Contents

Acknowledgments vii Preface viii 1. Biographical Background and Analytical Analysis 1 2. Influences of the Times: The 1930s 7 3. Leon H. Keyserling and the Council of Economic Advisers 17 Introduction 17 The Employment Act 19 The historical record of the Council, 1946–53 27 The Eisenhower comparison: a brief note 53 The Council, 1946–53: an overview 57 Appendix 1: A Personal Postscript 60 Appendix 2: Keyserling’s Anti-inflationary Policy and Cost Curves: A Simplified Analysis 61 4. Selected Testimonies: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress (HJEC) 64 Introduction 64 The Council years, selected testimony 66 The post Council years, selected testimony 68 Conclusion 80 5. Keyserling after the Council of Economic Advisers: “The Conference on Economic Progress” 82 Introduction 82 A selected review: The Conference on Economic Progress 83 6. Other Writings of Leon H. Keyserling: The Problems of Economic Balance and the End of Poverty – the Crucial Connection 133 The balanced economy and progress of poverty: the vital interdependence 133 v vi Contents

7. The Theoretical Analysis of Leon H. Keyserling and Economic Policy 141 Appendix 1: The Concept of Economic Growth in Economic Analysis 157 Appendix 2: Brief Chronology and Biographical References by Leon H. Keyserling (Edited: W. Robert Brazelton) 160 Appendix 3: Other Related Articles, Not Quoted Herein (But Presented to Author by Leon H. Keyserling) 162 Appendix 4: Book-Length Publications of Leon H. Keyserling 166 (Conference on Economic Progress)

Notes 168 Bibliography 169 Index 177 Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Dr Benjamin Zobrist, former Director of the Harry S. Truman Library, a Presidential Library, for financial support for the original study of Keyserling and the economic policies of the Truman era. The author also wishes to thank Dennis Bilger and others of the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, USA, for their aid, patience, and cooperation. Any acknowledgement would be incomplete without a special mention of Dr Willadee Gillan Wehmeyer who worked with me on the original report to the Truman Library on the research project financed by that Library. That project included both an analytical biography of both Leon Hirsch Keyserling and, also, his wife – a respected economist and “feminist” in her own right – Mary Dublin Keyserling entitled: Leon H. Keyserling and Mary Dublin Keyserling, Growth and Equity: Over Fifty Years of Economic Policy and Analysis, from Truman to Bush, 1989, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, USA. Special thanks go to both Leon Keyserling and Mary Keyserling. Their cooperation was crucial, and the association with them is a bright spot in my memory. Thanks, also to my typist, Linda Raske; my Doctoral Assistant, Jessie Jo Johnson, whose advice, sincere interest, patience, and pre- editing were crucial. Also, I would be remiss not to mention David Lazarus and the other staff members in Government Documents at the Miller Nichols Library of the University of Missouri–Kansas City for their aid and patience. Naturally, all errors, oversights, et alius herein are the author’s.

vii Preface

This book is a revision of a previous study, supported by the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, USA, by myself and Willadee Gillan Wehmeyer, a graduate student at the University of Missouri–Kansas City, and now an instructor at Central Nazarene University, Olathe, Kansas. The Truman Library study involved several interviews, usually of several days in length, with both Leon Hirsch Keyserling and his wife, Mary Dublin Keyserling, in their home in Washington, DC. In the original study, both Chapter I and Chapter II were personal in nature. Chapter I involved the personal recollections of Willadee and myself concerning the Keyserlings. Chapter II involved the Keyserlings’ personal stories concerning events, personalities, con- versations between personalities, et cetera, that are of great interest to historians and biographers. However, in this book, both chapters have been deleted for a study of the economic events and of econ- omic thought that existed at the time of the Keyserlings’ youth; their years of education; and the economic realities of the United States in the pre-World War II and the post-World War II periods. Thus, this specific book is more for economists or economic stu- dents and interested lay persons, rather than historians and bio- graphers of the Truman Era. For those who wish to read the original study by Willadee and myself, it is available in Independence, Missouri at the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, USA. The original copy on deposit at the Truman Presidential Library included both a study of Leon H. Keyserling and Mary Dublin Keyserling by myself and Willadee Wehmeyer. After that study, Dr Wehmeyer completed her Doctoral dissertation on Mary Dublin Keyserling (Mary Dublin Keyserling: Economist and Social Activist, University of Missouri–Kansas City, 1994) which expanded upon her contribution to the original work on the Keyserlings. This present work includes only an analysis of Leon Keyserling by myself. The work on Mary Dublin Keyserling will be published separately by Dr Wehmeyer. It is, I believe, an important work in

viii Preface ix relation to the Roosevelt-Truman eras, and of the women’s movement of that and later periods. W. Robert Brazelton 1 Biographical Background and Analytical Analysis

Leon Hirsch Keyserling was born in Charleston, South Carolina, on January 2, 1908, the son of a prominent Jewish family; and lived his first eight years in St. Helena Island, South Carolina, near Beaufort, South Carolina. His father, William Keyserling, was a prosperous and influential farmer, growing and marketing fruits and vegetables. After Leon Keyserling’s graduation from high school in Beaufort in 1924, he went to Columbia University in New York City and became a student of Rexford Guy Tugwell. Later, he received a Law degree from Harvard University before returning to Columbia University to work on his Doctorate in Economics, which he never finished. However, during that time, he was busy helping Rexford Tugwell in his writing; and in doing his own writings. And later, as he often said, he was busy composing and lobbying for legislation concerning the Labor acts, the Housing acts, the Employment act, et alius, which, to him, outweighed a dissertation. Later, he became Vice Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors to the President and succeeded to its Chairmanship after Edwin Nourse’s resigna- tion, partly for Nourse’s refusal to testify on economic policy matters before Congress – a task Keyserling considered both a neces- sity and a duty in order to support the President’s economic policies before Congress and the Nation. Keyserling’s policies were policies of growth, as will be seen in later chapters. Many economists argue that a growing economy, like a rising tide, raises all ships. Keyserling recognized, however, that some ships would not rise as fast as others or, without aid, may not rise at all. Thus, economic growth was a necessary condition for

1 2 Designing US Economic Policy increasing wealth, but, by itself, was not a sufficient condition. As some sectors of the economy were weaker than others; or, as some groups were weaker than other groups, those groups must be select- ively helped by selective policies or selective controls. Thus, anti- recessionary, pro-growth policies should stimulate the overall economy and help lagging sectors as well by selective methods relating to those lagging sectors. This view of anti-recessionary policy was continued into Key- serling’s view of anti-inflationary policy as well. An inflation can be argued to be caused by an excess of demand over supply. This Keyserling translated as a lag in supply in relation to demand. Thus, even though anti-inflationary policy should dampen overall inflationary pressures, it should also stimulate the growth of supply of lagging areas, especially those areas of high priority (for example, housing and the jobs related to housing). Then, even though an anti-inflationary policy may be less lenient than would be an anti- recessionary policy, it must allow for selective sectors to continue to expand via selective controls or interest rates. For example, if housing was in short supply and widgets in excess supply, anti- inflationary policy should restrict the latter, not the former. Also, to Keyserling, the high interest rates caused by anti-inflationary policy were a high cost to the economy and would have to be paid over a long period of time by taxpayers and debtors to bond holders and creditors. Thus, in general, Keyserling believed that interest rates, even in an inflation, should be kept low, and, if increased, only where needed, selectively on a micro level, not a primarily or exclusively macro level. In light of Keyserling’s view of interest rates, Keyserling dis- approved of the “Accord” between the Federal Reserve and the United States Treasury in 1951. In the post-World War II, period, the Federal Reserve had “agreed” to purchase Treasury bonds at a set rate of interest. This essentially pegged the interest rate. The interest rate was low and allowed the Treasury to float its bonds without fear of rising interest rates which may be considered as allowing the Treasury to increase debt, which could result in inflation. The reason for this policy was to keep interest rates low; and to belie the fear that the post-World War II years would duplicate the stagnation of the 1930s and the instabilities of the 1920s. However, as expan- sion – not contraction – was the post-war reality, many believed that such a policy was not needed. Thus, after the Accord of 1951, Biographical Background and Analytical Analysis 3 the Federal Reserve no longer pegged the interest rate which meant that Treasury deficits (bonds) did not have a guaranteed market at a guaranteed interest rate. It also meant that interest rates would likely rise, which Keyserling opposed as an impediment to invest- ment and growth. Thus, to Keyserling, the Accord was an error. To most economists in the 1990s, the Accord was probably seen as a necessity, especially after the large deficits of the 1980s which, without the Accord of 1951, could have been a very inflationary period. Indeed, during the 1980s, both Chairman of the Federal Reserve (Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan) purposefully allowed interest rates to rise (Brazelton, 1993; Cebala and Koch, 1989; Neikirk, 1987) to limit economic growth and to cause the recession of 1990–91 (Hall, 1993) in order to prevent inflation. It should be pointed out that Keyserling, in the period 1946 to 1953, was react- ing to that particular period of time in US economic history and would have never dreamed of such large fiscal deficits as in the 1980s. To a modern economist, the concept of the Federal Reserve pegging the interest rate low to provide cheap funds for the Federal deposits may be difficult to understand. However, one must remem- ber that economists in the post-World War II period were still being influenced by the Great Depression of the 1930s; and many econ- omists feared the return of that depression after the end of World War II. Thus, they wished for a stimulative policy after 1946. After a mild inflation in 1949 and the Korean War, the fear of a return to depression had become minimized and the Accord was the result. In the following chapter, we will analyze some major economic analy- ses of the Depression years; the years in which the Keyserlings were being educated and the world they saw around them with its econ- omic stagnation, high unemployment, homelessness, and social strife. This was to influence both Keyserlings and it was to forge their views concerning both economic and social policy – economic growth for economic welfare for all. Thus, the questions to be analyzed in this specific work relate to the theoretical background of Leon H. Keyserling himself: the major aspects of his economic analysis; the major policy goals derived therefrom; and his importance in relation to the “liberal” agenda of the time, of which he was a major player. Keyserling believed that the major work of John Maynard Keynes (later Lord Keynes) – The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 4 Designing US Economic Policy

Money (1936) – was an important work in the development of rele- vant economic analysis, especially after the advent of the “Great Depression” of the 1930s. However, Keynes’ stress in The General Theory was upon an economy at less than full employment. Keyserling’s stress was upon economic policies that would get the economy to full employment, and would then allow the economy to grow at a full employment rate of growth via economic policies and incentives (micro and macro) – both demand-side and supply- side policies. These policies would be in terms of an adequate money supply; low interest rates; tax policies; investment policies; and selected incentive policies towards selected, crucial, lagging sectors of the economy as needed. In relation to the latter, Keyserling was of the firm belief that economic growth must be balanced. That is, on the macro-level, if demand is growing, so must supply. If supply is growing, so must demand. On the micro-level, if the demand for steel is growing, its supply must be growing as well as the products and processes that supply the steel industry. This is a problem of eliminating or preventing bottlenecks to full em- ployment and its long-term continuation. These problems will be discussed in greater detail in the chapters that follow. Keyserling began his significant influence upon economic policy as early as the first administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933–45). It continued into the following administration of President Harry S. Truman (1945–53), especially in relation to the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) to the President, of which Keyserling was the first Vice-Chair and the second Chair. After- wards, Keyserling remained a critic of the economic policies of sub- sequent presidents via his numerous testimonies before the Joint Economic Committee Hearings of Congress (HJEC); speeches; the production of “Conference on Economic Progress” (CEP) pamphlets; and other writings to be analyzed in the chapters that follow. Thus, the following chapters will discuss and analyze the life’s work of a remarkable man – Leon Hirsch Keyserling (1908–87). However, in terms of an analysis of his life’s work, we will end this chapter with a brief review of his more major contributions, via the Memorial Service in his honor on September 10, 1987, which shows the respect in which he was held by friends and colleagues. After Leon H. Keyserling’s death on August 9, 1987, I had the honor of an invitation to his Memorial Service on September 10, Biographical Background and Analytical Analysis 5

1987, at the Cosmos Club in Washington, DC. Those who spoke in honor of Leon H. Keyserling helped to sum up the accomplishments of his life; and to put his life into historical perspective. I would like to close this brief chapter on Keyserling’s work and the economic and political history that he represents by quoting remarks from selected mourners at the Memorial Service who, as I did, knew, worked with, and respected this man of action, brilliance, and dedication. After recounting the accomplishments and virtues of Keyserling, several of the speakers spoke of his belief in the ability of the economy to give a good life to us all; and in the ability of the social system to achieve more equity and well-being – in part, through continued economic growth shared by everyone. One of the first to speak was Congressman Augustus Freeman Hawkins of California (a joint author of the 1978 Humphrey- Hawkins Act) who indicated that Keyserling, at discussions with col- leagues, would stress the historical record before reaching the crux of his argument, at which time his colleagues knew that he must be right about the economy and its needs (Keyserling, Mary Dublin, 1987, p. 10, Memorial Service). Congressman Claude Pepper of Florida stressed Keyserling’s nobil- ity, compassion, intellect and concern for all Americans; and his desire for a better America shared by all Americans (Memorial Service, p. 21). On the academic side, Michael Harrington, Professor of Political Science, Queens College, stressed that Keyserling always remained optimistic and confident about America and its future potential. To Harrington, Keyserling was part of the essence of the New Deal/Fair Deal. To Harrington, the death of men like Keyserling points out the lack of such men of courage to oppose the “politics of reaction” [my words] and the intellect to develop new ideas for that opposition (Memorial Service, p. 19). That such courage was lacking in 1987 was obvious to most of those present at the Memorial Service and, to this author, remains lacking in the present era, 1999 to 2001. More specifically, on the political side, Senator Paul S. Sarbanes stated:

Leon himself was a person of steady vision and extraordinary vigor. His commitment to the strengthening of the economy in order to build a better society never wavered for one minute over 6 Designing US Economic Policy

the course of eight decades of his extraordinary life … Leon was a thinker, a doer, a fighter for what he believed to be right, an American with a profound faith in the American people and in the nation’s future. Above all, he was a deeply moral man. (Memorial Service, pp. 16, 18)

More specifically, on the academic side, John Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard University stated:

We remember at this meeting this afternoon one of the truly committed and effective leaders in modern economic policy and beyond … on all compassionate economic action and reform. I decline to believe that men like Leon Keyserling are of the past. I believe or assuredly hope that they are also of the future. (Memorial Service, p. 16)

To that, I can only say: “Amen.” Index

“Accord,” the, see Federal Reserve Conference on Economic Progress Bank (Pamphlets), see Keyserling, Administered pricing, 70, 74–75, 85, Leon Hirsch; list of Pamphlets, 87, 89, 90, 93–94, 100, 102–3, see Keyserling, Leon Hirsch 108, 113, 115–16, 124, 137, Congressional Record, 137 139, 148–49 consumption (demand), 4, 17, 28, Price support system, 94 30, 32–33, 37–38, 41, 45, 67, 69, Income support system (Brannon 71–73, 79, 84–88, 91–92, 94–95, Plan), 94, 103 99, 103–112, 123, 129, 131, Agriculture, 35, 67, 72, 83, 86–90, 135, 141–156 93–95, 101–103, 129 Council of Economic Advisors Agriculture, Department of, 19 (CEA), 1, 4, 20, 22–26, 28, 49, Agricultural Adjustment 51, 57–58, 68, 74, 82, 157–58, Administration, 20, 25 161 Atlantic Ecnomic Journal, 157–59 Council Reports to Congress (Joint Economic Committee, Bahm-Bawerk, Eugene, 136 SEC), 28–59;Includes, Annual Bentham, Jeremy, 10 Reports and Midyear Reports, Bilger, Dennis, vii 1946–1953; and “overview,” Brannon, Charles (Brannon 1946–1953, 57–59. Plan), 94, 103, see also Agriculture Depression, Great (1930s) 2–4, 7–8, Brazelton, W. Robert, 3, 7, 8, 22, 27, 17, 36, 52, 74, 83, 114 29, 151, 158 Dewey, John, 9 Brown, Edmund, 99 Domar, Evsey, 13 Bryan, William Jennings, 86 Duesenberry, James, 7 Burns, Arthur, 53 Bureau of the Budget, 19 Eccles, Harold, 19 Byrd, Harry F. (Senator), 164 Eckstein, Otto, 127 economic growth and analysis, Carter, James, 74–75, 121–122 157–159 Cebula, Richard, 3 Economic Stabilization Civil War (American), 74 Commission, 41 Challenge, 138 economic triangle, see Keyserling, Chrysler Corporation, 40 Leon Hirsch Clark, John D., 17, 20, 23–24, Eisenhower, Dwight David 57–58 (President 1953–61), 26, 52, Clinton, William Jefferson, 86 53–58, 74, 121 Colm, Gerhard, 27 Truman/Eisenhower Comparison, Columbia River Valley Authority, 53–57 38, 52 Ellender, Allen J. (Senator), 160

177 178 Index

employment (demand), 28, 39–40, Stagnation Thesis (“Keynes- 48, 68–69, 70, 72–73, 74–75, Hansen”), 8–9 77–79, 80–81, 84, 90,95–97, 99, Harrington, Michael, 5 108, 112–116, 119–123, 127, Harper’s, 99, 135 157–159 Harrod, Sir Roy, 13 Employment Act (1946) (also Harry S. Truman Library referred to as Full Employment (Independence, Missouri, USA), Act by some), 8, 14, 19–21, 52, vii, viii 66, 79, 84, 87, 117, 119, 128, Hawkins, Augustus Freeman 157 (Congress, California), 5 Thirtieth Anniversary, Joint see Humphrey-Hawkins Act Economic Committee, 80–81, Hayek, von, 136 152–156 Heller, Walter, 22, 33, 70, 75, 84, energy (oil) crisis, 74–75, 113–114, 92, 97, 144, 154 148 Hoover, Herbert, 53 experimental economics, see Housing, 2, 26, 28, 32, 33, 52, 69, Tugwell, Rexford G. 84, 88, 107, 112, 123 Housing Act of 1937, 160 Fair Deal, see Truman, Harry S. Humphrey, Herbert (Senator, Fair Labor Standards Act, 33, 134 Minnesota), 165 farming, see agriculture see Humphrey-Hawkins Act Federal Reserve Bank, 2–3, 28, Humphrey-Hawkins Act (1978), 5, 31–32, 38, 41, 43, 53, 58, 73, 14, 22, 33, 79, 119, 128, 160 75–76, 100–101, 117–119, (Full Employment and Balanced 123–126, 128, 131–132, Growth Act) 148–150, 154 Accord (1951), 2–3, 57–58, 76–77, indicative planning, 14, 22, 42, 111, 124, 148–150, 154 119, 136, 145, 151 Open Market Committee, 126 inflation, 2, 16, 28, 30–33, 43–45, Flash, Edwin, 25 50–51, 58, 61–63, 66–69, 74–76, Ford, Gerald, 114–115, 121 79, 80–86, 89–91, 101, 108, 113, France, 14, 22, 119, 145, 151 115, 117, 128, 149, 157 Friedman, Milton, 100 interest rates, 2–3, 4, 28, 41, 48, 57, Full Employment Budget Concept, 73–74, 82–86, 91–93, 100–101, see Heller, Walter 113–14, 118–19, 123–126, 148 International Trade Organization, Galbraith, John Kenneth, 6–7, 9, 38 72 investment, 32, 49, 67, 69, 70–73, Gates, Robert J., 19–20, 22–26, 83–85, 92, 94–95, 101, 123, 129, 57–58 135, 141–156 Germant (West), 74 and retained earnings, 70 Greenspan, Alan, 3 Gosplan, see Stalinist Centrism Jacob, Neil H., 53 Japan, 74 Hall, Robert E., 3 Johnson, Jessie Jo, vii Hamby, Alonzo, 14–16, 21 Johnson, Lyndon (President, Hansen, Alvin Harvey, 7–9, 19 1963–69), 71, 104, 115, 121 Index 179

Joint Economic Hearings of economic triangle, 64–66, 65 Congress (Hearings of) (HJEC), (diagram) 64–81 inflation analysis, 61–63 Keyserling Council Years National Prosperity Budget (Testimony 1946–1953) (Freedom Budget) (Full Keyserling Post Council Prosperity Budget), 84, 93, (Testimony, post 1953) 103, 112, 137, 144–45, 151 Conclusion, Thirtieth Anniversary the Pabst essay, 18–19, 21–22, of Employment Act of 1946, 161 80–81, 152–156 theoretical analysis (conclusion), see also, Keyserling, Leon Hirsch 141–156; diagram, 144 Hearings of Joint Economic Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 71, 84, CommitteeR of Congress 97, 115, 121 (HJEC) Keynes, John Maynard (Lord), 3, 7, Council Years (1946–53), 64–68 9–10, 15, 19, 25, 36, 80, 136, Post Council Years (Post 1953), 4, 141 38, 68–79; Conclusion, 80–81 Keyserling, Leon Hirsch theoretical analysis, as (1908–1987), vii, viii, 1–4, 11, conclusion, 141–156; 13, 15–20, 22–28, 31–33, 42, diagram, 144 52–53, 58, 64, 66–68, 70, 77–79, Thirtieth Anniversary, 82, 97, 98, 103, 107, 113, Employment Act of 1946, 119–122, 129–131, 139, 80–81; 152–156 141–156 Keyserling, Mary Dublin, vii, viii, 3, table, comparative statistics, 120 82, 166 Conference on Economic Progress Keyserling, William, 1 Reports (1954–1983), 82–132, Kilgore, Joe M. (Congress, Texas), 19 list of, 166–167 with dates of Koch, James, 3 publication. Reports utilized: Korean War (1950–1953), 3, 16, 1956, 83–84; 1957, 84–86; 39–53, 58 1958a, 86–87; 1958b, 87–89; 1959a, 89–91; 1959b, 91–92; Labor, Department of, 19 1960a, 92–93; 1960b, 93–95; Lazarus, David, vii 1961, 95–96; 1962, 96–97; Lerner, Abba, 8 1963, 97–98; 1964a, 98–99, Lincoln, Abraham (President, 103; 1964b, 100–101; 1965, 1860–65), 118, 131 101–103; 1966a, 103–106; 1966b, 106–107; 1969, Mahoney, see O’Mahoney, Joseph 107–109; 1971, 109–112; Marx, Karl, 136 1972, 112–113; 1973, McCoy, Ronald, 53 113–114; 1975, 114–116; Morse, Wayne (Senator, Oregon), 19 1976, 116–119; 1979, Murray, James (Senator, Montana), 120–123; diagram, 120; 1980, 19 123–126; 1983, 126–132 Murray, Bill, 19 (eventually economic balance (balanced Employment Act, 1946) economics), 37, 42, 64–66, 133–140, 141–156 National Housing Agency, 19–20 180 Index

National Labor Relations Act Ricardo, David, 107, 136 (Wagner Act), 160 “Roaring Twenties,” 7 National Planning Association, Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 19 (President, 1933–45), ix, 4, 9, National Prosperity Budget, see 15, 52–53, 121 Keyserling, Leon Hirsch Ruether, Walter, 98 Natural rate of unemployment, 113, 157 Samuelson, Paul, 7, 29, 73, 151 New Deal, see Roosevelt, Franklin Sarbanes, Paul S. (Senator, Delano Maryland), 5 Niekirk, William R., 3 Say’s Law, 9 Nixon, Richard M. (President, Schiller, Bradley, 150 1969–74), 109, 111, 115, 121 selective controls (theoretic Nourse, Edwin, 1, 17, 20, 23–26, analysis), 68 57–58 Senate Banking and Currency Committee, 19 Office of War Mobilization and Senate Post War Planning and Reconversion (World War II), Economic Committee, 19 19 Silverman, Corrine, 23–24 O’Mahoney, Joseph (Senator, Smith, Adam, 11, 107, 136 Wyoming), 19 stagnation, 113 (1970s) stagnation thesis, see Hansen, Alvin Pabst Essay, see Keyserling, Leon Harvey Hirsch St Lawrence Seaway, 33, 38, 42 Patman, Wright (Congress, Texas), Stalinist Centrism (Gosplan), 14, 19 26 Pepper, Claude (Senator, Florida), Stewart, Walter, 53 5 Sweden, 104–5, 111, 151 Phillips Curve, (Trade-off Theory), 63, 78–79, 81, 115–117, 130, Taft, Robert (Senator, Ohio), 160, 154, 158 164 Pickens, Donald, 156 Tennessee Valley Authority, 52 Price-Wage Guidelines Commission, Thomas, Elmer D. (Senate, Utah), 19 104 Time, 127 productivity, 38, 70, 72, 85–86, 99, Tobin, James, 157 111, 127 Trade-off Theory, see Phillips Curve Truman Library, see Harry S. Raske, Linda, vii Truman Library Reagan, Ronald, 25, 75–76, 101, Truman, Harry S. (President, 126,157 1945–53), vii, ix, 4, 15, 20, 23, recession, 2–3, 17, 28, 34, 36–37, 39, 39, 52–53, 58, 82, 84, 94, 121, 52,67, 74–75, 87–89, 93–94, 125, 134 108, 111, 114, 128 Truman/Eisenhower Comparison, Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, 53–57 36 Tugwell, Rexford, 1, 7, 9–14, 25, 141 Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 35 unemployment, see employment Index 181

United States Housing Authority, Wagner, Robert (Senator, New 20, 25 York), 19–20, 25,160 University of Missouri – Kansas Wallace, Donald, 135 City, vii, 164 Wallace, Henry, 19 Miller Nichols Library, vii Wehmeyer, Willadee Gillen, vii, viii, 7 Viet Nam War, 104, 124 Wilson, Woodrow (President, Volcker, Paul, 3, 77 1913–21), 125 World War I, 8 Wage Stabilization Board, 50 World War II, 3, 17, 21, 42, 46, 50, wages, as part of economic policy, 53, 117 28–31, 35, 37–38, 67, 72–73, 75, Wright, David McCord, 7 83–87, 88, 91, 103–107, 109–112 Zobrist, Benjamin, vii