Corporate Air Commando ACA Partners JOURNAL Assisting ACA in our mission to support Air Commandos and their families: Past, Present and Future Publisher Michael Wooley / Email: [email protected] Arby’s Editor in Chief Dennis Barnett / Email: [email protected] AgustaWestland North America, Inc. Contributing Editors Beam, McLaughlin & Assoc.; Merrill Lynch Scott McIntosh Rick Newton Bell Helicopter – A Textron Company Darrel Whitcomb

Boeing Company Public Affairs/Marketing Director Shannon Pressley / Email: [email protected] Creative Awards and Framing Graphic Designer Elbit Systems of America Jeanette Moore / Email: [email protected]

Emerald Coast Convention Center Air Commando Association Board of Directors Esterline Defense Technologies Chairman of the Board : Michael Wooley, Lt Gen, USAF (Ret)

FLIR President: Dennis Barnett, Col, USAF (Ret) GE Aviation Vice President: Hoplite Group David Mobley, Col, USAF (Ret) Treasurer: L-3 Crestview Aerospace James Connors, Col, USAF (Ret) Executive Directors: L-3 Mission Integration Norman Brozenick Jr., Maj Gen, USAF (Ret) Clay McCutchan, Maj Gen, USAF (Ret) Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company Directors: Orbital ATK Tom Bradley, Col, USAF (Ret) Chris Foltz, Lt Col, USAF Operation Hawkeye Wayne Norrad, CMSgt, USAF (Ret) Gordon Scott, CMSgt, USAF (Ret) Quadrant Training Solutions, LLC Hollis Tompkins, SMSgt, USAF (Ret) Micheal Wright, CMSgt, USAF (Ret) Rockwell Collins Sierra Nevada Corporation Visual Awareness Technologies & Consulting, Inc. (VATC)

Air Commando Association Advertisers in this issue: P.O. Box 7, Mary Esther, FL 32569 Telephone: (850) 581-0099 Air Commando Foundation ...... 51 Fax: (850) 581-8988 Creative Awards ...... 50 Web Site: www.aircommando.org Email: [email protected] Emerald Coast Convention Center ...... 50 Lockheed Martin Corporation ...... 23 This publication is for the information, interest, and enjoyment of our readers. Views and opinions expressed are of the author or source of Northrop Grumman ...... 7 material and do not necessarily reflect opinions, views, or endorsements of the ACA. Material in the Air Commando Journal may be reproduced ScottEventPhoto ...... 50 provided the source is credited. Air Commando Journal is not sponsored Special Operations Warrior Foundation...... 29 by DoD, USAF or AFSOC. ACA does not endorse any particular candidate or political action group. TSC Productions ...... 50 Individual members are asked to restrain from inferring or stating any such association of the ACA in their dealings with these type groups.

2 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org Air Commando JOURNAL November 2015 Vol. 4, Issue 2 4 Foreword Matthew M. Caruso, CMSgt, AFSOC Command Chief 9 A Proud and Accomplished Lineage: MC-130P Combat Shadow 15 11 Men in the Arena: Low Altitude HAR Final The Crash of Ditka 03

5 20 Chindit Chatter From Both Sides of the Drogue 6 31 Hotwash Shadows Above 25 Four Marines & Their Shadow: OPERATION MOSHTARAK 40 39 Crew Chief Salutes Final Shadow Shadow Will Always Be a Part of Me ON THE 43 Mule Train COVER 47 A 67th Special Operations Squadron Gooney Birds, Napalm, & MC-130P Combat Shadow takes its final flight in the U.K. Jan 2014. The Combat Shadow, an airframe used for special operations missions since the mid-1980s, is the last of its kind 49 to leave the European theater. (US Air Force photo by SrA Kate Maurer) Book Review: Team of Teams www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 3 FOREWORD

Air Commando Hall of Fame

It is my distinct honor and pleasure to introduce readers to this 14th issue of the Air Commando Journal. To all of our Air Commandos out there…past, present and future, thank you so much for what you do and who you are. In this issue, we pay special tribute to the men and women who maintained, operated and supported the MC-130P Combat Shadow and its crucial mission. The MC-130P recently retired its last tail number and it’s only fitting we highlight this incredible workhorse to our Air Commando Journal followers and readers. While the beloved MC-130P airframe was tired and worn well beyond her years, we couldn’t have been more blessed to operate and maintain such a reliable and sturdy platform. I have really put some deep thought into this and I am sure most of you will agree.....what really made this aircraft and its mission so successful was its people. The most important aspect of any AF weapon system is people. I often talk about grit, determination, toughness, relentlessness, tenacity and skill when I refer to the character of an Air Commando. Other exceptional qualities we have come to expect in Air Commandos are teamwork, humility, pride, loyalty and a steadfast commitment to the mission. During my time as an MC-130P Flight Engineer, I was introduced to these key traits from the entire Shadow Community and it was demonstrated day in and day out. You would never hear us say it, but the joint partners we worked with and supported still talk about it to this day. We were just doing what we do and getting the mission done. For Combat Shadow Airmen who built the platform and performed the mission, it was never about the glory or a decoration on your chest, it was always about the supported unit, the customer and each other. It was about being on-time and on-target every time with hoses out, ready for anything, anytime and anyplace. I am certain that this was the source of the bonds we share today after many years in combat and generations of Airmen growing up in this incredible family. I know each of you will find similarities in the articles in this issue and your own AFSOC platform and experience. For it is that overall sense of Air Commando pride and sense of history and culture that comes out in everything we do, regardless of the weapon system we maintain or operate. I trust you will find this issue a good read and one that helps all of us appreciate one another for what we bring to make AFSOC America’s specialized air power.

Matthew M. Caruso, CMSgt, USAF Command Chief, AFSOC

4 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org CHINDIT CHATTER

ull disclosure, this is a very bittersweet edition of the Air Commando Journal for me. My primary weapon system was the MC-130P Combat Shadow. I loved the mission and was truly privileged to serve Fwith some of the finest aircrew and maintainers in all of the Air Force. I was introduced to the mission in late 1990, a time when the aircraft and crews had barely completed the transition from Rescue to SOF. HC-130s were making the transition from Rescue platform to SOF. These old birds were not made for utilizing the Night Vision Goggles (NVG), critical to the Shadow’s primary mission of covertly refueling helicopters at low level during the night. Aircrews were still evolving the mission tactics, techniques, and procedures. For example, because the cockpit was not compatible with NVG use, one of the engineer’s pre-flight duties was taping over the warning lights in the cockpit and creating unique ways to cover the gear warning handle so if any warning lights came on during NVG operations they would not “wash” the NVGs out and render the crew essentially blind. Some engineers used a combination of a Copenhagen can and tape to cover the gear handle light. At one unit, an unofficial and innovative use of commissary rollers replaced Benson tanks and were installed in the aft of the aircraft to allow airdropping supplies. Those were finally replaced after many years of Dual Rails proponency (dual rails allowed carrying and airdropping essentially any cargo that C-130 platforms were capable of), funding was finally found to allow this last modification. Some classified defensive capabilities were also made allowing the Shadow the ability to venture further into hostile airspace. From that rudimentary beginning, as my career progressed, I watched the various Special Operations Force Improvement modifications evolve with the crew capabilities. Included were refueling capabilities, Forward Looking Infrared pods, fully NVG capable cockpit lighting, and several others that allowed the Shadow to be utilized in expanding roles. Speaking with little bias these new modifications and an innovative crew and maintenance force allowed the Shadow to become one of the most diversely capable and versatile platforms in the inventory. Even without Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance radar, the crews learned to use the systems at hand with great coordination to complete missions in poor weather and low illumination conditions. This was because these teams embraced the true Air Commando ethos of finding ways to complete missions that others could not or would not attempt. Some older Shadow crewmembers coined the quip “half the equipment and twice the skill” in a friendly rivalry with our Talon brethren. And even though the Shadows operated in those very dire situations in a variety of combat situations, we fortunately never lost a crew—on the mission of Ditka 03 the tail was lost, but miraculously the crew all survived. (That story is highlighted on page 15 of this journal). This truly amazing accomplishment is something everyone involved in the mission of Combat Shadows should simultaneously take great pride and give thanks. The Shadow and the people who flew and maintained her were called upon and flew with great efficiency and honor in literally every conflict in every theater that AFSOC participated in from its very first day after the conversion to the SOF realm. It is a proud group, as are all airmen associated with Air Commando weapon systems, that is sad to see the old work horse move to the boneyard. With great pride we now see an aircraft at each of the two major AFSOC base’s airparks. The airplanes, the crews, the maintainers and all who supported her have now moved on to the realm of legacy. It is with great pride that we offer this edition of the Air Commando Journal dedicated to the Shadow’s great history.

Dennis Barnett, Col, USAF (Ret) ACA President and Editor In Chief

www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 5 HOTWASH Intellectual Warrior in 1982 and later went on to become Ranch Hand I just read the ACA Journal (Vol 4 an RTAF Air Chief Marshal and then Reference Air Commando Journal, Issue 1) and the last article “Intellectual the Managing Director of the Airports Volume 4, Issue 1, page 19. In the Warrior Captain John Frederick Shiner” Authority of , their equivalent “Editor’s Note,” there is a comment that really hit home for me. At the end of of our FAA. an article on Ranch Hand will appear in my freshman year I was struggling at Thanks again for your help and a subsequent issue. I have researched USAFA and I met an academic board. Lt support. the Air Commando Journal archives and Col Shiner was on the board, they voted Cheers, did not fi nd an article on Mule Train. Do to retain me, he came out and gave me Ken Alnwick you intend to cover that very important the news and told me to come see him (ACA Life member #32) event resulting in the introduction of when school started. I did and he became tactical airlift assets into Nam? Assets my advisor for a while, he got me pointed that eventually were assigned to Air in the right direction. The writer does an Mailing the Journal Commando units as they were introduced outstanding job describing him. I never I noticed the postage for the ACA in-country. knew of his background, I wish I had. I Newsletter and the Air Commando I realize that Volume 4, Issue 1 thought it was pretty amazing the impact Journal was a bit much to send to contained an article on C-123s that he had on my life, just like you (Dennis Australia. Included is an extra $100 addressed the personal observations of Barnett) did. toward your mailing costs. two individuals who were not veteran Thanks for continuing to send to C-123 pilots at the time the original Lt Col Chris Cicere Australia. I am almost 73 years old and C-123 entrance into Nam occurred. I appreciate all the excellent articles on However, unlike the articles on Farm “days-gone-by.” Gate, Jungle Jim and Photo Recon, the Miles Tanimoto C-123 article contained no background In Volume 4, Issue 1, you published Airborne All The Way on how we “trash carriers” were placed an article by Jimmy Ifl and describing William ‘Bill’ Mega in service in Nam. Mule Train had an photo recce in SEA. In that excellent Queensland, Australia interesting genesis and, during the early article, Jimmy described two B-26 months, some very interesting situations. How do I know this? I was the For the Record instructor pilot on Chalk 8 of the fi rst 8 I feel that I have been truly blessed in C-123s from the 346th TAS when we my Air Force career and my association departed Pope AFB in December 1961, with the Air Commando’s. Last year I destination Clark AFB. In March 1962 I gave my Commando Cash tickets to one was the Flight Commander for the fi rst of you to stand in for me. I suggested fl ight rotation to the 346th. I had no that, if I win, the proceeds should go orders for Nam. After several months to the young troops for a “Commando in-country we were awarded Air Medals Bash,” unfortunately I did not win, but for “aerial support of a friendly country.” Air Commandos Johnny Johnson, Jimmy Ifl and, and Miles Tanimoto at K.I. Sawyer will try again this year. I ask who ever As you know, we weren’t there---the war AFB in 1964. opens this letter to please give the tickets started later. to one of our proud young men or women If you want to fi ll pages in the Journal missions fl own by Miles Tanimoto, my to once again represent me. Enclosed is with personal remembrances, you should former RB-26 nav. It brought back many my check for the raffl e drawing. ask Mule Train personnel to contact you. memories. For the record The Air Commando I could give you lots of items such as the Would it be possible for you to send Journal is outstanding and I look forward day I was fragged to airdrop supplies into me two additional copies of that Journal to each copy. Having a few hours in the the outpost, A Loui, up the valley to the that I can send to his widow and their “Goonie” and more hours in the “Herkie” north of A Shau. We were using former children in ? I have thoroughly enjoyed each of the French equipment, not a good idea--- but This issue was especially poignant Journals stories, please keep it coming. we did not have an Aerial Port unit there for me since I deployed as a member of as happened later. The pallet started out both Farm Gate and Water Pump, where the ramp and then twisted sideways and I was Swede Svendson’s No. 2. One of Sincere regards to all, jammed on the ramp---the ramp buffers the Thai pilots we worked with there, Lt Richard J. Guetrin, and rollers came later. The pilot chute Nipon Sakornyen, showed up as one of Col, USAF (Ret) deployed then pulled the main chute out my allied students at the Air War College Williamsburg, VA which sent my airspeed plunging toward

6 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org stall. We climbed at METO power and just above stall while the loadmaster cut away the chute---a tricky job with a small knife and the turbulence. Oh, did I mention that we were also climbing up the side of a Laotian mountain? We had been headed toward “Indian Country” to begin with and I had no other options. Obviously we made it. Several years ago the Air Force Association printed an article about Ranch Hand. I questioned whether they were planning an article on Mule Train. They told me to get them some information and they would consider it. I contacted as many Mule Train people as possible and we overloaded Col Boyne with more information than he could use. I still have a copy of that issue with our story. When I retired in 1980, after almost 28 years active service, I had spent 16 years fl ying the C-123, models B, J and K. Total C-123 time was 6600 Hours. I hope that you will consider an article on Mule Train. Many of us eventually became Air Commandos THE VALUE OF as the C-123 mission fl owed to the Commandos. SUPPORTING Thank you for your time. THE MEN AND Roger D. Haneline Lt Col, USAF (Ret) WOMEN OF THE ARMED FORCES. Air Commando Journal ... I am going to have to say I am bit upset with my Air Force SOF brothers. I came across the current issue For all that you do, we are forever in of Air Commando Journal in my bosses offi ce today. your debt. She offered and I took it (They lack the appreciation & knowledge in the Pentagon for such a great read). This is the fi rst time I have seen the journal, I know THE VALUE OF PERFORMANCE. most of you take it for granted. I am all knowing when it comes to books & magazines particular SOF relevant ones. But this one has gotten past me...It’s like giving a crack head heroin...I love this stuff. It’s not often that I fi nd an entire journal/mag worth reading. Some great stuff and fond memories captured in these pages. I got www.northropgrumman.com my AC-130 intro & appreciation during OPERATION www.northropgrumman.com JUST CAUSE. Saw fi rsthand as it pulled us out of some sticky spots more than once. Some great articles on the Vietnam Gunships, Specter, OPERATION HONEY

BADGER (Desert I -part II). ©2014 Northrop Grumman Corporation

Ryan Whittington, Col, US Army (Ret)

Thank you for that fi ne article on “LAOS: THE SECRET WAR.” I especially appreciated it because I served with two outfi ts that were mentioned in the piece. From April ‘68 through April ‘69, I had the very great privilege, and honor, of supporting the great warriors of MACVSOG while assigned to that unit. From September ‘70 through September ‘71, I was assigned to the Igloo www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 7 White program at “Naked Fanny.” the Air Commandos and we have no Airpark outside of Tuscon . We Keep the fi ne, informative articles photographs of this period in his life, as also fl ew missions out of Sembach AFB coming. Several of the SOG warriors have he always stated that it was “classifi ed.” in Germany. written books about their experiences. I would like to be able to get a copy I tell anyone who has had interesting, of the photo for myself but to also share Anthony Vessella unique, or special, experiences to write with my children. Please advise me who USN, USAF, RIANG, them down. And, if possible, get them I can contact or how I can obtain a copy USAF Auxiliary (Ret). published. For themselves, for their of this photograph. Totaling 63 years service time. families, and for history. There are many stories out there that need to be, and v/r Sir, should be, told. Memories fade and old CDR Dan Fletcher III We were thrilled to get your response soldiers pass on. to the Jungle Jim article that appeared in Dan the latest Air Commando Journal. Thank Gary Daugherty, What a great discovery! Actually gives you for sharing more information about you MSgt, USAF (Ret) me chills. Our Graphic Designer, Jeanette and your fellow airmen’s contribution to the Moore will gladly assist in getting you many missions you were assigned to. Feel copies. free to send us more on your time as an Gary Thanks for giving us the opportunity to Air Commando we look forward to hearing Thanks for your response. We welcome any assist. more. and all feedback. I agree that folks need to Dennis Barnett, record their experiences and we of course Col, USAF (Ret) v/r depend on that to fi ll our pages. President Jeanette Moore Media Coordinator All the best Dennis Barnett, Dennis: Col, USAF (Ret) I just read Col Haas’s article about Jungle Jim in the current issue of the Air Dennis, Commando Journal. It brought back a lot My special thanks to you and Dear Dennis, of memories of the time I was TDY to members of your staff for yet another All issues of the ACA Journal are Air Commandos. I was with them from outstanding issue of the Air Commando superb in content. I suspect each hits January thru October 1963 and fl ew the Journal. This copy was particularly home in a particular way. For me, the T-28’s. My time in Vietnam was from meaningful to me with the superb articles interview with Lt Gen Leroy Manor, and May through October. The reason I am on “Jungle Jim at the Tip of the Spear” Laos: Part 4, continued that tradition of writing is the picture on page 12 appears and “Farm Gate the B-26’s in SVN.” I excellence. Thanks to each of you who to have a A-1 Skyraider not a T-28. was honored to be in the second class provide the unparalleled leadership I enjoy your publication as much of the original Jungle Jim program and that continues to move our Association as I did the time I spent with the Air arrived for my fi rst tour in Bien Hoa in forward. Commandos. October 1962 in support of this little known photo reconnaissance program. Richard Ivey Art McNay, ACA #3212 In this regard I’m particularly grateful to ACA Life Member #L4228 you and your editors for letting me share the story of this important program with Richard Regarding the article Jungle Jim in our readers. Our effort was great, but Thanks for the feedback. It is a labor the latest magazine that I received I have overall our success was disappointing of love with some great work by Jeanette in a couple of additional comments. In the the layout and a group of volunteer editors. due to the elusive enemy and the 1960 and early 70 era I Anthony Vessella We will pass your kind words on. formidable jungle canopy that they used and two of my fellow airmen, John Jesse to their great advantage. Dennis Barnett, and Peter Jannitto and others to numerous Col, USAF (Ret) to remember and name, were in the 143rd Any Time, Any place President Air commando Squadron of the Rhode Jim Ifl and, Col, USAF (Ret) Island which was mentioned in the article. What wasn’t Jungle Jim Article mentioned was the aircraft that we were I recently opened my new edition of using. We used the HU-16 Albatross Submissions can be e-mailed to info@ the Air Commando Journal (Vol 4 Issue on many of our missions including the aircommando.org or mailed to Hot Wash 1) and was reading the article on “Jungle U-10 and the U-6 later transitioning to c/o Air Commando Association, P.O. Box 7, Jim” and when I turned to page 11 and the C-119 and then lastly the C-130A. Mary Esther, FL 32569. ACA reserves the looked at the picture, looking back at me We put on demonstrations for celebrities right to eliminate those that are not deemed was my dad, Dan Fletcher Jr. at and we also tested the appropriate. Thank you in advance for your He spoke very little of his time in Fulton Extraction System at Marana interest in the Air Commando Journal.

8 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org A Proud and Accomplished Lineage: THE MC-130P COMBAT SHADOW By David Mobley, Col, USAF (Ret)

The first two decades of the MC-130P’s 45+ years of history were quite different than the most recent 25 years. Lockheed delivered the Air Force a fleet of about 100 HC-130 “King” search and rescue aircraft between 1964 and 1969 (see pages 26 - 27 for Mission Design Series [MDS] data). Its improved Allison T56-A-15 engines gave the HC-130 better high altitude/hot weather performance than similar- year C-130Es with Allison T56-A-7 engines. These new HC-130s were built to take on the busy mission of Combat Rescue in Vietnam. Initially, they were to use the Radio Directional Tracker located in the tracker radome (aka, “the piano bar”) on top of the aircraft to find emergency locator beacons of downed aircrew. But in 1965, Harry Dunn and Don Eastman proved that a CH-3 could refuel behind a C-130 using helicopter air refueling (HAR) pods. In June 1967, Wright-Patterson AFB demonstrated that the HH-53 could also refuel behind the Herk. As a result, HC-130s refueled Jolly Green HH-3 and HH-53 helicopters rescuing downed aircrews throughout most of the conflict in . Combat Rescue in Vietnam was a gallant mission with no shortage of heroic action.

Editor’s Note: This article has been modified An MC-130P Combat Shadow awaits its final checks on Kadena and updated since first printing under the Air Base, , before departing for the aircraft boneyard at title of Casting a New Shadow in Vol 1, Issue Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AZ., 15 Apr 2015. (US Air Force photo 1 of the Air Commando Journal. by A1C Stephen G. Eigel) www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 9 In the post-Vietnam 1970s, HC- special ops missions with AFSOC HC- Operational Testing in late 1993. This 130s continued to serve with distinction 130s. For example, as the only HAR pod- updated weapon system soon became in peacetime search and rescue roles, equipped C-130s in the Pacific in 1989 a force multiplier for the command at a but with few weapon system changes. (when the 33rd ARRS HC-130s became critical time in history. Nevertheless, rescue HC-130 crews the 17th SOS), the HC-130s became By this time, the SOF mindset for the racked up thousands of civilian and essential as an air refueling platform for former rescue aircrews had taken hold. military saves/assists alongside their the newly-arrived 31st SOS MH-53J The challenges and accomplishments Jolly Green counterparts. The late 1970s “Pave Low” helicopters in that theater. of DESERT STORM had clinched that were stagnant for the US Air Force and A similar set of events was unfolding in ethos for the crews once and for all. By the HC-130. The glaring result of this and at Eglin/Hurlburt, so HC-130 1995, the availability of SOF-I modified came to light during the rehearsals and aviators had to adapt quickly. Working HC-130s caught up to the aircrews’ attempt to rescue the Americans held with SOF teammates meant that CSAR capabilities and solidified the mission. As hostage by Iranian extremists. In April methodologies were no longer sufficient a result of all these factors, HQ AFSOC/ 1980, America found out the hard way to the task. DO and XP, were finally successful in re- that deploying a large contingent of In the early 1990s, with the help of designating the AFSOC HC-130 into an helicopters over long distances, using numerous young, energetic officer and aptly named SOF variant; the MC-130P C-130 support and refueling, cannot be enlisted aircrew, AFSOC leaders started “Combat Shadow.” It was about time an ad hoc endeavor. To be successful, reshaping the SOF HC-130 force from too; the aircraft was a different weapon crews have to train regularly as a unified a conventional “rescue” mentality into a system and its aircrews were, by then, an team in specific mission areas to meet the special operations NVG low-level infil / integral part of the joint SOF team. intense demands of special operations. exfil / resupply /refueling weapon system. Superb leadership, an awesome “Operation RICE BOWL, the There were a few holdout Airmen who aircraft, and especially the highly-skilled attempt to rescue American hostages wanted to maintain the “search and rescue and motivated aircrew, led to over two from the Embassy in mission” status quo, but most Airmen decades of accolades for the MC-130P Iran, ended in disaster at the Desert One eagerly took on the new special ops Combat Shadow and her Airmen. They refueling site in April 1980. As a result, mission. 23rd Air Force had successfully proved their skills and earned medals the Holloway Commission convened recruited a number of talented “Honey for combat and other operations on a to analyze why the mission failed and Badger,” C-130E Special Ops Low Level regular basis: Operation JUST CAUSE, recommend corrective actions. This led (SOLL), All-Weather Aerial Delivery DESERT STORM, Operation ALLIED to the gradual reorganization and rebirth System (AWADS), and other qualified FORCE over Bosnia/Kosovo, Operation of United States special operations aircrews to take these squadrons into a ENDURING FREEDOM-Afghanistan, forces.” new era. Operation PUMA in , OEF- By 1984, after lessons learned USSOCOM invested in new , tsunami relief operations from RICE BOWL, a few MC-130Es Center Wings for the (then) 25-year- for Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan, and were being modified with helicopter old MC-130E and HC-130P aircraft. several very challenging, unique, and air refueling capability for use in As a result, they had an extended life classified missions all the way through special operations. But the small fleet expectancy. This smart decision paid the weeks prior to the Shadow’s official of Combat Talons could not keep up off big dividends 20 years later, in 2006, retirement in April 2015. Though most of with the growing number of in-flight when most Air Force C-130s, including the “iron” is now in the boneyard, with refuelable special ops HH-3 and MH- MC-130H and AC-130Us were nearly one “resting” on a hilltop in Afghanistan, 53J helicopters (not to mention that grounded due to Center wear. four still in service with CSAR at Moffett early Talon crews seriously disliked 23rd Air Force had also initiated a major Field, CA, and a few in Airparks around those HAR pods). Thus, in Aug 1989, upgrade program for the HC-130 with the country, the professional Airmen when 23d Air Force became an official improved self-contained navigation who flew the Shadow still tell of its component of US Special Operations systems, an integrated Infrared Detection unwavering support to their mission. Command, 28 HC-130s shifted from System (FLIR), an improved radar These Airmen and their accomplishments Air Rescue and Recovery Service to and situation display, Radar Warning will always be the lasting legacy to our Military Airlift Command’s 23rd Air Receivers, IR and RF Countermeasures, Nation; but they are justifiably proud to Force. 23rd Air Force officially became and NVG compatible lighting. These say that they were MC-130P Combat Air Force Special Operations Command block-modifications, dubbed “SOF-I” Shadow aviators. (AFSOC) on 22 May 1990. The AFSOC for SOF-Improvements, would vastly HC-130s remained un-named for several improve operations when flying on years; no longer “Kings,” yet assigned NVGs to conduct low-level flight to David Mobley was the Deputy Commander, no other official moniker. Regardless helicopter air refueling. It also improved 1st Special Operations Group, Hurlburt of re-naming initiatives, aircrews had airdrop and airland precision. The new Field, FL and an MC-130P Combat Shadow certainly started the transition to flying SOF-I aircraft arrived at the 9th SOS for Navigator prior to his retirement.

10 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org An MC-130P Combat Shadow navigator relays fl ight path information to pilots. (US Air Force photo by SSgt Veronica Pierce)

Helicopter (HAR) is an integral and enabling capability inherent in our MC-130P crews. However, the mission is very challenging and requires intricate crew coordination by the COMBAT SHADOW crews. The following is a narrative of the intercom communications between MC-130P crewmembers as they carry out a rendezvous and refueling with a special operations helicopter.

LEFT NAVIGATOR: “Pilot, Nav. Radar contact, 10 Receiver on the left is 20 feet back,10 feet… pre-contact… o’clock, 5 miles, two possible targets.” contact left. Receiver up and stable.” PILOT: “Nothing in sight.” ENGINEER: “Fuel fl owing, left.” LEFT NAVIGATOR: “Roger, keep present heading and RIGHT LOADMASTER: “Receiver in sight on the right... speed. I will call your turn.” receiver in Observation, right.” PILOT: “Roger.” PILOT: “Clear them in on the right.” LEFT NAVIGATOR: “Targets 9:30 for 3 and a half miles. RIGHT LOADMASTER: “Signal sent… receiver moving Stand by to turn…Ready, ready, turn. Left standard rate, right…20 feet…10 feet…precontact…contact right. roll out on heading 160.” Receiver up and stable right.” PILOT: “Copy, in the turn.” ENGINEER: “Fuel fl owing right.” LEFT NAVIGATOR: “Twenty to rollout. Ten to rollout. LEFT LOADMASTER: “Receiver moving to disconnect Roll out now. Lead receiver is at 11:30, 2 miles.” left… disconnect left. Receiver in Observation, left.” PILOT: “Receivers in sight.” RIGHT LOADMASTER: “Receiver moving to disconnect LEFT NAVIGATOR: “Receivers twelve o’clock, one and right… disconnect right. Receiver moving up and aft… a half miles. Keep this heading.” crossing over…receiver out of sight on the right.” PILOT: “Roger. LEFT LOADMASTER: “Second receiver in sight left. LEFT NAVIGATOR: “Receivers one mile, confi rm Rejoined to the outside… both receivers descending, visual.” moving down and away left.” PILOT: “Receivers in sight, fl aps 50.” PILOT: “Post AR checklist.” COPILOT: “Flaps coming 50.” ENGINEER: “Hoses coming in left… and right.” LEFT NAVIGATOR: “One half mile.” LEFT LOADMASTER: “Hose approaching the pod left. PILOT: “Flaps 70.” Hose in the pod, appears stowed left.” COPILOT: “Flaps coming 70.” RIGHT LOADMASTER: “Hose approaching pod right. PILOT: “Crew, we’re abeam the receivers.” Appears stowed right.” COPILOT: “120 knots.” ENGINEER: “Hoses stowed and locked. Flaps…” ENGINEER: “Hoses coming out.” PILOT: “Flaps 50.” LEFT LOADMASTER: “Receivers in sight, Loadmaster.” COPILOT: “Flaps 50.” ENGINEER: “Hoses coming in… hoses extended. PILOT: “Flaps 20….fl aps up.” System set.” COPILOT: “Coming to 20…and up…Flaps are up.” PILOT: “Loadmaster, clear them in.” ENGINEER: “Post HAR Checklist complete.” LEFT LOADMASTER: “Signal sent, lead receiver LEFT NAVIGATOR: “Crew, Nav. Next heading 255, moving from Observation, second receiver crossing over. MSA 6500 feet.” www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 11 If you’re familiar with helicopter refueling, you will one previous attempt to fly some of these options with the 8th recognize the dance I just described. It’s fairly intricate. SOS, but there had been no follow-up events to date. EARLY The success of a refueling event is contingent upon all VICTOR was the first opportunity for this type of effort in the parties knowing and doing their jobs well and successfully MC-130P that I am aware of since the deployment for Desert communicating during all elements of the maneuvers. There Storm. are a lot of problems that can crop up and make the event very Fuel contingency planning to the MC-130P community interesting if a crew is unprepared. meant carrying extra gas in the fuselage tank, and relying on Receivers can, and have chopped hoses off. Hoses conventional tanker support from KC-135s or KC-10s. To occasionally fail to rewind and then sometimes fail to jettison. the SOAR fuel contingency planning required Forward Area Refueling drogues have fallen off just in front of the receiver Refueling Points (FARP). Essentially, an additional MH-47 as they approached the drogue to make contact. No Visual with extra fuel would ground laager short of the objective area Contact has occurred during a rendezvous at night over water and remain available in case of emergency. Availability of fuel with no lunar illumination and no visible horizon. Spare tankers via FARP might negate the need for MC-130 aerial refueling have rejoined on the wrong lead airplane at the conclusion of support. It could also assure critical fuel if we were delayed, refueling. Name the problem and odds are it has happened to but required the Army to deploy larger numbers of helicopters. a Combat Shadow crew on a mission. Nevertheless, Shadow Aircraft availability might not always allow rotary wing FARP. aircrews excelled at the tactic, with stellar results the world With that in mind, we had to identify alternative rendezvous over. methods that could get the helicopters to a refueling track in a Of all the places we refueled customers, in my opinion, hurry with minimum fuel expenditure. the most challenging was at extreme low altitude. By which The options we chose were helicopter rendezvous from a I mean refueling at 500 feet above ground level. Hey, easy ground laager and lower altitude refueling. We then adjusted stuff, you might say. Just like refueling at a thousand feet, only our training plans to focus on training our crews to proficiency lower—except, we flew 500 foot, modified contour all the in alternate rendezvous techniques that might be necessary time! So, not that easy. during a TEXACO (emergency or contingency fuel request). Why? We planned and flew modified contour low levels at If you’re familiar with the MC-130P, you’ll know most of 210 knots indicated, or faster, but Helicopter Aerial Refueling the aircrew said they hated HAR. Helo AR could be boring, (HAR) was accomplished at 110-115 knots with flaps at 70%, when crews spent seemingly endless hours shuttling between and in no case faster than 130 knots. (The event is often akin our AR tracks and the HAR track, and trolling around with to instrument slow flight—consider that at 500 feet above the receivers in tow. But the truth was we were proud of our ground.) The lower and slower you go, the more risky the event. reliability in meeting our scheduled times on target (TOTs) There was more risk to the plane and crew, for the helicopters, and performing the procedures by the book. It was the one and therefore risk to successful mission accomplishment. The capability we were called on far above all others (except only way to mitigate those risks was to climb to higher altitude hauling parts for Paves and Talons—sorry fellas!). EARLY and speed up. Of course, there was a reason we were flying VICTOR was our chance to expand our capabilities in our core low, so higher altitude might not be permissible, and faster is mission. not an option when refueling helicopters or when using the Among our deploying navigators were Captains Mike Sargent Fletcher hose and drogue refueling system without Guischard, John Peak and Dave Belfiore (the primary planner). high-speed drogues. We were also fortunate to have Lt Col Gary Morrison and How, then, did the Shadow community get into the Maj Andy Beno along doing mission requalification. Their extremely low altitude refueling regime? The answer is the experiences in DESERT STORM were invaluable to building Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise EARLY VICTOR. our training plans for EARLY VICTOR. In the summer of 2000, I was a new Major, and newly The planners created a refueling track in our corner of assigned Chief of Standardization/Evaluation, and was looking Jordan that would support our training, and we “what-if’ed” forward to my first mission commander job for the squadron. probable scenarios for no-notice requests for refueling support. That opportunity arrived when the 9th Special Operations Some of the questions we thought needed answers to were: Squadron deployed two MC-130P Combat Shadows to What minimum information will we need to quickly build a EARLY VICTOR. The 160th Special Operations Aviation contingency HAR track? How fast could it be built on the fly? Regiment (SOAR) also sent a flight of four MH-47E Chinook Were there any changes to crew duties that would be necessary helicopters. during a TEXACO? What altitudes and clearances can we In the few weeks before the deployment, we met with safely and effectively use for rendezvous and refueling? What Hunter AAF based 160th SOAR planners at MacDill AFB, do we need to do to assure we can find a flight of receivers in FL, and Ft. Campbell, KY, to review and update objectives a ground laager? Will air-to-air TACAN be of use? Would the and training plans. In my first conversation with them, the infrared system help us find the receivers? What signal would SOAR’s lead planner asked if we had ever practiced alternate we use to notify receivers to lift off and proceed down track? refueling options where tankers were late to the refueling Where might they ground laager? Will the helicopters need track, or receivers had too little fuel to make it to the track and to shut down engines and wait? If so, how long will it take to had to land to wait for us. We had not. The 160th had made start engines, climb to HAR altitude and be ready to refuel?

12 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org How far out do we signal? Should we signal in miles or in were ready to go, and managed the mayhem of an early minutes, in trail or when abeam? What restrictions should be departure with visits to St. Johns, Newfoundland, and RAF established to ensure safety of flight at low altitudes and in Mildenhall in the UK. We left Eglin AFB five days early with contingencies? tropical storm headed for landfall on the Panhandle. Normally One of the big challenges we faced with designing and we would HUREVAC to Ft. Campbell so we could ad lib some executing a contingency HAR, especially critical at low training with the SOAR. With EARLY VICTOR pending, the altitudes, was completely evaluating the proposed track for 16th SOW kicked us off to Jordan five days early. While we enemy threats, terrain, and obstacles. The constraint of time, were deployed, the USS Cole was bombed in Yemen. in this instance is a tremendous challenge. A crew might Upon arrival in Jordan several days later, we experienced have very little time in which to build a contingency track. bare-base living in the . The Jordanians hosted The lack of time limits threat mitigation and raises the risk us at a dusty little base in the southwest of the country, by the levels due to potential crew error. Standard crew duties had name of King Faisal, where they flew F-5s. Their Vietnam the left navigator responsible for enroute navigation, guiding era fighters didn’t make our 1960s vintage MC-130s look quite the crew to the event on time, supported by the right navigator so ancient. There was no telling what the Jordanian pilots (Shadows flew with two navigators), who was also responsible thought of us or the events we and the SOAR flew. Airdrops, for sensors and other duties. In case of a TEXACO, the right blacked out landings, and helicopter refueling probably just navigator would have to build the proposed track on his own, made them shake their heads in confusion as to why we’d do while the left navigator directed the pilots during the enroute those dangerous things so low to the ground. portion. From the pilot’s perspective, then, Lt Col Eric Kivi, 9th SOS/DO, Capt John Cline, 16 OG/OGV, and I talked about mission risk and pilot technique for refueling at altitudes than standard training tracks (i.e. below 1,000 feet AGL). We knew the biggest challenges facing crews during HAR is vertical and horizontal track clearance and the reduced margin of error. Whether you are talking clearance from threats, weather, man- made obstructions, or terrain, any of these factors can result in a missed or unsuccessful refueling. These problems have claimed aircraft and lives. Peacetime helicopter aerial refueling tracks are typically low risk locations. They are well planned out, consistently used, reviewed and modified, and known to air traffic control and local general aviation communities. There is a great deal of built-in risk mitigation. During a contingency where the receivers make a View from one the MC-130s as the receiver approached the TEXACO call and the enroute Shadow crew has to build a drogue to onload fuel during EARLY VICTOR in October 2000. track from scratch based on the coordinates passed by the (Photo courtesy of the author) receivers in trouble, risk in the HIGH category is likely, with few options for mitigation. In my opinion, for a flight of MC- Our crews typically flew one training mission per day— 130s and receivers on a contingency refueling track at half their each crew rotated between planning and flight duties. There normal altitude in hostile airspace, at night, in mountainous was ample opportunity to achieve proficiency in day and night terrain with enemy threats, poor weather, and low/zero lunar low-level ops, air drops and blacked out landings, as well as illumination, with the potential for unforeseen issues on track to give the SOAR’s MH-47 crews what they needed to perfect to force extension past the planned end HAR point, etc., the their aerial refueling skills. only risk mitigation option is crew competency. Most helicopter pilots I knew looked upon aerial refueling It is a fact that the lower you fly, the more time you spend with a strong sense of loathing. It was necessary— avoiding the ground. Flying nearer the earth with receivers vital even, to their ability to complete missions. But it would in tow also leaves little space for them to maneuver. Under never be enjoyable. One USMC CH-53 squadron commander any circumstance, you have to fly a defined MSL altitude in the midst of a discussion of HAR training with us said he to maintain a stable platform to give the receivers the best would rather perform an unnatural act than refuel his bird in the opportunity to successfully refuel. We concluded refueling at air. I guess that’s a statement of how difficult the maneuvers any altitude would be done at a set MSL altitude that might be are for helicopter crews. as low as 500 feet, but it would be an average altitude for the The SOAR may have detested the HAR requirement, length of the track to assure a solid refueling platform for the but they recognized its importance as a force extender. Their receivers. crews threw themselves at the job with impressive vigor, and By mid-August, with our planning done and appropriate improved rapidly. After the first week, we were collectively waivers for training at nonstandard altitudes approved, we satisfied with daytime proficiency, and switched to nights and www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 13 NVGs. Once proficient at normal night I mentioned the USS Cole bombing springboard. The training we conducted procedures and altitudes, we focused occurred while we were deployed. That in Jordan was key to the success of our on our advertised objectives and threw event happened less than 200 miles efforts operating from Uzbekistan, and curve balls at the crews. We gave from our deployed base. The attack put though we were paired with different TEXACO calls that limited the amount our presence in Jordan in a completely battalions from the SOAR during the of time crews had to build and reach the different light. two deployments, the mutual trust we track, changed the vertical limits of the Jumping forward to the 9th SOS’ rebuilt within TF Dagger was so firm, rendezvous maneuver and changed the first deployment to Uzbekistan in the SOAR stopped sending a FARP bird helicopters’ rendezvous to force them response to the attacks of 11 Sep 2001, along on the long-range missions into to a ground laager, as if their fuel was the impact of EARY VICTOR 2000 Afghanistan. They trusted, with good running low and we were delayed. All becomes very clear. The pairing of SOF reason, that the Shadow crews would always be there for them. Leadership, training, and focus made our efforts effective during EARLY VICTOR. As others have shown, after operation JUST CAUSE the path was wide open for AFSOC to improve its capabilities. As a fledgling major command, AFSOC’s sole wing and the two overseas groups strove to better their capabilities with single- minded determination. Leaders down through squadron level generally gave aircraft commanders the tools to do their missions, then let them loose. Across the command we participated in a number of robust JCS exercises, monthly readiness exercises, and rigorous squadron continuation training programs where we put ever- increasing challenges in front of some of the best crews AFSOC could produce. Our squadron continuation training programs focused crew efforts on the elements the command believed were most critical to extending and enhancing SOF capabilities. Leadership pointed the way and regulatory guidance allowed us the leeway to innovate and find ways to succeed within those boundaries. And we Loadmasters send signals from the back of a MC-130P Combat Shadow to the crew did. of a US Army MH-47 helicopter from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) during an aerial refueling mission. (US Air Force photo by TSgt Aaron Cram) our crews improved rapidly and along the units, the proficiency and trust gained About the Author: Joel Martin, Col, USAF, way built a great deal of mutual trust. By and built during our deployment, and (Ret), is a 1989 graduate of the US Air the time of our departure from Jordan in the improved capabilities that resulted Force Academy, and is married to Mrs. November, both the 9th SOS and 160th from those training and exercise Lori Martin of Albuquerque, New Mexico. SOAR had met all training objectives. flights set the stage for a profoundly They have a son, Matthew. Col Martin is a Why was this exercise so important? successful partnership between the 9th former MC-130P and HC-130P Evaluator On the face of it, EARLY VICTOR SOS Combat Shadows and the 160th pilot and served in multiple leadership positions in both the Special Operations was just another in a long line of JCS SOAR Nightstalkers in TF Dagger — and Rescue communities, including exercises that became annual events, the Joint Special Operations Task Force Squadron Commander, Deputy Operations with nothing in particular to distinguish that operated in northern Afghanistan Group Commander, and MAJCOM Division one from another other than the changing at the beginning of Operation Enduring Chief. Among his military awards and of the last digit of the year in the exercise Freedom. decorations are the Legion of Merit and the title. EARLY VICTOR was the Distinguished Flying Cross with Valor.

14 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org By George Akins, Lt Col, USAF (Ret) and John D. Cline, Col, USAF [Part 1 of a 2 Part Series]

When Dennis Barnett asked Col John Cline and I if we were interested in writing an article about the crash of Ditka 03 for the upcoming “Air Commando Journal” dedicated to the Combat Shadow, I readily volunteered to submit a re-telling of our experience. I say “re-telling” because the account has already been expertly chronicled in three chapters of Michael Hirsh’s book None Braver: US Air Force Pararescuemen in the Afghanistan War (Penguin Books, London, 2003). Mr. Hirsh does a fantastic job capturing our story, but his full content far exceeds this journal’s tight space limits. We therefore attempted to condense and capture the key elements of Mr. Hirsh’s narrative while sprinkling in fi rst-hand side notes/comments. A consequence of this approach is that not all the vivid details are able to be presented and not all viewpoints are covered, so I highly recommend reading Mr. Hirsh’s book for the “full story.” Benefi ting from the perspective of hindsight and refl ecting back through the 13-and-half years since the incident, I have come to embrace our story as not one of heroics; rather it is a story of survival, deft airmanship on part of the pilots during the fi nal minute of fl ight, joint recovery efforts following the mishap (I hate that word), and a story of a beloved, most forgiving workhorse of an aircraft: MC-130P Combat Shadow tail #66-0213.

On 13 Feb 2002 the day starts as it typically does with The fi rst part of the mission continues uneventfully, a sunset departure from our base in Jacobabad, Pakistan of however, during the aerial refueling we are called back to base a 2-ship mission to refuel a couple of MH-53s somewhere to reconvene and plan for a high priority emerging mission. southwest of Kabul; after which the formation is to split up and We experience about a 4 hour delay in receiving any defi nitive continue on separate sorties to support intra-theater movement course of action (which was not unusual), and after milling of troops and supplies. Our hard crew consists of: Aircraft around our planning hanger we fi nally shoot out the door to Commander Maj John Cline, Copilot Capt Jason Wright, launch at about midnight local time with some very sketchy Right Navigator Maj Don Tyler, myself as the Left Navigator, information. All we know is we are to conduct HAR with 3 x Flight Engineer MSgt Jeff Doss, Radio Operator SSgt Rodney MH-47Es. We know an approximate location of the objective Young, Left Observer/Loadmaster SSgt Chris Langston, and area, a HAR TOA, and the lat/longs for 2 points: the Aerial Right Observer/Loadmaster TSgt Jeff Pohl. Refueling Initial Point (ARIP) and the Aerial Refueling End As the sun fully sets and we approach the End of Nautical Point (AREP). And to add to the fun, after doing some quick Twilight the crew dons their Night Vision Goggles (NVGs), number crunching on the way to the plane it’s revealed we with the exception of the navigators who assemble their are already about 20 minutes late for the TOA; and that is if NVGs into a hand-held confi guration. As long as there is any everything goes super-smooth for our expedited take-off. As available light whatsoever, usually star light, our view through we depart we have no execution check-list, no HAR set-up the “nogs” lights up our surroundings pretty effectively. A sheet, no appreciation of any ground scheme of maneuver, full moon can make the landscape look as bright as daylight, and defi nitely no opportunity to conduct any sort of route albeit the world is presented in shades of a green hue due to study – basically just another day in theater, but easy to see in the color of the NVG phosphors selected by the manufacturers retrospect that this was a contributing factor on how our night (the color deemed most sensitive to our eyes). It’s important to was going to end up. note that if there is very little starlight available to amplify, due During our approximate one hour fl ight to the ARIP we to an overcast for instance, the view through the nogs begin to receive word the helos are slipping their TOA. We also hear a sparkle, or scintillate, which can signifi cantly diminish night radio transmission to AWACS from a recon aircraft reporting vision. Keep this aspect in mind as our narrative progresses. he’d been fi red at by a surface-to-air missile which, judging www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 15 from the excitement of his voice, apparently comes pretty number 3’s effort to connect. Although we’re only traveling at close to him. Adding to our own excitement, we plot where 2 miles a minute, we eat up the remaining track distance rather the apparent SAM was launched and see the area where he quickly. As we approach the end of the track, we begin to kick reported the incident is in the vicinity of the helos’ objective around options: Pull a 180 and return back up the track? No, area. This comes into play later. Another issue which later this will drag the assault force away from their objective and comes into play is that our Infrared Detection System (IDS) on add to the re-fueling requirements (additionally, time becomes its own begins to cycle between NORMAL field of view and a factor as we consider the approaching daylight only a few NARROW field of view. NARROW FOV presents a tapered, hours away). Extend the current track and continue straight ahead down the valley? No, as we travel West the valley floor begins to rise and blend in with surrounding ridgelines – effectively disappearing – and the visibility looks to deteriorate as ceiling sinks lower. A look to our left-forward quadrant reveals a nice looking valley, in addition to being in the general direction of the objective area. We ask the helo airborne mission commander what he’d like to do and he requests a heading of 210, which confirms our train of thought. So as we come to the end of the established AR track, we make the left turn to 210 and continue for about 10 miles while number 3 still tries to get plugged in. Then we approach a Y in the valley and Don and I converse off headset about our best route ahead. Really, “yelling” is more descriptive as at that time there is no NAV Private intercom and we’re forced to elevate our voices to hear each other over Maj Cline’s crew prepping for a pre-sunset departure from the din of aircraft noise. Don determines the leg off to the left is Jacobabad, Pakistan. From left to right, kneeling: SSgt more attractive (about a 120 heading), while I’m thinking the Langston, SSgt Young, Capt Wright, Standing left to right: Maj one on the right is more effective. This is a critical occurrence Tyler, MSgt Doss, Maj Cline, TSgt Pohl, Maj Akins. (Photo courtesy of Col John Cline) because at the time I believe Don understands my position to take the right leg of the Y; but weeks later when Don and I “zoomed in” view, like looking through a soda straw. After finally have an opportunity to discuss it it’s evident he never a while the IDS freezes in NARROW FOV, which presents picked up on my conclusion to take the right branch. a useless presentation for us when it comes to discerning Here, I’ll pick up excerpts of how Mr. Hirsch tells the story, surrounding terrain features. Oh, well…it’s not like it’s with a few of my sidebar comments: anything for which we’d even consider to abort. The Combat Shadow is a visual platform, and the IDS serves as an aid to ….Cline explains how it looked from the left seat. what are primarily visual tactics. So, other than these couple “We initially turned down a valley on the 210 heading the of occurrences we arrive at the ARIP ok, and during our hour helos had requested. With Chalk 3 swinging and missing and forty minutes of loiter while waiting on the continuous all the way through the eight- or nine-mile long valley, delay of the -47s we’re joined by our sister Shadow who were we found ourselves slowly turning due south, onto a maintenance-delayed and did not make our planned formation 180-degreee heading. We could see that there was a Y in take-off. The -47s finally arrive and we execute the rendezvous the terrain about five miles ahead of us. The right branch and start proceeding down the 60-mile AR track East to West ran on about a 210 heading, which is the way the helos as a 2-Ship with a 3-ship of -47s in tow. The AR track follows a wanted to go, and it angled away from the objective area, long, somewhat narrow valley with significant rising ridgelines whereas the left branch ran on about a 120 heading. I paralleling us on either side. Our AR altitude is about 9,000’ saw that we could have easily cleared the terrain to the MSL and the parallel ridgelines rise up from about our altitude left, but not wanting to get any closer to the objective to about 10,000’ MSL, and in some places disappear into a area because of noise and the potential missile threat, I rather solid overcastof 10,000’ – 11,000’. asked the navs specifically if the terrain on the right was Although there is a moderate chop and we’re getting going to “box us in.” I received conflicting info from my bounced around just a little bit, the first two -47s get their gas navs, but it was mostly for good reason. George, the left rather effortlessly. We are about 20 minutes down track with nav, said there was terrain up over ten thousand feet in another 10 minutes of track time remaining when it appears that direction (which was correct), and Don said, “No, our initially hazy plan is actually going to come together. we weren’t going to be boxed in,” that there was terrain Then it’s number 3’s turn to get on the hose. down to ninety-two hundred feet (we were at ninety-five After experiencing some initial difficulty connecting with hundred feet when I asked that question). Looking right, the drogue and trouble maintaining refueling contact position, down the valley on the 210 heading, that is exactly what I our moderate chop becomes a bit more pronounced and the thought I saw: terrain up over ten thousand on one side, overcast deck drops a bit – combining to further complicate and a nice cut in the terrain down to below our altitude on the other, so what the navs told me seemed to make perfect

16 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org sense. I remember looking down the valley and not being hydraulics and electrics, and it’s a pretty delicate control concerned at all with what I saw. Yep, we’re going to go up assembly up inside that pod. So again, in my mind at that here about five miles, turn right about 20 degrees through point, the terrain wasn’t my biggest concern. I saw what this – there was an arch of significantly lower terrain off I saw, and I was really worried about what was going on to the right about five miles ahead of us.” inside that pod.” The conflicting info from the navs occurs because they Because Cline is concerned with the possibility of are getting their information from different sources. Akins damage to the left wing, he calls Langston, “Hey Chris, is getting his information manually off a paper 1:500,000 look out on the wing; how’s the wing look? How’s the chart, and the pilots expect him to be able to identify only pod look?” He hears what he hoped to hear. There’s no the highest terrain. They know he’s trying to read contour metal hanging out, no torn-open panels. No fuel spray. lines on the paper chart in a darkened flight deck as they No fire. Nothing to be concerned about.He then turns his bounce along. Tyler, on the other hand, is using the GPS attention back to flying the plane, asking the navs which moving map display on laptop computer where the cursor way he should be heading. One of the navs says, “Go provides greater accuracy. to the right.” Cline responds, “I see it.” What he sees, Akins: Don’s comment that we weren’t going to be boxed in and the FE confirms, is a cut in the ridgeline the plane is really confuses me as it does not occur to me he’s talking about heading toward. A few seconds elapse, and the left nav, the left leg. who’s got his eyes glued to the radar screen, says, “I’m not painting clear.” “Painting” means the radar sweep Cline says, “Our bad luck was that Don was referring in front is clear. If the plane is higher than the peaks the to terrain down the left valley. Knowing where each nav radar is showing, they’re “painting clear.” was getting his information from combined with the visual illusion to make these two pieces seemly conflicting info Akins: During the approximate 30 second hose/drogue makes perfect sense to me.” discussion between the pilot, loadmaster, and engineer I’m The fact that they’re still dragging a 47 Echo behind trying to reconcile the conflicting information I’m receiving from Don about not being boxed in coupled with the apparent them is certainly complicating the task of flying the plane. affirmation from John that we’re visually clear, and what I’m During refueling, they can do only about 110 knots, barely seeing on the radar scope and chart. This is where an operable above what the manual says is stall speed. What’s more, IDS usually resolves the conflict - one quick glance typically they’re heavy with roughly 48,000 pounds of fuel and as confirms what I’m seeing on the radar scope, But alas, it’s a consequence the controls are very sluggish. To top it useless to me at this point being stuck in NARROW FOV. off, the optimism Cline had several miles back about the How could they, in a matter of seconds, go from helicopter needing only a few more minutes on the hose having a gap to fly through, to having a rock wall of the had faded quickly. Things were, indeed, getting uglier. Hindu Kush range in their face? Here’s what John Cline From the left paratroop door where he’d been thinks happened: “When I refocused my attention out signaling the helo’s pilots, Langston cuts in on the front, the horizon line is a low-contrast ridge line. We intercom. “Holy shit, I hope he doesn’t do THAT again!” had the big snow-filled bowl down this valley, and then The next time the helo lunges forward, Ditka 03 hits a bit that high overcast made for not a huge amount of contrast of turbulence, popping the hose straight up into the end between where the mountains ended and the skies began. of the rotor blades. “He cut the hose!” Langston shouts. What I’d thought I saw, five miles previous, ended up Doss tries to clarify: “Confirm he has cut the hose.” being just a kindof a crease in the ridgeline itself, not the Langston responds, “Hey, the hose is not cut. He just actual dividing line between the sky and the mountains. collapsed the drogue.” Turns out the ridge was about two hundred or three The difference between a cut hose and a collapsed hundred feet higher than that. The supposed open area to paradrogue is important. Cline, explains: “It was pretty the right turned out to be just kind of a shadowing effect important distinction from our point of view, emergency off of a big out cropping of rock, whichwas throwing a procedure-wise. The hydraulic system is active at that shadow up against a big open snowfield. So the escape point, so it’s only the drag that’s on that parachute out there “out”straightahead to just climb over the thing - all of holding that basket up that keeps the hose out. Without the a sudden the terrains is a lot higher than what I had drag on that chute out there, the hose just shoots back into perceived just a couple miles before. And my bailout to go the pod; the hydraulics overcome the drag, and the hose to the right – just a mirage. It evaporated in front of our wraps into the pod as fast as it can, which is the case if you eyes. So at that point, what can you do?” just cut the parachute drogue material and it collapsed. All the pilot can do now is throw the throttles forward As long as the big metal coupling is still on the end of the in an attempt to get the airplane to climb. Cline is thinking, hose, it’ll get inside the pod and hit the limit switches and “Hey, we’re going to scare the hell out of ourselves here,” shut the thing off. Kind of no harm, no foul. But obviously, but they all believe they’re going to make it over the if he’s actually cut the whole thing off the aircraft, you’ve ridgeline. got a three-inch-diameter open fuel line thrashing around Cline’s pulling the aircraft back, trying to will it inside the pod, because there’s nothing to stop it. You can to climb at the same time that he’s pushed the throttles have the pod up there whipping this open fuel line against www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 17 all the way forward. And both he and Jason remember in. The classic notion of trading speed for altitude won’t the simulator training at Kirtland,and what pops up work, because he needs both at the same time if they’re in their minds, in big, bold type: the full power-on stall going to fl y out of the terrain trap they’re in. If they characteristics of a C-130, especially one that has pods reduced the fl ap setting to 50 present, they might pick up out on the end of each wing, as does the MC-130P some airspeed, but in all likelihood, the plane would lose Combat Shadow, typically involve a wing roll that ends lift and they’d sink a bit. What he needs aerodynamically, unpleasantly with the plane cartwheeling into the ground. is the best angle of of climb they can get. Cline says, “I The action that this message translates to, in didn’t have the real estate to lower the nose and accelerate Cline’s words, is, “You gotta keep the wings level on this forward.... I fi gured tracking the fl aps to fi fty, we were airplane.” And what’s going through his mind, knowing going to lose some lift. And if we lost any lift at all, we that they were going to be close to terrain, is “Hey, we’re were so critical that, y’know, that power-on stall is the not dead yet, we’re not dead yet. Keep fl ying, keep fl ying.” biggest fear I had. So it was basically a gut decision, on the spot, to leave the fl aps at seventy.” With the pilot fl ying the plane and keeping the wings level, copilot Jason Wright focuses his Man in the Arena attention on the instruments, and then watches the horizon. The horizon line moving up tells him that either they’re not climbing, or the mountain is rising faster than the airplane. The navigator, who’s “It is not the critic who counts, nor the man who points out watching the radar is seeing this same image, and “where the strong man stumbled, or where a doer of deeds from behind the pilot, George Akins says, “Climb, could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man in climb!” the arena whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, Cline’s response to that command is fairly who strives valiantly…who knows the great enthusiasms, the automatic: he pulls back on the yoke, putting the great devotions, and spends himself in a worthy cause. The nose up. Wright notes that they immediately lose man who at best knows the triumph of high achievement and 10 knots. And then the plane starts buffeting, an who at worst, if he fails, fails while daring greatly, so that his indication that it’s about to stall, which is to say, stop fl ying and drop like a 130,000-pound rock. At place will never be with those cold timid souls who never his radio console in the back, Rodney Young hears knew victory or defeat.” the copilot say, “We’re stalling. We’re stalling,” — Teddy Roosevelt and he reacts. “That’s the very moment that I was literally scared. I was cool and calm up to that point because I trusted my pilots and I trusted the navs that we were going to get out of it. That’s when my heart went to the bottom of my shoes.” ” AKINS: I keep expanding the scope – grasping at anything So with his right hand, Cline has pushed the power all the way up on all four throttles, causing the propellers on the and providing the false sense of security that we had more constant-speed engines to take the maximum bite possible airspace to work with – only to watch the terrain approach us of the cold, thin air. His left hand is instinctively pulling that much quicker. back on the yoke, and his feet are on rudder pedals. Again, John tries to bring the nose up between ten Just trying to “keep the ball centered,”so the tail’s not and twenty degrees “trying to fi nd that sweet spot,” as he meandering right or left. describes it. “I kind of pulled back into the heavy buffet, The copilot, meantime, is pretty much an observer of the plane would start to get real mushy, and I’d let off. I the process. It’s not a time for conversation, and the only did that two or three times and found kind of the happy question Wright asks is if Cline wants him to reconfi gure medium, y’know, right in the kind of light tickle where, from 70 percent to 50 percent fl aps. What he asks is, hey, this is all this airplane is going to give us.” “Do you want fl aps fi fty?”What the pilot responds with At that instant, just for a second, Maj John Cline stops is, “Close the bleeds.” It’s directed at the engineer, who being the technician, or perhaps the artist, and gives in to says, “They’re already closed.” The “bleeds” are valves a very human emotion. “As we came closer to the terrain, that bleed hot air off the engines and drains power from I just had a fl ash of just absolute white-hot anger at myself, the engines and provides power to certain systems. Once swept over me for a couple of seconds, and then y’know, again the copilot asks if he should reset the fl aps to 50 the only airplane I’ve ever fl own, I’ve prided myself on percent. And once again, the pilot ignores the question. being able to do this stuff well. MAJCOM evaluator pilot, The decision to leave the fl aps set where they’d been is a the chief pilot of the whole command for this airplane, and judgement call. Cline has been running through his head how in the hell did I get us in this situation? But just as everything he’s ever been taught or learned from fl ying quickly as it came, it went away. I was too busy to dwell on 130s, and nothing matches the situation they are currently it. I just needed to keep fl ying this airplane.”

18 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org His copilot, who has a lot of hours in the right-hand seat and admires Cline for his adroit handling of the -130, does not share whatever anger Cline is feeling toward himself. He sees that pilot’s response to his warning that they’re stalling is to let up on the stick pressure a little bit, and then milk it right there – they call it a “burble.” It’s where the plane is shaking because the wings are starting to lose lift – the definition of a stall – but the pilot is max- performing the aircraft, which is something they learn on the simulator. “He had it max-perform and held it right there. It was perfect, remembers Wright. “There’s nothing more you can do.” Ditka 03’s radar altimeter had an adjustable bug that the crew would set so that if they dropped below the set height above terrain, a warning light popped on. Their low-light level was set for 450 feet, and Cline’s recollection is that it had already been on for about thirty seconds, and it was continuing to slowly count down. What the pilot sees out the window through his NVGs is featureless terrain covered with snow. On both sides Thermal image of Ditka 03, MC-130P #66-0213 minutes after there are big, craggy rocks, and he taps the rudders a impact. The hot spots are displayed in darker colors. Visible are bit just to keep the plane headed into the snow bowl. He one of the deployed 20-man life rafts, and our egress tracks in begins watching the radar altimeter needle count them the snow in and around the destroyed aircraft. (Photo courtesy of down, lower and lower, the needle sweeping down slowly. Col John Cline) It became obvious they aren’t headed for a vertical wall airspeed, which was incredible, considering how heavy we where they are just going to crash and all die. That isn’t were. I had never, never flown an airplane down to that going to happen if he can stick with the game plan: “Don’t airspeed before. And the airplane was flying wings level.” let the airplane stall; do not let the wing drop down, ‘cause Jason Wright’s last recollection is glancing at the once the wing drops, you cartwheel and you’re done.” radar altimeter and seeing twenty-five feet. That was when AKINS: Unlike John and Jason (Pilot and Copilot), I can’t he knew they weren’t going to clear the ridgeline. “And see the immediate topography features of the terrain. There is my heart just sank because up until then I was thinking, terrain directly in front of us, and for all I knew it was a vertical ‘we’re going to make it. We always make it.’” wall. On the right side of the plane, loadmaster Jeff Pohl is Behind him a feeling of profound sadness accompanied looking out the window and sees that the refueling hose, by fear has overcome the left nav, George Akins. With no which Doss is in the process of reeling in, is hanging real tasks to occupy his mind, he’s thinking about his wife almost straight down. It dawns on him that the reason and children as the recognition hits that this is what it’s is that they don’t have enough airspeed to keep the like to die. paradrogue inflated. Seconds later he sees the basket and And to Cline’s right, copilot Jason Wright is thinking the hose coupling strike the ground, sending out a shower about his friend who was killed when a Marine C-130 of sparks as it rips away from the wing. crashed a month earlier after taking off from the same AKINS: Then we hit the mountain. airfield they’d left earlier that night. He especially focused on his wife, Amanda, and how difficult it had been for her. And then he begins to dwell on what it is going to be like About the Authors: George Akins retired from the Air Force in to die. “About a million things flashed through my mind. I December 2013 after 23 years of active duty accumulating over guess some people say that a million things can go through 4200 navigator hours. His operational flying experiences include: your head in a second, and it really did at that point. The OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, SOUTHERN WATCH, next thing I expected was the whole mountain to just come OEF, and OIF. Flying assignments include the 40th TAS, 550th FTS, right through me. I thought about what happened when and the 9th & 67th SOSs. George’s last assignment was with the my friend crashed, and I figured, Well, he probably never HQ AFSOC IG team. He currently enjoys sharing ownership of a knew what hit him, ‘cause the mountain hit him so hard. It small business in Destin, FL - Gulf Coast Electric. just collapsed the whole airplane. So that’s kind of what I Col John Cline is a career MC-130P pilot with broad operational expected to happen.” flying experience in SOUTHERN WATCH, NORTHERN WATCH/ In the meantime, John pulls the airplane back in and PROVIDE COMFORT, PROVIDE PROMISE/DENY FLIGHT, UPHOLD out of heavy buffeting a couple of times. “I took a last DEMOCRACY, OEF, and OIF. A former 9 SOS and 466 AEG scan of the instruments and I think the last thing I saw was Commander, he currently serves as the HQ AFSOC Chief of Aircrew eighty-five feet on the radar altimeter, and eighty knots of Standardization and Evaluation at Hurlburt Field, FL. www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 19 By Travis Hill, Col, USAF

I finally received my first AFSOC both sides of the drogue.” has been said that the hardest mission in assignment to the 9th Special Operations The Combat Shadow was the primary AFSOC is flying a CV-22 from 3 miles Squadron (SOS) in June 1999. As an refueling platform in AFSOC, period. out to the objective. Add to this the close enlisted airman and again as a young Shadow crews qualified in all of the brotherhood tie with the assault force and Lieutenant, I tried every avenue to get other MC-130 Mission Essential Tasks, you get a sense of purpose like no other. an AFSOC assignment; but my desires but Helicopter Aerial Refueling (HAR) This mentality bled over to the Shadow didn’t align with the “needs of the Air was clearly their “bread and butter.” community. Although we weren’t “going Force.” Finally, after three years flying HAR provided a bedrock for what I call to the X,” we knew that the Shadow was C-130s at Yokota, my commander, Lt the “assault mentality.” This mentality critical in that without gas, the mission Col Tim Hale worked an assignment bled over from our primary customers, would fail. Conversely, we also embraced for me to Eglin AFB, FL flying the MC- the MH-53 Pave Low, the 160th Special our supporting role by understanding that 130P Combat Shadow. After arriving at Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) all that mattered at the end of the night the 9th, it wasn’t long before I started to Night Stalkers and ultimately the culture was how prepared we could be to support understand that I had gotten myself into of the assault crews flying the CV-22. the Helicopter Assault Force (HAF). It a unique culture. The Combat Shadow The assault mentality is used to didn’t matter what you did to get there, crews had a unique balance of pride and describe the humble and proud sense of just get there. humility that resonates with me to this day. mission focus understood by those that Air-to-Air Refueling isn’t necessarily A culture that I would come to embrace conduct combat assaults. Assault crews appealing but it is a critical requirement 13 years later when I had the honor of don’t consider failure an option…ever. in support of SOF infiltration, and it’s commanding the 9th SOS; followed by Assaults are extremely challenging, as close to the tip of the spear as you the unique opportunity to command our assume no room for error and imply can get in a C-130. Unless you’ve lived primary customer the 8th SOS flying the high risk by the very nature. Assault under a rock the last 15 years, you CV-22 Osprey. As such, I have been able crews hang it all out every night whether know that the assault force gets to the to witness a unique culture from which they’re training around the flagpole or objective by HAF or Ground Assault the Shadow community thrives “from conducting Direct Action missions. It Force (GAF). There are a few exceptions

20 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org The aircraft had the perfect mix of weight, speed, range, low and high-speed refueling capabilities.

www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 21 such as Military Free Fall, Boat Assault turned the scatter plan into chaos. Due an emergency resupply mission to Force or more covert means, but HAF/ to extended time in the objective area, sustain the teams in enemy territory until GAF typically meets the Ground Force multiple helicopters were low on gas, the weather allowed for extraction. Due intent of surprise, minimum force and most critical was second element Flight to the mission complexity, unforgiving contingency response. As such, I learned Lead’s helicopter. He finally plugged terrain, the amount of cargo and marginal early on that if you want to be where the with merely 2 minutes of gas remaining weather; the mission was allocated to an action is, you need to be a part of the before flameout. At the time, there were MC-130P Combat Shadow. The aircrew assault package. And in my experience, only two Shadows on station (Ditka of Agile 77 was immediately alerted helicopters always need aerial refueling 01 and 02). In relatively short order, for the rescue resupply mission while or at a minimum they’ll want contingency Ditka 01/02 were able to consolidate all maintenance hastily prepped the aircraft. gas options when things don’t go as helicopters and provide enough gas to In the minimal time allotted, the aircrew planned. Either way, the Combat Shadow continue the mission and get everyone meticulously planned a non-standard and her crews were very good at utilizing back to the base. Due to the Shadow’s airdrop flight profile to the multiple Point visual NVG low-level procedures to light weight, the Flight Engineers were of Impact (PI) locations. The profile provide the required amount of gas (and able to fit 160K pounds of gas on board had to allow for the expeditious aerial then some), always and on time. while refueling at 11,000’ MSL. Had we delivery of all required supplies while Additionally they were the best at not been able to carry that much gas; minimizing the aircraft’s and the SOF formation flying, no one in the Air Force the 7 MH-53 helicopters would’ve been team’s exposure to the threat of unknown flew the C-130 in formation like Shadow looking for places to land in the middle insurgent locations in the area. crews. We were very comfortable flying of Afghanistan that night. Weather en route to the objective around in low illumination with no more The MC-130P was a mobility area was worse than forecasted and did than two ship lengths of separation workhorse as well. With the recent (late) not allow for a visual descent into the (taxi interval for most C-130s). The addition of dual rails and an average of valley openings along the planned route requirement for close formation came 7K lbs weight advantage on the MC- of flight. The crew used ground mapping into question routinely, and there were 130H, the Shadow successfully moved radar, infrared detection system, and tactical discussions regularly on whether tons of cargo around Iraq, Afghanistan in-depth mission planning to penetrate the risk was worth it. I saw close formation and the Horn of Africa. The lightweight the weather and safely flew through the mitigate risk on numerous occasions and allowed it to fill a unique kinetic strike unforgiving terrain. While completely even salvage some missions when the requirement that no other AFSOC aircraft obscured by weather, the crew descended weather was worse than predicted, and could perform and in May of 2011 it was below the ridgeline peaks and used we never had a midair or accident due to critical in removing the nation’s number planned altitude step-down points to formation flying. one terrorist from the battlefield. Shadow navigate through the valleys and into the The Combat Shadow proved crews were also very good at airdrop, the canyon to the objective area. Once terrain invaluable during the initial tactics and procedures were antiquated permitted, the crew descended below the counterinsurgency missions in but proved tried and true every time. weather to airdrop altitude. The crew Afghanistan. The Task Force called In April 2011, three Special established positive radio communication on the men and women of the 9th SOS Operations Force (SOF) teams came into with the isolated ground team and repeatedly to support Direct Action contact with enemy forces in a remote received drop clearance and updated missions and to meet on-call refueling mountainous region in northwestern surface wind information. The navigator requirements. On one particular night, Afghanistan. After multiple hasty compared the information with altitude Shadow crews played a key role in one engagements, the teams were spread winds from the aircraft mission computer of the first Direct Action raids of OEF. out over several miles in the severe and recalculated a new computed air On 7 Jan 2002, I was Airborne Mission mountainous terrain and were running release points for all three PI locations. Commander for a four-ship of MC-130Ps low on food, water, ammunition, batteries At the first drop location, the loadmaster tasked to support 7 MH-53s during the for night vision devices, and other critical manually cut the restraint and released infil of SOF personnel to a known terrorist supplies. The teams’ extraction plan was the first set of lifesaving supplies. He bed down location in central Afghanistan. to exfil the area by rotary wing assets, but then rapidly repositioned to the next The intent was to secure the objective they were unable due to thick, low cloud bundle while the aircraft executed a and any sensitive information that could decks encompassing the entire region. sharp climbing left turn to line up for be used to fight the War on Terror. Due In preparation for holding their ground the next airdrop. Approximately one to the tyranny of distance from Pakistan, until the weather broke; the ground minute later, the aircraft was established the entire package consisted of 7 MH-53, teams established three drop zones with on airdrop altitude and airspeed, and the 4 MC-130P, 2 KC-135 and 2 AC-130H associated points of impact (PI). They second bundle of vital supplies exited the gunships. Besides some small arms and were within four nautical miles of one aircraft. Once the load was reported clear AAA while crossing the border into another in an east-west running canyon of the aircraft, the crew executed a sharp Afghanistan, the low-level infil was connected with multiple narrow valleys. right turn and descended to the final uneventful until actions on the ground The Air Component was tasked to conduct airdrop altitude. Less than two minutes

22 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 23 later the third and final emergency 130 ever. But, it’s performed flawlessly call him “complete.” A brief flash of the resupply bundle exited the aircraft. The conducting airdrops when no other position lights and we were moving for ground controller reported all bundles platform could. Precision airdrops in disconnect; then the basket dropped from landed at the precise location and thanked the mountains of Afghanistan under view, and we were back in observation the Combat Shadow crew for the rapid inclement weather were some of the most position. I remember wondering how response and perfect execution as the challenging airdrops ever accomplished, many times had I refueled behind a aircraft egressed the area. but the Shadow crews always nailed it. Shadow...and how easy the crews in the The ground teams received their Additionally, being 7-8K pounds lighter MC-130P made the process, ultimately supplies and in the next few days, the than the other MC-130, the Shadow enabling us to do our mission, night after weather cleared and coalition helicopters proved to be a premier SOF mobility night. We were smacking parts of our safely extracted the SOF teams from platform. It lifted millions of pounds of two aircraft together in the middle of the mountainous area. The expertise cargo and personnel around the world. the night at 110 knots, and the outcome exhibited by the crew of AGILE 77 AFSOC will never replicate the was almost assured to be successful. from the initial alert notification through Combat Shadow. The aircraft had the The Shadow and the crews who flew her the flawless execution reflects the perfect mix of weight, speed, range, low were simply as dependable as my Timex high standards of the Combat Shadow and high-speed refueling capabilities. watch. In my nine years in the Pave, I aircrews and maintainers. Later, the Air The maintainers always were able to never questioned if you would be there Component Commander wrote, “I sent keep it flying and were so familiar ready to give me the gas I needed...I the Shadow crew on what was the most with it that they typically had it fixed knew you would be. You always were. I difficult airdrop mission…it was a feat before you left debrief, despite all the owe a great debt of gratitude to all of you of airmanship as good as any I’ve ever modifications. Lastly, the crews knew the who crewed and flew her and dropped seen.” mission and their role in the mission, but out of blackness precisely on time to pass Since the Shadow did HAR so well, more importantly they made the Combat us the precious fuel we always were so along with the revolutionary CV-22 came Shadow what it had to be: flexible and short of. I can only hope that the MC- a new Tiltrotor Aerial Refueling or TAR responsive. That humble Shadow pride 130P’s history is preserved properly. You requirement. The CV-22 has proven to that comes from a mission that “isn’t that deserve a befitting tribute to the courage, be a game changer for how we conduct sexy but relevant for combat operations” conviction and professionalism of your assault operations. The speed and range will permeate through AFSOC as the crews; and to the dauntless dependability of the Osprey make it the only long- crews disband to other weapons systems. of that Pavelow pilot’s best friend, the range assault platform in SOCOM, but Personally, from being on both sides of Combat Shadow.” it adds other challenges to the refueling the drogue, it’s good to see. Lord, guard and guide the men equation. The range is perfect to facilitate A former MH-53 Flight Lead said it and women who flew and maintained standoff establishment of an Intermediate best when he wrote, “I consider myself the Combat Shadow as they continue Stagging Base or mitigate the tyranny of very fortunate to have found my way the Shadow legacy of flexibility and distance in places like the Horn of Africa. from the US Army to AFSOC, flying responsiveness any time, any place. But it also means that the tankers have the MH-53 from 1998 to 2007. My final to reserve enough gas to cover the same flying assignment was as an evaluator distances. at the 551st SOS at Kirtland AFB, and I Again, the Shadows showcased the gave the final mission evaluation of my About the Author: Col Travis Hill started his capability in December 2013. Bor, Sudan career in May of 2007. Like so many military career as an enlisted airman and was in a civil war, and the rescue package of my flights over the years, this one then commissioned from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University ROTC in 1994. of 3 CV-22s and 2 MC-130Ps were would have us joining with an MC-130P His is a Command Pilot with over 4,800 tasked to evacuate an unknown number over the desert late in the night. I would hours, 750 combat hours, and has been of US citizens to safety. When the 3 validate my student’s ability to perform a mission qualified in various versions of CV-22s sustained heavy battle damage task he would never have the chance to the C/MC-130, the PC-6, PC-12, C-208, from small arms, AAA and RPGs over repeat. Unfortunately for him and me, the DHC-6/8, the CV-22 and other aircraft. He the airfield, the Shadows were there to MH-53 had been selected to be retired commanded both the 9th and 8th Special drag them across to an from the inventory, and in less than a Operations Squadrons flying the MC-130 alternate base to transload the wounded. month we would fly our 7 Pavelows from and CV-22 respectively and has multiple A recovery that otherwise wouldn’t be Kirtland to Davis Monthan AFB, and put combat deployments to OEF, OIF, HOA and other small scale contingencies as possible without strategic tanker support, them to a final rest in the boneyard. Those pilot, Joint Special Operations Detachment but the Shadows were able to provide the thoughts were on my mind that night as Commander, J-3 and Squadron required gas (and then some). one of AFSOC’s last MH-53 students Commander. He attended Air Command The Combat Shadow has been the made contact with the basket, moved up and Staff College, numerous courses at platform of choice for many contingency and left into refueling position, holding the USAF Special Operations School and operations. Arguably, it’s refueled more there until we had taken what could be served as J-5 Special Plans for Joint Special SOF/CSAR assets than any other MC- considered a sufficient amount of gas to Operations Command, Ft Bragg, NC.

24 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org By Shelley Rodriguez, Col, USAF It was February 2010, near the the city of Marjah, by means of a battle operation before a government structure end of my tour as the MC-130 Mission named “Operation Moshtarak.” The was negotiated, but in this case, the Commander in Afghanistan, working name meant “joint,” reflecting a new government was agreed to and formed in the familiar compound located on way to fight the enemy in Afghanistan. by Afghan President Hamid Karzai Bagram Airfield, when I was summoned While the efforts in Afghanistan had months earlier. To my surprise, Operation to the Task Force (TF) Headquarters always been joint to the coalition, this Moshtarak was not a new operation, but Commander’s conference room. Through effort was different as it would include in fact, was already in progress and the the wooden door, I entered an in-progress brigades of Afghan forces alongside, multitude of airdrops done by the crews meeting of commanders being briefed by and independent of, the coalition. This earlier in my tenure near Lashkar Gah GEN Stanley McChrystal, commander would showcase the advances made by and south and west of Marjah were in of the International Security Assistance the Afghans in combat skills, battlefield support of Afghan special forces teams Force (ISAF), and was promptly put maneuvers, and general ability to wage being built by coalition special forces, as on the spot when asked simply, “Are war on the enemy. One other aspect of the well as preparation of the battlefield with your crews ready?” No introduction, no operation was also decidedly different. leaflet drops. briefing of the mission, no tasker…just Upon completion of the operation, GEN Unbeknownst to the crews and I, a question. After witnessing countless McChrystal wanted to insert what he a massive public affairs campaign had intense and successful missions over called a “government in a box.” been waging since fall 2009, in advance the course of the few months I had The “government in a box” was a of the operation, to both convey support commanded in Afghanistan, combined ready-to-use, Afghan-only, government to the local populace, but also encourage with 19 years in AFSOC as a Combat structure complete with a sizeable the Taliban to leave the city they had Shadow pilot, there was no hesitation as Afghan police force and a small Red- occupied for several years. While we I answered, “Absolutely.” “Good, now Horse-like construction unit to both knew the missions were to provide sit down,” was the response from the TF protect government personnel and ensure supplies and support for the construction commander, an Army colonel. the city retained its power and utility of forward operating bases and smaller I listened intently to an incredibly services for the population. In the past, detailed plan to remove the Taliban from it was usually weeks or months after an (Continued on page 28) www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 25 Tail # Orig MDS Final MDS Changes Estimated Disposition (Where They are Now) 1454 HC130H 67-7185 Ground Trainer, Kirtland AFB 64-14852 HC130H HC130P 39 RQS 64-14853 HC130H HC130P 39 RQS 64-14854 HC130H MC130P AMARG 64-14855 HC130H HC130P 39RQS 64-14856 HC130H HC130P Crashed due to fuel starvation off coast of CA in service with 304 ARRS, 11/96 64-14857 HC130H C130H 348 Crashed during service with Jordanian AF, 07/00 64-14858 HC130H MC130P AMARG 64-14859 HC130H C130E Once used as AFSOC “Slick” C-130E, now at AMARG, CF338 64-14860 HC130H HC130P 79RQS 64-14861 HC130H WC130H 105AS 64-14862 HC130H EC130H Flying 41ECS 64-14863 HC130H HC130P 71RQS 64-14864 HC130H HC130P 39RQS 64-14865 HC130H HC130P 79RQS 64-14866 HC130H WC130H 159FS 65-0962 HC130H TC130H 43ECS, No EC Gear, No External Tanks 65-0963 HC130H WC130H 105AS 65-0964 HC130H HC130P 79RQS 65-0965 HC130H WC130H Disappeared near during Typhoon Bess, 10/74 65-0966 HC130H WC130H 105AS 65-0967 HC130H WC130H 122FS 65-0968 HC130H WC130H 105AS 65-0969 HC130H C130E Scrapped, Corroded; Fuselage trainer, Trenton, Ontario 65-0970 HC130H HC130P 39RQS 65-0971 HC130H MC130P 550SOS 65-0972 HC130H C130E Scrapped, AMARG, CF183 65-0973 HC130H HC130P 71RQS 65-0974 HC130H HC130P 102RQS 65-0975 HC130H MC130P 550SOS 65-0976 HC130H HC130P 39RQS 65-0977 HC130H WC130H 39RQS 65-0978 HC130H HC130P 102RQS Interim as DC-130H, used as NC-130H Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) 65-0979 HC130H NC130H Aircraft, now in AMARC 65-0980 HC130H WC130H 105AS 65-0981 HC130H HC130P 71RQS 65-0982 HC130H HC130P 71RQS 65-0983 HC130H HC130P 71RQS 65-0984 HC130H WC130H 105AS 65-0985 HC130H WC130H 157FS 65-0986 HC130H HC130P 71RQS

26 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org Tail # Orig MDS Final MDS Changes Estimated Disposition (Where They are Now) 65-0987 HC130H HC130P 71RQS 65-0988 HC130P 71RQS 65-0989 HC130H EC130H 43ECS 65-0990 HC130H Disappeared/crashed off coast of Taiwan, 02/69 65-0991 HC130P MC130P 9SOS; Airpark-Cannon AFB 65-0992 HC130P MC130P 67SOS; AMARG 65-0993 HC130P MC130P 9SOS; AMARG 65-0994 HC130P MC130P 17SOS and 9SOS; Airpark-Hurlburt 66-0211 HC130P Crashed near Magdalena, NM during severe turbulence/winds, 04/86 66-0212 HC130P MC130P CA ANG 130RQS, Moffett Field 66-0213 HC130P MC130P Combat Loss in Afghanistan (Ditka 03), 02/2002 66-0214 HC130P Destroyed by sapper charge on ground in Vietnam, 07/68 66-0215 HC130P MC130P 67SOS; AMARG 66-0216 HC130P MC130P CA ANG 130RQS, Moffett Field 66-0217 HC130P MC130P 9SOS; first SOF-I MC-130P; AMARG 66-0218 HC130P Destroyed by sapper charge on ground in Vietnam, 07/68 66-0219 HC130P MC130P CA ANG 130RQS, Moffett Field 66-0220 HC130P MC130P 17SOS; AMARG 66-0221 HC130P 550SOS; AMARG 66-0222 HC130P 102RQS; AMARG 66-0223 HC130P MC130P CA ANG 130RQS, Moffett Field 66-0224 HC130P 79RQS 66-0225 HC130P MC130P 9SOS; AMARG 69-5819 HC130N MC130P 9SOS; AMARG 69-5820 HC130N MC130P 9SOS; AMARG 69-5821 HC130N MC130P 550SOS; AMARG 69-5822 HC130N MC130P 9SOS; AMARG 69-5823 HC130N MC130P 9SOS; AMARG 69-5824 HC130N 39RQS 69-5825 HC130N MC130P 67SOS; AMARG 69-5826 HC130N MC130P 17SOS; AMARG 69-5827 HC130N MC130P 9SOS; AMARG 69-5828 HC130N MC130P 17SOS; AMARG 69-5829 HC130N 550SOS; AMARG 69-5830 HC130N 550SOS; AMARG 69-5831 HC130N MC130P 17SOS; AMARG 69-5832 HC130N MC130P 17SOS; AMARG 69-5833 HC130N 550SOS 88-2101 HC130H(N) HC130N 102RQS 88-2102 HC130H(N) HC130N 102RQS 90-2103 HC130H(N) HC130N 210RQS 92-2104 HC130H(N) HC130N 210RQS 93-2105 HC130H(N) HC130N 210RQS 93-2106 HC130H(N) HC130N 210RQS

www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 27 A loadmaster from the 17 SOS, drops a simulated airdrop training bundle from an MC-130P Combat Shadow over a drop zone. The MC-130P Combat Shadows participated in training exercises for possible situations similar to OPERATION MOSHTARAK. (US Air Force photo by TSgt Kristine Dreyer) outposts, the broader operational scope Canada, Afghanistan, and other nations. While it seems sensible to simply leading to a strategic governmental Given that there was not an international clear the area of people and then detonate structure was not revealed to the air units solution to common communications the devices in absence of the EOD until this meeting. on the battlefield, coordination of the personnel, this tactic was contrary to GEN As I sat alongside my counterpart air and ground plan was astronomically McChrystal’s newly minted “courageous from the 160th Special Operations challenging. The JSTARS and AWACS restraint” memorandum issued weeks Aviation Regiment (SOAR), I listened crews’ management of the campaign earlier. The ISAF commander wanted intently to a highly complex briefing would prove to be miraculous over the the ground forces to use their brainpower about an operation beginning in less next several days. rather than firepower when dealing in than 36 hours, involving more than Instead of the Taliban leaving close proximity to civilians to avoid 15,000 US, coalition, and Afghan Marjah, as was the intent of the public increasing the locals’ animosity towards personnel, in the largest battle since affairs effort ahead of the operation, the US and coalition forces. This involved Fallujah (Iraq) in 2004. To say that enemy had instead embedded themselves heavy modification and, in some cases, the air plan was “complicated,” as the deeper in the city, planting improvised cessation of the night raids conducted for TF commander put it, is an enormous explosive devices at an unprecedented years in Afghan provinces – a significant oversimplification of the word. There daily rate, then importing anti-aircraft change in battlefield tactics. As an would be waves of helicopters – 97 to be weaponry throughout. While there aircrew member not on the ground, I’m exact – inserting forces around the clock were thousands of Marines and special unable to definitively ascertain whether in all quadrants of the city. The Marines operations forces already on the ground this change increased or decreased the were the preponderance of forces, along prior to this meeting, they could not Taliban’s ability to maneuver within the with coalition and Afghan forces, with keep up with the requirement to diffuse city, but it was commonly opined to be nearly all of our special operations the number of Improvised Explosive the case amongst the special operations forces scattered throughout the city. Device (IED)s given the limited number teams we supported. Forces and aircraft would come from of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Because of the significant risk to the United States, the United Kingdom, teams. fixed wing aircraft by the anti-aircraft

28 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org Special OperatiOnS WarriOr FOundatiOn Supporting America’s Special Operations Forces Since 1980

College Scholarships Ensuring full financial assistance for college for every child who loses a parent serving in Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps special operations. Family Services Providing on-going support and counseling services to the families of fallen special operators, including grief and educational counseling as well as private tutoring services. SOF Wounded Support Providing immediate financial assistance to every special operations warrior severely wounded in combat. The stipends relieve the burden of unexpected expenses, such as travel.

“It would have been difficult for my mom to send four kids to college. Empowering But with SOWF, what once seemed through Education impossible, is a reality. My sisters and I have the opportunity to pursue our dreams debt-free.” www.specialops.org

– Breanna Walters, daughter of Air Force Tech Sgt. Howard Walters who lost his life in 2003 while assigned to the 20th Special Operations Squadron. CFC # 11455 www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 29 weaponry, the insertions for Operation Combined Joint Special Operations Task state of the 14mm on the inbound flight Moshtarak were left to the multitudes Force (CJSOTF) commander gathered all path and I wanted the crew to understand of helicopters. The role of the Shadows available intelligence troops, gave them both the impact of the mission and that would be nothing new to the crews: be the coordinates of the drop, and asked for they had the power to call knock it off heavy on fuel to support the 160th SOAR, a full intel assessment while I determined should they determine the drop to be too but full of ammunition and equipment to which crew I could launch or divert to high risk. It was days after the mission that resupply the troops, as well as ready for help the Marines. the flight engineer would tell his fellow impending casualty evacuations. Another Because we were now hours into the crews in the planning center he “knew day in the life of AFSOC’s MC-130 operation, the crews that were already it was serious because the commander crews in Afghanistan. airborne were low on supplies and still returned my fist-bump.” (Laughter After the hours-long briefing, I on task to refuel the returning helicopter ensued, of course, at the thought of the returned to my desk via the plywood forces. The only crew I had left was a “old maid” having any understanding of door separating the TF and AFSOC ops crew that landed from a lengthy mission the fist-bump.) centers, and began to review the crews’ only hours earlier, having completed a Maintenance and logistics crews schedules. I had three and a half crews series of missions over several nights loaded the MC-130P at warp speed and and a mission requiring six – the usual that would have normally ended with a the crews launched, diverted, and strafed situation for AFSOC’s crews. After “down day.” Of course, there was no day a path to the Marines while I managed much adjusting of the schedule and a off in Afghanistan, as a down day was the mission from ops center. Listening bit of creativity, the crews were lined up actually just a crew’s alert day given the in to the radio exchange between the for Operation Moshtarak, but with little surge requirements of the task force over crews, the Marines, and the TOC, radio room for much else. Like any other day, the previous three months. The situation contact was sporadic along the run-in and the crews were briefed of the upcoming update was grim: of the four Marines, the silence was deafening after the crew airdrop and air refueling missions, but all were severely dehydrated, one was in commenced the approach to the drop per the ISAF commander’s guidance, and out of consciousness, and all were zone. The twenty-minute, ten-minute, were not briefed of the larger effort of down to their last packs of ammunition and subsequent calls were all only pieces the operation. It would not be until the with a retreating enemy headed their way. of conversation over a broken frequency completion of their missions would they The only crew left would have to forgo until a crystal clear call from a euphoric understand the full scope of the effort. their full crew rest in order to launch, Marine was heard: “F-YEAH! The sh*t’s With less than 24 hours to go to the significantly raising the risk to mission at our feet!” This was followed by a insertions that would kick off the tactical and crew. comment even more politically incorrect portions Operation Moshtarak, I was The intelligence troops re-entered noting that the resupply had nearly taken again called into the tactical operations the ops center with concerned faces the toes of the Marine who was lapsing center (TOC) to learn there would be a and calmly briefed multiple anti- in and out of consciousness because he delay. The Afghans were attempting to aircraft artillery positions surrounding was unable to move quickly enough. It negotiate with the Taliban in an effort the Marines’ location. In nearly every was only then that I realized the entire to remove them from the city. When direction of approach, there was anti- mission was also being watched next the negotiations failed hours later, the aircraft artillery. The best approach door via predator feed, with full audio operation went into full swing with would be from the south, where there for forty-plus operators and support the immediate launch of the air plan. was “only” a single 14mm. Not only personnel in the audience as the TOC Insertions went around the clock and were the Marines cut off from their erupted in celebration. The drop was a the Shadow crews supported flawlessly, convoy and unable to rejoin due to a success, and thanks to the teamwork of unaware of the full impact of their verifiable minefield of IEDs separating the full force of AFSOC, as well as Army missions. their positions, but now they were logistics and Apache crews, the Marines During the night, a frantic radio call seemingly unreachable by air. As is the and their Shadow lived to fight another was intercepted by someone on the TOC very nature of AFSOC, however, the ops day. floor who happened to be listening in to center had a solution within minutes to random frequencies. It was from four make it happen. All that stood between Marines, separated from their convoy the Marines and their lifeline was the risk About the Author: Col Shelley Rodriguez days earlier, out of water, food, and assessment and the word “go.” The air is currently Commander, 58th Operations ammunition. The air campaign had begun commanders evaluated the risk and with Group at Kirtland AFB, NM. She entered and the firefight was raging, pushing the the CJSOTF commander’s approval, AFSOC in 1993 as an MC-130P Combat Shadow pilot and served in all four MC-130P enemy closer to the Marines’ now isolated would launch the MC-130P, divert an squadrons, including 9 SOS at Eglin AFB, position. Because of our now well- AC-130 overhead, and task a pair of FL; 17 SOS at Kadena AB, Okinawa; 550 known airdrop accuracy rate, the person Apaches to lead the way to the drop site. SOS at Kirtland AFB, NM; and commanded who intercepted the radio call asked if I left the ops center to head to the 67 SOS at RAF Mildenhall, UK. She has we could divert a crew to get life-saving flight line to see the crew off. This was logged 23 years of service, all in AF Special supplies to the isolated Marines. The a high-risk mission given the unknown Operations.

30 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org By Rolf E. Place, Capt, USAF

The Untold Story of the MC-130P Refueling Mission to Save Three Battle Damaged CV-22s Over South Sudan

(Editor’s note: Call signs in this article have been changed due to the ever emerging threat environment these crews and aircraft operate in future and on-going operations)

It is anything but a normal sortie when CNN is airing Severely punctured CV-22 fuel tanks and fuel lines quickly led breaking news on the mission you flew in support of, before to the aircraft bleeding JP-8 to dangerously low quantities. A you even RTB. That just happened to be the case on 21 Dec formation of two MC-130P Combat Shadows would provide 2013. Shortly after landing back in our deployed location hope. That hope would come in the form of lifesaving fuel. of Djibouti, I walked into our operations planning room The following is the refueling effort conducted by Shado 21 to complete the normal post-mission paperwork. I had my Flight...the rest of the story. attention diverted to a nearby computer by our 9th ESOS Erupting Violence Mission Commander. He cued up a video splashed on the top of South Sudan was spiraling into a dangerous civil war in cnn.com with Pentagon correspondent Barbara Starr reporting December of 2013. Americans in this young African country, on a developing story out of Africa. She broke the news of many working for the UN, found themselves surrounded by a failed rescue mission of Americans from South Sudan that the fighting between government forces and rebel fighters. resulted in three CV-22 aircraft being riddled with bullet The political environment at the time, just on the heels of the holes and four seriously wounded Navy SEALs. Starr’s initial 2012 attack on the US embassy in Benghazi, , allowed reporting was followed up in the coming weeks and months no room for error in regards to the safety of Americans in with more revealing articles portraying the truly heroic efforts hotspots around the world. The US State Department a ordered of the CV-22 aircrews and troops onboard. However, there is the evacuation of its citizens in South Sudan, under Operation more to the story. OAKEN SONNET. The safe recovery of the crippled tiltrotor aircraft and In Djibouti, my crew (Shado 21) and the crew of the lives of the injured onboard hung in the balance during a Shado 22 were both at roughly the halfway point of our 90- race against time along a desolate, expansive route of Africa. day deployments when news of the unrest in South Sudan www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 31 caught our attention. Our efforts shifted All five AFSOC aircraft were cranked (unbeknownst to any of the five crews) abruptly to a 100% focus on planning the without any hiccups and logged on-time for a few days later when there would be evacuation missions soon to be coming takeoffs, a testament to the amazing only one COA…us. down the pipe. work performed daily by our deployed Fuel Planning The first mission was to extract maintainers. Mission planning for the next Americans from the South Sudan capital Airborne enroute to Juba, along OAKEN SONNET mission proved city of Juba, flying into Juba International with the other two Herks from the first to be a challenge. For the Shadow crewmembers, it involved us trading sleep and crew rest to build and refine a complex refueling plan. The CV-22 crews were similarly planning in their ops area for landing at another airfield with other Americans in Harm’s way. This next mission would be into the rebel held town of Bor. The Bor Airport had no approved landing zone (LZ) survey, so for the foreseeable future the possibility of any fixed wing assets landing there was out. A helicopter or tiltrotor airframe was needed, and the CV-22s were chosen. Up to the point of our deployment in which South Sudan became the mission focus, the pace of operations for the 9th ESOS was slower than it had been in previous theaters. Our two crews, along Shado 22, as seen off the right side of Shado 21. (Photo courtesy of Capt Rolf Place) with the Shadow crews who had preceded us in Djibouti, had more than enough time to plan AND fly the missions. Since no dedicated Shadow mission planners Airport. Planning revealed two C-130 COA, we all awaited the final decision had been needed, none were staffed. aircraft would be enough to support the for who would land in South Sudan. This left us with only ourselves, the number of individuals awaiting pickup. Our Shadows conducted the day’s first ones who would fly this Bor mission, This would be the first course of action TAAR, extending the Osprey flight’s to do all its necessary preparations. (COA), involving a single Rescue range and putting Juba within reach. Unfortunately, due to the urgent nature HC-130 and a conventional C-130H. Not long after we received a SATCOM of this Bor mission and factors changing However, reporting indicated a tank had radio call informing us the CV-22s were by the minute, planning continued for the been positioned on the middle of the no longer needed. The tank that was the aircrew throughout the night prior to the airfield’s single runway. If this would primary cause of us launching with the early morning launch. remain true, no fixed wing asset would CV-22s had since been moved and the The Combined Joint Task Force be able to land. Thus a second COA runway was now free from obstructions. – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), under was adopted. This option included three With that news, we conducted one more US Africa Command (AFRICOM), CV-22 aircraft, each able to land on the TAAR to ensure Raven 73 Flight was controlled this mission. Under the airfield without the need for a full-length able to return to base (RTB). Due to the direction of CJTF-HOA, we were runway. In addition, our two MC-130Ps amount of fuel offloaded, both Shadows directed to conduct the exfil out of Bor would be required for this second COA diverted to Entebbe, Uganda, to refuel during daylight hours. The CV-22s were to provide tiltrotor air-to-air refueling before also heading back to Djibouti. tasked with transporting the awaiting (TAAR) en route to and from Juba. The other Herks encountered no Americans to the safety of ‘nearby’ Both COAs were presented at the hostilities in landing at Juba and were Entebbe. There was never a confirmed highest levels of government and the successful in providing transport for number of personnel awaiting pickup, decision was not to choose one of the 120 personnel out of the capital city. even up to the point when we got COAs, but to execute both. Thus on the Although it was not AFSOC’s mission airborne, so it was necessary to plan for morning of 18 Dec 2013, Shado 21 Flight that day, we had refined our TAAR two trips into this South Sudanese town (our 2-ship Combat Shadow formation) tactics, techniques, and procedures in 80 nm north of Juba. Our Shadows had launched alongside Raven 73 Flight this theater and familiarized ourselves the responsibility of ensuring the CV- (the 3-ship CV-22 formation comprised with Entebbe International Airport. 22s would have enough fuel to make it of Raven 73, Raven 74, and Raven 75). We had performed a rehearsal of sorts from Djiboutii to Bor, Bor to Entebbe,

32 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org Entebbe back to Bor for a possible second duty day left to RTB. The fourth planned diminishing quantities in a dramatic exfil, Bor back to Entebbe to complete TAAR track was placed along this flight balancing act. the second lift, and back to Djibouti from path back to Djibouti. Everything was going mostly Entebbe for the RTB. As a result, we built The accuracy of this elaborate fuel according to plan leading up to our four TAAR tracks and were allocated a planning was contingent on getting three takeoff at 0335Z. My crew was flying dedicated KC-10 tanker overhead (in the CV-22s and two MC-130Ps flying, the with the addition of our Airborne Mission airspace between Bor and Entebbe). Shadows being fueled to their maximum Commander (AMC), who happened to be The first TAAR track was located on and each having their single high-speed the 8th ESOS Mission Commander, and course between Djibouti and Bor. Prior hose functioning properly, no deviations two maintainers. The AMC assumed the to refueling, Raven 73/74 would position from pre-calculated burn rates for any callsign Raven 01. The crew of Shado themselves in the lead element 1 nm aircraft involved, and a KC-10 on-station. 22 would add two maintainers as well. ahead of Raven 75. Shadow formation With all this planning and the changing Although I was notified my aircraft lead Shado 21 would refuel the lead criteria, it felt like the night before a big was awaiting maintenance on the brake element, and wingman Shado 22 would test. Bright and early the next morning antiskid system, which was inoperative, refuel Raven 75 in the trail element. would be our final exam. we did not have a third Shadow in country Post-refueling, Raven Flight would have Bor to act as a spare, or time to fix the issue. enough fuel to reach Bor. Shado 21/22 It was the early morning of 21 Dec Due to the mission priority, leadership would then push out to join a holding 2013. At that time I had my doubts as approved us to take the aircraft as-is; I pattern south of Bor. We would do what to whether the Bor plan would be given would just need to be especially cautious we could to minimize our fuel burn, so the go-ahead, but I trusted the mission when applying the brakes. our holding would be based off max risks would be weighed appropriately in While rendezvousing with Raven endurance airspeeds. Our second planned TAAR track was post-exfil from Bor en route to Entebbe. Upon notification of the Raven 73 Flight departure from Bor, we would proceed from holding for another rendezvous. As a result of the first refueling, Shado 21 would have less fuel than Shado 22. Thus Shado 21 would refuel Raven 73, alone in the lead element, and leave for an air-to-air refueling (AAR) with the KC-10 overhead. Shado 22 would stay on the track to complete the refueling of Raven 74/75 in the trail element. When TAAR complete, Shado 22 would proceed to their AAR. Shado 21 would then depart the AAR track to move on to the third TAAR track. Raven 73 leaking fuel over South Sudan, as seen from the cockpit of Shado 21. (Photo If there were remaining Americans courtesy of Capt Rolf Place) on the airfield in Bor, a return trip for the CV-22s would be in order and it would the approval decision-making process. Flight along the routing to Bor, require a TAAR after their departure from Regardless, the phone rang promptly at unforecasted clouds necessitated a climb Entebbe. This third planned TAAR track 0100Z (0400L). This phone call officially above the thick ceiling of clouds. At would be enroute to Bor from Entebbe. alerted our crews from the N+2 alert 0539Z my crew passed the coordinated Shado 21 would pass all the required fuel posture we were sitting (allowed thirty fuel load to the lead element of Raven to Raven Flight. Post-TAAR, Shado 21 minutes from notification to show up 73/74. Simultaneously, Shado 22 passed would land at Entebbe to refuel. Shado at our ops building and two hours from their planned fuel to Raven 75 in the trail 22 would then be the sole refueler for then before our formation needed to be element. Post-refueling, our Shadows Raven Flight after their departure from wheels up). A short time thereafter, just forged a path to the holding airspace Bor. All four aircraft would continue minutes after the sun began to rise above south of Bor. on their flight path to Entebbe and land. the horizon in Djibouti, the three-ship of In our holding pattern we suddenly Up to this point fuel would be passed CV-22s departed, immediately followed received a series of chilling radio calls airborne via eleven TAARs and AARs. by our two-ship of MC-130Ps. An from Raven Flight below. They had each After all Shadow and Osprey aircraft abundance of adrenaline (and caffeine) been engaged by ground fire on their were refueled on the ground at Entebbe, would fuel us. However, we would approaches into the Bor Airport. They we would analyze if we had enough crew soon realize JP-8 would be the fuel of were aborting. Each CV-22 had taken www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 33 damage. When queried by Raven 01 as to whether they had and pushed up the throttles to attain our max airspeed in our sustained injuries, they confirmed four personnel onboard effort to close the distance, as rapidly as possible, with Raven Raven 73 had gunshot wounds. I vividly remember that 73 Flight. They had reformed after their abort, and were now moment. My heart sank. However, I knew our Shadows above ahead of us in a southbound heading direct to Entebbe. were in a position to help. With the critical injuries sustained on Raven 73, getting I made a radio call to Shado 22 on our interplane those hurt to a hospital ASAP was absolutely vital. The nearest frequency requesting an immediate rejoin with my aircraft. I suitable hospital that could offer the required level of care was knew from referencing their position on my traffic collision in Nairobi, Kenya. We received unfortunate news of the KC-10 avoidance system (TCAS) display they were positioned aft being delayed. Thus additional fuel was nowhere to be found. of us in holding, 1,000 ft above. This position allowed them Making matters worse, the CV-22 formation received 119 total to rapidly descend and be in a visual trail formation position bullet impacts, many of which struck the fuel tanks and fuel off of us. After rejoining, our Shadow formation turned south lines. This meant the CV-22 formation was depleting fuel at

The crew of Shado 21 (Photo courtesy of Capt Rolf Place)

34 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org shocking rates. They did not have enough fuel to make it to Raven 73 Flight requested fuel urgently. They would Nairobi, or Entebbe for that matter. Our Shadows, without the need it prior to the location of our planned TAAR track. While KC-10 support, did not have enough fuel to pass the Ospreys closing the distance with the southbound Ospreys, I decided we that would put Nairobi within their range and allow us to be able needed to make my aircraft the dedicated tanker for Raven 73. to safely land. There was only one viable COA. We needed to Post-refueling, this would allow our two aircraft to accelerate get Raven 73 to the airfield at Entebbe. We would then have the out towards Entebbe together, minimizing the time required wounded moved to another platform that was ready and able to for Raven 73’s injured to arrive at Entebbe and be medevac’d. make it to Nairobi. This other platform would be my Shadow Meanwhile, Shado 22 would stay with Raven 74/75 to complete aircraft. We expected our fuel state to be such that refueling their larger combined offload (they had more fuel than my at Entebbe would not be required. Therefore, my loadmasters aircraft as a result of the first TAAR). Thus I requested the immediately began reconfiguring our cargo compartment with CV-22 flight to position Raven 73 in the lead element, ahead litter stanchions. of Raven 74/75 in the second element. With no additional

www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 35 fuel from a KC-10 coupled with a higher (but unknown) CV- lost a hydraulic system. Raven 73, who took the worst blow, 22 flight fuel burn rate, our fuel plan was officially outthe experienced an electrical system failure and damage to the window. Thus our Shadow navigators feverishly crunched and flight controls. Medics onboard Raven 74 drew blood from re-crunched fuel numbers. special operators whose blood types matched those who needed Our single high-speed hose and the one on Shado 22 were it so urgently in the lead Osprey. To refuel with our aircraft, the only two in theater. This meant we had no redundancy in the crew of Raven 73 was required to manually extend their our ability to refuel, as we both had a low-speed hose on the refueling probe. In an effort to alleviate some of the burden from Raven 73 Flight, my radio operator assumed control of the ATC radios for all five aircraft inbound to Entebbe. At 0800Z, Raven 73 notified us they were going to need more fuel. We were already in a visual trail position behind them so no rendezvous was necessary. We both simply slowed to our TAAR airspeed of 200 KIAS, while we moved forward of their position. While extending our single high-speed hose from the refueling pod on our left wing we experienced a hose malfunction. Luckily my flight engineer rapidly went to RESET on the corresponding reel response switch. This quick fix worked and the hose performed as advertised from this point forward. Upon completion of this additional TAAR, we no longer had enough fuel to reach Nairobi. Shado 22 now had more fuel than we did and it was enough that Nairobi would be within reach for them. Therefore, my wingman was now the primary medevac platform out of Entebbe. As a result of slowing down for this last TAAR, Shado 22 and Raven 74/75 had caught back up to us (my aircraft and Raven 73). We were now essentially a five-ship formation approaching Entebbe International Airport. Inbound my radio operator spent the better part of ten minutes overcoming language barriers with Entebbe Approach Control. He declared emergencies for the Osprey crews, relayed two MC-130Ps and 3 CV-22s were going to land on the airfield within minutes, and informed what our landing order would be (1st Raven 73, 2nd Raven 74, 3rd Raven 75, 4th Shado 22, and 5th Shado 21). While relaying our intent, he also received word from our mission commander in Djibouti that a C-17 in Entebbe was now primary for the medevac to Nairobi. By chance an American C-17 was fueled on the airfield in final preparations The view from Shado 21’s parking spot at Entebbe International for a departure to the US. We all knew it could get our critically Airport of the old terminal building on 21 Dec 13. (Photo courtesy wounded troops to Nairobi faster than any C-130, and every of Capt Rolf Place) moment absolutely counted. The C-17 was about to see our aircraft touching down. Its mission had changed. right side. A malfunction of either high-speed hose from this My aircraft stayed with Raven 73 until they passed the point forward would have been absolutely catastrophic in our threshold of Runway 17 for their landing at Entebbe. We plan to recover Raven 73 Flight at Entebbe. wanted to be there for any possible support up to the last Not long after distinguishing the Ospreys’ depiction on moment. The crippled state of Raven 73 led to approximately radar, we acquired all three of the tiltrotor aircraft visually 6,800 lbs of fuel being drained overboard their CV-22 during while maneuvering for the rendezvous with the lead CV-22. the 1.3 hour flight from the first TAAR after Bor to Entebbe. The thick, white trail of fuel we saw pouring overboard Raven After they touched down, we maneuvered into a left downwind 73 from my vantage point was alarming. They had been hit the to fall in place behind our other three aircraft currently on final worst and it was evident they were losing fuel at the highest approach. At 0845Z we landed last behind Shado 22. They rate of the three-ship. We moved into position for the join-up were now the secondary COA for the medevac to Nairobi. If as expeditiously as possible. My crew passed fuel to Raven 73 any unforeseen issues occurred with the C-17, they would be at 0725Z, before bringing in the hose and expediting together primary. towards Entebbe. Shortly thereafter Shado 22 completed their We taxied and pulled into parking, on the ramp east of TAAR. the shorter runway, alongside the shutdown CV-22s. We also The crews and personnel onboard Raven 73 Flight had commenced shutting down our engines hoping we would their hands full. In addition to the fuel leaks, each CV-22 had soon be able to locate a fuel truck and refuel. While we

36 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org A CV-22 Osprey from the 8th SOS, is refueled by an MC-130P Combat Shadow from the 67th SOS, during a training mission over Mali, Africa, Nov 2008. (Photo by Sgt Nicholas Hernandez) were running checklists, the critically wounded troops were setting on the horizon, and Shado 22 arrived not long after. receiving lifesaving blood transfusions on the airfield from that The next day, UN and civilian helicopters landed in Bor and previously collected onboard Raven 74. With the possibility of evacuated the awaiting Americans. Shado 22 being chosen as the medevac platform, they could We were very fortunate no lives or aircraft were lost this not risk an engine not starting. Therefore, Shado 22 would day. If that had been the case, the overall narrative would keep their engines running up until the successful departure of have been very different. There are takeaways from this the C-17 bound for Nairobi. mission beyond the survivability of the CV-22 or the refueling After our Engine Shutdown Checklist was called capabilities of the MC-130P. The heroics that saved lives have complete, I stepped off our plane. I discovered a parking ramp been rightfully applauded, but we also need to scrutinize and flooded with large pools of fuel from the leaking CV-22s. I learn from this mission in preparation for the next. also observed our arrival had created quite a large commotion It was a tremendous honor to lead our formation of on the airfield, and people were coming out of the woodwork Shadows on this mission. We overcame tremendous challenges. to see what it was all about. For this reason it was important to The MC-130P is a crew airplane, and on this day especially, secure critical items. When helping to carry equipment off the every crew position was essential and all contributed greatly. CV-22s onto our aircraft, I could not help but notice the floor There is no doubt these Shadow crews were instrumental in of the Osprey cabins covered with fuel and blood. I could see creating the best possible outcome out of a very dire situation. they had been through hell and back. We would onload CV- It is my firm belief that the support provided on this 22 crew and occupants, along with their weapons, ammo, and particular day by the MC-130P, with its blend of raw capability essential equipment. When complete, Shado 21 would have 29 and unique crew complement, could not have been matched additional personnel and 9,000 lbs of cargo onboard awaiting by any other platform. Djibouti was the last deployed theater transport back to Djibouti. for the Shadow and it finished its long and historic career in While awaiting the takeoff of the C-17, I remember its prime. It just so happened the very aircraft which flew this taking a moment to examine the building immediately in front mission would be the final two MC-130Ps to be retired. Their of our aircraft. It was the old terminal building of Entebbe formation flight together once again on 2 Jun 2015 would be International. Numerous bullet holes could be seen in its white the last time a Combat Shadow would ever take to the sky. facade. They were traces left behind from the historic 1976 hostage-rescue mission carried out by Israeli commandos. On 21 Dec 2013, our American commandos added yet another chapter to this fabled airfield’s history. About the Author: Capt Rolf Place is currently an AC-130U Pilot in the 4th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, FL. He In Conclusion was previously an MC-130P Instructor Pilot in the 9th Special The C-17 successfully airlifted the wounded troops to Operations Squadron from July 2009 to April 2014 at both Eglin Nairobi. They would all thankfully survive their injuries. My AFB, FL and Hurlburt Field. He resides in Fort Walton Beach with crew landed in Djibouti that same evening just as the sun was his wife Capt Lenora Grubb, an engineer at Eglin AFB. www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 37 A crewchief from the 353rd Special Operations Group checks the propellers of an MC-130P Combat Shadow at , Japan. (US Air Force photo/SSgt Samuel Morse)

38 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org Shadow Will Always Be a Part of Me By Stacy Quarles A lot of things shape the development of a man. Sometimes a lot to do with it, but one thing was evident, no one person it is his parents, sometimes it is his upbringing, sometimes it is was greater than the culture. You could enhance the culture, where he is or where he is going. There also things such as jobs, but you could not break the bonds of it. Going back through positions, and careers that all contribute to the development of my own personal history, I can’t think of a time that I have a man. One significant contribution to me as a professional and been around a more significant group of people than as my as a man, was my time as a Shadow maintainer. time as a Shadow maintainer. Most of these men and women Before becoming a Shadow maintainer, I spent time as a have become leaders of leaders since this time and I attribute a slick C-130 engine mechanic and then worked as a Combat lot of this to the “aura of the Shadow.” The Shadow flew like it Talon engine mechanic. In both instances, I was just another had great people around it. It was reflective of the great people wrench-turner going out to do a job. It was not until my that flew it as well as the people that maintained it. assignment as a Shadow maintainer that everything I felt I have no doubt that every person that became part of the about maintenance changed. Shadow maintenance made Shadow culture of the 17th SOS is a better person for their me significant. I felt part of something and it prompted me experience there. If you think that the retirement of a great to become better in everything I did. Becoming a Shadow aircraft like the Shadow is the end of that culture, then think maintainer was not about individual identity, it was about becoming part of a culture. I was welcomed into the Shadow maintainer community with open arms, but my membership depended on two things: teamwork and work ethic. It was not openly demanded, it was silently expected by the “leadership by example” that was going on daily. Every person was accountable for their role in this culture. If this was not the way you did business when you got here, it became the way you did business by the time that you left. Many people come to places with ideas about how to change it and make it better. In 1990, at Kadena AB, Japan, Shadow maintenance was part of the flying squadron, the 17th SOS. In my opinion, I call this the last great squadron of the Air Force. Now, there are plenty of good squadrons that followed, but the work, the people, and the culture of the Shadow flying 17th SOS was like no other. I am quite sure that every man and woman who worked there, regarded it as their favorite. I still Maintainers from the 353rd Maintenance Squadron solder say that grouping Shadow ops with Shadow maintenance was a part underneath the leading edge of a wing on a MC-130P one of the brightest ideas to ever come out of the Air Force. Combat Shadow. (US Air Force Photo by TSgt Aaron Cram) And, the 17th SOS Shadow culture should be the model for future squadron development. For starters, the operators and maintainers were the true again. Each and every member of this great community is definition of “one team – one fight.” We worked together, we impacting people in great ways, and it will reverberate for trained together, we fought together, and we played together. years to come. Thanks to this fine piece of history, this fine There was mutual respect for every person and piece of the group of people and this fine aircraft are a significant building puzzle. We had no trouble holding our people accountable. block of everything I am about. The Shadow may retire, but the We trained the best aircrew members and developed the best culture it created will live on forever. maintainers in the Air Force. Our commanders became the best commanders. Our officers became the best officers, and our airmen became the best airmen. We were diverse in every way. About the Author: Stacey Antwan Quarles grew up in Topeka KS We were professional in every way. We made things happen! and was the second of five kids. He joined the Air Force right after It is hard to say how this was made possible. Could it have high school for a dream to serve his country and travel. He spent been because of the great leaders that ran the 17th SOS, most 17 years in AFSOC as a Propulsion Technician and Crew Chief, of whom went on to do great things elsewhere? I think that had before finishing his 22 year career in Compass Call. www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 39 By Rebecca Shelley, SMSgt, USAF Seems like this year has been full of “lasts” for the Combat lied to you” warnings started to feel true. He said “You can be Shadow community; the last Shadow retired from Kadena, the a Crew Chief, you will be in charge of the plane, you point and last Shadow formation flight at Hurlburt, the last two Combat specialists will run in and fix , and you will fly with it wherever Shadows retire from the Air Force inventory. For me, today, it goes.” 1 Jun 2015 was the last time I would sign an Exceptional Things started to pick up over the following year; I was Release on a Combat Shadow and the salute I gave to aircraft finally assigned to my first plane…The Assistant to the Assistant 217 as she made her final turn on to the taxiway was also a Crew Chief on aircraft 66-0217. The Dedicated Crew Chief last….for both me and the plane. I guess it is kismet that I (DCC) sat me down and gave me a long expectations briefing, also experienced all of my Crew Chief “firsts” with the Eglin “When the plane lands empty the galley and cargo trash, sweep Shadows and aircraft 217. the cargo box, straighten all the seat belts, clean the windows, 22 years ago I signed into my first squadron, the 9th transcribe the forms, check the TO shelf for changes and post, SOS at Eglin AFB as a 20 year old Airman Basic. My first if the load masters leave vomit bags under the red seats throw experience as a Combat Shadow Crew Chief was at the wash them away, make sure no one used the honey bucket, if they rack. The Expediter dropped me off behind a green C-130 that did call the load master back out to empty it”…..yeah right! looked like every other C-130 I had seen to that point. I was Even though I had become an official Assistant Janitor to the handed a bucket of green slimy soap, a hose, and a scrub pad Assistant Crew Chief I was proud to finally be assigned to a and pointed in the direction of the belly. After spending my first plane. Vomit bags couldn’t diminish the feeling of pride when month washing soil barrier and urine off planes I was not very the DCC stenciled my name above the crew entrance door on excited about being a Crew Chief…..all those “your recruiter 217.

Editor’s Note: This article is derived from the speech by SMSgt Shelley during the MC-130P Heritage Flight at Hurlburt in May of 2015.

40 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org 217 was the first plane on the ramp at Eglin with the SOFI Northern and Southern Watch I had finally gotten my landing mod and it was the only plane painted special ops gray at sickness somewhat under control. the time…..like a brand new car compared to the rest of the I was a young Staff Sergeant when 9/11 happened. I was in camo paint jobs with the tracker humps on their heads. The Las Vegas getting married when the towers fell. The unit called 9th aircraft and crews were already deployed when I got to and asked me when I could get back; they were spinning up to Eglin and some of the planes were going through mod. I recall go dish some pay back. I wasn’t able to make it back in time to the first “real-world” mission I generated was to Guantanamo go on the first push out to Kharsi Khamabad (K2) but made the Bay Cuba when thousands of Cubans and Haitians attempted next round into Jalalabad, Pakistan (J-Bad). to cross the Caribbean on homemade rafts. It was the first time We were a combined unit at the time so we were sharing I could relate our mission to what was in the news and it set the missions with the 5th SOS and 719th MXS. I have so many stage for so many more news worthy taskings. memories of living and working with those maintainers and I deployed for the first time in 1995 to in support of crews. Somehow a few of the Reserve guys managed to get Operation Provide Comfort. My first time through St John’s in their hands on a goat. They dressed it like a deer and cooked it February we changed a prop in 5 foot snow drifts. I recall Capt in a hole in the sand behind the old hangars where we lived…. John Cline landing 994 wing-tip-low into Mildenhall through yuck! A weird thing to remember I guess but the living and what felt like a hurricane, I vomited behind the power unit for eating conditions at J-Bad were not the best. The mission and an hour before someone finally carried me to the bus headed maintenance was the best though; we were pushing two a night, for the Smokehouse. “You will fly with it wherever it goes” twice a night launching real missions. Flags were hung in the he said! After four more trips to Turkey during Operation’s cargo compartments, load masters and radio operators were

www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 41 coming back with stories for us, the planes were flying great! asked him…..then went to get the paint. I remember the 213 crash like it was yesterday. The plane I recall the time Major X let me sit in the pilot’s seat came back for a quick-turn and I was asked to top off the gas, for 15 minutes somewhere over the Atlantic and told me “a the FE, MSgt Jeff Doss said they would be right back to go little less rudder Bec,” that was awesome! I’m sure I owe ret. again. After refueling I sat on the end of the ramp with the CMSgt Gary Glover my life at least twice for saving me from two loads, SSgt’s Chris Langston and Jeff Pohl talking until wandering into a minefield at Baghram during a FARP and the officers came back. Motors again, goggles again andI holding the ladder as I stood on the tippy-top, on tippy-toes to marshalled them out…same as every other night. Chris gave check prop servicing somewhere in South America. me a wave as they turned on the taxi way and the ramp closed. But the best memories were with my maintenance crew I few hours later I was sitting on the power unit waiting on the Jimmy Drybola, Eric “EZE” Fair, Lance Roe, Ryan Landis, plane to land when TSgt Stacey Quarles came out to tell me Stacey Quarles, Matt Beck, Matt McCombs and so many there was a briefing in the haz. I asked where turn-over was, more awesome maintainers. We painted the parking squares told him that 213 was going to land, the sun was coming up, it and taxi lines in Djibouti out of the back of an EZ-GO with would be down any minute, who is going to catch it? paint rollers, unloaded chaff and flare standing on the hood of a The maintenance haz was full of ops, maintenance, bobtail because we couldn’t get AGE to bring us a stand. There everyone. Someone was up front talking, I couldn’t see him was the time we popped a guillotine and it nearly shot through but I heard him say, “213 crashed in the mountains, we don’t the side of the pod during a hose change. Then there was fuel have a status on the crew yet.” My knees buckled out from cell maintenance on that key hole in Bermuda when the tail under me, and then Chris Langston was waving to me before was hanging over the bluest water in the world. My Chief said the ramp closed and the world stopped spinning. We found out I could never go to Bermuda again! Where has the time gone? within a few hours that the entire crew survived and had been As the old birds go to the boneyard, it’s hard not to rescued, the relief was indescribable. I struggle with the crash feel a little resentment towards the industrial machine that’s still, nothing like what the crew must have gone through but it replacing them for newer and faster models. For the better part left a hole in me. I asked myself a million times, “Why didn’t of 22 years taking care of them has taken me and so many I look at the plane?” I threw on the gas then sat and chatted for of my AF brothers and sisters away from our families. I’ve an hour and never looked at a thing during that hour between spent half my life with these planes, more time than I spent flights, “What if something had been wrong and I didn’t even with my oldest son. I often wonder if he will ever forgive my look?,” “What if they hadn’t survived?” absence during his formative years because I was out playing To our surprise most of the crew came back to J-Bad in with planes. When we finally set the fleet down in the dirt field the week that followed the crash. I was scared to talk to them I was heartbroken for the loss, the planes at Eglin had become when they got off the plane, afraid to face them thinking my my kids in a sense. neglect may have caused the crash that could have killed them. Over the past couple of years I’ve moved over to the Eventually we found out what happened, it wasn’t the plane, Gunship side and I look forward to seeing the new AC-130J everyone was okay, the crews were flying again, the missions join the fight. I hope the young maintainers who start with this continued, and the world started spinning. All these years and plane have as many wonderful firsts, middles and lasts as I I still reflect on that night when the ramp closed on 213’s final did with the Shadow. I am eternally grateful to everyone who taxi and I still ask myself “Why didn’t I look?” That question shared memories with me to include the planes. There is only remained with me for every inspection, repair, and launch of one moment in all of my experience with the Combat Shadows every aircraft I’ve touched to this day. I hope it remains with that I would do over if I could; the rest would remain the same. each crew chief I’ve trained to follow me, and while I know In closing I say a final thank you to Col John Cline for finding that sometimes we don’t see everything and mistakes still me after the crash, giving me a hug and telling me she flew happen….the cost is too great to not look. perfectly to the very end. I did several more trips with the Shadows, the 9th and the 5th after 9/11. Each trip had ups and downs; the heat, sand, About the Author: SMSgt Rebecca Shelley entered the AF in tents, food options all took their toll but it was the really fun February 1993 as a C-130 Crew Chief. Her first assignment was fixes on the road that kept us going. I remember 822 hitting to Eglin AFB and the 9th SOS. She accompanied the Combat the excavation hole in Baghram and Capt Travis Hill calling Shadow, 9th SOS and 5th SOS through 14 deployments ranging for a tire which ended up being an entire landing gear. There from Operation Provide Comfort II to Operation Enduring Freedom. was the night 217 took the bullet in the wing in and the In 2007 she volunteered for the maintenance cadre to set up the week of in-tank maintenance in July to patch the hole. There 27th SOMXG at Cannon AFB. While at Cannon she was assigned was the time 4854 hit a pterodactyl somewhere over Oman that to Quality Assurance and the 16th Aircraft Maintenance Unit punched a 15 inch hole in the wheel well fairing and delayed where she supervised AC-130H Gunship maintenance. In 2011 SMSgt Shelley returned to Eglin and the 1 SOMXS/9 SOS as Lead our trip home for a week. I remember a pilot asking me if I Production Superintendent and led the unit move and stand-up at could spray paint the Benson tank black so the enemy couldn’t Hurlburt Field. In 2013 Sergeant Shelley joined the 1 SOAMXS and see the grey tank and shoot at it…..”Like they won’t see the the AC-130U Gunship team. SMSgt Shelley was selected as the grey plane and hear the 400 horsepower turbo props first?” I AC-130J Gunship’s first Aircraft Maintenance Unit Superintendent.

42 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org The airplanes were slow and ugly and they leaked, but they were a lifeline for the Vietnamese ground forces.

Fairchild C-123K Provider at the National Museum of the . (US Air Force photo) MULE TRAIN By Walter J. Boyne, Col, USAF (Ret)

The most satisfying flying jobs aren’t USAF’s Mule Train detachment was And they did all this with an aircraft that always glamorous. Sometimes, a routine a C-123 airlift unit sent to provide tactical was thought to be washed up. In reality, it or even lowly task, offering no glory, airlift support for ’s hard- proved to be perfect for the task. turns out to be highly rewarding. Such pressed ground troops. Its primary “If ever an aircraft was in its element, was the case with Project Mule Train, purpose was to give the ground forces an it was the C-123B in SEA [Southeast a Vietnam– era operation that began on assault capability via airdrop or insertion. Asia],” said Carl Wyrick, who as a 11 Dec 1961, and technically ended on 8 Yet the unit also saw a great need for captain flew the aircraft in Vietnam. “It Dec 1962. logistic support entailing daily delivery was slow, ugly, leaked, and was hot when The operative words here are of supplies to remote sites in Vietnam. it was hot and cold when it was cold, but “technically ended.” Even though Mule While hauling troops into battle or it was fun to fly—just like a big Super Train officially came to a close after only supplies to the troops, the Mule Train Cub.” one year, its innovative spirit influenced crews often had to go into harm’s way, The C-123, though never a candidate air cargo operations for the operate independently with little air for best-looking-aircraft honors, was rest of the war. The name “Mule Train,” traffic control and under marginal weather a solid performer, capable of carrying now virtually forgotten, was always conditions, flying in and out of small 60 fully armed troops, or up to 16,000 mentioned with respect. fields located in steep mountainous areas. pounds of cargo. It could carry a variety

www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 43 of equipment, including jeeps, small squadron in the wing and was manned crews had become so valuable that tours artillery pieces, and ground support by young pilots with an average 1,800 were lengthened to 179 days. Soon, equipment. It had a hydraulically hours flying time—of which 1,500 were the Air Force was giving permanent operated rear ramp, and the floor was in the C-123. Crews were augmented assignments for units, with individual both strongly built and well-fitted with with loadmasters (normally assigned to tours extending for a year or more. strong tiedown points. the Aerial Port Squadron) and additional The First Group Arrives In pre–Vietnam days, Pope AFB, ground personnel so that it could function Most sources fix 2 Jan 1962, as N.C., was home to five squadrons as a unit upon arrival in Vietnam. (A the date that the initial group of aircraft of C-123Bs. The aircraft had been second Mule Train squadron, the 777th arrived at Tan Son Nhut AB in South declared obsolete and was slated to enter TCS (A), arrived in South Vietnam on Vietnam. The unit had been preceded retirement in 1961. 15 Jun 1962. Eventually, both squadrons on December 28 by a team of officers Kennedy’s Decision were placed under the 315th Air from the 315th Air Division, led by However, on Nov. 13, 1961, Commando Wing.) Col Lopez J. Mantoux. On January 2, President Kennedy approved a On December 11, Lt Col Floyd the unit became the airlift branch of the Vietnamese Air Force/ 2nd Advanced Echelon joint operations center, with responsibility for managing C-123 mission activity. Ground crews immediately began working on the airplanes, knowing they were going to sleep under mosquito netting in tents and eat at a field kitchen. There was no billeting for the officers, who happily went downtown to a still generally quiet Saigon, where their $16 per diem would pay for decent quarters at local places such as the Majestic Hotel. Later, when some crews were transferred to equally primitive conditions at Da Nang, the officers also had to live under canvas on base and dine at the DOOM—Da Nang Officers’ Open Mess—a three-barrel dip-and-wash facility. Mule Train’s C-123s commenced The targets for the airdrops were sometimes small. One of them was described as being operations on January 3. Initial plans no bigger than a soccer field, allowing for only two bundles to be dropped per pass. called for six airplanes to fly four hours per day for the foreseeable recommendation by retired Army Gen future. The detachment’s task was not Maxwell D. Taylor, who was serving as K. Shofner led the first eight aircraft easy. While there were three major military representative to the President from Pope. A second contingent took radar sites—at Da Nang, Tan Son and was recalled to active duty in 1962 to off on 2 Jan 1962, led this time by the Nhut, and Pleiku—command and serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of unit operations officer, Maj Wayne J. control was casual in the extreme. Staff, and Walt W. Rostow, a top national Witherington. The aircraft had to be There were no first-rate instrument security advisor, to increase the mobility specially modified in order to traverse the approach systems, no navigation aids, of South Vietnam’s hard-pressed vast Pacific region. Upon arrival at Clark and no true communications facilities. military. The White House authorized the AB in the Philippines, the first crew spent Communications depended primarily on Air Force to deploy one of Pope’s C-123 two weeks recuperating from the long the shaky Vietnamese telephone system. squadrons and 40 Army H-21 helicopters flight; later crews were often shipped out Perhaps a dozen of the major to assist South Vietnam’s forces. to Vietnam the same day. Two instructor local airfields had low-frequency radio On December 6, the Defense pilots, Wyrick and Al Brezinsky, were beacons, but these were considered too Department ordered the 346th Troop pulled off to check out CIA’s unreliable for instrument approaches. Carrier Squadron (Assault) to the Far pilots in the C-123. Later, Air America Consequently almost 100 percent of East for 120 days TDY “to participate offered jobs to both, but they declined. the flying was done under “Mark One in a classified training mission” in the Original plans called for aircrews Eyeball” Visual Flight Rules—often official jargon of the day. The 346th to be assigned temporary duty for four- when the actual weather was below VFR was generally considered to be the best month tours. Soon, however, experienced minimums.

44 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org Mule Train crews soon adopted mission, interpreting the problems, and Dropping supplies was handicapped new operational techniques. Climbs then working with the ground crew to by the lack of air-drop equipment, and and descents would be made in a spiral solve them. for a time reliance was placed on 4-by- through a break in the overcast— the Fortunately, the C-123 was a 8 plywood sheets and leftover French infamous “sucker hole”— and cruise relatively simple and rugged aircraft. Its parachutes. On one occasion, pilot would be just on top of the generally low- systems could take the heat and humidity Roger D. Haneline, then a captain, lying cloud layer. better than more sophisticated aircraft. was dropping equipment when the All landing approaches had to be Tough landing gear and glider-strong plywood sheet twisted sideways on the visual, but landings were sometimes fuselage could take the rough landings on interior aircraft ramp after the chute had made under highly marginal conditions. short airfields, where stopping depended deployed. The open chute kept dragging Whenever possible, flights were made at upon a slow approach, touching down on the C-123 down, and Haneline had to go 2,500 feet along the coastline, away from the edge of the airstrip, then full reverse to full takeoff power just to stay out of heavy clouds and the ever-present Viet and a steady, heavy foot on the anti-skid the treetops. He could not turn for fear Cong marksmen. brakes. of stalling, and the airplane was heading All of the initial Mule Train missions Soon, the Mule Train route structure straight into “Indian Country”—Laos. At were dedicated to carrying cargo. One- became linked to the hard-surface the last minute the loadmaster managed hundred-kilo sacks of rice were a major runways at Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut, Nha to cut the shrouds and the struggling item, and at least one pilot over-grossed Trang, Bien Hoa, Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot, C-123 could gain some altitude. his aircraft by figuring them in at 100 Hue, Da Lat, Soc Trang, Qui Nhon, and Frederick P. Horky recalls taking off pounds. The most typical commodities Vung Tau. Virtually every Mule Train from Da Nang to fly to Kontum, one of were live ducks, chickens, pigs, and cows, sortie began or ended at one of these the main resupply points for the Special packed in locally made pens of wood airfields, but intermediate stops could be Forces camps. From there he flew air- and, when necessary, parachuted into the anywhere. drop sorties to a camp in the mountains outlying camps. Mule Train aircraft also Two C-123 aircraft were maintained near the Laotian border. The drop site transported many Vietnamese natives. at Da Nang to support northern outposts. was so small that Horky had to use five On more than one occasion, a Mule Train crew would smell smoke in the aircraft and find a traveler cooking food in the aircraft’s cargo compartment. There was no pretense that this was a South Vietnamese cargo operation, nor was there any training of Vietnamese for the task. Vietnamese were employed as “kickers” to move the cargo out the rear on resupply drops. The Mule Train detachment, in its first month of operations, put in 548 hours of flying. In the next month, the daily flight hour total was bumped from four to seven, and the flying hour total would grow steadily for the next year. Young Commanders In Mule Train, the Air Force placed great confidence in young aircraft commanders, many of them first lieutenants. They were given authority to conduct operations with little oversight. In fact, many former crew members assigned to C-123 duty were awed at first by the freedom from having to call the command post when a decision had to be made. Flying hours continued to grow, thanks to the dedication of the ground crews, who worked all night, in all weather, to get the aircraft ready. Flight mechanics were also invaluable, flying a www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 45 55-gallon drums of napalm mixed with gasoline. With a good kicker, the load could go out the back ramp in less than five seconds and leave a pattern of flame 1,200 feet long. The ground crews and the enlisted aircrews shared the dangers of the war with their officers, and it was an enlisted man, A1C Howard W. Wright, who would become the first C-123 crew member to be wounded by VC ground fire. He was hit in the right thigh while the aircraft was descending to Tan Son Nhut on July 10. The crews began using flak vests as interim armor plate. The rapid influx of aircraft and ad hoc nature of the requests for airlift had resulted in some Army dissatisfaction Capt Frederick Horky (left) and his C-123 crew line up at Kham Duc during an off load. Horky says in the early days, aircrew carried an incredible assortment of weapons— with Mule Train operations. The problem including a Thompson machine gun the loadmaster holds here. (Photo by Frederick P. Horky) lay in the lack of aerial port facilities and inadequate communications. There was passes, dropping two bundles on each The die was cast on 28 Jun 1962, little that could be done to rectify the pass, to deliver the cargo. The technique when 16 C-123s and 12 South Vietnamese situation. was to slide down the mountain, rotate to C-47s dropped paratroops under adverse In October 1962, there began drop the bundles, claw up the hill on the weather conditions about 35 miles north what became known as the Southeast other side of the camp, do a 180- degree of Saigon. The operation went off well Asia Airlift System. Requirements turn, and then repeat the process, with the despite a 500-foot ceiling. were forecast out to 25 days, and these engines operating at maximum except On other occasions, the C-123s requirements were matched against takeoff power much of the time. would load up troops from the South available resources. The 315th Troop When he had delivered the cargo, Vietnamese airborne brigade in Saigon to Carrier Group and 8th Aerial Port Horky flew back to Kontum for the fly to the relief of a village that had come Squadron came into being and set next load, making 10 sorties that day. under attack. Over the village, the C-123 the stage for tighter control of airlift During the entire period, the airlift pilot would reduce power, drop flaps, and operations. Secure field phones and a control center had no contact with the spiral down to the drop altitude and give radio network became available, and the aircraft nor had any idea of where they the a green light to jump. carrying of cargo became much more were or what mission they were flying. At times, C-123 crews were conventional, if perhaps a little less fun. Control assumed correctly that necessary uncomfortable with the assault role. Flying became more stable and jobs were being done, satisfying the South Vietnamese Special Forces were bureaucratic. The era of the Mule Train customer’s needs on the spot. sometimes capricious about when and operation was over. It left behind a record of success and a collection of procedures Pressure for More where they would fight. Straight cargo operations were hazardous enough, and techniques for cargo work in The Mule Train logistic operation especially during the monsoon season Southeast Asia. Many of the men of was paying dividends. However, when South Vietnamese troops were Mule Train returned for second and third Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara socked-in in the mountainous valleys. To tours, some in the C-130 that replaced the and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Curtis execute the mission, the C-123s would C-123. For all of them, however, there LeMay soon applied pressure for the line up in a proper direction, let down in was nothing that could replace the spirit Mule Train group to become more the undercast, and if they did not break and success of the original Mule Train. involved in the assault role. LeMay and out by a given altitude, would climb back other Air Force leaders were concerned up. There were usually 800- foot ceilings that the Army might pre-empt the assault in the valleys, and most of the time they About the Author: Walter J. Boyne, former role if the Air Force didn’t get moving. broke out. director of the National Air and Space The Mule Train crews were Mule Train missions during 1962 Museum in Washington, is a retired Air experienced in assault work, but they had Force colonel and author. He has written became extremely diverse, with the to improvise for conditions in Vietnam. more than 400 articles about aviation C-123s serving in roles ranging from It was difficult to decide exactly where topics and 29 books. duck delivery to napalm bombing. In to drop paratroops over the rough terrain, Reprinted by permission from Air Force the latter role, the Provider carried nine and much depended upon the map- Magazine, published by the Air Force wooden pallets, each holding three Association. reading ability of the crew.

46 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org Gooney Birds, Napalm, & Greece

By Randall Everett III, Maj, USAF (Ret) I was one of the original Jungle Jim the Skytrain, but during the Second day and at night. volunteers in the 4400th Combat Crew World War it had earned the nickname In September 1961, our commander, Training Squadron (CCTS). I’d like to “Gooney Bird” by the crews who flew Col Ben King, collected all 4400th CCTS share a few bits of history that to my her. I was designated as first pilot, with members in a guarded room and pulled knowledge have never been related in 1st Lt Steve Edwards as copilot and 1st a shade off a map Of South Vietnam, any of the Air Commando Jungle Jim Lt Willie Seirer as my navigator. Tech announcing that was where we were stories. Sgt Wylie was the final member of the training so hard to go. Most of us had In March 1961, I was a 1st Lt and crew, there to keep us safe. never heard of this faraway country. A I was ordered to report to the base For six months we trained, flying short time later four Gooney Birds, with commanders’ office at Harlingen AFB, during the day and at night at 50 feet aircrews departed Hurlburt field on their TX on a Sunday morning, which I thought above the highest obstacles, sometimes long journey to Bien Hoa AB, South was strange for a training command base. flying at treetop altitude during cross Vietnam. I was informed I would be asked a series country missions, with blackout landings About a month into the deployment, of questions to which I was to answer and takeoffs, air drops, and short field one of those first C-47s crashed without yes or no. At any time I answered “no,” landings and rapid turnaround takeoffs any survivors. One of my best friends, then the interview would be terminated with Special Forces teams. We were Capt Ed Kissam, was the aircraft with the warning if any context of the sent to Stead AFB, NV, to undergo commander. One of Hurlburt’s main briefing was discussed outside his office nine days of survival training, and we streets is now named after Ed. That crash I was subject to $10,000 dollars fine or were administered psychological tests. is listed as the first US aircraft loss in the ten years in jail! I answered “yes” to Surprisingly several volunteers did not Vietnam War. every question, and soon afterwards that answer some questions correctly and In January 1962, my crew was I had orders, coded “ Jungle Jim,” to the they soon were eliminated from the selected to replace the lost C-47 and 4400th CCTS at Hurlburt Field, FL. Jungle Jim program. Eventually a 3,000 aircrew. In February we departed Hurlburt In April 1961, I reported in with foot dirt runway was built just east of the with orders to deliver the Gooney Bird about 1,000 total flying hours and a little present runway at Hurlburt Field so that to Bien Hoa AB. We had a 500-gallon over 40 hours logged in the C-47 in the the new aircrews could practice real short Benson (fuel) tank installed in order to right seat. The C-47 was officially called field and rough strip landings during the eliminate extra stops for refueling. We www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 47 C-47s parked along with a C-123 on the ramp at Pleiku, Vietnam. (Courtesy of AFSOC History Office) flew for 22 long hours at 130 mph from pilots probably felt after a successful the first operational tests of the airborne Hurburt Field to Travis AFB, CA. That mission! radio direction finding equipment, for the was the longest flight I made in my 20 About a week or two later Col Jack intelligence and electronic surveillance years of flying. Back then, airspeed was informed me we had another napalm program, code named “Phyllis Anne.” reported in miles per hour because none mission. After briefing, takeoff, and The next day my crew was selected to of our old aircraft were updated with arrival at the target site, we executed dress in our green fatigue uniforms and newer, modern cockpit instruments. As three or four drops successfully. On the stand under the wing of a C-47 while Gen a matter of fact, all of those C-47s were next drop I felt a tremendous shake on LeMay inspected us. For us it was quite older than most of us flying them. We the plane’s yoke and I started a climb a thrill to see the big man himself, with arrived at Bien Hoa after island hopping to altitude while hearing the crew on the ever present half a cigar clamped in across the Pacific Ocean, flying 75 hours the intercom hollering that a pallet had his teeth! for close to 2 weeks. flown back and hit the tail section. We This journal has noted before many After about a month at Bien flew back and safely landed at Bien Hoa. of the countries the Air Commandos Hoa, learning the geography while After Col Jack viewed what basically operated in, but I’ve never seen Greece participating in the usual C-47 resupply was minor damage to the left part of mentioned. In February 1963, Col Jack missions to drop food and supplies to a the tail, he announced that there would selected me, another pilot, Capt Henry few Special Forces outposts, dropping not be any more Gooney Bird napalm Steidl, and Capt Dick Tegge, a navigator, flares at night for the T-28 and B-26 missions. And there never was another along with a loadmaster and a combat attack missions, and leaflet dropping, our C-47 napalm drop mission during the controller, to proceed on to Athens, commander, Col Chester Jack, informed rest of that war. My crew was submitted Greece, where for the next three months my crew that we were selected to drop for a medal, however, we were told that we flew with the Royal Hellenic Air napalm over a designated suspicious we weren’t there because we were still Force in their C-47s, instructing and enemy activity site. Since this mission Top Secret and that operation was never flying unconventional air warfare tactics. had not been accomplished before, I was mentioned again! The operation was a great success. It instructed to fly a landing type approach, One day we were told that a high was such a success, that while still flying gaining top speed of about 170 mph, and ranking officer was on his way to Bien C-47’s out of Sembach AB in Germany turning final at around 40-50 feet, lining Hoa to observe the 4400th CCTS in the fall of 1966, I was selected by up on the target, with the crew in the back facilities and operations. The VIP my commander, Lt Col Stan Reece, pushing one barrel out at a time on our turned out to be Gen LeMay, the Chief to form a team and proceed to Athens, green light signal. We had 10 55-gallon of Staff of the Air Force. We were told Greece, to participate in another training barrels filled with napalm. Each had an that a captain with Gen LeMay would team mission with the Greek aircrews. explosive cap strapped to explode on be accompanying us while we flew a The team was formed with pilot Capt contact with the ground. The barrels six hour flight. During that flight, at the Joe Conde and navigators Capt Bill were loaded on separate pallets, on a captain’s instructions we performed Williams and Ted Scarpino, and Capt rail system the length of the cabin. We what seemed strange triangular patterns Tom Eggleston, a combat controller, successfully dropped every barrel on the while he sat at the navigator’s table along with a loadmaster. It was another site without incident. On the way back working with a big strange looking piece great successful operation. I have always to Bien Hoa, for a few minutes we were of communication equipment! Later on, enjoyed the memories of flying with the so excited we felt like we thought fighter we realized that we had flown one of Greek aircrews in their C-47’s!

48 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org BOOK REVIEW Teams of Teams By Gen Stanley McChrystal, US Army (Ret)

appeared relaxed in a sweater and slacks structure of our command, could squeeze as he talked about leadership philosophy itself down, spread itself out, and ooze into and what he might do next. The take- any necessary shape. There was space away was that he still had more to offer between our forces—both geographically and in our communications sharing—that and he didn’t seem emotional about his created safe pockets in which the enemy parting ways with the US Army after could expand. AQI learned to live and 34 years of service to America. operate in the gaps of our system. (p.84) With the publication of Team of Teams, he and his new team (at The task, which the book elucidates, least two of whom are former SOF boiled down to creating a resilient but professionals) he continues to still robust network to counter and defeat contribute. The book fi rst argues that the AQI organism. It is the journey One of teams need to stop using effi ciency as to the adaptive ‘Team of Teams’— the strengths of John Boyd and his a metric for progress. It then proceeds breaking down the stove-pipes between OODA loop is that it is applicable to to elaborate and dissect the nineteenth- operators and analysts and empowering any competitive endeavor—certainly century revolution in management theory subordinates to act in the absence of applicable to MiG Alley, but you can produced by Frederick Winslow Taylor, traditional decision-nodes in order to overlay it on basketball or business as which emphasized doing “more, faster, correct the slackening OODA Loop— well. While Boyd’s theories are accessed with less”—a model ideal for a shop full that makes this book so readable and most often by military historians and of men cutting wire to prescribed lengths, interesting. theorists, in the analysis of athletic but hardly appropriate for taking down a Mr. McChrystal takes the reader to competition, Vince Lombardi’s wisdom nimble network of violent actors enabled waypoints on that journey to buttress his from the gridirons at West Point, the Polo by access to modern communications. argument: to NASA (7 years between Grounds, and Lambeau Field are just as What revolutionized production in the President Kennedy’s declaration of intent prevalent and applicable. He famously Industrial Revolution, the book argues, and the actual Moon Landing), Trafalgar argued, for example, that “Individual was grafted onto the hierarchical (Admiral Nelson’s advocacy of an commitment to a group effort—that is military that values “standardization early ‘centralized control/decentralized what makes a team work, a company and uniformity… to bring a semblance execution’ model; he may have died work, a society work, a civilization of predictability and order to the during the battle but Nelson’s selected work.” Gen Stanley McChrystal (Ret), otherwise crazy environment of war.” and nurtured ‘Team of Teams’ ended in Team of Teams, has similarly culled While McChrystal acknowledges that up smashing the French and Spanish his experience leading the competition this perspective provided success to fl eets without him), and the adaptive and against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to tighten corporations like General Motors, he connected Boston trauma centers where the shot group on not only making a team points out that emphasis on effi ciency— medical marvels were performed in the work, but networking that successful instinctively relying on training as wake of the Marathon bombing. team with other teams; in his refl ections military planners and leaders—was not The SOF truths, while unwritten here, on this process, Mr. McChrystal relates working against AQI’s tighter OODA lay silently in the background (I actually some lessons learned that are just as Loop: “We deployed more resources, scrawled ‘Humans over Hardware’ in the applicable in Green Bay as they are in we put more people to work, and we margin at one point) even without the Balad. strove to create ever-greater effi ciency more overt narratives on lessons learned I personally believe it’s a shame within the existing operating model.” in both Desert One and McChrystal’s that when the word “McChrystal” comes (p.81) Machines are effi cient; organisms, tenure at Joint Special Operations up in conversation, someone invariably however, adapt and survive. Command. He writes of SEALs and fl ight blurts out “Rolling Stone” and the The adversary, McChrystal argues, crews performing well under pressure, conversation goes right off the rails. I was acting more like an organism than a highlighting that “team members cannot heard Mr. McChrystal speak at the Air machine: simply depend on orders; teamwork is Command and Staff College shortly AQI was not concerned with effi ciency. a process of reevaluation, negotiation, after his retirement, when he was starting Through trial and error, they had evolved a and adjustment; players are constantly the next phase of his life teaching military structure that was not effi cient but sending messages to, and taking cues International Relations at Yale, and he was adaptable—a network that, unlike the from, their teammates, and those players www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 49 must be able to read one another’s every move and intent.” (p.98) To enable this ideal, the book advocates pulling down stovepipes (e.g., the “need to know” mindset traditionally separating operators from analysts), and committing to disciplined and deliberate information sharing. In Iraq, Mr. McChrystal writes, “We wanted to fuse generalized awareness with specialized expertise.” (p.153) This is done by sending the best liaisons possible to partner organizations, dismantling cubicles to make a more open shop fl oor (physically fl attening the hierarchies and silos as Mayor Bloomberg has done at New York’s City Hall and the Joint Operations Center did at Balad Airbase), and—like Admiral Nelson—ensuring there are no single points of failure in the organization/kill chain. He makes a cogent argument, citing The 9/11 Commission Report to show that the modern information fi rehose had provided all the cues of the impending attack but, in the absence of that ideal coupling of awareness and expertise, no one had acted to stop it. I’d like to circle back and tackle the elephant in the room. As he advocates information sharing amongst the Team of Teams and an “eyes on—hands off” approach to leadership (where the leader considers himself less a chess master than a gardener nurturing the organizational structure, processes, and culture, then watches the team fl ourish), it’s hard to avoid thinking about the aforementioned moment when members of his staff likely over-shared in front of a journalist. He admits the previous shift in leadership style and perspective was diffi cult, and that asking subordinates for opinions and advice at PRECISION, SERVICE, LOYALTY, DISCIPLINE. meetings, while necessary, was also uncomfortable. Like ADD HOSPITALITY Admiral Nelson, though, Stanley McChrystal had “crafted and you’d have the Emerald Coast Convention Center. an organizational culture that rewarded individual initiative and critical thinking, as opposed to simple execution of commands.” Having cultivated this “adaptable, complex organism,” Gen McChrystal and his staff found, fi xed, and fi nished Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; moreover, they effectively exploited, analyzed, and disseminated the post-strike details because his team morphed and struck AQI via an emphasis on shared consciousness and empowered execution. Perhaps this is the sinew that links both McChrystal’s and Zarqawi’s exits from the fi ght; at the end of the day, though, Zarqawi has been positively 004037-Air Commando Ad.indd 1 8/30/11 7:38 PM identifi ed and put in the ground—never to rise again and make mischief, and Stanley McChrystal is still gardening with his elite team from the campus at Yale. As Coach Lombardi once said, “The greatest accomplishment is not in never falling, but in rising again after you fall.” Team of Teams represents yet another accomplishment in a long and venerable record.

About the Author: Maj Scott E. McIntosh is a Regional Affairs Strategist at Allied Air Command (NATO), Ramstein Airbase, Germany. He has served as a Leadership and Command instructor at Air Command and Staff College (2009-2012) as well as the J2 at CJTF TROY, Iraq (2011).

50 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │Vol 4, Issue 2 www.aircommando.org www.aircommando.org Vol 4, Issue 2│ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 51 he ACA has become a destination for those who have performed the SOF mission, shared the risks, celebrated the successes and honored the sacri ces of our fallen teammates. ACA maintains the history, the culture, the friendships and professional associations essential to Tsustaining the capability in the best of and the most trying of times. It operates as a trusted business and oers its members value: associations, education, exchanges and family and wounded warrior support. And, it remains small enough to oer all members a family-friendly venue through which alumni, those currently serving and those who will serve share the excitement and promise of the special operations warrior discipline. -- NORTON A. SCHWARTZ Gen (Ret), Former USAF Chief of Sta

Become a member today at www.aircommando.org AIR COMMANDO ASSOCIATION Supporting Air Commandos: PAST•PRESENT•FUTURE

(US Air Force photo by A1C Andrea Posey) The appearance of military and government personnel is not meant to suggest an official endorsement by the Department of Defense of the Air Commando Association or its fundraising efforts.