Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: LKA23769 Country: Date: 9 November 2005

Keywords: Sri Lanka – Tamils – Karuna Group – LTTE

This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

1. There are a number of cases of Tamils claiming harassment and worse from the Karuna ‘faction’ of the LTTE. Please provide some general information about this group. 2. Is there any information about where they are operating? 3. How do they operate? 4. Are there any reported instances of harm towards Tamils from them?

RESPONSE

1. Could I please have some general information about this group?

Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, alias Col. Karuna, who, as Special Commander, Batticaloa- Amparai, was in over-all charge of the LTTE's military operations in the Eastern Province until he fell out with Prabhakaran’s (northern) leadership. He was expelled from LTTE in March 2004. A veteran of the ‘Operation Unceasing Waves’, Karuna led the LTTE troops to capture Ayakachi, which preceded the success of LTTE in Elephant Pass operations. Ever since he parted company with LTTE, LTTE had been waging a mini war to eliminate him and wrest control of the East. In this bloodletting process a number of key leaders loyal to Prabhakaran as well as Karuna have been killed. These include Karuna’s brother Reggie and LTTE’s senior functionaries Senadhi and Bawa…. (Hariharan, R, 2004, ‘Karuna in Politics: Old War Horse in a New Mantle’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 19 September, http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1148.html - Accessed 3 November 2005 – Attachment 1). The reasons for the split are numerous:

1. While thousands of LTTE cadres from the east have participated and laid down their lives, their home district continued to be in a state of neglect. 2. Of the top level 30 administrators of LTTE area there is none from Batticola-Amparai district and the people in Batticola-Amparai district doubt whether they would get justice in the ISGA setup that has been proposed.

3. While other cadres are going home and meeting their relatives or going abroad, the fighters from the eastern district are spending their time in bunkers and sentry points.

4. Wanni leadership wanted 1000 cadres to be sent north to prepare in the event of war and this could not be implemented as an assurance had been given to the parents of the cadres of the district that they will be utilised for development work in Batticola district itself. 5. The intelligence unit of Pottu Amman has been acting irresponsibly in their district carrying out murders etc. ( without informing or consulting the eastern leadership) (Chandrasekharan, S, 2004, ‘Sri Lanka – Split is a major challenge to the LTTE leader – Commentary’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 8 March, (http://www.saag.org/notes3/note215.html - Accessed 3 November 2005 – Attachment 2).

For further general information about the activity of Karuna and his faction please consult the attached chronologies:

(‘Sri Lanka (LTTE) 1983 – 2004,’ The International Institute for Strategic Studies website, http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictTimeline.asp?ConflictID=174&YearI D=869&DisplayYear=2004 – Accessed 3 November 2005 – Attachment 3).

(‘Sri Lanka (LTTE) 1983 – 2005,’ The International Institute for Strategic Studies website, http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictTimeline.asp?ConflictID=174&YearI D=869&DisplayYear=2005 – Accessed 3 November 2005 – Attachment 4).

6. Any information about where they are operating? 7. How do they operate?

A search through the Tribunal’s resources located scant information on the specific operations of Karuna’s faction.

In an interview between The Sunday Times and the head of the international ceasefire monitors in Batticaloa Mr Steen Joergensen, the issue of where they operated was addressed:

Mr. Joergensen told the Presidential commission that he could confirm the presence of Karuna forces in the government held territories. The transcript of his interview, published by the Sunday Times follow:

Q. How many LTTE paramilitary groups are there in the area? A. To my knowledge the only paramilitary group is The Karuna faction which is a breakaway group of the LTTE.

Q. Where does it operate? A. It operates near the Welikanda area

Q. Does this area come under the government controlled area? A. Yes. It comes under the government controlled area.

Q. Was this group formed after the signing of the CFA? A. It was formed after the signing of the CFA, when 'Col'. Karuna was expelled by the LTTE on 6.03.2004 Q. Does this group get any help from the ? A. I do not know.

Q. Is it a violation of the CFA to have Karuna forces in government- controlled areas? A. Yes, it is a violation. According to the CFA, Tamil paramilitary groups should be disarmed.

……

Q: Are you aware that the Karuna faction is operating in government controlled areas? A: Breakaway Karuna faction cadres are operating in LTTE controlled areas. Q: Are there any Karuna faction camps located in government controlled Welikanda area? A: There are no such camps in the Welikanda area. (‘Sri Lanka: SLMM official: ‘Government must disarm Karuna Group’, 2005, TamilNet, 10 April – Attachment 5).

Hariharan reported that Karuna loyalists number around 500 and are believed to use jungle hideouts in Thoppigala area, northeast of Batticaloa, and in the Aralaganwilla-Maha Oya area, east of Batticaloa where they attack LTTE cadres (Hariharan, R, 2004, ‘Karuna in a no-win situation’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 19 September, http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1165.html - Accessed 3 November 2005 – Attachment 6).

With regard to Karuna’s organisational structure and financial support, a paper written by retired Col R Hariharan stated:

Organisational structure and financial support: Political party needs an organizational structure to maintain contact with people and influence their thinking on an ongoing basis. These activities need financial resources also. LTTE has enormous resources both at home and abroad. It has an excellent propaganda machine, a viable administrative set up in the areas of its control. Pitted against LTTE, Karuna will need enormous resources. These may not come through even if he indulges in LTTE style ‘tax collection’, as LTTE is there to cramp his style. So who is going to bankroll Karuna’s activity? Answer to this question will ultimately decide Karuna’s sustainability (Hariharan, R, 2004, ‘Karuna in a no-win situation’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 19 September, http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1165.html - Accessed 3 November 2005 – Attachment 6).

According to the Asia Times, early in the schism, most of the eastern leaders had deserted Karuna and instead backed Prabakaran (LTTE leader in the north). The finances as well as the intelligence wing remained under control of the northern leadership. The Sri Lanka government had refrained from taking sides in the feud even though it was reported that Karuna was seeking a separate ceasefire agreement with the government. Furthermore;

Karuna might have built up a political-administrative structure in the east that is almost on par with that in the north. And while he is a leader of considerable standing, he is no match for Prabakaran. The LTTE cadres, indeed many Tamils in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora, look up to Prabakaran, who enjoys demi-god status among the Tigers and Tamils. They are unlikely to shift loyalties to Karuna (‘Ramachandran, S, 2004, ‘Beware when Tigers fall out’, Asia Times, 9 March, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FC09Df06.html - Accessed 4 November 2005 – Attachment 7).

In an interview with the Tamil Guardian, Anton Balasingham (LTTE’s chief negotiator) outlines the LTTE’s military structure which may give an inkling to the organisational structure of Karuna’s faction since they were originally part of the LTTE:

There are not thirty-five major units in the LTTE’s organisational structure as claimed by Karuna. The major structures are military and political. The military hierarchy is organised according to district levels with district military commanders functioning under the supreme command of Mr Pirapaharan. The political section has also district level leaders. The other important units are Finance, Law and Order, Intelligence and Education. The heads of these sections have been appointed on the basis of seniority. Mr Pirapaharan promotes leaders on the basis of their seniority, ability and regionalism has no place in his scheme of things.

Tamil Guardian: Karuna claims that he commands a military formation of five thousand fighters and has the backing of the people of the east. He also proclaims that the eastern province does not constitute a contiguous part of the Tamil homeland because it is inhabited by Muslims and Sinhalese. What are your comments?

Mr Balasingham: We are not aware of the exact number of fighters he has under his command. What we know is that the vast number of his fighters are recent recruits and with no combat experience. They were recruited during the ceasefire times, for the cause of liberating the Tamil homeland constituting the northeast. All his fighters have taken an oath of allegiance to the Tamil national leader Mr Pirapaharan. In actual fact, they are Mr Pirapaharan’s freedom fighters who have pledged their lives for the cause of the LTTE. It is a treacherous act of bad faith on the part of Karuna to impose his leadership on these innocent young men and women who joined the LTTE pledging their allegiance to the national leader and to the national cause. Already almost all his senior commanders, political leaders and a substantial number of cadres have deserted Karuna and joined Mr Pirapaharan’s command. We know that he is holding the rest of his fighters under tight security within the confines of his camp fearing mass scale desertion. Karuna’s future depends on how long he can maintain order and the discipline of his cadres as an organised force under his command. (‘Karuna’s revolt is ‘temporary aberration’ – Balasingham’, 2004, Tamil.net website, 17 March, http://www.tamilnet.com/print.html?artid=11487&catid=13 – Accessed 4 November 2005 – Attachment 8).

By 11 April 2004, the eastern revolt within the LTTE had ended after Kurana “called it off…” and escaped to with some of his trusted confidants. A ‘peace’ deal was reached between Karuna and Prabakaran which required Karuna:

1. to cease fighting permanently; 2. to disband and disperse his forces and send them home; 3. to facilitate arrangements for the smooth handing over of military assets including arms, armaments and ammunition to the LTTE; 4. to release all Tigers and supporters in Karuna's custody safely; 5. to vacate "the soil of " (Northeastern Province) immediately and never return to it again; 6. to refrain from any direct or indirect military or political activity in future; 7. to maintain silence about all matters concerning the LTTE and avoid all related media publicity; and 8. to seek a new life outside Sri Lanka as early as possible.

In return the LTTE provided the following assurances to Karuna:

1. will not deter Karuna from leaving the East or Sri Lanka; 2. will not try to eliminate him while in Sri Lanka or abroad; 3. will not demand return of any money or things of value taken away by Karuna. 4. will not harm all cadre under Karuna's control and allow them to return to a normal life. 5. to reabsorb only those cadres willing to rejoin the movement; 6. to refrain from punishing all senior cadre who stood by Karuna against the LTTE leadership; 7. to permit them wherever possible to leave the East and/or Sri Lanka; 8. to refrain from taking revenge on Eastern civilians who supported Karuna and engaged in acts like burning effigies, destroying LTTE offices and so on.

After the deal was struck, Karuna disbanded his units and dispersed around 3,500 to 4,000 cadre, asking them to go home and resume normal lives. The weapons, uniforms, cyanide capsules, identity tags and so on were confiscated.

Karuna, along with more than 20 trusted associates and some of their family members travelled by road in six vehicles to a Colombo suburb. Though his whereabouts are unknown, it is reported that he will soon travel to a South-East Asian country for an indefinite period of stay (Jeyaraj, D.B.S, 2004, ‘The fall of Karuna’, Frontline Magazine, Vol 21, Issue 09, April 24 – May 07, http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2109/stories/20040507006712200.htm - Accessed 4 November 2005 – Attachment 9).

8. Any reported instances of harm towards Tamils from them?

According to ‘Reporters without Borders’, when Karuna and his followers split from the LTTE, there was a wave of violence from March 2004 onwards targeting journalists working for Tamil media and newspapers who have links with the LTTE.

Pro-Karuna supporters killed Aiyathural Nadesan (31 May) a correspondent in Batticola for several Tamil media. Additionally, 15 other reporters have received death threats resulting in them seeking refuge in Colombo or fleeing to Europe. Newspapers believed to be close to the LTTE have been targeted by Karuna’s men. The Tamil newspaper Thinakkural was threatened by Karuna while thousands of copies of the newspaper was burned in the east of the country. Dharmaratnam Sivaram, head of the news website .com was threatened with reprisals from armed Tamil groups as well as from the security forces - for opposing the Karuna split from the LTTE. Tamil journalists have reportedly been threatened by representatives of armed Tamil groups in Australia, Canada and the UK “for their coverage of the situation at home” (‘Sri Lanka – Annual Report 2005, 2005, Reporters without Borders, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=13442 – Accessed 3 November 2005 – Attachment 10 ). Some correspondents feared for their safety claiming that “their lives are in danger because Tamil warload Karuna’s supporters have formed genuine death squads whose job is to eliminate LTTE officials and those who support them….The BBC’s Tamil and Sinhalese services have stopped broadcasting reports from their correspondents in eastern Sri Lanka due to fear of reprisals” (‘Nine recommendations for improving the state of press freedom – Investigative report’, 2004, Reporters without Borders, 19 July, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10956 – Accessed 3 November 2005 – Attachment 11).

The Country Research desk wrote to Retired Colonel R Hariharan author of some of the above listed papers and who is considered to be “a specialist in counter-insurgency intelligence who has seen active staff and field service in counter-insurgency operations in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tripura and lastly in Sri Lanka with the IPKF. Questions were sent on the 4 November 2005 (Attachment 12) and a reply received 7 November 2005. Col Hariharan advised the following:

… In my personal assessment I don’t believe Karuna poses any threat to ordinary Tamil[s] in the East; he definitely poses a threat to LTTE cadres, camp followers and sympathizers not only in East but wherever they are… (Hariharan, R. 2005, Email ‘Request for information regarding Karuna’, 7 November – Attachment 13).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources: Google, Vivisimo & Copernic 2001 Personal Agent search engines BBC News website http://www.bbc.co.uk website http://www.guardian.co.uk/ CNN website http://www.cnn.com/

Databases: Public FACTIVA Business Briefing

REFINFO IRBDC Research Responses (Canada) RRT ISYS RRT Country Research database, including U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. RRT Library FIRST RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. Hariharan, R, 2004, ‘Karuna in Politics: Old War Horse in a New Mantle’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 19 September, http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1148.html - Accessed 3 November 2005.

2. Chandrasekharan, S, 2004, ‘Sri Lanka – Split is a major challenge to the LTTE leader – Commentary’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 8 March, http://www.saag.org/notes3/note215.html - Accessed 3 November 2005.

3. ‘Sri Lanka (LTTE) 1983 – 2004,’ The International Institute for Strategic Studies website, http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictTimeline.asp?ConflictID=174&Y earID=869&DisplayYear=2004 – Accessed 3 November 2005.

4. ‘Sri Lanka (LTTE) 1983 – 2005,’ The International Institute for Strategic Studies website, http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictTimeline.asp?ConflictID=174&Y earID=869&DisplayYear=2005 – Accessed 3 November 2005.

5. ‘Sri Lanka: SLMM official: ‘Government must disarm Karuna Group’, 2005, TamilNet, 10 April. (CISNET Sri Lanka CX129753)

6. Hariharan, R, 2004, ‘Karuna in a no-win situation’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 19 September, http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1165.html - Accessed 3 November 2005.

7. ‘Ramachandran, S, 2004, ‘Beware when Tigers fall out’, Asia Times, 9 March, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FC09Df06.html - Accessed 4 November 2005.

8. ‘Karuna’s revolt is ‘temporary aberration’ – Balasingham’, 2004, Tamil.net website, 17 March, http://www.tamilnet.com/print.html?artid=11487&catid=13 – Accessed 4 November 2005.

9. Jeyaraj, D.B.S, 2004, ‘The fall of Karuna’, Frontline Magazine, Vol 21, Issue 09, April 24 – May 07, http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2109/stories/20040507006712200.htm - Accessed 4 November 2005.

10. ‘Sri Lanka – Annual Report 2005, 2005, Reporters without Borders, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=13442 – Accessed 3 November 2005.

11. ‘Nine recommendations for improving the state of press freedom – Investigative report’, 2004, Reporters without Borders, 19 July, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10956 – Accessed 3 November 2005.

12. Email to R Hariharan, 2005, ‘Request for information regarding Karuna’, 4 November.

13. Hariharan, R. 2005, Email ‘Request for information regarding Karuna’, 7 November.