CORPORATISM AND CONSOLIDATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
DEMOCRACY IN EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS & COSTA RICA
by
DWIGHT EDWARD FISHER WILSON
(Under the Direction of Howard J. Wiarda)
ABSTRACT
Democratic consolidation in Central America has proceeded at a languorous pace, despite the discrediting of alternatives to free markets and democracy. Why are these countries not embracing liberal-pluralist democracy? This thesis proposes that a history of authoritarian corporatism has left vestiges in the legal and political culture that precludes the acceptance of political competition and legitimacy necessary to democratic consolidation. Case studies of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica will examine the military, labor organization, and peasantry of each country for evidence of corporatist design and practice. The evidence is found to confirm the hypothesis. The conclusion assesses the impact of corporatism on democratic functioning.
INDEX WORDS: Democratic consolidation, Corporatism, Central America, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras
CORPORATISM AND CONSOLIDATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
DEMOCRACY IN EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS & COSTA RICA
by
DWIGHT EDWARD FISHER WILSON
B.A., Georgia State University, 2000
A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
ATHENS, GEORGIA
2004
© 2004
Dwight Wilson
All Rights Reserved
CORPORATISM AND CONSOLIDATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
DEMOCRACY IN EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS & COSTA RICA
by
DWIGHT EDWARD FISHER WILSON
Major Professor: Howard J. Wiarda
Committee: Christopher S. Allen Gary K. Bertsch
Electronic Version Approved:
Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia August 2004
DEDICATION
To Gabrielita.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work would not be complete without acknowledgement of the input of Dr. Howard
Wiarda, who supplied invaluable expertise and energy. I must also express my gratitude to Dr.
Christopher Allen and Dr. Gary Bertsch for improving this paper by supplying their time and trenchant insight.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... v
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1
Defining Democracy ...... 3
Becoming Democratic...... 5
Consolidation...... 6
Liberalism and Corporatism...... 9
Hypotheses ...... 13
Methodology ...... 15
2 EL SALVADOR...... 18
Background...... 18
The Military in El Salvador...... 19
Labor in El Salvador...... 23
The Peasantry in El Salvador ...... 26
Democratizing El Salvador ...... 30
3 HONDURAS ...... 33
Background...... 33
The Military in Honduras ...... 36
Labor in Honduras...... 39
vi
The Peasantry in Honduras...... 43
Democratizing Honduras...... 47
4 COSTA RICA...... 50
Background ...... 50
The Military in Costa Rica ...... 52
Labor in Costa Rica...... 54
The Peasantry in Costa Rica...... 58
Democracy in Costa Rica...... 61
5 CONCLUSION...... 63
Hypotheses ...... 63
Implications...... 66
Toward Democratic Corporatism? ...... 68
REFERENCES ...... 72
vii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
What has happened to democratization in Central America? More than ten years after the settlements ending the crisis in Central America hard on the heels of the dismantling of
the Soviet Union, Central America has fallen back into obscurity for most Americans and
we assume that, the peace having been secured, the area is democratic and secure.
The strides taken toward representative government throughout Latin America
have no doubt been considerable – we no longer speak of the “pathology of democracy”
that once dominated the discourse – but are neither ineluctable nor irreversible. The
palace coups and revolutions that buffeted the small republics of Central America for
much of the twentieth century at present appear an implausible option for the
discontented, but at the same time a pall of discontent has settled over the populace
concerning the success and desirability of democracy, and populists with a flamboyantly
undemocratic streak have appeared in several instances.
Though majorities endorse democracy as a regime, that endorsement is heavily
conditioned on certain performance indicators such as economic prosperity and
maintenance of order. In any event democracy may be understood in ways departing
dramatically with a Western understanding. A consensus has emerged within the
scholarly literature that democratization is “incomplete” and its consolidation stalled,
perhaps auguring the end of the third wave. The implications of this occurrence for the
future of democracy are profound, particularly keeping in mind Huntington’s observation
1 that waves of democratization are followed by counter-waves of authoritarian regimes.1
Questions concerning the compatibility of democracy with non-Western cultures are beginning to reemerge.
Our best predictions in previous decades, or most hopeful guesses, were that as modernization took off and affluence spread, a better educated and sophisticated middle class would demand greater representation and responsive government, and liberal democracy would replace traditional governing apparatuses that could not respond to the needs of modern, plural societies. This model is nonspecific in that it could emerge in any culture area. The particulars of the matrix are incidental, but the demands for rationalization are universal. In Latin America generally, this meant that the creaking
Catholic-corporatist formulations handed down from the colonial era should be swept away by the tide of liberal institutions that free the individual from a communally oriented, hierarchical and undemocratic culture. For Central America, this should mean that the quasi-feudal patterns of oligarchic rule enforced by the military are replaced with participatory, competitive, and pluralistic democracy.2
Liberal democracy, of course, does not spring from nothing, and its emergence
has proven more stubborn than anticipated by the members of the developmentalist
school. Another possibility is that consolidation is illusory, and that liberal democracy
may be confined to a relatively small group of nations historically and culturally linked,
1 Huntington, Samuel (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: Oklahoma University Press. An interesting study would evaluate Huntington’s “wave” thesis with reference to the impact of domestic factors such as stage of economic development and the character of the national elites. 2 Authoritative studies of Central American society and politics include Thomas P. Anderson (1982) Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, New York: Praeger; Dana G. Munro (1960). The Latin American Republics, A History. 3rd ed. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts; Ralph Lee Woodward Jr. (1976). Central America: A Nation Divided, New York: Oxford University Press.
2 rather than a universally applicable model for social and political relations. In Central
America it may be the case that the shell of procedural democracy will never penetrate the traditionally corporatist core, and the two may coexist in tension indefinitely. More pessimistically, the shell itself may break presaging a return to naked authoritarianism.
These two stark options – liberal, pluralistic democracy on the one hand, or atavistic authoritarianism – may pose a false dilemma, however. Rather than speaking of a single democracy with narrowly defined contours, liberal-pluralism, for example, we can speak of democracies with varying origins, paths of development, and ultimate expression. Many distinct currents of democracy exist within the industrialized world, each displaying unique facets that fit native conditions. European social democracies lean further toward the collective than the relatively more individualist U.S., for instance.
The Central American republics have been deeply affected by their proximity to the United States, institutionally and through foreign policy. Can we expect a liberal- pluralistic form of democracy to emerge in Central America in the near (or even not so near) future? The purpose of this paper is to examine the state of democratic consolidation in Central America with particular reference to the social and political antecedents that condition the development of democracy. While much research has focused on economic, this paper will seek to causally link the persistence of an authoritarian corporatist political culture to the halting rate of democratic consolidation in
Central America by a comparative case study of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.
Defining Democracy
Our assessment of the extent of democratic consolidation hinges on what exactly we are referring to when speaking of democracy, an issue that becomes the more complex when
3 speaking of democracy outside one’s own country, as the word has startlingly different meanings to different ears. The most straightforward and easily measured conception of democracy is a procedural one that enumerates the various institutions that comprise the mechanics of governing.
These procedural definitions of democracy are open to the charge of admitting regimes as democratic that to a reasonable observer are clearly not. Even free and fair elections can produce a government that is decidedly undemocratic, and such an expansive definition of democracy threatens to rob it of real meaning. Schmitter and Karl argue that modifying the word with terms like “tutelary,” “guided”, “protected” or
“conservative” debases the meaning of democracy and squeezes undemocratic regimes into the democratic rubric.3 Liberal democrats can find something to endorse here, as it
rises above the minimalist picture of democracy that takes elections as sufficient for
ensuring representativeness. In Central America, this objection is amplified by questions
of civilian authority over the military, corruption, and political violence among
contending factions. When contemplating democratic consolidation, many scholars
demand a more stringent definition of democracy that includes substantive requirements
for established liberal democracies4 Taxonomic overreaching, though, presents the
opposite problem of including such steep criteria for democracy that no existing regime
can claim democratic credentials.
3 Schmitter, Phillipe; Terry Lynn Karl (1991). “What Democracy Is . . . And Is Not,” Journal of Democracy, (Summer, 1991), pp. 75-89. 4 See for example Larry Diamond (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 8-17.
4 Becoming Democratic
Theorizing on the development of democracy, its preconditions and factors affecting
survival, are as old as democratic regimes themselves. The cyclical nature of ideas tends
to bring to the forefront various ideas at times with greater or lesser emphasis on structure
or psychology, external or internal factors. The modernization school took shape with
W.W. Rostow’s treatment of stages of development through which all societies pass, eventually alighting at a period of maturity resembling the economic and social structures of advanced capitalist democracies.5 Subsequent writers such as Lipset and Deutsch
noted the association between economic wealth, urbanization, and education with social
mobilization and democracy.6
Although arriving at a conclusion radically divergent from that of the developmentalist group, the dependencia school was likewise informed by an economic determinism. Dependency theorists applied the Marxian analysis of economic exploitation among classes to international economic relations, explaining the failure of
Latin American periphery countries’ development to their dependence on the rich, capitalist center.7 Shortcomings in capturing the complexities of Latin America realities
led to both the modernization and dependency theories’ fall from favor among scholars.
Departing with various research projects which sought prerequisites that stimulate
democratic growth, Rustow dispensed with requisites and preconditions and instead
focused on decisions of actors and historical contingencies, charting the transition to
5 Rostow, W.W. (1960). The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6 See for example Seymour M. Lipset (1959). “Some Social Requisites for Democracy,”American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, no. 1: 69-105; Karl Deutsch (1969) “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 55 no. 3: 493-514. 7 See for example André Gunder Frank (1967). Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil, New York: Monthly Review Press.
5 democracy from background conditions of national unity and conflict to elite and mass
“habituation” to democratic problem-solving.8 If the structural theory of the
modernization school could be accused (maybe unfairly) of simplistic teleology by
attributing political transformation to tectonic factors beyond individual influence, this
view reintroduces democracy as a medium designed by humans to facilitate their
interaction. As such, developing countries are not doomed to authoritarianism until their
economies take off, but may develop democratic institutions given the correct historical
conditions and compromises among actors.
In a similar vein Terry Lynn Karl called for a path-dependent approach to
studying democratization in Latin America.9 Warning against universalist modernizing
assumptions that democracy will follow economic growth, she highlights the wide
spectrum of circumstances along which Latin American countries find themselves and
emphasizes the importance of contingencies in the dynamic of democratization. Claiming
that the conditions previously identified as causal mechanisms yielding democracy may
be better understood as the effects, she demonstrates with evidence from Latin America
that there is not a single transitional path ending in democracy, and that it is quite
possible for one type of illiberal democracy to evolve into another, more liberal one.
Consolidation
The distinction between transition to democratic regimes and their consolidation has
become an important one as more countries elect civilian governments. As the third wave
unfolded, the large part of the literature devoted to the phenomenon focused on the
8 Rustow, W.W. (1970). “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 337-363. 9 Karl, Terry Lynn (1990). “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 1-23.
6 transition phase.10 With the crest of that phase passed, a greater focus has fallen on
consolidation. Transition involves the replacement of one regime, understood as a set of
rules and procedures by which contestants for public office secure and exercise power,
with another set of rules for this purpose. Consolidation might be conceived as the more
protracted and inchoate process of ensuring democracy becomes, in Linz and Stepan’s
colorful terminology, “the only game in town.”11 When does democracy become the
exclusive form of political competition? There are now more nominal democracies in the
world than ever before; the transition has been made, but many remain in a parlous state
and distant from an ideal type of democracy.
As the literature on democratic consolidation suggests, liberal democracy does not
occur by default when authoritarian regimes fall, but experiences growing pains and faces
the looming threat of reversal. Linz and Stepan for this reason distinguish between
democratization and liberalization, understood as policy and social changes associated
with an open society.12 Liberalization is essential to democratization; absent liberalization, democratic procedure descends into mere “formalism” and democratic deepening is stunted.13
A number of authors ascribe high importance to the achievement of legitimacy in
assuring democratic consolidation. Linz and Stepan further stress the paramountcy of
legitimacy of the democratic regime, which rests on an internal judgment that the
government has the right to make binding decisions that must be obeyed whether or not
10 Gunther, Richard et al, eds. (1995). The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, p. 4. 11 Linz, Juan; Alfred Stepan (1996). “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 14-33. 12 Linz & Stepan eds, (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 13 Liberalization may also precede democratization, such as free market reforms by authoritarian regimes. Whether this ineluctably produces democratization is beyond our scope here.
7 one agrees with them. Legitimacy is expressed in “loyalty” to the regime among the
various actors seeking control of the government, crucially for the opposition, as well as
the public at large. Disloyal and semi-loyal opposition pose a threat of destabilizing a
newly created democracy by withholding assent to or actively opposing the regime’s
decisions. Erecting a high standard for loyalty, they list forbearance in appealing to the
military for political support, a significant requirement for Latin America. Linz and
Stepan thus define consolidation as the period of struggle for allegiance of actors not yet
fully loyal to the regime. In their judgment, a consolidated democracy is one in which the
large majority of the population holds the regime as legitimate.14
If we agree that the countries of Central America have successfully transited from
authoritarian regimes to something else, we may say that the something else is not a
consolidated democracy, that there may be other games possible. What is true for other
recently transited democracies is also true for Central America: democratic quality is
lacking and institutionalization incomplete. Objectively, the new regimes confront
economic underdevelopment, endemic crime, and corruption that could exhaust the
patience of any citizenry. The style of politicking is often marred by invective or frank
violence. Subjectively, democracy is viewed with alarming skepticism considering some of these countries’ unenviable experiences with authoritarian rule and civic unrest. Karl describes an oxymoronic blending of authoritarian and democratic political styles that marks the Central American “hybrid regimes.”15 Relatively complex democratic and
pluralist interaction may take place at the national level while the older style of patronage
14 Linz & Stepan eds., (1978). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 16-17. 15 Karl, Terry Lynn (1995). “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 72-86.
8 and coercion remain ingrained at local levels. The conclusion to the internecine civil wars of previous decades has put an end to nationwide organized violence, but did not cure the nations’ ills or create an instantly democratic polity.
With the important exception of O’Donnell,16 democratization is almost invariably studied in terms of what is lacking. Consolidation is usually described in negatives: the absence of a strong party system, for instance, or the absence of legislative autonomy. Even where described in the reverse, such as the pervasive presence of military impunity, or lingering authoritarian impulses, the issue is stated as a problem area in which insufficient progress has been made toward liberalism. Without a theory that explains the current positive conditions within democratizing polities, we cannot explain why unconsolidated regimes remain such.
Considering the foregoing requisites for an emerging democratic regime to qualify as consolidated, democratic consolidation can sensibly be construed as the consolidation of liberal democracy. At this point, we confront the problem of the applicability of liberal democracy to culture areas outside the West. Put another way:
How well does liberalism travel?
Liberalism and Corporatism
The United States is often presented as a model for developing nations for fashioning representative democracy, a mission that has driven U.S. foreign policy.17 The liberal blueprint of the U.S. includes a politically agnostic state that serves as a neutral arbiter amid competing societal interests, all of which enjoy an equal standing before the law.
16 O’Donnell, Guillermo (1996). “Illusions About Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, no. 2, pp.34-51. 17 Wiarda, Howard J. (2001). Comparative Democracy and Democratization, Ft. Worth, TX: Harcourt College Publishers, p. 10
9 Opposition groups are afforded the freedom and legitimacy necessary to articulate their interests and vie for influence. A robust civil society emerges here and serves as a counterbalance to the power of the state. The state and various political adversaries respect the right of opposition to operate freely, insofar as it remains loyal to the democratic regime. The lines between regime and government are strictly drawn, and the eyes of the opposition are trained toward the government, not the regime. The liberal society is one of diffused powers, as concentration of powers is dangerous to the free exercise of the individual’s will.
Though the U.S. and Central America share some broad similarities, such as geographical situation, a European colonial heritage, and ensuing independence struggle, the Spanish colonial powers implanted a manifestly different political philosophy that predated the individualistic liberalism that would take root in the United States. The political philosophy of Spanish America was supplied more by scholasticism than the
Enlightenment, and more by Rousseau than Locke.18 The Madisonian assumptions about the dangers of state power and salutary effects of the interplay and competition among societal factions were foreign in the corporatist, state-centric society of Iberian America.
In contrast to the colonizing efforts in North America, the Spanish crown undertook a civilizing mission in which the state assumes a “tutelary” role.19
Corporatism has deep roots in Latin America that profoundly shape current regime structures. The term is freighted with many definitions, but here will primarily refer to the Catholic organicism rooted in scholastic philosophy. Wiarda traces the historical roots of the Iberian corporatist model springing from the fusion of medieval
18 Rousseau was, of course, also concerned with egalité. 19 Morse, Richard (1964). “The Heritage of Latin America” in Louis Hartz, ed., The Founding of New Societies, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, pp. 140, 144.
10 corporations and the later exigencies of centralizing power and the Conquest.20 The
scholastic base of Thomas and the 17th century Spanish philosopher Suárez upon which
the Iberian political system rested dictated an organic conception of the state as a natural and necessary body designed by God to ensure unity and oversee the smooth functioning of society. Among the most important features of Suárez’s writings enumerated by
Richard Morse are the objective nature of natural law and the proper ordering for society, the collective as the source of sovereignty, and the total (though contingent) alienation of power from the collective to their rulers.21 The result was in Wiarda’s words “a social and
political order that is hierarchical, authoritarian, elitist, patrimonial, Catholic, stratified,
feudal, corporatist, and patriarchal to its core.”22
The historical antecedents of Catholic corporatism have laid the groundwork for
the modern incarnation of hierarchical and authoritarian political relations that persist in
some cases today. Corporatism in Latin America has historically been closely associated
with authoritarianism, given the centralization of power and vigor of the state it implies.
With corporatist antecedents in Latin America, democracy as a regime – or any
consistent, institutionalized regime – can implant itself only with difficulty, and no means
to exercising political power can be discounted. Chalmers describes this as a “politicized
state” in which political institutions are fluid and malleable according to the prevailing circumstances.23 In the politicized state there is a sense that “anything is possible” and
those with a political program may seek its realization through whatever means are
20 Wiarda Howard, (1981). Corporatism and National Development in Latin America, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 34. 21 Morse (1964), p. 154. Morse does not inflate the influence of Suárez but describes his work as “symptomatic” of the Spanish mindset. 22 Wiarda (1981). Corporatism and National Development, p. 34. 23 Chalmers, Douglas (1977). “The Politicized State in Latin America” in James Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
11 available. That approach has been adopted by political elites of disparate stripes: from
liberals to conservatives and from socialists to military officers. Ebel describes the
personalistic balancing act among factional elites in the Central American “city states” in which ideological clashes were practically non-existent. The upper-level sectors rather concerned themselves with protecting the modernized urban center from disruption by the hinterland.24
Corporatism as it unfolded in Latin America privileges social harmony and
acceptance of hierarchical power relations. The centrality of order and harmony to the
corporate body tends to yield a perception of politics as a corrupting influence. The
corporate head should remain above particularistic and narrow political frays in order to
secure the common good. The corporate state is thus marked by its politically active
posture, assuming a central, directing role in the interactions of societal segments. The
state acts as a unifying power. In this capacity the state imposes settlements on vying
groups with a heavy hand, possessing the power to reward and punish, or even end the
legal existence of those groups. No independent opposition can flourish in this
environment, as groups are reliant on the state for legitimate functioning. The rule of law,
primary for the guarantee of an equal playing field in the liberal society, is tenuous in the
authoritarian state. As the directing force, the state is not subject to the law, but remains
above it.25
These conditions make Central America tough terrain for liberal democracy.
Liberal institutions and procedures have overlain the overtly authoritarian ones of
24 Ebel, Roland (1984). “The Development and Decline of the Central American City State,” in Howard Wiarda ed., Rift and Revolution: The Central American Imbroglio. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 25 Catholic corporatism was not necessarily hegemonic and other ideologies influenced the church, particularly with the advent of liberation theology in the second half of the 20th century. The corporatist philosophy does have a far older more entrenched foundation, however.
12 decades and centuries past, but the commitment to democracy so integral to consolidation
is lacking. Democracy is not held as a good in itself, but one means of gaining control of
the state. The pronounced patron-client tendencies characteristic of corporatism preclude
the egalitarian competition of a pluralist civil society, and competition is centered upon
displacing the current corporate head and substituting another in its place.
Hypotheses
Liberalism and corporatism are ideal types; each exists in degrees and a particular
regime may employ aspects of both simultaneously. The main hypothesis of this paper is that the degree to which corporatist elements are embedded in the society negatively
influences the extent of consolidation undergone there. Applied to Central America, the hypothesis leads us to expect that corporatist tendencies have been pronounced, thus
slowing the rate of democratic consolidation. We expect to find that corporatism is
embedded in the legal structures and behavior in those countries that show the lowest
levels of democratic consolidation and a corresponding weakness of corporatist practices
in the confirmedly democratic countries.
Two other possible explanations for the deficit in democratic consolidation will
enter the analysis. The first alternative hypothesis centers on patterns of land ownership.
In those countries in which a land-owning oligarchy exercised its preponderance of power to subjugate peasants and labor and to control the state, democracy was stifled, as landed elites still exercise inordinate influence over politics. Coffee production, labor-
intensive and land-hungry, lends itself to the consolidation of an agricultural oligarchy.
This alternative follows a theory expounded by Barrington Moore and applications to
13 Central America by Baloyra-Herp and Weeks.26 The hypothesis, then, is that where
power has historically been concentrated in the hands of a relatively small, homogeneous
class of agricultural elites which controls the national economy and directs the resources
of the state toward its own ends, democratic consolidation suffers. Elites lack the
commitment to democratic rules necessary for democratic legitimacy. Where
industrialization and socioeconomic pluralization take place, thereby undercutting the power of the oligarchy, democracy flourishes. Confirmation of this hypothesis will depend on demonstrating a correlation between concentrated landholdings and coercive
labor relations which gives rise to an exclusionary and undemocratic elite on the one
hand and unconsolidated democracy on the other.
The second alternative hypothesis concerns the advent of militarism. Military
institutions of Central America were relatively insignificant as an independent influence
until the 20th century, at which time they modernized, professionalized, and asserted
themselves as autonomous political actors with particular interests to defend. These more
effective and efficient armed forces independently quashed movements toward reform
and democratization that came through socioeconomic growing pains (labor upheaval,
peasant movements, etc.) and the crises of the 70s and 80s. Entrenched military machines
still act with comparative impunity, denuding the quality of democracy. The hypothesis is
that militarization in the 20th century negatively affects quality of democracy today. In
this view, difficulties in democratic consolidation are an artifact of a relatively recent
phenomenon of military assertiveness. Confirmation of this hypothesis will come in
26 Moore, Barrington (1966). Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston: Beacon Press; Baloyra-Herp, Enrique (1983), “Reactionary Despotism in Central America,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 295-315; Weeks, John (1986), “An Interpretation of the Central American Crisis,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 31-53.
14 evidence of an evolving militarism, proceeding from a rudimentary force unable to exert
itself as a separate interest after independence to the power brokers of the 20th century
able to quell dissent over its independent rule.
The hypotheses examined here focus largely on internal factors within the
designated countries. This is not to dismiss the important influences of international
actors and events, but is due only to the limited space available here.
Methodology
A most similar systems design of comparative case study will be used to evaluate
the hypotheses. The paper will attempt to demonstrate a relationship between corporatism
and democratic consolidation by establishing a plausible argument for a causal connection through qualitative data. The limitations imposed by a small number of cases
and large number of variables are real, but the comparative case method used here offers some advantages, as well. The cases are small in size and similar in a number of political and other respects, thus achieving what Lijphart calls “partial generalizability.”27 By
limiting research to countries within a single region, an amount of noise in the form of
uncontrolled variables is suppressed. The countries of Central America share a great deal
in history and culture, having been territories within the same colonial unit and having
been members of a federal unity.
The cases of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica are chosen for their
variability in outward signs of democratic consolidation. El Salvador and Honduras
demonstrate a limited commitment to democracy, while Costa Rica is clearly a consolidated democracy. The explanations employed to account for this difference may
27 Lijphart, Arend (1971). “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, no. 3.
15 draw on a smaller number of system-wide variables than would be the case for countries
with fewer historical and cultural commonalities.
Though the similarities within a political-cultural region are extensive, no two
countries are identical. The most similar system design reduces the number of variables
influencing the outcome, but intra-system differences are nevertheless abundant. The occurrence of internal war has been an unfortunately frequent reality in Central America,
and may exercise an independent effect on democracy. However, while El Salvador and
Honduras have experienced a similar, imperfect process of democratization, there was no widespread challenge to governmental authority in Honduras as there was in El Salvador,
(as well as in Guatemala and Nicaragua) mitigating the possibility of an intervening effect on democratic quality by civil conflict. These countries also display an array of economic developmental characteristics, with El Salvador and Costa Rica at the more
economically advanced end of the spectrum and Honduras at the lesser end.
The study will also stretch over time. Recognizing the morphing tendency of
Central American societies recommends a longitudinal approach to confirm the presence
of the target variables over a significant period of time and to guard against inflating the
importance of transient phenomena.
The investigation will proceed by a case study of three corporate groups in the
three countries: the military, labor groups, and peasants. These segments represent three
of the most important entities in a corporate state, but of course are not an exhaustive
representation of the civil society of these nations. The agricultural and business elites
warrant separate analysis, but will not be included in the present research, again due to
space constraints.
16 The extent of these segments’ formalized aggregation as functional bodies, and the nature of their interaction with the state apparatus, should demonstrate the level of corporate consolidation there. This paper will make use of formal legal evidence – constitutions and labor codes – as well as the historical record to test the hypotheses.
An evaluation of the explanatory power of the hypotheses and a discussion of the ramifications of the findings for democratic consolidation will follow the analysis of the cases in the concluding chapter.
17
CHAPTER 2
EL SALVADOR
Background
The smallest country on the American landmass, El Salvador was briefly thrust into the international eye due to its polarizing civil war of the 1980s. Reconstructing the polity itself has been a challenge, and the added complexity of creating a democratic state will be a Herculean task. The country was long dominated by the armed forces in conjunction with an agricultural elite known collectively as the “oligarchy,” or simply the fabled
“fourteen families.” Coffee became the principal export in the 19th century, following the forcible expulsion of Indians from the mountain slopes and their enforced labor needed for coffee cultivation. Resentment stemming from the eviction and forced labor contributed to revolts that invited state repression.28 Coffee cultivators became so closely entwined with the government that El Salvador became known as a “coffee republic.”
Following the economic downturn of the Great Depression and resulting political and social turmoil, a coup replaced the elite republic with military strongman Hernández
Martínez. Massive popular mobilization in the face of declining social conditions culminated in a peasant revolt led by the communist intellectual Farabundo Martí, which was bloodily quelled in what came to be known as “La Matanza”.29 The rule of
Hernández Martínez marked the shift to a personalistic dictatorship that survived more
28 Booth, John; Thomas Walker (1999). Understanding Central America, 3rd edition. Boulder: Westview Press, p. 40. 29 See Anderson, Thomas (1971). Matanza: El Salvador’s Communist Revolt of 1932, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press.
18 than ten years. The military, displeased with Hernández’s favor toward the National
Guard ousted him and installed a military regime that would signal the beginning of the
institutionalized rule of the military as a corporate body.30 The military regime established an official party to stabilize and extend its rule. The Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrática (PRUD) later transformed itself into the Partido de
Conciliación Nacional (PCN), which identity it has retained until today. A cycle of military reform and reaction tested the limits of public forbearance and after expectations of political opening in the 1960s that were only disappointed by the seemingly inevitable conservative coup that followed, a period of popular mobilization in the 1970s erupted in the civil war that spanned the 1980s finally ending only after the end of the cold war and the loss of tens of thousands of lives.
The Military in El Salvador
Probably no other institution in El Salvador’s history has played as pivotal a role as the
armed forces. More than an enforcer for the oligarchy or periodic coup-maker, the armed
forces in El Salvador were the effective source of central state authority. No organized
party system developed in El Salvador in the 19th century31 and the military filled the
resulting void. From the founding of the independent republic and dissolution of the
Central American Federation, the military acted with broad autonomy as the defender of
state interests against subversion and disorder. The armed forces are constitutionally
forbidden from acting in a political capacity, but military officers nevertheless took a
vigorous part in politics from the founding of an independent El Salvador; the military
acted swiftly and energetically to quell many perceived threats to the safety of the nation.
30 McDonald, Ronald (1984). “Civil-Military Relations in Central America” in Wiarda, ed, Rift, p. 157. 31 Loveman, Brian (1999). For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, p. 132.
19 The original constitution did not give the president the position of commander-in-chief,32
an omission that betrays an important reality of military dominance. The military has
accordingly retained for itself the prerogative to intervene in political affairs and rule in
effect behind the scenes when not wielding direct power.
The earliest constitutions declared the armed forces a non-deliberative and
obedient body.33 The constitution of 1864 first reserves a title for the armed forces, and
establishes the military fuero, as long as the military remains a permanent institution. In fundamental laws of the 1880s the duties of the armed forces are amplified to include maintaining public order and underwriting constitutional guarantees, most of which have been retained in the current constitution. The military is invested with the duty to defend the constitution, a provision that essentially opens the door to any means whatever seen fit to fulfill this obligation, even if contrary to the constitution itself. The 1962 constitution declares that special attention shall be given by the military to ensure the alternation of the presidency (Article 112). There is an expansive tendency in the
constitutions, with the precise duties and privileges of the armed forces given more
explicit detail with the passing constitutions. An Organic Law of the Armed Forces structures the fundamental attributes of the military. The current organic law reinforces the constitutional specifications, stating its mission, mindful of its prerogative to maintain internal order.34
32 Elam, Robert (1997). “The Army and Politics in El Salvador, 1840-1927,” in Brian Loveman & Thomas Davies Jr., eds., The Politics of Antipolitics: The Miltary in Latin America, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, p. 53. 33 All of the constitutions refereced are available at the website of the National Assembly:
20 Prior to its centralization and modernization in the 20th century, the public force
was composed largely of private militias organized to keep order in the countryside. 35
The military’s assumption of direct rule began in the 1940s and lasted until the troubled
transition to democratic rule beginning in the 1980s. Oscar Osorio, the new military
governor taking the helm in the place of Hernández Martínez, created an official state
party patterned after the PRI of Mexico.36 The PRUD and its successor, the PCN, would establish an extensive patronage machine incorporating labor unions, peasants, and
bureaucrats. Non-ideological in posture, the party served mainly to validate the policy
decisions of the military hierarchy and to mobilize votes to validate its regime.37
The military institution exhibited a strong corporate character by responding
aggressively when its prerogatives were threatened by disorder. In 1932 the armed forces
used its preponderance of power to crush dissent where it couldn’t be co-opted. Officers
similarly took action in 1948 to forestall a diminution of their influence by Hernández
Martínez. A burgeoning crisis of legitimacy and breakdown in tight control over the
sectors in the 1970s resulted in the same approach as that taken in the 1930s. The style of
repression effective in the 1930s and 1940s could not carry the same success in the
1980s, however. The military and oligarchic interests did not account for the far-reaching
changes the country had undergone as peasants and workers had become politicized,
international ties deepened and scrutiny of the international community increased. The
negotiated settlement of the conflict following the end of the cold war appeared to have
ushered in a new era in civil-military relations.
35 Montgomery, Tommie Sue (1995). Revolution in El Salvador, Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 31-32. 36 Sanchez, Alvaro L. (1989). La Politica in El Salvador en las Ultimas Seis Decadas: 1930-1989, p. 36. 37 Baloyra, Enrique (1984). El Salvador in Transition. Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, p. 35.
21 An elected civilian government had taken the reins of state, but the demands of the civil war had paradoxically driven the militarization of society still deeper, just as an
historic process of democratization was underway. During the war, the military still
tolerated only historically sanctioned activities in the countryside and by labor. Even in
the post-civil war era, the military still rejects civilian intrusion into military affairs and
guards its autonomy in regard to ministerial posts and military academy. Symptomatic of
the old military fueros, civilian oversight of the military is limited.38 The negotiated
resolution to the war brought attention to the excesses committed by the military in its
efforts to eradicate the rebellion. A truth commission was established to investigate
claims of abuses against the civilian population, the findings of which the military
rejected out of hand by appealing to its overarching mission to defend society from
extraordinary threats.39 The military considered itself the only institution competent to answer the discord of earlier decades and maintain the integrity of the corporate body.
The military of the 21st century is a different creature from that of the 20th; extensive retraining, reorganization, and downsizing following the peace accords make for a more disciplined force. Furthermore, the military budget has fallen precipitously from more than 30% of the government’s expenditures during the conflict to less than 2% in 2003, curtailing its independence.40
38 These characteristics of the military during and after the civil war are described in Knut Walter & Phillip Williams, “Antipolitics in El Salvador, 1948-1994” in Loveman & Davies eds, Antipolitics, and the same authors’ “The Military and Democratization in El Salvador” Journal of Democracy, (1993) Vol. 35, no.1: 39-88. 39 Loveman, Brian (1997). “Human Rights, Antipolitics, and Protecting the Patria,” in Loveman & Davies eds. Antipolitics, 415-417. 40 On the military’s reaction to the budget cuts see “El Salvador: Civil Society Supports Reduced Role for the Military,” IPS-Inter Press Service, September 1, 1995. Current figures from the CIA World Factbook at:
22 The composition of the Salvadoran military is strongly corporate in character due
to its history of autonomous, organic construction and (despite constitutional
prohibitions) active political career. Though its capacity to intervene is not as robust as
previously, even today it is not clear that the military hierarchy would restrain itself from
use of its traditional “judicial review with bayonets”41 in the face of mismanagement by
the civilian governors.
Labor in El Salvador
Despite a progressive ring to the constitutional articles governing labor, state-labor
relations in El Salvador have been stormy from the beginning, with the government
variably attempting to corral and crush its organization.
The early constitutions reflected the liberal philosophy in their brevity. Labor is
seldom mentioned, if at all, in the constitutions of the former half of the 19th century,
while individual liberties are clearly expressed. Following the accession to power of
Hernández Martínez and his bloody repression of the communist uprising, the constitution of 1939 for the first time deals explicitly with the rights and duties of
workers. Only two articles, they guarantee equity between workers and employers, and
provide that conflicts will be resolved by tribunals established by law (Articles 62-3).
The 1950 constitution was the first to systematically and finely state the social function of labor and its role in the national body, reserving an entire title to work and social security. It treats at length the rights and responsibilities of workers, employers,
and the state, stipulating hours, benefits, and security, and stating the interest of the state
(retained in the 1962 constitution) to avoid vagrancy (Article 182). In openly corporatist
fashion, it refers to the labor code which establishes workers’ and employers’ “rights and
41 Loveman, Brian (1997). “Protected Democracies” in Loveman and Davies, eds, Antipolitics.
23 obligations” and serves as a mechanism which is to “harmonize relations between Capital
and Labor” (Article 183). Comparable language appears in the current constitution.42
Article 192 assures the right to associate freely, explicitly stating the power of unions and professional associations to obtain personería jurídica and thereby enjoy the protection of the state. The right to strike is granted to workers, and the right of work stoppage to employers, the conditions of which are to be dictated by law (Article 193). The two subsequent constitutions retained much of the provisions of this document, enlarging on protections and extending rights to different categories of workers.
The labor code is animated by “the principal objective to harmonize the relations between employers and workers, establishing their rights and obligations” (Article 38).
The labor code itself is a cumbersome document, although the requirements for obtaining legal personality are reasonably simple.43 The latest labor code gives the benefit of the
doubt to strikers, assuming them legal until shown otherwise, a first for Latin America a
first for Latin America, 44 and a decided turnabout from the 1963 labor code that erected
nearly insuperable barriers to legal strikes.45
The organized labor movement in El Salvador formed a nucleus of potential
opposition to the rule of the oligarchy and military, and was consequently the object of
great attention. Prior to the organization of the modern union movement, workers in El
Salvador, like most Central American countries, grouped in mutual associations that
provided relief to members needing assistance. In the early 20th century the modern labor
42 The relationship between the law and actuality in regard to workers’ rights would be a subject for valuable research. 43 Article 219, Código de Trabajo de la República de El Salvador, available at:
24 movement took shape as labor organizations mushroomed with communist inspiration.
When labor agitation reached its apex in the 1930s, the perceived impotence of the civilian government in controlling the unruly workers eventuated the military takeover and murderous suppression of the ill-starred uprising led by the communist party. Having broken the back of the labor movement, the Hernández Martínez regime banned labor organization for most of its tenure.46
Labor unions’ organizing efforts remained underground and illicit until the
military felt confident enough in its consolidation to allow the formation of a labor
federation loyal to the government. The planned pro-government labor congress in 1957
staked out independent territory however, and produced a leftist union, the Confederación
General de Trabajadores Salvadoreños (CGTS), with communist guidance. As a
counterbalance to the CGTS and its communist leadership, labor leaders sympathetic to
the regime established the Confederación General de Sindicatos (CGS) under the aegis of
the government and the AFL-CIO affiliated Organización Regional Interamericana de
Trabajadores (ORIT). The position of the CGS suffered and its membership waned due to
its close relationship with the ruling PCN.47
The art of clandestine coordination learned in the 1930s allowed the survival of
anti-government groups. By the 1970s the legitimacy of the military regime had so
suffered that opposition organizations flourished underground and labor and other mass
organizations were openly defying its right to govern. The Unión Nacional de
Trabajadores Salvadoreños (UNTS) came into being in 1986 as the largest labor
organization in thirty years and united centrist and leftist unions. Powerful public
46 ibid, p. 325 47 ibid, p. 387.
25 employees in the group used their position to demand that the Duarte government enact labor reforms and seek peace with the rebels.48
The change in atmosphere following the close of the civil war has been advantageous to labor,49 though improvements have only been slowly implemented.
Procedurally, labor has taken great strides, but substantively, there is evidence that the government has not surrendered corporate control over the labor sector through selectively using its power to grant personería jurídica to social groups to impede the activities of disfavored groups (such as those with ideological affinities with the former guerrillas50). The International Labor Organization has also received complaints concerning violation of the associational freedom of public sector employees by denying legal recognition to otherwise properly constituted unions.51
The strict legal regulations that govern the labor sector show a clearly corporatist tendency. Labor groups are obligated to function within clearly defined boundaries mandated by the state. The state has grudgingly yielded some territory to an emergent pluralism, but a vigilant promotion of harmonious relations remains a guiding principle in labor relations.
The Peasantry in El Salvador
Peasant mobilization, as demonstrated in the peasant uprising of 1931, has the potential shake the social terrain of El Salvador. Due to a real or imagined threat to order posed by
48 Montgomery, (1995), p. 194. 49 Tracy Fitzsimmons and Mark Anner find that labor strength has counterintuitively waned in the more liberal atmosphere of democratization. See their “Civil Society in a Postwar Period: Labor in the Salvadoran Democratic Transition,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 34, no. 3 (1998), pp. 103-128. 50 Steve Ropp (forthcoming) relates the case of a group relocating internal refugees in “What About Corporatism in Central America?” in Wiarda, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America Revisited, p. 575. 51 See the website of the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association:
26 the untamed countryside, the government has taken extraordinary measures to insure its
pliability. Peasant unionization remained illegal until the promulgation of the 1982
constitution, and subsequently procedural technicalities prevented free association in the
countryside. Peasants living outside the political center of San Salvador have comprised a
large portion of the Salvadoran population (agriculture comprised 30% of labor even in
199952) but traditionally have had minimal voice in the affairs of state.
The constitutions of 1950 and 1962 legalize the formation of unions for workers,
but apply this right narrowly; the labor code explicitly grants the power to unionize only to manual laborers and employees in certain named categories that exclude agriculture.53
Agricultural workers, in turn, are defined clearly.54 Given that only those organizations
granted personería jurídica in accordance with the labor code are in a position to enjoy
the protection of the state, this omission effectively delegalized peasant unions. Before
reforms made to the labor code in accordance with the 1982 charter, peasant
organizations were afforded a separate chapter in the labor code that allowed only
“professional associations.” The code meditates at length on the conditions for the formation of such associations, which are dictated entirely by the executive.55
The cultivation of coffee since the 1880s rested on the accessibility of peasant
labor, and the interests of the economic elite therefore were in keeping the countryside passive. In the wake of La Matanza the peasantry remained quiescent and would not
become active again until the cataclysmic events of the 1970s. For many observers the
primary impulse toward the civil war was the extremes of inequality in land distribution
52 CIA World Factbook, (2004).
27 and obstruction of land reform and progressive agrarian policies that ended in the
deterioration of the military regime and onset of civil war.56
Reacting to social turbulence the military government of the 1960s sought to channel peasant energies into acceptable activities. Established in 1963, the Organización
Democrática Nacionalista (ORDEN) aggregated peasants and farm workers in an anticommunist militia operated directly by the armed forces. ORDEN became the nucleus of the later notorious death-squads that targeted dissident peasant leaders and suspected
subversives for assassination. ORDEN was formally abolished after the 1979 coup that
installed a progressive junta, but its mission and activities continued largely unaffected.
Though agricultural unions were officially outlawed, the military allowed pro-
government organizations as an inoculation against communist penetration. The peasant
group Unión Comunal Salvadoreña (UCS), for example, was recognized as an
“association” rather than a union in keeping with the official intolerance of agrarian
unionization. Created with the help of the American Institute for Free Labor
Development (AIFLD) and with the permission of the government, the UCS campaigned
for land reform to head off radicalization of the peasantry, but suffered from accusations of complicity in the terror campaign of ORDEN.57 Efforts at peasant organization
outside the officially tolerated associations met with the state-sponsored repression.
The military governments of a more reformist stripe unveiled several abortive attempts at land redistribution. The Insituto Salvadoreño de Transformación Agrario
(ISTA) was created in the 1970s for the purpose of undertaking land reform, but factions of the military and economic elites erupted in bitter recriminations over the move and the
56 See for example Tommie Sue Montgomery (1995). 57 Bollinger, (1987), pp. 367-396.
28 controversy stalled the effective implementation of reforms through successive military
and civilian governments58 and violent repression ultimately escalated in the early 1980s.
The conclusion of the war brought manifold improvements to the situation of the
nation’s peasant population as for other sectors. Among the reforms mandated by the
peace accord was the creation of a civilian police force directed from the Interior
Ministry, which would presumably neutralize the threat from the military-directed
paramilitary squads in the countryside. The outcome of land initiatives has been murkier
because empirical measures of the effects of land reforms are hindered difficulties by
measuring the attributes of the agricultural sector, such as land tenancy patterns and
employment rates. Though it appears that land distribution is less acute a problem than in the past, landlessness and unemployment remain a reality for many Salvadoran peasants.59 Targeted assassinations of peasant leaders are not unknown and the government still displays recalcitrance in granting legal recognition to the many rural organizations that have sprung up to voice interests that had long been ignored.60
Corporatist elements are in evidence in the peasant sector as they are in labor. The
agricultural orientation of El Salvador demanded the subordination and regulation of the
peasant sector to such an extent that their associational activity was dictated in the
constitution. Legislation was only enacted in 1994 that lifted the ban on rural trade unions
and the removed the power of the government to withdraw recognition of unions
58 Bird, Shawn L; Phillip J. Williams (2000). “El Salvador: Revolt and Negotiated Transition” in Walker & Armony, eds., Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, p. 29. 59 Seligson, Mitchell (1995). “Thirty Years of Transformation of the Agrarian Structure in El Salvador, 1961-1991,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 30, no. 3: 43-74. 60 Ropp, (forthcoming) in Wiarda, ed., Corporatism and Authoritarianism.
29 administratively.61 The recent liberalization toward peasant groups yields a mixture of
liberalism and corporatism in the countryside, as peasants are relatively freer to organize
while corporate management is still written into the constitution and labor code.
Democratizing El Salvador
The corporate character of the Salvadoran political process reveals itself in the preoccupation of the predominant groups’ efforts to unify and direct the colliding social forces that emerged with increasing mobilization and complexity. As the body retaining the greatest access to force, the armed forces filled the vacuum of leadership that opened in the absence of a strong, centralized state. In contrast to its officially non-deliberative status, the military has occupied the role of the ultimate arbiter of the national good. The military did not act unilaterally, though, and found itself in a symbiotic relationship with the economic oligarchy, which contributed to its sullied reputation. The narrowly conceived interests of the economic elites pulled the military away from conciliation with competing interests and necessitated forceful repression of labor and peasant groups. The parade of military factions assuming control of the government acted more or less closely with the elites as their political makeup shifted, but when the interest of the military in national order was threatened, as it was in the 1930s and again in the 1970s, the military resorted to aggressively imposing conformity on unruly actors.
The abuse of power by the military-orchestrated garrison state resulted in its loss of legitimacy as the director of the corporate body. The military’s unwillingness or inability to harmoniously accommodate the vying political forces in the country and serve the interests of the national community resulted in an exclusionary battle for the state
61 Bronstein, Arturo (1995). “Societal Change and Industrial Relations in Latin America: Trends and Prospects,” International Labour Review, Vol. 134, no. 2, pp. 163-187.
30 apparatus. When legal means of change proved unreliable, the labor and peasant sectors,
along with elements of the Catholic church, were thrown together in an effort to topple a regime that had lost its mandate according to the “pre-Lockean” view of sovereignty in which the alienation of power is total, but contingent on equitable rule.62 The 1970s and
1980s were a period of disintegration of the national polity as the corporate head lost the
credibility it had only tenuously held during previous decades. As the military struggled
to maintain the unity of the Salvadoran nation, the leadership of the FMLN waged a
parallel battle to conquer political power and replace the military at the summit of the
state. No less than the military, the insurgent movement sought to unite the Salvadoran
polity and implement its own Marxian vision of the common good.63
The political competition between the now legal FMLN and its civil war nemesis,
the Alianza Republicana Nacional (ARENA) is no longer conducted through open
warfare, but is still saddled with mistrust. Politics exhibits an exclusionary character and
democratic legitimacy remains dubious. Political violence among competing parties is
common, compelling the presidential candidates in the recent election to sign a pledge
against their partisans’ use of violence. The rancor of the election, however, was palpable
in the candidates’ frequent allusions to the civil war and thinly veiled evocations of death
squads and the looming specter of communism.64
The promise of the bounty of state resources animates political actors as much as
civic notions of collective cooperation for the public advancement. The electoral tribunal
62 Dealy details this formulation of sovereignty as total, but contingent alienation of power. See Dealy, Glen (1992), “Pipe Dreams: The Pluralistic Latins” in Wiarda, ed., Politics and Social Change in Latin America, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 287. 63 Dealy quotes Cayetano Carpio’s view of the rebellion as “on the road to the monolithic unity of all the people” in “Pipe Dreams” in Wiarda, ed., Politics and Social Change, p. 283. 64 ARENA’s candidate referred to the FMLN not only as communists but “children eaters,” while the leftist aspirant reminded voters that the ARENA was founded by the notorious death-squad chief Roberto D’Aubisson. See “Schafik y Handel Cambian Discurso,” El Diario de Hoy, January 19, 2004.
31 (Tribunal Supremo Electoral), charged with the non-partisan oversight of elections, suffers from a reputation of bias and tactics that violate the spirit of democratic competition, while an alarming portion of the public remains disengaged from the democratic process.65 The 2003 Latinobarómetro report on perceptions of democracy finds a disappointing 45 percent of the Salvadoran population prefers democracy to any other regime type, a number that has fluctuated and declined substantially since the late
1990s. Satisfaction with the workings of democracy has interestingly increased, but remains at only 33 percent.66 In this sort of uncertain environment liberal democracy remains somewhere over the horizon. The historic reliance on coercion and the paternalistic incorporation of labor and peasant movements, and ruthless enforcement by an unaccountable military body that stands above the rule of law would not lead us to predict a significantly different state of affairs within only one generation of democratic government, but the evidence on consolidation is sobering nonetheless.
65 These and other problems of democratic and social nature are described in the study by the United Nations Development Program, “Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano El Salvador 2003.” The report details the lack of engagement by the population in the democratic process, an overweening executive, and the absence of “organs of control.” The report is available at
32
CHAPTER 3
HONDURAS
Background
The upheaval of the twentieth century did not touch Honduras in the same way as its volatile sister republics, though it bears a strong resemblance to its neighbors in its tradition of caudillismo and political violence and intimidation. Its first several decades of political experience after independence were of instability and regionalism, punctuated by foreign intervention.67
Economically, agriculture forms a primary base of income and banana production
contributed significantly to the national livelihood well into the 20th century. The military has played a preponderant role in the national political order since the 1950s and assumed a lasting position of direct authority in the 1970s. Its government was held as a valuable ally by the U.S. in its struggle against communist subversion in the area and the military
engaged in repression and assassination of opponents reminiscent of the dirty wars in other Latin American countries.
Beyond these surface features, though, Honduras exhibited a much more mild form of authoritarian rule than did El Salvador, and democratization did not require a destructive civil conflict. In spite of its relatively serene recent history and transition to democracy, Honduras continues on a troubled road to democratic consolidation. In fact,
67 Sieder, Rachel (1995). “Honduras: The Politics of Exception and Military Reformism,” 1972-1978. Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 27, no. 1, p. 105.
33 Honduras typifies that unique blend of authoritarian and democratic elements of a
“democradura.”68
A small and poor country, (along with Nicaragua one of the poorest in the region)
Honduras suffered the continual indignity of interventions by foreign powers, including
other Central American countries, the United States, and foreign fruit companies. The original “banana republic,” Honduras was at the mercy of foreign investors from the time of its independence. Due to economic weakness Honduran elites were unable to muster a centralized state that could extend control throughout its nominal territory in the first decades of independence.69
The competition between Conservatives and Liberals was decided in favor of the
Liberals in the latter half of the 1800s. The Partido Liberal Hondureño (PLH) was the first political party organized in the country and remains one of the two primary political forces. Its ideology was supplied by the classical liberal philosophy separating church and state and governmental powers. A conservative opposition splintered from the PLH and formed the Partido Nacional Hondureño (PNH). The new party managed to elect conservative strongman Tiburcio Carías Andino in 1932, who would have a decisive influence for some years to come, jailing and exiling liberals and ruling with a dictatorial hand.70 Under the tutelage of Carías Andino the new PNH fashioned a patronage machine that instituted itself as a fixture in the countryside.
68 Ruhl, J. Mark (2000). “Honduras: Militarism and Democratization in Troubled Waters,” in Walker & Armony, eds, Repression, p. 55. 69 Euraque, Darío (1996). Reinterpreting the Banana Republic, Region and State in Honduras, 1870-1972, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, p. 3. 70 Morris, James A, (1984). Central America: Crisis and Adaptation, Albequerque: University of New Mexico Press, p. 8.
34 The two parties differed in their ideological platforms, but in practice they
adhered to the same basic economic and political policies with only minor modification.71
The parties relied heavily on patronage and bossism, with personal connections serving
as a principle mobilizing mechanism. The scant economic opportunities in a poor country
made politics and control of state resources a valuable prize and corruption and cronyism have been endemic for the life of the republic.72
Unlike its Central American neighbors coffee was not a major export until after
World War II, but bananas filled the role that coffee did for the other nations, comprising
up to 80 percent of export revenue until 1930.73 The role of foreign-based banana outfits
loomed large in the Honduran political drama as domestic elites accommodated
themselves to the needs of the international investors and availed themselves of the
financial rewards to dispense patronage.74
The hierarchical power relations of an authoritarian system still linger in
Honduras. The pattern of paternalistic political relations and corruption survived the
transition to democracy of the 1980s, and the consolidation of a liberal regime has
suffered for it. The military, too, occupies a position disproportionately large for a
democratic regime, having become a kingmaker in mid-century deciding the fates of
politicians and governments.
71 Becerra, Longino (1983), Evolución Historica de Honduras, Tegucigalpa: Baktun Editorial, p. 144. 72 Pearson, Neale J., (1987), “Honduras,” in Greenfield & Maram eds., Labor Organizations, p. 463. 73 Morris (1984), Central America, pp. 195-196. 74 Ibid, 197.
35 The Military in Honduras
The Honduran military did not play a significant role in Honduran national politics until
the 1950s. The armed forces served mainly as militias for local caudillos before their
institutionalization and development of a unique set of interests.75 Before the period of
military modernization taking place in the 20th century no military “caste” existed to
defend the interests of the army. As late as the 1960s a liberal president attempted to
wrest control of public force from the military by instituting a Civil Guard under civilian
control.76
The protean character of the military is reflected in Honduras’ many constitutions
of the 19th century, in which it is given scant attention. The provisions for the military
consisted of a handful of articles, the focus of which mirrored the Salvadoran
constitutions by establishing an “obedient and non-deliberative” military (Article 272)
and acknowledging the military fuero. Those of the early 20th century provide only slightly more detail. Just as an organic law governs the military of El Salvador, the constitutions of Honduras give the military their fundamental structure in the form of a
Constitutive Law of the Armed Forces. The composition of each branch of the armed forces is separately enunciated.77
The constitution of 1957 represents a turning point for the military institution.
Previously referred to simply as the “Public Force” or “Army,” it here is christened the
“Armed Forces.” The armed forces gained a new orientation; seventeen long and detailed
articles elaborate a pronounced role for the military, not just in national security, but in
75 Sieder, (1995). 76 Morris, James A. (1984). Honduras: Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers. Boulder: Westview Press, p. 38. 77 Ley Constitutiva de la Fuerzas Armadas. La Gaceta, October 29, 2001. Issue 29,617.
36 “cooperation” with the president in promoting literacy, education, and communication,
among others tasks (Article 316), a mandate that persists in the current constitution.78
Furthermore, while the president is made the titular head of the armed forces in this constitution, he only exercises that power through the “intermediary” chief of the armed forces (Article 318), who is given the implicit privilege to reject the president’s orders. 79
While the chief of the armed forces is vested with the responsibility to obey the mandates
of the president, this clause explicitly places an officer between civilian leadership and
the military. Reforms made to the current constitution in 1999 closed this loophole, and
reined in some of the expansive privileges of the military.
The profound redefinition of the military’s place in Honduran society documented
in the country’s constitutions was a reflection of an evolving political situation on the
ground. The military’s first incursion into politics took place in 1956, the eve of the
promulgation of the constitution that surrendered meaningful control to the same
institution. Air Force colonel Oswaldo López Arrellano contrived with the Liberal Party
to grant autonomy to the military, removing the president from a position of real
authority.80 The deteriorated relationship between Liberal President Villeda Morales,
elected under the new constitution, invited a second and longer military regime. Alarmed
by the Liberal presidential candidate’s plans to undercut the growing power of the
military (there was even discussion of following the example of Costa Rica and
demilitarizing altogether81), the military intervened in 1963, deposing Villeda Morales in
a coup that one author calls “one of the most bloody and barbaric in the history of Latin
78 Constitución de la Republica de Honduras 1957, Article 316, Constitution of 1982: Article 274. 79 Article 319 declares that when a dispute arises over orders between the president and chief of the armed forces, the matter will be resolved by congress. 80 Euraque, (1996) p. 107. 81 Bowman, Kirk (2001) “The Public Battles over Militarization and Democracy in Honduras, 1954-1963.” Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 33, no. 3: 53-
37 America”.82 On the day of the coup López Arellano declared that the military would be
“the true incarnation of the aspirations of its people.”83 In order to better fulfill those
aspirations, he set about to tame opposition forces, the labor movement, and peasants, dispatching the military to contain popular mobilization.84
The military cemented its decisive role in politics during its last tenure, coming to
power in a coup led again by López Arellano in 1972, this time at the head of a populist
coalition. This progressive military regime in fact made considerable advancements in
labor reforms and land redistribution.85 The military encouraged involvement by civil
groups, with the important proviso that they act within tolerable political boundaries demarked by the regime. The waning popularity and effectiveness of the military in government resulted in a constituent assembly and process of democratic transition in
1980. The civilian regime was significantly hobbled by the military’s lingering
autonomy, leading one observer to term the democratization “counterfeit.”86
An independent military has raised barriers to the advancement of democracy
even in the 1990s. Reforms of the armed forces in1999, formally consolidating civilian
control over the military, placed the president at the head of the armed forces without a
mediator, stating that his orders will be executed according to the law.87 The surrender of
authority was dramatized by intrigue and rumors of a coup attempt when President Carlos
Roberto Reina exercised his power for the first time, replacing several high-ranking
82 Becerra, (1983) p. 174. 83 Quoted in Leticia Salomón (1982), Militarismo y Reformismo en Honduras, Tegucigalpa: Editorial Guaymuras, p. 34. 84 Becerra, (1983) p. 180. 85 Ruhl, (2000) p. 50-51. The reformist regime would be counterbalanced by a swing to a more conservative junta in the coming years. See Becerra (1983), pp. 213-214. 86 Ruhl,(2000), pp. 50-52. 87 Constitutional reform of 1999, Article 277.
38 military officials.88 The president appointed the first civilian ever to head the armed forces in this year as well.
A corporatist conception of the military is revealed in the constitutions and codes
of Honduras. While the reforms of the 1990s may be applauded as the final step in
subordinating the military to civilian rule and are an important formal step toward
democratic consolidation in the long term, returning the genie to the bottle after forty
years of military autonomy may require an attitudinal shift that goes beyond legal
formalities.
Labor in Honduras
The late development of the armed forces was paralleled by the slow growth of an
organized proletarian class. Modern labor unions made their appearance in Honduras
much later than in most other Latin America countries due to the relative
underdevelopment of the economy.89 The legalization of strikes and unions came as laborers discovered their strength in the banana zones, at which time the government wished to co-opt the burgeoning labor behemoth. The most powerful unions were affiliated with ORIT, an association that engendered hierarchical structures within the unions by giving labor bosses access to state resources and an “official” status. Honduran labor unions have exhibited a close working relationship with the state and have a history of caudillismo.90
The constitutions of the liberal reform period are silent on the issue of labor. Only in the 20th century does labor appear as a right guaranteed to all Hondurans, so long as
the work is “useful and honest”(Article 51). More emphasis is placed on the right to
88 “Honduran President Fires Military Officials, Denies Coup Attempt,” July 31, 1999, Associated Press. 89 Alba, Politics and the Labor Movement, p. 282. 90 Sieder (1995).
39 freely dispose of property. The 1936 constitution establishes some rights of workers and states the duty of the state to provide protection to labor. The constitution of 1957, on the other hand, takes great pains to enumerate the rights and duties of workers, employers, and the state. Twenty-four articles are crowded with protections that are to be afforded to workers by the state. Article 112 calls for periodic state intervention to fix a minimum wage and grants workers for the first time the right to strike and form unions, conditioned by relevant laws. The state is given the duty to protect (tutelar) the rights of workers while simultaneously protecting capital and free enterprise. The state also has the obligation to “promote conciliation and arbitration for the pacific solution of labor disputes.” In language resembling that in the Salvadoran constitution and also strongly corporatist in nature, the state is also charged with promoting the “harmony of capital and labor” (Article 123).
The 1963 and 1982 constitutions retained the bulk of the provisions and the structure of the 1957 constitution. The labor code referenced in the constitution consists of hundreds of articles with explicit provisions for thousands of contingencies that might
arise in the workplace. Acquisition of personería jurídica is a burdensome affair with detailed procedures for the functioning of every union from its founding, records kept, treasury and accounting, to dissolution (Articles 517-531). The conditions stipulated for personería jurídica are significantly more complex than those of El Salvador, a feature that gives the government some leverage over labor and opens the government to charges of imposing on the right to free association. The careful attention given to labor in legal
documents shows the tug of war between labor and government, and the need to manage
the insertion of labor into Honduran social network.
40 Workers were first concentrated in Honduras for the construction of an inter-
oceanic railway and as miners extracting the country’s rich mineral resources, forming mutual aid societies. As the banana monopolies took shape at the turn of the century,
workers became increasingly confrontational.91 The Federación Obrera Hondureña
(FOH) was the first workers’ federation organized in the country and was largely mutualist in outlook. The more militant Federación de Sociedades Obreras del Norte
(FSON) established itself five years later as an alternative force for the unification of workers against the interests of owners. Liberal appeals to organized labor in the 1930s
served to link the PLH to socialism and communism in the eyes of the nationalists and, maybe more importantly, the United Fruit Company, which accordingly threw its support to the PNH candidate, General Carías.92 His stranglehold on the country’s political
activity and hostility to organized labor erected substantial barriers to the movement. The
swift repression of unions kept labor quiescent until the monumental 1954 banana strike.
Under Carías’ handpicked but less exacting successor, the congress had established a
Bureau of Labor and Social Welfare and allowed the formation of some unions.93 The strike that began among the north coast banana-workers achieved wide-ranging support and the government found itself unable to effectively respond.94 The strike stretched over
three months, spawning the two most significant trade unions in the country, the
Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Tela Railroad Company (SITRATERCO) and the
Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Standard Fruit Company (SUTRASFCO). Two large
Federations followed suit and were granted personería jurídica.
91 Becerra, (1983), p. 144. 92 Euraque, (1986), pp. 52-58. 93 Ibid, pp. 92-93. 94 Morris, (1984), Central America, p. 79.
41 The 1963 coup of Oswaldo López Arellano against President Villeda Morales
reintroduced unfriendly state-labor relations. The military regime did not uproot the
newly assertive labor groups entirely, however, which continued to mobilize. López
Arellano began to allow the operation of some labor and peasant groups by 1967,95 which
formed a confederation with the support of ORIT. The Confederación de Trabajadores
Hondureños (CTH), comprising the two large federations and the peasant group
Asociación Nacional de Campesinos Hondureños (ANACH), was granted recognition by
the government in 1965. The CTH became a moderate voice for workers, and established
close ties with the government in ministerial initiatives related to working conditions.96
The CTH also answered López Arellano’s patriotic appeal to help defend the country at the time of the Salvadoran invasion in the short “Soccer War” of 1969.97
López Arellano’s return as the head of the government in 1972 was on somewhat
warmer terms with labor. Sieder writes that the military reformism of the 1970s was
constructed on the foundations of a political process laid generations earlier: unions
operating with training and support from ORIT enjoyed official favor and access to state
resources, a formula reflecting the deeper tradition of clientelism and patronage ingrained
in Honduran politics.98 A more vocal confederation organized with Christian Democratic
leanings came into being in 1970, but was denied legal recognition until 1984. The
Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT), by adopting an adversarial attitude
toward the government, paid the price in influence and membership.99
95 Ruhl, (2000), p. 52. 96 CTH leaders have supported both Liberal and National governments as well as the military regime of López Arellano. See Pearson (1987), p. 477-478. 97 Euraque (1986), p. 138. 98 Sieder (1995). 99 Morris, James A.; Ropp, Steve C. (1977). “Corporatism and Dependent Development: A Honduran Case Study,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 27-68.
42 Unions accuse the government of violating associational autonomy and using
procedural tactics to deny legal recognition. The International Labor Organization’s
Committee on Freedom of Association has chided the government for violations of international labor conventions in the case of a newly formed textile workers’ union that
claims that the government obstructed “trade union pluralism.”100 Further allegations
concern the government’s tolerance for intimidation of activists and illegal disruption of
unions.101
In all of the 20th century constitutions, the state is a prime actor in labor issues,
taking a leading role in relations in ensuring harmony in production, supporting a
corporatist interpretation of Honduran labor relations. As is the case in El Salvador,
demilitarization of society has loosened strictures on group activity while the state retains
a considerable corporate interest in their activities and over their recognition.
The Peasantry in Honduras
The passivity of the Honduran countryside has perplexed many scholars, some of whom
have underscored a relative equality in land distribution as an explanatory factor. In
comparison with El Salvador, Honduran peasants are said to have been satisfied by the
wide-open and unused countryside, while others have explained Honduras’ distinctive
development by reference to various other economic and political features.102 The peasant
movement of Honduras has been remarkably active, pressing for and gaining concessions
on wages and land reform, but its energy has been met with counterforce by employers
100 Report of the International Labor Organization’s Committee on Freedom of Association “325th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association” June, 2001. The case referenced is no. 2100. Available on the web at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb281/pdf/gb-6.pdf. 101 International Federation of Free Trade Unions, “Honduras: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights (2002)” available on the web at: http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991215650&Language=EN 102 Sieder (1995) lists several of these hypotheses.
43 and the government, sometimes violently, and been subjected to the temptations of
official cooptation. Though not a small percentage of the population, the peasant farmer
has been marginalized and participated in politics only through political bosses.103
The Honduran constitution does not focus the same attention on agricultural as industrial labor, but includes a chapter on agrarian reform (Article 344), and states that agricultural production must be oriented toward the sustenance of the Honduran population (Article 347). Article 128 of the constitution states that a special law will regulate agricultural contracts, and the labor code deliberately defines the provisions that are to be made for agricultural workers by landowners.104
Although less inequality in land concentration distinguishes Honduras from El
Salvador, the levels of extreme rural poverty have been higher in Honduras than in any
other Central American country (1980 data).105 The large tracts of Honduran land served as an escape valve for landless peasants from El Salvador, contributing to the war of
1969. 106
Land scarcity did become a problem in the 20th century as population grew and
lands were claimed for commercial agriculture, which after World War II pushed peasant
tenants off of land held by the fruit companies and began to encroach on ejidos, spurring
a competition for land that gave birth to peasant coordination, including direct action.107
For the most part, though, due to the small population of the country, large-landholders’
103 Morris (1984) in Crisis and Adaptation, p. 163. 104 Articles 191-199, Código de Trabajo de Honduras, op. cited. 105 Brockett, Charles D., (1991) “The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 253-274. 106 See Thomas P. Anderson, (1981).The War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador, 1969, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 107 Ruhl, (1984), p. 40.
44 economic activities did not conflict with the livelihood of the peasantry.108 In the latter
half of the 20th century the government oscillated between reforms and repression in the
countryside. Policies of reformist administrations aimed at colonizing underutilized land
and streamlining land claims for the landless were then corrected by those unsympathetic
to the landless peasants’ plight.
The banana strike of 1954 launched the modern peasant movement in tandem
with labor. The movement was further catalyzed when President Villeda Morales raised
hopes for agrarian reforms among peasants, but he was only able to pass a diluted
provision for reform over objections from landowners. The entire project was derailed
when López Arellano overthrew Villeda Morales in 1963.109
The peasantry was again stirred by the appointment in the late 1960s of a
sympathetic head of the Instituto Nacional Agrario (INA), under whose leadership the
body issued rulings favorable to peasants in land disputes, and the populist coup of López
Arellano that capitalized on peasant discontent. López’ populist incarnation of the 1970s
expanded the peasantry’s access to land; his military government issued a decree
requiring the transfer of unused lands to peasants. Dissatisfaction among cattle ranchers
led to revisions to the law with consultation among the government, landowners, and
peasants.110 The eventual swing to the right after López Arellano’s dismissal and
replacement signaled a more sympathetic hearing given to landowners, and a national
108 Ruhl, (2000), p. 48. 109 Kincaid, Douglas (1985), “’We Are the Agrarian Reform’: Rural Politics and Agrarian Reform” in Nancy Peckenham & Annie Street, eds., Honduras: Portrait of a Captive Nation, New York: Praeger Publishers, p. 138. 110 Morris, James A.; Ropp, Steve C. (1977), “Corporatism and Dependent Development: A Honduran Case Study, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 27-68.
45 security environment unsuited to associational autonomy darkened the prospects for independent peasant activities.111
The organizations involved in the peasant movement have displayed notable diversity and competitiveness drawn along ideological lines. The Federación Nacional de
Campesinos Hondureños (FENACH) was created in 1962 with help from members of the communist party taking a militant stand against the fruit companies. The ANACH, on the other hand took shape as an anti-communist peasant union with the encouragement of the government and help from ORIT and participated in the moderate CTH. As was the case with labor groups, some peasant organizations were viewed more benignly by the military government, which transformed into official favors. ANACH, for instance, received official material and institutional support as a favored alternative to FENACH.
ANACH, in turn, threw its support to the López government for its agrarian reform initiatives.112 A rival peasant group, the Unión Nacional de Campesinos (UNC), affiliated
with the CGT and lobbied unsuccessfully for legal recognition for some ten years.113 In the 1980s the major peasant groups joined in the Consejo Coordinador de Organizaciones
Campesinos de Honduras (COCOH) to demand agrarian reform, but the united
movement disintegrated due to differences over policy.114 The government of Rafael
Leonardo Callejas is also reported to have split the peasant movement by dispensing favors to peasant leaders in exchange for their cooperation.115 Attention to the rights of
the poor and landless in the country is increasing as human rights activists take up their
111 Brockett, (1991), p. 262 112 Becerra, (1983), p. 203. 113 Morris & Ropp, (1977). 114 The COCOH still functions, along with two other peasant leagues. 115 Edelman, Marc (1998). “Transnational Peasant Politics in Central America,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 49-86 (See footnote 26).
46 cause, but murder and intimidation remains a threat and confidence in the government to
act evenhandedly is low.116
The Honduran peasant sector was the most thoroughly organized in Central
America,117 but the results it achieved varied according to the receptivity of the regime in
place at a given time. In sum, a corporatist tendency is visible in the pattern of legal and
behavioral intersection in the countryside. Hierarchical cooptation by parties and the
government is also a standard form of political participation. This can be expected given
the rigid system of controls over groups enshrined in the constitution, and the place
reserved for the state in regulating relations, to actively promote the harmony of groups.
Democratizing Honduras
Political centralization came late in Honduras, as a national landed elite with a cohesive
identity and particularized interests failed to develop, leaving a political opening for
foreign enterprises and later the military to assume control. Perhaps because no single
force coalesced at the head of a central state, in Honduras an outwardly more benign type
of authoritarianism has contributed to comparatively smooth inter-segmental relations.
This stands in contrast to the military-oligarchy alliance of El Salvador in which state
control most often took the form of suppression. During the generalized upheaval of the
1980s in nearby countries, Honduras remained largely tranquil, albeit authoritarian. A surprising level of interest group assertiveness is evident in the strength of the Honduran labor movement and vocal political activity of the peasant movement. Where the suffocating atmosphere in El Salvador degenerated into war, the military in Honduras,
116 See The New York Times, “Rights Workers in Honduras Still Live in Fear,” September 26, 2002. 117 ibid.
47 though acting autonomously and outside the law, showed less propensity to resort to
oppression and more willingness to show conciliation.118
A predisposition toward the harmonious functioning of the body politic is
manifested in the legal foundations of Honduras. Interest groups are required to apply to the labor ministry for personería jurídica, a process subject to political manipulation, a charge made with some frequency. Particularly during military rule, groups engaged in suspect activities have at times found their applications for legal recognition tied up while similar, but less offensive, groups enjoy recognition.119 Each sector is endowed with
rights and privileges along with corresponding duties to fulfill for the proper functioning
of the Honduran social body. The concord of capital and labor is given special treatment
in the constitutions and labor code. This paternalistic disposition is evident in the
clientelism of the traditional parties that remains endemic to Honduran politicking. The
special attention given to the military in the constitution and its organic law sets it apart
as an autonomous body, invested with the authority to adjudicate in questions of a purely political nature, as is the case in the Salvadoran constitution.
The relative stability of Honduras cannot be mistaken for democratic
consolidation. According to the Latinobarómetro, Honduras is one of only two Latin
American countries to show an increase in both the percentage of committed democrats
and those satisfied with democracy since 1996.120 Those levels are not overwhelming,
though, with those preferring democracy to any other regime at fifty-five percent, while
118 This does not minimize the human rights abuses that occurred and sensitive issues continue to surface in Honduras and the U.S. See for example “Bush Latin America Nominations Reopen Old Wounds,” August 1, 2001, The New York Times. 119 Morris, James A.; Ropp, Steve C. (1977), “Corporatism and Dependent Development: A Honduran Case Study, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 27-68. 120 The other, interestingly, is Venezuela.
48 satisfaction hovers at thirty-seven percent, and over a third remain indifferent to the type
of government.121
The two traditional parties act as patrons to their constituents, and corruption
among public officials is the cause of disdain among the citizenry. Party participation is
lacking among the masses; the oldest and strongest political parties operate as patronage machines without a clear difference in policy positions. The political parties are geared toward personalism and remain suspicious of each other.122 Input into the political system
from the masses often takes the form of direct action rather than participation through
established democratic mechanisms.123 The realization of liberal democracy will remain elusive while crime and corruption undermine the rule of law, and Hondurans are
unimpressed with the quality of their governance.124
121 Latinobarómetro, 2003. 122 Sieder (1995). 123 Ruhl, (2000), p. 63. 124 Ruhl (2000), pp. 61-63 describes many of these problems undermining the quality of democracy, as perceived by the Honduran public.
49
CHAPTER 4
COSTA RICA
Background
Once identified as “possibly one of the most unhappy provinces,”125 Costa Rica could not
have departed more dramatically from the unhappy political development of its
neighbors. Inconsequential and remote, its democratic government survived severe
economic troubles and military conflagrations in its immediate vicinity. Its unique
character has been explained by appealing to its supposedly homogenous and ethnically
European population, a relatively egalitarian class composition, and by the institutional
design that ended the brief civil war in 1948.126 What is certain is that the major political
actors have accepted the legitimacy of the democratic regime and regard it as the single
acceptable route to political power. At a time when military regimes harshly punished
opposition movements, opposing interests in Costa Rica were accorded legitimacy to
mobilize supporters and compete peacefully for influence, and the commitment to
democracy currently remains as strong while democratic consolidation plods in other
Central American countries.
The dearth of natural resources in Costa Rica attracted few settlers, Indian or
European and the colony occupied a secondary position in the consciousness of the
125 Monge Alfaro, Carlos (1966) Historia de Costa Rica, San José: Imprenta Trejos Hnos., p. 89. 126 Lehoucq, Fabrice E. (1996), “The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Cooperation in Costa Rica,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 329-355.
50 colonial authorities.127 The shortage of labor and lack of large-scale hacienda system
gave rise to a significant population of prosperous small farmers. Its storied poverty is
said to extend even to the colonial governors, requiring them to manually provide for
their own subsistence.128
Independent Costa Rica made an inauspicious start in the dictatorships of Braulio
Carrillo, in which very little escaped official scrutiny, and that of Tomás Guardia, which bore strong resemblances to the contemporary Porfiriato in Mexico. Subsequent regimes opened considerably the political process and a tradition of liberal freedoms became entrenched.129 The reformist administration of Rafael Calderón Guardia collaborated with
the communist party to enact sweeping social changes during the era of World War II.
Costa Rica managed to escape the tumult of its northern neighbors in the generalized time of troubles in Central America, as it appeared to have reached a democratic consensus in the middle of the century. A fully-fledged democracy did not spring from nothing, however, and Costa Ricans proudly point to their republican institutions of the 19th century as the foundation of their democracy.130 Costa Rica
displays strong pluralist tendencies, more akin to the social construction of a Western
democracy than that of Central America. Few, if any, corporatist facets of its social and
political design are evident, and Ropp finds no latent corporatist practices lurking below
127 Pérez Brignoli, Héctor (1997), Breve Historia Contemporánea de Costa Rica, Mexico, D.F.: Colección Popular, p. 98-99, p. 16. 128 Seligson (1980), pp. 4-9. 129 Arias Sánchez, Oscar (1976). Quien Gobierna en Costa Rica?: Un estudio del liderazgo formal en Costa Rica, p. 28-31. 130 Lehoucq and Molina contrarily contends that until 1949, Costa Rican politics was carried out through fraud and violence. Institutional changes gradually transformed the face of competition. See Fabrice E. Lehoucq & Iván Molina, Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform, and Democratization in Costa Rica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
51 the surface.131 The well-oiled democratic functioning of an agricultural Latin state
confounds conventional wisdom. The institutions surveyed in this study are eminently
distinct from the two foregoing countries, as is apparent below.
The Military in Costa Rica
19th century constitutions depart dramatically from their counterparts in
containing little mention at all of the military as an institution, making only incidental remarks concerning the martial powers of the executive. The 1871 constitution empowers
the legislature to ensure the observance of the constitution.132 The 1949 constitution
contains only one article pertaining directly to the military. Article 12 states “the army is
proscribed as a permanent institution.” It allows that an army may be organized for the
national defense, and makes the standard proclamation of military subordination to civil
authority and prohibition of deliberation by any such force. Internal order is to be
provided by “necessary police forces.”133 Nearly identical linguistically to the articles of
other Central American constitutions, the legal subjugation of militarism in Costa Rica
became reality.
The military missions of colonial Costa Rica were the same as those of other
Central American provinces: pacifying Indians and expanding and protecting the integrity
of the territory.134 The dictatorships of the 19th century were those of military strongmen
who did not trouble themselves with constitutional niceties and were often challenged by pretenders to power.135 The reliance on force as arbiter in political affairs was known, but
increasingly infrequent in the 20th century, and then halted altogether after the civil war.
131 “Corporatism in Central America?” (forthcoming) in Wiarda, ed. 132 See Peralta, Hernán (1962). Las Constituciones de Costa Rica. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos. 133 Article 12, Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica (1949). Available at the website of the Asamblea Nacional de Costa Rica:
52 Only one military man took the initiative to mount a coup in the 20th century. Bitterly
opposed, he remained in office for less than two years.136
Storm clouds had been gathering for several years,137 but when the government’s
electoral chicanery caused the civil war to break in 1948, it was contested largely by ad
hoc militias; José Figueres Ferrer’s expedition consisted of some 600 men, and the hastily
assembled pro-government forces fell early due to lack of numbers, inefficiency and poor
logistics.138 Recognizing a dire predicament President Teodoro Picado capitulated after
only forty days and fled the country. Negotiations ending the war were concluded without
rancor and even the dignity of the outgoing government was preserved.139 The complex
relations among the “Founding Junta,” the defeated calderonistas, and economic elites
were not amicable, but the transitional government completed its term without further recourse to violence. While military machines were becoming entrenched in Honduras and El Salvador, Costa Rican elites eschewed the entanglements of militarism.
The celebrated abolition of the armed forces is sometimes prescribed for achieving democratization in neighboring Central American countries because, according to one view, military spending in developing countries inhibits democratization.140 The
unique character of the abolition of the military in the consolidation of Costa Rican
democracy cannot be understated, but neither should it be given significance beyond its
136 Monge Alfaro, (1966), pp. 259-276. 137 Figueres favored armed action against the Calderón government since going into exile in Mexico in 1942. See Charles D. Ameringer, Don Pepe: A Political Biography of José Figures of Costa Rica, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, pp. 22-42. 138 See Bell, John Patrick (1976). Guerra Civil en Costa Rica: Los Sucesos Políticos de 1948, San José: EDUCA, pp. 190-191; Tord Høivik; Solveig Aas (1981). “Demilitarization in Costa Rica: A Farewell to Arms,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 333-351. 139 Ameringer, (1978) Don Pepe, p. 64. 140 Kirk Bowman tests this hypothesis and finds military participation a more significant variable associated with non-democraticness. See Kirk Bowman (1996), “Taming the Tiger: Militarization and Democracy in Latin America,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, no 3, pp. 209-308.
53 due. The military had already been emasculated by liberal governments in favor of the
police, which supplanted it in the tripartite rule with the coffee oligarchy and church.141
After the dictatorships of Carrillo and Guardia, civil and political rights implanted
themselves in the political matrix. The character of the elites was not disposed toward
violence, and at no time did the military constitute an independent political force. Where the constitutions of El Salvador and Honduras entrusted an unaccountable military as
arbiters of constitutionality, those of Costa Rica gave that responsibility to the legislature.142
It bears noting, lest our impression of Costa Rican pacifism be unrealistically
idyllic, that the national police forces are formidable, thoroughly trained and well
equipped. During the turmoil of the 1980s, the Civil Guard was nearly pulled into the
regional conflict as pressure mounted to respond militarily to territorial violations from
Nicaragua.143 Heightened political tensions and fears of extremist campaigns even stirred
rumors of an impending coup in 1984.144 These events notwithstanding, Costa Rica
escaped the pall of civil disintegration that befell Central America and retained its commitment to liberal democracy in spite of military conflict next door and international economic challenges.
Labor in Costa Rica
Though promulgated at a time when the constitutions of El Salvador and
Honduras were moving toward elaborate and explicit statements of labor rights and obligations, the 1949 constitution of Costa Rica is less detailed in its treatment of labor.
141 Schifter, Jacobo, (1996). La Fase Oculta de la Guerra Civil en Costa Rica. Ciudad Universitaria Rodrigo Facio, Costa Rica: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, p. 17. 142 Article 129 of the 1871 constitution, for example. 143 See Edward Cody, “Costa Rica Struggles to Stay Neutral; Clashes with Nicaragua Add Pressure to Rearm” The Washington Post, May 21, 1984. 144 Pérez Brignoli (1997), p. 210.
54 Articles governing labor are incorporated in a section on “Social Rights and Guarantees”
and are comparatively sparing in language. Amendments made in the 1940s to the
constitution of 1871 that granted the right of labor to organize freely (Article 60) and to
strike, along with other social welfare provisions, were adopted as an integral part of the
new constitution of 1949. Though no mention is made of personería jurídica in the
constitution, it is required for labor unions to obtain recognition by the state, and the
labor code of Costa Rica lists in-depth procedures for its acquisition. As Ropp notes,
however, almost all democratic countries have some licensing practices, and Costa Rica’s
are eminently balanced in their application.145 The philosophy of state intervention in
collective conflicts is not developed in the way of El Salvador and Honduras in the labor
code, and there is no mention of promoting harmony among capital and labor. The Costa
Rican code even dedicates a section to the procedures by which workers and employers should arrive at a mutual arrangement to resolve their differences.146
In practice, labor relations in 20th century Costa Rica have had a considerably
conciliatory tone, the progressive labor code having been established before the civil war.
Two major tendencies took shape within the labor movement, the Christian Democratic
and Marxist.147 The tenor of competition between the social democrats and Marxist
laborers, though real, was cooperative, even congenial at the outset. Though this would
change by the time of the civil war, it had a deep impact on the evolution of the welfare
state.148 A conservative, evolutionary strategy pursued by the communist movement and
dedication by the Catholic Church to social reform coupled with a progressive
145 Ropp, (forthcoming), “What About Corporatism?” p. 566. 146 Código de Trabajo (1943) Articles 504-506. Available at the website of the Asamblea Nacional de Costa Rica: http://196.40.31.19/asamblea/proyecto/leyes_c.htm. 147 Booth, John (1987). “Costa Rica” in Greenfield & Maram, eds., p. 217. 148 Miller, Eugene D., (1993). “Labour and the Wartime Alliance in Costa Rica: 1943-1948,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 515-541. (521).
55 government in the 1940s to create a social safety net that has survived repeated economic
and political troubles.
Urbanization only brought a significant portion of the population to city centers
during the rise of the coffee economy, and then in modest numbers.149 The state created
the first professional guilds in the former half of the 19th century in order to advance
important professions such as medicine and law.150 Laborers relied on mutualism to
cushion their hardships in the 19th century, though without great success. Workers found
themselves largely at the mercy of their employers, relying on their patrons’ goodwill and
with a nearly inaudible political voice.151 A labor confederation was founded in 1913
with a class-conscious outlook. The confederation, the Confederación General de
Trabajadores (CGT) would transform itself into the Reformist party that would play a role in the drama of the 1940s. Labor agitation sprang inevitably out of the Great
Depression as workers watched their living standards plummet, and confrontations at
times ended in violence.152
Labor unions gained some strength when the communist movement brought its
formidable organizing capabilities to the banana workers, which would become the only
labor sector with any weight. The Marxist Confederación de Trabajadores de Costa Rica
(CTCR) grew from a massive strike against United Fruit in 1934.153 During World War II
the CTCR cooperated with the Christian Democratic Confederación de Costarricense de
Trabajadores ‘Rerum Novarum’ (CCTRN), given guidance by the socially conscious
archbishop of the country. That cooperation was instrumental in effecting the labor code
149 Seligson, (1980), p. 43, 150 Booth, John (1987), in Greenfield & Maram, eds., p. 214. 151 Schifter, (1979), p. 43-44. 152 Booth, (1987) in Greenfield & Maram eds., pp. 218-220. 153 Ibid.
56 in 1942 that survived the civil conflict. The CTCR was dissolved along with the
communist party after the civil war, however, for having violated the proscription against
labor unions involvement in political activity.
Following the civil war, labor relations were normalized owing to the acceptance
by all sectors of the social welfare provisions adopted by the Calderón administration.
Early achievement of the social protections integrated in the constitution robbed the labor
movement in Costa Rica of the motivation that propelled its counterparts in nearby
countries, and the workforce of Costa Rica is sparsely unionized. By no means do
workers hold governmental labor policy faultless; complaints regarding anti-union
activities and the inability of public-sector unions to legally organize have been lodged
with the International Labor Organization’s Committee on Freedom of Association.154
The ILO has furthermore faulted the Costa Rican government with failure to diligently prosecute violations of labor law.155 Beyond these complaints, however, denial of legal
recognition does not appear to contribute significantly to labor tensions.
Though labor unions in Costa Rica shared similar origins to those of their counterparts in El Salvador and Honduras in the 19th and 20th centuries, they did not feel the weight of repression that the Salvador movement did, or the kind of control exercised by the military government in Honduras. The provisions in the constitution affecting labor and regulations in the labor code are relatively relaxed and pluralistic, with no corporatist aspects apparent. Requirements for gaining legal recognition show an
154 See the website of the Committee at:
57 unexpected convergence with those of Honduras, but in this case it does appear that the
regulation was used in a punitive manner.156
The Peasantry in Costa Rica
In contrast to the constitutions of El Salvador and Honduras, that of Costa Rica makes almost no mention of any separate considerations, duties or obligations, for peasants.157 The labor code makes some guarantees for agricultural workers, including
the length of the workday, but does not detail any separate definitions of agricultural
work or stipulations for peasant organizations. The labor code enacted through the reforms of the Calderón administration did not extend to the peasants,158 a failure
reminiscent of the peasant oppression in El Salvador. However, even though land
shortages and conflicts with landowners and government officials have seized the Costa
Rican countryside at times, the state apparatus has not turned to systematic oppression to
answer the peasant question. Though peasants are in many ways distrustful of the
government and its intentions,159 they have benefited from the openness of Costa Rican
society by exploiting the democratic mechanisms of the government in search of redress
of its grievances.
One of the reputed pillars of Costa Rican democracy is the egalitarian and
inherently democratic yeoman farmer culture. Seligson writes that colonial settlement
patterns were instrumental in the development of this rustic independence. Difficult
living conditions in the remote colony precluded the luxury of town dwelling and
necessitated subsistence farming in isolated enclaves. The one seemingly inexhaustible
156 Ropp, (forthcoming), in Wiarda, p. 566. 157 Article 69 requires “rational exploitation” of land contracted for sharecropping. 158 Miller, (1993). 159 Anderson, (1990), “Alternative Action.”
58 resource – land – was available to anyone who desired it.160 Security in land ownership
was not guaranteed indefinitely, however; as the coffee boom got underway in the mid-
19th century usable land grew scarce. Much as in El Salvador, land hungry cultivators
acquired large tracts to exploit the coffee bonanza on the world market, driving up the price of land. Rather than eke out a marginal existence on a small patch of land, much of
the peasantry left the patrimony to seek more profitable employment on coffee
plantations and in cities.161 Problems of land availability and employment in the
countryside mounted in the next century, exacerbated by cattle ranching and population
growth, and landlessness affected the majority of peasants in the early 1990s.162 It was in
the 1960s that the situation demanded action for self-preservation, before which time
only workers in the banana zones were well organized. Peasant leagues sprang up to
force the issue by organizing land invasions to claim unused lands from their owners.
The government itself, in fact, undertook to relieve the building pressures of landlessness. The Instituto de Tierras y Colonización (ITCO) was created in 1961 in response to an upsurge in squatting by landless peasants.163 The institute, later renamed
IDA (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario), at times even assisted landless peasants in their squatting expeditions. The state purchased land from owners of large and underutilized estates for distribution to peasants in colonization efforts. The project reached such
160 Seligson, (1980), pp. 7-9. Lowell Gudmundson cautions that pre-coffee society was in fact highly complex and unequal. See “Costa Rica Before Coffee: Occupational Distribution, Wealth Inequality, and Elite Society in the Village Economy of the 1840s,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 15, no. 2, (1983), pp. 427-452. 161 Seligson (1980), p. 24. 162 Anderson, Leslie (1991), “Mixed Blessings: Disruption and Organization among Peasant Unions in Costa Rica,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 111-143. 163 Seligson (1980), pp. 125-126.
59 heights in the 1970s that owners attempted to evade the reapportionment of their land by
nominally dividing it into many small parcels that continued lay fallow.164
Despite pursuing a variety of avenues in advancing its cause, none of the agency’s efforts bore fruit for the majority of the landless. Frustrated by the bureaucratically laden reforms, many peasants turned to organizing themselves to take direct action to ameliorate the peasants’ plight. Two of the most prominent and decisively active unions,
UPA and UPAGRA, turned to confrontation through strikes to seize the attention of otherwise uninterested bureaucrats.165
Ameringer observes that the peasantry does not organize effectively to exercise
influence as a group, but may take part in established political organs such as parties.166
Costa Rican peasants does not fatalistically forego political participation, however, and do press animatedly for their rights when they perceive them violated by the state or the landowning classes.167 While governmental actions have been aimed toward co-opting
the peasant constituency, the state took the conciliatory approach for which it is noted
without resorting to the coercive efforts of the authoritarian regimes of El Salvador and
Honduras.168 The land reform was not remarkable for its success and could be compared
to that of Honduras in the 1970s, but of course, the extent of coercion was absent in Costa
164 Edelman, Marc; Mitchell Seligson, (1994), “Land Inequality: A Comparison of Census Data and Property Records Twentieth-Century Southern Costa Rica,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 74, no. 3, pp. 445-491. 165 Anderson, (1991), Blessings. 166 Ameringer, Charles D., (1982) Costa Rican Democracy, 73. 167 Anderson, Leslie (1990), “Alternative Action in Costa Rica: Peasants as Positive Participants,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 89-113. 168 Horst and Høivik (1981) nevertheless write of the incidences of violence directed toward peasants.
60 Rica. In both cases, the state has made conciliatory gestures toward the peasants,
although making limited progress in addressing the fundamental problem.169
Like the labor sector, the Costa Rican peasantry is decidedly pluralistic. The
absence of explicit regulations for peasant activities gains significance in comparison to
the scrutiny given to the rural sector in El Salvador and Honduras. Costa Rican peasants
endure hardships as do their counterparts, but the state’s conciliatory approach toward their organizational efforts demonstrates a liberalism foreign to the corporate contexts of
El Salvador and Honduras.
Democracy in Costa Rica
Costa Rica is thoroughly liberal and pluralist. The constitutional construction of Costa
Rican democracy reinforces the pluralist nature of the society. Power is diffused among
the branches, each constrained by an elaborate system of checks and balances and an
alphabet soup of autonomous institutions. The diffracted political system creates a wide
field for interest group activity, and a diverse spectrum of interest groups have availed
themselves of this political space, creating a system of counterbalancing interests.170 The
constitution itself displays a liberal character in its concentration on individual liberties
and rights – in this way almost identical its counterparts of El Salvador and Honduras – but contains no mention of fueros or group rights and duties. Personalism is, of course, a characteristic at times encountered in Costa Rican politics171 as it will be in any political system to one degree or another, but constitutional design and a democratic ethic mitigates its excesses.
169 Seligson points up the debate over the sincerity of intentions behind the land reform measures. See Peasants, pp. 125-126. 170 Ameringer, (1982), Democracy, pp. 37-56. 171 ibid, p. 76.
61 The consolidation of Costa Rican democracy reveals itself in the comparatively
glowing assessment of democracy in the Latinobarómetro report. Seventy seven percent of respondents identified democracy as preferable to any other type of regime in 2003, second only to Uruguay. Costa Ricans express the highest levels of satisfaction with the
workings of democracy.172 Recalling the importance of democratic legitimacy, evidence
suggests that Costa Rica easily surpasses the tests of loyalty put forward by Linz and
Stepan.
The confrontation taking place in nearby countries between reformists and
conservatives did not infect the Costa Rican body politic in the same way. The wartime
alliance between the communists and church achieved progressive reforms that blunted
militant tendencies among workers. The reformist approach of the Costa Rican
communist party lent it the flexibility to pursue alliances of convenience, a hallmark of democratic pragmatism. While the civil war broke the power of the communists, the welfare state was left intact.
Identifying the democratic political system of Costa Rica as a model for the rest of Central America is an attractive option, given their proximity and common historical roots. The more difficult question is whether its pluralistic, liberal politics is imitable.
The sectional, hierarchical aspects of organic corporatism are virtually absent in Costa
Rica, and the power of the state is circumscribed. The following concluding section will briefly address the prospects for liberalization in El Salvador and Honduras.
172Latinobarómetro, (2003) p. 160.
62
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Hypotheses
How are we to explain the observed variance in democratic consolidation? What follows is a review of each of the hypotheses stated in chapter one, and assessment of their explanatory power.
The first alternative hypothesis predicted that patterns of landholding suited to coercive labor practices would inhibit democratization and negatively influence democratic consolidation as the landholding elite continues to shape political processes.
The criteria established above for confirming this hypothesis required that unconsolidated democracies show a history of unequal land ownership and exploitative labor. This
hypothesis is supported in the case of El Salvador: coercive systems of labor and elite
intransigence to democratic reforms were evident at least since coffee cultivation
demanded that communal lands be abolished and dedicated to coffee production, with the
occupants serving as involuntary labor. Land reform was resisted with ardor well into the
1980s. So recalcitrant was the oligarchy that some peasants and social reformers felt
impelled to take up arms.
In Honduras, authoritarian regimes effectively co-opted agricultural labor by enacting mild reforms and including peasant representatives in the policy process, and
making more selective use of repression. Great rural poverty still exists, nonetheless, in
keeping with Honduras’ status as one of the poorer countries in the world. Coffee did not
63 flourish in Honduras as it did in El Salvador, but the foreign banana companies acted in
the same capacity as the cafetaleros, usurping land and wielding influence over the
government that stymied autonomous political development. Agricultural labor has been
the object of cooptation efforts, which fosters corruption and passivity among peasant
leaders. The landed elite did not, however, posses the same power over governmental
policy as did the Salvadoran elite; rather, the national agricultural elite was one of several
contenders for state control, ultimately taking a position secondary to the military.
The Costa Rican case militates against this hypothesis. Whether real or not during its early history, Costa Rica’s celebrated egalitarianism gave way with the advent of the coffee economy and concentration of land for its production. Land scarcity and rural unemployment has been an unfortunate reality for much of the Costa Rican peasantry since the 19th century. An agricultural elite did exercise control over the economy and government to a significant degree. Many peasants regard government initiatives and agencies insincere in their efforts and mobilization among peasants at times took a disruptive turn, but the government has shown restraint and the situation never showed
the signs of deterioration that took place to the north.
Confirmation of the second alternative hypothesis would rest on a demonstration
of a growing trend toward militarism in the constitutions and behavior of all three
countries studied here. This hypothesis is strengthened by reference to El Salvador and
Honduras. There a military class took shape in the first half of the 20th century to gradually construct garrison states that would shut out participation by emerging social groups. The cold war and national security concerns of international communism only exacerbated the institutionalization of military rule that was already evolving as an
64 outgrowth of social and economic transformation. In Honduras, the newly institutionalized military in the 1950s fortified its status through its anticommunist mission, aided in by the United States. The constitutional dispositions of the Salvadoran and Honduran militaries give them a political and autonomous bearing well before the mid-20th century national security states grew in the region.
Our first impression of the Costa Rican case would support the second alternative
hypothesis. By freeing themselves of the military, Costa Rican elites blocked what might
have been an inevitable outgrowth of militarization in Central America. However, Costa
Rica shows no outward sign of a growing and independently oriented military
establishment before it was abolished following the civil war. Indeed, as the military was
cresting in the other two countries, it was on a downward trajectory in Costa Rica. When
the civil war broke, the government was obliged to deploy unionist militias to supplement
the meager armed forces. Significantly, the many constitutions of Costa Rica gave little
impression that an armed force was even present. The sputtering efforts military officers
to control politics exhausted themselves in 1919. A pacific, non-martial attitude was
already well established as a Costa Rican trait by the 20th century. Perhaps had the Costa
Rican revolution taken another, less pacifist route and the military establishment would have made Costa Rica a more orthodox Caribbean state. Though it is impossible to
determine what might have happened had the conclusion of the war not ended in a
demilitarized Costa Rica, the evidence represented here points away from an underlying
tendency toward militarization. The constitutional proscription of the military proceeded
from an established pattern.
65 Support for the main hypothesis would come in the form of legal and behavioral
displays of authoritarian corporatism in the two less consolidated countries, and a lack of
such features in Costa Rica. The absence of authoritarian corporatist characteristics in the
Costa Rican case lends support to the main hypothesis: the country demonstrating the
least influence of corporatism enjoys the most consolidated democracy as well. Though
suffering through military dictatorships and ruled by an oligarchic class in its earlier
history, Costa Rica never manifested a corporatist representational system. Instead, a
liberal governmental style contributes to a lively pluralism that undermines the
implantation of exclusive politics that elevates a single conception of the good over competing ideas. This liberalism undergirds the Costa Rican republic.
The democratic trouble spots, El Salvador and Honduras, reveal authoritarian
corporatist tendencies in each of the three institutions examined here; each of the sectors is bound by special clauses in the several constitutions, establishing boundaries for each sector and a schema for their interaction. As three vital organs of the corporate body, the three sectors are defined each with its own autonomous, but interdependent, role. All three show embedded corporatist aspects that dispose the national body toward the group- centered political philosophy described in the introduction. Political practice, on the other
hand, confirms a hierarchical and organic approach to politics that privileges established
norms and adapts to social change with difficulty.
Implications
El Salvador and Honduras have been especially prone to authoritarian, hierarchical corporatism. The hypothesis of this paper was that the consolidation of authoritarian corporatism negatively influences the emergence of liberal democracy. The foregoing
66 analysis of the Salvadoran and Honduran reality has demonstrated that though a liberal
democratic framework may be erected, the corporate and hierarchical substance remains.
Historical conditions have retarded the implementation of a liberal democracy, and the
countries remain a blend of individualist and liberal ideas on the one hand, and
communal, authoritarian practices on the other. The political profession remains mired in
contempt as the domain of charlatans who serve their personal or partisan interests over
that of the nation as a whole. Patronage is a primary mode of political interaction, and
parties engage in vituperative campaigns against one another.
The rule of law in El Salvador and Honduras is not fully institutionalized; the
rules do not enjoy the full endorsement of all the relevant players. The corporatist, group-
centered political worldview inserts a zero-sum quality into political competition. Kings,
caudillos, the military, and now democratically appointed presidents have occupied the
apex of the corporatist pyramid, but the vestiges of the old social morphology remain
throughout. Power descends from the top to the lower strata. The corporate head wields power, in principle, for the good of the entire body. In practice, of course, the interpretation of the common good appears narrowly conceived to benefit particular interests.
The military places itself outside the channels of constitutional rule as a guarantor
of the national integrity, an arrogation that undermines the status of the constitution as the
supreme law of the land and introduces an element of arbitrariness: the highest good of
the nation is whatever those in the military deem it to be. The repudiation of militarism in
Honduras is a very recent phenomenon. Only several years ago did the elected civilian
leadership wrest control of the military machine from the officer corps.
67 The same can be said of civilian politicians. The two primary political parties of
El Salvador were born in a political struggle in which each group rejected legal constraints on their political aspirations. The traditional Honduran political parties, on the other hand, alternated in power for most of a century, readily adapting to personalist dictatorship, military government, and now electoral democracy, thriving as patronage networks, rather than through ideological mobilization.
Democratic legitimacy, so important to democratic consolidation, is lacking. The commitment of both elites and masses to the democratic rules of the game presupposes an open-minded willingness to tolerate and accept opposition, up to and including the possibility of the opposition’s assumption of power. Even through a transformative process of democratization and social mobilization, the Central American political realm is written on a corporatist palimpsest.
Following the hypothesis of this paper, the successful pluralist democracy of
Costa Rica can be attributed to a predisposition toward liberalism, tolerance for opposing political positions, a diffusion of power, and an absence of corporatist requirements for peasants and labor. The constitution, in fact, makes reference to the pluralistic nature of its political parties (Article 98). Costa Rican democracy is not an accident, but an outgrowth of a favorable political culture that supports felicitous institutional designs.
The Costa Rican model – and the U.S. model by extension – has little applicability for El
Salvador and Honduras.
Toward Democratic Corporatism?
There is nothing definite about the survival of new democracies. The somewhat superficial democracy in Central America may provide a thin veneer for a ponderous
68 militarism. A gloomy construal of democratic development in El Salvador and Honduras would predict not only stalled consolidation, but also its reversal. Just as political factions vie for control of the government in democracies, perhaps civilians and military will alternate in power, with neither finally consolidating itself once and for all. This represents one possible future for El Salvador and Honduras: an indefinite cycle, lurching from democratic crisis to relative stability, without reaching the level of a consolidated democracy.
Though evidence from Central America shows a strong tendency toward authoritarian corporatism and corresponding frailty of democratic institutions, this is not an invitation to complacence. The probability of liberal democracy in the near future does not look promising, but neither is it inconceivable. The more optimistic go much further and identify economic globalization not just as an opportunity material prosperity, but also the harbinger of a democratic tidal wave. Political cultures are only stubbornly dislodged, however, and the rising tide of globalization may wash away undemocratic practices only over decades or centuries.
Furthermore, a rapid shift toward a substantively realized democracy might prove problematic in itself. The instability of Central American societies is at least partially due to the difficulty of integrating new social actors clamoring for a position at the table. In the economically and socially polarized societies of this area a disadvantaged and mobilized majority may give birth to an illiberal populism of the kind that has appeared throughout Latin America at various times.
It should not be assumed that corporatism and liberalism are opposites, or that more group-oriented political dispositions are inimical to liberal democracy as such. We
69 know that corporatism has emerged in very different circumstances and regions around
the world.173 The hypothesized link between corporatism and democratic consolidation
presumes that the pre-existing non-liberal ethos generates dissonance with the practices
of the newly introduced regime. Institutions are not to be dismissed as simple reflections
of cultural conditions, however. Properly designed institutions will not alter behavior
immediately, but are important elements in any sociopolitical formula.
Does there exist the possibility of democratic (or social, or neo-) corporatism
here? Can corporatism in the Latin context shed the hierarchical and organic flavors and
make the transition to a more representative style of bargaining and reconciliation? A
group-styled democracy, still patterned on corporatist interest representation customary in
Latin America, could be the most attractive option for the stabilization of democratic
regimes in Central America. The challenge, then, would be in the conversion of
hierarchical, patronage-driven and authoritarian modalities into effectively representative
and horizontally interacting bodies. The project, though not without difficulties, is given
impetus by an underlying predisposition toward functional representation and an
orientation toward the collective. The emphasis on harmony and group comity seems to
resonate with the organicism of the traditional corporate philosophy of Latin America
State-society relations in democratic and authoritarian variations of corporatism
are markedly distinct, but at the same time flow from the notion that the state performs
natural and necessary functions that benefit the entire political community, and the
incorporation of functionally defined groups into the state, lie at the center of both
173 Wiarda, (1997). Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great “Ism,” Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, Inc., p. 177.
70 authoritarian and democratic corporatism.174 The role of the state in democratic corporatist systems is a comparatively relaxed one, but occupies a more tangible position than in the pluralist U.S., where there pervades a belief in the wisdom of limiting state power and of relatively unfettered competition.
Institutions are integral to democratic functioning, but the institutions are not self- sufficient; the human material gives institutions their strength. Karl Popper has written that “Institutions are like fortresses. They must be well-planned and properly manned.”175
Democracy itself is held in low esteem in Central America in general, generating a cynical and distrustful populace. Central America’s lamentable experience with authoritarianism and militarism has no doubt had a demoralizing effect on its citizenry and their perception of elites and political processes. This bleak outlook speaks to the pivotal importance of statesmanship and value of leadership. For a society with the simmering divisions of El Salvador, or the greater traditionalism of Honduras, this will requires a particular finesse, but the reward may be a significant leap toward democratic consolidation.
174 Ibid, p. 44. 175 Popper, Karl (1957). The Poverty of Historicism, Boston: Beacon Press, p. 158.
71
REFERENCES
Books and Journal Articles
Alba, Victor (1968). Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Ameringer, Charles D. (1978). Don Pepe: A Political Biography of José Figures of Costa Rica. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
_____ (1982). Democracy in Costa Rica. New York: Praeger.
Anderson, Leslie (1990). “Alternative Action in Costa Rica: Peasants as Positive Participants.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 89-113.
_____ (1991). “Mixed Blessings: Disruption and Organization among Peasant Unions in Costa Rica.” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 111-143.
Anderson, Thomas P. (1981). The War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador. 1969, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
_____ (1982). Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. New York: Praeger
Arias Sánchez, Oscar (1976). Quien Gobierna en Costa Rica?: Un estudio del liderazgo formal en Costa Rica. San José: Editorial Centroamericana.
Baloyra, Enrique A. (1984). El Salvador in Transition. Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press.
Baloyra-Herp, Enrique (1983). “Reactionary Despotism in Central America.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 295-315.
Becerra, Longino (1983). Evolución Historica de Honduras. Tegucigalpa: Baktun Editorial.
Bell, John Patrick (1976). Guerra Civil en Costa Rica: Los Sucesos Políticos de 1948. San José: EDUCA.
Bowman, Kirk (1996). “Taming the Tiger: Militarization and Democracy in Latin America.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 209-308.
72 _____ (2001). “The Public Battles over Militarization and Democracy in Honduras, 1954-1963.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 53-
Brockett, Charles D. (1991). “The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 253-274.
Bronstein, Arturo (1995). “Societal Change and Industrial Relations in Latin America: Trends and Prospects.” International Labour Review, Vol. 134, no. 2, pp. 163-187.
Deutsch, Karl (1969). “Social Mobilization and Political Development.” American Political Science Review, Vol. 55 no. 3: 493-514.
Diamond, Larry (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Edelman, Marc (1998). “Transnational Peasant Politics in Central America.” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 49-86.
Edelman, Marc; Mitchell Seligson (1994). “Land Inequality: A Comparison of Census Data and Property Records Twentieth-Century Southern Costa Rica.” The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 74, no. 3, pp. 445-491.
Euraque, Darío (1996). Reinterpreting the Banana Republic, Region and State in Honduras, 1870-1972. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Fitzsimmons, Tracy; Mark Anner (1998). “Civil Society in a Postwar Period: Labor in the Salvadoran Democratic Transition.” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 103-128.
Frank, André Gunder (1967). Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Greenfield, Gerald; Sheldon Maram, eds. (1987). Latin American Labor Organizations. New York: Greenwood Press.
Gudmundson, Lowell (1983). “Costa Rica Before Coffee: Occupational Distribution, Wealth Inequality, and Elite Society in the Village Economy of the 1840s.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 15, no. 2, (1983), pp. 427-452.
Guidos Véjar, Rafael (1982). Ascenso del Militarismo en El Salvador. 2nd ed. San José: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana.
Gunther, Richard; P. Nikiforos Diamondouros; Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds. (1995). The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
73 Hartz, Louis, ed. (1964). The Founding of New Societies. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Horst, Tord; Høivik Aas (1981). “Demilitarization in Costa Rica: A Farewell to Arms?” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 333-351.
Huntington, Samuel (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: Oklahoma University Press.
Karl, Terry Lynn (1990). “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 1-23.
_____ (1995). “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 72-86.
Lehoucq, Fabrice E. (1996). “The Institucional Foundations of Democratic Cooperation in Costa Rica.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 329-355.
Lehoucq, Fabrice E.; Iván Molina (2002). Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform, and Democratization in Costa Rica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lijphart, Arend (1971). “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, no. 3.
Linz, Juan; Alfred Stepan (1996). “Toward Consolidated Democracies.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, no. 2: 14-33.
Linz Juan; Alfred Stepan, eds., (1978). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
_____ (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lipset, Seymour M. (1959). “Some Social Requisites for Democracy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 69-105.
Loveman, Brian; Thomas M. Davies Jr., eds. (1997). The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Loveman, Brian (1999). For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
James Malloy, ed. (1977). Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
74 Miller, Eugene D. (1993). “Labour and the Wartime Alliance in Costa Rica: 1943-1948.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 515-541.
Monge Alfaro, Carlos (1966). Historia de Costa Rica. San José: Imprenta Trejos Hnos.
Montgomery, Tommie Sue (1995). Revolution in El Salvador, Boulder: Westview Press
Moore, Barrington (1966). The Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press.
Morris, James A, (1984). Central America: Crisis and Adaptation. Albequerque: University of New Mexico Press.
Morris, James A.; Ropp, Steve C. (1977). “Corporatism and Dependent Development: A Honduran Case Study.” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 27-68.
Munro, Dana G. (1960). The Latin American Republics, A History. 3rd ed. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts
O’Donnell, Guillermo (1996). “Illusions About Consolidation.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 34-51.
Peckenham, Nancy; Annie Street, eds. (1985). Honduras: Portrait of a Captive Nation. New York: Praeger Publishers.
Peralta, Hernán (1962). Las Constituciones de Costa Rica. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos.
Pérez Brignoli, Héctor (1997). Breve Historia Contemporánea de Costa Rica. Mexico, D.F.: Colección Popular.
Popper, Karl (1957). The Poverty of Historicism, Boston: Beacon Press.
Ropp, Steve C. (forthcoming). “What About Corporatism in Central America?” in Wiarda, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America Revisited.
Rostow, W.W. (1960). The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rustow, Dankwart (1970). “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 337-363.
Salomón, Leticia (1982). Militarismo y Reformismo en Honduras, Tegucigalpa: Editorial Guaymuras.
75 Sanchez, Alvaro L. (1989). La Politica in El Salvador en las Ultimas Seis Decadas: 1930-1989.
Schifter, Jacobo (1979). La Fase Oculta de la Guerra Civil en Costa Rica. Ciudad Universitaria Rodrigo Facio, Costa Rica: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana.
Schmitter, Phillipe & Terry Lynn Karl (1991). “What Democracy Is . . . And Is Not.” Journal of Democracy, (Summer), pp. 75-89.
Seligson, Mitchell A. (1980). Peasants of Costa Rica and the Development of Agrarian Capitalism. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Seligson, Mitchell A. (1995). “Thirty Years of Transformation of the Agrarian Structure in El Salvador, 1961-1991.” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 43- 74.
Sieder, Rachel (1995). “Honduras: The Politics of Exception and Military Reformism, 1972-1978.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 99-107.
Walker, Thomas; Ariel C. Armony, eds. (2000). Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
Walters Knut; Phillip Williams (1993). “The Military and Democratization in El Salvador.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 35, no.1, pp. 39-88.
Weeks, John (1986). “An Interpretation of the Central American Crisis.” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 31-53.
Wiarda, Howard J., (1981). Corporatism and National Development in Latin America. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
_____ (1997). Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great “Ism.” Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Wiarda, Howard J., ed. (1984). Rift and Revolution: The Central American Imbroglio. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
_____ ed. (1992). Politics and Social Change in Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition? Boulder: Westview Press.
_____ ed. (2001). Comparative Democracy and Democratization. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt College Publishers.
_____ ed. (forthcoming). Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America Revisited.
76 Woodward, Ralph Lee Jr. (1976). Central America: A Nation Divided. New York: Oxford University Press.
Newspaper Articles
Cody, Edward (May 21, 1984). “Costa Rica Struggles to Stay Neutral; Clashes with Nicaragua Add Pressure to Rearm” The Washington Post.
Gonzalez, David (September 26, 2002). “Rights Workers in Honduras Still Live in Fear.” The New York Times.
Marquis, Christopher (August 1, 2001). “Bush Latin America Nominations Reopen Old Wounds,” August 1, 2001, The New York Times.
“Schafik y Handel Cambian Discurso.” (January 19, 2004). El Diario de Hoy.
Internet
AFL-CIO (2004). “What’s Wrong with Central America’s Labor Laws?” Report available at: http://www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/globaleconomy/upload/Whats_Wrong.pdf
Latinobarómetro. (2003) “Summary Report: Economy and Democracy Latinobarómetro 2003,” Report available at
United Nations Development Program, (2003). “Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano El Salvador 2003.” Report available at:
77