Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin

CUBA'S NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM AND POST-COLD WAR PRESSURES

by Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin1

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado is a graduate student in the Ph.D. program of the University of Georgia's Political Science Department and a Research Assistant at its Center for East-West Trade Policy. Alexander Belkin is a Researcher at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO).

t the closing session of the Rights, clearly captured the importance regime of Fidel Castro appeared to have Cuban National Assembly on of the issue when he stated, "Nuclear cleared the last hurdle in its 10-year AJuly 6, 1993, Fidel Castro energy is a must. It is not impossible. quest for nuclear ascendancy. The stated, "we are really facing a very, very We will complete it with the Russians nuclear power reactors were to be the great challenge. We have to be ready or other sources (...)." He concluded, crowning achievement of the Cuban for greater difficulties than we can imag- "for the time being it is only delayed."6 revolution. Indeed, the Cubans claimed ine."2 This stark assessment of Cuba's In September 1993, Moscow ad- that the first reactor in Juragua was more economy is based on the fact that oil vanced $30 million to Cuba to moth- than three-fourths complete.8 Cuba imports and international trade have ball the Juragua project in the needed only to negotiate payment of $21 declined to half their previous levels, Cienfuegos province, where two 440- million to the German firm Siemens AG resulting in a severe energy crisis as VVER reactors sit nearly completed.7 for the installation of instrumentation well as shortages of food, medicine, and This ends, at least for the time being, and control facilities at Juragua-1 to most other goods. Of all the issues speculation over the nuclear safety and reach its goal. The agreement was all confronting Cuba in the now two-year- proliferation concerns surrounding the but forgotten in the September 1992 old "special period,"3 energy has Cuban nuclear program. Given the "State of the Revolution" address, when emerged as the most daunting. How stop-and-go nature of the project in the Fidel Castro proclaimed that Cuba was can Cuban government justify its enor- past three years and Cuban overtures to temporarily suspending construction of mous capital outlays in the pursuit of the nonproliferation community, this the nuclear power reactor at Juragua. nuclear energy while most Cubans have temporary lull in the project presents In announcing his bitter and painful been reduced to rations of one piece of an opportunity to assiduously address decision at that time, Castro blamed the bread daily?4 The answer is that only these issues. Russians for demanding $200 million a reliable source of energy can get Cuba While this announcement could be for continued work on the project. Yet, back on its feet again and allow it to viewed as a death knell of sorts for on November 4, 1992, Russian and feed its people. That source, in the Cuban nuclear power aspirations, Cuba Cuban officials announced that they had absence of a steady flow of imported has had to clear a number of hurdles agreed to resume the long-stalled con- oil, may well be nuclear energy.5 over the past several years to reach this struction of Cuba's nuclear power plant Miguel Alfonso, a professor of Interna- point. When Russian officials agreed with French assistance. Although this tional Relations at the University of in April 1992 to continue funding for agreement called for resuming construc- Havana and Cuba's representative to the the construction of two VVER-model tion at the Juragua site, no concrete United Nations Commission on Human reactors in Cienfuegos province, the plans have ever been detailed.

18 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin

Moreover, now that Russia has ad- should increase cooperation on the most ment). It has repeatedly put forward vanced $30 million to mothball the re- pressing issue related to Cuba's nuclear conditions for its accession to the treaty, actor site at Juragua, the United States program, that of nuclear safety. The including the cessation of persistent and the nonproliferation community potential safety hazards at Juragua surely hostility from the United States, a U.S. have new opportunities for cooperation concern Cuba's leadership, which has pledge to renounce the use of military with Cuba. Such cooperation would not rejected safety assistance from the force against Cuba, and the end of port be timely because of the recent move of United States and the international com- visits of U.S. ships equipped with Cuba towards a broader endorsement munity in the past. In fact, if economic nuclear weapons to the U.S. Naval Base of nonproliferation goals. A letter from considerations are the main factors pre- at Guantanamo Bay. Secretary of State Warren Christopher venting safe completion or completion Before the Soviet break-up, Cuba's to U.S. Senator Connie Mack stated: at all of the reactor, Cuba may welcome generally negative attitude towards non- "The Russian government, which is this type of aid. By providing assis- proliferation had the effect of undermin- fully aware of our non-proliferation and tance in this area, the United States and ing the credibility of the Soviet posi- safety concerns about the Juragua plant, the international community can estab- tion on these issues. In fact, after 1968, has concluded that completion of the lish contacts with Cuba that may fur- Cuba's unyielding stance on nonprolif- project is not feasible under present cir- ther influence its attitude toward non- eration was the only apple of discord in cumstances."9 This cooperation could proliferation. In summary, the United the generally amicable Cuban-Soviet serve to eliminate safety concerns about States should use this window of op- relationship. Cuba's intransigence the construction at Juragua, and also portunity to see that Cuba's nuclear aroused suspicion. This behavior, along eliminate proliferation fears concerning program, long feared as both a prolif- with the questionable economic value a possible weapons program surround- eration and safety concern, becomes of the nuclear energy program, was in- ing Cuba's power program. neither. terpreted by those in the anti-Castro It is important to note that shortly To provide a basis for considering community as an indication of the pos- before Castro's announcement on the these opportunities, this focused case sibility of another, more nefarious, ra- suspension, Cuba declared at the Au- study examines the history of Cuba's tionale behind the Cuban program. At gust 1992 Organizacion por la nuclear program. This analysis includes the end of the 1980s, rumors about a Prohibicion de Armas Nucleares en current and future proliferation devel- secret weapons program were magni- America Latina (OPANAL)10 meeting opments, the political and economic mo- fied in a series of denouncements of the in Mexico City that it would join Ar- tivations for pursuing nuclear power, the nuclear program made by knowledge- gentina, Brazil, and Chile in signing the difficulties faced in continuing construc- able and seemingly trustworthy Cuban newly-amended Treaty for the Prohibi- tion, and the nuclear safety questions defectors.12 There has been little evi- tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin surrounding the project. dence to support these claims, but the America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). The Congressional hearings in July 1991 new amendments would, in effect, place NONPROLIFERATION CONCERNS before the Committee on Energy and the nuclear facilities of all signatories the Environment as well as an October under full-scope international safe- Cuba has never had a positive non- 1992 General Accounting Office (GAO) guards.11 These changes to the regional proliferation record. Since the first days study of the issue highlight the signifi- agreement suggest two catalysts for of the nonproliferation regime, it has cance of these concerns. The current Cuba's action: the nonproliferation strongly opposed the efforts of the in- state of Cuban nuclear activities has regime's strengthening resolve to con- ternational community to curb the provided little evidence of a weapons dition nuclear exports to non-signato- spread of weapons of mass destruction. programs. This conclusion is buttressed ries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty The Havana government was one of only by experts in the field who consistently (NPT) on acceptance of full-scope safe- four countries in the United Nations refer to "Cuba's inability to develop guards and Russia's inability to act as a General Assembly to vote against the nuclear weapons."13 reliable, sole-source provider of capital resolution endorsing the NPT in June At the insistence of the Soviets, and technology. 1968. Furthermore, Cuba is now the Cuba signed three safeguards agree- Because of Cuba's positive move- only major Latin American state that ments with the International Atomic En- ment on the issue, the world commu- has neither signed nor ratified the Treaty ergy Agency (IAEA), which currently nity and particularly the United States of Tlatelolco (despite its 1992 announce- apply to all nuclear facilities, including

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 19 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin nuclear power plants, a nuclear research Academy of Sciences in Havana. Nine POLITICAL IMPERATIVES reactor, and a zero-power nuclear reac- months later Granma and Pravda an- tor.14 In January 1993, Cuba announced nounced almost simultaneously that the In retrospect, an analysis of Cuban the opening of a nuclear waste facility. countries had reached an agreement on nuclear activities suggests that officials Under an INFCIRC/66 model agree- cooperation in the peaceful uses of involved in initiating the nuclear pro- ment, this facility would be safeguarded, atomic energy.17 gram gave primary consideration to but it is uncertain whether or not Cuba Under the accord, the Soviet gov- political reasons, viewing potential eco- and the IAEA have negotiated such an ernment was to provide Cuba with a nomic dividends as important but less agreement.15 Cuba may now be driven research reactor for experimental and significant. At the start of the program, toward participation in the nonprolif- teaching purposes, as well as hardware however, the government attempted to eration regime by Russia's refusal to to set up physics and radiochemical emphasize the economic benefits. Fidel bankroll Cuban nuclear activities. laboratories. The Soviet Union also Castro Diaz-Balart, the former Execu- agreed to assist in assembling and op- tive Secretary of the Cuban Atomic HISTORICAL BACKGROUND erating equipment exported to Cuba. Energy Commission, claimed that the Soviet specialists were to be sent to Cuba first Juragua reactor, when running at Before weighing the motivations sur- to "help in organizing studies on a cor- full capacity, would allow the country rounding Cuba's nuclear program, it is responding faculty of Havana Univer- to save 600,000 tons of oil annually. If important to examine the program's his- sity to train specialists in physics, all four units were operating, he said, torical context. Cuba began to show an nuclear physics, and radiochemistry."18 the savings would be 2.4 million tons interest in nuclear energy before the After a lull in nuclear-related activi- of oil annually.20 1959 Revolution. Its first nuclear ac- ties, the next major agreement came in Yet Cuba's actions left little doubt as cord was struck during the Bautista re- April 1976. It obliged the Soviet Union to the prime motivation for the venture. gime in June 1956. The agreement to assist its client in the construction of Two possible forms of nuclear coop- envisaged close cooperation with the two 440-megawatt nuclear power reac- eration were available to Cuba, the con- United States in civilian uses of nuclear tors at Juragua, on the south central struction of a "turnkey" project, or the energy. The initiative for the agreement coast in the Cienfuegos province. In provision of technical assistance, which came from the United States, which was March 1981, the Leningrad branch of would be less efficient. Cuba opted for making an aggressive attempt to cap- Atomenergoproyekt began research on the latter, which was perceived to be ture the world nuclear market under the the design of a Cuban nuclear power "the most flattering for the political "Atoms for Peace" policy.16 Under the station. The actual construction started ambitions of the Cuban leadership."21 terms of this agreement, a small nuclear two years later. Cuba was to receive 12 Moreover, it was not clear that a nuclear power plant of 40 megawatts was to be atomic power reactors in all, at least energy program was needed in Cuba. built jointly by American Machine twice as many as all other Latin Ameri- A 1970 monograph by Soviet geologist Foundry and Mitchell Engineering can countries combined. If all the re- Boris Semevski did not even discuss (Great Britain) in Pinar del Rio prov- actors were built by the year 2005, as nuclear power engineering as a possible ince. However, the plan was canceled planned, Cuba would have had the alternative for overcoming Cuba's acute in the middle of 1960 after the break in nuclear generating capacity of 4,800 shortage of organic fuel. Semevski con- diplomatic relations between Cuba and megawatts (or roughly double its cur- cluded that the planned construction of the United States. rent needs).19 two thermoelectric power stations with The new revolutionary leadership Nuclear power engineering was not a total capacity of 1,200 megawatts inherited this interest in nuclear energy. the only field in which Cuba sought to would "finally solve the shortage of The government, however, was seeking expand its expertise. Nuclear medicine, energy and would make Cuba the Latin support from Cuba's new ally, the So- biotechnology, and other nuclear-related American leader in energy production viet Union. The first sign of links be- applications were also considered. per capita."22 tween the Cuban and Soviet govern- However, quite logically, given the But only a short while later, Cuba ments in the nuclear field appeared in nation's dependence on external sources launched its ambitious scheme to con- January 1967, when a Soviet-sponsored of energy, nuclear power engineering struct a network of nuclear power fa- photo exposition, "Atomic Energy for was the top priority. cilities on the island. Cuba's national- Peaceful Purposes," was held at the ism was an important motivation for the

20 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin project. The country needed a symbol economic policies in Russia, Cuba found ing for an end to Washington's 30-year- to prove its increased international stat- itself in dire straits. Nearly bankrupt old embargo against Cuba.29 Most of ure and a means of exhibiting the capa- after the abrupt ending of Russian aid, America's allies either voted for the bilities of its model of revolution. In- it was incapable of continuing construc- Cuban-sponsored resolution or ab- deed, "a nuclear power station built with tion with indigenous funds. More than stained. The vote serves as a gentle Cubans' own hands would become a 80 percent of Cuba's trade had been reminder to the United States of its own brilliant propagandistic confirmation of with the former Soviet bloc. Its col- limited authority in the post Cold War the success of the Cuban revolution."23 lapse sent the Cuban economy into a era. As a by-product of nuclear ascen- swift, downward spiral. Recent press In April of 1992, Russia agreed to dancy, Cuba could lessen its dependance reports estimate that the Cuban economy complete construction at Juragua if the on oil imports, thereby developing a has declined by 85 percent since 1991.26 Cubans would begin repayment of So- stronger bargaining position with the Although the end of the Cold War has viet loans for the construction of the Soviets and diminishing the impact of not severed all economic relations be- plant and assume responsibility for all the U.S. embargo. Cuba's domestic oil tween Cuba and Russia, Cuba must now additional hard currency spending for production is roughly 1.5 million tons deal with a country with severely lim- the Juragua project. Although the de- annually. The amount required to meet ited resources. Russia still seeks to cisions by the Cuban government to its basic energy requirements is 8 mil- maintain trade relations with the Car- suspend and then resume construction lion tons annually.24 Under its trade ibbean state, but relations between the were unexpected, a closer inspection agreement with the Soviet Union, Cuba countries reflects Russia's new "real- reveals that these were necessary and received 13 million tons a year. This economik." Russia is also facing eco- rational decisions for at least two rea- arrangement allowed Cuba to resell the nomic pressure from the United States sons. 5-million-ton excess and to export 6.5 and the International Monetary Fund Given the nature of Cuba's economic million tons of oil annually. During (IMF) to cut off trade with the country. free-fall, even the will of El Máximo the "special period," Cuba has been able The recently-signed Torricelli bill in the Líder was unable to overcome the dif- to generate only 30 percent of the en- United States prohibits port entry to any ficulty in funding the venture. Castro ergy required. The severely diminished ships that have recently conducted trade now freely admits the catastrophic blow output has resulted in nightly blackouts, with Cuba and, moreover, threatens to to the economy and has urged the Cu- limited telephone service, and extensive cut off aid to Cuba's trade partners. bans to be ready for even greater diffi- shutdowns of factories throughout the However, the new legislation also pro- culties ahead.30 In the nuclear field, island. The peak energy use on the is- vides incentives for Cuba should it de- moreover, the recent GAO evaluation of land is 1,300 to 1,500 megawatts per cide to hold democratic elections, in- the program confirmed lingering fears hour, the addition of the 440-megawatt cluding aid and trade assistance to de- that safety and design deficiencies could reactor to the grid would partially re- velop industry on the island. An added require extensive retrofitting of the re- duce the impact of the loss of Russian enticement is the expansion of mail and actor sites to bring them up to interna- oil imports.25 telephone services to Cuba, expanding tional standards. Changes of this na- links between it and the mainland. The ture could increase the cost of the project PRESENT ECONOMIC efficacy of this bill remains in doubt, by millions of dollars. ENVIRONMENT however, because the European Com- Despite its current offer to mothball munity and the United States' new the plant, it is obvious that Russia has a Cuba's ambitious nuclear plans did North American Free Trade Agreement vested long-term economic interest in not foresee the dramatic changes in its (NAFTA) partners, Canada and Mexico, the successful and safe completion of economic relations with the former So- have both stated that they will not honor the Cuban project, because it is likely viet Union after 1991. As a superpower, this new law.27 Mexico has stated em- to increase the marketability of the Rus- the Soviet Union had been willing and phatically that no one will dictate its sian reactors. Recently, this was im- able to provide the Caribbean nation foreign policy.28 In late November plied by Alexander Nechayev, of the with all the technology and materials 1992, the General Assembly of the Russian engineering firm necessary for its program. But with United Nations delivered an unexpected Zarubezhatomenergostroy, who stated the dissolution of the Soviet Union and rebuke to the United States by over- that "under the present conditions, the implementation of new political and whelmingly passing a resolution call- where the first reactor is almost 90 per-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 21 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin cent complete, it would be extremely extending to a 900-mile radius (depend- that the welding pipes for the cooling unreasonable to end the construction."31 ing on prevailing weather conditions). system were weakened by air pockets, Perhaps the most obvious demonstra- Although an accident might happen bad soldering, and heat damage. Of tion of this sales effort took place when because of design deficiencies, it is more the pipes that were originally approved, Russian officials invited prospective cli- likely that one would occur due to im- 15 percent were later found to be flawed. ents from India and Iran to Cuba in an proper or faulty operation of the facil- Another defector, Jose Oro, a senior effort to promote Russian reactor sales. ity. Part of this problem stems from nuclear engineer at the site, stated that But there is at least one flaw that can the fact that 300 of the 450 Soviet advi- the support structure of the plant con- seriously undermine the credibility of sors who helped to construct the reac- tains numerous faulty seals and struc- Russian reactors: the lack of confidence tors have been recalled to Russia since tural defects, and that the steam supply in the safety of their design. the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The system has been left outdoors and un- In summary, the overwhelming weight remaining specialists had nothing to do covered since December 1990. This of Cuba's economic slide has forced the before the November announcement and would have exposed the equipment to pre-existing political rationale for the it is uncertain what role they will play highly corrosive tropical salt air, risk- nuclear energy program to take a back in the future of the project. They are ing critical damage. The stability of seat for the time being, if not perma- being replaced with Cubans with less this equipment is essential to reactor nently. Russia no longer has the means experience, which may further erode the safety, because leakage or other struc- to support the venture. In reality, reach- on-site expertise.33 Yet Cubans point tural failure could result in a melt- ing out for international cooperation is to the fact that many of the Cuban engi- down.36 Dr. Nils Diaz, the director of the only way that either Cuba or Russia neers were educated in the former So- Nuclear Engineering Sciences at the can hope to have safely operating viet Union and have hands-on experi- University of Florida and a staunch nuclear power reactors in the near-term. ence working in Russian and Mexican opponent of the Cuban program, suc- reactors. Under the original agreement cinctly summarizes the critique of safety between Cuba and the Soviet Union, at Juragua by stating: SAFETY ISSUES AND THE CUBAN Soviet technicians were to operate the There is no design control, no procure- NUCLEAR PROGRAM facility for two years after startup. Now, ment document control, no control of because of the financing difficulties and purchases and materials, no controls of Critics assert that the prevailing eco- the ensuing changes of project status, equipment (...) who is going to operate nomic difficulties have forced the Castro the issue of who will operate this facil- this plant? The indispensable interna- regime to cut corners, approve shoddy ity has been placed into question. tional requirement for operation of a workmanship, and compromise safety The Cuban reactor was the first So- nuclear reactor is that the operator be considerations. The debate over safety viet nuclear venture in the Western trustworthy, that people believe this at Juragua raises the possibility of a "Cu- Hemisphere. The challenges of build- person will respect international law, ban Chernobyl" lying a mere 90 miles ing a reactor so far from home led to will be capable of operating and main- off the coast of Florida. Critics con- extensive delays in the construction taining this plant in strict compliance tend that if a "serious" or "major acci- schedule. Also, the original reactor with safety standards(...). It is obvious dent"32 were to take place, large amounts design was inappropriate for the Cuban that Fidel Castro does not meet any of of nuclear fuel could spew into the at- project and had to be revised in the these requirements.37 mosphere and surrounding waters. The fourth year of construction, adding an- Russian officials responsible for con- radioactive fallout would create a "dead- other two years to the planned seven- struction and quality control defensively zone" with an 18-mile radius where year project.34 and flatly deny that Juragua's safety is nothing could survive; a 200-mile ra- Recently, a published editorial by an a legitimate concern. They point to dius where there would be serious health engineer on the project (who defected Finland's Loviisa Soviet-designed risks and food production would be im- to the United States) all but declared VVER nuclear plant as evidence of a possible; pockets of high contamination the Cuban reactor a technical disaster.35 safely-operating Soviet designed nuclear that could drift as far as 300-miles away, In the editorial, defector Vladimir power facility.38 Cuban specialists who and a radioactive cloud creating seri- Cervera, a senior engineer responsible have worked at the Juragua site are ous ecological damage as far north as for overseeing quality control at the re- quoted as saying that the Juragua facil- Tampa, Florida, with secondary fallout actor, stated that x-ray analysis showed ity is virtually earthquake and tornado

22 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin proof. They also say that the humid international experts who have visited fuel. The Soviet Union, at a time when climate and the possibility of a direct the Juragua facility and know about its it was promoting its nuclear power busi- aircrash have been taken into consider- safety measures include William Lee, ness, sweetened contracts with commit- ation in the construction of the contain- director of the World Association of ments to take away all spent fuel from ment structure. Nuclear Operators (WANO) and Hans reactors it sold.43 Will Russia fulfill The recently-published GAO report Blix, director of the IAEA. The U.S. the promise of the former Soviet Union is a comprehensive study of the safety Nuclear Regulatory Commission's to transport fissile material to and from concerns regarding Cuba's nuclear pro- (NRC) Director of Operations James Cuba despite logistical difficulties and gram. Currently, the United States dis- Taylor, in testimony before the Senate the expense of building a flotilla ex- courages other countries from provid- Energy and Environment Subcommit- pressly for this purpose? Given the dire ing assistance, except for safety pur- tee on Nuclear Regulation, told the economic situation in Russia, this pos- poses. The United States would like to panel that senior NRC staffer Harold sibility seems remote at best. Even if prevent construction from ever being Denton had visited the site in 1989. He Russia managed to commission such a completed and insists that Cuba sign said that construction work observed flotilla, the outcry from activist groups either the NPT or the Treaty of then included the containment liner, over Japan's plutonium transports from Tlatelolco--both of which require sig- turbine generator building, and other France indicates that this kind of trans- natories to place their entire nuclear pro- components. No primary system com- port effort would not be undertaken grams under international safeguards-- ponents had been installed at the time without some controversy. before it will consider reversing its of the visit. Taylor further stated that Some sources claim that Boris policy. The GAO report did not take NRC experts had concluded that the Yeltsin's administration has said that into account reports of Cuba's request Cubans were knowledgeable in their re- Russia will not accept Cuban nuclear to the IAEA to conduct operational spective areas of expertise and that the waste. Consequently, it would have to safety and review (OSART) inspections technical issues raised by critics could be shipped to Argentina for reprocess- in 1993.39 potentially be safety concerns. But he ing. Cuba would then receive the ex- The United States continues to dis- added that since analysts have no way tracted plutonium and weapons grade cuss concerns about the safety of the to evaluate the validity of the claims uranium.44 This seems highly unlikely Cuban reactors with the Russian gov- made by defectors and lack specific in- now, however, because of Argentina's ernment. According to State Depart- spection knowledge, it is somewhat dif- nuclear cooperation agreements with ment officials, the Russian government ficult to assert that they are safety con- Brazil and its impending accession to has given assurances that the nuclear cerns.42 the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which will power reactors in Cuba will meet inter- Due to the fact that no comprehen- place all its facilities under full-scope national safety norms. The U.S. gov- sive appraisal of safety measures has safeguards. ernment also asked Russia to cease pro- been undertaken, there remains a de- viding any nuclear assistance until Cuba gree of uncertainty as to whether ADDITIONAL FACTORS signs the NPT or the Treaty of Juragua could meet international stan- Tlatelolco. If Cuba were to sign either dards. This doubt is fostered by new A number of other significant factors treaty, State Department officials would reports of safety failures and ecological are pushing Cuba toward a broader en- prefer to have Russian aid limited to disaster in the former Soviet nuclear dorsement of nonproliferation regula- safety matters.40 industry, including at the Semipalatinsk tions. First, some major changes have In response to the allegations that the nuclear test range and in the seas off taken place in the policy positions of reactors are a technical disaster, Andres the Kola Peninsula. Cuba, apparently key nuclear exporters. For example, in Garcia de la Cruz, director of the Centro recognizing the danger, has invited the 1990 Germany decided to permit sub- Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear (Na- IAEA to conduct a safety review. How- stantive exports of nuclear technology tional Nuclear Safety Center), asserted ever, if the inspections find that retro- to states not party to the NPT, if the the efficacy of safety measures at the fitting is necessary, the cost of making recipient submits all its nuclear activi- construction site and added that U.S. Juragua safe may be prohibitive. ties to IAEA safeguards.45 This shift, doubts "are a political argument which In addition to safety concerns, equally along with the accession of China and can be countered with techniques and important issues include the supply of France to the NPT, introduces a new scientific exactness."41 He said that fissile material and the disposal of spent set of criteria to the states that are in-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 23 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin terested in developing nuclear programs liferation community. The strengthen- from abroad and thereby help the Cu- with foreign assistance. Second, Cuba ing of this regional nuclear nonprolif- ban economy to remain afloat. This has failed to establish close contacts with eration agreement has the effect of research does not require huge invest- other potential suppliers. Castro's at- complementing the prevailing interna- ments and is sponsored in many cases tempts to elicit nuclear cooperation from tional system rather than distracting or by international agencies.51 Argentina and Iran pointed to the diminishing the effectiveness of the re- How the anti-Castro opposition will program's glaring weakness and the lack gime. react to U.S. attempts to cooperate on of any indigenous nuclear know-how. But accession to the regional nonpro- safety and support nonproliferation is As one U.S. Senate aide describes it: liferation pact provides no guarantee that less predictable. Human rights analysts "All the knowledge and expertise has Cuba will soon endorse the more uni- consistently point out the highly vola- been exported from elsewhere."46 This versal NPT. Its preconditions for sign- tile nature of extremist anti-Cuba groups combination of factors proves what has ing the Treaty of Tlatelolco are still in in parts of the United States as an im- been evident since the first days of the place, and Cuba may renew its reason- pediment to better relations with Cuba. Cuban nuclear program: the country is ing for not signing the NPT. Further- Calls by print and broadcast journalists incapable of carrying out such a large- more, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile con- for warmer relations with the island scale program without massive exter- tinue to consider the NPT as discrimi- nation have been met with death threats, nal support, assistance, and aid. natory and reject any possibility of join- assassination and bombings. The first indications of Cuba's will- ing it. Since energy is the most important ingness to join the Treaty of Tlatelolco In practical terms, Cuba's accession economic issue facing Cuba during this appeared as early as the end of 1990 in to the Treaty of Tlatelolco will lead to "special period," Cuba will continue a statement made by Argentina's For- negotiation of a full-scope safeguards with its nuclear program. But the only eign Minister Domingo Cavallo.47 agreement under INFCIRC/153 with the viable means for acting upon this de- Then, in May 1991, the country became IAEA. Even after the most recent de- sire may be its participation in the in- an observer to OPANAL. This posi- velopments, the Cubans remain intran- ternational nonproliferation regime. As tive drift towards nonproliferation was sigent in the face of the United States' a source of proliferation concern, Cuba expressed by Castro at the July 1991 continued hostile posturing and appear is unique by virtue of its relationship Ibero-American summit when he stated unwilling to discuss anything with the with and dependence on the former So- that, "although no condition named by United States until the Torricelli bill is viet Union. As Russia's support waiv- Cuba as an impediment to its adhesion rescinded or radically altered. ers or becomes a less-dominate factor, (sic) to the Tlatelolco Treaty has yet Cuba may become the most notable ex- disappeared, we hereby reiterate our will CONCLUSION ample of a country forced to observe to sign it when all Latin American coun- international safeguards in order to de- tries commit themselves to the Treaty."48 The future of the Juragua nuclear velop its nuclear industry. Given the This was not the usual rhetoric and power plant is predicated on Cuba's co- isolated nature of the Cuban program, posturing. Cuba announced its inten- operation with the nonproliferation re- it is quite obvious that the international tion to accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco gime. If funding is not available and community has the capacity to help with when three other major holdouts--Ar- Cuba's overall economic situation wors- the construction of a nuclear power plant gentina, Brazil, and Chile--agreed to ens, a proliferation risk arises, as Castro now and to prevent Cuba from adven- amendments in the treaty, clearing the may "dispatch cadres of specialists to turous undertakings in the future. way for their signing. Obviously, this other Latin American countries to pro- Castro has not abandoned ship on the step was primarily motivated by gen- cure hard currency for Cuba."50 Simi- nuclear issue. He is simply waiting for eral foreign policy considerations. Since lar to the situation in the former Soviet a time when Russia or some other will- the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Union, this could include engineers and ing partner will be able to provide Cuba Cuba has been steadily enhancing its scientists from the nuclear program sell- with assistance. Castro also may be ties with Latin American states.49 ing their expertise to the highest bid- ready to seek out Western assistance to At the same time, the probable ac- der. Regardless of financial difficul- supplement Russian aid and to continue cession of Cuba, along with Argentina, ties, other fields of nuclear science are to yield ever so grudgingly on Cuba's Brazil, and Chile, to the Treaty of unlikely to be abandoned. Nuclear long-held principle of noncommitment Tlatelolco bodes well for the nonpro- medicine and radiology attract patients to the nonproliferation regime.

24 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin

The biggest threat stemming from the The term "mothball" here refers to an indefinite deystvuyuschikh dogovorov, soglashenii i presence of a nuclear reactor at Juragua suspension, where materials and equipment are konventsii, zakluchennykh SSSR s inostannymi stored in place so that construction or operation gosudarstvami (Moscow: IMO, 1972), Vol.XXV, is that an accident might occur, not that can be resumed at some later date. p. 225. Cuba could possibly produce fuel for 8 A U.S. General Accounting Office report 19 In 1980, the total amount of economic atomic bombs indigenously. The fact (GAO/RCED-92-262)(Washington, D.C.: GPO, assistance to Cuba from the Soviet Union was that Cuba has now taken steps to enter September 1992) says that no fuel has been $3.2 billion. Most of this assistance (72 percent) the nonproliferation regime provides delivered and key primary components at the consisted of trade subsidies for sugar and site are not in place. Furthermore, the report petroleum. In 1983, the total amount of Soviet Washington and the international com- states that just 37 percent of the Unit-1's internal economic assistance had increased by 65 percent munity with the clearest window of op- construction is complete. to $4.9 billion. In 1983, 70 percent of all portunity for a rapprochement, mainly 9 Cited by Dizard, op. cit. economic aid extended to communist countries in the field of technical cooperation with 10 In English, the Agency for the Prohibition of was going to Havana. For more detailed Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. information see, Central Intelligence Agency, the Castro regime. Experience with 11 The amendments provide that special Directorate of Intelligence, Handbook of research assistance and technical coop- inspections of all safeguarded facilities will now Economic Statistics, 1990, CPAS 90-10001 eration has been encouraging, and these be delegated to the IAEA. Presently, Argentina, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1990), pp. 178-79. efforts should be continued and ex- Brazil, and Chile are attempting to ratify the 20 Fidel Castro Díaz-Balart, La Energía Nuclear tended. This process will have the ef- agreements in their respective domestic En La Economía Nacional De La República De legislatures. Cuba (Moscow: COMECON, 1986), p. 9. fect of not only ensuring that the Juragua 12 Examples of such evidence were found first 21 Igor Ivanov, "The Atlantis of the Castro facility is completed safely and with no in John Barron, "Castro, Cocaine and the A- Brothers? Will Fidel's Bulb Light up in Cuba?," threat of nuclear catastrophe, but it will Bomb Connection," Reader's Digest (March Literaturnaya Gazeta in JPRS Proliferation also enable the nonproliferation regime 1990) and in the account by the Cuban defector Issues, June 25, 1992, p. 20. Jose R. Oro Alfonso, "Some Aspects About 22 B.N. Semevski, Economicheskaya to monitor and accurately assess the na- Environmental Pollution and Protection of the geographiya Kuby (Leningrad: Nauka, 1970), ture of Cuba's nuclear program. Ecological System in Cuba and its p. 67. This monograph is still considered by Surroundings," unpublished paper (November some to be the most comprehensive study on 1991). Cuban geography. 13 23 1 The authors would like to thank Clay Moltz, Taken from a statement by Brazilian Foreign Ivanov, loc. cit. 24 Glenn Chafetz, Chris Fitz, Betsy Perabo, and Minister Rezek in "Argentina, Brazil Propose Interview by author Benjamin-Alvarado with Joseph DiChiaro for their invaluable editing Changes to Tlatelolco," Proliferation Issues, 3/ Arnaldo Coro, chief science and technology assistance. The passages from Spanish and 20/92, pp. 8-9. corespondent, Radio Havana, in Havana, Cuba, 14 Russian sources were translated by the authors. These three INFCIRC.66 model agreements June 6, 1993. 25 2 Quoted in Jose De Cordoba, "Survival tactics: are: INFCIRC.281 (signed May 5, 1980); Ibid. 26 Its economy dying, Cuba seeks salvation in INFCIRC.298 (signed September 25, 1980); and Jose De Cordoba, "Some see Castro regime dollars," The Wall Street Journal, July 19, 1993, INFCIRC.311 (signed October 7, 1983). coming to end in violence as Cuban economy 15 p. A1. The IAEA's INFCIRC/66 model agreements worsens," The Wall Street Journal, September 3 In 1991, Fidel Castro announced that because relate to "item-only" safeguards--particular 10, 1993, p. A14. 27 of the loss of its Soviet benefactor, Cuba would technologies or materials. INFCIRC/153 model Guy Gugliotta, "The Castro Bill: No Cigar," be entering a "special period" in which it would agreements cover "full-scope" safeguards--all The Washington Post, February 29, 1992, p. utilize every means available to address the nuclear material in the peaceful activities of a C5. 28 devastating economic impact of losing aid from nation. "Making Poor Cubans Suffer More," The 16 the former Soviet Union. The "special period" From 1956 to 1959 the United States New York Times, June 15, 1992, p. A18. 29 is still intact with no end in sight. concluded such agreements with some 40 Stanley Meiser, "U.N. Rebuffs U.S. on Cuba 4 Interviews conducted by author Benjamin- "friendly states." See Betrand Goldschmidt, The Embargo," The Los Angeles Times, November Alvarado with Cuban citizens, Miramar section Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History 25, 1992, p. A1. See also Frank J. Prial, "U.N. of Havana, Cuba, June 8, 1993. of Nuclear Energy (Le Grange Park, Illinois: Votes to Urge U.S. to Dismantle Embargo to 5 Ibid. Cuban citizens lined up outside a state American Nuclear Society, 1982) p. 303-306. Cuba," The New York Times, November 25, 17 provisions store shared their impressions about Alexander Belkin, "Cuba's Nuclear 1992, p. A1. 30 the economy. Notably, those who were willing Program," unpublished paper (April 1992), p. Granma, July 8, 1993, p. 1. 31 to speak supported Cuba's efforts to employ 12. Quoted in Izvestiya, September 9, 1992, p. 18 nuclear power as a means towards achieving "Soglasheniye mezhdu Souzom Sovetskikh 4. 32 national economic and energy self-sufficiency. Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Respublikoy Kuba The International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) 6 Interview by author Benjamin-Alvarado, June o sotrudnichestve v oblasti ispol'zovanya adopted by the IAEA defines a "major accident" 8, 1993, Havana, Cuba. atomnoy energii v mirnyikh tselyakh ot 15 as an external release of a large fraction of the 7 Wilson Dizard III, "Christopher Says Moscow sentyabra 1967 goda" (Agreement between the radioactive material in a large facility (e.g. the Will Pay Juragua's $30-million Mothball Tab," USSR and the Republic of Cuba in the Use of core of a reactor). Such a release would result Nucleonics Week, September 30, 1993, p. 7. Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes of in the possibility of acute health effects, delayed September 15, 1967), in Sbornik health effects over a wide area (possibly

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 25 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin

involving more than one country), and long-term Ministry, told the Cuban news agency Prensa environmental consequences. Latina: "We are ready to sign (The Treaty of 33 John Shanahan, "Cuba's Potential Tlatelolco) for the sake of Latin American unity." Chernobyls," The Wall Street Journal, August See Pascal Fletcher, "Cuba Ready To Sign 5, 1992, p. A14. Regional Treaty Against Nuclear Arms," Reuter 34 For more details, see Men'kin Y.A., A.G. News Service, August 20, 1992. Liparteliani, and D.V. Kiranov, " Planirovaniye 50 Ivanov, loc. cit., p. 20. i upravlenye stroitel'stvom AES Juragua na 51 For example, the IAEA helped fund the Center osnove setevykh graphikov," Energeticheskoye for Applied Nuclear Energy in Cuba, which was stroitel'stvo za rubezhom, No. 6, 1987, p. 20. inaugurated by Hans Blix. Through U.N. 35 Shanahan, loc. cit. assistance, Cuba received a special laboratory 36 Shanahan, loc. cit. See also Susan Benesch for the Institute of Oncology and Radiobiology. "Cuban warns of risky reactors," The This is now a center for applied nuclear studies Washington Times, May 6, 1992, p. A1. It in medicine. The treatment of Chernobyl and should be noted that although the criticisms of Brazilian radiation victims attests to the efficacy the design and safety risks are harsh and of Cuban advancements on this front. worrisome, the editorial gave no technical analysis supporting its assertions. 37 Dr. Nils Diaz, testimony before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Committee on the Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, 102nd Congress, hearing on International Commercial Reactor Safety (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 25, 1991), pp. 42-43. (Hereafter: Committee on the Environment and Public Works, op. cit.) 38 Press Conference Transcript, NBC Nightly News, July 5, 1991. 39 U.S. General Accounting Office, op. cit., p. 11. 40 Michael Kozak, Principal Assistant Secretary, Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Department of State, in Committee on the Environment and Public Works, op. cit., p. 20. 41 "Director Insists Facility Safe," Nuclear Developments, June 24, 1991, p. 17. 42 Committee on the Environment and Public Works, op. cit., p. 24. 43 B.A. Kuvshinnikov, A.M. Petrosyants, and B.A. Semenov, "Opit SSSR v Mezhdunarodnom sotrudnichestve po mirnomu ispol'zovaniu atomnoi energii," Atomnaya Energiya 63 (November 1987), p. 295. 44 Eric Ehrmann, "Cuba's Nuclear Safety Struggle," The Journal of Commerce, July 5, 1991. 45 Roland Timerbaev, "A Major Milestone in Controlling Nuclear Exports," Eye on Supply, No.6, Spring 1992, p. 60. 46 Wilson Dizard III, "Castro Halts Juragua Construction Over Russian Hard Currency Demand", Nucleonics Week, September 10, 1992, p.3 47 "Cavallo Says Cuba To Sign Tlatelolco Treaty", Nuclear Developments, January 4, 1991, p. 10. 48 Granma, July 23, 1991. 49 Pedro Nuñez Mosquera, Director of Multilateral Affairs at the Cuban Foreign

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