingly little to no effect on actual frequency or severity of crime despite the costs and the consequences for the overall public police mission (McQuoid and Haynes 2017). There are also key concerns regarding the financial and social costs of using SWAT teams, and the issue of legitimacy and legitimacy crises as well (Roziere and Walby, forthcoming). The use of SWAT teams

123 B. Roziere, K. Walby in routine policing and even in warrant execution should be declared a failed public policy and scaled back immediately. Militarization does not merely affect interactions between the state and criminal offenders, it changes what policing is by changing what police officers do (Hill and Beger 2009). The consequences of militarization is likely fall disproportionately on those from minority groups, those with mental health issues, and those exercising democratic rights associated with political expression (Weiss 2011). The questions that should be asked extend well beyond whether the police should be allowed to use one form of equipment or another, to how legally innocent individuals should be treated by police; what the purpose of the police should be in a democratic society; and to what extent we are willing to allow the state to violently intrude on our lives. Future research should also connect findings on the scope and institutionalization of police militarization in Canada to literature on and critical questions about police violence (Jacobs 1998; Ross 1992, 1995), police shootings, and oversight.

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Ross, J. I. (1992). The outcomes of public police violence: A neglected research agenda. Police Studies, 15(1), 163–183. Roziere, B., & Walby, K. (forthcoming). Police militarization in Canada: Media rhetoric and operational realities. Policing: a Journal of Policy and Practice. Salter, M. (2014). Toys for the boys? Drones, pleasure and popular culture in the militarization of policing. Critical Criminology, 22(2), 163–177. . (n.d.). Tactical support unit. Retrieved January 8, 2017, from http:// saskatoonpolice.ca/tsu/. Shantz, J. (2016). They have always been military: On so-called militarized policing in Canada. Journal of Social Justice, 6, 1–26. Vancouver Police Department. (2016). Vancouver Police Department crime incident and crime rate statistics. Retrieved from http://vancouver.ca/police/Planning/StatsCrimeRate/2010-2015R.pdf. Vancouver Police Department. (2017). Vancouver Police Department crime incident and crime rate statistics. Retrieved from http://vancouver.ca/police/Planning/StatsCrimeRate/2011-2016R.pdf. Walby, K., & Larsen, M. (2012). Access to information and freedom of information requests: Neglected means of data production in the social sciences. Qualitative Inquiry, 18(1), 31–42. Weiss, T. (2011). The blurring border between the police and the military: A debate without foundations. Cooperation and Conflict, 46(3), 396–405. Winnipeg Free Press. (2016). Free Press has top readership. Winnipeg Free Press, City, p. 2. Retrieved from Canadian Reference Centre database. (Accession No. 7BS2253628032). Winnipeg Police Service. (2016). Winnipeg Police Service announces downtown safety strategy (Press release). Retrieved from http://www.winnipeg.ca/police/press/2016/12dec/2016_12_15.aspx. Winnipeg Police Service. (2017). Winnipeg Police Service 2016 annual statistical report. Retrieved from http://www.winnipeg.ca/police/AnnualReports/2016/2016_wps_annual_report_english.pdf. Wood, D. (2016). Calgary cops shopping for new armoured vehicle. Calgary Sun. Retrieved from http:// www.calgarysun.com/2016/08/02/calgary-cops-shopping-for-new-armoured-vehicle. Wood, L. (2014). Crisis and control: The Militarization of protest policing. London: Pluto.

Access to Information Requests

Access Request #16-10-911. (2016). Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act request to Winnipeg Police Service. Access Request #16-2974A. (2016). Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act request to Vancouver Police Department. Access Request #16-867. (2016). Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act request to Ottawa Police Service. Access Request #16-G-1467. (2016). Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act request to Calgary Police Service. Access Request #17-4-295. (2017). Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act request to Winnipeg Police Service. Access Request #17-G-0582. (2017). Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act request to Calgary Police Service. Access Request #CSCS-A-2016-04906. (2016). Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act request to Ontario Provincial Police.

Legislation

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-25, s. 20(1)(c), 20(1)(k). Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M-7, s. 17.

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1

Article Police Militarization in Canada: Media Rhetoric and Operational Realities

Brendan Roziereà and Kevin WalbyÃÃ

Abstract This paper examines police militarization in Canada between 2007 and 2017. We contrast media and police accounts of militarization with special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team deployment records disclosed under freedom of information (FOI) law. Discourse analysis reveals a series of armoured vehicle purchases has been justified by police claims about the danger faced by police officers, and the need to keep police officers and the public safe. Media and police accounts thus suggest militarization is limited. However, our FOI research shows planned and unplanned deployment of SWAT teams have risen in major Canadian cities and are higher in some cases than those reported by Kraska on public police militarization in the USA. After revealing this juxtaposition between media rhetoric and the organization and operational reality of police militarization, we reflect on the implications of police militarization in Canada and the challenges that police may face in communications about armoured vehicle purchases as public awareness of SWAT team use rises and police legitimacy is questioned.

Introduction accounts of militarization in Canada with disclosure Despite extensive attention paid towards police mili- of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team deploy- tarization in the USA (e.g. Kraska and Kappeler, ment records. 1997; Dodge et al., 2010) and debate about its nor- Media and police accounts in Canada suggest malization (Jefferson, 1990; Waddington, 1999; Den militarization is limited. In print media, armoured Heyer, 2014), the Canadian case has not been the vehicle purchases have been rationalized by police subject of scholarly inquiry. This paper examines the claims about the current and increasing danger status of police militarization in Canada between faced by police officers, and the need to keep the 2007 and 2017. We assume that militarization public safe. However, the organization and oper- exists on a continuum, and that deployment of ational reality of police militarization differs from SWAT teams for routine police activity is the leading print media depictions. Disclosures under freedom indicator. Building on Rantatalo’s (2016) effort to of information (FOI) law reveal that deployments contrast cultural representations against police tac- of SWAT teams have spiked in major Canadian tical unit’s work, we compare media and police cities and are higher in some cases than those

ÃUniversity of Manitoba, Faculty of Law, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2M6, Canada ÃÃDepartment of Criminal Justice, University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3B 2E9, Canada. E-mail: [email protected]

Policing, pp. 1–13 doi:10.1093/police/pax075 ß The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions please e-mail: [email protected] [27.10.2017–5:41pm] [1–13] Paper: OP-POLI170075 Copyedited by: PR MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE

2 Policing Article B. Roziere and K. Walby

reported by Kraska (2007) in the USA. Alvaro purchases and increasing SWAT team use as (2000) found the average yearly number of deploy- public awareness rises and police legitimacy be- ments by Canadian tactical units was 60 total per comes questioned. unit; two decades later we show that the average annual number of deployments by Canadian tac- tical units (as of 2017) is approximately 1,300 per Literature on militarization of unit. Additionally, SWAT teams in Canada are public police being used more for routine policing tasks includ- ing traffic stops, petty warrants, community poli- Police militarization is vital to study for at least cing, and response to mental health crises. three reasons. First, many scholars claim militariza- The juxtaposition between media representa- tion can shift the mission of the public police to- tions of SWAT practices and actual deployment wards a more aggressive, forceful orientation data is significant because media messaging by (Kraska, 2007; Hill and Beger, 2009). Second, as public police shapes their legitimacy and public Delehanty et al. (2017) find, police access to mili- confidence in them (McGovern and Lee, 2010; tary weapons and vehicles is linked to increased Lee and McGovern, 2013). As prominent claims- fatalities from officer shootings. Third, as we makers about law and order issues, public police reveal, comparing the media rhetoric and oper- experience a unique relationship with media ational reality of police militarization provides a (Ericson, 1989; Mawby, 2010; Ellis and case study of how police communications can mis- McGovern, 2016). If police communication staff represent operational police practices and organ- present contradictory information to the public, it izational processes. can increase a sense of risk, and decrease trust of Kraska (2007, p. 503) suggests police militariza- police (Lee and McGovern, 2016). Rhetoric matters tion can be studied by using ‘four dimensions of the for gaining legitimacy, and trust (Coˆte´-Lussier, military model’: material, cultural, organizational, 2013; Bieler, 2016). Thus, it is noteworthy for and operational. The material dimension refers to police, policymakers, and the public in Canada the military-style equipment, weapons, and tech- and elsewhere that our findings demonstrate a nologies used by police. The cultural dimension stark contrast between the rhetoric and the reality encompasses the appearance and language used of police militarization. Not only do we highlight by police, and the values that they communicate. the extent of SWAT team deployment in Canada, The organizational dimension focuses on the we show how police communications about mili- SWAT teams that are structured to mimic military tarization downplay SWAT purchases and procure- units. The operational dimension is concerned with ment and why this disparity represents a possible the ‘patterns of activity’ (Kraska, 2007, p. 503) used policy problem and potential police legitimacy by police that emulate those of the military, par- crisis. ticularly in response to high-risk incidents. First, we review literature on police militariza- As it regards the material dimension, the trend of tion as well as police media framing and commu- transferring military equipment and technology to nications. After a note on method, we provide our the police has been ongoing for decades. Tasers for analysis. We use discourse analysis and FOI re- example were first used by the military, but are now quests to contrast the rhetoric and reality of used commonly by police forces (Kitchen and police militarization in Canada. Finally, we reflect Rygiel, 2014; Salter, 2014). Phillips (2016) high- on the implications of police militarization in lights that the trend is that a growing number of Canada and the challenges that police may face in police forces acquire and expand access to military- communications about armoured vehicle style assault rifles to street-level officers (Haggerty [27.10.2017–5:41pm] [1–13] Paper: OP-POLI170075 Copyedited by: PR MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE

Police militarization in Canada Article Policing 3

and Ericson, 1999). Phillips argues that claims carrying out drug raids, policing ‘hot spots’ (Kraska about ‘crime prevention, crime fighting and and Cubellis, 1997; Hill and Beger, 2009) ‘conduct- danger’ (Phillips, 2016, p. 186) have been used to ing traffic stops, executing petty warrants, crowd justify the trend, but that they rely on questionable control duties’ (Hill et al., 2007, p. 305) and other evidence. routine policing activities that fall outside of the Although militarization may be visible to the PPU mandate. public when police adopt military-style equip- ment, the ideology may permeate police depart- ments in less overt ways (Kraska and Kappeler, Method and data 1997, p. 3). The cultural dimension of militariza- tion includes elements such as police language and To examine the cultural dimension of militariza- dress as well as beliefs they communicate (Kraska, tion (Kraska, 2007), discourse analysis was applied 2007, p. 505). The narratives commonly utilized by to a set of sampled media articles on armoured ve- the police in our sample below are reflective of hicle procurements. To complement this approach what Phillips (2016) describes as ‘policing we used FOI requests to investigate the operational myths.’ Myths are ‘narratives or stories’ that and organizational dimensions of militarization. draw on and reproduce societal values or ideolo- Each data collection technique informed the other gies through a ‘blend of truth and untruth’ by providing supplementary data that would be (Phillips, 2016, p. 186). Police reiterate myths as missed using a single technique. a way of justifying their continued existence, ac- Discourse analysis reveals how competing dis- cumulation of resources, and expansion. Phillips courses shape the way in which people think and (2016, p. 188) argues that the police and the media feel, as well as discover which discourses are pro- take part in promoting the myths ‘that crime pre- moted as truth (Waitt, 2005, p. 174). Since most vention, crime fighting, and danger are an integral individuals’ first-hand experiences with criminal part of policing’ despite evidence to the contrary. justice are limited, external sources such as mass Below we apply discourse analysis to a sample of media are crucial to how the public understands media articles on the recent armoured vehicle ac- discourses of crime and justice. Surette (2015, quisitions of several Canadian police departments p. 35) describes claims-makers as those who for- as a proxy for studying the cultural dimension of ward ‘specific claims about a social condition,’ militarization. while claims themselves are explanations for how We juxtapose this focus on the cultural dimen- an issue should be understood. Claims-makers sion of militarization with data on organizational shape how an issue is constructed, and the policy and operational patterns. We treat the rise of police solutions that follow. Mass and news media’s pref- paramilitary units (PPUs) and SWAT teams in erence for constructions ‘that are dramatic, Canada is an indicator of the organizational dimen- [that] are sponsored by powerful groups, and sion of militarization; their use in routine policing [that] are related to pre-established cultural activities (typically the bailiwick of regular duty of- themes’ (Surette, 2015, p. 34), means that more ficers) is the operational pattern we report on. This critical constructions do not receive a platform as is significant because as Kraska (2007, p. 506) de- often. scribes, the traditional role of PPUs (and that por- Media articles on armoured vehicle procure- trayed to the public) is their ‘reactive deployment’ ments rather than PPU deployments were selected to dangerous or high-risk yet rare incidents includ- as our focus for two reasons. First, police procure- ing terrorism and hostage-takings. Yet police forces ments of armoured vehicles have been common in have further entrusted PPUs with tasks including Canadian cities, and once purchased the vehicles [27.10.2017–5:41pm] [1–13] Paper: OP-POLI170075 Copyedited by: PR MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE

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have regularly fallen under the control of PPUs.1 FOI requests are an under-utilized method for con- Second, PPU deployments are rarely covered by ducting social science research (Walby and Larsen, media outlets, limiting their potential for insight 2012; Luscombe and Walby, 2015). They allow re- into police activities. Analysis was limited to cover- searchers to circumvent rhetoric by providing access age of the procurements in Saskatoon, Winnipeg, to internal information that has not been subject to and as they were the most recent, and the same management process as official discourses the most likely to be representative of the state of disseminated to the public. FOI requests also afford the cultural dimension of militarization related to an opportunity to conduct research on agencies that Canadian police forces. Given their size, these cities may not be accessible otherwise, such as policing also represent typical Canadian cities and act as agencies which sometimes decline participation in typical cases in our sample.2 The sample was col- surveys. Terminology used to describe government lected by searching for the term ‘armoured vehicle’ records or practices in an FOI request should reflect in the Lexis-Nexis and Canadian Reference Centre that used by the subject agency because failing to do databases. Only articles that were published by so may result in gaps or delays in disclosure. The major news outlets in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, access requests that we filed were worded as follows: New Brunswick, or those published by national 1. Requesting all records pertaining to the [name of outlets were selected. This sampling strategy was relevant police service and PPU’s name] fre- meant to capture the narratives conveyed by news quency of deployment and type of deployment sources with high regional readership, as these in each instance (e.g. executing search warrant, sources could be expected to have the most signifi- responding to call, etc.). cant impact on public discourse. Articles that did 2. Requesting all records pertaining to the number not focus on the armoured vehicle purchases in of officers assigned to the [name of relevant Saskatoon, Winnipeg, or Fredericton were police service and PPU’s name]. removed. Due to limits in the availability of news sources found within the Lexis-Nexis and Canadian To save time and control cost, each request was Reference Centre databases, the ‘armoured vehicle’ limited to include only the years of 2007, 2010, search term was also run through the search engines 2013, and 2016. By doing so, it was possible to on the CBC News, Metro, and Winnipeg Sun web- track and measure the growth of the PPU/SWAT sites. These news sources were selected because units and their number of deployments while while they were not available in either of the data- avoiding barriers to using FOI. bases, excluding them would mean overlooking 3 The rhetoric of police militarization other sizable news sources. The sample consisted of 30 articles, which while small is justifiable for the in Canada illustrative purposes of discourse analysis (Van der Analysis revealed that the claims made in favour of Valk, 2003; Waitt, 2005). the armoured vehicle purchases relied on two

1 Notable examples include the OPS’s purchase of a BearCat armoured vehicle in 2010 (OPS, n.d.), the VPD’s ARV which was also purchased in 2010 (Palmer, 2010), and the CPS’s Armet Balkan MK7 purchased in 2008 (CBC News, 2008a). 2 As of 2016, about 65% of the Canadian population resides in a municipality with over 50,000 people (Statistics Canada, n.d.). Winnipeg is the 7th largest in Canada with 705,244 people, Saskatoon is the 19th (246,376), and Fredericton is the 92nd (58,220) (Statistics Canada, n.d.). 3 In 2016, the Winnipeg Sun and the Metro were estimated to each have readership of approximately 50% of the adult population in Winnipeg (Winnipeg Free Press, 2016). Additionally, the Metro claims to reach approximately 2 million Canadians nation-wide everyday (Metro News, n.d.). As of 2015 the CBC reports that approximately 10.6 million unique users visit its website each month (CBC/Radio-Canada, 2015, p. 39). [27.10.2017–5:41pm] [1–13] Paper: OP-POLI170075 Copyedited by: PR MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE

Police militarization in Canada Article Policing 5

overlapping themes; the current and often increas- as a very dangerous place, but it is very dangerous’ ing danger faced by police officers; and the need to (in May and Kives, 2015). While police frequently keep police officers and the public safe. Claims asserted that there has been an increase in danger- made against the armoured vehicle purchases like- ous incidents, few provided data to support this wise fell primarily into two thematic categories; claim. Winnipeg’s deputy police chief was one of those critical of the potential militarization of the a few to provide a statistic, stating that in 2014 and police; and in the case of Winnipeg’s armoured ve- 2015 combined, Winnipeg police executed around hicle purchase, concerns over the cost and procure- ‘[three-hundred] search warrants that involved ment process.4 Themes were established by weapons or had the potential to involve weapons’ identifying reoccurring keywords and ideas across (in CBC News, 2016), though he gave no further the media articles (Ryan and Bernard, 2003). indication of any actual increases in Canada. There Phillips (2016, p. 188) contends that while inci- is a lack of clarity in the claim, which is part of the dents such as active shooters and terrorism are rare, way the claim functions as a policing myth about danger myths persist because it is argued that danger (Phillips, 2016, p. 188). ‘crime control activity and crime fighting tasks in- Police officer and public safety were also refer- clude a potential for danger’. As Phillips (2016, enced often. This theme overlaps with the danger p. 187) points out though, it is easy to suggest theme, but should be considered to be distinct. that the ‘potential for danger’ is omnipresent and Most often the concept of danger was associated unpredictable, thus justifying additional resources with hypothetical references to high-risk incidents to prepare for it. In our sample the danger theme such as hostage takings and active shooters, whereas followed a similar logic. Many police officers the idea of providing safety to officers and the claimed that policing has become more dangerous, public was connected to more specific incidents and that they are increasingly responding to high- that had occurred in the past. Police tended to ref- risk incidents or executing more high-risk warrants. erence local incidents in which they felt an ar- A statement by Saskatoon’s police chief that an ar- moured vehicle would have provided officers and moured vehicle would be useful for ‘potentially civilians needed protection, though they also made lethal warrants, standoffs and conflicts invol- references to well-known incidents in other juris- ving a with a high-calibre weapon’ (in dictions such as the 2014 Moncton shooting during Hutton, 2011) likewise encapsulates an oft-re- which three officers were killed and two seriously peated argument by police claims-makers. Some injured by a shooter with high-powered long guns. claims-makers gave ambiguous statements on the These claims focused on the idea that an armoured dangers faced by police such as Fredericton’s police vehicle would protect police officers from similar chief who argued that purchasing an armoured ve- situations in the future. hicle was necessary for her force because policing Another way in which the safety theme appeared around the globe has changed, making it necessary was in the portrayal of armoured vehicles as safety to prepare for a ‘worst-case scenario’ (in Fraser, equipment. One of the most common arguments 2016). Similarly, the president of the Winnipeg made by the police was that the armoured vehicles Police Association praised the Winnipeg Police should be thought of as safety equipment because it Service (WPS) for purchasing an armoured vehicle, would protect police officers during high-risk inci- claiming that ‘We [Winnipeg] don’t see ourselves dents. Winnipeg’s police chief went as far as to

4 Some criticisms were voiced over the usefulness of such a vehicle in comparison to other options given that the vehicle had a $343,000 price tag (CBC News, 2015a), although the majority of such criticisms were over the secretive nature of the purchase (Pursaga, 2016). While the cost and procurement process of armoured vehicles does leave much room for debate, such an analysis is beyond our scope. [27.10.2017–5:41pm] [1–13] Paper: OP-POLI170075 Copyedited by: PR MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE

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suggest that an armoured vehicle was a necessary armoured vehicles against protestors (CBC News, piece of safety equipment to avoid injury lawsuits 2016). (May, 2016). The claim that public safety would Police claims-makers in the articles regularly also be improved relied on the idea that the vehicles admitted that they had heard criticisms and con- would make it possible for medical personnel to cerns regarding militarization though, they were reach civilians in conflict areas or as a way to dismissive of those criticisms. In response to con- remove civilians from danger. This idea was ex- cerns, the police often suggested that since their tended by the police’s frequent insistence that the vehicle would not be equipped with any armaments vehicles had a ‘rescue’ function, and thus should be or was not military-grade, it did not contribute to considered ‘armoured rescue vehicles.’ an increased level of militarization. The WPS for Little overall coverage was given to those articles example claimed that they had decided against critical of the armoured vehicle purchases. While acquiring an old vehicle from the military because most articles at least acknowledged that there were that would ‘send a message we’re really uncomfort- criticisms of the police becoming more militarized, able with’ (May and Kives, 2015) as opposed to few elaborated on what those criticism were, or at- their Gurkha armored vehicle which was built for tempted to explain what police militarization is. An ‘policing purposes’ (Hildebrand, 2016). In regard even fewer number of articles included comments to concerns about the police’s relationship with the community, police representatives argued that from claims-makers about militarization. In con- their armoured vehicle would not change the po- trast almost every article in the sample included lice’s community approach, and that they had no extensive quotations from police. Only four of the intention of distancing themselves from commu- sampled articles conveyed a primarily critical tone nity members. Moreover, they highlighted events of the purchases in terms of their potentially mili- which they felt would offer community members tarizing effect. The CBC (New Brunswick and an opportunity to be educated about the armoured Winnipeg) published two articles that covered the vehicle. criticisms of local academics, while the Metro The overall pervasiveness of the police as claims- (Winnipeg), and the Winnipeg Free Press each fea- makers in the media articles allowed for a greater tured a single critical editorial style article. dissemination of the danger and safety themes than The militarization theme was critiqued almost that of the competing militarization theme. This exclusively by academics. Although these com- presents a problem in that as Greenberg (2004, ments appeared in only a handful of articles, their p. 355) explains, when only a few themes are used perspective on militarization was consistent. These to construct an issue it may appear as if relative academics claimed that the acquisition of an ar- consensus exists. moured vehicle presented a threat to the commu- None of the following critiques are meant to sug- nity policing model. They challenged the notion gest that police do not face danger, or that the safety that public safety would be improved, arguing in- of police officers and the public is unimportant. stead that the vehicle would intimidate members of Policing myths are not necessarily devoid of truth, the public, and put them at greater risk of facing rather they often reflect a combination of accurate, aggressive policing tactics. The criticisms offered exaggerated, and false beliefs (Phillips, 2016, p. spoke to the changing mentality of the police to- 186). However, as Phillips (2016, p. 191) argues wards the community that was reflected by the ar- policing myths influence policy decisions like moured vehicle purchase. One article included equipment purchases and even the proliferation comments from an indigenous advocate who of PPUs, making it imperative that inaccurate or raised concerns about the potential use of misleading claims are challenged. Kappeler and [27.10.2017–5:41pm] [1–13] Paper: OP-POLI170075 Copyedited by: PR MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE

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Kraska (2015, p. 269) likewise argue that it is ne- would be little cause for concern. However, as cessary to assess policing practices, rather than FOI disclosures show, this has not been the case. accept them simply because police work is at times dangerous. Even if police are faced with an increasing The reality of police militarization number of high-risk situations, Kraska and in Canada Kappeler (1997, p. 8) argue that in many cases Deployments PPUs are themselves creating them. PPUs have in- FOI disclosures reveal a stark contrast between creasingly focused on proactive areas of policing media rhetoric and operational realities of police that pose more risk of danger to civilians than militarization, which we conceive of as a potential police (Kraska, 2007, p. 507). PPUs may be re- policy problem for police. The figures for PPU sponding to more incidents, but it should not be deployments are not monolithic. There is variation presumed that this means policing has become by police service, as in Canada there is no national more dangerous. In Canada, violent crime has policy or law regulating PPU conduct or growth. been on the decline for over two decades (Cotter, Deployments by some PPUs such as the 2015a). Likewise, the violent crime severity index Ottawa Police Service’s (OPS) Tactical Unit and has dropped each year since 2006, other than a mar- the Vancouver Police Department’s (VPD) ginal increase in 2015 (Allen, 2016, p. 4). Emergency Response Team (ERT) fluctuated Additionally, the number of police officers in throughout the period covered, though generally Canada who have been killed in the line of duty speaking deployments were on the decline before in Canada has declined since 1961 (Dunn, 2010, increasing slightly in 2016. Both of these units re- p. 6). Officers are statistically more likely to be ported deploying between 100 and 200 times in killed investigating robberies, firearms complaints, each year (other than in 2010 when the VPD de- and conducting traffic stops than executing high- ployed 282 times), which was relatively constrained risk warrants or responding to hostage takings compared with other PPUs. However, one limita- (Dunn, 2010, p. 7). tion that was present in both sets of data was that Finally, although the police departments gave the deployment figures excluded incidents. The their assurances that they are committed to main- data provided by the VPD included only incidents taining a community policing approach, that does that ‘met the threshold of a critical incident’ (Access not mean that the use of armoured vehicles will be Request #16-2974A), while the data provided by the restrained (Kraska, 2007). Like American police de- OPS included only those in which the reporting partments, Canadian police may see little conflict officer had specifically noted the involvement of between community policing, PPUs, and military- the Tactical Unit. style equipment. A statement on Saskatoon’s Deployments of the other PPUs were much armoured vehicle by a Saskatoon Police Sgt. is re- higher. The Ontario Provincial Police’s (OPP) vealing: ‘when we pull up with that thing [ar- ERT and the WPS’ Tactical Support Team (TST) moured vehicle] with the red and blue lights and deployed at their highest rates in 2016, with over all that stuff, everybody knows it’s the police there 2000 and 3000 deployments, respectively. The in- to serve a search warrant’ (in Taylor, 2015). If formation disclosed by the OPP revealed that the Canadian police services had been restraining ERT has consistently deployed at just under 1900 their use of armoured vehicles and the PPUs who times to over 2000 times since 2007. Based on stat- control them to only the most dangerous incidents istics which were extrapolated from two disclosed justifiably requiring their expertise, then there daily occurrence reports, the WPS’ TST deployed [27.10.2017–5:41pm] [1–13] Paper: OP-POLI170075 Copyedited by: PR MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE

8 Policing Article B. Roziere and K. Walby

Figure 1: PPU Deployments 2007-2016, Canada

just under 500 times in 2013 and almost 3,400 times each PPU throughout the covered period was in 2016. Although this appears to suggest an extra- somewhat more consistent having remained stable ordinarily high increase in deployments by the TST, or increasing slightly for each unit. it is likely that the unit deployed far more frequently The most significant finding is the rise in the in 2013 than was captured by the 2013 daily occur- average number of deployments by tactical units rence report. In 2013, two separate operational re- since 1980. Using a survey, Alvaro (2000) found views of the WPS concluded that the TST’s the average annual number of deployments for reporting standards at the time needed to be im- Canadian tactical units was on average 60 total proved. Furthermore, in one of these reviews the per unit. Our results show the average annual TST’s number of deployments was estimated to number of deployments for Canadian tactical have been just under 2000 in 2012. It is likely that units is approximately 1,300 per unit, an increase the TST deployed far more than the approximately of roughly 2,100% in 37 years. Although the 500 times suggested by the 2013 daily occurrence number of deployments of some units decreased report, though this would still suggest that the in the last 5 years, none of the PPUs saw similar TST’s deployments have increased since then. The decreases to their number of assigned officers. This Calgary Police Service’s (CPS) Tactical Unit de- finding may be reflective of Kraska’s (2007, p. 511) ployed at a similarly high rate in 2007, but deploy- argument that PPUs are difficult to scale back once ments have since declined significantly each year to they become normalized. just over 600 in 2016. Deployment numbers for the PPUs in our sample were inconsistent. Some units Warrant work averaged only a single call every few days whereas Warrant executions represented varying propor- others averaged several calls per day. Likewise, the tions of each PPU’s deployments. For both the focus of each unit differs with planned and un- OPP’s ERT and the WPS’ TST warrant work did planned deployments representing drastically dif- not make up a large proportion of deployments, ferent proportions of each unit’s total and declined even further from 2013 to 2016. deployments, as well as variation in the types of Despite this decline the TST still executed almost calls being responded to. While deployments for 250 warrants in 2016, which was more than most some PPUs have decreased since 2007, others other PPUs. Although deployments of the CPS’ have increased by a noticeable margin. These Tactical Unit declined over time, warrant execu- changes are inconsistent between jurisdictions, tions remained steady at around 200–250 instances and do not clearly reflect local changes in the per year, which accounted for about 15% of the crime rate even in jurisdictions where deployments Tactical Unit’s deployments in 2007, and grew to have dropped. The number of officers assigned to represent around a third of all deployments by [27.10.2017–5:41pm] [1–13] Paper: OP-POLI170075 Copyedited by: PR MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE

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2016. The OPS’ Tactical Unit executed approxi- publicly announced until December 15, 2016, the mately 100 warrants in each year. The most signifi- TST attended meetings and deployed under it as cant number of these were drug warrants which early as June, 2016. The TST’s involvement in com- accounted for over 60% of all warrant executions munity policing is further evidenced by a substan- in 2007. Drug warrants decreased to just over 30% tial number of deployments in response to noise of warrant work in 2016, though deployments to complaints, traffic incidents, disturbances, and execute other types of warrants grew during this other minor events. The involvement of the time. Throughout the period warrant work consist- VPD’s ERT and the OPS’ Tactical Unit is largely ently represented about 70% of all deployments of unknown. Although both are known to assist the OPS’ Tactical Unit. These figures show warrant street-level officers upon request, accurate records execution by the SWAT unit is becoming institu- of this work are not kept by either force. tionalized in Canadian public policing. PPU deployments in response to individuals with mental health issues, suicide threats, and to conduct Regular duty and community policing well-being checks have been common. The CPS’ One of the most significant findings from the FOI Tactical Unit was called to over 130 such incidents requests was that several PPUs regularly engage in in 2007, which while decreasing each year still saw the routine or mundane policing which includes re- unit respond to over 60 incidents in 2016. The OPS’ sponding to minor offences or even non-criminal Tactical Unit responded to relatively few calls of this incidents. The CPS’ Tactical Unit deployed almost nature in each year (20–30% of the unit’s unplanned 300 times in response to various ‘dispatch codes’ in deployments). In most cases the deployment entry 2007, as well as approximately 200 times each noted that the purpose of the Tactical Unit’s involve- to ‘disturbances’ and ‘suspicious’ incidents. ment was to assist street-level officers in bringing in- Deployments in these three categories accounted dividuals with known or suspected mental health for nearly 45% of the unit’s total deployments issues into custody. In contrast the WPS’ TST has during that year, and continued to represent as responded to an increasing number of these inci- much as 30% by 2016. Deployments to other dents. Under 20 suicide threats and well-being minor offences including noise complaints, drug checks were recorded in the 2013 daily occurrence offences, property crimes, traffic violations, and report; the 2016 report records almost 300 such de- motor vehicle collisions represented almost a ployments. Some entries included notes that pro- third of all deployments in 2007, though these de- vided insight into the TST’s strategy for handling ployments declined to under 15% by 2016. such occurrences that involved confronting suicidal The WPS’ TST was the most heavily engaged in individuals and gaining their compliance. Given that community policing type work. Nearly 100 in- PPUs are the most heavily armed and armoured stances of ‘special attentions’ or ‘hot-spots’ deploy- units, it is concerning that they continue to have a ments by the TST are recorded in the 2016 daily significant role in responding to suicidal individuals occurrence report, several of which indicated that and those suffering from mental health issues. In they were connected to the WPS’ recently created these cases the individuals have not necessarily com- Centreline strategy. The Centreline strategy is mitted any offence and may not respond well to an described by the WPS as downtown policing strat- escalation of force by the police. egy that is meant to reduce crime and disorder, and improve public safety (both actual and perceived) by combining elements of problem-oriented poli- Discussion and implications cing, smart policing initiative (SPI), and commu- While Canadian police services have not been mili- nity engagement. Although the strategy was not tarized as overtly as many American police [27.10.2017–5:41pm] [1–13] Paper: OP-POLI170075 Copyedited by: PR MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE

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agencies, and there are no policies that allow the used for routine policing. Additionally, the disclos- military to directly transfer technology and equip- ures show little consistency between the role of ment to police as there are in the USA, at least some Canadian PPUs as primarily reactive or proactive police services show signs of PPU normalization forces, but do provide evidence that they are acting that is linked to militarization. Discourse analysis outside their advertised mandate.5 Similar to the of media articles on armoured vehicle procure- findings of Kraska and Cubellis (1997) and Kraska ments reveals that the attitude of Canadian police and Kappeler (1997), Canadian PPUs are engaging departments in obtaining what is military-style in extensive warrant work and community policing equipment relies on misleading claims. We found rather than strictly responding to high-risk inci- that there is a stock set of claims pertaining to dents. That is not to say that our FOI data are with- danger and safety projected by police services that out limits, as FOI disclosures are almost guaranteed procure military-style armoured vehicles. Media to have been limited in unknown ways in addition sources largely reproduce the position of the to the more explicit redactions (Walby and police when covering topics relevant to militariza- Luscombe, forthcoming; Lippert et al., 2016). tion, and identify police as primary claims-makers, However, FOI requests offer a research method which not only limits research, but public debate. that is of value to those studying government agen- Although this component was limited to a small cies, allowing researcher to gain access to records sample size, in terms of the number of articles that would not otherwise be disclosed. Further re- and number of police services, the findings were search on militarization in Canada using FOI and consistent. As a result, a considerable level of con- other research methods is warranted less Canada fidence can be placed in the findings and in the follows this trend and American style militarization likelihood that they would remain consistent if becomes institutionalized across public police the sample were to be expanded, particularly since services. the results reflected a police mentality that has been These findings are an account of police militar- documented (Phillips, 2016, p. 187). The fact that ization in Canada, but also raise questions about most major Canadian cities have a PPU with at least police communications in international context. one armoured vehicle, and that PPU assigned offi- As Kappeler and Kraska (2015) argue, the normal- cers have grown, provides evidence that the cultural ization of police militarization continues, yet dimension of militarization is pervasive and re- claims-makers obfuscate these processes. Media inforces the organizational and operational dimen- and police framing of equipment purchases play a sions of militarization. part in manufacturing a neutral image of a poten- FOI disclosures show that the operational reality tially dangerous change in policing. Following of police militarization in Canada is very different Kappeler’s (2014) claim that research should com- than the portrayal of this phenomenon in media municate directly to public police, there is a clear and police rhetoric. SWAT teams are being used message in our findings for police and criminal for more than public emergencies; they are being justice policymakers: contradictory messaging

5 On their websites, the OPS, VPD, and CPS similarly describe the mandates of their PPUs as responding to high-risk or dangerous situations such as hostage-takings, barricaded suspects, and high-risk warrant executions (Calgary Police Service, n.d.; OPS, n.d.; Vancouver Police Department, n.d.). The WPS does not provide any information on its website about the TST, however a similar mandate to that of the aforementioned units was presented in media accounts of the unit’s creation (CBC News, 2008b). The OPP ERT’s public mandate is broader than that of the other PPUs. While the ERT is responsible for many of the same duties, it is also described as being involved in tasks including search and rescue, assisting in canine tracking, and public order policing that are not within the publicly presented mandates of the other PPUs (Ontario Provincial Police, 2016). [27.10.2017–5:41pm] [1–13] Paper: OP-POLI170075 Copyedited by: PR MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE

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about and media framing of militarization by police http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/calgary-police- roll-out-armoured-vehicle-for-high-risk-calls-1.702311. claims-makers could increase risk and decrease CBC News. (2008b, May 13). Winnipeg police launch full- trust and public confidence (Ellis and McGovern, time SWAT-type unit. CBC News, Manitoba. http://www. 2016; Rantatalo, 2016). Such an erosion could be cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/winnipeg-police-launch- damaging to community relationships with the full-time-swat-type-unit-1.725400. police, particularly in minority communities CBC News. (2015a, December 9). ‘Militarizing police’: Winnipeg buys $343K armoured vehicle for officers. where confidence in the police tends to be lower CBC News, Manitoba. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ (Cotter, 2015b). Moreover, the public may manitoba/militarizing-police-winnipeg-buys-343k-ar- become less willing to accept future police requests moured-vehicle-for-officers-1.3357289. about equipment needs and PPU activities if earlier CBC News. (2016, June 22). Winnipeg police show off new claims have been shown to be inaccurate. armoured vehicle. CBC News. http://www.cbc.ca/news/ canada/manitoba/winnipeg-police-get-armoured-ve- Challenges to police legitimacy in the form of repu- hicle-1.3647088. tational risk are a potential problem that police may CBC/Radio-Canada. (2015). Annual report 2014–2015. need to remedy as this juxtaposition becomes http://www.cbc.radio-canada.ca/site/rapports-annuels/ starker. 2014-2015/_documents/annual-report-2014-2015.pdf. ˆ ´ The contrast between the media rhetoric and op- Cote-Lussier, C. (2013). Narratives of Legitimacy: Police Expansionism and the Contest over Policing. Policing erational reality of police militarization in Canada and Society, 23(2):183–203. is stark, out of touch with the best practice model of Cotter, A. (2015a). Canada’s Crime Rate: Two Decades of communication advocated by Wu¨nsch and Hohl Decline. Canadian Megatrends, No. 2015001, January. (2009). Police administrators should be more Statistics Canada Catalogue No. 11-630-X. http://www. statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2015001-eng.htm candid about SWAT team use and changes in rou- (accessed 10 January 2017). tine police work, or take efforts to freeze this mili- Cotter, A. (2015b). Public Confidence in Canadian tarization creep. Militarization is not the result of Institutions. Spotlight on Canadians: Results from the some natural evolution in policing. It is a political General Social Survey, No. 2015007, December. Statistics Canada Catalogue No. 89-652-X. http://www.statcan.gc. decision, and it affects the lives of citizens ca/pub/89-652-x/89-652-x2015007-eng.htm (accessed 26 (Delehanty et al., 2017). We call for research into August 2017). police militarization in all countries where it is Delehanty, C., Mewhirter, J., Welch, R., and Wilks, J. (2017). occurring with consequences for the relationship Militarization and Police Violence: the Case of the 1033 Program. Research and Politics, 4(2):1–7. between police and the citizens who police are sup- Den Heyer, G. (2014). Mayberry Revisited: a Review of the posed to professionally, impartially serve. Influence of Police Paramilitary Units on Policing. Policing and Society, 24(3):346–361. Dodge, M., Valcore, L., and Klinger, D. (2010). Maintaining References Separate Spheres in Policing: Women on SWAT Teams. Women & Criminal Justice, 20(3):218–238. Allen, M. (2016). Police-Reported Crime Statistics in Canada, 2015. Juristat, 36(1):1–55. Dunn, S. (2010). Police Officers Murdered in the Line of Duty, 1961 to 2009. Juristat, 30(3):1–8. Alvaro, S. (2000). Tactical Law Enforcement in Canada: An Exploratory Survey of Canadian Police Agencies. MA thesis, Ellis, J. and McGovern, A. (2016). ‘The End of Symbiosis? Carleton University. Australia Police-Media Relations in the Digital Age’. Policing & Society, 26(8):944–962. Bieler, S. (2016). Police Militarization in the USA: the State of the Field. Policing: An International Journal of Police Ericson, R. V. (1989). ‘Patrolling the Facts: Secrecy and Strategies & Management, 39(4): 586–600. Publicity in Police Work’. British Journal of Sociology, 40:205–226. Calgary Police Service. (n.d.). About our Tactical Unit. http://www.calgary.ca/cps/Pages/Specialty-teams/About- Fraser, E. (2016, December 15). Fredericton police chief de- our-Tactical-Unit.aspx (retrieved 17 August 2017). fends need for armoured police vehicle. CBC News, New Brunswick. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-bruns- CBC News. (2008a, March 17). Calgary police roll out ar- wick/leanne-fitch-fredericton-vehicle-1.3897560. moured vehicle for high-risk calls. CBC News, Calgary. [27.10.2017–5:41pm] [1–13] Paper: OP-POLI170075 Copyedited by: PR MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE

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