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Action Identity: Evidence from Self-Recognition, Prediction, and Coordination Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2003) 620–632 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Action identity: Evidence from self-recognition, prediction, and coordination Guunther€ Knoblicha,* and Ruudiger€ Flachb a Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, Amalienstrasse 33, Munich 80799, Germany b Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College, London, UK Received 10 March 2003 Abstract Prior research suggests that the action system is responsible for creating an immediate sense of self by determining whether certain sensations and perceptions are the result of oneÕs own actions. In addition, it is assumed that declarative, episodic, or autobiographical memories create a temporally extended sense of self or some form of identity. In the present article, we review recent evidence suggesting that action (proce- dural) knowledge also forms part of a personÕs identity, an action identity, so to speak. Experiments that addressed self-recognition of past actions, prediction, and coordination provide ample evidence for this assumption. The phenomena observed in these experiments can be explained by the assumption that ob- serving an action results in the activation of action representations, the more so, when the action observed corresponds to the way in which the observer would produce it. Ó 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Action identity There can be no doubt that humans are able to identify the products of their past actions. Often, there are obvious cues. For instance, the authors in this issue can identify the papers they have written by looking for their names. When browsing in an old diary one will recognize oneÕs handwriting and when looking at an old drawing one will recognize oneÕs drawing style. However, in other situations it is less obvious whether one perceives the products of oneÕs own past actions. * Corresponding author. Fax: +49-89-38602-199. E-mail address: [email protected] (G. Knoblich). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S1053-8100(03)00070-9 G. Knoblich, R. Flach / Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2003) 620–632 621 Consider for example Aida who finds an old audiotape without a label. As she listens to the tape she hears a noisy record of a piano piece, which everybody in her family likes to perform. Will she recognize whether it is her who played? If so, why? It seems that in order to make this judgment she would need to somehow compare what she currently hears to what it would sound like if she performed the heard piece herself (cf. Barresi & Moore, 1996). And if she could identify herself as having played the piece, based on this com- parison, her ability to recognize herself would likely result from the fact that the actions she performed earlier and the ones she would perform now are identical or very similar. In other words, her self-recognition ability would be based on identical actions. Phenomena of action identity are largely unexplored. This is probably due to the following reasons. First, it is obvious how individuals can recognize themselves based on a stable repre- sentation of their anatomical features (e.g., their face, Kircher et al., 2001), certain traits they ascribe to themselves (Baumeister, 1998), episodic and autobiographical memories (cf. Tulving, 2002), or narratives (Dennett, 1992). These abilities are some of the main markers for what Neisser (1988) called the Remembered Self. It is less obvious how individuals can recognize themselves based on stable action knowledge, mainly because this knowledge is assumed to be implicit and cognitively impenetrable (cf. Cohen & Squire, 1980; Ryle, 1949). Second, if one addresses the relationship between self and action, the most obvious questions that come to mind are how intentionality creates phenomenal experience (Metzinger, 2003), how one is able to identify whether a certain perceptual event is caused by oneÕs own actions (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Jeannerod, 1999; Leube, Knoblich, Erb, & Kircher, 2003), and whether oneÕs feeling of control reliably reflects the actual amount of control one exerts with oneÕs actions (Wegner, 2002). These issues pertain to a more immediate self that Neisser (1988) referred to as the Perceived Self (see also Rochat, 2003). Phenomena of action identity, if they exist, would suggest that stable action representations allow one to recognize oneÕs own way of doing things, oneÕs action style, so to speak. And if one thinks about exceptional musicians, dancers, or athletes, it seems quite plausible that they should be able to recognize their action style. However, there is reason to assume that phenomena of action identity also can be observed in less exceptional performers. After all, there are action domains in which almost every adult is more or less of an expert (e.g., walking, throwing, clap- ping, or handwriting). Also, individuals carry out the same actions in different ways. Possible reasons for inter-individual variability include differences in anatomical constraints, different learning histories, and different levels of expertise. All of these inter-individual differences could give rise to phenomena of action identity, at least if a given individual performs the actions in question in a relatively stable manner. The first aim of the present paper is to provide a theoretical basis for addressing phenomena of action identity, using current theoretical approaches that postulate a contribution of the action system to perception. These approaches will provide principles to explain how action knowledge becomes activated through perception (even when one has currently no intention to perform the action), and to explain why there could be an asymmetry between observing oneÕs own actions and somebody elseÕs actions. The second aim is to then provide an overview of studies that ex- plored various phenomena of action identity in different action domains. Some of these studies addressed the question of whether individuals can recognize their own past actions. The remaining studies addressed the question of whether one can generate more accurate predictions for oneÕs 622 G. Knoblich, R. Flach / Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2003) 620–632 own past actions and whether the higher accuracy facilitates coordinating new actions with the perceived ones. 2. Action identity as a marker for the action systems contributions to perception Exploring phenomena of action identity allows one to address the important theoretical question of whether and how the action system contributes to action perception in a new way. Several theoretical frameworks have postulated that such contributions exist, e.g., GibsonÕs (1979) ecological theory of perception, and the motor theory of speech perception (Liberman & Whalen, 2000). In the following, we will concentrate on the common coding approach to perception and action (Hommel, Muusseler,€ Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1997) and on action simulation approaches (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Dokic & Proust, 2002; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Jeannerod, 2001; Knoblich, Seigerschmidt, Flach, & Prinz, 2002). The common coding theory applies JamesÕ ideomotor principle (James, 1890) to the domain of event perception, action perception, and imitation (Greenwald, 1970; Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997, 2002). The original principle was postulated to explain voluntary action. It states that imagining an action will create a tendency to carry it out. This tendency will automatically lead to the execution of the action when no antagonistic mental images are simultaneously present (James, 1890, Vol. II, 526). In addition, the common coding theory claims that the mental images (or representations in more modern terms) do not code actions per se (Prinz, 1997). Rather, it is assumed that the early mental antecedents of an action are coded, more specifically, the distal perceptual events that an action should produce. If the activation of a common code exceeds a certain threshold the corresponding motor codes are automatically triggered. An important implication of this assumption is that there is a common medium for perception and action. In other words, the common coding theory postulates a functional equivalence or commensurability of perceptual and action representations. Accordingly, perceptual representa- tions should contribute to action, and action representations should contribute to perception. Most importantly for the present purpose, the perception of an action should activate action representations to the degree that the perceived and the represented action are similar. A growing body of neuro-physiological evidence suggests that common coding of perception and action is also a principle that applies to the neuronal implementation of perception action links. There are a number of areas in the brain that are active during planning and controlling an action as well as perceiving the actions of others (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Decety & Greezes, 1999). Rizzolatti and his colleges provided evidence for ‘‘mirror neurons’’ in the pre-motor area of the macaque monkey (Metzinger & Gallese, 2003; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). These neurons fire when the monkey carries out object-directed actions. They also fire when the monkey observes the experimenter carrying out the same specific action. Recent positron emission to- mography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies suggest that humans possess a similar mirror system (e.g., Iacoboni et al., 1999; Koski et al., 2002). Further ‘‘motor’’
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