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XA0300582 - IAEA/NSNI LIMITED DISTRIBUTION INIS-XA-583 WVORKINGMATERIAL NOTES ON THE REGIONAL WORKSHOP ON MODELLING OF EXTERNAL HAZARD S TC PROJECT: RER/9/046 6-10 November 2000 Sofia, Bulgaria Reproduced by the IAEA Vienna, Austria, 2000 VOLUME I NOTE The material n this document has been supplied by the authors and has not been edited by the IAEA. The views expressed remain the responsibility of the named authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the governments) of the designating Member State(s). In particular, neither the IAEA nor any other organization or body sponsoring this meeting can be held responsible for any material reproduced in this document. XA0300583 Fire Hazard Assessment by: M. Roewekamp FIRE PSA METHODOLOGY AND APPLICATIONS M. Roewekamp Gesellschaft f~ir Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit (ORS) mbH Workshop on Modeling of External Hazards in PSA Sofia, Bulgaria, 6 - 10 November 2000 Contents o:Pa-rt 1: Screening for Fire PSA -GRS Methodology c Part 2: Fire Simulation with the GRS-Code COCOSYS cPart 3: PSA Study for an Exemplary Plant Location of a German PWR Built to Earlier Standards o Part 4- Results of recent sensitivity and uncertainty analyses Screening for Fire PSA GRS Methodology Major Steps of a Fire PSA • Selection of relevant plant areas * Detailed fire specific analyses for selected plant areas * Implementation of fire specific results in existing PSA Screening Steps • Data collection Data collection of all information for each compartment with relevance to fire * Screening Estimation of those rooms (including ranking) with a necessity of fire specific detailed probabilistic analyses Steps of the Screening (1) Fire specific compartment data - Compartment identification * Building name * Compartment number • Building level - Adjacent compartments and connections • Openings (to adjacent compartments) • Doors, type of doors (to adjacent compartments) * Openings for monitoring devices * Fire and smoke dampers * Fire barriers (rating) Steps of the Screening (2) Fire specific compartment data - Fire specific data • Fire load density (in MJ/M 2) • Combustibles (PVC, FRNC, oil, wood ... ) • Fire detectors (automatic, press button) • Fire extinguishing systems - Compartment inventory (safety related equipment incl. cable) Steps of the Screening (3) Screening procedure - Excluding criteria • Fire load density < 90 MJ/M2 * Inventory criteria (compartments not containing safety related equipment without openings to adjacent ones with such equipment are screened out) - Ranking criteria * Fire load • Fire occurrence frequency • Fire spreading - Expert discussion • Combination of compartments * Representative plant areas Data Collection - - Example 0208*1 2 8 T Antrebe D-Forderpumpen K 02 084 T PVC. 012 A~~~ V ertefliung n 02082 KLB1SAAO1 1 lBrandlast PVC und 01 fr die Antriebe der 3 H D-Forderpumpen, Brandlast wesentlich groBer 90 (nach Begehung 17.01.99); Datensatz: 211-62 II von 271 04 03 04 0 1 4 ~~~~~~~~~~0417 04 11 )4 Data Analysis (1) II0 1 1.MMM MM0 (slelolla) ) OK BK BK BHK BK *BK 0301803002 ~~~~~030811 03 019 ~~~~~~~~~03003 0377 0=70 0~~~~~~~~~~=43 Ef 03 000 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~03072 B~~144 0=~~B144 M A B=20 028 H27 211 T 90 02071A 02 R ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~02066 R B-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~032 02 074 02 010 7 A~~~~~~~~~~~~2 1M 0 o o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 01 00 _ 01 02 07 I1 Data Analysis (2) Building Number of compartments Fire load group No. of compartments UBA switchgear building 201 No fire load 59 UBP emergency power supply building 54 Fire load" 90 MJ/m2 72 UJA containment 136 Fire load > 90 MJ/m2 140 UJB3 reactor building annulus 271 Fire load density (> 90 MVIJ/2), UKA nuclear auxiliary building 331 groups of compartments and connected ULB emergency feedwater building 94 compartments UMA turbine building 67 2870031005 U1QB cooling water pump station 9 03 034 03 034 03 058 03 058 Level of UJB1 No. of compartments 03 071 03 071 01 77 1900 02 39 01 024 01 024 02 024 03 36 01 025 01 025 02 025 04 34 01 027 01 027 02 027 05 17 01 028 01 028 02 028 06 28 1365 07 16 03 025 03 025 04 025 08 13 03 028 03 028 04 028 09 11 1150 03 024 03 024 04 024.. Estimation of the F 0 t- 9 Occurrence Frequency I.,-$TTTI4 1'9 Example (1)ttemr _ ____ ------ C ________ 1~~~~&~~~Ftt*~~~~irr \ a~Kwn Estimation of the Occurrence Frequency Example (2) Inside building UJ8 a conditional fire occurrence frequency was estimated for 139 of 271 compartments, minimum value 6,61E-04 average value 7,19E-03 maximum value 1,82E-02 1,82E-02 01 004 1,62E-02 01 035 01 043 01 062 01 086 02 083 1,57E-02 01 055 1,37E-02 05 033 05 058 05 071 1,31E-02 05 014 A 1,28E-02 01 006 01 007 1,26E-02 01 005 01 022 01 033 01 044 01 045 01 056 01 057 01 063 01 072 01 087 01 088 01 089 02 016 02 037 03 016 03 035 03 072 1,22E-02 06 018 B 06 035 06 036 06 037 A 06 037 B 08 060 B 09 033 9,94E-03 06 033 8,92E-03 01 091 01 092 02 081 04 003 04 014 04 035 04 057 04 072 8,01E-03 01 009 01 017 01 036 01 046 01 060 01 073 02 009 02 017 02 036 02 060 02 073 02 084 03 017 03 036 03 060 03 073 04 042 04 060 04 061 04 064 04 066 04 073 04 079 6,48E-03 03 009 04 074 08 015 B 08 033 08 060 A 08 061 08 073 09 034 09 060 etc. Fire Specific Event Tree Example (1) Fire detection: * Presence of humans * Availability of automatic fire detectors in the compartment and in the adjacent compartment Fire extinguishing (early): * Presence of humans * Availability of manual fire extinguishing and fire extinguishing systems Fire containment: * Compartment open * Compartment not open (fire doors, fire dampers) Fire Specific Event Tree Example (2) N - S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rn Bxn, Bad-B &' UJB~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,E Selection of Fire Zones *Ranking - Fire load - Occurrence frequency (ntroduction of a cut-off value) - Fire effects / consequences - Combined ranking *Expert selection - Discussion basis: original raw data, processed data due to the above mentioned ranking - Considering of further data: plant operational and safety related inventory - Combination of compartments - Representative compartments XA0300584 Plant Walkdown by: M. Kostov REGIONAL WORKSHOP ON EXTERNAL EVENTS PSA 6-1 0 November 2000, Sofia Plant Walkdown Presented by Dr. M.Kostov Risk Engineering Ltd Content: 1. Preparatory steps for performing plant walk-down 2. The objectives of the (first) plant walkdown 3. Plant walk-down procedures 4. Earthquake screening evaluation 5. Walk-down documentation 6. Second Plant Walkdown 7. Conclusions Based on: 1. IAEA TECDOC-724, Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Seismic Events 2. NUREG/CR-4482, Recommendations to the NRC on Trial Guidelines for Seismic Margin Review of NPPs 3. UCRL-ID3-115714Rev2, Walkthrough Screening Evaluation Field Guide 1. Preparatory steps for performing plant walk-down a The site seismic hazard (or RLE) is known. m The system modeling (event tree) is preliminary elaborated. m The systems, structures and components are preliminary grouped and categorized. a The groups for generic fragility are preliminary set 2. The objectives of the (first) plant walkdown are: 1. To mark which component could be modeled by generic data and which have to be address on plant-specific basis. To confirm that no weaknesses exist in the plant structures and equipment that would make their HCLPF lower than the generic values and to look for signs of abnormal aging or poor maintenance that would invalidate the use of generic values. 2. To confirm the accuracy of system descriptions found in plant design documents (e.g., FSAR, general arrangement drawings, piping and instrumentation diagrams, and line diagrams for electrical equipment). 3. To identify any system interactions, system dependencies and plant unique features not already identified. 4. To gather information on certain potentially weak components for further HCLPF (fragility) calculations Walk-down team: THE SYSTEM ANALYST In defining these items, the system analyst should consider: • those components that comprise safety related systems. • potential systems interactions, i.e., component and system failures of non-safety related items that can lead to failure of systems performing safety functions He should mark these items on general arrangement drawings, piping and instrument diagrams and line diagrams, for electrical equipment. THE FRAGILITY ANALYST: By reviewing such marked up drawings should be able to identify the plant areas that require inspection. The fragility analyst should consider: • The element seismic capacity • The potential system interaction The team members should have: • Detailed knowledge on the analyzed facility (NPIP) • Experience in earthquake engineering • Studied other (similar) PSA projects • Knowledge on earthquake fragility data (experimental or real) 3. Plant walk-down procedures • After performing the review by the systems and fragility analysts to become familiar with the plant systems, structures, components they identify areas of the plant requiring physical walk-down. • It is expected that the system analyst will review all areas of the plant and provide advice to the fragility analyst on the function of any component in the safety systems and the consequences of its failure. The steps in performing the first physical walk-down are described below: 1. A pre-plant visit meeting between system and fragility analysts to plan the plant walk-down and discuss areas to concentrate on should take place. 2. Necessary arrangements must be made with the plant management regarding radiation protection and scheduling the walk-down activities to create minimal conflict with normal plant operations. The walk-down team should either include or have access to the following: • A reactor operator or utility engineer familiar with the plant systems, • An electrical technician capable of de-energizing and opening electrical cabinets for anchorage inspection.