House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee
The Work Programme: experience of different user groups
Written evidence
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published
Published on 14 December 2012 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited
The Work and Pensions Committee
The Work and Pensions Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Work and Pensions and its associated public bodies.
Current membership Dame Anne Begg MP (Labour, Aberdeen South) (Chair) Debbie Abrahams MP (Labour, Oldham East and Saddleworth) Mr Aidan Burley MP (Conservative, Cannock Chase) Jane Ellison MP (Conservative ,Battersea) Graham Evans MP (Conservative, Weaver Vale) Sheila Gilmore MP (Labour, Edinburgh East) Glenda Jackson MP (Labour, Hampstead and Kilburn) Stephen Lloyd MP (Liberal Democrat, Eastbourne) Nigel Mills MP (Conservative, Amber Valley) Anne Marie Morris MP (Conservative , Newton Abbot) Teresa Pearce MP (Labour, Erith and Thamesmead)
The following Members were also members of the Committee during the Parliament: Harriett Baldwin MP (Conservative, West Worcestershire), Andrew Bingham MP (Conservative, High Peak), Karen Bradley MP (Conservative, Staffordshire Moorlands), Ms Karen Buck MP (Labour, Westminster North), Alex Cunningham MP (Labour, Stockton North), Margaret Curran MP (Labour, Glasgow East), Richard Graham MP (Conservative, Gloucester), Kate Green MP (Labour, Stretford and Urmston), Oliver Heald MP (Conservative, North East Hertfordshire), Sajid Javid MP (Conservative, Bromsgrove), Brandon Lewis MP (Conservative, Great Yarmouth) and Shabana Mahmood MP (Labour, Birmingham, Ladywood)
Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk. Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/workpencom.
The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume.
Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Carol Oxborough (Clerk), David Foster (Committee Media Adviser), James Clarke (Inquiry Manager), Daniela Silcock (Committee Specialist), Emma Sawyer (Senior Committee Assistant), Hannah Beattie (Committee Assistant). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Work and Pensions Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 2839; the Committee's email address is [email protected].
List of written evidence
1 Indigo Foundation (Norfolk) 2 A G and I (UK) Ltd 3 DROP the TAG 4 Milton Keynes Women and Work 5 Wallace School of Transport 6 Somali Golden Centre of Opportunities 7 Ms M J Canning 8 Social Firms UK 9 National Association for Voluntary and Community Action 10 LifeLine 11 The Pluss Organisation 12 Wheatsheaf Trust 13 Scope 14 Papworth Trust 15 Single Parent Action Network 16 Locality 17 3SC 18 Turning Point 19 A4e 20 Association of Colleges 21 Shaw Trust and Careers Development Group 22 Cymorth Cymru 23 Clink 24 DrugScope and Homeless Link 25 ERSA 26 UK Council on Deafness 27 Royal National Institute for Blind People 28 Centre for Mental Health, Mind, and the Scottish Association for Mental Health 29 Department for Work and Pensions 30 Rehab Group 31 G4S 32 St Mungo’s 33 Mencap 34 Single Homeless Project 35 Community Links 36 London Voluntary Service Council 37 National AIDS Trust 38 National Institute of Adult Continuing Education (England and Wales) 39 Citizens Advice 40 Social Market Foundation 41 The Camden Society 42 Gingerbread
43 Ross Bradford 44 David Marshall 45 Douglas Coombs 46 Prospects Services 47 Crisis
Written evidence submitted by Indigo Foundation (Norfolk)
As a charitable organisation working in the field of Specific Learning Difficulties (Dyslexia) we are pleased to submit the following comments on the implementation of the Work Programme.
1. Indigo’s Credentials and Services 1.1 We are the primary specialist provider for dyslexic adults’ services and are a recognised centre for dyslexia related training: we run accredited courses at Level 1 and Level 3 for Dyslexia Awareness and Supporting Dyslexic Learners.
1.2 We are Investors in People and are MATRIX accredited.
2. Identified Need 2.1 At least 10% of the Work Programme population will have a degree of dyslexia, and 4% will be severe. We would therefore expect these people to require our services.
2.2 As many children leave the school system undiagnosed and training providers will come into contact with dyslexic people, providers should know to refer to INDIGO for diagnosis.
2.3 All training organisations need to be fully aware of dyslexia and how to help and support dyslexia. We do not expect them to diagnose the condition – however, support for dyslexic people’s needs is vital.
3. Referral Practice 3.1 We do not receive a noticeable volume of referrals and we believe this is due to the fact that our services need to be paid for. We are a completely not- for-profit organisation.
3.2 Contract holders seem unwilling to provide financial support for disadvantaged dyslexic people in need of diagnosis or support: this is a gap in the services for Work Programme participants.
3.3 There is a discrepancy between the services provided under Access to Work (Department of Work and Pensions) for employed adults to help overcome work-related obstacles and the services provided on the Work Programme. The Disability Discrimination Act applies to the Work Programme just as it does for employers.
4. Conclusion 4.1 The method of payment on result makes it impossible for us to tender for services as we are not an end-to-end provider.
4.2 Whoever holds the contract for the Work Programme should be held accountable for provision of specialist services for dyslexic people to an acceptable quality standard.
4.3 The commissioners of the Work Programme also need to be aware of the acceptable standards required and the reasonable adjustments that must be put in place.
As a not-for-profit organisation, we are always pleased to be consulted and provide information, advice and guidance.
15 November 2012
Written evidence submitted by Gill Marshall, A G & I (UK) Ltd
I have not been directly involved but as a new Training Provider and having had dealings with providers of Work Programmes in my previous roles, I have the following comments:
• There are too many providers delivering the same work programmes which results in money being wasted through duplication of overhead costs. Companies such as A4e/Ingeus are too large to effectively run the programme and have far too much control. It would be better if there were one centre (Centre of Training & Educational Excellence) in each county holding the funding, regulating and managing the training providers to ensure standards and performances are met. Training providers would still have to be approved but there should be a limit on the number of providers in each area. This would reduce the current number of contracts that are awarded and subsequently sub‐contracted, thereby saving money. • Not enough reviews are carried out to monitor the training providers and how they deliver or how successful they are. Anyone can claim that they are successful, A4e being a prime example! • One centre in each county would be easier for people who use the service to know where they can go and to get help • There should also be a more flexible approach to help the unemployed. What is generally forgotten is that everyone is an individual and should be treated equally and fairly – so if there are other programmes that would suit a claimant to help get back into work then they should be able to opt for these. Plus I personally feel a lot of the programmes offered are not challenging enough and more inspiring courses should be offered. The one centre per county approach would be better suited to do this.
A lot of problems arise because of the funding and how it is administered. Competition between providers is NOT driving performance up. Arguably it is the other way round with corners being cut and statistics manipulated, in order that the providers get the money to survive. When you only get payment on outcomes paying wages and costs is important, this applies to any size company, otherwise they fail. You should NOT have competition where people’s lives are involved and providers should not have to worry all the time about whether they will have enough money each month to pay staff or if they will keep getting funding to keep going.
I also find that funding goes to the same providers and is a ‘closed shop’ for other providers who bid for the funding. If a centre for training by county is approved then the committee approved to manage it must be changed yearly/2 yearly so things do not get stale and so there is openness and fairness.
Links to the Apprenticeship Service could also be adopted and also save on wasted funding.
If there is one Training Funding Stream then duplication of training and funding would be more effective and better outcomes could be achieved.
6 November 2012 Written evidence submitted by Anna Burke, Consultant Partner, Drop the tag
I was the Managing Director of Eco-Actif Services CIC, 46 Throwley Way, Sutton SM1 4AF, a small social enterprise that held a Work Programme contract from July 2011 – July 2012, when the Company went into voluntary liquidation. Eco-Actif was originally a spin-off from Sutton Council and provided welfare-to-work services for the furthest from the mainstream, including ex-offenders, serving prisoners, young offenders and addicts. We successfully ran a direct DWP funded programme, Progress2Work, for nine years in South London and Surrey. Eco-Actif had a turnover of £700,000, 14 staff and a potential order book of over £1,000,000 when it closed down.
1. Prime Provider Model – The Background - When Progress2Work funding ceased early in 2011 we sought funding to carry on helping disadvantaged people. We secured a small Work Programme contract to work with Sutton residents. We also had a number of specialist contracts to work with offenders but never actually had any work through these contracts.
1.1 Our Work Programme contract was a second-tier sub-contract under A4e, the Prime Contractor and the first tier contractor, 3SC. The impact on us as service providers was twofold – the financial impact of payment by results on a small organisation and the fact that we only received £210 of the average £400 attachment fee in Year One. This double impact meant that we found it very difficult to provide the quality of service and adviser time that we were contracted for. Indeed we felt it would be unethical to provide less. The double layer of contractors also meant that it was taking an average of 10 weeks for invoices to be paid, which was disastrous for our cash flow.
1.2 Our Work Programme contract was effective but losing a small amount of money each month. We had robust plans to turn this around and were starting to be successful in this. In the meantime, we were seeking funds to run another PBR contract. We found that that, although our sustained job outcomes were reported to us at 38%, the general financial reputation of the work programme, together with a knock on effect from the media storm surrounding A4e, meant that we were unable to secure finance and our ability to deliver new work was dependant on our being able to fund the delay between delivery and payment under PBR contracts. The Board unanimously decided that it would be impossible for us to continue to provide quality services and we entered into voluntary liquidation. The Work Programme was not solely responsible for Eco-Actif’s demise – however, it did render us unrescuable. I understand that we are by no means the only provider to have found ourselves in this position.
1.3 http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/index.cfm?event=page.search&sSearchPhrase= Eco%2DActif This is a link to an article in Third Sector Magazine featuring the closure of Eco-Actif.
1.4 Effects on Service Provision – I hope that the evidence above shows the effect on the sub-contractors – however; quite rightly, this inquiry is focusing on the effect on participants. The model makes it difficult for organisations to fully cater for participants’ particular needs. One of the main reasons for this is randomisation. The programme was devised so that participants are randomly allocated to providers within a geographical area, in order to promote competition and provide a robust statistical analysis of results. This has had the unfortunate side effect of not always directing clients to the best provision for them. As an example, Eco-Actif was a specialist in offending but we have many examples of offenders being allocated to providers with no experience in this field. Conversely, we were allocated clients whose needs might have been better met by another provider with specialist knowledge of their particular barriers (e.g. parents of disabled children, visually impaired people). This was felt particularly sharply in the case of sex offenders. Eco- Actif was a specialist in this very difficult field – yet sex offenders leaving custody were of necessity referred to other providers with no experience of the issues involved. The model allowed for referrals to specialist sub contractors but there was no money in the system to pay for this. Eco-Actif had no referrals as a specialist sub-contractor – however, we understand this as we were unable to afford specialist help ourselves. We were at one point asked to provide services for sex offenders but were only offered £50 per client!
1.5 Eco-Actif had a policy of offering a full service to all participants, without regard to the payment group they were in. We did adhere to and exceed the minimum specified standards – as an example all participants had a dedicated adviser who worked with them throughout the programme. We were, however, under a great deal of pressure to ‘cream and park’. At one point we were told (after a monitoring visit) that our advisers were ‘very good and experts in their field’. We were then advised to redeploy them to other projects and employ more sales oriented staff who ‘would not care so much’. It seems to me that minimum standards were perhaps not specified in sufficient detail by DWP. As an example of this, I have always regarded a minimum standard of engaging with a participant once a month to be an absolute minimum – that is a clause to protect the provider from breach of contract if, in exceptional circumstances, they are unable to work with the client for a short period. It is impossible to help a disadvantaged jobseeker to find work if monthly meetings become the norm, which appears to be the case with some providers.
2. Black Box Approach – As a subcontractor, it appeared to me that the Black Box approach only applied to prime contractors. We were given very little leeway in how we worked with clients, which made it challenging to provide the personalised service we had previously found so effective. There was very little in A4e’s approach that could be considered in any way innovative.
Summary
I have only commented on those aspects of the inquiry where I feel our experiences are particularly pertinent. These are – • Whilst we understood the payments by results model, the very small amount of attachment funding left when the primes have taken their percentage made it difficult to work with clients and impossible to invest in the programme. Delays in payment exacerbate this already difficult situation and make financial projections almost impossible. • The reputation of the Work Programme disincentivises investors from investing in companies that run WP provision. • Randomisation has an adverse effect on quality of provision for disadvantaged individuals. • The model encourages ‘creaming and parking’ and pressurises social enterprises and charities to work in a way that is contrary to their ethics. • We saw no evidence of a ‘Black Box’ approach. • The ultimate losers in this chain of events have been the specialist clients on both the Work Programme and other Eco-Actif contracts, who we are no longer able to help.
23 November 2012 Written evidence submitted by Milton Keynes Women and Work
This submission is in response to the Work and Pensions Committee inquiry into the effect of the Work Programme and how it is working for different user groups. This response is primarily regarding the prime provider model and its impact on subcontractors, and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs.
1. Milton Keynes Women & Work (charity No 1010038) established an agreement with the local A4e office to deliver various training packages. A4e did not adhere to the terms of the agreement e.g. a) They did not confirm numbers of attendees in time, did not give agreed notice times to cancel a course, did not give agreed notice period to cancel the crèche provision we had outsourced. All of this had a negative financial effect on the charity. b) They did not pay their invoices for several months which also impacted on the charities cash-flow. c) They cancelled a course we had an agreement to provide for them and started delivering a course in-house based on the format and content we had devised.
2. At a joint meeting Maximus said that they would refer their clients to our charity to use our funded services. They would not sub-contract us to deliver services for them and did not acknowledge any problem with using charitable resources to reach their targets.
3. We have had clients try to access the charities funded services who are on the Maximus or A4e programmes who have told us that they are not getting adequate, professional help with their job search and training.
26 November 2012
Written evidence submitted by the Wallace School of Transport
We write in response to the inquiry into how well the Work Programme is working for different user groups.
Here are our concerns:
1) We had issues that the Primes (prior to the launch of WP) as they all asked for Expressions of Interest from existing contractors (to help them gain a contract with a 'balanced' portfolio of provision) that in reality (and in practice) they had no intention of seeing through.
2) The 'prime' model means that innovative programmes (like our Work Based Learning) are dismissed out of hand as DWP will not contract with, reasonable size companies, but not Multi-National/Multi-Million Pound leviathans.
3) If the primes buy from us on a casual basis then we have no 'track record' (Ofsted, etc or the equivalent) that we can provide to DWP so that when (and if) contracting comes round again we will have fallen into a 'black hole'.
4) The training that the 'Primes' can't/won't fund are channelled through LVP. But although the 'sign-up' for LVP has some qualifying questions (H&S and creditworthiness) about the company who registers to receive RFQ's it does not address the required quality/accreditation's of the provider. And it does not address the way manipulative providers can 'trick' the LVP system into drawing down funds for training that it then not be delivered.
27 November 2012
Written evidence submitted by the Somali Golden Centre of Opportunities
Summary
Our submission is based on our experience as a supply chain member as a G4S Knowledge Bank Provider in Greater Manchester.
In summary we found:
• The prime provider showed considerable interest in us during the bidding process and when being assessed for the Merlin standards, but very little interest in genuine partnership working to support jobseekers.
• The primes have not referred a single client to us, despite accepting us as part of their supply chain. (We are aware that this is the case for many organisations – it would be interesting to know how many Knowledge Bank providers have received any referrals/payment.)
• Work programme clients are approaching us to use our services but not through any referral process ‐ the assumption seems to be that we can and will support them for free.
• Although primes are supposed to manage and support sub‐contractors in their supply chain, the onus has been us to chase them, make links and pursue them, despite the fact that we are a named supply chain member.
We feel this is of relevance to your inquiry in:
The prime provider model including: its impact on subcontractors; and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs
We believe in practice the aim has been to reduce costs by avoiding paying specialist subcontractors, rather than to ensure appropriate services for clients.
The level of service provide to participants in different payment groups including whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP, and the rigour and effectiveness of DWP’s monitoring and complaints procedure.
The structure does not encourage prime providers to try and meet the needs of the participants – providing them with specialist subcontracted support seems to be viewed as a last resort. Our own experience and feedback from participants and subcontractors suggests that the monitoring and complaints procedures are not ensuring that participants are offered anything other than minimal support. Full Submission
1. Our submission is based on our experience as a supply chain member as a G4S Knowledge Bank Provider in Greater Manchester. See page 7 of http://www.g4s.uk.com/~/media/Files/United%20Kingdom/CPA7%20Exec%20Sum mary.ashx
2. Our engagement with G4S Work Programme started when we signed the contract for the Knowledge Bank Confidence and Motivation as well as ESF Families with Multiple Problems. We thought once we had done this we would then get referrals and help people towards gaining employment we still have not received even 1 referral for the work programme.
3. In June 2011 we contacted G4S Manchester / Cheshire, we felt we needed better connection with G4S, someone who could be an advisor, and could help us gain referrals to our Centre. I was put through to a man named Nick Hughes, Customer Service & Employer Liaison Manager (Greater Manchester, Cheshire & Warrington). We arranged for him to visit our Centre, we found him very helpful and informative, we agreed to do a pilot ESOL for work classes over the summer 2010 starting in beginning July for 4 weeks, we employed our own 2 ESOL tutors to take the class, with at least 30 clients needing ESOL support of all levels the tutors we used were able to teach all level ESOL dividing the class into 2,at the end of the course we did a graduation day, giving certificates to all learners giving them incentives to lean more and not to give up and gain employment. Nick was supporting us with getting the message across that we were a knowledge bank provider providing ESOL support for work and Confidence and Motivation, he invited on our behalf several Job Brokers from Greater Manchester and Cheshire to attend our graduation day. They were Peter Maybury from Reploy and Charlotte Wood, lead advisor for Work Solutions in Manchester and Trafford, as well as Nick, we even paid for the Buffet for ESOL clients and our visitors. Charlotte was totally not interested in what we were offering and was very negative saying that there were plenty of ESOL provision Work Solutions can choose to work with Peter was a little bit more positive and even stayed to the very end. Where Charlotte Wood stayed a few minutes then left.
4. The graduation took place and we took photos that we have posted on our website please visit www.somaligolden.org.uk you can view our Graduation Day. After the day we tried to contact Peter from Reploy and he just wasn’t interested in working with us. With the odds being like that we felt even with Nick’s help and he really tried to help us that we would not get any referrals. Then Nick left G4s and a new lady took over his role ‐ Jane Prior. We thought we could pick up with the good communication with Nick and work with Jane on a positive to getting our organisation referrals. We found Jane hard to reach even to reply to our emails, eventually she contacted me by email and asked me to contact here in 2 weeks’ time when her diary would be free to visit us. After several months when I did not hear anything from G4S, I contacted Ann Marie Naylor, I told her that we had not yet received any referrals. She said she would send Job Brokers for me to contact it took almost 2 weeks , after a lot of badgering she sent me the information. I contacted all Job Brokers, the majority being in Cheshire, at least 3 contacted me saying that they could not work with us at the moment, and the rest did not bother to contact me.
5. I feel that we have been proactive, we have gone out of our way to make contact spending lots of money we could not afford to carry out the 4 week ESOL Class.
6. I made a complaint about G4S to emqc. G4S then contacted me for a meeting. G4S were at that time undertaking their Merlin Assessment, however Jane Prior contacted me for a meeting, which we had, where she said that she had identified for us 70 learners. After the meeting we corresponded by email, where we agreed to the price of £300 per learner, and that a contract would be sent to us. That never happened. I believe because the Merlin Assessment ended, and they had no reason to be so obliging as to follow up the contract with us. I felt at the time that as we were now negotiating with G4S there would be no need to take part in the Merlin Assessment and become a sample; I now feel that we had been tricked by G4S.
7. On DATE, I received an email by Jane Prior, she said that G4S would not be working with us as unfortunately it will not now be possible for G4S to commission these services with our organisation. She says that she realises this will be a disappointment, but the requirements of the client group mean that our offer of provision is not appropriate at this time. She has also forwarded a letter which she has constructed I believe today dated 20th March 2012 explaining there is no guarantee that G4S is obliged to send our organisation learners. I had never seen this letter before, and yet it is dated 20th March 2012. She should have sent the letter when I made the first complaint in March but she had not. I can send you all this information if requested.
8. Even if G4S were not obliged to send learners to our centre, they had sent me emails after that date (20th March 2012) saying that she would have a contract signed saying that we would support 70 learners at £300 per learner. They then change her mind around June time this year saying that she would need to find funding for this project. I personally believe it was because the Merlin Assessment ended.
9. I have also sent G4S a copy of the dispute resolution procedure in March this year. After I submitted my complaint to Merlin Standard. I was then contacted by a Tim Andrews Work Programmes Division Contracted Customer Services Directorate. He contacted me by phone to tell me that my complaint was not upheld; I felt that he did not look at my side of the story. I found him in favour of G4S. I can send you all this information if requested.
29 November 2012 Written evidence submitted by Ms M J Canning
The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups including: whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP; and the rigour and effectiveness of DWP’s monitoring and complaints procedures;
1 - If my experiences as a user of the work program are standard it is a miserable failure. I am 58 and long-term unemployed. This is my second year on the program.
2 - Bad service experiences
My first WP advisor, though pleasant, failed to come up with any constructive way of moving forward, but at least agreed I had taken too many courses which led nowhere, only to send me off to a sub-contractor for two of the most useless courses imaginable. Prior to those I had to do tests in basic maths and English. Basic was an over-statement. I have an honours degree, and O levels in both subjects, yet was asked what two plus two equals. The English paper was little better, asking me to circle the word spelled incorrectly ( wehn!!!) Next came a positive thinking course, which made me feel like a Stepford Wife. ‘We’ll change the way you think’ I was patronisingly told, when it’s obvious my inability to get a job is merely because of my age and the fact that few employers will even consider the long-term unemployed, and has nothing whatever to do with my thought processes. It seemed pretty obvious to me that if twenty of us went for the same job after that positive thinking course, it was not going to work for nineteen of us. I was then sent on a warehousing course from which I was sent home as over-qualified. My second advisor, a very creative individual of the sort Ingeus favour, correctly ascertained I would be best working in the third sector, but the tasks she gave me were ridiculous. I had to contact ten charities with a view to a salaried job, at a time when they are cutting back, and at 58 and long-term unemployed. Most looked at me as if I was from another galaxy. One, the Salvation Army, even offered to pray for me! I protested to my MP and was finally told I could find voluntary work, which I have done.
3 - Solution for long-term unemployed
This solution could be carried out by Job Centre employees just as well, but if the work program cannot be discontinued I suggest the following:
4 - Workfare has been much criticised and rightly so, since it has been seen to not lead to paid employment in the majority of cases, and claimants are cynically used as cheap labour by some employers. Workfare further alienates job seekers, but if they had a real choice along with a training opportunity, I think many would find it very satisfactory. The WP advisor should ask each person what line of work they would like to go for and, if it requires training, arrange for an employer to provide the necessary training on the job (courses are not accepted by employers as experience). The employer should receive part of the work program fee towards the training. Allow the claimant to continue on the dole for the training period, to gain confidence, then get the employer to guarantee six months waged, once training is completed. This would allow us to compete for jobs on equal terms with the continuously employed. If such proper training is not possible it is inhumane to continue to force certain groups to seek employment that does not exist for them. We are well aware that there are 2.6 million unemployed and only a few hundred thousand job vacancies.
5 - Sub-contracting should be discontinued. The primes take advantage by sending the harder to place people to the sub-contractors for useless, demoralising exercises, so that they themselves can concentrate on those they are more likely to profit from i.e. the ones likely to find work without their help.
SUMMARY
We have government expectation of work providers, and of unemployed, yet expectation of employer involvement does not seem to be factored in at all, and any such scheme is doomed to failure. Those work providers that realise this, can see the fault in the scheme, because the government ask the impossible from them also. Those without realisation delight in handing out sanctions. The unemployed realise it first hand. They are sending us on an errand for something that is not in stock, yet we risk sanction for saying so; a recipe for deep-seated alienation.
Being cut off from any useful activity is worsened by enforced participation in useless activity, like prisoners in an exercise yard.
5 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by Social Firms UK
Summary
This submission covers evidence provided by Social Firms UK members who are Work Programme subcontractors or specialist providers. Creaming and parking remains common practice. Lack of, or inappropriate, referrals mean that individual’s needs are not being met. DWP Merlin Standard and monitoringf (i it happens) is ineffective. The cumulative effect of creaming and parking, lack of referrals and lack of support for subcontractors by prime contractors, lack of accountability through the black box system, and DWP’s laissez faire approach has resulted in at least 2 of our members going out of business. This means that there is less specialist provision available to meet the needs of people furthest from the labour market. Incompatible arrangements between the Work Programme and ESF funded employment support mean the individual jobseekers lose out.
1 Introduction
1.1 Social Firms UK is a charity and the national support body for social enterprises that focus on employing, or creating employment opportunities for people facing the most significant barriers in the labour market. This might be because the individual has one or a combination of the following: a learning disability, mental health problems, sensory impairment or other disability, a prison record, drug or alcohol habit, or experience of homelessness.
1.2 We have consulted our members about the issues raised in this enquiry and this response reflects the views and experience of those who are or have been involved in the Work Programme. Involvement has been as “end to end” subcontractors or as specialist providers.
1.3 It is important to note that, for a variety of reasons, only a minority of our members are currently involved in the Work Programme. Our members may not to be involved because: • their business focus is on employment rather than job readiness; • the arrangements offered by the prime providers are not acceptable; • the financial risk is too high; • they have been involved but limited referrals and the restrictions cash flow have eventually led to closure.
2 Differential payment / Creaming and Parking1
2.1 Following the recent announcement of the Work Programme’s performance it’s clear that with so few people staying in work, the programme is not meeting claimants’ needs. All our respondents confirmed that creaming and parking happens regularly.
3 The Prime Provider Model / Impact on subcontractors /tailoring provision to individual need
3.1 Tailoring provision to individual need depends very much on how providers higher up the contracting change carry out their duties, and in particular, whether individuals are referred to appropriate specialists. Our members who are specialist providers have said that they have experience of inappropriate referrals or even no referral at all. So people needing specialist help are not getting it and in some cases are only getting the minimum service of one meeting a month, with requests for additional/specialist help being refused.
3.2 The cumulative effect of creaming and parking, lack of referrals and lack of support for subcontractors by prime contractors, lack of accountability through the black box system, and DWP’s laissez faire approach has resulted in at least 2 of our members going out of business. These organizations were well established specialists, who had been working very successfully for several years to support people furthest from the labour market into work. Specialist support and expertise has now been lost, and the people providing it became unemployed themselves. Not only has the Work Programme been less successful than other programmes in getting people into work, it has actually created unemployment.
4 Rigour and effectiveness of DWP’s monitoring and complaints procedures.
4.1 This response covers: • Prime provider monitoring through the Merlin standard; • Ongoing monitoring ; • Handling/support for people leaving the Work Programme for health reasons.
4.2 In general , while our members who are involved in Work Programme consider that the Merlin Standard is a welcome development, they remain unconvinced that it is being effectively applied and consider that it lacks teeth. For example, given that all prime providers have now been awarded the standard, one wouldn’t expect a contract offer to be withdrawn on day one of delivery due to a disagreement that had been highlighted at the start of the contract negotiations and which the subcontractor had been told would not affect the sub‐contract offer. This highlights the need for the Standard to cover the tendering and post tendering discussion
1 “Creaming” refers to prime and tier 2 contractors giving preferential treatment to people who are more likely to find and stay in work. “Parking” is where people facing more barriers to work are only given a minimum level of service .
stages. It could also help to overcome the strong suspicions held by several members that some Prime Contractors used third sector organizations as “bid candy”.
4.3 Some of our members have experienced a degree of improvement in their relationships with and the support they receive from their contractors’ over the course of the contract, but there is still a lot to do. Others have not received any support above the bare minimum. They all thought that prime contractors should provide more support. None had experience of DWP monitoring.
4.4 Social Firms UK has written to Ministers at the Office for Civil Society about the model and its impact on third sector subcontractors, and our members have written individually to DWP ministers. The responses received have been polite but along the lines of “ nothing to do with us, it’s a contractual matter and organizations shouldn’t enter into contracts that don’t suit them”. This kind of response does little to counter the criticisms that DWP’s monitoring lack teeth.
4.5 A particular issue raised by one member was how slow administrative systems had a detrimental impact on people leaving the Work Programme due to ill health. They report that when a woman became mentally ill while on the Work Programme and had to be hospitalized, service from the prime provider was suspended immediately but it took a year to move her off that system so that she could get the support and benefits she needed given her health problems.
5 Regional variations and competition between providers
5.1 A particular issue raised by 2 members (one in Wales, the other in North East England) is the interplay between the Work Programme and other “into work support” initiatives that are funded under the European Social Fund. It would appear that concerns about double funding are leading some providers to withdraw services, thus leaving individuals more isolated and with less support than they had before joining the Work Programme – through no fault of their own they’ve fallen between two stools. This is an administrative non‐sense which needs to be resolved urgently with clear guidance issued to all providers. All publically funded support needs to work together in the interest of the individual, and consequently society.
7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by NAVCA
NAVCA is the national voice of local support and development organisations in England. We champion and strengthen voluntary and community action by supporting our members in their work with over 160,000 local charities and community groups. NAVCA believes that voluntary and community action is vital for vibrant and caring communities.
We provide our members with networking opportunities, specialist advice, support, policy information and training. NAVCA is a vital bridge between local groups and national government.
Our specialist teams take a lead on the issues that matter most to local support and development organisations. We influence national and local government policy to strengthen local voluntary and community action.
1 Executive Summary Charities have an important role in supporting people into employment. NAVCA believes that the way that the Work Programme is currently constructed is excluding charities and most importantly it is letting down the people that it is designed to help. We have particular concerns about the financial viability of contracts, the robustness of the Merlin Standards and the appropriateness of many referrals. We make the following recommendations: • Increase data transparency • Make changes to the Merlin Standards • Enforce the Merlin standards • Remove contracts • Ensure that inappropriate referrals are not being made to voluntary organisations • Value individuals’ existing volunteering activities. • Provide tailored support to clients
2 Role of Charities in supporting people into employment 2.1 Charities and voluntary sector organisations have a major role in helping people back into employment. This can be through: • Bespoke targeted support and delivery of services targeted at helping people into employment • Providing specific skills training • Provision of work placements • Providing volunteering opportunities
2.2 Charities have been involved for a long time and there are many organisations that have significant experience in the field. We have concerns that the Work Programme is either side-
lining these organisations, driving them out of business or putting them under pressure to provide support to job-seekers without providing any resources for this. This will mean people looking for work losing out on expertise and support that is so important. NAVCA’s primary concern is not about the effect on organisations but on people looking for work. As voluntary sector organisations are not properly involved in the Work Programme, it is failing to help the unemployed, the people it is designed to help.
3. Transparency 3.1 Although data has recently been released, it has until then been very difficult to obtain any figures on the success of the programme. Furthermore providers feel unable to share their experiences and performance publicly, despite Government clarifications on this matter. This seems to conflict with the Government’s commitment to open data and makes scrutiny of the programme difficult.
4. Financial viability of contracts 4.1 The Committee is no doubt well aware of the organisations that have publicly closed or terminated their contracts because the arrangements have proved not to be financially viable. From what our members tell us, it is clear that their demise has had an impact on local people. However, we also know that these are not isolated cases. Other organisations have indicated that they are considering giving up their contract but do not wish to go public because it may affect on-going discussions and because clauses in their contracts prevent them criticising the DWP or contractors. Voluntary sector providers consistently report that the true cost of helping individuals into employment is not being met by payments offered by prime providers. The clients that are being referred to them need substantial help and there are suspicions that the prime providers have focussed their work on the “easier to place people”, passing the most difficult cases to sub-contractors. The Work Programme appears to be resulting in a reduction in the number of local providers, reducing local choice and the loss of experienced and valued local services. This will mean a reduction in help to people who most need support.
5. Merlin Standards 5.1 NAVCA has received reports of unfair treatment of voluntary sector providers by prime contractors; practices include passing on costs, failing to plan workflow and reneging on agreements. We are concerned that some prime contractors have been cherry-picking – getting the “easiest to place” in work on their own books expecting charities to deal with the harder (and more expensive) people to place. Elsewhere, it seems that many charities were simply “bid candy” and, it appears, that the prime contractor has no intention of actually sub-contracting to them. All these practices mean that people looking for work lose out on the support they should have received. The Merlin Standards were supposed to promote supply chain excellence. It was therefore surprising that despite the public reports of significant supply chain issues, all the prime providers have been accredited. This seems to indicate that the Merlin standard lacks teeth and fails to protect small contractors, thereby letting down people looking for jobs.
6. Inappropriate referrals 6.1 Many volunteer centres that do not have contracts with providers have reported that they are having a significant increase in people on the Work Programme being referred to them. In many cases, these people are: • Told not to tell the member that they are on the Work Programme, because the provider has no intention of paying for the support that the Volunteer Centre will provide • Unaware of what volunteering is, and that it should be voluntary • Given the impression that if they do not volunteer they will lose their benefits • Far from being volunteer-ready, and so need a significant amount of support This still seems to be occurring despite the letter in November 2011 to Volunteering England from the then Minister of State for Work and Pensions, that this should not occur1.
6.2 Volunteer centres are seeing an increase in enquiries from people with no real interest in volunteering or who need significant input to help them into volunteering. Many of these people do not understand what volunteering involves or the reasons why it may be helpful for them. Many do not even understand why they have been referred or that volunteering is unpaid and in its very essence voluntary. As the prime providers have made no contact with the Volunteer centres, and do not reply to approaches, it has not been possible to: • Discuss setting up support programmes that: o explain what volunteering is and how it can help them gain skills necessary for employment o provide the intense support that many of the individuals need • Discuss the appropriateness of referrals
6.3 There are several consequences of these inappropriate referrals: • Referred people feel let down because the providers have not made arrangements for volunteer centres to accept the referrals. Volunteer centres in general do not have the resources to provide intensive long term support on a one to one basis to individuals who show no interest in volunteering. Those that have the expertise to provide such support, would be keen to discuss doing so provided there was a prospect of being resourced to provide such a service. It is unreasonable to expect them to be able to finance this from their existing funding because this was never designed to support the significant numbers of people that are now being referred to them who need substantial input before they become volunteering ready. • People feel they are being compelled to volunteer, undermining their interest in volunteering and demeaning volunteering generally. Where volunteer centres have the capacity to help people understand the benefits of volunteering, people on the Work Programme are generally more interested in taking part. However volunteer centres are
1 http://www.volunteering.org.uk/images/stories/Volunteering- England/Documents/Policy/Benefits_employment/response_from_chris_grayling_mp.pdf generally funded to support people who have made a conscious decision to volunteer, so without the resources to support intensive one to one guidance on the nature and benefits of volunteering, people on the Work Programme will miss out. Many people are losing out on this because there is no funding for such support. • Other people, not on the Work Programme, are keen and motivated to volunteer but find it harder to gain support because the volunteer centre’s capacity is being absorbed by supporting reluctant Work Programme placements.
7. Undermining existing volunteer placements 7.1 Organisations have reported that some of their existing volunteers, who are making progress in skills development and are desperate to work, are being dissuaded or even prevented from volunteering. It appears that some people are still being given inaccurate information about the law relating to volunteering. Equally some people seem to be being required to undertake Work Programme activities in place of existing volunteering activities. Where a person is clearly actively engaged in constructive activity, it would seem to be a negative move to force them to stop their existing volunteering activity, in order to engage in Work Programme activities, which do not help move the person closer to employment.
8. Lack of support to vulnerable clients 8.1 Members and local organisations, that members have put in contact with us, have also reported concerns based on the personal experiences of volunteers or clients who have been referred to the Work Programme. The organisations report concerns that individuals with particular support needs, including mental health issues, do not appear to be receiving support addressing their particular circumstances.
9. Recommendations 9.1 Increase transparency: There needs to be a change of culture at the Department for Work and Pensions and amongst prime providers that encourages transparency and openness.
9.2 Make changes to the Merlin Standards. We are grateful to David Tyler at Community Matters who has shared with us specific recommendations, that he has already made to the Department for Work and Pensions. These are listed in Appendix 1 as they have not been published elsewhere.
9.3 Enforce the Merlin standards with a regulator that has powers to investigate and ensure change occurs. This could be part of an appropriate existing regulator or a separate body. It should seek out bad practice with activities such as mystery shopping and sample audits.
9.4 Remove contracts from suppliers that have failed to deliver what they promised, be this targets or supplier relations.
9.5 Ensure that inappropriate referrals are not being made to voluntary organisations. The Department for Work and Pensions should ensure that prime contractors should not refer or recommend individuals to organisations that they do not have some agreement or arrangement with. Volunteer Centres should not be expected to do complex placement work for free.
9.6 Value individuals’ existing volunteering activities. Referral to the Work Programme should not undermine existing positive action being undertaken by individuals.
9.7 Provide tailored support: The ‘black box’ approach that allows providers to design services as they see fit, should be supporting individuals to obtain the support they need. Providers need to be trained to work effectively with a range of clients or refer people on a properly funded basis to services that can offer that support.
Appendix 1: Community Matters recommendations on changes to the Merlin Standards
• In the section on ‘supply chain design’, VCSE organisations, small organisations, local organisations and SMEs should be specifically mentioned in the requirement to demonstrate ‘enrichment of supply chains’. We also strongly urge that the requirement to engage with wider networks outside of supply chains be reinforced to include support and resource for relevant networks contributing indirectly to the outcomes of their contract. Services such as welfare to work, offender management and health recovery services have too long taken for granted local social capital projects and the work of self- help groups as a free social good, despite the fact that their outcomes may depend upon it. Prime and relevant sub-contractors should be encouraged to pay for this underpinning support through grants where sub-contracting mechanisms are too cumbersome or inappropriate. They should also be encouraged to use local community venues for meetings and service delivery and source ancillary goods and services locally. • In the section on ‘collaboration, cooperation and communication’, prime contractors should be urged to avoid unreasonably imposing unduly burdensome systems and processes on supply chain partners and instead see it as their job to absorb bureaucracy. This may include interpreting technical documents for small sub- contractors and ensuring that processes and reporting are proportionate to the value of the sub-contract. • In the section on ‘contracting and funding’, prime contractors should be urged to avoid sub-contracting at punitive rates and marginalising VCSE and local organisations with token roles and be prepared to make payments in advance of expenditure where this is appropriate and necessary. They should also be urged to negotiate with Commissioners to minimise information requirements, insurance requirements and changes to contract terms once started. This will help attract smaller organisations to their supply chains. They should also have to justify their mark-up for supply chain and contract management and demonstrate that it is reasonable and relative to the degree of risk absorbed and the value added. Where they have negotiated longer contracts they should also offer contracts of sufficient length (subject to performance) to their supply chain to enable long-term planning and investment. • In the section on ‘demonstrating business and commercial integrity’, Primes should be urged to develop an agreed communications and media strategy (that avoids a blame culture), have a clear and fair process for dealing with sub-contractor failure or perceived failure, and have clear mechanisms to protect contract, client and supply chain in the event of Prime failure. They should also guarantee that they will not seek to obstruct or prevent sub-contractors from presenting reasonable strategic or operational grievances to the Commissioner, not encourage sub-contractors to present as employees of the prime contractor in dealings with the customers and will not ‘poach’ potential delivery staff during sub-contracting negotiations. • In the section on ‘Quality Assurance and Compliance’, the requirement to develop “policies and processes to ensure and maintain the security of all data and assets within the supply chain” should be reinforced to include confidentiality of data and agreements with partners about the limits of data usage.
7 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by Lifeline
Executive Summary
1. This is a written submission of evidence to the Work and Pensions Select Committee’s Inquiry into how well the Work Programme is working for different user groups. LifeLine is responding to one of the target issues identified by the Committee:
• The “black box” approach to service delivery including: whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups.
2. In order to understand the experience of our Work Programme clients, LifeLine held three focus groups in November 2012, asking 15 clients a series of six questions to discuss which elements of LifeLine’s black-box approach they found most effective. The feedback from this focus group, as well as feedback our organisation’s biannual Census of Work Programme clients, is presented in this submission.
3. Based on LifeLine’s experience of delivering the black box-approach to different customer groups, we are making the following recommendations: • Work Programme providers should continue to be innovative in their delivery, and test different ways of working in order to move all customers into sustained employment. Taking a solution-focused approach, LifeLine is currently undertaking a number of pilots to improve provision for our clients of different groups and backgrounds. • The Department of Work and Pensions should also play a key role in sharing innovative best practice throughout the sector. • The Department of Work and Pensions should remove the random allocation for voluntary customers, and allow Work Programme providers to engage these customers directly to facilitate a positive warm handover into the Work Programme for people furthest from the labour market.
About LifeLine
4. LifeLine is a charity that equips people for life and work. We do this by recognising the importance of the WHOLE person, WHOLE family and the WHOLE community. Over the last 12 years, we have grown from a small organisation with two part-time members of staff, to one of the larger community- based, social enterprises in London, with an annual turnover of £4.2 million in 2011-12.
5. Our work is organised into three divisions: • Employment and Skills - enabling unemployed adults to identify the right path for them and to gain sustainable work with prospects for progression; • Youth - supporting young people to finish their education and progress into the workplace; and • Families - facilitating the development of stronger family relationships.
LifeLine’s factual information
6. As a subcontractor to A4e, LifeLine is a provider of the Work Programme in East London. We are keen to provide a platform for the views of our customers on the Work Programme, and will therefore be responding to the following target issue:
• The “black box” approach to service delivery including: whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups.
7. We held the focus groups in our centres in Barking, Dagenham and Redbridge, asking the following six questions to clients to find out which elements of LifeLine’s black box approach that they found effective:
• What has been different about the Work Programme compared to previous employment programmes? • How is LifeLine different from the Jobcentre? • What do you like about the Work Programme? • What do you dislike about the Work Programme? • What would you like more of? • What has helped you most on the Work Programme?
8. Facilitated by Employment Coaches, the focus groups contained 15 clients from different backgrounds and payment groups:
• In Barking, there were 4 clients: ‐ 1 White British male in the JSA 25 Plus group of CAG1 classification1; and ‐ 3 females of BME origin in the JSA 25 Plus group and of CAG2 classification2. • In Dagenham, there were 6 clients:
1 CAG1 clients are close to the labour market, and are ready to fully engage with the job seeking process (A4e classification system) 2 CAG2 clients have some barriers to employment, and require further skills to enable them to move closer to the labour market (A4e classification system) ‐ 1 White British female in the JSA 18-24 group of CAG2 classification; ‐ 1 male of BME origin in the JSA 25 Plus group of CAG1 classification; ‐ 1 White British female in the JSA 25 Plus group of CAG2 classification; ‐ 1 White British female in the JSA Early Access group of CAG3 classification3; ‐ 1 male of BME origin in the ESA Volunteers group of CAG3 classification; and ‐ 1 White British female in the JSA EX IB group of CAG1 classification.
• In Redbridge, there were 5 clients: ‐ 1 female of BME origin in the JSA 18-24 group of CAG1 classification ‐ 1 female of BME origin in the JSA 25 plus group of CAG1 classification ‐ 1 male of BME origin in the JSA 25 plus group of CAG1 classification ‐ 1 male of BME origin in the JSA 25 plus group of CAG2 classification ‐ 1 female of BME origin in the JSA Early Access group of CAG2 classification
9. These 15 clients have received a total of 89 appointments with LifeLine’s Employment Coaches, and accessed a total of 34 interventions.
10. 13% of our focus group clients were JSA claimants aged 18-24. LifeLine is very committed to maximising the Department of Work and Pensions’ Youth Contract wage incentive scheme for employers to support young people into work. Five employers will be taking up the scheme with LifeLine.
11. A key element of LifeLine’s black box offer is the personal development course CrossRoads (created by Day 2 Consulting). Designed to enable participants to find quality of life through discovering a purpose for their life, CrossRoads works particularly well for those who are furthest from the labour market. An evaluation of the impact of our CrossRoads courses on participants (including 44 clients on the Work Programme) found a 75% increase in clients who thought that getting a job was a priority after taking the course. Below are some comments from participants about what they would do differently after the course:
Before CrossRoads I would have: After CrossRoads I would:
…difficulty in identifying my skills and Be able to identify my skills and qualities better qualities. which will help with my CV and interviews.
Be complacent, not utilising my potential. Keep on track, be more productive, utilise my potential, get more out of myself.
3 CAG3 clients have multiple barriers to employment, and are furthest from the labour market (A4e classification system) Question 1: What has been different about the Work Programme compared to previous employment programmes?
12. (a) Responses from the Barking Focus Group
One client had never been on other employment programmes. The other Barking clients all gave very positive responses in favour of Work Programme delivery, identifying that LifeLine’s staff are more helpful and encouraging.
One client appreciated the fact that she had been given information about the different ways she could get back into work:
“She gives that option to you of being self-employed after assessing your abilities.”
Some of the clients spoke about how they received the support from LifeLine’s Employment Coach to overcome their barriers:
“Sometimes you’re scared of finding a job. When she comes up to you, I feel like I can do something and be something.”
“When you get a rejection, that can push you like 100 metres back, but we have the chance where if they knock you back, [LifeLine] push you even harder.”
12. (b) Responses from the Dagenham Focus Group
One client had not attended other programmes. All other Dagenham clients expressed a better experience on the Work Programme, and were particularly positive about the friendliness of LifeLine’s staff, and the individual attention they receive.
One client stated:
“You get the feeling that you are somebody rather than a statistic. With your organisation, it’s designed and curated to the individual, for the person’s needs, with what they really want.”
A number of clients appreciated the efforts by staff to give them additional support:
“They do go out of their way.”
“They’re just genuine, they always know how to help. Even if the place is closed.”
12. (c) Responses from the Redbridge Focus Group
As well as commenting on the friendliness of staff, the Redbridge clients found that the Work Programme at LifeLine was much better in comparison to how it was described to them at the Jobcentre:
“I think with the Jobcentre they portrayed it a really scary way, talking about sanctions, but you’re all friendly.”
“The Jobcentre kinda told me, we are going to put you on this job programme, it’s going in be for two years, it’s mandatory to attend, and if you don’t, your benefit is going to be stopped. But then now it’s alright.”
12. Question 2: How is LifeLine different from the Jobcentre?
13. (a) Responses from the Barking Focus Group
The majority of the Barking clients did not have positive experiences with the Jobcentre. The main differences noted were:
• Work Programme providers offer more practical resources to help clients into employment; and • Work Programme staff have more capacity to build relationships with their clients
One client summarised her opinion of the Jobcentre:
“I can’t understand how someone can be signing on for 3 years. It’s because they’re not getting enough help from where they are supposed to be going to seek help.”
In comparison to the Jobcentre, one client said of LifeLine:
“Here you can do jobsearch on computer, you have access to the phone, job enquiries, and you have one-to-one discussions. You have more freedom.”
Some of the clients discussed the impersonal nature of the staff at the Jobcentre:
“I think the important thing is building a relationship between you and your advisor, and you don’t do that at the Jobcentre. Every week can be someone new, and that person doesn’t even know you.”
13. (b) Responses from the Dagenham Focus Group
The majority of the Dagenham clients present were unhappy with their experience at the Jobcentre. For example, one client said:
“You know, you don’t get any feedback from the Jobcentre.”
One client didn’t perceive the Jobcentre as a place with the purpose of getting people back into employment:
“It’s a different situation anyway. We don’t go there to get a job, we go there to sign on.”
One client had a positive experience with the Jobcentre, but agreed that LifeLine staff had more knowledge of individual needs:
“I’m not so computer literate as the others, and I’m going to a course now, thanks to [the Work Programme], which the Jobcentre would have never put me on.”
13. (c) Responses from the Redbridge Focus Group
All Redbridge clients found LifeLine to provide a better service in comparison to the Jobcentre, discussing:
• The lack of information received from the Jobcentre staff; and • The flexibility provided by LifeLine.
The general consensus of the group was that the Jobcentre did not provide them enough support:
“I had more interviews in the past month here than I had in the past six months in the Jobcentre.”
Another client, who recently entered into self-employment, appreciated the availability of her Employment Coach at LifeLine:
“My advisor helps me all the time, and I started a new business, and he helped me with this. I can come with any problems, and he helps me.”
13. Question 3: What do you like about the Work Progamme?
14. (a) Responses from the Barking Focus Group
Most of the Barking clients were happy with LifeLine’s delivery of the Work Programme, particularly the advice and support given by Employment Coaches:
“The advisors are committed and dedicated to help me to get back into work.”
“There is no time, apart from me calling and saying ‘I can’t make it because I’m ill’, there is no time [an appointment is cancelled] - your advisor is always there.”
14. (b) Responses from the Dagenham Focus Group
All Dagenham clients expressed that their Employment Coach evidenced genuine understanding for them and their situation:
“Here, they look at your needs and what you can do before they advise you to take a particular job.”
Some clients enjoyed the efficiency of the Work Programme, and the different job search facilities provided:
“Here you have the opportunity to use the internet, and use the telephone.”
14. (c) Responses from the Redbridge Focus Group
The Redbridge clients felt they received a lot of motivation from their Employment Coaches:
“It is helpful, how you corrected my CV and signposted me to things – the Jobcentre wouldn’t do that.”
“They are very included in the process of getting you a job. They care.“
Clients also felt they received the right level of support whenever they needed it:
“I am happy with them because it is easy to get in touch with them, and they help.”
15. Question 4: What do you dislike about the Work Programme?
15. (a) Responses from the Barking Focus Group
Only one client in the Barking group had aspects of the Work Programme that he did not like:
“I just feel like most of the time it’s just a waste of time coming here every week to sit at a computer for an hour doing jobsearch – I do that at home anyway.”
The Employment Coach facilitating the session discussed this issue with the client, explaining that at LifeLine clients are asked to do their jobsearch at our centres to give them the opportunity to ask staff questions, and get feedback on applications as they are writing them.
15. (b) Responses from the Dagenham Focus Group
Everyone in the Dagenham group were generally happy with their experience on the Work Programme. One client in the group disliked the amount of time spent she spent job searching during appointments:
“I had to do it for three hours last week. I was sitting there… like I don’t know what I’m here for.”
Another client disagreed, explaining that job searching at LifeLine gave the opportunity to leave his home:
“I don’t like to do it indoors – for me it’s just about getting out. It can just become mundane and boring.”
15. (c) Responses from the Redbridge Focus Group
The clients in Redbridge were generally satisfied with their experience at LifeLine. One client disliked the resources available:
“I think that the facilities can kind of improve –the lack of computers, and the slowness of computers.”
16. Question 5: What would you like more of?
16. (a) Responses from the Barking Focus Group
The Barking group identified the following:
• More regular one-to-one appointments; • Less time spent on jobsearch; and • More computers available at the centre.
16. (b) Responses from the Dagenham Focus Group
The Dagenham group agreed that more computers were needed, but also that they appreciated the open-plan jobsearch area that enabled them to interact with other clients:
“It’s quite personal, when you’re sort of with everyone… you bond.”
16. (c) Responses from the Redbridge Focus Group
The Redbridge clients all agreed that more employer links would be beneficial, and also the opportunity to obtain access to more work placements. One client commented:
“Because I am from a graduate background, it’s difficult to approach employers out there, but LifeLine actually know how to approach them. I have a lack of experience, so a work placement would be helpful.”
17. Question 6: What has helped you most on the Work Programme?
17. (a) Responses from the Barking Focus Group
The support that the Barking clients felt they had benefitted from the most was:
• One-to-one discussions with their Employment Coach; and • Employability training.
One client shared her experience of an employability course:
“I came here before I went to my interview, and the questions the tutor was telling us they actually asked. Everything just came in mind, and I got the apprenticeship.”
17. (b) Responses from the Dagenham Focus Group
The aspects of the Work Programme that the Dagenham clients gained the most support from were:
• Tailored CV and interview preparation; and • The relationship developed with their Employment Coaches.
One client was able to overcome one of his barriers to employment:
“My CV weren’t really up to date, and I got help with that. Now I am able to hand CVs in for other jobs.”
Another client discussed her experience of interview practice:
“I ain’t had a job interview before, and he went through the questions. It helped with the confidence.”
A number of clients felt that their Employment Coaches were their key source of support:
“You are more in contact with the reality of what people need. You source out what they need, and you source out what they can do.”
17. (c) Responses from the Redbridge Focus Group
The Redbridge group believed that they received the most help from:
• The encouragement received from their Employment Coaches; and • Their Employment Coach identifying sources of appropriate vacancies
Some clients felt supported by their Coaches in the face of job rejections:
“You apply for so many jobs a day, and sometimes you don’t even hear back, but my advisor motivates me.”
“I think LifeLine actually motivates you, and keeps you going, and you know that you can get somewhere in the end and get a job.”
A number of clients discussed how LifeLine staff enabled them to obtain access to vacancies that were difficult to locate:
“My advisor shows me the vacancies, and this is very important, because we don’t know where the vacancies are. “
18. Work Programme Client Feedback from the LifeLine Census
LifeLine conducts a biannual Census of our clients across all of our centres, as a mechanism to obtain feedback regarding their level of satisfaction of our services.
Detailed below are the results from our Work Programme clients who completed the questionnaire in our Barking, Dagenham, Havering and Redbridge Centres about LifeLine’s black box approach to delivery.
Figure 1: Census Responses of LifeLine’s Work Programme Clients
7 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by The Pluss Organisation
1.0 Summary 1.1 This evidence on the delivery of the Work Programme is from the perspective of The Pluss Organisation, a national specialist provider of disability and health condition employment services. 1.2 The initial performance data makes it clear that people furthest from the labour market are benefitting least from the Work Programme. Whilst the programme promises to achieve eventual success with high volume payment groups that include people who are relatively job ready 1, the contractual structure and commercial imperatives of the programme mean that we believe it will continue to fail to meet the employment related needs of people with significant disabilities and health conditions. 1.3 It is the view of Pluss that the needs of people with significant disabilities and health conditions will be best met by a specialist disability programme that is separate from the Work Programme. We also believe that this approach is appropriate for other disadvantaged groups whose needs are not being met by the Work Programme. This may include: people with substance misuse issues, homeless people, people over 50 and care leavers. 1.4 The optimum delivery model for such a specialist programme will feature specialist prime providers and supply chains of practitioners who have developed proven employment methodologies to help disadvantaged groups furthest from the labour market. 1.5 A black box approach should be used alongside contractual requirements that ensure an equitable service is delivered to all and is not dependent on the distance an individual is from the labour market. 2.0 Introduction 2.1 Pluss is a Social Enterprise and the largest Social Firm in the UK. It has over 40 years` experience as a specialist provider of disability employment services. As well as running DWP and local authority employment programmes, it delivers employment opportunities through a range of service-based and manufacturing social enterprises, with approximately 50% of its 600 employees having a disability. 2.2 Pluss is the best performing Work Choice2 provider in the UK in terms of job entry outcomes. We work with over 1000 employers and 5000 disabled customers annually to secure employment opportunities and develop career choices. 2.3 Pluss has been involved in the procurement and delivery of the Work Programme in a number of ways which we have detailed below: 2.4 Pluss are a founding member of Disability Works UK (DWUK), a consortium of 8 major national third sector disability organisations which offers Work Programme prime providers specialist disability and health condition services
1 http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/summ2011-2012/821summ.pdf. 2 The DWP’s specialist disability and health condition employment programme. for their customers. As such, Pluss personnel were involved in detailed negotiations with a significant number of potential Prime providers throughout the Work Programme bidding process, which resulted in DWUK securing subcontracted Work Programme delivery. 2.5 Pluss were offered a number of end-to-end specialist contracts. These were declined as they were deemed to be extremely high risk. Specifically: • The expectation was that Pluss would be responsible for ‘cash flowing’ the contract. Our detailed modelling showed that for a typical contract size of £5m (over 7 years) there is a negative cash flow of £150,000 and, whilst positive cash flow was achieved by the end of year 3, this was temporary with further losses expected in later years3. • Achieving even the ‘temporary break-even’ point was dependent on meeting very challenging targets with a customer group who faced multiple and complex barriers to entering and sustaining employment. • Pluss had no control over the referral process. There was, therefore, a major risk that we would only receive customers who the Prime regarded as being too far from the labour market to warrant resource allocation in their ‘mainstream’ provision.
• None of the Prime providers offered any meaningful assistance with cash flow and, with the Prime’s top sliced management fee varying from a minimum 12.5% up to a maximum of 50%, Pluss would be left with insufficient funding to provide an effective service.
2.6 Pluss entered into an ad-hoc spot purchase arrangement for specialist services with a prime provider. This arrangement proved to be unsatisfactory due to customer volumes being undefined, despite an agreement during negotiations that volumes would be specified. After considerable efforts to demonstrate the nature and value of our services to both the Prime’s managers and front-line staff, no referrals had been received after 12 months. We therefore withdrew from the contract.
2.7 Pluss personnel remain embedded into another Prime's front line delivery staff, where they offer a specialist service for people with disabilities and health conditions using tried and tested supported employment techniques (as far as possible within the confines of the contract). This has met with some degree of success, with job entry levels for the hardest to help groups being higher than the typical levels stated in the recent DWP performance data. (However, it is important to note that they are not as high as those being achieved by Pluss’ delivery of Work Choice). The current commercial arrangements for this contract are based on full cost recovery of staff salaries. The Prime has indicated that this arrangement is not sustainable and has offered a more risky outcome-related arrangement in which Pluss takes a significant proportion of the cash flow risk. This proposal has been declined by Pluss.
3 This was predicated on ESA referral levels that to date have not materialised. The negative cash flow and losses that have materialised as a result of low referral numbers are in fact far worse than our initial predictions.
3.0 The Differential Payment Model 3.1 Pluss believes that the concept of a differential payments model is an improvement on previous schemes and offers the potential for additional specialist resources and support to help those furthest from the labour market to find and keep a job. However, there are problems with the way that this differentiation has been applied in the Work Programme. The result is that it has not incentivised providers to deliver enhanced levels of services to those with higher needs. 3.2 The commercial imperative of a highly end-loaded payment by results programme has made creaming and parking inevitable. What is more, differential payment is applied in relation to payment groups of customers, meaning that `creaming and parking` occurs within each payment group. The only way to avoid this effect would be to differentiate payment for each customer based on a sound assessment of their individual needs. The evidence of creaming and parking is contained in the recent DWP Work Programme Performance data4 and information provided by ERSA4. Analysis undertaken by Pluss indicates that the ‘best case’ current job start performance for the ESA payment groups is 11% (Volunteers and Flow) and 4% (ex-IB). As a comparison, the Work Choice programme, which is directed at individuals further from the labour market, is achieving an average of 22% (Pluss achieves 34% in Devon and Cornwall). The Work Programme is therefore clearly failing the most difficult to help groups5. 3.3 In practice, the Work Programme groups do not effectively distinguish between those who need only a little support and those who need more intensive interventions. The programme relies heavily on benefit type to define a customer’s payment group and hence the support available. This means that a significant minority of people in JSA groups with disabilities and/ or health conditions will not receive the help they need. (For example, in the recent performance data4, 27% of people in the JSA 25+ payment group had a ‘disability indicator’). 3.4 Pluss also believe the current Work Capability Assessment is adding to this problem. Until the WCA becomes fit for purpose, people will continue to be placed on the wrong benefit which will impact negatively on their chances of accessing appropriate support. 3.5 When Primes were establishing supply chains, targets were set for each payment group. The low targets set by the Primes for the harder to help groups at an early stage demonstrated that they never had any intention to invest significant resources into these groups and take advantage of the relatively higher payments that were available. For example, the job outcome expectation for the ESA ex IB group was between 9% and 13%. From the outset, Primes were focusing on more job ready customers with service
4 http://www.ersa.org.uk/ Work Programme Job Start Data, November 2012. 5 Note table 4 in the ERSA report does not give an accurate representation of the Job outcome performance for a number of the ESA payment groups because the sample sizes are insufficient to draw any statistically meaningful conclusions about the total ESA referral populations for specific groups. delivery strategies that involved parking hard to help customers. It is against this background that specialist providers confirm they are not receiving sufficient referrals for their subcontracts to be viable, which is leading to a consequential loss of expertise from the sector as services are withdrawn. Unsurprisingly, in the first 12 months, only 330 people across all of the ESA payment groups secured employment, representing only 1% of the job outcomes delivered by the Work Programme,6 and our analysis shows that the probability of achieving a short job outcome is halved if a person has any type of disability. The Work Programme is effectively ‘locked in’ to a culture of delivering an effective service only to work ready customers. 3.6 From a financial standpoint, the primary purpose of the Work Programme was to generate savings by helping people achieve long term sustainable employment. This is particularly significant for customers in the ESA groups who can potentially spend many years out of work. In comparing the Work Programme with specialist disability programmes, the direct cost may be less for the Work Programme, but on current performance, it is not generating the anticipated social return on investment (which includes benefit savings and tax revenue). It is therefore not providing the same value for money as Work Choice.. In the ESA ex-IB category, where current performance indicates that job starts will be no more that 4%, every job is carrying the cost of 25 attachment fees. This makes the Work Programme relatively expensive compared to Work Choice which has an average performance across all providers of 22% and more than 30% for the best performing providers. 4.0 The Prime Provider Model 4.1 Pluss believes that when the Work Programme model was designed the contract value and size were established to give Prime providers the required critical mass to finance the provision, mitigate the risk (across the supply chain) and absorb variation in customer flows. This is not how current delivery models work. From the perspective of a third sector provider, the model contains two significant flaws: 1. The balance of risk within supply chains has produced unviable subcontracting arrangements; 2. Ineffective engagement and use of specialist providers means that harder to help individuals do not receive an effective service. 4.2 The balance of risk 4.2.1 Subcontracting arrangements have generally involved the Prime passing down DWP terms and conditions to an end-to-end supply chain (typically with a 20% management fee). A number of Primes act as managing agents with no front line delivery, locating a significant level of risk with subcontractors. 4.2.2 Primes generally have a number of subcontracts within a CPA which are split on a geographical basis. This means the risk is further increased for a subcontractor through a decrease in the potential number of attachment payments that are available and a reduction in potential sustainability payments.
6 http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=wp 4.2.3 For providers holding specialist end-to-end contracts, risk is compounded further by the fact that they only receive referrals for the most difficult cases. 4.3 Use of specialist providers 4.3.1The original intention of many of the Primes was to use a specialist supply chain to help the hardest to help cases. The development of this supply chain has been very limited which is due in part to the very low level of referrals from the ESA payment groups. 4.3.2 Pluss` experience is that there is reluctance on the part of Primes to pay a reasonable rate for a specialist end-to-end service. We believe this is partly caused by the belief of a number of Primes that the third sector could and should deliver a free service as they are being supported by charitable donations and other funding sources. 4.4 Pluss believes that the best option to support the hardest to help groups is a separate programme run by specialist primes. Such a programme, run alongside the Work Programme, would yield a higher social return on investment. It would enable the Work Programme to concentrate on delivering outcomes for those closer to the labour market and would mean that the harder to help groups would have an effective service underpinned by an appropriate level of expertise and experience. 5. 0 Minimum Service Level Standards 5.1 Analysis of the Minimum Service Delivery offers7 made by the winning Primes demonstrates that customers are subject to a ‘postcode lottery’ in the service they are guaranteed. 5.2 Each of the Primes commits to offering: • An action plan (with little clarification around process or content); • Job search activity; • A service which is `personalised` or `tailored` (ill-defined); • Regular contact (varies between daily and 4 weeks - no assurance that the contact will be face-to-face).
5.3 At one end of the scale, CDG offer a long list of specific, time-bound commitments for CPA 4 across a five stage customer journey with a focus throughout on health and disability-related barriers and how these will be addressed. At the other end, Ingeus (CPAs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 & 16), Reed (CPA 3), ESG Holdings (CPA 15), Avanta (CPAs 5, 7 & 10), EOS (CPA 14), Pertemps (CPA 14), Serco (CPAs 15 & 17), Best (CPA 16) and Rehab (CPAs 12 & 13) make no reference at all to health or disability. 5.5 There are a series of good practice examples from individual Primes. These include a commitment to provide: • Referral conversion rates to attachments (Maximus, CDG, JHP); • Pre-programme engagement with one-to-one mentoring (CDG); • A named advisor (Seetec, Working Links, G4S, Prospects);
7 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/provider-minimum-service-delivery.pdf • Maximum travelling times to the service via public transport (A4E and EOS); • Specialist health assessments (A4E, CDG); • Time-bound voluntary activities as part of the action plan (CDG).
5.6 What is striking, however, in offers which exist to form the bedrock of delivery guarantees, is the lack of consistency, the vagueness of many of the commitments and the dangers implicit in a universal service for a diverse customer group for many of whom the process will not be suited.
5.7 Pluss believes that the current set of minimal service level standards will not ensure that those with greatest need will get an appropriate level of service. In reality, this is not possible with a high volume, high case load (in excess of 100 per advisor) programme such as the Work Programme.
6.0 Black Box 6.1 The reality of the Work Programme procurement process is that the high risk, end- loaded commercial arrangements have stymied innovation and led to the implementation of broadly similar delivery models amongst the Prime providers and their supply chains. These approaches requiresthe providers to focus on job-ready customers to maximise outcomes. 6.2 The intention to use specialist providers to help those furthest from the labour market hasn’t materialised to any great extent for the reasons described above. As a result, the more difficult to help customers seem to have been parked in pre-work streams where there is evidence of relatively little investment in resources to support them. 6.3 Pluss are concerned that current delivery does not feature evidence-based approaches which customers with mental health and learning disabilities will most benefit from – the Individual Placement and Support (IPS) model endorsed by the Centre for Mental Health8 and the supported employment model endorsed by BASE and others9. Our concern is that many people in these cohorts are quickly being parked on to ‘train and place’ activities, (where place is sourcing a job), in group settings which are cheaper and easier to deliver than more suitable ‘place and train’ methods. Pluss believes that this is likely to be both de-motivating and in some cases harmful to vulnerable people in the harder to help payment groups. 6.4 Recovery in a mental health context is unique to the individual. Under the IPS approach holistic assessment are seen as crucial to establish the nature of the customer’s mental health condition and all relevant factors that create or exacerbate barriers to work. This is done in two stages, first examining general factors that may impact on work, and then reviewing specific work- place barriers. The assessment involves a measure of well-being which can be repeated to demonstrate progress which is most often captured in ‘Recovery Star’ or ‘Work and Social Adjustment’ assessments. IPS`s seven key principles include focusing on paid employment of an individual’s choice,
8 http://www.centreformentalhealth.org.uk/ 9 http://base-uk.org/ not sheltered work or lengthy job preparation, and support that continues once the person gets a job. 6.5 For customers with learning disabilities, Supported Employment is the most appropriate approach (accepted by DWP, DH and ODI). This addresses specific needs and uses: vocational profiling, job matching through direct engagement with employers, job analysis, in-work job coaching, on-the-job training that maximises people`s potential to acquire skills, and the development of natural workplace support which is un-intrusive as possible and fades over time. 6.6 Pluss believes that the expertise to deliver services to harder to help groups lie predominantly with third sector providers and are best utilised through a separate specialist disability programme that concentrates its delivery on these harder to help groups. 7.0 Regional variations in job outcome statistics 7.1 Pluss has had over 40 years of delivering employment programmes in areas of extreme rurality where there are significant cost implications of delivering programmes to isolated communities. The situation is exacerbated by poor labour market conditions where jobs can be seasonal and short term, making difficult delivery conditions even more challenging. The practice of splitting funds across two Prime supply chains can result in neither of them delivering an effective service in these areas. Pluss recommends that for rural area delivery should be apportioned on a geographical basis and carried out by one supply chain. 7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by Wheatsheaf Trust
1. Introduction
Wheatsheaf Trust is a charity based in Southampton that has been supporting deprived local communities with employment, training, and social inclusion initiatives for 15 years. We have six ‘Employment Access Centres’ spread across 5 local authorities in urban South Hampshire. We have three main divisions – adult services, youth support, and intensive work with families. Our activities are funded from various sources, including charitable trusts, local authority grants, and various Government Departments (via Prime Contractors).
2. Summary
• The Work Programme derives from an original intention to enlarge the employable workforce at a time of labour and skills shortages by engaging those furthest from the labour market. It is less relevant, though still useful, at a time of high unemployment. • The best providers will make all aspects of their services available to all client cohorts regardless of their payment group. • Contractual terms are harsh but clear. Wheatsheaf Trust went into it with its eyes open, a strong cashflow, and a careful assessment of the risks, which are considerable. • We are comfortable with the principle of payment by results. At a time of severe constraint on public funds it would be hard to argue for anything else. • To date, our performance is roughly as we predicted, though just below the national MPL. It is too early to make any really useful assessment of long term success. • The Work Programme is not really suitable for small, financially insecure groups who have few other sources of income – unless the Prime Contractor is, unusually, prepared to take most of the risk. • Because of the competitive nature of the Work Programme and the harsh commercial realities, there is a risk of increasing competition for job vacancies between the different providers and Job Centre Plus. • The IT security requirements have been extremely expensive, burdensome, and difficult to operate. They have also reduced our overall efficiency. • There is a serious risk that DWP, and local communities may lose high-performing local subcontractors if the Prime Contractor loses market share or has its contract terminated through under-performance elsewhere in the CPA.
3. Differential Payments
3.1 The broad principles of differential payments are correct. However, there are a large number of people who have been wrongly assigned to the JSA groups, so in practice the differentials do not often align with the amount of work required by different categories of disadvantage.
3.2 The very best providers will not discriminate against any client group, but provide support tailored to individual needs and aspirations. At Wheatsheaf Trust, this approach extends to ‘blindness’ as between
different funding contracts, so WP clients have access to support funded by other contracts and vice versa. We take pride in the fact that our clients do not need to know which Government programme they are on, or even if they are on one at all. This approach only works where an organisation has a spread of funding sources.
3.3 Considered as financial levers in the current labour market, the WP differentials are not wide enough to discourage creaming and parking. More to the point, the 104 week time on programme is too short to encourage providers to put in the necessary long term support required by those furthest from the labour market. Wheatsheaf Trust has long experience of working with the very long-term workless, and we have examples of people who took 3, 4, or more years of careful support before successfully getting a job. Under WP rules, providers principally motivated by profit will, quite sensibly, not waste resources on anyone unlikely to get a job in 2 years.
4. Prime Provider Model
4.1 On financial and contractual matters, we feel, perhaps unusually, that our WP Prime Contractor has dealt reasonably openly with us. They were willing to re-negotiate substantial parts of the sub-contract, resulting in a 7 page letter of variation which addressed some of our concerns. We have been surprised at how few other sub-contractors appear to have pushed their Primes to soften the contractual terms.
4.2 The financial terms of business with the PC are pretty harsh. Wheatsheaf was fortunate to have reasonably healthy cash reserves in June 2011 and a greater tolerance for risk than most other small subcontractors. Other than a top-sliced attachment fee, no cash flow support is offered by our PC and in the first financial year of the WP we took a cash loss of about £130k (on a £1.5m turnover).
4.3 Management information from the PC is very poor. Perhaps because of some very public criticism about earlier data loss, they have an obsessive fear of giving us any useful figures to judge comparative performance with the rest of the supply chain. Orally, they tell us that we are their best performing sub-contractor, and also out-performing their own direct delivery hitherto (though this is still very early to be assessing overall performance). However, they do not give us even our own performance data in writing or electronically. Our staff have to sit with them in front of a laptop, are given a brief look at our own numbers, and are then sent away with no chance to analyse comparative performance against either other subcontractors or the contract as a whole.
4.4 The ‘black box’ approach does not filter down to subcontractor level. The PC’s concerns about earlier poor publicity leads it to try to micromanage our own delivery even though we can outperform its direct delivery.
4.5 I do not believe that DWP is aware of how massively inefficient and wasteful of resources the procurement process was for sub-contractors. I suspect that the Department thinks it has saved a lot of administration and bureaucracy by restricting the number of Prime Contractors and issuing fewer and larger contracts. Although there may have been a saving of administrative effort at DWP itself, the result has been to push all of the bureaucracy and complication down the food chain.
4.6 By way of illustration, we had to produce expressions of interest (in some cases quite detailed and all in different formats) for 45 PCs at the Framework stage, and then went on to write detailed bids with 9 different Primes at the final bid stage. All of the PCs had different requirements, did not stick to the DWP template for submitting information and due diligence details, and between them absorbed something like 30 – 40 days of our senior management time. Inevitably, the vast majority was abortive because all of them were bidding for the same contract and in effect we had to write 9 different bids to get the same piece of work. We estimate that the total cost of winning the WP subcontract was c. £140,000, but at least we were successful. If we had not won, all that cost would have been abortive. This wasted effort will have been replicated across the voluntary sector in the UK (and also in small commercial providers) and will be paid for either in the increased price of future bids or in reduced spending on other current service provision.
4.7 A major concern is whether, in the event that a prime contractor has its contract withdrawn, DWP will do anything to protect those frontline delivery agencies who are still continuing to perform against their subcontracts. I have been trying to get an answer to this question – a fairly obvious one - for some 2-3 years now, ever since the prime contracting system first started to appear. DWP has chosen to put all its investment into large, sometimes multi-national companies, and has squeezed successful local providers like ourselves out of the direct contracting market. Given the massive investment we have had to make, and the potential damage to long-term local capacity, the Department should take some responsibility to protect subcontractors from the consequences of a failure of government policy.
4.8 We have tried to get answers from ministers and civil servants as to whether the existing sub-contract would simply be novated to the new prime contractor on the same terms, or whether we would have to negotiate new terms. If the latter, a new PC could easily feel in a very strong position to negotiate harder terms, given the vulnerability of sub- contractors. Even if the terms remain the same, there will be considerable disruption in transferring the work. All the prime contractors have different reporting systems, web-based claims mechanisms, and security requirements. We are working with four different Primes on various government contracts at the moment, and it is already causing us difficulty trying to reconcile their various systems with our own management information systems. Working with a new PC will require yet further investment, which we can ill afford after the demands of cash flow in the first year of the contract.
5. Level of Service
5.1 Wheatsheaf Trust was established specifically to work with socially excluded people and those furthest from the labour market. We have pioneered a number of new approaches over the last 14 years (long before it occurred to DWP to commission this type of work) and focus on providing holistic, individualised support tuned to people’s specific needs and aspirations. The Work Programme is not friendly to this approach, and we do not expect it to cover our costs when working with the most marginalised people. We use other Government contracts, local authority grants, and charitable income to ensure that anyone who walks through our door gets the best possible service to improve their economic and social wellbeing.
5.2 The Work Programme was effectively inherited from the last Government and designed to meet the needs of the 2008 labour market. It is considerably less relevant to a situation where there are 2.6 million unemployed and only 450,000 vacancies in the economy. When employment levels were high, the main economic problem was bringing into the labour market new sources of employable talent which was
excluded from finding work for reasons of disadvantage, discrimination, or caring responsibilities. At a time when there are around 5 or 6 unemployed people for every single vacancy, the practical financial incentive is overwhelmingly biased towards ‘parking’ the most disadvantaged. Wheatsheaf Trust uses a spread of funding streams to ensure that this does not happen, but providers more reliant on WP income are finding it difficult to avoid, as the chance of recouping the investment in the more challenging clients is even smaller than 3 years ago.
6. The ‘Black Box’ Approach
6.1 The principle of the ‘Black Box’ is absolutely right, and something for which we have been arguing for many years. Payment by results, as long as the outcome is sufficiently clearly defined, is the correct approach and commissioners should not concern themselves with matters other than performance, quality of service, and value for money. It has been our experience over many years of deficit-funding approaches (such as ESF or SRB) that funders who focus on outcomes rather than the detail of how money is spent will always in the end get better value for money providing that the delivery agency knows what it is doing.
6.2 In practice, the main fault of the WP system is that the ‘Black Box’, as noted above, does not penetrate down the supply chain. We have a long and successful record of getting people, particularly those with high disadvantage, into work and training opportunities and the process is merely hindered by the imposition of complex, one-size-fits-all, systems of management information, IT security, and form-filling. In the Work Programme, DWP is a unique position to confirm whether or not outcomes have been achieved and should do more to minimise the amount of paperwork and other evidence required to substantiate a job outcome.
7. Regional Variations
7.1 The Committee’s request for submissions asks ‘whether competition between providers is driving up performance’. In one respect, our experience is almost the opposite. In Southampton, we have put in a considerable amount of work over the last 5 or 6 years, alongside Job Centre Plus and the Local Authority, to get all the agencies working in the employment and skills arena to co-operate, particularly in approaches to employers. Because providers are now in direct competition with each other for outcome payments and with Job Centre Plus for the few available vacancies, this co-ordinated approach is falling apart and employers are already getting frustrated with a number of multiple approaches from different agencies chasing their vacancies.
7.2 On regional variations generally, the Trust operates in only one CPA, and we do not feel we have any useful comment to offer.
7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by Scope
1. About Scope
1.1. We all want to live in a world of opportunity – to be able to live our own life, play our part and be valued for the person we are. At Scope we’re passionate about possibility. It inspires us every day and means we never set limits on people’s potential. We work with disabled people and their families at every stage of their lives. From offering day to day support and information, to challenging assumptions about disability and influencing decision makers – everything we do is about creating real and lasting change. We believe that a world where all disabled people have the same opportunities as everyone else would be a pretty incredible place for all of us. Together we can make it happen.
1.2. We welcome this opportunity to submit written evidence to the DWP Select Committee Inquiry into the experience of different user groups on the Work Programme, and share the Government’s vision of supporting disabled people to fulfil their potential.
1.3. Scope has previously delivered one ‘end to end’ Work Programme contract as part of the wider Disability Works UK (DWUK) consortium, who will be submitting a separate response to the Inquiry. Scope has now withdrawn from delivering the Work Programme end to end because of a lack of appropriate referrals, an issue we explore further below. However, as part of DWUK, we are currently exploring options for delivering a specialist intervention service for Tier One and Tier Two contractors.
2. Executive summary:
2.1. Recently published performance statistics show that the Work Programme is failing to support disabled people into work1. The disabled population as a whole on the programme are not reaching job outcomes, and those coming onto the programme as ESA claimants are particularly lacking in support.
2.2. As such, Scope has serious concerns that the group of disabled people who are furthest from a job are receiving the least support. This is compounded by performance issues on other disability-specific employment schemes like Work Choice2, and the on-going failures of the WCA which mean many claimants are being placed onto inappropriate programmes. Taken together, these issues mean that a large number of disabled people fall between the gaps of programmes and so lose out on vital back-to-work support.
2.3. To resolve these problems, Scope’s recommendations for action are:
2.3.1. Introduce a ‘Distance from Work’ Test: A ‘Distance from Work’ test should be introduced as an extra module in the WCA so that disabled people’s actual readiness for work situations is given equal consideration to their functional limitation, and the real barriers to employment are recognised and supported.
2.3.2. Introduce an Employment Support Plan: The Government should implement greater links between Work Programme and other employment support schemes for disabled people by creating an ‘Employment Support Plan’, collaboratively produced by the claimant and JCP, which acts as a ‘gateway’ mechanism and provides disabled people with a roadmap for their welfare-to-work journey. 3. Recommendations for action:
3.1. Scope believes that meaningful work and volunteering can give disabled people the opportunity to be more financially independent and socially engaged, and can boost confidence and self-esteem. We are clear that many disabled people do require support to access the labour market and get the most out of work, so welcome the existence of employment support schemes like the Work Programme.
3.2. However, the Work Programme is failing to deliver for disabled people: in spite of making up a third of all referrals onto the programme, disabled people account for only 1 in 5 of the total job outcomes. In light of this poor performance, and the lack of a joined-up employment offer across Government, Scope recommends a mix of short and long-term interventions to improve the way disabled people are supported into work.
3.3. As such, our recommendations for action are:
3.3.1. Introduce a ‘Distance from Work’ Test: A ‘Distance from Work’ test should be introduced as an extra module into the WCA so that disabled people’s actual readiness for work situations is given equal consideration to their functional limitation, and the real barriers to employment are recognised.
3.3.2. Many providers are already carrying out tests such as this as part of the referral and attachment process, so introducing a ‘Distance From Work’ test within the DWP-owned parts of system would not lengthen the time claimants spend going through the process. Rather, by creating a test that measures actual work-readiness, there would be positive impacts such as supporting the ‘right first time’ agenda within the WCA, in addition to improving disabled people’s experience.
3.3.3. Introduce an Employment Support Plan: The Government should implement greater links between Work Programme and other employment support schemes for disabled people by creating an ‘Employment Support Plan’, collaboratively produced by the claimant and JCP, which acts as a ‘gateway’ mechanism and provides disabled people with a roadmap for their welfare-to-work journey. The core objective of the Employment Support Plan would be to ensure that the appropriate employment options are offered to disabled people following their WCA, and to allow the right decision about which programme to enter to be made.
3.3.4. In turn, this would ensure a more appropriate match between claimants and schemes, which would give providers a clearer sense of the claimants coming onto their programmes; ensure lower appeals rates which would save money and boost claimant flow; and improve disabled people’s experience of the scheme, reducing their uncertainty and fear about what will happen after they have been found fit for work. In addition, a DWP evaluation of the Work Programme showed that many participants actively wanted greater involvement in the development of their own plans, and many felt that this would improve their engagement in the programme.
3.3.5. Where similar plans have been used in other areas of disability care and support – such as transitions planning for young people, or personalised care planning for adults – it has been shown to increase buy-in from all involved, ensure support is effectively targeted, and improve outcomes3. The Employment Support Plan also has the potential to link into these wider support programmes, such as by introducing employment support into statutory transitions services
4. Factual information:
4.1. The Work Programme performance statistics released on November 27th show disappointing outcomes for disabled people on the scheme4. Overall, the data indicate that the stated policy objective of the Work Programme – to support those furthest from work – is not currently being met.
4.2. Scope analysis of the data shows that in total 267,490 disabled people were referred to the Work Programme during the first 14 months. This means that around a third of all participants on the scheme have some form of impairment.
4.3. For this group there were only 6,120 job outcomes, around a 2.2% outcome rate. The rate of sustained employment is lower, with only 3,940 disabled people remaining in work long enough to trigger a ‘sustain’ payment.
4.4. This means that despite making up over a third of all referrals onto the Work Programme, only one in five of the total job outcomes through the scheme were for a disabled person.
4.5. This pattern is seen across the whole programme: those who require the most support are least likely to have found a job. For ESA claimants, who typically require a higher level of support, only 1.3% of participants achieved a job outcome – 1,070 outcomes from a total of 78,640 referrals. For ESA claimants who were previously on Incapacity Benefit – some of the furthest from work on the whole programme – figures from the DWP tabulation tool shows that only 30 people achieved a job outcome, an outcome rate of 0.3% for that group.
4.6. There are a range of structural reasons why the Work Programme is not delivering appropriate support for disabled people. Although the payment by results model incorporates differential payments to encourage more support for those furthest from work, a DWP qualitative evaluation of the programme found that providers’ business models continue to be built around placing a high volume of easy to place clients5. This means that there is currently minimal investment in specialist disability interventions. Although some contractors are beginning to provide these services, there is little evidence to suggest that this is translating into outcomes.
4.7. But we know that specialist interventions can deliver job outcomes for disabled people. For instance although there continue to be performance issues with Work Choice – notably around the length of time providers have to work with claimants – the scheme has delivered overall outcomes rates of 11%, which is a noticeable improvement on the Work Programme6.
4.8. Yet many of the group of disabled people furthest from work are not currently able to access Work Choice. The programme has a limited number of places, and there remains no clear gateway mechanism linking entry onto the scheme with entry onto the Work Programme. Further, only 14% of Work Choice participants are from the ESA group, raising even further concerns about the absence of support for this group.
4.9. In conclusion, the Work Programme is failing to support disabled people into work, especially those with the greatest support needs. Yet there are even more serious concerns about employment support for this group across the Government’s overall employment support strategy.
4.9.1. This means that there is a large group of severely disadvantaged disabled people currently claiming ESA, many of whom want to do meaningful jobs, but who are falling through the major gaps in provision between Work Programme and Work Choice. Scope would strongly welcome changes to the structure of employment support – such as those outlined above – that would provide better and more coherent support for the disabled people in this group.
7 December 2012
1 DWP Work Programme Statistical Release, available online here: http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=wp 2 Work Choice: Official Statistics – November 2012 3 Personal Budgets: Taking Stock, Moving Forward, Think Local, Act Personal: 2011, available online here: http://www.thinklocalactpersonal.org.uk/Browse/SDSandpersonalbudgets/Implementing/?parent=8615&child=9094 4 Based on Scope analysis of Work Programme performance statistics, using the DWP Tabulation Tool 5 Work Programme evaluation: Findings from the first phase of qualitative research on programme delivery, DWP: 2012 6 Work Choice: Official Statistics – November 2012 Written evidence submitted by Papworth Trust
Introduction
Papworth Trust is disability charity and provider of the Work Programme in the East of England and East Midlands, subcontracted to Ingeus. We have 95 years’ experience in helping disabled people into work and in the last year have supported 6,000 people through our employment programmes. Papworth Trust fundamentally believes that a job is the best form of welfare and route out of poverty. Where individuals can work, they should be supported to do so. For some individuals work is not always a viable solution, this may be due to their condition or circumstance, and there must be a system in place that supports them as well.
Low Employment and Support Allowance referrals to the Work Programme
1. Recent data published by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) indicates that Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) claimants on the Work Programme are less likely to find work, or receive a ‘job outcome’, than Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) claimants. 3.9% of those attached to the Work Programme on JSA have a job outcome compared to 1.4% of ESA claimants.1 ESA is claimed by people with long term illnesses, conditions or disabilities who have limited capability for work or need additional support to find and keep work. In Papworth Trust’s experience there are several causes of this trend. 2. ESA referrals to the Work Programme are 60% less than expected when the Programme was launched. Papworth Trust expected 25% of customers of the Work Programme to be ESA claimants; the reality is closer to 10%. 3. The low referral rate has made it difficult for providers to develop sufficient infrastructure and support for this group specifically. This includes employing or training specialist staff, or investing in training courses and work placements tailored to this group.
Accuracy of the Work Capability Assessment
4. There are also ongoing issues with the Work Capability Assessment (WCA) which are impacting ESA claimants’ progress on the Work Programme. 5. The WCA is the test which decides if people with illnesses, conditions or disabilities are capable of work, need additional support to find work, or are unsuitable for work. Those placed in the ESA Work Related Activity Group and on JSA as a result of the WCA can feel they have been incorrectly assessed. Therefore they feel they should not be on the Work Programme, and are
1 DWP, November 2012, Tabulation Tool: Work Programme: http://83.244.183.180/WorkProg/tabtool.html
1 demotivated. Others will be appealing the outcome of their WCA, in the hope that they will be found unfit for work, while some will be facing the prospect of reassessment in 3 to 6 months. 6. In our experience, the stressful and time consuming WCA process makes it harder to engage some ESA and JSA customers on the Work Programme, whose focus is entirely on getting the WCA outcome they expect. 7. As a disability charity we are ambitious and open-minded about the capability that disabled people have for work, and believe that everyone who can work should work. Despite this, Papworth Trust still encounters some customers who although having appealed their WCA and lost, we feel are unfit for work. 8. Papworth Trust has campaigned extensively on the WCA and feels that several improvements can still be made to the WCA process. Progress to date has been slow and we urge the Government to implement the recommendations of the Independent Reviewer, Professor Malcolm Harrington, as soon as possible.
Differential payments model
9. Papworth Trust believes the issue of ‘creaming and parking’ is more complex than it appears. While some providers may be failing those who hardest to help, there are also reasons as to why it can seem that certain people are left behind. It is also important to remember that providers have up to two years to support individuals into work. Statistics from the Employment Related Services Association (ERSA) indicate that the people most likely to find work are those who have been on the Programme the longest. 29% of people who started the Work Programme in June 2011 have found work compared to 15% of those who joined in June 2012.2 10. As mentioned above, we have found that some of our customers are not suitable for work because of the severity of their illness or disability. We have experience of people referred to us with severe mental ill health including schizophrenia, suicidal thoughts and agoraphobia, and others who have very recently survived heart attacks or major surgery. 11. When someone is unsuitable for work our Employment Advisers have to use common sense and show consideration for that person. Often they will use a ‘light touch’ approach, such as telephoning the customer for their appointment, rather than having it face-to-face, or not asking them to complete a work placement. 12. What also can appear to be ‘parking’ is actually the time it takes for our Employment Advisers to resolve the issues that customers with more complex barriers to work face, for example addiction or homelessness. These issues have to be addressed first before someone can be supported to find work. Job outcome statistics
2 ERSA, November 2012, Release of Job Start Data: http://ersa.org.uk/hub/details/723
2 13. We believe that the targets set for job outcomes will take longer and cost more to achieve than initially anticipated. This is primarily because of changes in the labour market resulting from the current economic conditions. There are fewer jobs available and it is taking longer to get people into work. 14. Under the Work Programme, a job is only recognised as an ‘outcome’ after 3 or 6 months of continuous employment, depending on the customer, the point at which the provider receives a payment. We are finding that we need to get multiple short term jobs for customers on the Work Programme. Sensibly, this is allowed under the Work Programme, which was not the case under previous welfare-to-work schemes. 15. However, as these jobs often last less than 6 months or are non-continuous, they are not counted as a job outcome. This cycle can carry on but the provider receives no payment. This is especially problematic with more short term jobs and fewer permanent jobs in the economy. 16. When designing the Work Programme, the Government recommended that its progress be reviewed after implementation. We believe that now is the right time to do this.
The ‘black box’ approach
17. Papworth Trust has found the ‘black box’ approach to be incredibly helpful, allowing us to have flexibility and control in how we deliver the Work Programme. The ‘black box’ approach allows us to adapt and evolve to suit our circumstances, as we have done recently, to improve performance. Without the ‘black box’ approach it is unlikely that we would have been able to remain a provider of the Work Programme.
Other factors
18. In the past, the Government has recognised some of the issues which prevent people returning to employment such as disability, health problems and in some circumstances the complex nature of our benefits system. Papworth Trust also believes that discrimination, language barriers, criminal records, lack of experience and transportation needs further restrict the opportunities and ability to gain work. A major barrier for our clients is that employers often seek ‘ready- made’ employees who are proficient in their role with minimum training, support, cost or perceived risk to the employer. Extra support or training is viewed as inconvenient, time consuming and costly. We hope that the Government’s new disability employment strategy will help to alleviate some of these problems.
7 December 2012
3 Written evidence submitted by Single Parent Action Network (SPAN)
1. Summary
1.1. SPAN has interviewed single parents across England about their experience of the Work Programme (WP) and is sharing findings for this inquiry.
1.2. Given their experience of the WP, we are not surprised that single parents fair less well than the average WP user, nor that their satisfaction with the programme is low.
1.3. The evidence illustrates three realities:
• That the WP does not take adequate account of their need to care for their children as well as participate in the programme; • That single parents are too often denied appropriate flexibility in the work that they are expected to obtain; and • Their experience of the programme is characterised by a lack of clarity over rules to which they are required to abide and a lack of predictability about the services that they should expect to receive.
1.4. All these findings are evidence of a lack of fairness and consistency in the treatment of single parents and help explain why the service is not achieving success. If the scheduling of participation clashes with caring responsibilities, if the provisions that allow single parents to balance working hours with caring responsibilities are ignored, if there is little co-ordination with Job Centres and scant information on how to seek advice or redress, the programme will not work.
1.5. We propose simple recommendations with the potential to improve the service: building on the need to accommodate caring responsibilities; respecting rights and working on realistic expectation of working hours; and bringing clarity and consistency to the programme.
2. Context
2.1. Single parents are a significant user group on the Work Programme (WP) making up 7.4% (62, 333) of all attachments between June –July 20121. In terms of long-term employment outcomes single parents do worse than jobseekers overall. Out of the 31,240 job seekers who have moved into longer-term work 1,650 were single parents (3.7% for all clients compared to 2.7% for single parents)2.
1 DWP November 2012 http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=wp 2 Gingerbread analysis of DWP data www.gingerbread.org.uk/news/180/work-programme
1 2.2. SPAN is a Bristol based charity and directly works with single parents. We also operate nationally, helping membership groups and individual members. We have a national online forum called One Space. In March 2012 we published an analysis about single parents transferring onto the Work Programme3. We have followed this up with a more comprehensive study, funded by Oxfam UK, looking at the experience of single parents nationally. This submission contains results from this study; the full report is scheduled for publication in January. This submission is the first time these results have been shared.
2.3. We concentrate on two areas of the Inquiry: first the level of service provided; and second the effectiveness of the “black box” approach to service delivery.
3. Background
Requirements for single parents to become jobseekers
3.1. There are 2 million single parents (9 out of 10 are women) the majority are already in employment (59%). Both the previous and current Government want to further increase this number. Since 2008, 400,0004 single parents have moved from Income Support to job seeking requirements.
What makes single parents preparation and seeking requirements different?
3.2. Single parents on Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) are subject to the same requirements as other job seekers showing they are available and seeking work. Like all jobseekers those that are longer term unemployed are transferred onto the WP. However, it is recognised that as well as being a job seeker single parents have responsibility for children. The Welfare Reform Act 2008 contains a provision to protect the wellbeing of children5. There are also ‘Lone Parent Flexibilities’6 such as the ability for a single parent to ask to restrict their hours of work.
3.3. Like all public sector organisations, the DWP (including Jobcentre Plus) and contracted services under the WP are subject to the public sector equality duty7. Services should be designed to take account of the particular needs of single parents.
4. A. The level of service provided to single parents on the Work Programme
The source of our evidence
3 Is the Work Programme Working for Single Parents? Analysis of the Experience of Single Parents Moving onto the Work Programme SPAN March 2012 pdf http:span.org.uk/publications 4 Grayling C PQ March 2011 and figures from DWP report 736 May 2010 p11. 5 Section 31. 6 Set out in regulations. 7 s.149 of the Equality Act.
2
4.1. During the second half of 2012, SPAN used national and local networks to advertise for single parents on the WP who were willing to be interviewed in order to share their lived experience of the programme.
4.2. Sixteen single parents across England were interviewed, eleven from different regions and four from London. The ages of the single parents’ children ranged from 5-15 years. The time spent on the WP ranged from one week to one year. Two single parents have left the WP, one into work and one has come off benefits. Satisfaction levels with the WP were low averaging 3.5 out of 10. More details are set out in Appendix A.
Accommodating single parents and their children
4.1. WP offices cater for all types of job seekers including ex-offenders and there is divergence as to how Providers will accommodate single parents and their children particularly in school holidays.
4.2. Three single parents were told before the school summer holidays they should not bring their children to the WP (SP3, 10 & 14). Three single parents (SP’s 4, 6 and 15) were initially turned away from the Work Programme during school holidays. SP4 was told that she could bring her child in for her weekly job search meetings but on arrival was told he could not be there for ‘health and safety reasons’. SP15 first appointment at the Work Programme was in half term and she was turned away for the same reason. SP6 was told on arrival with her child in the school holidays that she should not do that. She was then told to leave her child (aged 9) in a room on her own (something her daughter did not like) whilst she had her appointment. For subsequent appointments she paid a neighbour to look after her child. The same single parent was offered employability training but then this was withdrawn because it clashed with the school holidays and childcare was not provided.
4.3. Consideration around term time appointments for single parents varied. SP6 and SP4 initially thought the Provider was fitting appointment times in with school pick-up but this flexibility diminished over time. SP4 was recently offered appointment and training times without negotiation. When she attended a workshop she had to pay for her child to attend the school breakfast club. SP11 was given an appointment time that clashed with school drop-off. When she tried to change the appointment she was told she must come in or lose her benefit. SP15 was offered an advanced job-seeking course but the hours were 9am - 4pm and so she would not be able to pick up her youngest child from school (aged 9) so was unable to attend.
4.4. This contrasted with some good practice. SP2 was informed by the WP that childcare costs were covered, while SP5 & 13 said their advisers made sure appointments were during school hours.
4.5. SP 12 was told that courses arranged by her Provider would be held in the school day and she did not need to attend the WP during the school summer holiday. Both SP9 & 1 were positive that their Providers agreed to change appointment times because they clashed with
3 school pick up times. In addition SP9 was also told that if her child was ill that she could rearrange an appointment.
Poor coordination between JCP and Work Programme
4.6. DWP research has found that there can be poor co-ordination between Jobcentre Plus (JCP) and the WP for all groups8. Our findings support this with over half of the parents (8) reporting a lack of co-ordination.
4.7. For two parents this meant receiving no back to work support from either organisation. SP1 had one appointment in three months. The WP cancelled her next appointment and she has not been given an appointment since. SP8 was suspended from the WP for being late for an appointment. For four months she has not been offered any back to work support. Both parents informed JCP about their situation but were told they were the responsibility of the WP.
4.8. The parents who had a more positive experience appreciated knowing what the WP would involve. Their Providers gave induction training, setting out practical support (like money towards interview clothes or childcare) and details of services that they could access (such as training). It also worked well where the JCP offered support to single parents before transfer and could inform them about what the WP would involve. For instance, SP12 had an interview before transfer with a Lone Parent Adviser at JCP to go through a new Jobseekers’ Agreement.
4.9. The WP and JCP could be inconsistent concerning the application of the “lone parent flexibilities”. All claimants should have a Jobseekers’ Agreement, which should be applied by JCP and the WP. This was not always the case. For instance, two single parents (SP4 & 6) were told by the WP to apply for jobs that went against their Jobseekers’ Agreement. SP 4 had been told to apply for jobs where she would have to work Saturday and Sunday even though her Agreement specified work between Monday and Friday.
4.10. SP14 felt she had “two people to please” in her job search. In addition she was given inconsistent messages from the two organisations. JCP had agreed under ‘Lone Parent Flexibilities’ that she did not have to sign on during the school summer holidays. She was then offered her first appointment at the Work Programme on the first day of her child’s school holiday. They insisted that she attend and she was threatened with a sanction.
4.11. The WP has inherited some inconsistent practice in the application of ‘Lone Parent Flexibilities’ from JCP. The DWP’s own commissioned research report (2011) found that the majority of single parents "were not aware of the specific flexibilities, a proportion had been told they were allowed to only look for work that was during school hours only
8 Work Programme Evaluations: Findings from the first phase of qualitative research on programme delivery. Nov 2012 DWP
4 (12%) or have the availability and costs of childcare taken into account when working out their availability to work (8%)"9.
4.12. This lack of consistency from JCP led to a number of single parents having unrealistic Jobseekers’ Agreements. The WP’s task of helping these parents move into sustainable work may be impeded. For example, SP 9’s Agreement includes that she must work the hours from the moment she drops her child off at school to the moment she picks her up, allowing no time for her travel to a place of work.
4.13. There was also evidence that flexibilities were not necessarily applied to the single parents that might have the greatest needs. SP8 has a child in primary school with an educational statement. He needs support including being taken to and from school and would struggle in an after-school childcare setting. She had left work two years earlier because of the need to support her son. Her Agreement specifies that she must apply for full-time hours because “there were not many part-time jobs available” and this was applied at JCP and the WP.
Recommendations
4.14. SPAN believes this evidence supports six recommendations.
i) There needs to be better account taken of single parents’ responsibilities to care for their children whilst on the WP. Clearer provision for term time appointments and certainty as to how single parents will be accommodated in the school holidays.
ii) Single parents should be given the same opportunities to train and develop as other job seekers, so training needs to be scheduled at times when single parents can attend.
iii) Work Programme Providers should pay for childcare when it is needed for single parents to attend appointments or training.
iv) At present no figures are kept for the reasons why sanctions are threatened or applied to single parents on the Work Programme 10. In order to show that single parents are treated fairly these figures need to be collected and published.
v) Account needs to be taken of ‘Lone Parent Flexibilities’ and these need to be consistently applied on the WP. JCP should make sure that before a single parent transfers that a lone parent specialist is available for the parents final
9 Lone Parent Obligations supporting the journey into work" DWP Research Report 736 May 2011 Page 86 10 Parliamentary Question about single parents on the Work Programme and Sanctions Kerry McCarthy MP 21 May 2012.
5 interview before transfer and that a Jobseekers’ Agreement is drawn up that reflects a claimants caring responsibilities.
vi) Better co-ordination is needed between JCP and the WP. In particular single parents should be made aware of how they can complain and have the support of JCP (including access to specialist Lone Parent Advisers).
5. B. The “black box” approach to service delivery
Flexibility on the Work Programme
5.1. For three of the single parents the flexibility around support and attendance at the WP was positive. SP13 valued the support she was given by her “really brilliant adviser”. Her appointments were every two weeks because it was recognised that she knew what she was doing. The Provider then gave her substantial practical support including sending out flyers for her and paying membership of a regulatory body for her qualification to help her move into work. They also paid her train fare to attend a job interview in another city.
5.2. SP15’s adviser was trained in Human Resources and was really useful at helping her with her CV and referring her to appropriate agencies to find work. She had to attend once a month but was in regular email and telephone contact. The WP offered more support when it was needed such as when she was going for an interview. SP 5 thought her adviser was “really nice”. She was offered courses although it was made clear these were optional. She felt her Adviser recognised her skills (as a qualified teacher) and did not push her into low skilled work.
5.3. However, the gaps in appointments left some parents feeling abandoned by the WP. SP3 attends every two or three months “as they don’t feel there is much they can do for me.” She has a degree and postgraduate qualification and was told, “they cannot cater for all kinds of needs.” SP12 &16 had infrequent contact with their advisers.
5.4. There was concern about the lack of training or its poor quality and that it was geared at a basic level. SP8 & 11 were told that there was no money for training on the WP. SP14 was only offered a course in food hygiene (she is a qualified teacher). SP4 wanted to improve her basic skills in Maths and English and found a course at her local college only to be told that the WP appointments must come first and she could not attend.
5.5. Single parents wanted predictability in the services they received including specialist support to go through a better off in work calculation. This was raised as an issue by SP4, 6 & 12. These parents (and SP 10) also raised concern about not having access to the specialist support of a Lone Parent Adviser (they had valued this at the Jobcentre).
Recommendations
5.6. SPAN believes this evidence supports four recommendations.
6 i) Single parents need some basic predictability about the services and support that they will be getting under the WP. It needs to be made clearer what activities are mandatory or optional. ii) The WP should have specialist advisers for single parents including those that can help with better off in work calculations iii) The good practice of WP Providers should be shared to show how tailored support could work better for single parents. iv) Single parents are likely to have been out of employment for a significant time and require a wider range of training courses on the WP to enable them to compete in the job market.
7 Appendix 1: Information about Interviewees
How Work How often do satisfied Single Ages of How long on Programme you attend? with the Parent dependent WP? Provider Area WP?11
1. 11 & 15 3 months Avanta, East Once 2 Sussex
2. 10 & 13 One week A4E, East Once 3 Midlands
3. 14 One Year Progress, Every two or 0 Bristol three months
4. 11 9 months A4E through Varied between 1 Knowsley once a fortnight Works, to 4 times in Liverpool one week.
5. 12 9 months A4E, Varies. 7 London
6. 9 9 months ESG and First every two 1 Sencia, Staffs weeks and now every week
7. 12 & 11 One Year Ingeus At first once a 6 Wardwick, fortnight but Derby recently less often.
8. 16,15 & 10 6 months Reed, London Once a month 1 but suspended from WP
9. 10 6 weeks G4S delivered Every two 9 by Pertemps, weeks but Eastbourne flexibility
10. 12 5 months Sarina Russo Every fortnight 0 Coventry
111 the least satisfied, 10 most satisfied.
8
11. 5 3 months In Training, Once a month 3 Leicester
12. 12 and twins 8 months Prospect, Not consistent 2 aged 9 London
13. 8 5 months Ingeus, London First once a 9 week and then once a fortnight
14. 16 & 13 4 months Ingeus, Varied but 1 Nottingham attended 4 times in the 4 months
15. 9 & 13 2 months Kennedy Scott, Once a month 6 Harpenden
16. 10 8 months G4S, Varied three 5 Scunthorpe times over period
7 December 2012
9
Written evidence submitted by Locality
Locality is the leading nationwide network of settlements, development trusts, social action centres and community enterprises. We believe that every community is a place of possibility. We help people to set up locally owned and led organisations. We support existing organisations to work effectively through peer-to-peer exchange of knowledge and best practice on community asset ownership, community enterprise, collaboration, commissioning support, social action, community voice, community rights and regeneration.
Historically 47% of our members have been involved in providing employability support services, and our response is based on evidence supplied to Locality by these members, although many of them are, by choice or circumstance, not currently able to be directly involved in Work Programme supply chains.
The differential payments model including: the extent to which it is incentivising providers to help all participants and thereby addressing “creaming and parking”; how effectively the model reflects claimants’ relative needs; and variations in job outcomes between the different payment groups;
1.1 Provision of higher payments for certain client groups should not be assumed to automatically transfer down supply chains. With such limited numbers of Prime Contractors, Work Programme supply chains are effectively a buyers’ market and higher success fees will not automatically find their way into sub-contractual agreements.
One Locality member reported to us their financial agreement as support provider for harder-to-help clients under a three-tier supply chain arrangement. Depending on the range of possible outcomes, their net payment is estimated as being between 46% and 64% of the overall payment drawn down by the Prime Contractor. In other words between 36% and 54% of the fees are being retained as management costs and profit in the top tiers of the supply chain. This is still “creaming”, just not in the sense implied in the question.
The prime provider model including: its impact on subcontractors; and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs;
2.1 The prime provider model is not proving effective at removing financial barriers for smaller providers. Risk and long term cash-flow requirements are being passed down the supply chain. Although this may be inevitable given the nature of the programme, smaller providers can struggle to raise risk finance and manage tight cash-flows, and there is little evidence of prime providers offering support to their supply chains in these situations. Indeed there is evidence in some cases of prime providers exacerbating the situation:
One Locality member has reported 3-4 month payment delays over and above the agreed payment in arrears schedules.
2.2 We are also disturbed by reports of prime providers actively discouraging collaborative efforts by smaller providers. Such collaboration could serve to facilitate entry of providers into supply chains that might otherwise struggle to do so, but would also add other value to quality and diversity of delivery, and to the co-ordination of services. Whilst there may sometimes be valid contract management reasons to prefer single supplier arrangements, it has been suggested that it may be one of the outcomes of the buyers’ market that exists, that an aversion to collaboration is often simply the result of a preference for a divide-and- rule approach to suppliers.
2.3 Locality was an early critic of the prime provider model and the experience of our members to date has only served to strengthen our view. We are unsure how the prime provider model is compatible with Localism.
Locality is currently engaged in a research project to examine instances of “Diseconomies of Scale” [see http://locality.org.uk/news/diseconomies-scale/], and strongly urges the government to reconsider the full costs and consequences of such huge contracts.
The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups including: whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP; and the rigour and effectiveness of DWP’s monitoring and complaints procedures;
3.1 Far fewer Locality members are now involved in providing employability support than was the case before the Work Programme. Our experience of differential quality is therefore largely from external observer perspectives. Unfortunately it has to date been universally reported to us that quality of provision is poor.
A typical example from a Locality member relates to a local resident that they are supporting voluntarily because of an extremely poor level of service having been received from a Work Programme provider. The individual asked for help in reproducing his CV as it was generally weak and his first name (David) had been misspelt. The Work Programme provider had indicated that they were unable to correct and re-print, and their advice in relation to the misspelling had been to “just cross out your name and re-write it”
3.2 We are also concerned at some weaknesses in the proposed Merlin Standard procedures, which may not serve to bring such quality issues, or indeed wider supply chain problems, to light. The process could do more to encourage concerns to be raised from providers further down supply chains, and to seek more anonymous feedback from participants and providers. Other comments re the Merlin Standard include: - The Standard focuses too much on contact with the primes and not enough with subcontractors - Subcontractors for Merlin ‘inspectors’ to engage with are likely to be identified and suggested by primes rather than any random sampling from the supply chain - There is some concern about confidentiality and the potential detrimental consequences if subcontractors do give a negative view of their work programme experiences - There is a need for those charged with checking adherence to the Merlin Standard to ‘follow the money’ (only then will they get an understanding of whether they’re assessing the quality of a prime/subcontractor relationship and not just more tiers of management involving ‘sub-prime’ contractors)
The “black box” approach to service delivery including: whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups; and DWP’s role in monitoring this;
4.1 Locality welcomes the “black box” approach. A focus on outcomes rather than methods was overdue and in general can serve to encourage innovation
4.2 However if the “black box” is encouraging innovation, in our experience the sheer scale of contracts issued under the Work Programme is discouraging and counter-acting innovation. With contracts focused principally on supply chain management, the preoccupation of prime providers is on process, sub-contracting arrangements, and profit maximisation. Innovation is seen principally is these processes, not in services and delivery methods, and such “innovation” includes the effective exploitation of sub-contractors and other non- contracted charities and voluntary organisations.
Regional variations in job outcome statistics: including whether competition between providers is driving up performance in contract package areas where the economy is particularly depressed; and how provider performance could be improved in these areas;
5.1 Most Locality members operate in the most deprived neighbourhoods across England. The most common feedback we get from our members is that the Work Programme is “invisible” in their areas. It is not always clear whether this is the result of large scale and centralised delivery methods which pull clients away from their neighbourhoods to central locations, or whether participants from the most deprived areas are effectively being “parked”. In either case our members are adamant that the Work Programme is significantly less targeted on their areas than previous programmes were.
Other comments based on the experience of Locality members:
6.1 It is of grave concern to us that some community organisations have had to sign contracts forbidding public disclosure. This flies in the face of the government’s transparency agenda.
6.2 The introduction of the Work Programme has served to reduce the number and diversity of suppliers of employability services in England. Many potential (and formerly successful) providers have disbanded their employability operations entirely and now focus their energy in other areas. They have been discouraged from engaging with the Work Programme for many reasons, but the impact of a programme design which requires providers to combine support with elements of coercion and policing should not be underestimated in terms of its effect on the supplier market. Some other organisations which have tried to engage with the Work Programme have gone bust either due to the payments regime or due to an inability to get into supply chains in the first place. We do not believe that to date the government has appreciated the deleterious effect that the design of the Work Programme has had on the diversity of the employability supplier market, particular on those operating within the “not for profit” sector.
6.3 The scale of the Work Programme is mitigating against the development of joined-up provision. Links between the Work Programme and even other employability schemes such as the National Enterprise Allowance scheme are reported to us as being weak, although the extent of join-up (or lack of it) appears to vary widely region by region. In general the National Enterprise Allowance scheme is felt to be more effective and more focused on individual need and aspiration than the Work Programme, and the transfer of clients from the former programme to the latter has been described by participants as effective abandonment.
6.5 Across the country community organisations mourn the loss of the Future Jobs programme. We feel that it would be helpful and instructive to this inquiry for the Committee not just to consider the performance of the Work Programme, but to compare and contrast the benefits accrued from this programme and other programme approaches, past and present.
7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by 3SC
Introduction
3SC wins and manages public services contracts on behalf of third sector organisations. Using a consortium model, we manage the bidding process and build supply chains of local organisations, allowing smaller third sector providers to compete for, and deliver large contracts.
Third sector organisations have a vital role to play in public services delivery, but the size of the contracts makes it difficult for smaller organisations to compete on their own, so we have developed the capability and flexibility to act as a prime contractor, subcontractor, and intermediary between social investors and delivery organisations. We manage the procurement process from beginning to end, and also manage the contracts to ensure high quality performance, enabling our third sector partners to focus on excellent delivery.
Executive summary 1. 3SC consulted our 2000+ members, including all our Work Programme subcontractors with regards to this response. What we have written here is representative of our views and those of our members within the wider third sector. We are keen to ensure that the unique voice of the third sector is heard, and responded to.
Key points: • The differential payments model should be based on the level of support that a customer requires in finding and sustaining a job, taking into consideration the range of barriers they face, and therefore reflect the costs involved in supporting them to overcome those barriers. • DWP should take on a greater market stewardship role to ensure that risk is not unfairly passed down the supply chain from prime contractor to subcontractor, particularly as these are more likely to be smaller organisations with lower cash reserves. The level of risk that can currently be passed to subcontractors is too high for many third sector organisations to sustainably engage in the programme. • Best practice should be shared, and there should be collaboration within supply chains and between prime contractors. A wider understanding of what activities produce positive results and have lasting impacts would benefit everyone. • Innovation in the form of the “black box” model is undermined by contractual obligations, delivery models imposed by prime contractors, and the setting of minimum service standards. This restrains frontline organisations from truly innovating and adopting genuinely tailor‐made approaches. • The current economic climate has made jobs scarcer and meant that as standard practice many organisations have had to develop a continuum of part‐time and full‐time intermittent jobs in order to achieve outcomes. While this may provide a short‐term solution, it undermines the premise that continuous employment and career progression is the best route into long‐term sustainable employment and out of poverty.
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2. Below we have answered only those questions where we feel we have relevant expertise and a useful contribution to make.
Responses Q1: The differential payments model including: • the extent to which it is incentivising providers to help all participants, thereby addressing “creaming and parking” and how effectively the model reflects claimants’ relative needs; • variations in job outcomes between the different payment groups.
3. We agree fundamentally with the use of differential payments and payment by results models. However in their current format, differential payments encourage “creaming and parking” because they reflect the benefit group that a customer falls into and the relative benefit savings made, rather than the levels of needs and barriers which must be addressed in order for the customer to enter sustainable employment and the subsequent wider savings to the public purse. The Work Programme’s payment by results model encourages organisations to work with “job ready” customers, because the payment mechanism fundamentally incentivises this behaviour. This encourages “creaming and parking” within the differential payment groups, as opposed to across different payment groups.
4. The current model does not reflect the level of funding needed to genuinely help those “hardest to help” customers who are furthest removed from the labour market. For example: a provider receives a referral of an ex‐offender who has severe substance misuse and anger management issues, but they fall into the JSA 25+ group. The provider knows that the maximum total payment they will receive as a result of placing that customer into sustainable employment is relatively low, and is probably less than it will cost to support them to achieve that outcome; they cannot therefore deliver the level of support required without the risk of making a financial loss. That customer, therefore, is at risk of being “parked” and not receiving the specialist support they require.
5. The Committee should also note that the above scenario will become more prevalent when attachment fees are phased out. Smaller organisations and those providing more specialist services tend not to have the level of reserves or access to capital that will permit them to risk investing money up front in delivery that is unlikely to yield positive long‐term outcomes (i.e. sustainment payments). As greater levels of financial risk are transferred from the commissioner to the provider base, the more providers will be forced to assess customers on a “return on investment” basis.
6. Our membership organisations, many of whom are smaller third sector organisations who do not deliver the Work Programme, found that many customers were referred into their services by a Work Programme provider – for which these organisations received no payment. This is problematic because the referring Work Programme provider then claims payments for services delivered by others. We recognise that the Work Programme was not designed to be delivered in isolation, but its providers need to deliver integrated services rather than encouraging and exploiting voluntary provision.
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7. 3SC believes that in future iterations and programmes a more sophisticated model of assessment and diagnosis must be utilised to accurately determine a customer’s needs and barriers, and distance from the labour market – and ultimately the cost savings to the public purse.
Q2: The prime provider model including: • its impact on subcontractors; and • the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs.
8. The prime contractor/subcontractor model should provide a clear structure for the management and allocation of delivery. It should enable smaller providers to compete in an increasingly complex, and aggregated, contracting environment. It should enable them to deliver without having to bear all the inherent commercial risk associated with the principal contract. However, Work Programme primes as a majority do not bear the risk on behalf of their subcontractors. They pass down risk to their supply chains. This isolates and marginalises some organisations, which are dependent on the strength of their balance sheet and the scale of their organisation. 3SC believes that the DWP needs to take a more active role as market stewards and ensure that prime providers are more responsible in their contracting methods.
9. Primes and subprimes charge management fees to their subcontractors. Whilst it is to be expected given the constraints of commercial confidentiality, there is an overall lack of visibility surrounding what is provided within this fee (other than performance and quality management). Primes and subprimes must demonstrate what they are providing not just ,to DWP but to the prospective and current subcontractors. As part of their prime contractor role, it is essential that they share best practise and collaboration across their supply chain.
10. Our Work Programme members attempt to ensure each customer’s journey is individually tailored, but subcontractors cannot truly innovate because they are often bound by the delivery model proposed by their prime. For example, one of our larger national third sector partners, who works with multiple prime contracts said “we can vary how we do it, but the ingredients be must the same”. These frontline organisations, who often know their customers and communities the best, are prevented from delivering what they know works. The “black box” is no longer available as primes purchase prescribed processes and services.
11. With reference to paragraph five, the Work Programme payment model does not incentivise the tailoring of services, because it encourages providers to focus on those closest to the labour market. The Work Programme operates on the basis of agreed performance targets between primes and DWP. These targets implicitly accept that while the aim is to move a proportion of customers into sustained employment, an equal or greater majority will not enter employment. This encourages the provider to gear their delivery only towards those closest to the labour market. The rest will receive services that meet the minimum delivery standards, rather than services that are tailored to meet their particular needs.
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12. We note that CRM systems used by different primes vary in accessibility, capability, and functionality across the board. Those subcontractors working with multiple primes have to use multiple systems, taking time away from frontline services. We suggest that in future iterations, one universal CRM is commissioned so that subcontractors are not overly burdened with administration.
13. Whilst we recognise the necessity of random referral allocation between primes, it has caused a range of issues. For example, if there are 9 prisons and 6 primes in a CPA, do they all invest in placing an engagement worker within each prison to manage their own referrals? This is financially inefficient and unproductive, so there is often no through‐ the‐gates support for prisoners being released from custody, and consequentially attachment rates are much lower than for other customer groups. There have been pockets of innovation and best practice to counter this; for example, primes across London are pooling resources to coordinate in‐prison engagement and to create mutual marketing materials for use across all prisons. We suggest that the Committee consider ways to encourage streamlined partnership approaches between primes to prevent customers being disadvantaged through lower levels of engagement, and varying degrees of availability and quality of service delivery.
Q3: The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups including: • whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP.
14. We believe that if DWP wish to closely monitor detailed minimum delivery standards, they need to consider how they align this with a genuine “black box” approach, as these two principles are mutually exclusive. In order to truly innovate, providers need to be able to experiment with and/or depart from standard practices. The setting of minimum standards effectively limits providers to “innovating” within a narrow set of proscribed practices.
Q4: The “black box” approach to service delivery including: • whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups.
15. One key issue with the “black box” approach adopted within Work Programme procurement is that what was innovative when the programme commenced is now a standardised delivery model, and providers are not continuing to innovate. Primes cannot change their models as they are contractually bound to deliver their proposed and tendered for service. Additionally, a significant proportion of the Work Programme tender documentation required primes to evidence their ability to deliver similar services. They were required to do this by proving their track record, which runs counter to the principle of innovation.
Q5: Regional variations in job outcome statistics including: • whether competition between providers is driving up performance in contract package areas where the economy is particularly depressed; and
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• how provider performance could be improved in these areas.
16. Areas where the economy is particularly depressed are commonly areas which have insufficient economic vibrancy. Because of this, there is often a reduced provider base, especially in those more geographically remote areas. This has resulted in multiple primes subcontracting to a single provider. Therefore competition does not drive up performance, as the same service is, in essence, being delivered multiple times to multiple primes by the same provider. 3SC would encourage more collaboration between primes, who need to share best practice across not only their supply chain, but with other primes. For example, there have been instances of positive impact on job outcomes through primes working together to create CPA‐wide employer engagement strategies.
17. 3SC welcomes greater levels of information surrounding the impact of the differing “black box” approaches of primes. The wider industry would welcome understanding of what works, produces positive results, and has the greatest long‐term impact. This must be balanced with the understanding that the Work Programme has been set up on competitive lines and this process would involve primes sharing their commercially competitive advantage.
Recommendations for action 18. We recommend the introduction of a standardised categorisation process to differentiate customers by needs and barriers, and distance from the labour market, rather than by benefits category. This would more accurately reflect the costs involved in supporting these customers, and work to prevent creaming and parking.
19. The Work Programme should be restructured to support greater participation of third sector providers, including third sector prime contractors. Most third sector organisations operate on very small margins, while payment by results favours larger organisations with stronger balance sheets, as they are able to take on a greater level of risk. Prime contractors are currently passing much of the risk down their supply chains, which also acts as a barrier to third sector involvement. We believe that there is room in the market for more third sector prime contractors, but the Work Programme’s current structure makes it difficult for this market to grow.
20. We recommend that DWP consider the Work Programme as part of a range of measures to support job seekers into sustainable work. In the current economic climate, the Work Programme will not be capable producing the intended outcomes.
21. The loss of attachment fees is likely to have considerable delivery consequences, especially for third sector providers. We recommend that DWP take action to prevent declining standards in frontline delivery when attachment fees are phased out.
7 December 2012
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Written evidence submitted by Turning Point
About Turning Point
1.1 Turning Point is a leading health and social care organisation with over 45 years experience of providing support to adults with complex needs including those affected by drug and alcohol misuse, mental health problems and those with a learning disability. We work in over 200 locations, providing specialist and integrated services that meet the needs of individuals, families and communities across England and Wales.
1.2 We are a social enterprise reinvesting its surplus to provide the best services in the right locations for people with a range of complex needs who need them the most.
1.3 For over a decade we have been providing employment services and are currently a sub contractor within the Work Programme, helping people with mental health issues, learning disabilities and drug and alcohol addictions back into work.
1.4 We understand the impact unemployment can have on people's lives and the wider issues it can affect. We also know that meaningful employment helps people get the most out of life.
1.5 Turning Point was previously the largest provider of the previous Government’s Progress2work services, the primary aim of which was to help people experiencing drug addiction towards and into employment. Progress2work was decommissioned two years ago, but we still maintain expertise in what works in this area, and we have contributed to and support the UK Drug Policy Commission’s response to this Year’s Call for Evidence.
1.6 Our employment service was designed to support people with substance misuse issues, criminal justice histories and low level mental health conditions (anxiety and depression). We provide over the phone support to individuals across the country plus more targeted face to face support where needed. The model works by providing an initial assessment followed by sessions of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) support and generic employment support and signposting. We currently work with three prime providers; A4E, Avanta and CDG. Between July 2011 and September 2012 we received 1439 referrals, the majority of which came through A4E.
The Differential Payments Model
• To what extent is the programme incentivising providers to help all participants, not just ‘cherry picking’ the most easily helped therefore addressing ‘creaming and parking’?
1.7 Although the Work Programme may have been designed to avoid providers cherry picking those easiest to work with, in theory, our experience and that of many sub contractors, is that this is happening. Given the economic backdrop against which this programme has been introduced, all providers, both Primes and Subs, are finding it difficult to get people into sustained employment. The recent ONS Work
1 Programme figures1 show that out of the 878,000 referrals to the programme only 31,000 have achieved sustained employment. These figures illustrate, and possibly go some way to explain our experience which is that Prime Providers are retaining those clients who are closest to the job market while ‘parking’ those furthest away with specialist sub contractors. Because of the payment by results (PbR) system in place, some sub contractors, often not for profit organisations, are finding it difficult to see a sustainable way forward within the programme, in which they are not paid until someone has been in employment for up to 26 weeks dependent on their benefits.
• How effectively does the model reflect claimants’ relative needs?
1.8 The experience of people we support is that the model does not necessarily reflect the needs of the claimants, particularly where mental health issues are involved.
1.9 The biggest challenge to meeting people’s needs, and ensuring the model reflects these needs, starts with the assessment process.
1.10 There are many issues in regards to the assessment process and criteria, particularly for those who have mental health issues, where individual’s needs are not being appropriately considered. The experience of people we support of the assessment process is often very negative. Because of the black and white, bureaucratic nature of criteria during the assessment, some clients feel that the assessment process is completely unsympathetic to their condition. As with communications prior to the assessment, there is a risk of seriously undermining the already poor mental health of an individual, or gains someone may have made in the treatment of an addiction if undue pressure is applied during the assessment process.
1.11 Individuals have been assessed as being ready for work when they are plainly not; people’s benefits are being changed, reclassifying people ready for work, regardless of their GP disagreeing; and there is very little understanding of the wider impacts on an individual’s ability to work through the assessment. For example someone may be physically fit but have substantial mental health conditions impeding their ability to work or chance of retaining employment without significant ongoing support. Much more needs to be done before the assessment process, and therefore the service that follows, consistently meets people’s needs, however complex.
• How can the DWP justify variations in job outcomes between the different payment groups?
1.12 Variations in job outcomes between the different payment groups was demonstrated in the recently published ONS Work Programme statistics which showed that 30,000 (96.3%) of job outcomes came from participants in a ‘JSA payment group’ (as opposed to ESA group). The highest number of job outcomes 13,000 (43.0%) was paid for the ‘JSA 25 and over’ group followed by 11,000 (34.0%) for ‘JSA early entrants’, just under 6,000 (19.0%) were in the ‘JSA 18-24’ payment group2.
1 Published by the Department of Work and Pensions on the 27 November 2012, http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=wp 2 Work Programme official statistics, DWP (Nov 2012) http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=wp
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1.13 The low success rate overall could be due to a range of different factors, both within and external to the programme, however the significant difference between JSA and ESA claimants is worrying and demonstrates that the people furthest away from employment (on ESA) really have very little chance of gaining employment through this programme. If this is the case it is again hard to state that the model ‘reflects claimant’s relative needs’.
1.14 Many individuals on ESA that Turning Point support have such complex needs that it is unlikely that they will be supported into employment within the two year time frame, or be able to retain employment for the targeted length of time for payment to be triggered. What happens after two years of someone being on the programme without any success is yet to be tested but it is becoming clear that the model may need to be significantly adjusted to support ESA claimants in particular to access employment.
1.15 One individual we support, for example, is unable to leave the house due to severe anxiety issues. Before our employment advisers can support someone to be job ready they often first need to address wider issues around mental health issues, relationships and sometimes substance misuse. This is not a quick process, nor one we are currently being paid for under PbR beyond the attachment fee, which in reality has a value of nothing. A recent report by the NCVO found that ‘half of charity sub contractors (48%) were subsidising the delivery of the Work Programme from their own reserves.3’ This constitutes an untenable business model long term.
1.16 We know that people are being assessed as ready for employment when they are not and many people Turning Point support are being seen as part of the Work Programme when they should really be accessing Work Choice. This again implicates the assessment process as being considerably flawed and a potential cause for the variations that exist.
1.17 As the Employment Related Services Association (ERSA) recommend in their response to the Committee, more sophisticated assessment and diagnostic tools should be developed by providers and the Government working together. By accurately determining a person’s distance from the labour market, a more sophisticated differential payment model can be developed.
The Prime Provider Model
• What are the programmes’ impacts on its subcontractors in the voluntary and community sector?
1.18 As a subcontractor our reliance on prime providers for referrals and information significantly affects our ability to support someone into employment. The number of referrals we receive vary monthly and could undermine the stability that smaller organisations require in terms of providing a sustainable model of support.
1.19 The needs of the people referred to us by the Primes also vary from what we originally expected to be supporting and therefore designed the model to meet. This reflects the broad spectrum of people entering into the Work Programme and the
3 The Work programme: Perceptions and Experiences of the Voluntary Sector, NCVO (Sept 2012) found here: http://www.ncvo‐ vol.org.uk/sites/default/files/sig_survey_june_2012_report_17.9.12.pdf
3 extreme needs specialist providers are being asked to address. Our model was designed to provide over the phone support to those with low level mental health conditions, substance misuse issues and offending histories. Many of the referrals we have received are far, far more complex than the model was originally designed to work with. This again impacts on the stability of the model and the ability of sub contractors to achieve positive outcomes for the individuals and also needed for payment.
• To what extent does the scheme help ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs?
1.20 On the whole services are in place to provide tailored employment support for individuals, regardless of the complexity of their needs. The challenge is not service availability, although that is being challenged by the financial pressures associated with being part of the programme, but rather ensuring the Primes use specialist providers and refer the appropriate people to the most appropriate service.
1.21 To this end, particularly in regards to the ability of providers to understand and support the mental health and wellbeing of individuals, a working group of Prime Contractors and specialist Providers, Chaired by John Mallalieu (Turning Point) and Jeremy Clarke (New Savoy Partnership), and assembled by Lord Freud have recently completed a toolkit to help Employment Advisers to identify and help jobseekers to better well-being through work, whatever their health or circumstances. The toolkit’s particular focus is: • To help advisers focus on employment goals as a means to better mental health • To help providers offer good employment advice to people with mental health conditions and know where to go for more specialist help • To help the jobseeker get into work and sustain it, and have better well-being through work
1.22 On a practical level, the toolkit helps identify those instances when a jobseeker may benefit from more specialist employment or mental health intervention to help them get into work or when a self referral to a GP is advised, and also know what specialist support is available, how to find it and how it can help the jobseeker to their job goal. This toolkit was launched on the 30th November and can be found on the DWP website4.
1.23 One example of someone we support on the Work Programme, who would be far better suited to Work Choice, for example, is DH. DH is a 57 year old man with severe lifelong learning disabilities. He does not understand the concept of money and is only able to form relationships and communicate with close family. Brother has to have power of attorney and keep a constant check on him. He is vulnerable due to the fact that he creates sexual conversations which open him up to all sorts of serious allegations and possible conviction. Although DH has completed some educational courses he is still far away from the job market and is unlikely to ever retain employment without significant ongoing support.
1.24 By supporting DH on the Work Programme he is not getting the support he needs therefore he is potentially not achieving the outcomes he could if he was
4 Working for Wellbeing in employment: a toolkit for advisers (Nov 2012) http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/mh‐toolkit.pdf
4 supported in a more targeted program tailored to his very complex and enduring needs.
The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups
• Have minimum service delivery standards been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP?
1.25 The standards are in place however our experience is that Primes are too focused on response rates. From an operational level we have found that as a sub contractor we are restricted in the way we comply to the necessary standards as we have to conform to the Prime’s procedures. We obviously want to comply to standards however there could be an opportunity, which would benefit all partners, to allow more flexibility in the way providers do this, for example using a different data system to the one prescribed by the Prime which is more tailored to the people being supported.
• How rigorous and effective are the DWP’s monitoring and complaints procedures?
1.26 Based on our experience, which is mainly with the Primes, DWP monitoring of Primes is robust. We would, however, question whether the Merlin Standard was the optimal process for safeguarding the relationship between Primes and Subs, particularly the fact that references that influenced the awarding of accreditation were chosen by the Primes, rather than through a more independent means.
The ‘Black Box Approach’ to service delivery
• Is this approach proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for service users in all payment groups?
1.27 Not having a prescribed model of delivery has allowed service providers to design interventions, based on their expertise, which are most relevant to their client groups. This, in theory at least, enables tailored services to be designed and delivered around the individual’s needs.
1.28 The variety of people Turning Point supports means that a ‘one size fits all’ model would not have been successful at all in helping to address the barriers to employment being faced. Given the increased complexity of these needs, compared to what had originally been envisaged, of those referred to us, flexibility in how we operate has been essential to allow us to adapt to a very different client group in less than ideal circumstances.
• What is DWP’s role in monitoring this?
1.29 Using the data available DWP have a role in ensuring consistency across the country for individuals in the same payment groups to ensure that regardless of the model or where in the country they are, they are receiving the same benefits. If there was vast disparity between outcomes based on different models DWP can flag this up by sharing examples of good practice.
1.30 DWP also have a coordinating role to bring together funding, good practice and partnership working between Work Programme providers; between providers and
5 local authorities and between government departments. For example more could be done to link skills funding to the Work Programme either through colleges of the Skills Funding Agency (SFA).
7 December 2012
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Written evidence submitted by A4e
1.0 Introduction
1.1 A4e is submitting this response in relation to the Work and Pensions Select Committee inquiry into the Work Programme: the experience of different user groups. A4e is one of the largest providers of the Work Programme on behalf of the DWP and Jobcentre Plus (JCP). We are the Prime Provider for five Work Programme Contract Package Areas (CPAs): East London; East Midlands; North West; South East; and South Yorkshire. A4e is also a subcontractor in the following contract package areas: North East; Wales; Scotland; Surrey, Sussex and Kent; West Yorkshire.
1.2 In delivering the Work Programme across these areas, A4e has directly supported tens of thousands of people into work. We have seen particular success with young people. Nearly half (47%) of the 18‐24 year olds claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance, who were referred to A4e at the start of the Work Programme in June 2011, got a job. Since the Work Programme began, A4e has also supported jobseekers in setting up over 2,000 new businesses – 81% of these were trading successfully at six months.
2.0 Executive Summary
With A4e’s insight, expertise and front‐line experience, in our submission we make the following recommendations:
2.1 A review of current categories, definitions and pricing to produce a fine‐textured set of cohorts. 2.2 Investigate the potential for more effective profiling tools, and if successful, for more day one entries to the programme. 2.3 A review of referral mechanisms to the Work Programme and the effectiveness of minimum referral guarantees. 2.4 The DWP to lead a pan‐government effort to create a common social outcomes procurement framework, which allows a single provider to pool budgets around an individual. 2.5 Use of the claimant to vacancy rate as a preferred metric of labour market ease/difficulty, rather than GDP. 2.6 Local and national media should follow the lead of those publications already championing the Work Programme to help employers to understand the potential to support local jobseekers into work.
3.0 The differential payments model
3.1 A4e strongly supports DWP’s differential payment model. Some customers are much further from work, much more costly to the taxpayer, and much more expensive to move into work than others. It guards against so‐ called “parking and creaming”. Paying according to the complexity of the work in hand is therefore sensible.
3.2 In an ideal system, the differential payments would be so well calculated and precise that all customers would move into work at exactly the same rate, because both the incentives and resources to deal with them would all be exactly equal to the challenge of that cohort. Other things being equal, if one group is moving into work faster or slower than others, this indicates the payment level is too high, or low (although clearly in reality there are many other factors at play that determine the rate at which customers move into work, such the strength of the local economy).
3.3 One way the Work Programme could be enhanced further is by strengthening the use of differential payments. The nine current payment groups for the Work Programme are still loosely based on the previous type of benefit recipient. A4e is a provider to Job Service Australia, which means that we also operate with the Australian model. The Australian system has over eighty different payment groups. Our experience is that this creates better incentives, and better reflects the true costs and difficulty of dealing with a very diverse group of customers.
3.4 Mental health, self confidence and skills all deteriorate the longer a person is out of work. Therefore, we would support greater use of “Day 1 entry” for some types of customer. Ex‐offenders now enter the Work Programme immediately upon release. Having a criminal record presents an enormous barrier to employment, and these customers need bespoke, in depth support as soon as possible. A4e believes that there may be other groups that would benefit from a similar approach: customers with very low qualification levels for instance.
3.5 An improved profiling assessment tool, either managed by Jobcentre Plus or independently, which coulde tak into consideration a wider set of personal indicators and situational issues (location, poverty, local job market, etc.), would help to create an even more efficient market. Better profiling would allow for a faster and more effective diagnostic of the many issues an individual can face in their first twelve months of unemployment. With a better diagnosis of the level of a person’s need, it would be possible to collect data to make a better judgement about which customer groups could benefit from being fast tracked to the Work Programme on day one of unemployment in the future.
Recommendations • A review of current categories, definitions and pricing to see if it is possible to hone the accuracy of cohort divisions. • Investigate the potential for more effective profiling tools, and if successful, for more day one entries to the programme.
4.0 The prime provider model
4.1 Prime contracting is a sensible way to combine the advantages of large and small organisations. Across our five CPAs, over 40% of A4e’s delivery comes from our supply chain partners. We have a diverse supply chain with a mix of third sector (44%), publicr secto (31%) and private sector (25%) partners. A4e has worked with each of these sectors for many years and understands the different challenges partners within these sectors face, and different strengths that each sector can bring to our supply chain.
4.2 We provide an array of support to our supply chain partners, including financial modelling workshops, face to face advice and flexible payment options, from the initial contract negotiation phase through to current operations. In the last ten months, A4e has delivered over 900 training days to our partners, averaging 20 days per organisation in less than a year. For example, specialist training has been delivered to help partners to build employer relationships and securing employment opportunities for customers. Over 50 partner representatives have undergone this training, to date.
4.3 Looking ahead, the most important way to enhance the prime contracting model would be to improve the consistency of referrals onto the Work Programme from Jobcentre Plus and the Work Capability Assessment. Primes like A4e have built supply chains to suit the expected blend of referrals, including many smaller, community providers who specialise in the particular types of barriers which ESA customers often face. At the start of the Work Programme, prime contractors expected 30% of customer referrals to be ESA. However referrals have consistently been substantially below expectations, particularly in the first year of the contract. As a result, primes often have not always had the customers to refer to their specialist suppliers. This has created issues for those suppliers, who often have fixed costs that they have to maintain without the anticipated revenue stream. The heart of this issue is good communication from DWP / JCP to primes and suppliers, and continuing the improvements to the referral process.
Recommendation • A review of referral mechanisms to the Work Programme and the effectiveness of minimum referral guarantees.
6.0 The “black box” approach to service delivery
6.1 A4e strongly supports the black box approach. Frontline providers know what works best at the frontline. Moreover, in a system where risk is transferred, providers must have the flexibility to operate as they see fit. DWP should monitor outcomes and distanced travelle by customers, not how that is achieved.
6.2 It is vital customers have a voice in the service they receive. It is crucial both to ensuring quality service and to suggesting further improvements to the service model. Therefore having good mechanism of feedback and complaint is a very important part of the Work Programme’s black box.
6.3 The length of Work Programme contracts supports innovation, because it permits longer term investment, better data, and stronger links with local employers, community organisations, Local Authorities and many other crucial stakeholders.
6.4 An example of service innovation is The Dearne Approach, a ground‐breaking joint project involving A4e, Serco, local residents, Turning Point and Barnsley Metropolitan Council. The project trains up local people to be community researchers, developing new insight into their needs and aspirations. This bottom‐up research will then inform a closer alignment of public, private and third sectors working in Dearne, providing services which are better targeted to meet the needs of local people.
6.5 Another example is A4e’s job creation work with a local Housing Association in Southampton. The intent of the project is to refer customers who are further from the jobs market to the Housing Association for an interview, selection and 6 month job placement. Those who complete the programme will be either offered employment by the Association or put forward for opportunities locally with their newly acquired skill set. The pilot has been running for 4 months ‐ so far without a single drop out.
6.6 Customers are a vital focus for the Work Programme, but so are employers too. The black box also gives us much more flexibility when working with employers. A major focus for us has been creating long term partnerships with employers. We work with employers to understand their HR strategy, and the kinds of roles that they will need to fill over not just next week, but next month or next year. A4e can then work with customers to skill them up, not just for that industry, but for that specific role and specific employer. For the customer, knowing an employer is ready to give them a chance gives them a great boost to their confidence and motivation. For the employer, they know they will get good quality candidates who understand the role they are entering, and have the necessary skills and attitude. Unlike a recruitment agency, A4e charges no finder’s fee. This cuts costs for employers in recruitment, reduces turnover, and helps them fulfil their social responsibility objectives.
Employer Case Study: QUBE Telecommunications
A4e has joined forces with telecommunications firm QUBE, to help them to staff their nationwide network of telecomms engineers. The partnership with QUBE has given A4e customers all over the country the chance at a brand new career: nearly 200 have successfully made that step. We now manage the whole recruitment process for QUBE ‐ from sourcing to selection. Our sustainment rate has been exceptionally high, a sign that both our customers and our employers are happy with our service.
“A4e have supported QUBE through a rapid and exciting phase of growth. By working with them we have recruited around 200 engineers. They have provided us with an efficient, professional and extremely cost effective service.” ‐ Caroline Keefe, HR Director, QUBE
6.7 We are now working to extend the number of employers we can support in this way, by integrating higher and higher levels of skills training into our pre‐employment support, so that we provide a complete pathway for a customer to work. In some cases this begin with basic hygiene, time keeping, literacy, numeracy, confidence building; then job search, health support, employer link up, interview preparation; through to help starting work, and an apprenticeship in work. The further integration of welfare and skills spending would greatly help this process.
6.8 An important component of our black box model is to help people start their own business. So far we have helped 2,535 people on the Work Programme to start their own business. Self employment is particularly appropriate for customers who have a barrier to the normal workplace, such as caring responsibilities or a disability.
Looking ahead: where the black box goes next
6.9 The next development for the black box model centres on innovation and integration with public services around the individual customer. Being out of work is rarely the only challenge our customers face. Inadequate skills, low self esteem and poor health are very common issues. For instance, 27% of our customers consider themselves to be overweight. 54% smoke, far more than the national average. Poor mental health is also a large concern for our customers, which in turn involves issues such as loneliness (19% of our cohort see friends or families less than once a month).
6.10 These problems are often more entrenched amongst our customers than the majority of unemployed people seen by Job Centre Plus. For instance, whilst two thirds of short term unemployed people (unemployed for less than a year) say they have a health issue, amongst our customers the figure is even higher at 84%.
6.11 This creates a complex, overlapping set of problems which are mutually reinforcing.
Tackling all these issues requires a coordinated effort across all public services to achieve agreed outcomes. This requires not just the right range of support, but also careful sequencing. The right support in the wrong order will not stick.
6.12 A4e welcomes the cross government move towards payment by results to do just that. However, in doing so, it is vital that any new procurement frameworks for reoffending, health or addiction outcomes mesh with the Work Programme. Recreating silos across the Ministry of Justice, Department of Health and so on might result in a single individual having three providers working in isolation towards three outcomes for three ministries – which would see no improvement for the individuals receiving services, or the taxpayer.
6.13 The DWP has been at the forefront of designing payment by results contracts. Along the way it has built an unparalleled expertise in commissioning for outcomes, building an effective market, and securing value for money. We hope that departments work together to build systems which are mutually reinforcing of positive outcomes on the ground.
Recommendation: • The DWP to lead a pan‐government effort to create a common social outcomes procurement framework. This should build on the work of the recent Social Justice Framework for measurement and the Cabinet Office’s Social Outcome Fund, to allow a single provider to pool budgets around an individual.
7.0 Regional variations in job outcome statistics
7.1 One way to counter difficult local labour conditions is to work with local media to change the perception of unemployed people. The media labelling of unemployed people as “scroungers” or “benefit cheats” is not only unhelpful for customers, it also makes employers more cautious about taking on people who have been out of work for some time. It is vital to make the case that our customers are hard working, diligent and keen to be given a chance. A4e is working with several local newspaper groups on a “We want to Work” campaign, encouraging employers to take on people who have been on the Work Programme. The campaign began in Derby, where all six candidates featured in the paper have now found work, and has spread to Oxfordshire, Grantham and Doncaster. All of the campaigns have attracted local support from their constituency MPs, many of whom have acted as crucial champions of their unemployed constituents.
7.2 Providers work within a system of very different local economies across the country. Moreover, forecasts suggest that these differences will become starker as the national economy recovers1. These variations show up somewhat in official figures. However, the main national measure – GDP – is perhaps not the best reflection of local labour markets. A4e believes a better measure of the state of the local labour market is the Claimant Count Vs Vacancies rate – the ratio of the number of people looking for work to the number of jobs available locally.
7.3 Using this measure demonstrates just how different local labour markets are now becoming. In some parts of the country there are twice as many vacancies per claimant as the national average, whilst in others there are three times fewer vacancies per claimant as the national average.2
Vacancies: Claimants ratio October 2012 Top 5 Jobcentre Plus Districts Standard full‐time Total claimants Number of vacancies vacancies for every 100 claimants Staffordshire and Shropshire 11,494 30,549 38% Thames Valley 11,693 31,668 37% Mercia 10,818 30,183 36% Leicestershire and Northamptonshire 12,755 37,325 34% Greater Manchester Central and Cheshire 15,837 50,180 32%
Bottom 5 Jobcentre Plus Districts Standard full‐time vacancies Total claimants Number of vacancies for every 100 claimants South East Wales 4,405 34,802 13% East London 6,254 61,592 10% Durham and Tees Valley 4,465 44,933 10% South London 6,302 68,697 9% West of Scotland 2,453 30,500 8%
Recommendations • Local and national media should follow the lead of those publications already championing the Work Programme to help employers understand the potential to support local jobseekers into work. • DWP should use the claimant to vacancy rate as a preferred metric of labour market ease/difficulty, rather than GDP.
7 December 2012
1 Oxford Economics (2012) Regional Economic Outlook Autumn 2012 2 October 2012 figures. Written evidence submitted by The Association of Colleges (AoC)
The Association of Colleges (AoC) represents Further Education, Sixth Form and Tertiary Colleges and their three million students. Colleges provide a rich mix of academic and vocational education at all levels. As independent, autonomous institutions, established under the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, they have the freedom to innovate and respond flexibly to the needs of individuals, businesses and communities.
Over 200 Colleges are sub-contractors under the Work Programme and most commit a proportion of their budget to work with unemployed people. The average College provides over 1000 unemployed people with training each year.1
The prime provider model including: its impact on subcontractors; and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs
1. Colleges responded positively to the prime provider model introduced by DWP to administer the Work Programme. Within each tendering area there was at least one bid that pulled together Colleges within that area, alongside other partners to respond to the challenge of delivering a ‘Welfare to Work’ Programme that responded to the needs of the communities those College were established to serve.
2. Only one College led bid was successful (and this was from Newcastle College Group which includes a recognised national Welfare to Work provider). Over 200 Colleges are named within the extensive list of subcontractors supplied by the successful Primes and yet AoC has received little evidence to suggest that Colleges are being used extensively in support of the Work Programmes ‘black box’ approach to delivery, with only a handful reporting a significant role in sub-prime provision or even ‘one off’ training.
3. Given Colleges level of success in regional bidding and tendering in general (for example for the European Social Fund), it would seem that DWP did not have an appetite to support local provider consortiums, but favoured larger organisations who, whilst having a track record in the management of sub contracts, could not necessarily be said to have direct links to, or knowledge of, the learners they were attempting to engage with, nor the communities within which they would be operating. It appears whilst lip service may have been paid within bids to the importance of local links, these do not appear to have been brought to fruition once contracts had been won. It would be an interesting exercise to compare the partnerships and approaches within the successful bids with the actual partnerships and approaches that have emerged.
4. Whilst there has finally been a statistical release on the Work Programme, there is still a limited level of information publically available on the models of delivery and the satisfaction of learners, employers, stakeholders and sub contractors.
5. AoC highlighted the excellent work that Colleges undertake with unemployed people within their communities through a publication entitled ‘Back to Work: Colleges supporting sustainable jobs’2. The publication, which was supported by a survey of Colleges, provided specific case studies that highlighted the type of innovative approaches that Colleges are
1 AoC Survey, November 2011 2 AoC Back to Work, http://www.aoc.co.uk/en/parliament-and-campaigns/Public_Affairs/back-to- work.cfm taking to address problems at a local level. The survey highlighted that in 2010/11 the average College provided training for over 1000 unemployed people and this number has increased significantly since then.
The “black box” approach to service delivery including: whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups; and DWP’s role in monitoring this
6. By definition it is very hard to comment on what is inside the ‘black box’. The recent statistical release suggests that the box is indeed pretty dark. There is no question that the individuals that the Work Programme is attempting to support are arguably the furthest from the job market, so it could be said that the original expectations from the programme were overly ambitious. It is disheartening to see that the Work Programme has actually yet to meet the levels of success of its predecessors3, although, if ERSA4 are accurate the cost per job is significantly reduced.
7. What the AoC publication ‘Back to Work’ also demonstrates is that the ‘black box’ approach is not the only successful model of bringing unemployed people back into work. College job outcome success rates highlighted in a recent Ofsted Report5 are noted as being between 19% and 27%. From August 2011, Colleges were given freedoms and flexibilities by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to enable them to better respond to local circumstances6. By January 2012, two thirds of them had already changed their provision to provide courses and qualifications for people who were unemployed7 This suggests an effective development of provision is taking place, particularly when compared to the record achieved by Work Programme Primes.
8. Barnsley College can claim significantly higher levels of job outcomes than those achieved on the Work Programme and believe that their delivery really meets the needs of local job seekers. For example, Barnsley College ran 12 Sector Based Work Academies in 2011/12 that resulted in 48% of learners securing employment with local employers ranging from McDonalds to Grosvenor Casino.
In 2011/12 Leicester College supported around 1,000 learners across its three strands of work to support unemployed people into work:
• Skills conditionality • Sector based work academies • ‘Pipeline’ Sector based work academies (see below)
21% of these learners went into jobs in 2011/12.
9. Leicester College told us:
“We work with Leicestershire and Northamptonshire JCP and have developed a very productive working relationship with them. We are locally based, have lots of good local contacts. Unlike some
3 CESI, Work programme performance statistics: Inclusion analysis, November 2012 4 ERSA Employment Related Services Association Media Pack, November 2012 5 Ofsted Skills for employment July 2012 6 ‘New Challenges, New Chances’, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011 7 AoC Survey of Colleges, published January 2012 of the large national contractors, we have no issues with the need to find, and pay, for office space in particular localities, or with the time needed to develop new contacts and networks.
“We do get a very few referrals from the prime contractors. This seems to be a missed opportunity by prime contractors to get their clients some important training that might increase their chances of progressing in to work later on. This may either because they are trying to draw down Adult Learner Responsive Funding for their own training (which in all likelihood will be from a more limited offer than a college could provide) or because they have not yet realised this would be a resource to help the individual, and to help them improve their progression rates.”
10. One of the ‘critical factors’ identified by Colleges when dealing effectively with unemployed people is to have strong, collaborative partnerships with other stakeholders, particularly JCP. What appears to be missing from the Work Programme model is any recognition of such collaboration. Colleges who have tried to engage with Primes have met with limited success, whereas 89% describe their relationships with JCP as ‘good’ or ‘excellent’8. The insistence on working in isolation when there are Colleges and other providers within every community is shortsighted and unhelpful.
11. AoC tried to establish relationships, on behalf of its members, with all the Primes, but only two responded to the request to meet and whilst the meetings appeared positive, little or nothing has happened as a result.
12. It seems that individuals are not being supported as effectively as they could be due to this lack of engagement. Indeed, we have been given reports of instances where individuals are on a College course that has a strong likelihood of leading to work, having been removed and placed on the Work Programme where the Prime will not even discuss the possibility of the individual completing the programme they have started. This does not seem to be a helpful position. This is a particular issue when students have ESOL needs and gaining competence is an essential precursor to gaining employment. It is both expensive and counterproductive for these students to be unable to finish a programme that will indeed lead to them being employment ready.
13. AoC strongly support the development of a greater level of collaborative partnership to support unemployed people back into sustainable work, with the partnership including all stakeholders.
14. The feedback that we have been given is that the ‘black box’ seems to be resulting in more ‘one size fits all’ delivery rather than individualised programmes. We do not see primes sharing innovative models of effective practice with each other or anyone else, nor do we see the sharing of individual assessment tools and diagnostics, or tracking systems. To be effective a Prime must have developed such tools which could be of great benefit to other providers and yet with no collaboration, such opportunities are lost.
7 December 2012
8 ‘Back to Work’ http://www.aoc.co.uk/en/parliament-and-campaigns/Public_Affairs/back-to- work.cfm Written evidence submitted by Shaw Trust and Careers Development Group (CDG)
Executive Summary
1. The Work Programme is a much needed evolution in the delivery of welfare to work services. The flexibility offered through the black box approach to delivery; the longer duration of the customer journey at two years compared to an average of 6.5 weeks on predecessor programmes like New Deal; and the opportunity for staff to work with customers on a one to one basis has resulted in the Work Programme being the most bespoke and tailored welfare to work programme to date. In a recent survey, 80% of Shaw Trust and CDG’s Work Programme delivery staff felt that the Work Programme enabled them to deliver a more individually tailored service than previous welfare to work programmes.
2. Although the Work Programme has brought much needed enhancements to the delivery of welfare to work services, further refinements including moving towards a differential payments model based on customer need, rather than their barriers to work could lead to even more customers finding and sustaining work through the contract. Additionally, a realignment of funding of the Work Programme for harder to help payment groups could also lead to further job outcome successes. By redistributing a small proportion of funding away from sustainment payments and towards the attachment phase- especially for harder to help groups like Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) customers, more funding could be spent on delivering tailored interventions to these customers, while retaining the payments by results funding structure of the Work Programme. Ensuring that the ESA customers furthest from the labour market are able to participate in alternative specialist provision, such as Work Choice, could also contribute to raising the job outcome achievement rate for this group of customers.
3. Although variations in contract performance on the Work Programme can be attributed to the differences in delivery between Work Programme providers, it is also important to acknowledge the impact of regional socio-economic factors on contractual performance. In particular, the level of deprivation and the competition for jobs in each CPA have a demonstrable impact on contractual performance.
4. Shaw Trust and Careers Development Group (CDG) welcome the opportunity to submit evidence to the Work and Pensions Select Committee in relation to the experience of different user groups on the Work Programme. Our evidence focuses on areas of Shaw Trust and CDG’s direct delivery experience as both a prime provider and a subcontractor. Introduction to Shaw Trust and CDG
5. Shaw Trust and CDG is a newly merged charity comprising leading welfare to work charities Shaw Trust and the Careers Development Group. Both charities have over thirty years of experience of supporting unemployed and disabled people to achieve employment, independent living and social inclusion. In 2011/2012 the combined organisation supported 46,595 customers from over 190 delivery centres nationally.
6. Shaw Trust and CDG is one of only two third sector prime contractors of the Work Programme in the UK. The charity delivers the Work Programme as a prime contractor in the London East Contract Package Area (CPA). The charity also operates as a subcontractor to a range of different prime contractors in the London West; Thames Valley, Hampshire and the Isle of Wight; Surrey, Sussex and Kent; Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and the West of England; Coventry, Warwickshire, Staffordshire and the Marches; and North Yorkshire and the Humber CPAs.
7. Shaw Trust and CDG additionally delivers a range of specialist contracts to support disadvantaged groups towards and into employment in the UK. These include 17 Work Choice prime contracts for people with severe health problems and disabilities, the new DWP Day One Support for Young People contract to support young people into work experience and employment, as well as operating a range of social enterprises which generate stepping stone employment opportunities for the hardest to help.
8. The charity has extensive experience of delivering the Work Programme’s predecessor contracts: New Deal, Pathways to Work and Flexible New Deal as both a prime contractor and a subcontractor. Such a wealth of delivery expertise ensures that Shaw Trust and CDG are best placed to comment on the experience of different service users on the Work Programme to date.
Differential Payments
Define customers by need and not by benefit claimed
9. Shaw Trust and CDG welcome the differential payments model offered by the Work Programme. Throughout our thirty year history of delivering employment focused services to unemployed and disadvantaged customers, we know that some individuals need more intensive support over a longer period of time than other beneficiaries that we work with. The Work Programme’s differential payments model reflects this diversity of need, and is intended to offer the funding needed to support some of the most disadvantaged customers participating in the Work Programme into and through sustained employment. 10. However, despite the Work Programme’s differential payments model delivering a necessary evolution in welfare to work delivery, Shaw Trust and CDG would like to see this model evolve further in future welfare to work commissioning. In particular, future differential payments models should assign payment not on the type of benefit claimed – such as Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) or Employment Support Allowance (ESA) – but on the specific barriers and level of disadvantage that each individual faces to getting into work.
11. Shaw Trust and CDG’s survey of Work Programme delivery staff revealed that in the experience of our front line teams the barriers that people face in getting back into work are specific to each individual and not to any one payment group. 60% of staff stated that they did not feel that the payment group a customer is allocated to on the Work Programme accurately reflects how easy or difficult each customer will be to get into work. For example, staff reported that mental and physical health problems affect customers in all payment groups, and not just the three ESA payment groups and the Incapacity Benefit and Income Support payment group. Similarly, barriers to work such as homelessness, or a lack of access to affordable childcare, are not exclusive to just one payment group.
12. The published Work Programme statistics add additional weight to the need for a further evolution of the differential payments model. The statistics highlight that the most disadvantaged JSA payment group – JSA Early Access – outperforms perceived easier to help payment groups. Lower outcome payments are paid for helping these perceived easier to help groups into work such as the JSA 25+ customers. According to the published figures in November 2012, Work Programme providers have been paid for job outcomes for 4.9% of JSA Early Access claimants, compared to 3.4% of JSA 25+ customers.1
13. A future differential payments model linked to barriers and not payment type could utilise best practice from the Australian Job Seeker Classification Instrument (JSCI) model. The JSCI is used by Centrelink staff (Australia’s equivalent to Jobcentre Plus) to comprehensively assess customers’ barriers to work before they are referred to a provider for employability support. The JSCI assesses whether customers possess common barriers to employment such as basic levels of literacy and numeracy or health problems, alongside a more holistic range of socio-economic factors which may affect an individual’s ability to move into employment. These include the locality in which someone lives, such as a rural area with few jobs or an area of multiple deprivation, whether an individual suffers from intergenerational disadvantage, and any transport
1 For Work Programme performance statistics, please see DWP’s Work Programme Tab Tool page: http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=wp related barriers an individual may face.2 Benefit claimants are then placed into four different streams, according to their identified difficulty to move into work. Providers are paid ten times as much funding to support customers on their journey into work in ‘stream four’ the most disadvantaged stream, compared to ‘stream one’- the stream with the most job ready customers.
14. Such a comprehensive measure of individuals’ needs could be used to enhance both providers’ and Jobcentre Plus’ (JCP’s) delivery of employability services on future programmes, such as the next phase of Work Programme. Shaw Trust and CDG are currently developing a new in-house assessment tool – Springboard – to support our Work Programme prime contract delivery in the London East CPA. Springboard will not only identify Work Programme customers’ barriers to employment, but will assist our Employment Advisors by suggesting the most appropriate intervention delivered in-house or by a menu partner to tackle that barrier. This enhancement to the charity’s Work Programme delivery will ensure that every single Work Programme customer will receive the right tailored support at the right time in their journey back into employment.
Realigning the payment pattern for the hardest to help
15. Shaw Trust and CDG also have further concerns regarding the current Work Programme differential payments model. By tying a minimum of 80% of the contract’s funding to the achievement of sustained outcomes in year one, moving to a 100% in year four of the contract, the ability of providers to purchase tailored interventions to support the most disadvantaged customers could be affected. This could particularly impact on the three ESA customer groups on the Work Programme, which have not performed as robustly on the contract to date as customers in other payment groups.3
16. To date, Shaw Trust and CDG has invested in supporting ESA customers by providing specialist interventions to tackle their barriers to work, such as condition management support from menu partner Expert Patients, and specialist support for people with hearing difficulties and disabilities from Clarion. For ESA customers who need home visits or are unable to travel, specialist Engagement Advisors provide intensive individualised support to customers on an outreach basis or from customers’ homes.
17. However, further tailored support could be provided to ESA customers if the Work Programme payment structure for these groups was realigned. By
2 Department for Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2009), Review of the Job Seeker Classification Instrument 3 For Work Programme performance statistics, please see DWP’s Work Programme Tab Tool page: http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=wp redistributing a proportion of the funding for job outcomes or sustainments to the attachment phase, or by creating a series of transitional funding triggers for achieving distance travelled targets, more funding would be allocated earlier on in ESA customers’ journeys into work. This would enable providers to invest more heavily in tailored interventions which support customers in managing their health conditions, and pave a realistic and sustainable path back into employment. It would also retain the payments by results financial incentive on the Work Programme, which is a fundamental policy objective of the current government.
18. Additionally, we would urge the Department for Work and Pensions to carefully evaluate the appropriateness of the Work Programme for some groups of ESA customers- particularly those with return to work prognoses of over six months. A more specialist programme, such as Work Choice, which offers customers intensive support tailored to each individual’s pace of development, coupled with distance travelled outcomes like participation in supported employment as part of an individual’s journey back into sustained mainstream work, could be better suited to the barriers and employability needs of ESA customers further away from the labour market.
“Creaming and Parking”
19. Shaw Trust and CDG agree fully with the findings of DWP’s first piece of qualitative research into the Work Programme. This initial report emphasises that at this stage of the contract, it is too early to evaluate whether creaming and parking is occurring in delivery.4
20. In particular, we would caution against using the published job outcome data on 26th November 2012 as evidence to conclude whether creaming and parking is occurring. Providers have two years to support a customer to prepare for and to secure employment on the Work Programme. The DWP data published on 26th November 2012 shows only the job outcomes paid for by DWP between June 2011 and July 2012. This means for the JSA 18-24 and JSA 25+ payment groups – the majority of Work Programme participants – a job outcome would have needed to have been secured by February 2012 to qualify for a job outcome payment in this data period. The job outcome data therefore underestimates achieved performance.
21. As the Work Programme progresses, and the first cohort of customers in June 2011 complete the Work Programme in June 2013, a clearer picture of both performance and any potential creaming and parking may be revealed. However, reviewing Shaw Trust and CDG’s job start data for the London East
4 Department for Work and Pensions (2012), Research Report 821, Work Programme evaluation: Findings from the first phase of qualitative research on programme delivery prime contact for the June 2011 cohort to date reveals that 14% of job starts for this cohort have been achieved one year after contract commencement. This suggests that Shaw Trust and CDG are effectively working with the Work Programme customers furthest from the labour market, and supporting them into employment.
Acknowledging the Causes of Regional Variations in Job Outcome Statistics
22. Although Shaw Trust and CDG fully acknowledges that the published Work Programme performance, showing paid job outcome data until July 2012, does highlight variance in performance between providers, it is also important to acknowledge the wider range of social and economic factors which have an influence on job outcome achievement in each CPA.
23. Shaw Trust and CDG’s own analysis of the published data reveals that both the level of deprivation in each CPA and the competition for jobs in each CPA have a tangible impact on Work Programme contracts’ performance to date. For example, Shaw Trust and CDG’s prime contract in London East is located in the most deprived Work Programme CPA in the country. Eight of the sixteen local authorities in the CPA are in the top twenty most deprived local authorities in England according to the Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2010.5 This includes having the top three most deprived local authorities in the CPA- Hackney, Newham and Tower Hamlets. Shaw Trust and CDG’s prime contract is ranked 23rd out of the 40 prime contracts in terms of performance achieved to date. In contrast, the least deprived CPA in the country- Thames Valley, Hampshire and the Isle of Wight achieved the best performance in the published Work Programme results. The charity is also a subcontractor in this CPA.
24. Similarly, the London East CPA has the highest competition for jobs6 out of all CPAs across the UK. Data from June 2011- July 2012 shows that there are 9.6 benefit claimants per JCP notified vacancy in the CPA. There are just 3.5 claimants per job in the top performing CPA, Thames Valley, Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, with the lowest level of benefit claimants per job in another top performing CPA- Coventry, Warwickshire, Staffordshire and the Marches.
25. This evidence firstly emphasises the danger of comparing CPAs on a national level, as the unique labour market and demographic factors specific to each CPA have a bearing on contract performance. As per the Work Programme’s original design, a comparison of the performance of providers within each CPA is therefore the fairest and most effective gauge of contractual performance, as
5 The Indices of Multiple Deprivation are published by the Department for Communities and Local Government: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/english-indices-of-deprivation-2010 6 Competition for jobs is calculated by dividing the total number of Jobseekers Allowance claimants and Employment and Support Allowance claimants (i.e. claimants ready for work) in a CPA by the number of JCP notified vacancies available in the CPA. the two or three providers within each CPA face the same challenges to performance as each other.
26. Additionally, our data analysis suggests that regionalised performance targets, which potentially evolve in line with labour market conditions, could be of benefit in future welfare to work contracts. Setting providers uniform targets could result in targets being missed in areas of the country where the labour market is not buoyant, as well as national factors such as the recent double dip recession – where economic growth for 2012 has fallen to -0.1% compared to the 2.6% originally forecast by the Office of Budgetary Responsibility at the time of Work Programme bid submission – not being factored into contractual performance. Equally, national minimum performance levels could also result in providers in more economically buoyant CPAs not being set realistically stretching performance targets. Linking performance to locality could again be benefitted by a differential payments system linked to individuals’ barriers to work rather than benefit type. By identifying where in the country the most disadvantaged benefit claimants are, and providing more funding to these areas accordingly, providers can not only develop more targeted and bespoke service delivery models, but taxpayers’ money could be saved by more effectively tailoring job outcome payments to level of need. This would acknowledge that the average JSA claimant in the least deprived local authority in England in Hart in Hampshire faces very different challenges on their journey back into work than a claimant in the most deprived local authority of Hackney.
Conclusion
27. Shaw Trust and CDG fully supports the Work Programme. The Work Programme offers a much needed evolution in service design by enabling delivery staff to work with customers more flexibly and for longer than predecessor programmes. When evaluating the Work Programme’s effectiveness to date, regional social-economic factors which impact on performance such as the level of deprivation and competition for jobs, should be fully acknowledged.
28 Further enhancements to the Work Programme could involve a redistribution of the funding structure towards more disadvantaged customer groups. This would ensure that providers have the funding up front to invest in developing and delivering tailored interventions to tackle customers’ barriers to work. Any future evolutions in service design should consider linking differential payments to customer needs and not benefit type, as well as retaining specialist employability provision to prepare customers with disabilities and health problems for the workplace.
7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by Cymorth Cymru
Cymorth Cymru is the umbrella body for organisations working with vulnerable people in Wales. Our members work to assist people who are vulnerable, isolated or experiencing housing crisis, including:
• people who are homeless, or at risk of homelessness • families fleeing domestic abuse • people dealing with mental or physical health problems, or learning disabilities • people with alcohol or drug problems • refugees and people seeking asylum • care leavers and other vulnerable young people, and • older people in need of support • offenders and those at risk of offending
This list isn't exhaustive, and individuals may often face a range of challenges that make it difficult for them to find or maintain a stable home and build the sort of lives we all aspire to.
Cymorth Cymru's members help people address these issues, supporting them to fulfil their potential and build happy and fulfilling lives. Our members work across policy areas – including Community Justice, Social Services and Health etc – with the shared recognition of the key role that housing plays in promoting wellbeing.
We have three overarching objectives: • To improve the links between policy and practice by ensuring that those working in frontline service delivery understand and are influenced by the wider policy context, and those working in policy development understand and are influenced by the experiences and knowledge of those working on the ground. • To ensure that the sector maximises its contribution to the lives of citizens and the communities in which they live by helping to build and develop the sector’s capacity and professionalism. • To increase public understanding and support for the sector and the work it does in helping people build the lives they aspire to within the community.
Summary
1. We welcome this inquiry into the Work Programme and the drive to ensure that the client group experience is better understood in order to make any necessary improvements is laudable. It is key that the views of specialist support providers are taken into consideration as these organisations are best placed to help those that are furthest removed from the job market. As such, Cymorth Cymru held two consultation events with our members to gather information for this inquiry. Organisations represented included: mental health organisations, housing providers, homelessness organisations,
substance misuse organisations, organisations that work with young people, organisations that work with ex-offenders and local authorities.
2. The main points raised were:
• Work programme providers need to be more open to working with specialist support providers to meet the additional support needs of individuals;
• Work programme providers need to better understand the need for pre-employment support as often this is not provided by work programme providers and they are unwilling to be flexible and engage other organisations to do so through subcontracting.
• More creative approaches to the type of support delivered by the work programme is needed as part of the ‘black box’ approach to ensure that needs of participants are fully met, as currently the consensus is that support is not tailored, intensive or flexible enough to meet people’s needs.
• Work programme providers need to be further incentivised to work with harder to reach groups to ensure that the additional investment required from providers to assist these individuals to become work ready is made.
• Work programme staff need to be better skilled to ensure they understand the complex needs of some individuals in order for them to assist participants effectively.
The differential payments model including: the extent to which it is incentivising providers to help all participants and thereby addressing “creaming and parking”; how effectively the model reflects claimants’ relative needs; and variations in job outcomes between the different payment groups
3. Our members indicated that, in their view, there is currently a very strong drive from work programme providers to work with people receiving ESA benefit and also those who used to receive Incapacity Benefit. It is felt that many individuals who are difficult to work with are not a high priority for work programme providers due to the payment group they are in and, as such, individuals do not receive the support they need and are left to self motivate. Many of the people that our members work with often have the same additional support needs as those receiving ESA but may find themselves in less high yield payment groups and as such there is less financial incentive for work programme providers to work with these individuals and therefore they do not receive the level of support needed to help them succeed.
4. Due to this, it was felt that a payment model based on benefit groups is arbitrary. As ‘creaming and parking’ is slowly being phased out with ESA, ex-Incapacity Benefit and other ‘high yield customers’, it is exacerbated in lower yield payment groups. It was felt that returning to different programmes might provide more tailored support as benefit based eligibility isn’t working effectively for JSA claimants who present with many of the same needs as an ESA-exIB customer. As such, our members would like to see more focus directed towards young people for instance as the current model dis-incentivises providers from working with this client group.
5. It was also reported that many young people are being advised by the Job Centre Plus to take up work programme early on the promise of receiving additional support. However, our members felt that this is not always in best interest of young people and many individuals are being mis-sold this option as they are unknowingly excluding themselves from effective pre-work programme provision delivered by specialist organisations. In Wales, individuals that are involved in the work programme are then ineligible to receive support from specialist programmes funded through Welsh Government or EU Structural Funds due to an issue around ‘double funding’. Whilst this is not currently the case in England, it remains a real issue in Wales.
6. Our members raised concerns about the employment prospect of groups such as ex-offenders in terms of employer perceptions. Whilst we are involved in some very innovative work in Wales with HMP Cardiff, on the whole it was felt that DWP and MoJ should be working much more closely together to target employers and support the case for employing ex-offenders.
7. It was felt that work programme prime contractors aren’t open to subcontracting enough, either due to a lack of flexibility in models of subcontracting or an unwillingness to admit they aren’t specialists. Our members reported that prime providers aren’t open enough to bringing in relevant additional support which is vital to meeting the needs of individuals who have complex support needs, though we would caveat this by saying Working Links in Wales have been engaging in discussion, so we are hopeful that opportunities will arise that better meet the needs of customers.
The prime provider model including: its impact on subcontractors; and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs;
8. Our members working in North Wales reported a lack of stewardship from prime contractors has resulted in a lot of confusion in that area.
9. As previously mentioned, the fact that prime and sub contractors are on the whole currently unwilling to subcontract to specialist providers who can provide appropriate support to individual with complex support needs, many work programme participants are not currently receiving the tailored support that they require. Work programme provider staff who do not fully understand the complex issues that some people have, can result in serious adverse effects to individuals such as relapse and reoffending for example. This indicates that work programme staff are pushing people into work without fully understanding implications of doing so.
10. It was noted that there are a larger group of people who don’t currently meet the strict criteria to receive DLD/PIP but have mental health issues. Given the reluctance to bring in support from specialist organisations, the organisations that are best placed to support such needs are absent from the picture at the detriment to the Work Programme and, more importantly, to work programme participants.
11. It was acknowledged that both providers of work programme and providers of other community based services have a part of play in ensuring they work more closely on the ground to ensure that people’s issues are picked up by different agencies and the different layers of support an individual receives are all speaking to each other to provide good support. Cymorth Cymru will be working with our members and work programme providers to facilitate this exchange going forward.
12. There was a feeling that services in some areas of Wales were not fully meeting the Welsh language requirements of some individuals. It is vital that additional barriers like this are not added to the other barriers that face many individuals who participate in the work programme.
13. On a positive note, our members working in the Cardiff area were pleased that the work programme providers that they had encountered were open to special support organisations accompanying people on the work programme. Work programme providers in this area are also very flexible to change appointments to fit in with their clients other commitments as individuals with complex needs may have more chaotic lifestyles.
The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups including: whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP; and the rigour and effectiveness of DWP’s monitoring and complaints procedures;
14. Our members overwhelmingly felt that there is currently a very light touch approach to support – often the only support received by participant is a fortnightly phone call. They reported that many of the people that they work with often do not even know they are participating in the work which is itself testament to the lack of support that work programme providers are giving.
15. There was also criticism of the transfer of people between Job Centre Plus and work programme providers. It was felt that a letter in the post telling people that they are now on the work programme and that they need to meet with their work programme provider is not enough – especially as the letters received contain no reference to an appointment time or give the address of the work programme provider. As such, more needs to be done to induct participants by work programme providers and JCP (e.g. clear explanation on phone with individual about what is expected) as this can improve engagement and helps prevent fall out. In summary, the handover needs to be much warmer.
16. It was felt that, with the exception of a few work programme providers, many were not giving an adequate induction. In addition, it was reported that many JCP centres are not providing work programme providers with relevant information such as action plans which they are required to do.
The “black box” approach to service delivery including: whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups; and DWP’s role in monitoring this;
17. It was felt that assessment is key to understand individuals’ needs. As such, if work programme provider staff do not have the skills to carry out an appropriate assessment or have the skills to recognise additional support needs and refer to more specialist support providers, the right services will not be provided.
18. As previously stated, the need for pre-employability skills for individuals who are not ready for work is paramount but this is currently not provided through the black box approach. This is a particular issue for more vulnerable individuals such as young people, care leavers and people experiencing
homelessness as they are often far removed from the world of work and require pre-employability in order for them to succeed.
19. Our members working in more rural areas of Wales had a number of concerns around the flexibility of support under the ‘black box’ approach. In rural North Wales for example, public transport can be difficult to access, expensive and inconsistent which presents real issues for work programme participants such as: getting to appointments or work if you live in the smaller areas; lack of financial support is there for transport costs. This indicates that work programme providers aren’t being flexible enough with what they are spending their budgets on to support people into work.
20. It was felt that there is very little flexibility and innovation in what is currently being delivered by work programme providers and that ultimately people are sat in front of computers rather than receiving tailored solutions. Our members also felt that there is currently a lack of variety of training courses offered by work programme providers. As such, the ‘black box’ approach isn’t currently fostering innovation which could be a result of work programme providers being unwilling to invest heavily up front to provide the appropriate support to get people into work. It was suggested a more citizen centred approach like providing out of hours services such as peer mentoring to provide on call support to people 24 hours would be welcomed as such innovations would better meet the needs of work programme participants with mental health and/or substance misuse issues for example.
Regional variations in job outcome statistics: including whether competition between providers is driving up performance in contract package areas where the economy is particularly depressed; and how provider performance could be improved in these areas.
21. We strongly advocate that work programme providers engage specialist providers to help participants with additional support needs. It is also key that providers recognise the importance of pre- employability work for individuals who are furthest removed from the job market. Many of our members reported that they have tried to engage their local subcontractors but were refused. Many of our members can offer the type of support that can improve outcomes for work programme providers. An example of the type of pre-employability work that can be provided is given in the case study below:
Learning 4 Life
Learning 4 Life is Llamau’s education and learning programme. We offer learning opportunities to young people in a friendly and supportive setting. We help young people to build their confidence and to develop their skills and talents to plan for their futures. The young people we support need a structured programme to become work ready encompassing small, achievable steps.
The young people we support are not yet ready to engage in more formal provision and are at the beginning of a journey to become work-ready. Learning 4 Life offers the very first steps. Our learners learn to work independently, to work together and to have confidence and belief in themselves. Learners learn to arrive on time, to reflect on their achievements and to think about how their skills may be transferred and developed.
Our day is structured carefully to allow a balance of activities. In the morning, the young people work independently and in small groups on their Basic Skills. We offer City & Guild accreditation in Essential Skills Wales from Entry Levels to Level 2. All young people have a Basic Skills target. The learners cook lunch for each other and eat together. Thus Learning 4 Life aims to support their socialisation skills along with basic cooking.
After lunch, there is a workshop addressing topics such as Sexual Health, Drug and Alcohol Use or Budgeting. However, the underlying purpose of the workshops is to encourage collaborative working and to help to prepare young people for working in a team or taking part in group learning in more formal provision.
We end the day with a practical hands on activity such as art and craft, cookery and photography. Young people are encouraged to try out new hobbies which they may continue independently in the future; they often make things to decorate their flats or to give as gifts.
Learning 4 Life also provides employability support with one-to-one advice sessions to write CVs or prepare for interviews. We work in partnership with local employers to offer site visits and work tasters. The young people we support would find it very difficult to complete blocks of work experience as a first step. Instead, we offer socialisation visits, practice interviews with mentors and taster days before looking at longer placements. Learners are initially supported with transport and even wake up calls to ensure work placements are completed.
Unfortunately, once a young person is mandated onto the Work Programme, we are no longer funded to work with that young person. There have been times when the young people we support have been unaware that they are on the Work Programme and we had already worked with them to set up work placements. We then contacted the Work Programme to explain what had been arranged for the young person and to explain their support needs. However the Work Programme has not been able to provide the initial support with lifts, wake up calls and meetings to offer emotional support to the young person to help them to maintain placements.
This has been frustrating for Learning 4 Life staff. We have worked hard to build up confidence in the young people and supported them with interviews and preparation work. Yet once on the Work Programme, they are not given the structured and intensive support that they need and so our work, and the young person’s work, is wasted. The work placements have failed because the young person was not provided with the structured support that they needed.
We have also had to negotiate with the Work Programme to allow a young person to continue at a volunteer placement they were enjoying and which was of benefit. The Work Programme had initially stopped the young person attending.
It concerns us that we have passed on information about a young person’s achievements with Learning 4 Life and learning plan to the Work Programme and taken him to interviews with their workers to ask
what the next steps will be. The Work Programme responded that the provision would be driven by the young person. However, the young people we work with need structured support, persistent encouragement and small achievable goals if they are to be motivated to plan for their future. A fortnightly phone call does not constitute such provision.
Llamau works with young care leavers and with young people who are at risk or have experienced homelessness. The young people we support have faced disadvantage and significant barriers to achievement. We are concerned that the Work Programme is not providing the structured programme needed by these young people. More frustrating, is that we are able to provide this intensive support, but once the young person is on the Work Programme, our funding means that we are no longer able to work with them.
7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by Clinks 1. Summary
1.1 Clinks is concerned that the use of large‐scale payment by results (PbR) contracts in the DWP Work Programme has proved unworkable for significant number of Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS) providers and is keen that the lessons from this are learnt and applied to other areas of public service provision where the use of PbR contracts may be extended.
1.2 This submission focuses on the experiences of subcontracted VCS partners in the Work Programme, and the potential implications of large‐scale PbR models for small to medium‐ sized VCS organisations. It eoutlines th difficulties faced by small to medium sized organisations in the current economic climate, the specific problems of the DWP Work Programme in terms of the referral system and the financial model, and several of recommendations which should be considered if PbR is extended to the criminal justice system.
2. Background
2.1 Clinks is the umbrella body supporting Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS) organisations working with offenders and their families. We are a membership organisation with over 450 members, including the Sector’s smallest providers as well as its largest, and our wider national network reaches 3,500 VCS contacts. Overall, through our weekly e‐bulletin Light Lunch, we are in contact with over 8,200 individuals and agencies with an interest in the Criminal Justice System (CJS) and the role of the VCS in the resettlement and rehabilitation of offenders.
2.2 Clinks has a longstanding interest in different models of commissioning and contracting VCS providers, and has authored a report, Competition, commissioning and the VCS, on behalf of the Ministry of Justice’s Reducing Reoffending Third Sector Advisory Group.1 It is likely that large‐scale payment by results (PbR) contracts, using a prime‐sub contractor model, will be extended into the criminal justice system in the near future. This makes its performance in the DWP Work Programme an issue of considerable importance to Clinks’ members.
2.3 To date, at least two Clinks members that were subcontracted Work Programme providers have ceased providing services, citing problems with the PbR model leading to insurmountable financial pressures. These were reputable organisations with a proven track record of delivering high‐quality, innovative projects.
3. The VCS in the current economic climate
1 L. Frazer and C. Hayes. 2011. Competition, Commissioning and the VCS. RR3. Online: http://www.clinks.org/assets/files/PDFs/RRTSAG/RR3%20Competition,%20Commissioning%20and%20the%20 VCS.pdf [last accessed 7.12.2012]. 3.1 The findings of the recent NCVO survey of the perceptions and experiences of VCS providers in the Work Programme are disconcerting. Overall, 72% of respondents believed that their contracts were at risk of failure, with over half of this group stating that they were at risk of failure within the next six months.2
3.2 There is some evidence to suggest that these figures have contributed to a perception within government that small organisations have naively allowed themselves to enter into unfavourable contractual arrangements with prime providers, through poor governance.3 This does not reflect accurately either the relative experience of most VCS organisations in negotiating contract terms vis‐à‐vis larger partners, or the difficult choices faced by small providers in the current economic climate. In a survey examining the impact of the economic downturn on VCS organisations conducted by Clinks at the end of 2010, 74% of respondents reported a decrease in grant income, almost half a reduction in earned income, and over a third a reduction in public donations. 87% expected further decreases in grants in the coming year. These financial pressures were exacerbated by rising costs resulting from increases in VAT and National Insurance contributions.4
3.3 The perfect storm of funding cuts and an increased demand on services leaves small to medium sized VCS providers with very little room for manoeuvre when it comes to negotiating new business opportunities. Given the coalition Government’s commitment to an open public service agenda, it must work to develop its market of providers and ensure that a level playing field is in operation for smaller organisations. Clinks endorses the recommendation of the RR3 paper Competition, commissioning and the VCS that commissioners and primes should not view VCS partners purely in a ‘delivery’ capacity, and instead seek to engage with them as strategic partners from the earliest possible stages of planning.5
4. Referrals to VCS providers
4.1 Clinks is particularly concerned that, of all VCS organisations who responded to NCVO’s survey, one third had received no referrals at all from their Work Programme prime, and 15% had only received between one and ten.6
2 NCVO. 2012. The Work Programme: Perceptions and experiences of the Voluntary Sector. p.11. Online: http://www.ncvo‐vol.org.uk/sites/default/files/sig_survey_june_2012_report_17.9.12.pdf [last accessed 7.12.2012]. 3 M. Buchanan. 4.10.12. ‘Work Programme under fire as charities shut down’, BBC News. Online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‐19822669 [last accessed 7.12.12]. 4 Clinks and Home Office. 2011. When the Dust Settles: The impact of a changing landscape on the Voluntary and Community Sector working to reduce reoffending and address community safety. p.8. Online: http://www.clinks.org/assets/files/PDFs/When%20the%20dust%20settles.pdf [last accessed 7.12.12]. 5L. Frazer and C. Hayes, Competition, commissioning and the VCS. 6 NCVO. The Work Programme. p.10.
4.2 NCVO also found that organisations delivering ‘specialist’ services had been disproportionately affected by a lack of referrals.
4.3 The ability to provide appropriately‐tailored interventions to minority groups is an important, historic strength of the VCS. Small organisations providing such ‘niche’ services are generally not in a position tod bi for contracts themselves, yet their presence is essential to ensure diverse, responsive supply chains. The potential of large scale PbR contracts to disrupt service provision to minority groups within the criminal justice system is a matter of serious concern, and should be carefully monitored by commissioners.
5. Problems with the financial model
5.1 NCVO’s survey found that the majority of VCS respondents had experienced cash flow problems as a result of their participation in the Work Programme. Forty‐eight of those questioned claimed to be subsidising delivery from their organisation’s reserves.7 The crux of the problem appears to be the delayed payment aspect of PbR. Unless VCS organizations are paid a sufficiently generous upfront fee, it will not be possible to both operationalise basic services and innovate with a view to reducing reoffending. Financial planning is further complicated by the difficulty of predicting how many referrals an organisation will receive in a given month. 5.2 One Clinks member has reported a positive experience as a subcontracted partner in the Work Programme, as a result of the agreement they were able to negotiate with their prime provider. Rather than waiting for payment on outcomes, the subcontracted partner is paid monthly in advance and the large prime provider retains the financial risk. The small VCS partner can therefore carry on providing specialist one‐to‐one support to help ex‐offenders find and sustain employment.
5.3 It is clear, however, that the risk of failure is often being passed down to partners by primes. Some primes are reportedly holding onto a disproportionate share of the referral fee. 8 One in five of respondents to NCVO’s survey had experienced some extent of non‐payment for referrals. Clinks would strongly endorse the implementation of a robust set of standards for PbR in criminal justice to uphold the Compact and ensure fair treatment of VCS providers in supply chains.
6. Recommendations
6.1 Clinks endorses the following recommendations of the RR3 report, Competition, commissioning and the VCS, if the intention is to apply the Work Programme model of PbR across the CJS, to achieve reduction in reoffending:
7 NCVO. The Work Programme. p.13. 8 M. Buchanan. ‘Work programme under fire as charities shut down’.
• MoJ/NOMS should implement a training programme to ensure local commissioners have a clear understanding of Payment by Results and its implications for the various providers delivering in their area; • Further debate should take place about the best ways to tailor PbR to meet the needs of specific groups of offenders, including those with complex multiple needs who may require co‐ordinated support across many local agencies; • A distinct, national approach to PbR and commissioning is required for women offenders; • MoJ/NOMS should raise the profile of the refreshed Compact and develop a code of conduct (similar to the DWP Merlin Standards) to ensure fair treatment of the supply chain; • The service fee (delivery costs) in PbR contracts should be available up front, with 10 – 30% of the contract at risk.
7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by DrugScope and Homeless Link
Executive Summary
DrugScope and Homeless Link are membership organisations whose member agencies provide treatment, support and accommodation to some of the most excluded individuals in society. Both see value in the Work Programme and want to see it meet its objectives. We believe that by making the following changes, the Programme will deliver better results for the most vulnerable and better results for society.
These are:
1. Increased payment or a new client group for those furthest from the job market including people who disclose as drug and /or alcohol misusers and / or homelessness.
2. Allow reviews of referrals that appear to be in the wrong JSA group.
3. Better communication between Jobcentre Plus, Programme providers and treatment non‐supply chain services including treatment providers and homelessness agencies.
4. Co‐ordinate the Work Programme with overlapping initiatives – e.g. Troubled Families, drug payment by result (PbR) pilots.
5. Consider vulnerability before requesting a benefit sanction.
6. In the event of a sanction being applied, ensure that claimants have access to the information and support they need.
7. Strengthen assessment and diagnostic tools.
8. Introduce interim outcomes for the very mfurthest fro the job market.
9. More specific prime contractor minimum offers or a national minimum standard offer.
10. DWP to do more to promote good and effective practice among Programme primes and subcontractors.
11. Greater emphasis on support for self‐employment and social enterprise.
Introduction
12. DrugScope is the leading UK charity supporting professionals working in drug and alcohol treatment, drug education and prevention and criminal justice. It is the primary independent source of information on drugs and drug related issues.
13. DrugScope has over 400 members, primarily treatment providers working to support individuals in recovery from dug and / or alcohol use, local authorities and individuals. Its member agencies are amongst those providing support to over 200,000 people receiving community and residential treatment, plus harm prevention, advice, education and related recovery services.
14. Homeless Link is the national umbrella organisation for front‐line homelessness services in England. It is the national centre for information on homelessness and works to improve services for homeless people and campaigns for policy changes that will help end homelessness.
15. Homeless Link has over 500 members including day centres, outreach services, hostels, supported housing, floating support through to employment, education and training services. Its member organisations help support around 70,000 homeless people every year.
16. Approximately 80% of problem drug users (i.e. those dependent on heroin and / or crack cocaine) are not in paid employment1; the corresponding figure may be above 90% for people in homelessness hostels2. Whilst this reflects particular difficulties faced by these groups in engaging in the current job market, there is clearly scope for these figures to improve.
17. DrugScope and Homeless Link recognise that work can be a determining factor in enabling individuals in their recovery and to move towards social integration and financial independence. Both welcome the Department for Work and Pensions 2012 Social Justice Strategy3 including the commitment to provide tailored support to help the most socially excluded into sustainable, paid employment and in particular would highlight the increased prominence given to training and employment in the 2010 Drug Strategy.4
Involvement in the Work Programme by sector
18. Whilst neither sector has an agency delivering as a prime contractor, both the substance and homelessness sectors are represented in Work Programme supply chains, generally but not exclusively as Tier 2 or specialist subcontractors.
19. From the most recent supply chain information made available by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)5 , there are specialist services from the substance sector on supply chains in 15 out of 18 contract package areas (CPAs). There appear to be agencies with expertise in homelessness or housing in 9 out of 18.
1 http://www.ukdpc.org.uk/publication/getting‐problem‐drug‐users‐back‐into‐employment‐employer‐ provider‐service‐user‐perspectives/ 2 http://www.mungos.org/actionweek/be_part_action_week_2010 3 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/social‐justice‐transforming‐lives.pdf 4 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/alcohol‐drugs/drugs/drug‐strategy/drug‐strategy‐ 2010?view=Binary 5 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/wp‐supply‐chains.xls 20. A number of agencies from the homelessness sector in particular have withdrawn from the Work Programme including SHP6 and St Mungo’s7 in London.
21. Trust for London has funded DrugScope’s London Drug and Alcohol Network Employment Pathways Project to work to improve employment outcomes for people with histories of substance misuse; this has included working closely with the 6 London Work Programme prime contractors amongst other services.8
About this evidence
22. This submission has been developed following separate surveys carried out by DrugScope and Homeless Link, which gathered detailed responses from over 100 Work Programme participants, and by the work with member agencies and service users that both organisations engage in on a day to day basis.
23. A summary of the findings of DrugScope’s survey can be found on its website.9
24. The findings from Homeless Link’s survey are incorporated in a joint report produced by Crisis, Homeless Link and St Mungo’s, which is available on its website. 10
The differential payments model
25. DrugScope and Homeless Link broadly welcome the introduction of a differential payments model and acknowledge that it may go some way towards discouraging the “creaming and parking” seen in some previous active labour market interventions.
26. However, in mostly using benefit type as a proxy‐indicator for barriers, the DWP has missed an opportunity to align the incentive much more closely with need and risks undermining the principle that the Programme should specifically be of use to those furthest from the job market. The current payment model which appears to assume that the needs and barriers of most people on a given type of benefit will be similar does not reflect reality and consequently, creaming (and of particular concern) parking within groups seems inevitable.
27. DrugScope and Homeless Link welcome the variation aiming to counter this, the Jobseeker’s Allowance Early Access customer group, which provides for early entry to the Programme for people who have experienced a number of issues, including homelessness and histories of drug and / or alcohol use.
6 http://www.shp.org.uk/story/shp‐withdraws‐work‐programme 7 http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/finance/news/content/12395/st_mungos_withdraws_from_work_programme 8 http://www.ldan.org.uk/employment.html 9 http://www.drugscope.org.uk/POLICY+TOPICS/workprogramme2012 10 http://homeless.org.uk/news/work‐programme‐not‐working‐homeless‐people 28. This customer group also provides for a larger payment as part of the effort to align incentives and need. In our recent client surveys, 54% of homeless respondents and 43% of respondents with histories of drug use saw their adviser once a month or less; it is not clear that these customers are getting the level and quality of service expected. Treatment and support providers confirm that the predominant experience is one of infrequent appointments and little support.
29. However, it should also be noted that for this group, anticipated payments per participant using DWP’s indicative expectations are lower than for other customer groups at under £800 per person, compared to over £1000 for others.11
30. To think of the costs of homelessness and addiction in purely financial terms is inherently imprecise, but relevant to the principles of the DEL:AME switch, which can broadly be thought of as investing to save. A 2008 report by the New Economics Foundation for Business Action on Homelessness12 found the annual cost to the state of each homeless person to be in the region of £26,000. The cost of drug dependency is more difficult to ascertain, but in 2012 the National Treatment Agency estimated the total cost to society of drug misuse as being in the region of £15bn.13
31. Experience so far has shown that for the furthest from the job market, the maximum payment on offer to providers of just under £7000 (before the application of any discounts) is insufficient to provide an effective service, and may not provide a strong enough incentive. Crucially, it also fails to reflect the potential cash savings to society in the event of a homeless person or person with a history of addiction being supported into work – by investing more money now, society can quickly make substantial savings.
32. Furthermore, people who are homeless or who have histories of drug misuse are not consistently being identified as such and are consequently often placed in one of the “mainstream” JSA groups, giving Programme providers an incentive that is weaker still. The relatively low payment and frequent non‐identification or non‐disclosure undermines the policy objectives stated in the 2010 Drug Strategy14 and runs counter to principles of the Work Programme “to provide more personalised help” and that providers are “expected to handle the journey into work and the early stages within a new job – when those hardest to help are in the most fragile position.”15
33. We believe that it would be beneficial to people eligible for but not referred as JSA Early Access if a review process for referrals was to be implemented; at the moment, too much depends on Jobcentre Plus (JCP) getting the referral route right. As a bare minimum, communication
11 http://lseo.org.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/Work_Programme_report.pdf and http://lseo.org.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/Work_Programme_report.pdf 12 http://www.bitc.org.uk/document.rm?id=8850 13 http://www.nta.nhs.uk/uploads/whyinvest2final.pdf 14 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/alcohol‐drugs/drugs/drug‐strategy/drug‐strategy‐ 2010?view=Binary 15 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/newsroom/ministers‐speeches/2010/02‐06‐10.shtml between JCP and providers needs to improve and ideally warm handovers adopted. DrugScope welcomes the new joint working protocol developed between the National Treatment Agency (NTA), DWP and Work Programme providers16 but will be watching keenly for signs of operational improvement. Homeless Link urges DWP to consider an equivalent protocol for the homelessness sector.
The prime provider model; its impact on subcontractors and provision of tailored services
34. As referred to in paragraph 21, a number of agencies from the homelessness sector have withdrawn for reasons including a lack of referrals. Fewer agencies from the drug and alcohol sector have withdrawn, but again, referrals have not yet met reasonable and informed expectations. This is particularly concerning as the implication is that a substantial store of accumulated expertise across the two sectors is not being accessed.
35. Onerous and potentially costly contracting arrangements make it difficult for smaller projects to take part even when their activities and outcomes could be of interest to providers; this is of particular relevance in London where a provider might need to engage with all 6 primes and potentially deliver according to 6 different models.
36. More generally, the current lack of transparency within the Programme makes it difficult to assess the extent to which specialist support is being offered. From our work with front‐line substance and homelessness agencies, we have a significant degree of concern that specialist services are not being offered to a large extent, a concern echoed in DWP’s initial qualitative evaluation of the Programme.17
37. The evaluation referred to above includes the suggestion that referrals to non‐supply chain providers are common, possibly because they are in effect free of charge to the Work Programme provider. Whilst we recognise that the Work Programme is explicitly designed to co‐ exist with other services, member agencies of both DrugScope and Homeless Link have raised concerns that they are, in effect, subsidising the Programme through their own activities and funding.
38. With regard to the drug sector in particular, the potential move to a PbR model could include training or employment as outcomes; approaches to treatment and recovery are currently being piloted in 8 locations. DrugScope believes that if Work Programme providers work more closely with treatment providers, this model can provide additional leverage. Currently, some effective coordination and communication takes place at a local level, but it is extremely inconsistent, even within CPAs.
39. A cause for concern is the apparently disproportionate use of sanctions on the most vulnerable. DrugScope and Homeless Link accept that the Programme is, once joined, mandatory and that as such, conditionality and sanctions will remain part. However, Homeless Link’s research indicated
16 http://www.nta.nhs.uk/uploads/joint‐workingprotocolwithjcp.pdf 17 http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/summ2011‐2012/821summ.pdf that 22% of homeless people on the Work Programme had been sanctioned, the corresponding figure from DrugScope’s survey being 44%, the second in particular being substantially above the norm for the Programme as a whole. Many of the people sanctioned reported that the reasons related to causes such as appointments they hadn’t been informed of, clerical error, or appointments they had had to move due to other commitments, e.g. a meeting with probation or an appointment with a healthcare provider.
40. Some of the personal barriers and characteristics that disadvantage people in the job market may make it difficult to engage in a structured programme, and consequently the duty to consider any additional vulnerability before requesting a sanction should be extended from Employment Support Allowance (ESA) claimants to JSA Early Access customers.
41. From discussions with agencies around the country, we also believe that sanctions are having unintended consequences that go beyond the policy intent due to sanctioned claimants receiving incorrect or incomplete information about eligibility for housing benefit when sanctioned. It appears that people are not routinely informed that they may still be eligible for housing benefit, meaning that their accommodation may be put at risk, or if in a hostel, they may be unable to move on due to arrears. Services in the homelessness and substance misuse sectors have a role in ensuring their clients receive accurate welfare benefit advice, but we believe that DWP and in particular Jobcentre Plus could do more to reduce, for example, the risk of homelessness and ultimately destitution.
42. In order to better understand the barriers an individual may face and the support needs they have, Programme provider diagnostic tools should aim to capture more information than they currently do. Where prime contractors have shared their diagnostic tools, the quality is variable. A consistent pattern is that barriers that may appear to be “difficult” to discuss, including substance use, housing needs and mental health are approached obliquely. Surveys by DrugScope and Homeless Link both indicated a pattern in which up to 50% of respondents felt that their provider had not taken full account of issues including substance use, accommodation, mental health, physical health, debt and offending history, with particularly low satisfaction around mental health needs.
The level of service provided to claimants in different payment groups
43. As above, DrugScope and Homeless Link have concern that clients of their member agencies are often seen infrequently by Programme providers and that a substantial minority report low levels of satisfaction that their support needs and barriers have been thoroughly assessed.
44. In some cases, the level of service has been so low that one conclusion could be that diagnostic tools, rather than being used to identify barriers and develop an action plan, are in fact being used to triage customers out of the building, leading to the frequently referred to problem of “parking” those furthest from the job market off the Programme and without employment support. Conversely, DWP’s Research Summary referred to above18 confirms that some
18 http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/summ2011‐2012/821summ.pdf providers may be concentrating resources on those nearest the job market.
45. In any active intervention of this sort, it is inevitable that a significant proportion of customers will fail to find employment, and that some of those people may be such a distance from the job market that providers will need a different kind of incentive to work with them in the likely absence of a job outcome payment. In the case of people with significant histories of drug and / or alcohol use or with histories of homelessness and rough sleeping interim outcomes using a “distance travelled” methodology would add value and improve their prospects of eventually moving into paid employment, even if beyond the 2 year duration of the Work Programme.
The “black box” approach – specialist support, innovation and monitoring
46. It would not be abandoning “black box” principles for DWP to require of providers that they make more specific minimum service offers19. Whilst some minimum service offers have reasonable levels of specificity, others do not, and appear to be aspirational in nature. An example would be to reframe “we will keep in regular contact with you” with a more robust commitment to do so at particular intervals and by specified means. We note that in comparable systems elsewhere, including in Australia, national minimum standards apply.
47. The “black box” approach was broadly welcomed as a means of driving innovation and shifting the focus from process to outcomes. In reality, whilst DrugScope and Homeless Link are aware of and take an interest in some genuinely exciting and innovative provision, many areas of Work Programme activity – e.g. CV preparation, confidence & motivation, assisted job search, interview coaching and so on seem strongly reminiscent of the type of support provided under predecessor initiatives.
48. A concern about the black box approach is that good practice and innovation is not yet being shared for beneficial purpose. Commercial considerations may tend to make providers reluctant to share information about successful services; DWP has an over‐riding interest in finding a balance between being fair to its suppliers and disseminating effective practice. There is the risk in designing black box models that some necessary control is surrendered – there should be a balance in the “levers” DWP retains to achieve policy objectives.
49. As referred to above, DrugScope and Homeless Link have learned from their respective surveys and conversations with their member agencies that often, those furthest from the market are not receiving a tailored and personalised service at all, but only very intermittent contact. Without firmer minimum offers to hold providers to, there is the risk that the black box becomes a mechanism that hides a poor quality service.
50. We acknowledge that the emphasis on “black box” has shifted at various points, most recently being referred to by Mark Hoban MP, Minister of State for Work and Pensions as a “Perspex box”20 – we would welcome a commitment by DWP to promote effective practice and to
19 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/provider‐minimum‐service‐delivery.pdf 20 Comment to meeting of Work Programme stakeholders, 7th November 2012. support the Work Programme brand through greater transparency.
Regional variations in job outcomes
51. This lies beyond the areas of expertise of DrugScope and Homeless Link, although we have noted that broadly speaking the Programme fares worst in areas that have been particularly badly affected by the economic downturn of the last 4 years. Responses to both surveys indicate that some Programme participants feel that they are not getting support to become self‐employed or to establish a social enterprise. Further support around enterprise and innovation may be useful in generating vacancies in a locally depressed job market.
7 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by the Employment Related Services Association
1. Introduction
1.1 The Employment Related Services Association (ERSA) is the trade body for those delivering or with an interest in employment related services. ERSA represents 17 of the 18 prime contractors for the Work Programme, covering over 95% of the market by contract value, alongside a large and growing number of subcontractors. ERSA’s membership spans the private, voluntary and public sectors and it is this diversity that gives ERSA the authority to speak on behalf of the entire welfare to work sector.
1.2 This response has been developed following extensive consultation with ERSA’s membership. It is informed by qualitative evidence from all members, plus quantitative evidence collected from all 18 of the Work Programme prime contractors in November 2012. This included data on referrals, attachments, Job Starts, Job Outcomes and Sustainments for all monthly cohorts up to and including September 2012, broken down by Payment Group, provider and Contract Package Area (CPA). An analysis of this information is attached to this submission for information.
1.3 The response covers the main areas of focus of the inquiry, including the differential payment model, the prime contractor model, level of service to participants, the ‘black box’ approach and the possibility of regional variations.
2. Work Programme performance statistics
2.1 The Government published official statistics for the Work Programme on 27 November 2012. These show that just 31,000 jobseekers have stayed in work for at least three or six months out of 878,000 referrals. However, the Committee is asked to note that official data is likely to be of limited use to the Committee as it only covers the period up to the end of July 2012 and reports on Job Outcome and Sustainment payments alone. This means that government data, in effect, only captures information on jobseekers who started work through the Programme up to the end of January 2012. The figures do not give information on participants who were referred to the Programme up until January 2012, but who have achieved a Job Outcome since that date, or information on participants joining the programme after January 2012 who have since entered employment.
2.2 The Committee will therefore note that the period for which the Government Outcome data covers is in reality June 2011 to end January 2012. This was the start up period for the Work Programme, which was marked by huge TUPE flows, and which also co‐incided with the double dip of the recession. The ERSA data shows clearly that the seasonal dip that is always experienced by the industry in December, started earlier in 2011 and was deeper than is usual, indicating the recessionary affect.
2.3 In recognition of the limited use of the official Government statistics, and to aid the industry in understanding its own performance levels, ERSA has been collecting its own performance information from across all 18 prime contractors. Of particular interest to the Committee will be its Job Start data (the number of jobseekers who have entered a job). This shows that 207,883 people on the Work Programme have found work up to the end of September 2012. The figures show considerable month on month improvement with the industry placing 10,000 people into work in February 2012 and more than 22,000 people into work by September 2012. This indicates continuous performance improvement across 2012 and promises better Job Outcome statistics in future government releases.
2.4 It is worth the Committee noting the misapprehension that underpins the assertion that Work Programme is ‘worse than doing nothing’1. This is based on an estimation that 5% of the total number of referrals would have found work without support from the Work Programme (the so‐ called non‐intervention rate) compared to the actual overall performance figure of 3.2%. These non‐ intervention rates then fed into the setting of a ‘minimum performance levels’ by the Government. However, it must be noted that the non‐intervention rates were based on a set of assumptions made in 2010. Although the methodology underpinning these assumptions has never been publicly shared, the industry is aware that they did not take into account variations in geography or time and were overoptimistic about economic growth in 2011and 2012. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) forecast at the time the non‐intervention rate was set predicted economic growth in 2012 to be 2.6%2. However, the latest OBR figures predict that the economy will contract by 0.1% in 20123. The 5% non‐intervention rate should therefore be treated with a great degree of caution.
2.5 Not only is the performance measure sensitive to changes in the economy, but it is also sensitive to fluctuations in referral numbers. Performance is measured by dividing the total number of Job Outcomes by the number of people who are referred in the same period to develop a percentage ratio of those who have achieved ‘sustainable’ employment. One of the implications of this is that more referrals will tend to bring down performance figures. In the first year of the Work Programme there were 780,000 referrals, some 175,000 above DWP initial forecasts, which have made it harder for providers to hit their targets. Furthermore, referrals have varied significantly over time and between different CPAs, which has had had a bearing on performance metrics, regardless of the individual performance of providers. Providers operating in multiple CPAs have reported perverse incidences whereby their best performing CPAs appear to be performing poorly due to an increase in referrals. Conversely, a fall in referrals will in effect improve a provider’s performance regardless of the quality of support in helping participants into sustained employment.
3. The differential payment model and jobseekers on ESA
3.1 ERSA believes that the differential payments model, which is central to the design of the Work Programme, is an improvement on previous schemes and has the potential to give providers access to additional resources. However, it relies heavily on benefit type as a means for determining into which Payment Group a jobseeker should be placed and therefore what resources a provider potentially can achieve to help that individual into sustainable employment. Whilst it can be reasonably assumed that most people on Employment Support Allowance (ESA) will be further from the labour market than those on Jobseekers Allowance (JSA), this is not always the case. Providers
1 See ‘Iain Duncan Smith’s Work Programme 'worse than doing nothing', Daily Telegraph, 27 November, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9706074/Iain‐Duncan‐Smiths‐Work‐Programme‐worse‐than‐doing‐ nothing.html 2 OBR forecast, June 2010 ‐ http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/wordpress/docs/junebudget_annexc.pdf 3 OBR forecast, December 2012 ‐ http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/December‐2012‐Economic‐and‐ fiscal‐outlook23423423.pdf report that a significant proportion of those on JSA also have a health condition, which has sometimes previously been undiagnosed.
3.2 The Committee should note that the financial realities of managing payment by results contracts means that providers look at the overall amount of resource available to support jobseekers. Put simply, if a provider works with nine jobseekers falling into the ESA ex‐incapacity benefit category (who may have been unemployed for a long period) and manages to get three of those into work, they will have a total of £40,650 to cover the cost of working with all nine, meaninge they hav in effect £4,516 to spend on each jobseeker. This is considerably lower than the £13,550 figure that is often quoted.
3.3 782,000 individuals, or 89% of the number of referrals to the Work Programme, have been referred via only three of the nine payment groups, including JSA 18‐A24, JS 25+ and JSA Early Access4. The scope of barriers faced by individuals in these Payment Groups is extremely varied. JSA 25+ alone comprises 44% of total referrals, or 390,000 individuals, and can include jobseekers with many different needs. The advantage of the ‘black box’ means that providers have the flexibility to respond to those needs, but they are still constrained by the amount of resources available. ERSA believes that in the development of future programmes, providers and the Government should work together to develop more sophisticated segmentation tools that can accurately determine a person’s distance from the labour market and in turn, provide the evidence needed to develop a more sophisticated differential payment model.
3.4 The Committee will note that performance for participants on ESA has to date been lower than for participants on JSA. This was anticipated given the wider challenges for jobseekers on ESA in the labour market and the length of time it is likely to take some ESA jobseekers to achieve sustainable work – put simply, they were less likely to achieve a job outcome in the short period to which the official government figures relate, thus justifying the decision to allocate two years to work with jobseekers. However, it also likely that this group will have been more disadvantaged than others by the recession which is a concern. This is reflected in DWP figures that show only nine per cent of people in the Work Related Activity Group (WRAG) were in employment 12‐18 months after making their claim5. However, the Committee should note that referrals to the Programme of jobseekers on ESA have also been far lower than anticipated and therefore it may be too soon to make judgements on ESA performance. The Committee should also note ERSA’s Job Start data which shows that 10% of referrals of Payment Group 6 (ESA Flow) referred in June 2011 have now found work.
3.5 ERSA is aware that there may be a danger on any employment programme of some level of gaming, regardless of who is delivering support. However, the term ‘parking’ is subjective given that providers will work with jobseekers in different ways and that jobseekers respond to different types of support. Furthermore, parking should not occur given that all providers are signed up to delivering minimum performance standards.
3.6 At present, evidence for parking is anecdotal rather than conclusive. ERSA would caution against using the official statistical data as evidence for parking given that performance is building in the
4 DWP statistical release, 7 November 2012 5 DWP, Work Capability Assessment Independent Review – Year three, November 2012, pg. 35. http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/wca‐review‐2012.pdf pipeline and it is less likely that those furthest from the labour market would achieve a Job Outcome in the short period of time to which the data relates. ERSA analysis of the people who entered a job in September 2012 shows that people who were referred at the beginning of the Work Programme are still being found employment over a year later, indicating that people referred in earlier cohorts are still being supported into work. In addition, the Programme is showing a strong growth in subsequent (ie, second, third, etc) Job Starts, which indicates that when people have not managed to enter into a sustainable job, they are being helped again into another role. The number of short term jobs in the economy and the impact on both jobseekers and providers is proving a significant factor in the Work Programme.
4. The prime contractor model
4.1 Work Programme prime contractors use a network of supply chain partners to deliver support tailored to the needs of jobseekers. This model gives providers flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances. However, the model has presented challenges for some subcontractors given their reliance on prime contractor for referrals and information.
4.2 One persistent problem has been the low level of referrals of jobseekers on ESA partially due to problems with the Work Capability Assessment. Prime contractors were anticipating 30% of referrals to be ESA and therefore developed supply chains with partners who were in the best position to provide support, many of whom are from the voluntary sector. In reality, referrals have been closer to 9% and therefore ESA referrals have not flowed down to partners as expected6.
4.3 ERSA has been working closely with the market to strengthen the relationships between employment services providers. Relationships are working well where prime contractors are sharing performance data with their supply chain, ensuring essential information is communicated to subcontractors in a timely fashion and that subcontractors are supported in building their capacity7. However, there are also challenges including the cuts the third sector is experiencing overall, the challenges of a payment by results model and the variation in referrals from that the Government set out in its tender documentation.
5. The level of service provided to participants
5.1 All prime contractors have developed Minimum Service Delivery statements that are communicated to jobseekers by Jobcentre Plus before referral. Providers are under an obligation to ensure that jobseekers are aware of what service they should expect on the Work Programme.
5.2 However, there is variation between the prime contractors sin term of the Minimum Service Level statements, with some very detailed and specific, whilst others are more thematic. In future commissioning exercises, ERSA would support an examination of measures to bring about greater consistency and visibiliy. However, it is vital this does not tie provider hands or become a meaningless tick box exercise.
6 DWP statistical release, 7 November 2012 7 For further information please see the ERSA, ACEVO, NCVO report – ‘Perfect Partners: strengthening relationships within employment services supply chains’, July 2012
5.3 The Committee is asked to note that the Minimum Service Delivery standards are just that – minimum standards. The type of service provided can vary greatly between jobseekers depending on their differing needs and the different delivery models of providers. The opportunity now exists to undertake some level of sharing of good practice, while understanding that the Work Programme has been set up on essentially competitive lines.
6. The ‘black box’ approach
6.1 In the past, employment programmes were sometimes too prescribed and did not allow providers to take into account the specific barriers an individual may face in gaining employment. The programme design of the Work Programme allows providers to develop flexible interventions, tailored to the needs of jobseekers and is an advance on predecessor programmes. Furthermore, jobseekers are on the programme for a maximum of two years allowing providers to gain a fuller understanding of the sorts of barriers an individual faces and an opportunity to try out different interventions.
6.2 A number of ERSA members are now collecting information detailing the level of need amongst participants, including literacy and numeracy levels and the prevalence of health related conditions. This in turn helps providers take advantage of the black box in order to develop more effective solutions to help jobseekers. In essence this means the industry better understanding what interventions help particular types of jobseekers at different points along the journey back to work.
6.3 However, the industry has faced a number of challenges since the Work Programme went live that has affected the drive for innovation. This means that the first six to nine months of the programme’s live running was dominated by the TUPE flows between providers and the efforts of setting up a programme in areas where a substantial number of providers had no previous footprint. However, contract length means that providers are able to make adjustments to their models and supply chains and to experiment more as they gather greater information. ERSA expects this to increase over the life of the Work Programme.
6.4 The Work Programme operates under a tight financial model and so combining funding and services delivered and commissioned by other government departments, agencies and levels of government will be a key way to introduce more innovation to Work Programme delivery and help increase the quality of support to jobseekers. This makes logical sense given the impact a sustainable job may have in up‐skilling the workforce, reducing reoffending, improving health outcomes, reducing crime and benefiting local communities.
6.5 Government has made some headway with this by introducing a ninth customer group onto the Work Programme for prison leavers as well as introducing employment and reoffending pilots that reward providers for not only getting somebody into work but also reducing reoffending.
6.6 Far more could be done to link skills funding to the Work Programme. Providers report that many jobseekers on the Work Programme struggle with numeracy and literacy skills. Some providers have been able to access resources within their own organisations or form partnerships with training providers. However, the existence of parallel commissioning processes for employment and skills is undeniably a barrier to join up of service delivery in these areas.
6.7 Better co‐ordination between local authorities and Work Programme providers is another area that would allow for more innovation. There are examples of this happening, for example by pooling together Work Programme funding and Community Budget funding to reduce worklessness. However there can be mistrust between providers and councils. In future provision, we would recommend that local authorities are given a more central role before or at the commissioning stage which would help to lay the foundations for more innovative partnerships.
6.8 Of particular concern is the level to which voluntary sector providers of local services previously accessed by jobseekers have been hit by public sector funding cuts. In some cases, those voluntary sector organisations have understandably looked to Work Programme providers to provide payment for their services given that this is a payment by results programme. However, the finances of the Work Programme were predicated on the Work Programme payment structure being able to be combined with other funding streams. If those other funding streams are drying up it is highly unlikely that the Work Programme finances will be able to replace them.
7. Regional Variations
7.1 ERSA has undertaken analysis of performance data to see whether regional economic variations are evident. The picture is complex. Performance is lower in some of the former industrial areas in the north of England vis‐a‐vis many CPAs in the south, as might be expected. However, there are some CPAs which cover some areas of depressed economic activity that are doing better than might have been expected. In addition, some CPAs that cover predominantly rural areas for instance are faring better than other CPAs covering urban areas, although this is not a uniform picture.
7 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by UK Council on Deafness
Work Programme and deaf people: a cause for concern. In general, deaf people1 are more likely to be underemployed or unemployed (Kyle et al, 1989; Harris, 1995; Dye et al, 2000), due to the challenges they face to gain and remain in employment. In the current economic climate everyone faces a challenge to obtain a job that matches their skill: deaf people face additional attitudinal and practical barriers. Since June 2011, the Work Programme was extended to support Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) claimants to find employment through a two- year programme of intensive development and employment search. In the first year, only 1000 ESA claimants with a disability have found work through the Work Programme. Given there are 79,000 ESA claimants (UKDPC, 2012) who have passed through the Work Programme since its inception, it suggests that only around 1% of them have successfully found employment, and we are unclear how many of those will be in sustained employment. It is unknown just how many of the ESA claimants are deaf or hearing impaired. In the UK, there are 135,000 people of a working age with severe to profound hearing loss (Action on Hearing Loss, 2012). Even if a small percentage were found to be claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) or Employment Support Allowance (ESA), the number of deaf and hard of hearing people potentially attending the Work Programme could be in its thousands. Reports from Work Programme sub-contractors, that cater specifically for deaf people, indicate that only a few hundred people have been referred to them, which leaves the question of where the deaf people are placed and how they are being supported. Additionally, we are concerned that Access to Work as a key aid to the employment of deaf people is poorly understood by Work Programme contractors. Recent figures on Access to Work claimants has indicated a drop in the number of deaf people who are receiving support. If they are no longer supported by Access to Work, then it is highly probably that they are no longer in employment. Again, it is not clear where deaf people are being supported in Work Programmes across the UK Cause for concern Jobcentre Plus (JCP) provides extended support for disabled jobseekers through their Disability Employment Advisor (DEA), but there is no indication on how much information about the claimant is passed to the Work Programme providers to ensure they understand the specific support needs of deaf and other disabled people. It is unclear whether Prime Contractors are
1 The term ‘deaf people’ is used to encompass all individuals who have a hearing loss, including Deaf people who us British Sign Language as their preferred means of communication. aware of what deaf claimants need in order to maintain effective communication with their trainers and advisors. Without the appropriate communication support, deaf people will struggle to gain real benefit from the opportunities on offer. The Department for Work and Pensions will expect Work Programme providers to meet the cost of communication support: there are no special additional funds to cover this cost. Therefore, from the perspective of the Prime Contractor, a deaf person brings extra cost and potentially extra challenges in finding work. Ideally the Prime Contractor should engage a specialist sub-contractor and ensure all communication needs are met. The risk is that too many deaf people will be forced to communicate in ways that do not meet their needs such as by writing on a piece of paper, typing on a computer screen or attempting to lipread; none of these approaches is ideal for an intensive learning environment or in preparation for employment. Instead an appropriate sign language interpreter, speech-to-text operator or lipspeaker (in all cases registered with NRCPD as meeting proper professional standards) would be essential for the deaf person’s inclusion in the Work Programme. Any other approach should not be considered a ‘reasonable adjustment’ providing equality of opportunity. A deaf accessible work programme Prior to the establishment of the Work Programme, deaf people were already experiencing unemployment and underemployment in the work place. Many deaf people are unable to attain employment due to the attitudinal barriers at work. For this reason, there should be greater support for employers to overcome such concern. The Work Programme has the essential function to equip the deaf person to be employable and create a bridge with potential employers to promote the claimant’s abilities. Is it, therefore, the sole purpose of the Work Programme to focus on the claimants’ employability or should they also focus on the employers and the workplace? What part should DWP play support its own providers engage employers and build more positive attitudes to support the employment of disabled people? UKCoD fears that the current approach to supporting deaf people to gain employment, risks failure because providers will be reluctant to fund effective access to communication support, which is essential for deaf people to engage and to move into appropriate employment. Recommendations Record the number of deaf claimants on Work Programmes and monitor the measurable improvements and outcomes achieved by each provider Encourage referral for deaf claimants to specialist providers, who are more equipped to meet their communication needs. Improve the quality of data made available by JCP to the Prime Contractor when deaf people are referred, critically the deaf person’s access and communication needs. Disseminate a wider awareness of deaf people’s access needs and how they should be funded. Ensure all communication is in clear and plain English or translated into British Sign Language. Never assume a deaf person can communicate by telephone and check their preference particularly in access telecommunications. Identify and allocate communication support for claimants in all situations and plan the claimant’s progression, with their support, through the two years. References Dye, M., Kyle, J. with Allsop, L., Denmark, C., Drury, A. and Ladd, P. (2000) Deaf people in the community: Demographics of the Deaf community in the UK, Bristol: Deaf Studies Trust. Kyle, J., Thomas, C. and Pullen, G. (1989) Assessing deaf people for employment and rehabilitation, Project Report, Bristol: Centre for Deaf Studies, University of Bristol. Harris, J. (1995) The Cultural Meaning of Deafness: Language, identity and power relations, Aldershot: Avebury. UKDPC, news item. http://www.ukdpc.net/site/news-archive/159-dwp-reports- suggest-work-programme-has-failed-disabled-people-posted-301112 [accessed on December 5th, 2012] 7 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by RNIB Group
Introduction
The RNIB Group comprises of the Royal National Institute of Blind People, its associate charity Action for Blind People in addition to other national and local charities concerned with the welfare of blind and partially sighted people.
The RNIB Group is a specialist sub-contractor in the delivery of the Work Programme. Action for Blind People delivers end to end support to Work Programme customers with disability barriers in 6 Contract Package Areas (CPAs) under sub-contracts with four of the Prime Providers. It is currently working with those prime providers to set up arrangements to deliver specialist Interventions on a call off basis in a number of contract package areas.
In our role as a specialist sub-contractor supporting a hard to help group we hope the committee will wish to follow up the evidence supplied here with an invitation for us to respond to questions in their evidence gathering sessions.
The prime provider model
1.1 The RNIB Group bid to be a tier 2 end to end provider in Work Programme because we passionately believed that customers had a right to expect the best personalised and specialist service appropriate to their disability barriers and we wanted to provide that support to meaningful numbers of customers.
1.2 To date our referral volumes of blind and partially sighted claimants have been very low. Inspection of DWP Work Programme data leads us to question the Government's promise that Employment and Support Allowance "offers you personalized help so that you can work if you are able to." (https://www.gov.uk/employment-support-allowance) 1.3 Matching data sources is problematic because DWP maintains no data that allows a single cohort to be tracked through both the benefits system and also through employment support. However comparing data for the same time frame highlights the issue of concern. Due to the eight month time lag in the collection of the data it is necessary to begin this analysis in February 2012. Table 1 of DWP official statistics bulletin of November 2012 states that 14,000 of all those potentially entitled to ESA were found fit for work in February 2012. Table 1.1 from annex A of DWP's Work Programme statistical release of the 27th of November 2012 reveals that for all IB/ESA payment groups 5640 were referred to the Work Programme of which only 810 were ex- IB. Table 2.1 from the same data source states that actual attachments for all ESA/IB payment groups numbered 5880 of whom only 750 were ex-IB. For February 2012 table 1.1 of page 4 of this same data source reveals that for all ESA/IB payment groups only 130 claimants secured a job and of these the numbers that were ex-IB were less than 10 i.e. too small to record. This suggests that the proportionate job outcome rate is less than 2%. 1.4 The equality impact assessment that accompanied the regulations that enshrined the current work capability assessment published by DWP on 7/12/2010 referred to a 5% fall in eligibility for ESA (paragraph 9) but offered the Work Programme by way of mitigation. The reality appears to be that more people are being found fit for work than originally expected (47% of blind and partially sighted claimants) but less are being offered any effective support. 1.5 There may be two possible counter arguments to this. Firstly that more people than expected are appealing their fit for work decision and that due to the high volume of caseload the appeals are taking a long time to be heard. However taking the figure of 40% appeals (quoted in DWP statistical release for October 2012) and applying this to the 14,000 found fit for work produces a figure of 5,600 appeals. If this number is subtracted from the 14,000 it gives a figure of 8,400 compared to the actual 5,640 referred to a prime provider. 1.6 The second counter argument concerns the natural length of time processing the caseload takes and securing their active engagement with prime provider support following their WCA decision. However even if this was to take say three months it is also the case that February 2012 statistics would have benefited from those processed over the previous "attachment processing period" too. 1.7 This analysis suggests that some 2,740 ex IB claimants not being referred onto a prime provider for this one month alone. There then follows the question - "how many were referred onto a specialist sub contractor by a prime provider where appropriate to do so?" Blind and partially sighted people represent a group with specific support needs. It is usually the case that blind and partially sighted people require the acquisition of disability specific skills such as in navigation, the use of assistive technology and accessible communication prior to attaining work specific skills such as the use of a particular software package. 1.8 Blind and partially sighted people represent some 0.5% of those on incapacity benefit/severe disability allowance (DWP statistical release, 12th September 2012). If the 0.5% figure was to be applied to the 73,000 ESA payment groups (final paragraph, page 15 of November 27th DWP statistical bulletin) attached to Work Programme prime providers then it could be expected that some 365 blind or partially sighted people being referred onto a specialist sub-contractor such as Action for Blind People (during the first year of operation of the programme). However despite being part of prime provider supply chains in two thirds of package areas in England our employment services have seen just 62 clients/claimants. 1.9 It is obviously the case that blind and partially sighted people may be being referred on to other specialists however the data leads us to be seriously concerned that blind and partially sighted may be being "parked" firstly by the Government and then secondly by prime providers. 1.10 It is also the case that we are receiving complaints from some blind and partially sighted people over the lack of specialist support from the prime providers. Raymond Brough of Merseyside is one such person and in an email of 5/12/12 he wrote, "After being put in contact with A4E and Avanta I expected all of the programmes I would participate in to be truly accessible and usable by a totally blind person, i.e. from beginning to end. They have not been!" 1.11 Where blind and partially sighted are being referred to us these people are often in the very hardest to help category and the furthest away from the labour market. The customers referred to us often have barriers which are additional to their main disability, for example issues with substance abuse or basic skill needs. In these cases the funding we receive is insufficient for us to buy in the additional support they need, so people with multiple barriers are not necessarily receiving the variety and intensity of support they should be receiving. 1.12 Our end to end contractual payments are a mirror image of the main funding model, but with up to 20% deducted from the funding as a service charge retained by the prime. In addition some primes have also charged for use of their IT system. As a consequence we are expected to support very low volumes of the hardest to help with intensive and specialist interventions with considerably less funding than the prime providers receive and with little hope or expectation of receiving job entry and outcome payments. In addition when we do get someone into work we do not receive any job entry or job outcome payments until at least 13 weeks. 1.13 The delay of 13 or 26 weeks before any job outcome funding is made means that for a period of up to 18 months we are delivering a full range of support for 80% of the attachment fee typically only £600. When we do receive job entry and job outcome payments it is too little and much too late making managing cash flows extremely difficult. 1.14 We were offered the opportunity to set up specialist end to end delivery in a Comprehensive Package Area but our financial modeling showed that if we did so we would lose an average of £5,000 per month. Consequently despite being keen to expand and offer our specialist services to a wider range of customers we are unable to do so. 1.15 It is clear that in the current economic climate insufficient job entries are being achieved to draw down adequate funding to provide good quality specialist support to the hardest to help customers. 1.16 It seems likely that many people only receive a minimum service which does not meet their needs as mainstream advisers do not have the experience to be able to deal with people with complex disability barriers and we are not currently in a position to expand our delivery to be able to offer them our support. It is worth restating here our investment of £73,000 in tendering related costs alone. 1.17 As things stand the cash flow risk of the outcome related funding is being inappropriately pushed down onto sub-contractors who are not in a position to be able to adequately manage that risk. Consequently there is insufficient money in the system for specialist sub-contractors to invest in developing and providing innovative delivery. 1.18 In conclusion to this section on our experiences of the prime sub contracting model we invite decision makers to examine the flow rates of the ex IB group and determine the reasons for the restriction on their access to specialist support. In addition we would wish to see the Merlin standard recast to ensure that risk is borne more by prime providers and that management fees do not significantly erode the funding available for those offering and funding specialist support. Our experience of the Differential Payments model 2.1 At the start all of our Work Programme our contracts were “end to end” as we felt that would offer the best way of planning delivery against forecast volumes and allow us to offer support to individuals throughout their journey on the Work Programme. However this approach is proving difficult to sustain.
2.2 The outcome related payment model which is passed on by primes to sub-contractors, the low volumes of referrals and the distance from the labour market of most of the customers referred to us, has meant that it has become financially unviable for us to continue to deliver on this basis in many of the CPAs. Hence we are working with a number of primes to convert our contractual relationship to something which is less financially risky for us but still allows us to work with disabled customers and help them towards gaining employment. This arrangement will allow us to be paid for actual delivery of specified services rather than being subject to the Work Programme outcome related performance funding.
2.3 Whilst being supportive of the principle of differential payments the model is not working as originally envisaged. Although there are substantial payments available for moving ESA and ex IB customers into work, in practice the distance away from the labour market of many of these people, combined with the significant delay in receiving payments, means that generally customer support is being funded through the attachment fees only.
2.4 For us as a specialist provider, it is particularly difficult. The current funding model may just about work for the primes who are dealing with high caseload volumes and a wide variety of customers, some of whom will be more job ready than others.
2.5 For Action for Blind People (the delivery organisation of the RNIB Group) customers referred are a significant distance from the labour market and many will not be in a position to move into work during the 52 weeks we have to work with them and indeed may never move into work. We try very hard to provide appropriate support to all our customers, but this can be expensive and resource intensive. 2.6 In summary differential payments may need to be supplemented by penalties for prime providers holding onto clients and not referring them onto specialist support within a specified and reasonable period of time. Given that many if not all prime providers will also have built pricing models on the assumption that there would be more people from the ex IB category than there has been, there also ought to be new commitments by DWP to refer these people on to providers quicker and in greater numbers. Minimum Service level Standards 3.1 The Work Programme success rate is around 3.53% and seemingly less than 2% for blind and partially sighted people so there clearly needs to be some measure of whether the programme has delivered any other benefits. This raises the question of minimum service level standards to participants. 3.2 The DWP funded research to underpin the development of a distance travelled toolkit (Purvis, A., Lowrey, J., and Law R, DWP Research Report 566, 2009) promoted a five step A-E system of measuring client progress. One option could be to fix some standards around the quality of interventions by providers that would best enable clients to move through these stages.
3.3 At the outset of the programme is an assessment of the client to decide which possible menu of interventions would best meet their needs. Following this, marking progress over these A-E stages will depend in turn upon staff being able to make valid judgements on progress. Consequently staff training, highlighted in the above report as a key success factor, ought to be the third benchmark of quality.
3.4 The first transition i.e. A to B is linked to client's own recognition of their support needs. Thus an action plan willingly entered into by clients, in whom they have chosen from an appropriate menu of "life skill" support options, ought to be established as the fourth benchmark of quality. The "life skills" that may be appropriate could or should include the following: possible identification of role models, peer support, peer mentoring, independent living skills (e.g. around mobility training), handling money, basic skills support such as literacy, numeracy etc.
3.5 The second transition from B to C is linked to the client making initial progress. The acquisition of a disability specific skill by the client that is applicable to a working environment could constitute evidence for this transition and the training input provided. Examples of these skills could include accessing documents i.e. through the use of speech activated software, mobility e.g. use of public transport etc.
3.6 The third transition from C to D is linked to the client making sustained progress. The ability of the client to independently produce a CV could constitute evidence for this transition and the training input provided.
3.7 The final transition from D to E is linked to clients routinely demonstrating the necessary level of competence to acquire a job. The ability of the client to independently job search and complete a job application form could constitute evidence for this transition and the training input provided.
3.8 All transitions made should be recorded in the client action plan. The final and crucial evidence of quality should or could be a job outcome. The possibility of employment being an option should be raised at the outset e.g. through the aforementioned discussion of role models conducted at the initial assessment (if needed).
3.9 In summary quality indicators should comprise: • A system for customer feedback into service delivery review • Staff training e.g. Vocational Rehabilitation standards, NVQ advice and guidance standards, etc • Routine availability of appropriate communication and information formats specific to clients needs • An action plan that includes access to life skills and basic skills support • Acquisition of disability specific skills that enhance employment prospects (if needed) • Completion of a CV by the client • Acquisition of job searching and job application skills by the client • A job outcome
Our Experience of Black Box Service Delivery 4.1 The "Black Box" approach may have merits in not stifling prime providers with unnecessary contract specifications such as onerous record keeping and it may also have had the good intention of focusing quality on job outcomes but it also has drawbacks too.
4.2 Firstly the figures released on prime provider performance on the Work Programme on November 27th show only marginal differences between levels of performance (a range between 5.0% for the best and 2.2% for the worst) with too few discernible benefits in delivery. Secondly a black box approach may be acting to reduce the dissemination of good practice. Commercial confidentiality and market advantage may act against the sharing of information and also diminish collaboration that leads to innovation.
4.3 We are currently negotiating contracts to provide call off specialist interventions for a number of the Primes. However, getting adequate volumes through to make it worth our while setting up delivery arrangements is dependent upon the personal advisers recognising that an individual needs specialist support and should be referred onto it. Additionally, it seems that each local business manager has to justify expenditure on such specialist support and be convinced that these interventions will result in a job outcome in order to balance the books. Consequently there is a strong temptation to not make referrals and try to support them in-house or to buy in inadequate levels of support. We will do our best to work with advisers to understand what benefits we can offer to their customers, but undertaking that marketing and selling role with advisers is time and resource consuming, and we receive no funding for doing that. 4.4 In summary we would support the crystallization and funding of collaboration platforms to foster a deeper more public understanding of people's barriers to work and how to scale up successful local projects.
Conclusion
5.1 The Work Programme appears to be failing blind and partially sighted claimants. New and drastic interventions are needed because the performance may worsen as the relatively easier to help progress through it to fill existing vacancies and the harder to help enter the programme as the labour market offers fewer vacancies.
7 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by mental health organisations: the Centre for Mental Health, Mind, and the Scottish Association for Mental Health (SAMH)
1. Introduction
1.1 The Work Programme works with an unprecedented number of benefit claimants, with vastly different circumstances, barriers, prospects and needs, within a single back-to-work scheme. It is therefore absolutely vital that the programme is able to identify these circumstances, recognise these barriers, and support these needs.
1.2 People with mental health problems make up a significant proportion of people on the Work Programme. People with ‘mental and behavioural disorders’ accounted for 44 per cent of claims for the old Incapacity Benefit.1 For the new out-of-work disability benefit, Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), 32 per cent of claims are primarily for mental health problems. 2 Many people on Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) may experience depression and anxiety, linked to their unemployment. It is therefore essential that the Work Programme is able to adequately cater for this user-group. We agree that returning to work can be an important step in someone’s recovery from a mental health problem. However, it is vital that any back-to-work programme does not jeopardise this recovery through inappropriate conditionality or insufficient support.
1.3 This submission is built upon information we have gathered from people with mental health problems who have received back-to-work support and from Work Programme providers.
2. Key concerns
2.1 Work Capability Assessment (WCA): The WCA, which determines the payment a provider receives when someone finds work, is an insufficient assessment tool to determine levels of support needed.
2.2 Pricing Categories: The current pricing categories are too broad. As a result there are people in the same group who have vastly different needs. Those whose needs are less time intensive are prioritised. The impact of contracting based on such broad categories is driving providers to focus less on participants who face greater barriers to work.
2.3 Focus on Outcomes: The exclusive focus on outcomes (finding
1 DWP, Statistics tabulation tool (Benefit Caseload National Statistics (WPLS) data) http://83.244.183.180/100pc/tabtool.html (statistics run up to February 2012) 2 DWP, Main health condition reported by Employment and Support Allowance claimants, by employment situation immediately before claim, http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/adhoc_analysis/2012/ESA_claimants_health_fro m_work_final_20121101.xls work) fails to recognise the importance of progress made by people on the Work Programme. If payments were also made on progress, specialist providers would be more incentivised, and have more resources, to work with people facing the largest number of barriers to getting back into the workplace.
2.4 Conditionality and Sanctions: The disproportionate emphasis on conditionality and sanctions presupposes that people who are out of work do not want to get back into work and fails to help build people’s confidence.
2.5 Specialist training and Integrated services: The Government must ensure that that all staff are appropriately trained in mental health problems and that providers have more mental health experts. The Government should also ensure that Work Programme providers are given the financial incentives to work with health and social care services to offer clients integrated health and employment support.
3. The Work Capability Assessment
3.1 The WCA decides which people are eligible for ESA, and if so whether they are placed in the Work-Related Activity Group (WRAG), where they are required to start preparing for a return to work, or placed in the Support Group where any preparation would be voluntary.
3.2 It is therefore essential that the WCA works properly in assessing needs.
3.3 However, overwhelming evidence from people who have undergone the WCA shows that it is unfit for assessing people with mental health problems. Between October 2008, when ESA was introduced, and May 2011 (the most recent figures available for condition-specific appeals data), 43 per cent of ‘Fit for Work’ decisions for applicants with ‘mental and behavioural disorders’ were appealed and 41 percent of these appeals were successful. 3
3.4 We regularly hear from people who have received zero points on the WCA and are declared ‘Fit for Work’ who then have the decision overturned after a long and distressing appeals process:
3.5 “I wasn’t asked any questions about my illness or how I was coping. Even though I volunteered information none of my responses were documented in the subsequent report. It was decided that I was completely fit for work having scored O on the medical assessment.”
3 DWP, Employment and Support Allowance: Appeal Outcomes (Tables) http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/adhoc_analysis/2012/ESA_Appeal_Outcomes.xls
3.6 One of our local Minds in South East London, which runs a welfare advice service, reported that they frequently receive referrals from the Jobcentre. Referrals are made up of clients on the Work Programme, but who the Jobcentre believes are currently unfit to participate in back-to-work activities. The local Mind will help the client to appeal the decision of the WCA. In the last three months they have received 10- 12 of these types of referrals.
3.7 We have also heard from Work Programme providers that they spend a significant amount of time helping people appeal the decision of the WCA rather than offering them back-to-work support because providers felt the decision was incorrect.
3.8 For more details about our concerns about the WCA, please see our joint submission to the third Harrington review, which was recently passed onto the Clerk of the Committee.
3.9 As a result of these problems with the WCA, people are getting inadequate support or being forced to undertake activities with which they cannot cope.
3.10 For people placed in the WRAG, the point at which they are referred to the Work Programme is largely set by the ‘functional prognosis’ from their WCA. Initially people in the WRAG were referred to the Work Programme three months before this date. This period was then extended to six months and is now being extended to twelve. We are concerned that there will be a lack of adequate assessments put in place to ensure that people are actually well enough to properly engage with back-to-work-support so far in advance of the date that the WCA has decided that they will be better.
3.11 We have heard from significant numbers of people experiencing high levels of stress and anxiety as a result of the WCA. This results in them feeling much less positive about engaging in back-to-work support and less likely to return to work sooner. We have also spoken with Work Programme providers who described how negative experiences of the WCA can make participants less likely to positively engage with back-to- work support. They also told us that that information passed onto them about someone’s health condition from the WCA offers little to no insight into their mental health problems and the support they require.
4. The Work Programme
4.1 Pricing Work Programmes providers receive a higher level of payment for securing work for people on ESA than those receiving JSA. A higher payment is made for clients on ESA in the Support Group than those in WRAG.
4.1.1 Given the complex and intangible nature of many mental health problems and the tendency for conditions to fluctuate over time, finding sustainable employment for a client in these groups is a huge challenge. We therefore support the policy of paying providers more for finding work for people in these groups in order to reflect the additional costs associated with placing and supporting clients.
4.1.2 However, that there is one payment level for all ESA WRAG claimants results in a very broad group of claimants within one price band. A person’s mental health diagnosis is not a good predictor of their employability or the barriers they face to getting work. We have spoken with sub-providers, specialising in helping disabled people to find sustained employment, who reported that such broad categorisation and payment structures forces them to focus on clients whose needs are less complex as payments do not cover the amount needed for clients with more complex needs, despite that fact that this goes against the values of their organisation.
4.1.3 The system needs to be better able to reward providers according to their clients’ personal needs and barriers.
4.2 Greater Focus on Progression
4.2.1 Currently providers can claim a job outcome payment after a participant has been in a job for three to six months. After receiving a job outcome payment, providers can claim sustainment payments every four weeks when a participant stays in work.
4.2.2 The current system fails to recognise the progress that specialist providers are making with participants who have mental health problems, but who may not yet have gained employment. These participants face greater barriers to work and often need a considerable amount of support in building work-skills. However, the current payment structure fails to recognise this important work that specialist providers are performing.
4.2.3 We welcome a payment structure which would reward, not simply the outcome of employment, but also the progress made by clients with more complex needs. This payment structure would make it much more viable for small specialist providers to work with clients, who have complex needs, over a longer period of time and better support their return to work.
4.3 Conditionality and Sanctions
4.3.1 The majority of people with mental health problems on ESA are placed in the WRAG and are required to participate in back-to-work support. They face sanctioning if they do not participate. We are increasingly concerned that the system is characterised more by coercion rather than by a genuine attempt to support individuals into the workplace.
4.3.2 Significant numbers of people have described to us the negative impact threats of sanctioning have upon their return to work:
4.3.3 “I got a nasty letter which said my benefit was at risk because I didn’t attend an appointment and I had to give a really good explanation within a week or my benefit would be cut. It quoted all these regulations I broke. I freaked out because I couldn’t understandt wha I hadn’t done. …It turns out there was a mistake”
4.3.4 “I was made very anxious and sleepless by what I perceived as threatening letters and terms from Jobcentre Plus and a4e. I became depressed because I could see that my hopes to return to work were being made unrealisable by this route”
4.3.4 These comments demonstrate how sanctioning is detrimental to people’s mental health and weakens their ability to successfully engage with back-to-work support. Supporting this evidence, the Employment Related Services Association analysis of Work Programme statistics at the end of November 2012 showed that there are better job outcomes for people claiming ESA who voluntarily participate in the Work Programme.4
4.3.5 The only international evidence on the impact of conditionality on people with mental health problems found that the system does not incentivise job searching or work-related activity; rather it leads to a loss of income as sanctions are applied, with a consequent risk to the person’s health: “Rather than creating behavioural change, sanctions imposed on unresponsive groups are punitive.”5
4.3.6 We have also heard from Work Programme providers who find the policy of sanctioning detrimental to their engagement with clients with mental health problems. Currently sub-providers are required to report to the Jobcentre if clients fail to engage with any element of back-to- work support. They explained that often this means they are forced to report clients for sanctioning whom they feel had a legitimate reason for not fully engaging with back-to-work-support. Whilst they can submit details of mitigating circumstances to the DWP, they felt that this policy often weakened their relationship with clients.
4.3.7 Furthermore, the focus on sanctions as a tool for ‘encouraging’ people in the WRAG to engage with support presupposes that people with disabilities do not want to work, and that the principal barrier in not doing so is their motivation. Significant numbers of people have described to us how this approach has led them to feel increasingly
4 The ERSA Analysis of Work Programme Job Start Data and Work Programme Briefing, November 2012. 5 Meara E and Frank R, 2006, Welfare Reform, Work Requirements and Employment Barriers. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA stigmatised, further disengaging them from back-to-work support. One person stated:
4.3.8 “I always feel that benefits treat me as if I am lying all the time, they assume I’m like some others and trying to avoid work”
4.4 Barriers to Successful Employment Outcomes
4.4.1 Whilst people with mental health problems have one of the lowest employment rates among disabled people (at 27 per cent for depression and anxiety, and 14 per cent for more severe conditions, compared to 46 per cent for disabled people as a whole), they have the highest ‘want to work’ rate among benefit claimants.6 The Government should therefore focus on external barriers that people with mental health problems face in employment, including workplace discrimination. One claimant we spoke to commented:
4.4.2 “My objective for the last 11 years in unemployment has been to find appropriate work for my condition and qualifications that would make claiming state benefit unnecessary. Such dictatorial and penalising attitudes would increase my levels of anxiety and depression and would be counterproductive, replicating what happened with my last employer”
4.4.3 Fewer than four in ten employers would knowingly employ someone with a mental health problem7 and 40 per cent of employers view workers with mental health issues as a ‘significant risk’.8 A 2011 Populus poll of 2,006 adults in employment found that of those who disclosed a mental health problem, 22 per cent were sacked or forced out of their jobs,9 demonstrating that many of the fears that people have about re-entering the workplace are well founded. The Work Programme should therefore also consider external barriers and the Government should focus on resolving workplace stigma and discrimination.
4.4.4 People have also described to us how activities were focused on getting people any form of work, rather than the most appropriate forms of work:
4.4.5 “Support was only really to get me into a job, however unsuitable, in order to tick a box and provider to get money in and achieve targets”
4.4.6 Whilst we know that work based on a person’s preferences and accessed with the right kind of support can be a vital part of recovery
6 Social Exclusion Unit (2004) Mental Health and Social Exclusion 7 DWP (2001) One Evaluation 8 Shaw Trust (2010) Mental Health: Still The Last Workplace Taboo? 9 Populus survey for Mind, in 2011, interviewed 2,006 adults in employment. Data have been weighted to be representative of all GB adults in terms of gender, age, SEG and region. Of the 2,006 interviewed, 516 had experienced a mental health problem while in employment and 294 had told their boss. Press release retrieved from: http://www.mind.org.uk/news/5053_workers_face_the_sack_for_admitting_they_feel_stressed from a mental health problem, we also know that inappropriate work can be worse for someone’s mental health than not working at all.10 Often the Work Programme does not account for the skill and experience that someone might have, and people are offered lower paid roles which require less experience. This approach does not support aspiration or wellbeing.
4.4.7 Work Programme providers also reported to us that at present, due to cuts to other services, they spend significant amounts of time assisting people with issues such as housing and health. These issues should also be recognised as key in helping someone re-enter the workplace, and greater focus and resources should be allocated by government to help providers address multiple needs.
4.5 Work Choice
4.5.1 We would also recommend that more people with mental health problems are referred to Work Choice, the Government’s specialist employment programme. Participation in Work Choice is voluntary, which we believe, and is reflected in the ERSA recent analysis of Work Programme statistics, is a basis through which to successfully work with people facing multiple barriers and ensure their sustain return to the workforce.11 Work Choice however, is limited to 115,000 placements over the lifetime of a five year contract and only 14 per cent of all referrals to Work Choice so far have been ESA claimants.12
5. Mental Health Expertise and Integrated Support
5.1 Specialist Mental Health Training Many of our supporters have commented that there is a lack of understanding of mental health among Work Programme providers: Comments include:
5.1.1 “She said of depression things like if I felt a bit down then I should really just make more of an effort to do stuff even if it is a chore. It’s lovely having your feelings being made light of”
5.1.2 “When I eventually got to see a disability specialist the first thing he said was he didn’t understand my diagnosis and was going to get an occupational therapist to reassess me… when I turn up to an appointment it seems pretty clear that no thought has been given to me between appointments or even before the appt as the advisor … [had] look on her computer to refresh her memory of what my diagnosis [was]”
10 Butterworth, P, Leach, L, Strazdins, L et al 2011, 'The psychosocial quality of work determines whether employment has benefits for mental health: Results from a longitudinal national household panel survey', Occupational and Environmental Medicine, vol. 68, no. 11, pp. 806-812. 11 The ERSA Analysis of Work Programme Job Start Data and Work Programme Briefing, November 2012. 12 See November 2012 data: http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/workingage/wchoice/wc_nov12.pdf 5.1.3 We also heard from providers who described how, with greater funding could recruit extra staff to coordinate health and social care with back- to-work support. They described that this approach would be more sensitive to the multiple needs people with mental health problems face and better support their transition into the workplace.
5.2 Individual Placement Support (IPS) Model
5.2.1 There is clear evidence that employment support is most effective for people with mental health problems if it is integrated with health care. The IPS approach, which is used in secondary mental health care, is twice as likely to enable people with severe mental health problems to enter competitive work than any other type of work programme.13 Advisers who understand mental health help the person to identify what barriers they face, how they might overcome them, and what work they would like to do. The adviser proactively seeks out employers who might be well suited to the person’s abilities and needs. The individual and their employer are then supported within the workplace for as long as required.
5.2.2 Participation in IPS is voluntary, so conditions and sanctions are not necessary. As already discussed recently published DWP figures show that there are better job outcomes for people claiming ESA who voluntarily participate in the Work Programme. We believe that voluntary participation coupled with specialist support for people with mental health problems, demonstrating to people that the system was genuinely designed to help them, would result getting far larger numbers of people back into sustained employment.
6. Recommendations
6.1 The Government should ensure that the WCA is fit to properly identify the needs and barriers that people with mental health problems face in the workplace.
6.2 The principle focus of Work Programme providers should be on demonstrating to clients that the back-to-work process is a positive one, rather than using sanctions to enforce involvement. Discussions about sanctioning should not take place until it is clear that the client does not want to engage with back-to-work support.
6.3 Any conditionality should take account of the individual client’s circumstances and needs, and should not result in any negative impact on the clients’ mental health.
6.4 The ambitions and expectations of the client should be central to any programme designed to help them back to work.
13 The Centre for Mental Health, ‘The Work Programme, supporting individuals with severe mental health conditions into work’, http://www.centreformentalhealth.org.uk/pdfs/work_programme_providers_briefing2.pdf, (accessed 19/11/2012)
6.5 The Work Programme should function to ensure that providers are properly incentivised to cater for the needs of all clients, including those with greater levels of need and barriers to the workforce.
6.6 The Government should ensure that external barriers including workplace discrimination are tackled in order to guarantee successful long-term employment of people with mental health problems.
7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by the Department for Work and Pensions
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Work Programme was launched as planned in June 2011 throughout England, Scotland and Wales, providing personalised back to work support for long-term unemployed people and for others with significant barriers to employment. 1.2 The Work Programme is designed to give these hardest-to-help groups longer-term support than previous provision, with individuals staying on the Programme for 24 months. This recognises that people with poor work records and other significant barriers to overcome often need substantial support over a sustained period to help them move back to work – support that continues even after they have started employment. 1.3 The latest figures for referrals and attachments published on 7 November 2012 showed that 837,000 people had joined the Programme by 31 July. However the large majority of the people who had joined the Programme during that period had been with their provider for less than one year and, as providers are able to claim an outcome for up to two and a half years after a person joins, it is too soon to judge the performance of the programme. In particular, it is too soon to judge performance by job outcomes alone. The Work Programme only rewards providers when participants stay in work and off benefit for a sustained period – six months for most; three months for the harder to help – so most participants, even if they are in work, have not been on the programme long enough to appear in the official job outcome statistics that were published on 27 November. For these reasons the Department is also looking at evidence from benefit records and from providers’ records of job starts to judge performance in the pipeline. 1.4 These records show that participants are moving off benefit and into work. For example, 56% of the people who joined the programme when it started in June 2011 have had a break in their claim, with the majority being in work. Providers had recorded over 200,000 job starts to the end of September. There is every expectation that this evidence that participants are leaving benefit and starting work will translate into increased job outcome performance. 1.5 Where possible, the evidence provided by the Department seeks to address the individual lines of enquiry that the Work and Pensions Select Committee are particularly interested in, but with the major caveat that it is too early to judge the overall performance of the Programme or to answer detailed questions about its operation. This memorandum covers each point of interest in turn.
2 The Differential Payments Model [NB – the Committee is interested in the extent to which the payment model is incentivising providers to help all participants and thereby addressing “creaming and parking”; how effectively the model reflects claimants’ relative needs; and variations in job outcomes between the different payment groups] 2.1 The job outcome statistics published on 27 November show differences between the main payment groups, with those on Jobseeker’s Allowance more likely to achieve job outcomes than those on Employment and Support Allowance. There are several possible factors or combinations of factors that could explain these differences, including the comparative difficulty of helping people with very significant barriers to employment particularly in difficult labour market conditions. It is too early to determine whether or not the payment model itself is right. The differential payment model was designed to offer very real incentives to support the harder to help groups, with providers able to earn up to £13,600 for getting Employment and Support Allowance recipients into sustained work compared to £3,800 for a young jobseeker. In particular, the payment model ensures that providers can only make a reasonable return on their investment if they genuinely help all their participants; in other words “creaming and parking” will not pay. 2.2 To further ensure that providers are delivering at least the minimum standard of service they promise for each participant, the Department conducts a monthly survey of a sample of claimants from each contract, requiring providers to rectify any shortcomings identified. 2.3 The report on the first phase of qualitative evaluation of the Work Programme published on 27 November noted some evidence that participants with the most severe barriers to employment were seen less frequently. However the report pointed out that less frequent contact is not necessarily indicative of lower quality or less appropriate support, and that this was an issue that requires further monitoring during evaluation. The report also noted that specialist provision for those with particular barriers was considered to be functioning effectively.
3 The prime provider model
[NB – the Committee is interested in the model’s impact on subcontractors; and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs] 3.1 The Department is keen to promote healthy supply chains in which subcontractors are supported and treated fairly by prime providers. To that end the Department supported the development of the Merlin Standard, an independently managed accreditation standard that all Work Programme providers were required to apply for in the first year. 3.2 All primes achieved the required standard. As well as seeking input from subcontractors during the accreditation process, Merlin offers a confidential advice and mediation service for any supply chain organisation experiencing problems with their prime. 3.3 The Department conducts regular supply chain stock takes which show that, apart from a small amount of churn, the numbers of private, public and voluntary sector organisations in the Work Programme supply chain has remained fairly constant. The July 2012 stock take showed 785 (down by 24 (3%) since the January stock take) different organisations listed in the Work Programme supply chains, of which;
• 368 (47% of total compared to 45% in January) are from the voluntary and community sector, up by 5 in net terms from January stock take; • 125 (16%, of total compared to 17% in January), are public; and • 292 (37% of total compared to 38% of total at January) are private, a net drop of 16.
4 The level of service [NB – the Committee is interested in the service provided to participants in different payment groups including: whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP; and the rigour and effectiveness of DWP’s monitoring and complaints procedures] 4.1 Unlike previous programmes, the Work Programme does not have prescriptive elements where providers are paid for delivering centrally designed processes. So, the Department has required all providers to set out their minimum service delivery standards so that each participant knows what to expect, without prescribing the standards themselves. To do so would have missed the point that service delivery needs to be as flexible as possible to meet the needs of individuals and to fit with each provider’s delivery model. 4.2 The Department requires all providers to operate an open and accessible complaints process that participants can use if they feel they are not receiving the promised standard of service or if they have concerns about any other aspect of the support they are receiving. The Department believes that it is right to expect providers to seek to remedy complaints so that they can get their relationship with participants on to the right, positive footing. However, if complaints are not resolved to a participant’s satisfaction they can be escalated to the Independent Case Examiner who has powers to charge providers up to £5,000 towards the cost of the ICE investigation if they are found to be at fault. 4.3 Up to the end of October 2012, ICE had received a total of 209 complaints of which 165 have been cleared. Of the remaining 44 cases, 17 are currently with a case officer under investigation or attempting resolution, 17 are awaiting investigation and 10 are awaiting a gateway decision as to whether the complaint can be accepted for investigation by this office. Of the 165 cases cleared,153 complaints went to ICE prematurely, 7 were investigated (all not upheld), 2 complaints were resolved, 2 withdrawn and 1 was referred to Merlin mediation
5 The “black box” approach to service delivery
[NB – the Committee is interested in whether the black box approach is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups; and DWP’s role in monitoring this] 5.1 In procuring the Work Programme the Department took steps to attract bids from a wide range of organisations from the public, private and voluntary sectors including several with experience of delivering employment programmes in comparable labour markets abroad. Similarly, the Department encouraged successful bidders to engage as wide a range of subcontractors as possible in order to ensure provision meets the varied needs of individuals and the local labour market. 5.2 This led to a rich mix of prime providers and subcontractors and a wide range of delivery models. Others will judge the extent to which these are innovative – the Department’s primary concern is that the programme should support as many people as possible into sustained employment. To that end no delivery model should be regarded as fixed. Indeed, providers are actively encouraged to adapt their delivery models in the light of lessons learned from experience and as circumstances in the economy change. 5.3 Providers must seek the Department’s approval for any changes to delivery models. However, as the onus is on providers to use initiative and innovation to deliver the best performance, the Department would normally agree changes that didn’t impact minimum service standards and that didn’t breach fundamental principles, for example that the service should be free to participants.
6 Regional variations
[NB – the Committee is interested regional variations in job outcome statistics: including whether competition between providers is driving up performance in contract package areas where the economy is particularly depressed; and how provider performance could be improved in these areas] 6.1 The job outcome statistics published on 27 November showed some variation between contract package areas, and some variation between providers within contract package areas. However this picture is volatile, making it particularly difficult at this very early stage to ascribe variation to different labour market conditions or provider performance.
7 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by Rehab Group
1 Introduction
1.1 The Rehab Group welcomes this opportunity to contribute to the Work and Pensions Committee’s inquiry into how the Work Programme is working for different user groups. We feel the information contained in paragraphs 20‐26 will be of most interest to the Committee.
1.2 Across the UK, Rehab Group provides services to more than 60,000 disabled people, people who are unemployed and others who are marginalised. Rehab Group is involved in the Work Programme in the following ways:
1.3 Rehab JobFit is a third sector‐led partnership of the Rehab Group and Interserve which delivers training, support and employability services across the UK. The partnership is unique because of the distinctive strengths and experience of both organisations. Rehab Group’s extensive experience in supporting a wide range of customers to realise their full potential enables the achievement of a real step change in people’s lives to deliver a better future. Interserve, as one of the UK’s largest employers, brings a wide variety of sustainable job opportunities as well as extensive supply‐chain management expertise. Rehab JobFit delivers the government's Work Programme and Mandatory Work Activity Programme in South West England and Wales. Through its supply chain of 18 subcontractors, Rehab JobFit has worked with over 40,000 customers helping over 9,000 into employment since April 2012.
1.4 TBG Learning is the Rehab Group’s training division operating across the UK. It works with unemployed people of all ages, from many different backgrounds who have many different reasons for being unemployed. Whether they’re looking to find their first job, have been made redundant from an industry they’ve worked in for many years, or have been out‐of‐work due to illness, disability or social circumstance, TBG Learning provides a tailored, individualised approach to employment support including help with employability or job search, completing one of its training courses, or undertaking a work placement with a local employer so they can build up their confidence and gain some on‐the‐job experience. TBG Learning is involved as a supply chain partner as part of Rehab JobFit.
1.5 This submission will address some of the themes highlighted in the Work and Pensions Committee call for submissions.
2 Themes: The differential payments model including: the extent to which it is incentivising providers to help all participants and thereby addressing “creaming and parking”, How effectively the model reflects claimants’ relative needs; and variations in job outcomes between the different payments group.
2.1 The principle of a differential model is sound. It has motivated those driven by revenue and profit to spread their attention across the full profile of referrals. In theory, the differential model could, in fact, motivate a provider to focus on the harder‐to‐help as they command the greatest fee. This would be directly opposed to the concept of “creaming and parking” which suggests working with those who are easiest to help and parking those who are harder to help.
2.2 However, the measurement and ranking of customers in some ways undermines the potential benefits of the differential pricing model. The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has included Minimum Performance Levels in its contract with providers but only makes reference to three different customer profiles (PG1, PG2 and PG6). This influences how people’s needs and abilities are measured and ranked and is therefore the focus of the provider. This impacts negatively on the principle of differential payment and can encourage “creaming and parking”
2.3 The funding model does not fully reflect the needs of the customers. While it offers a higher price for people who are harder to help, the price is based on the benefits classification of the unemployed person rather than on his/her assessed needs. For example, JSA Early Access Customers, a group of claimants who often face many and complex barriers to workforce participation, attract the lowest fee because of their benefits classification. This is despite the fact that they are among the customers with the highest support needs. It would be more appropriate to establish a more needs‐ based, individualised funding model which recognises the person’s specific employment support needs.
2.4 In summary, the differential model structure is sound in principle; however, in practice it does not ensure that the needs of the customer are matched with the appropriate level of supports to ensure the person achieves their goals and moves on to long‐term employment options.
3 Theme: The prime provider model including: its impact on subcontractors; and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs
3.1 The Prime Contractor model has some positive benefits for subcontractors. It allows smaller providers to participate and gives scope for capacity building for smaller, local providers. A good, effective prime provider can help subcontractors to learn from each other. It also gives subcontractors access to programmes which are tried and tested for the benefit of the customer.
3.2 However, there are some less positive impacts for subcontractors. The prime provider model has enabled DWP to effectively transfer the risk associated with operating a programme like the Work Programme to the prime providers. This risk is then transferred to the subcontractors who must bear this risk without necessarily receiving the same level of reward as the prime contractor, on the basis that the prime contractor retains a management fee.
3.3 In order to provide for more complex needs, the prime provider should engage with specialist providers who can provide for the person’s individual needs in a way that is contractually stronger than it is currently. There is some evidence that this is not happening universally. Some third sector contractors have reported that in some cases, prime providers have promised to refer customers to them but in many cases did not, leading to the charge that these specialist providers were referred to in the bid documents but were not intended to be active members of the supply chain. Subcontractors, particularly, third sector organisations, should also be assisted to develop capacity to deal with more complex needs, thereby utilising the expertise built up by charity organisations through the social entrepreneurship they so typically demonstrate.
3.4 The prime provider model is still very useful as a means of keeping focus on the delivery of outcomes for customers by applying effective performance management tools and applying a business‐like approach to contractual compliance and delivery.
4 Theme: the level of service provided to participants in different payment groups including: whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP; and the rigour and effectiveness of DWP’s monitoring and complaints procedures
4.1 There is a need for greater acknowledgement and acceptance by DWP of the diversity of support needs amongst customers who are referred to the Work Programme. As the basis of measurement, the minimum performance levels dictate the priorities of providers. Unfortunately, because the MPLs only consider three categories of customer this measurement is limited in impact. The MPL approach could be enhanced by setting minimum levels of outcome achievement for each customer group, or for JSA and ESA as total groups, thereby ensuring that anomalies arising from the uneven profile of referrals across different CPAs do not disadvantage any provider or all providers in different CPAs.
4.2 DWP’s monitoring is strong and it consistently and regularly monitors performance.
5 Theme: The “black box” approach to service delivery including: whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups; and DWP’s role in monitoring this. 5.1 The “black box” approach is good. It allows providers to deliver what they feel is best for the customer groups that they service. However, there are some drawbacks.
5.2 For example, the Welsh government has determined that the definition of black box is anything that an unemployed person needs to get work within the Work Programme and consequently they will not allow a customer on the Work Programme to access other programmes funded by, for example, ESF. There are many examples of customers in Wales being disadvantaged as a result of this interpretation of the “black box”. Here are some examples, directly from staff working on Work Programme delivery in Wales, of how this has impacted on people’s outcomes provided through Rehab JobFit’s supply chain:
5.3 A Work Programme customer applied for a job online as part of his job search activity, only to be informed that he was not eligible as Jobs Growth Wales is ESF‐funded. The customer met all criteria for the position advertised.
5.4 A gentleman was working with this organisation to overcome his barriers which were literacy, numeracy and self‐confidence. The customer had a history of mental illness, he had been with this organisation for a few months and there were definite improvements to his life. The customer was informed that he would be required to join the Work Programme and as a consequence this meant that he would have to leave the programme he was in because it was ESF‐funded. We were approached by the customer’s mother who pleaded with us to let him stay where he was as she could already see the decline in his overall wellbeing. Unfortunately this was not possible however, we did arrange a 1‐1 meeting with MIND to try and source a voluntary placement.
5.5 One customer thought he had a job. He then came into the office to say he wasn’t eligible to start at the garage that day due to it being under the Jobs Growth Wales funding and he was on Work Programme.
5.6 Another customer was referred to Kaleidoscope by JCP to complete Track Safety Licence but came onto Work Programme before he got his appointment with them. Due to being on the Work Programme, he was told that he was no longer eligible even though he was referred previously.
5.7 Three customers with learning disabilities who were in receipt of Disability Living Allowance needed a Job coach which could have been sought from Quest previously, but this isn’t accessible for customers on the Work Programme.
5.8 A customer was referred to the Work Programme although he had already advised JCP that he had a Jobs Growth Wales opportunity, he was referred to us anyway and after 6 months of issues and complaints to deal with he has finally been taken off Work Programme and has now taken eup th Jobs Growth Wales opportunity.
5.9 Another less impactful drawback of the black box relates to its interpretation by subcontractors, many of whom initially saw the black box approach as an opportunity to continue providing services in the same way as they had previously done and some of those practices did not work as effectively as possible. At this stage in the programme, providers are aware of what works and doesn’t work and change is beginning to take place; however, this change could have commenced earlier had the black box not been interpreted so loosely, including permitting the way things were done in the past.
6 Theme: Regional variations in job outcome statistics: including whether competition between providers is driving up performance in contract package areas where the economy is particularly depressed; and how provider performance could be improved in these areas. 6.1 There is currently no competition between prime providers in contract package areas (CPA). In general they work independently of each other and because referrals are sent alternately to each of the two providers in a CPA, there is never any need to compete with the other provider.
6.2 It is understood that performance at the end of Year 2 will potentially shift some market share between providers. In the case of Rehab JobFit there is also no competition between subcontractors as each provider is solely assigned to a specific JCP area.
6.3 There are regional variations in performance and therefore it is more appropriate to measure each provider within their CPA rather than comparing them to the full group of 18. For example, compare providers within Wales, or within the South West and so on. It seems unfair that performance in London, which in effect has its own strongly performing micro economy, is compared with the North of England, Wales or Scotland.
6.4 In relation to improving provider performance in areas where the economy is particularly depressed there is only one solution – job creation. If the economy in a particular CPA is impacting on the number of jobs available and, therefore, on the Work Programme’s performance, there is very little that DWP can do to help improve the provider performance. Local job creation initiatives are the only solution.
7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by G4S
Background
1. G4S Welfare to Work is one of the largest and most successful prime contractors on the Work Programme, operating contracts in the following areas:
South East (Kent, Surrey and Sussex) North West (Greater Manchester, Cheshire and Warrington) Yorkshire and Humber (North East Yorkshire and The Humber)
2. G4S operate a unique 100% subcontracted model through a network of both large and small subcontractors. Across our three contract areas, we have 20 main subcontractors – 8 from the private sector, 7 from the public sector, and 5 from the voluntary sector.
3. The official performance data released in November 2012 showed that G4S is the top-performing prime contractor in all our contract areas:
Kent, Surrey and Sussex Job Outcomes achieved by G4S: 900 Job Outcomes achieved by competitor: 820
Greater Manchester, Cheshire and Warrington Job Outcomes achieved by G4S: 880 Job Outcomes achieved by two competitors: 710 and 590
North East Yorkshire and The Humber Job Outcomes achieved by G4S: 460 Job Outcomes achieved by competitor: 310
4. G4S is one of the most successful Work Programme providers at a national level. According to Inclusion, G4S are ranked 5th out of the 18 prime contractors. A separate ranking by the Spend Matters website ranked G4S joint 1st out of the 18 providers in terms of comparative performance across our contract areas.
Summary
1. The Work Programme incentivises providers to help as many people as possible into sustained jobs. There is no ‘creaming’ as most jobseekers sent to the Work Programme have been unemployed for at least nine months despite receiving the support of Jobcentre Plus. Almost all require considerable additional support to find work. Parking is a concern when the amount of funding available is insufficient to meet a jobseeker’s needs. The differential payments model helps to direct resources towards the harder-to-help jobseekers. In the short term, the payment model could be improved by incorporating the length of time that someone has been on benefits in addition to the type of benefit they are claiming. In the long term, we support the development of a tool that assesses each jobseeker’s needs rather than relying on benefit type or length of claim. ‘Cycling’ remains a concern but this can be resolved by adapting the referral mechanism for jobseekers joining the Work Programme.
2. G4S’s performance on the Work Programme to date shows that our pure prime contractor model is working better than direct delivery models and ‘mixed’ models. Our delivery model has had a positive impact on our subcontractors by providing support, advice and guidance as well as clearly dividing the responsibilities between prime and subcontractors.
3. Our fully subcontracted delivery model makes us well placed to deal with the varying needs of jobseekers from different claimant groups. Minimum service delivery standards formed part of our bid and are published so that we can be held accountable to them. We believe that the DWP’s monitoring and complaint procedures are already very rigorous.
4. Although the ‘black box’ approach does present some challenges, it offers the best way of ensuring that jobseekers in each payment group receive personalised interventions rather than a rigid, tick-box set of inappropriate activities and actions.
5. Competition is a vital part of the Work Programme, but in order for it to drive up performance DWP must act on comparative under-performance by prime contractors in each area. There are clear regional variations in Work Programme performance, which is likely to be largely the result of variations in labour markets. Geographical variations are best controlled for by looking at the relative performance of prime contractors in the same contract area. One way of improving provider performance in difficult geographical areas would be to introduce a regional element to the differential payment mechanism. The differential payments model
6. The Work Programme is still in its early stages but is showing encouraging signs. Our modelling suggests that 45% of Work Programme jobseekers will be placed into sustained jobs over the lifetime of the programme.
7. The Work Programme represents good value for money for the taxpayer. Calculations published recently showed that the Work Programme currently costs £2,097 for each job secured as opposed to £7,495 on the Flexible New Deal, £7,857 on Employment Zones and £3,321 on the New Deal programmes for Young People and those aged 25 and over.
8. All providers must work with the finite resources that are available through the Work Programme when supporting jobseekers. Providers must therefore make decisions about how to allocate those resources. The Work Programme is set up in such a way that providers are incentivised to place the most jobseekers possible into work. The differential payments model tries to direct more resources towards jobseekers claiming certain benefits on the basis that they might be harder-to-help.
9. We do not believe that there is widespread ‘creaming’ of jobseekers on the Work Programme. By its very nature, Work Programme providers only get referred jobseekers after they have typically received 12 months of full support from Jobcentre Plus (JCP). The support from JCP ensures that the easiest-to-help jobseekers will have found employment already, meaning that it is only the hardest-to-help who are referred to the Work Programme.
10. Similarly, the notion of ‘parking’ can be misunderstood. It is important to be realistic about the range and complexity of barriers to work facing those who start on the Work Programme (e.g. long-term physical health issues). It will not be possible to find sustainable employment for every single jobseeker on the Work Programme. The additional money available to support jobseekers claiming Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) is certainly a welcome innovation, but the Work Programme is still operating on less funding than previous programmes. This guarantees that the Work Programme will be efficient in terms of the level of success it generates for the amount of taxpayers’ money invested in the scheme. However, it will also mean that providers may not have sufficient resources to support jobseekers with the most severe barriers to work.
11. The differential payments model in its current form, in which jobseekers are placed into ‘payment groups’ on the basis of which benefit they are claiming, is only a proxy (and a loose one at that) for the likely difficulty in finding sustained employment for each individual. This system is not ideal as it does not take into account the complexity of their needs. For example, a jobseeker who has been in receipt of Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA) can be just as hard to help as an ESA claimant yet a Job Outcome for an ESA claimant triggers a much larger payment.
12. An alternative proxy would be to use benefit type alongside the amount of time someone has been claiming that benefit. In our submission to the previous Select Committee inquiry into the Work Programme in 2010, we made the following recommendation:
“A balance should be struck between a highly personalised classification system able to account for the huge diversity of barriers facing jobseekers and a practically viable system that places jobseekers into clear and identifiable groups without being too time-consuming or impractical. …G4S believes the best proxy at present is the type of benefit that each jobseeker has been receiving and how long they have been receiving it. Those who are harder to help often receive higher benefits for longer periods of time relative to other jobseekers.”
This simple system for allocating jobseekers to payment groups – which could be incorporated into the existing differential payments model – represents the best compromise (at least in the short-term) between complexity and personalisation.
13. In the longer term, G4S support the development of an assessment tool that attempts to understand the severity of each jobseeker’s needs at the outset in order to place them into the most appropriate ‘payment group’. This system has been used in Australia for many years through the Jobseeker Classification Instrument. This tool places every jobseeker on a scale based on the severity of their needs (which also determines how much money a provider receives for supporting them into employment). Even a more sophisticated tool such as this is still only a proxy for individual needs. That said, the potential improvements it could offer in identifying needs and barriers while ensuring providers have the right level of resources to help each individual should provide the necessary impetus for trialling such a tool.
14. Another point related to the differential payments model is the issue of ‘cycling’. Under the current model, jobseekers are usually referred to the Work Programme once they reach a certain threshold in the time they have spent with JCP (normally 9-12 months). ‘Cycling’ refers to a situation in which jobseekers begin claiming benefits at JCP and then enter employment (and in doing so cease claiming benefits), only to fall out of work shortly afterwards and begin the process of claiming benefits again. This is a major concern because it means jobseekers can have multiple periods of unemployment without ever staying out of work for nine months continuously (which is when they would normally join the Work Programme). As a result, thousands of disadvantaged jobseekers are being denied access to the Work Programme.
15. One possible solution to ‘cycling’ is to alter the mechanism by which jobseekers join the Work Programme. For example, rather than specifying that a jobseeker must spend 9- 12 months continuously with JCP, the referral point could be changed so that any jobseeker who has been claiming JSA for, say, 9 out of the last 12 months automatically joins the Work Programme. This mechanism would ensure that jobseekers who are not entering sustainable work would get access to the personalised support available on the Work Programme.
The prime provider model
16. G4S use a pure prime contractor model on the Work Programme. The success of this model is demonstrated by the fact that we are out-performing all our competitors in each region where we deliver the Work Programme (see Background section for further details).
17. We believe that the impact of our model on subcontractors is positive. We provide rigorous performance management and extensive support for our subcontractors with the aim of driving up the performance of our whole supply chain. This includes offering subcontractors the potential reward of growing their organisation through being sent additional jobseekers if they perform well. Our performance management also incorporates ‘Performance Improvement Plans’ for any subcontractor that under-performs. Should a subcontractor not place enough jobseekers into employment over an extended period of time, despite intensive support and guidance from our team, we would consider removing them from our supply chain. By only partnering with the most effective subcontractors, our supply chain will place more jobseekers into sustained employment.
18. Having a single organisation managing and coordinating a range of subcontractors also creates clear dividing lines in terms of responsibilities. This in turn allows the subcontractors to focus on what they do best – delivering high-quality frontline services – while the prime contractor provides the necessary support to drive better performance. A pure prime contractor model also promotes fair competition as it avoids the situation seen on previous programmes when prime contractors withheld jobseekers from their subcontractors to keep hold of more funding (which inevitably had an enormously detrimental impact on the subcontractors).
“Our experience has been of a genuine partner able to add value through their supply chain management expertise, committed to quality, challenging us to surpass our best but recognising and rewarding our achievements.” - Jerry Stokes, Chief Executive of Work Solutions (a G4S subcontractor in the North West)
The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups
19. Our fully subcontracted model makes us well placed to deal with the varying needs of jobseekers from different claimant groups. Our subcontractors are drawn from the public, private and voluntary sectors, and have the necessary expertise to provide a tailored service to each jobseeker. We selected a number of subcontractors as a direct result of their expertise in helping more disadvantaged jobseekers. For example, Richmond Fellowship - one of our top performing providers - was selected due to its excellence at supporting people with mental health problems. Our diverse supply chain ensures that frontline services are not overly rigid, which makes it better suited to helping different claimant groups.
20. We believe that the minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail. All providers were evaluated on the appropriateness of their minimum standards as part of the bidding process. Not only were our minimum standards included within our bid (which is now available online), DWP also published providers’ minimum standards as a separate stand-alone document on their website.
21. Central to our delivery of the Work Programme is our ‘situational’ approach. This means that for every jobseeker on the Work Programme, our subcontractors’ advisors tailor their support to each individual’s circumstances. Such a flexible approach ensures that our advisors provide bespoke support to jobseekers from different claimant groups and do not follow a ‘one size fits all’ approach. An overly prescriptive, rules-based attitude to minimum standards would undermine this situational approach, as it might force advisors to adhere to certain actions or activities that do not help each individual jobseeker.
22. We recognise that DWP monitoring is an essential part of the Work Programme, not least to combat potential abuses such as fraud. Our experience shows that the current system for monitoring providers is very rigorous. Our three Contract Directors have review meetings with Regional Performance Managers on a monthly basis. We have bi-annual review meetings with senior DWP officials to discuss our performance at a national level. Each month, we meet with local Compliance Monitoring Officers in all our contract areas to ensure that we are complying with the contractual standards for issues such as claiming payments. DWP’s Provider Assurance Team also visits our operations on an annual basis to conduct a comprehensive review of our policies and procedures. On top of all this, we have just been through the Merlin Assessment to assess the quality of our supply chain management.
23. The complaints procedure implemented for the Work Programme has proved to be equally robust. Providers are expected to spend time and effort trying to resolve any complaints from their jobseekers. If providers are unable to satisfactorily resolve the complaint, it is passed to the Independent Case Examiner. To date, 165 complaints have been made to G4S out of over 60,000 jobseekers. We have resolved, to the satisfaction of the complainant, 156 of these ourselves. Of the 9 issues that have been passed to the Independent Case Examiner, none have been upheld.
The “black box” approach to service delivery
24. G4S believe that the ‘black box’ approach is fundamental to the success of the Work Programme and that, despite some criticism, the Government should remain committed to it. We recognise that the “black box” approach presents some challenges. For example, it can lead to a perception that ‘not enough is being done’. However, the ‘black box’ approach has far fewer problems than a prescriptive, box-ticking approach seen under earlier outsourced programmes.
25. The ‘black box’ offers the best way of ensuring that jobseekers in each payment group receive personalised interventions. It gives our subcontractors the freedom to deliver in such a way that, with their expert local knowledge, is most likely to support a jobseeker into work. It also allows advisors to offer a tailored service to all jobseekers – which forms part of our situational approach and our commitment to understanding the varying needs and circumstances of every jobseeker.
“NCDA delivers across a wide range of sectors so the black box approach allows us to be flexible with our service to customers depending on their individual and specific needs. The ‘black box’ approach of the contract enables us to deliver a service that meets contractual requirements and fits in with the NCDA ethos, which is to provide a client focused service.” Penny Shimmin, CEO at NCDA (a voluntary sector subcontractor in the South East)
Regional variations in job outcome statistics
26. G4S believes that competition is a vital part of the Work Programme, but in order for it to drive up performance DWP must act on comparative under-performance by prime contractors in each area. Conversely, providers that are demonstrating particular success at helping jobseekers into sustainable employment should be rewarded with additional referrals through an increase in market share. If a provider is consistently failing to perform at the same level as their geographical peers, the Government should have no hesitation in terminating their contract and passing their customers to the most successful existing provider in that area (or to a new provider).
27. Competition is also important for encouraging providers to find new and innovative ways of helping jobseekers. With the potential reward of an increase in market share alongside the threat of having a contract removed, providers are compelled to find novel ways of improving their service to jobseekers.
28. There are clear regional variations in Work Programme performance. Our Yorkshire and Humber operations are achieving around 45-50% fewer Job Outcomes than our operations in the South East and North West. This is solely due to variations in the respective labour markets. Geographical variations are best controlled for by looking at the relative performance of prime contractors in the same area. For example, in Yorkshire and Humber we are ranking 22rd out of the 40 Work Programme contracts around the country in terms of converting referrals to Job Outcomes. However, the other prime in the same area is ranked 38th.
29. One way of improving performance in difficult geographical areas would be to introduce a regional element to the differential payments. For example, the Government could pay more for a Job Outcome in Yorkshire and Humber than in London.
7 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by St Mungo’s submission
St Mungo’s has been opening doors for homeless people since 1969. We currently run over 100 projects, providing accommodation for more than 1,700 people every night and helping thousands more who are rough sleeping or at risk of homelessness. St Mungo’s delivers a range of residential services from emergency shelters to semi-independent flats, as well as non-residential health, education and employment services. We also prevent homelessness through our housing advice programmes.
St Mungo’s services are based on a recovery approach and we aim to work in partnership with clients in a personalised, effective way. Our clients often have complex problems that cause, or are caused by, homelessness; we deliver holistic support to help people rebuild their lives.
Evidence upon which this submission is based
This response draws on a recent joint report The Programme’s Not Working: Experiences of homeless people on the Work Programme1 by St Mungo’s, Crisis and Homeless Link. The report was based on 20 in depth qualitative interviews with homeless people who are on the Work Programme and two national surveys of the same group. This response also draws on St Mungo’s internal analysis of the Work Programme’s payment by results system.
Summary
St Mungo’s believes that the Work Programme can work for people who are homeless, a group which includes many who face multiple and severe barriers to entering sustainable employment.
However, the evidence we have gathered on the Work Programme so far suggests that it is generally not working for homeless people. The main findings of The Programme’s Not Working: Experiences of homeless people on the Work Programme are:
• More must be done to identify the barriers to entering work faced by homeless people. 58 per cent of homeless people had not talked with their Work Programme adviser about their barriers to employment.
1 Available at http://www.mungos.org/press_office/1481_work‐programme‐is‐not‐working‐for‐homeless‐ people • Levels of customer service must improve. 54 per cent of the homeless people surveyed had seen their advisor once a month or less since joining the Work Programme and 58 per cent did not feel they were treated with dignity and respect by their Work Programme provider.
• Specialised sub-contractors must be able to support people on the Work Programme. St Mungo’s pulled out after nine months on the programme without a single referral.
St Mungo’s also believe that the payment by results structure needs to be based on needs assessments that take into account barriers faced by individual participants.
This submission responds to issues that the Inquiry has specifically requested evidence to be submitted on (underlined headings).
1. How effectively the model reflects claimants’ relative needs
1.1 We know that people in this group typically require intensive support due to the extent of the barriers to employment that they often face, including mental and physical health issues, problematic drug and alcohol use and housing. People who are homeless also frequently have poor skills and literacy and few or no qualifications.
People who are homeless must receive the intensive support that they often require to get into work
1.2 The Programme’s Not Working: Experiences of homeless people on the Work Programme found that 54 per cent of the homeless people who were surveyed had seen their advisor once a month or less since joining the Work Programme. This suggests that providers are not investing enough resource or time in helping our clients to find employment.
1.3 St Mungo’s believes that the changes need to be made to the Work Programme to ensure that providers are better incentivised to provide the intensive support that many of our clients need to enter employment. (see sections 1.2 and 1.3 below)
The barriers to employment faced by many homeless people on the Work Programme must be better identified
1.4 The DWP does not dictate how Work Programme providers assess the barriers that participants face to entering employment. Providers are free to determine their own diagnostic processes. However, our findings suggest that in many cases these processes are not working.
1.5 Providers are failing to ask participants about the issues that may be making it more difficult for them to find a job. Survey data in The Programme’s Not Working: Experiences of homeless people on the Work Programme reveals that 58 per cent of homeless people had not been talked to by their Work Programme adviser about their barriers to employment.
1.6 Many of the people we interviewed told us that even when they discuss the barriers they face, Work Programme advisers tended only to discuss work experience and qualifications. There was very little discussion about health, housing. alcohol and/or drug problems and confidence; issues which are more likely to affect people who are homeless.
1.7 Rory was homeless for several years before moving into a St Mungo’s hostel. He doesn’t have any job-specific skills but he wants to get a job in gardening. He has dyslexia, is dependent on alcohol and has low self-confidence. He told his adviser that he had a health condition, but didn’t feel able to tell them that he is dependent on alcohol. Rory has not had a discussion with his adviser about the barriers to employment that he faces. His action plan does not consider key issues that make it difficult for him to find employment. According to Rory, “The action plan does not consider the problems I have with addiction issues or offending and physical health issues.” Rory feels that his interaction with the Work Programme so far has been very unsupportive.
1.8 Recommendation: Work Programme providers, in partnership with the homelessness sector, should continually review the effectiveness of their diagnostic tools; the better they understand their customers’ barriers to work, the easier it will be to support them to find and secure employment.
1.9 St Mungo’s would welcome the opportunity to work with Government to develop diagnostic tools that could better identify barriers to employment faced by those most disadvantaged in the labour market.
2. The differential payments model including: the extent to which it is incentivising providers to help all participants and thereby addressing “creaming and parking”
People who are homeless must be identified as homeless by Jobcentre Plus
2.1 Homelessness is recognised within the Work Programme as a disadvantage that makes it harder for unemployed people to move into work. The programme therefore pays providers extra for getting homeless people on Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) into sustained work.
2.2 These extra payments are dependent on Jobcentre Plus recognising people who are homeless and placing them in the correct claimant group.
2.3 However, several homelessness service providers have observed that many people who are homeless - including a number of people who are actually sleeping rough - are not being identified as such by Jobcentre Plus when they are referred into the Work Programme. Many of the people interviewed also told us that they did not think Jobcentre Plus knew that they were homeless.
2.4 If people who are homeless are not being placed in the correct claimant group, then providers are not being paid to fund the more intensive support that is required for helping them into work.
2.5 If providers are not paid more for working with those who need more support then there is a heightened risk that they direct resources away them. The fact that 54 per cent of those surveyed for The Programme’s Not Working: Experiences of homeless people on the Work Programme have seen their Work Programme adviser once a month or less may be an indication that homeless people are being “parked”.
2.6 Recommendation: Benefits claims forms should ask people whether they are homeless, and/or live in supported accommodation, such as a hostel. When reviewing a benefit claim, Jobcentre Plus staff need to know whether a provided address is supported accommodation.
2.7 Recommendation: The DWP should introduce a quick review process for cases in which providers believe an individual has been referred in the wrong customer group. Claimants should be quickly reassessed by Jobcentre Plus and payments adjusted accordingly.
The payment structure must take individual needs into account
2.8 The Work Programme currently considers only benefit history and some relatively crude measures of disadvantage in the labour market; it does not directly consider many common barriers to employment, such as a lack of basic skills and qualifications, or physical or mental health problems that do not meet the threshold for the award of Employment and Support Allowance.
2.9 Recommendation: The assessment of how far someone is from the labour market that informs the differential payment decision should be based on robust assessments that take a number of factors, specifically focused on employability, into account. These factors could include physical and mental health issues, drug and alcohol use and a claimant’s housing situation.
2.10 This would encourage more individualised action planning, which would reflect the type of service each person needs, and the frequency they receive it. They must also ensure that participants are aware of minimum service offers and know where to address complaints to if these standards are not being met (see section four of our submission below).
3. The prime provider model including: its impact on subcontractors; and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs
Sub-contractors must be used to effectively provide specialist support to people
3.1 Much of the expertise in understanding and supporting people with vulnerabilities lies with sub-contractors, many of whom are charities. Recent research has found that sub-contractors across the Work Programme are not receiving as many referrals as they expected from prime contractors.2
3.2 Several organisations with expertise in helping homeless people into work became Work Programme providers in June 2011. In early 2012, St Mungo’s left the Work Programme after not receiving a single referral over nine months. Single Homeless Project (SHP) also withdrew, citing a lack of referrals.
3.3 A recent NCVO survey of charities on the Work Programme found that 47 per cent of respondents felt that their contacts were at risk of failure within the next six months and 26 per cent thought they were at risk of failure before the end of their contract.3 There is currently no specialist provider of employment support for people who are homeless available on the Work Programme in London.
3.4 As involvement in the Work Programme becomes financially unsustainable for charities, more may be forced to leave. This could mean that there is less effective support available for the most disadvantaged and those furthest from employment, as it is often people in this group that charities specialise in supporting. Very few of the people that we interviewed had been referred onto sub-contractors. Out of the few that had, almost all told us that they were disappointed with the support that they received.
Charities should not have to subsidise the work programme
3.5 Many specialist agencies outside the Work Programme continue to provide employment support to homeless people who are on the Work Programme. Although not providers in the Work Programme, specialist charities such as St Mungo’s continue to provide this support as it is plays a key role in homeless people’s recovery from homelessness.
3.6 We have an excellent track record of supporting homeless people into employment. In 2011-12 St Mungo’s supported 441 homeless people into formal and informal learning. St Mungo’s employment team helped 204 people into volunteering roles and 94 people into paid employment.
3.7 However, many of the homeless people we surveyed and talked with were receiving very little support from their Work Programme provider, and encouraged to carry on accessing support from St Mungo’s. The perverse consequence of this is that while charities continue to support homeless people into work, the Prime Contractor will ultimately be paid thousands of pounds for job outcomes they may have done very little to contribute towards.
2 National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 2012, The Work Programme: Perceptions and Experiences of the Voluntary Sector, http://www.ncvovol.org.uk/sites/default/files/sig_survey_june_2012_report_17.9.12.pdf 3 Ibid.
3.8 Recommendation: We recommend that the rules should be changed to ensure that Work Programme sub-contractors are able to plan their services better. The Merlin Standard is a tool developed by DWP to develop high performance, share best practice and ensure fairness in the supply chain.
3.9 The Merlin Standard should require Prime Contractors to give an indication of how many referrals an organisation can expect to receive when they first join the Work Programme, so that subcontractors can better plan their future delivery. Where actual referrals fall below these indicative volumes, providers should be required to give an explanation.
4. The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups including: whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP
Standards of service must improve for people who are homeless
4.1 A mixed picture emerged when we talked to people about the standards of service they have experienced on the Work Programme. Some told us that they felt they have been treated well, with respect and that it has been easy to access and talk to advisers.
4.2 Sensitivity was raised as an important quality for advisers to have. One participant who had a family bereavement told us how helpful his adviser had been by temporarily relaxing work search requirements and allowing him to move appointments so that he could be with his family.
4.3 But there are many more homeless people who do not feel that they have been treated well by providers and advisers, 58 per cent of homeless people surveyed for The Programme’s Not Working: Experiences of homeless people on the Work Programme did not feel they were treated with dignity and respect by their Work Programme provider. Many of the people that we spoke to felt they had been largely ignored by their providers.
4.4 St Mungo’s is currently running a separate employment programme with Jobcentre Plus to support people who are not eligible for the Work Programme. However, St Mungo’s have had to reject two thirds of applicants for this programme, because they were not eligible for the course as they were on the Work Programme. There seems to be much confusion amongst both people who are homeless and Jobcentre Plus in identifying who is actually on the Work programme.
4.5 Several people told us that they have to wait months between seeing Work Programme advisers, that advisers frequently cancel appointments and that they are often unavailable for long extended periods of time. In fact, 54 per cent of those surveyed forThe Programme’s Not Working: Experiences of homeless people on the Work Programme have seen their Work Programme adviser once a month or less.
4.6 A particular problem for many people who are homeless as it often reinforces feelings of low self-worth and trust which can stem from being repeatedly let down by services in the past. It also makes it more difficult for people to build structure into their lives, which is an important part of recovering from homelessness.
4.7 We have found instances where being referred to the Work Programme had meant that people are unable to attend existing employment related courses. People that we talked to had been told that while Jobcentre Plus would have paid for these courses, their Work Programme provider will not. As they were now on the Work Programme, Jobcentre Plus could no longer pay for them.
4.8 One of the worst examples of customer service that we found involved a young homeless man who has been given extremely misleading advice, which resulted in him losing all of his income, running up rent arrears and losing the opportunity to move from a hostel into his own independent accommodation.
4.9 Sam lives in a St Mungo’s hostel. When he told his Work Programme adviser that he wanted to work in construction, his adviser suggested that Sam become self- employed. He was assured that he could claim different benefits and led to believe that his income would not be affected. Sam followed this advice and signed-off JSA, which meant that his housing benefit was also stopped. He tried to claim benefits for those who had declared themselves self-employed, but was told by the Jobcentre that he was not eligible.
4.10 “They said I would get help and my benefits wouldn't get cut off, but that's not how it went - it put me in jeopardy for three or four weeks. My housing benefit was cut off, my JSA stopped....I was misguided." He was left with no income apart from a £51 one-off grant from the Work Programme provider. After several weeks Sam started to receive JSA again. Around this time he was planning to move-on into more independent accommodation but he had to abandon this move because he had no housing benefit to pay the rent. Because he had signed off JSA, Sam also became ineligible for Social Fund grants that would have helped him to furnish a new flat.
4.11 This experience has left Sam feeling deeply cynical about the Work Programme; "They get their commission for people coming off JSA. For them to manipulate my brain for me to come off it... it's sad for me. It stopped my move-on [from a hostel into independent accommodation]."
4.12 Recommendation: We recommend that Work Programme providers develop more specific minimum service offers which help people to understand what level of service they can expect.
5. The “black box” approach to service delivery including whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups
The work programme must start to deliver the personalised, specialist support that people who are homeless need to get into employment
5.1 Most of the people that we talked to and surveyed for The Programme’s Not Working: Experiences of homeless people on the Work Programme had received helpful support with their CV, searching for work and interview training. However, specialist support which addresses individual need is often not delivered. In fact, 64 per cent of those surveyed didn’t feel more optimistic about gaining employment after meeting with their Work Programme adviser; and only 22 per cent of those surveyed with drug and alcohol problems received helpful advice and support from their Work Programme provider in these areas.
5.2 Michael is a long-term rough sleeper who recently moved into supported accommodation. At an early Work Programme appointment he was told to send off at least twenty CVs per week, despite having very restricted access to a computer.
5.3 “I have worked with [the provider] for the past few months but they have done nothing to help me. I have sent a formal complaint to Jobcentre Plus about them but Jobcentre Plus lost it and nothing happened. I have had several new Work Programme advisers and I don’t feel they want to help me. They ask a lot of questions then don’t help. They make a lot of notes then nothing happens. I feel they are only interested in getting paid and consider their budget before trying to help people. I have asked them to help with me clothes for interview but they don’t want to help. I have asked them for help with my maths and English but they didn’t respond to this.
5.4 It has been a very patronising service. When I attended a mandatory computer course I was told off in front of the class and the tutor made me cry. I don’t expect to be treated this way. When I ask for help with applications none is provided. Business In The Community has done far more for me that the Work Programme could ever do.”
5.5 In many cases the Work Programme is failing to deliver specialist support. Instead providers are taking a standardised approach, without sufficient regard or response to individual need and barriers.
5.6 Recommendation: Specialist subcontractors that excel in providing innovative and personalised employment support should be enabled to play a greater role in the Work Programme. The Merlin Standard needs changed to ensure that this happens (see above recommendation in section 3).
7 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by Mencap
1. About Mencap and its employment service
1.1. We support the 1.5 million people with a learning disability in the UK and their families and carers. We fight to change laws and improve services and access to education, employment and leisure facilities, supporting thousands of people with a learning disability to live their lives the way they want. See www.mencap.org.uk for more information. We are also one of the largest providers of services, information and advice for people with a learning disability across England, Northern Ireland and Wales.
1.2. Mencap’s network of supported employment services has been in operation since the 1980s. It aims to give people with a learning disability equal opportunities to get and keep rewarding jobs that match their individual needs and preferences. The service works in a person centred way, drawing on the range of experiences, aspirations, skills, abilities and support needs of each individual, and working to ensure the involvement of the individual throughout the process.
1.3. Mencap’s employment staff may work with family members to address any concerns they have, and will also engage with employers in order to challenge prejudices and secure job opportunities for people with a learning disability. From experience, Mencap knows that with the right support and opportunities, people with a learning disability can succeed in the workplace and become highly valued employees.
2. Learning disability and the employment situation for this group
2.1. A learning disability is caused by the way the brain develops before, during or shortly after birth. It is always life-long and affects someone's intellectual and social development. It used to be called mental handicap but this term is outdated and offensive. Learning disability is NOT a mental illness. The term learning difficulty is often incorrectly used interchangeably with learning disability.
2.2. Less than 7% of people with a learning disability known to social services are in any form of paid employment1. Even where people do work, it is often for low pay and for part-time hours. However, research shows that 65% of people with a learning disability want to work and that with the right support they can – and do – make a significant contribution to the workplace.
2.3. People with a learning disability tell us about the importance of work to them. It is not just about the financial benefits that employment brings, it is also about the opportunity to become more independent and take greater control of their own lives, to expand their social relationships, to play a more active part in the wider community, and to develop confidence and self-esteem.
3. Mencap and the Work Programme
3.1. The Work Programme has been described as the “centrepiece of the Government’s plans to reform welfare-to-work provision in the UK”.2 Overall, across five years, the DWP’s estimation of how many people will enter the Work Programme has increased from 2.5 million to 3.3 million.3 It has been estimated that cost of delivery will total around £5 billion4. The Programme is aimed at supporting a wide range of individuals, including disabled people, contributing to “the Government’s key aims of fighting poverty, supporting the most vulnerable, and helping people break the cycle of benefit
1 Social Care and Mental Health indicators from the National Indicator Set – 2009-10 Provisional, August 12 2010: www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics- and-data-collections/social-care/adult-social-care-information 2 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/newsroom/press-releases/2011/jun-2011/dwp062-11.shtml 3 http://www.cesi.org.uk/keypolicy/dwp-raises-estimates-work-programme-starts-32 4 http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1012/hc17/1701/1701.pdf dependency.”5
3.2. Given the focus being placed on the Work Programme to support the Government’s reform of the welfare system, Mencap’s involvement in its delivery has been with the aim of ensuring our specialist knowledge and expertise is available to people with a learning disability coming through the system, and ultimately to support more people with a learning disability into paid employment.
3.3. Mencap has been involved in the delivery of end-to-end contracts as a subcontractor in six of the contract package areas. However, this has proved unsustainable for us. The financial model, combined with a low number of referrals in some areas, and the intensive support required by those individuals being referred to us, has led us to stop delivery on this basis. We are now working towards converting our contracts to a ‘call-off’ arrangement, which will allow us to provide specialist intervention services on a more ad-hoc basis.
4. Summary
4.1. Given the centrality of the Work Programme to the Government’s ‘welfare to work’ agenda, it is essential that it fully open to, and supportive of disabled people. However, Mencap is very concerned that this is not the case. The most recent referral and outcome figures published by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) suggest a programme that is supporting very few people into employment, and the situation for disabled people appears particularly worrying.
4.2. The low number of Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) referrals (just under 9%) to the Work Programme raises serious concerns about the support being offered to a group of disabled people who have been deemed to have “limited capability for work”, but for whom many will see conditions attached to receipt of their benefit (i.e. those in the work-related activity group (WRAG) of ESA). Of these referrals, 8.2% have actually attached to the Programme – a total of just 73,000 ESA claimants, out of 837,000 total attachments6.
4.3. In parallel, Work Choice, the specialist employment programme aimed at those “who face the most complex and long-term barriers to employment”, is limited to 115,000 placements over the lifetime of the five year contract. Additionally, Work Choice has also seen a low number of ESA (or Incapacity Benefit) referrals. Out of a total of 50,700 referrals, only 14% have been ESA (or Incapacity Benefit) claimants – a total of 7,150 claimants. Of these, 5420 have started on the programme.7
4.4. These numbers should be considered in the context of the total ESA caseload. The latest Government statistics show this figure to be 991,000 people, with 309,000 being found eligible for the work-related activity group (WRAG) of ESA8 - the group identified as needing additional help and support to move towards and into employment. Whilst the figures cannot be compared like-for-like (e.g. the data collection spans different time periods), in the absence of any robust analysis of the entire ‘welfare to work’ process for benefit claimants, the gap between the total number of ESA claimants (991,000) and total numbers accessing employment support through the two principal programmes (78,420) available to them, is significant and concerning, and merits detailed investigation and explanation.
4.5. Numbers of ESA claimants with a learning disability specifically are not collected, but this group is likely to fall under the DWP classification group “mental and behavioral disorders”. Of the 991,000 caseload, 426,000 claimants fall within this group. In contrast, 41,000 referrals to the Work
5 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/work-prog-prospectus-v2.pdf 6 As at 27 November 2012. See: http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=wp 7 See November 2012 data: http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/workingage/wchoice/wc_nov12.pdf 8 Based on DWP statistical data up to February 2012: http://83.244.183.180/100pc/esa/esa_phase/ib_mig/a_carate_r_esa_phase_c_ib_mig_feb12.html
Programme are identified as having a mental and behavioral disorder.9
4.6. The Government’s first set of official statistics on outcomes (27 November 2012) is also a concern for disabled people. Whilst the overall figure for job outcomes is around 3.5 per cent of those referred to the Programme (below the 5.5 per cent minimum target set by Government), for ESA claimants this figure drops to just 1.3 per cent.10 Further work is needed to fully understand what is happening in the supply chain, and the support being accessed by those furthest from the labour market.
4.7. An individual claimant’s experience of the ‘welfare to work’ system is about the entire journey from making an initial claim for benefit, all the way through to the employment support they receive and – hopefully – any job outcome. Currently, this end-to-end process is not being considered in its totality, with fragmented data collection by the DWP and information that does not look in detail at different disability groups. As a result, it is impossible to track a cohort of people through the system from beginning to end and therefore establish how it is working for different user groups.
5. Response
5.1. The differential payments model
5.2. A differential payment model, aimed at reducing the ‘parking’ of those ‘harder to help’ groups, is a welcome approach. However, there are a number of issues with the current model that are challenging the aim of the Work Programme to support a range of customer groups. Even with the potential for higher unit costs for those ‘harder to help’ groups, the bulk of payment comes only with a sustainable job outcome. With a minimal up front attachment fee, this is proving hugely financially challenging to a range of providers, and can set the clock ticking in relation to further payments for sustained employment (for example, if payments are not delivered beyond the Programme’s two years, and a job outcome took a significant amount of time to secure).
5.3. For prime providers, who are dealing with high volumes and a wide variety of customers – some of whom will be more job ready that others – this model is perhaps more manageable. For Mencap, due to the disability and/or enduring and complex health issues of those people we work with, this approach has simply not proved sustainable. The people Mencap tend to work with are those who need far more intensive support than other groups and may take far longer to progress into paid work – if they reach it at all. Essentially then, any programme that is structured around a sustained employment outcome to ensure a flow of income presents challenges for those who are furthest from the labour market.
5.4. The differential payments model does not recognise distance travelled for those who are furthest from the labour marker. Thus, while differences in payment groups may appear significant, this must be considered against the likelihood of lower outcome rates for the more ‘difficult’ groups. There is potential for the development of an assessment that better determines a person’s distance from the labour market, and therefore a more robust differential payment model.
5.5. Additionally, this model relies heavily on benefit types as a means for determining payment groups. Current issues with the assessment for ESA (the Work Capability Assessment) mean that this determination is not straight forward. With high numbers of people with significant disabilities failing the assessment and moving onto Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), it may not always be the case that those furthest from the labour market are ESA claimants and therefore subject to a higher payment. Indeed, Mencap’s employment services have noted that in some cases, there is little to distinguish
9 Based on the International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, published by the World Health Organisation 10 Based on 1 thousand job outcomes for ESA payment groups, out of 73,000 attachments: http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/work_programme/wp_release_nov12.pdf?x=1
ESA and JSA customers in terms of levels of support required, despite them being in different payment groups.
5.6. It is also significant to note the very low numbers of ESA claimants being referred to the Programme – fewer than 9% of all referrals. Initially, prime contractors were anticipating 30% of referrals to be ESA.11 The latest data published by the DWP show that 89% of the total number of referrals have been referred via only three of the nine payment groups, including JSA 18-24, JSA 25+ and JSA Early Access. As noted previously, Work Choice, running alongside the Work Programme has also seen a very low number of ESA referrals, with the majority of referrals to this programme also being JSA claimants.
5.7. Total job outcomes for the Work Programme to date are 31,000 (June 2011 – July 2012). Only 1000 of these are job outcomes for ESA payment groups, with 96.3% being for participants in a JSA payment group. Whilst it is possible that some of these may be disabled JSA participants, the data collection does not provide this level of detail.12
5.8. There remains confusion about the relationship between Work Choice and the Work Programme, with a lack of clarity around the ‘gate-keeping’ process – how does a DEA decides to refer someone to the Work Programme rather than Work Choice? Is there consistency in approach? Some providers for Work Choice have suggested that difficulty in getting referrals through has been as a result of claimants being referred to the Work Programme.
5.9. Additionally, it is confusing to comprehend why a Work Programme prime provider can potentially receive up to £13,000 for supporting someone in the highest payment group into a job, whilst those providing specialist support for those with the most severe disabilities through Work Choice receive around £3000 for the same outcome.
6. The prime provider model
6.1. The prime provider model means that subcontractors are reliant on their prime contractor for referrals and information. In some cases, there have been issues with transparency in relation to volumes of claimants, and a fewer number of referrals in some areas have meant that these have not flowed down the supply chain, and have limited numbers.
6.2. As noted previously, referrals to Mencap through the Work Programme have tended to be claimants with very complex needs - including claimants with serious illnesses, and awaiting invasive medial interventions. In these cases, there are significant challenges for claimants to engage with the Programme, despite being at risk of losing their benefit if they do not. Yet, once someone is on the Programme it is not a straightforward process in getting him or her off it and reassessed – even if their condition worsens.
6.3. As a subcontractor, Mencap has found that in some cases we have been provided with limited information about the referral to ensure a good diagnostic assessment is achieved. This can lead to access and safety issues when members of staff are arranging to meet with customers, as they have limited knowledge about them.
6.4. In relation to participants receiving the services that meet their needs, it is also worth noting the inflexibility of the Work Programme’s focus on job outcomes of 16 hours or more (as is also the case for Work Choice). Whilst Mencap absolutely support the ambition to support people with a learning disability into work of 16 hours or more, we also believe that this may not be a realistic ambition for
11 http://www.ersa.org.uk/downloads/ERSA_Job_Start_data-PFw5hB.doc 12 http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/work_programme/wp_release_nov12.pdf?x=1
everyone. It is essential to acknowledge the spectrum and range of people we are talking about within this group. For some, it may never be likely. For others, it may be necessary to build up their hours over time. In addition, it may also be the case that an employer is only willing to "try out" someone with a learning disability for a few hours a week. Again, there is potential for providers to cherry pick those with lower level need or risk those with more complex support needs disproportionately eating into the budget.
8. The “black box” approach to service delivery
8.1. The “black box” approach is intended to allow providers to be flexible in their approach, providing personalised support to claimants, which can meet their specific needs. This is right in principle, given the range of customers coming through the Programme, but this has to be balanced with a means of providing some level of expectation about what people can expect from the programme.
8.2. A flexible approach might include Primes buying in specialist support through sub-contractors, but there are parameters for such organisations within the financial model, as well as through specified terms passed down from Primes to subcontractors - particularly around process and monitoring. As Mencap has noted previously, if the funding is not there, there is a real danger that quality of provision will be jeopardized and that the "innovation" associated with the "black box" approach to the Work Programme will be lost.
8.3. We believe there is potential for linkage with other related funding streams – for example, skills funding to support claimants who may be struggling with basic literacy / numeracy skills.
7 December 2012
Single HomelessSingle Homeless Project (SHP)
I. SHP is a London-based charity set up 35 years ago to support people who are homeless or at risk of homelessness. Today the charity works with 6,000 people a year across 16 London boroughs, providing a wide range of accommodation and community-based support services to prevent homelessness and promote social inclusion. For more about SHP visit http://www.shp.org.uk
II. Summary
a. SHP has direct experience of the Work Programme as an end-to-end sub- contractor. We were commissioned to provide employment support to homeless people. In our experience this client group needed intensive support to deal with significant barriers to employment including homelessness, mental ill-health and substance misuse. We withdrew from the contract after nine months because the payment structure was not designed to meet the costs of providing support to this group.
b. Our experience suggests that the current Work Programme provision for homeless people and others with complex needs is inadequate and cannot achieve the professed aim of supporting those furthest away from work.
c. We have also listened to the experience our clients have had of the Work Programme, and their experience (documented in a number of case studies) endorses our view that it does not meet their needs and, in some cases, makes their lives a great deal more difficult.
III. SHP’s involvement in the Work Programme
a. SHP was selected by Seetec as a specialist sub-contractor working with claimants who were homeless or at risk of homelessness in East and South- East London. We became involved for a number of reasons:
1. We thought the Work Programme was a good idea in principle. Work can lift people out of poverty, provide structure, independence and a sense of achievement to people’s lives.
2. We had experience of providing employment services for homeless and socially excluded people
3. We wanted to use that experience to support people referred to the Work Programme
b. We worked on the contract from June 2011 until the end of March 2012. We have the following comments to make:
1. The differential payments model including: the extent to which it is incentivising providers to help all participants and thereby addressing “creaming and parking”; how effectively the model reflects claimants’ relative needs; and variations in job outcomes between the different payment groups;
c. The WP wasn’t designed to accommodate clients who need more extensive support to be job-ready despite that being one of the professed aims of the programme.
d. People who have experienced homelessness can have complex problems and often need long-term support before they are even in a position to contemplate returning to work. Many of people referred to us had been out of work for at least five years and many of them had far more pressing problems than finding a job – for example being homeless, sleeping rough, struggling with mental ill-health or substance misuse. For us the priority had to be to help people with these problems, and ironically although we were there to get people in to work, this was of secondary importance to the more basic needs with which people presented. The payment structure militates against an investment in clients with these types of need – the only outcome that’s rewarded is a job outcome.
e. Whilst we have no evidence, our experience suggests that ‘parking’ clients with the kinds of needs with which we worked must happen as a matter of course. Contracts are really only financially viable if staff work with a minimum ratio of 1:200 referrals, with a good proportion of those already being job ready. SHP worked with a ratio of one member of staff to 30 referrals as this was the only way we could meet the needs of the people referred to us.
f. There needs to be flexibility and resources built in to the Work Programme which is based on the reality that some groups are going to struggle to comply if they have no where stable to live and are not linked in to appropriate support services. Adequate resources need to be available to help people deal with the barriers that stop them from looking for work, rather than punishing them with benefit sanctions.
1. The prime provider model including: its impact on subcontractors; and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs;
g. SHP was the only sub-contractor specifically working with homeless referrals in London. Despite our unique position and our expertise and experience of the needs of homeless people, referrals from Job Centre Plus were made on a random basis to each of the three primes operating in east London. So homeless people were routinely referred to the other two primes on the basis of an allocation process which focused on the need to be fair to the primes, not to meet the needs of the participants.
1. The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups including: whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP; and the rigour and effectiveness of DWP’s monitoring and complaints procedures;
h. The fact that the payment groups are purely based on which benefit the client is on, means that many individuals with multiple needs are actually in the lowest payment band which doesn’t make them any more attractive to work with. The vast majority of our clients were on JSA despite having high needs around housing, mental health, substance use etc.
1. The “black box” approach to service delivery including: whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups; and DWP’s role in monitoring this
i. The black box approach is designed to give the providers, who are deemed to be the “experts”, the freedom to do what they want as long as they achieve the outcomes set. In reality this often means that it gives providers the freedom to do very little with those people who need the highest levels of support as the most effective way to achieve the employment targets is always going to be to focus on those clients closest to the labour market.
IV. Why did we decide to leave the WP?
a. The WP didn’t provide the resources to enable us to support people properly. It works on the basis pretty much that one size fits all. By taking the approach of allocating resources evenly regardless of need, inevitably the most vulnerable will lose out and potentially get lost in the system.
b. The resources were insufficient to provide the kind of support that at least half of our clients needed. Frankly we were surprised that some of the referrals were even on JSA given the complexity of their needs and their limited ability to meet the expectations of the programme
c. The current WP structure left those in need of the most support at greatest risk of sanctions. We don’t believe those sanctions served a constructive purpose for the client. Rather it forced them further in to poverty with little option other than to beg, steal or work for cash in hand in order to find the means to survive
V. Can the work programme really help homeless people?
a. Potentially yes, as long as the right support is in place and they are not viewed by employment services as “too hard to help”.
VI. What needs to change for homeless people?
a. Acknowledge that some people will find it harder to engage: some people are such a distance from the job market that a (theoretically) intensive two year programme is virtually impossible for them to engage in unless barriers such as homelessness are addressed.
b. Have a more flexible approach to outcomes: for some clients the reliance on hard outcomes (jobs of 16hrs pw) overlooks the distance travelled and fails to acknowledge that services can have a genuine impact in moving people along the path to work without actually getting them there; and the agencies working with them (prime or sub) receive nothing for that
c. Avoid sanctioning disadvantaged clients: we've seen aggressive sanctioning of vulnerable people. For ESA clients acknowledged to be vulnerable, there is a duty to carry out further engagement work prior to raising a compliance doubt. We recommend that this is extended to JSA Disadvantaged clients – in keeping with personalisation and segmentation.
VII. SHP’s clients’ experience of the Work Programme
a. SHP provides support services across London to people who are homeless or at risk of homelessness. We have attached a number of case studies based on the experience of some of our clients who have been referred to the Work Programme.
Client A
Client A has diagnosed learning difficulties and been referred to SHP by his local authority learning disabilities team. Client A has been receiving ESA and is on a work-related activity group. He has been attached to an East London Prime WP provider for over a year.
Client A had WCA in September and subsequently his ESA benefits have stopped. Client A, with the support of SHP, appealed the decision and his now waiting for the appeal decision.
Client A used to work as a cleaner and catering assistant from 2000-2010. Some of these jobs were paid and some were work placements; vacancies were found for him by a local specialist LD support project.
His WP advisor is trying to be helpful, however he lacks understanding of Client A’s learning needs. Client A has been offered a couple of vacancies, however they were either part-time or 50 hours a week and he was unable to fulfil application requirements. Client A was also supported to update his CV, though we have updated it further at SHP.
Client A feels anxious regarding the WP rules and new Welfare to Work system. When SHP staff called the Advisor to query a vacancy he was asked to apply for and was scared not to apply for as he might be sanctioned, the Advisor was very angry and asked the client why SHP staff was phoning her although the staff member had explained the connection to SHP and the client’s support needs. At the time Client A was not receiving benefits for four weeks and did not understand that his ESA been stopped, so he thought he was sanctioned.
Client A has been referred to a LD specialist by SHP, a non-Work Programme LD project, which offers him specialist support and ‘on-the-job training’ opportunities. (The organisation he has been referred to also has a large WP contract and is a sub-contractor with a different prime WP Contractor).
Currently SHP and the LD specialist are providing support the client was supposed to get from WP:
• Client A attends SHP ETE drop-ins for help using his email address and for help in sending his CV and job applications. • Client A was referred to literacy course in an adult learning programme. • Client A attends employability workshops and SHP’s Fuchsia programme for help with all aspects of Job application process. • Client A attended an accredited word processing course at SHP.
Client B
Client B is 48 years old; he is on JSA and suffers with depression. His life can become chaotic at times due to relationships he is involved with.
Client B been with a West London WP prime provider for over a year and has been looking for warehouse and retail work or support starting his own business.
Client B has worked in a variety of jobs, such as school cleaning and ground maintenance, stock control for a large charity and as a catalogue agent. His last job ended in 2010.
Since being with the Work Programme he has been sanctioned twice. The first one was for failure to evidence his job search which he was doing at SHP ETE drop-ins. WP providers would not accept the ‘business start-up preparation and training’ that Client B was engaged in at this time unless he could start his own business within six weeks. Job Centre Plus also did not accept this as a viable career.
The second sanction was due to Client B becoming depressed and not attending WP on some of the days he was required to attend. Client B knew that failure to attend would result in sanctioning, however he felt depressed and was not coping well with commitments. He was frustrated due to lack of money as the first sanction got him into debt and was physically attacked and robbed not long before that. Although the sanction seems justified, SHP staff feel that clients with mental health needs need a bit more understanding around their ability to cope on certain days.
Client B attends SHP ETE drop-ins on a weekly basis; he has also completed the Fuchsia (life skills) programme and GOALS training. He also volunteered at Whitecross Street Party last July.
In the ETE drop-ins SHP staff have supported the client with: • Applying and securing funding to start his business selling comics. • Writing his CV and cover letters through one-to-one support. • Emailing employers for his job search. • Coaching for job interviews through one-to-one support. • Securing a paid job—full-time temporary job which may extend after Christmas.
Client B’s SHP support worker supported client with: • Attending the job centre with him to explain his support needs. • Inviting WP advisor to our ETE drop-ins, so that they have better understanding of SHP’s work and client’s training. • Working with Job Centre Plus, so SHP can help client evidence job search.
Client C
Client C has been diagnosed with depression and anxiety and subsequently is prescribed with anti-depressant tablets.
Client C has over 10 years of photography experience as well as experience in retail on a volunteer basis with Oxfam and experience driving a community bus for the elderly.
The client was transferred to the Work Programme in Summer 2012 following a failed medical assessment. Client C reports that he attended weekly, but felt the advisors at the WP were merely following a tick box exercise and did not take note of his past or current experience to aid him in locating a job. The client states “the advisors were invasive and just wanted to see me to fulfil the requirement, not help me get a job.” Despite being advised of Client C’s past experience, the WP failed to locate any training or job opportunities for the client. The client reported that his anxiety levels were increased in the lead up to attending the WP appointments and after.
With SHP staff, Client C appeared confused and stated his job search skills and training needs were not being met and has advised that he has received more help from the SHP staff in a very short space of time than in his WP appointments.
Client C has attended the SHP’s ETE drop-ins consistently, which have helped him with:
• Claiming the appropriate benefits. Client C is currently claiming ESA. • Assisting to locate a local driving training course to obtain a PVC licence for free which would enable Client C to find paid work in driving with a recognised qualification. • Assisting to obtain paid contract work with the Paralympics 2012.
Client C continues to receive support to source jobs and complete job applications. He has booked to attend SHP GOALS training and attends ETE drop-in weekly. He wants a paid job, but needs specialist mental health ETE support as on some days he is very confused and anxious.
Client D
Client D was on the Work Programme although he has now made a long overdue claim for ESA. He has mild learning disabilities and suffers with anxiety.
Client D was compelled to attend numerous sessions and courses which weren’t suitable for him during his participation in the WP, for example computer classes which he was unable to follow and staff said they didn’t have time to give him the support he needed. His abilities didn’t seem to be taken into account, for example courses he attended were for office jobs whereas his learning difficulties, IT illiteracy and problems reading and writing, meant had difficulties in those courses.
The requirements of the WP and particularly the compulsion to attend a number of sessions during the week and the threat of sanctions if he misses any caused a great deal of stress for Client D, compounding his anxiety and its physical symptoms. The requirements also prevented Client D from attending more therapeutic activities or better suited work readiness programmes run by SHP and other partners.
Despite leaving the work programme Client D recently took up a work experience placement, organised by the Job Centre, in the post room at Southwark Council’s Tooley Street office. This will provide Client D with something to put on his CV, but it is clear it will not lead to a paid position.
Client E
Client E is a 39-year-old woman who has been diagnosed with Anxiety Disorder, Depression, Paranoia and a Personality Disorder. She has not worked for many years.
Client E is supported by a psychiatrist and a mental health nurse at CMHT. She also attends Studio Upstairs, a long-term art therapy group, one day a week.
She has recently been assessed as needing more intensive support and is currently being supported to apply to attend the Studio Upstairs two days a week and is also going to begin intensive CBT immediately after Christmas, with a view to accessing long-term group therapy to address the difficulties she experiences due to her Personality Disorder.
Client E was migrated from IB to ESA and was asked to attend A4e’s offices in Stratford as part of the Work-Related Activity Group. She was unable to attend due to her difficulties, so when she received the appointment SHP staff called A4E and the Job Centre to arrange that all her appointments would be conducted on the phone.
A4e did this for the first appointment. Last week she received a text notifying her of another appointment last Friday at 4:20 pm. Client E called A4e on SHP staff’s recommendation to check that this would be done on the phone. She was informed that this would be the case and Client E waited for the call at 4:20. She was not called, but instead received a letter on Saturday to say that she had been sanctioned and her ESA had stopped.
SHP staff are still dealing with this matter and have no more information about what will happen next at this time.
7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by Community Links
Summary
1.1 Differential payments should be designed around the needs of customers, not the type of benefit they are on.
1.2 Modifying the differential payments model would, in our view, ensure all customers received high quality support tailored to their individual needs.
1.3 As the differential model stands, it is inevitable that certain customers will not be properly supported as providers are not adequately resourced.
1.4 Sophisticated supply chains that reflect the needs of customers in the local communities of contract package areas will endure more customer needs are met, and therefore produce a higher quality of service.
1.5 A benchmark of high quality support should be set by government the minimum service standards should be better enforced.
1.6 An enquiry of customer experience of employment support cannot look at the Work Programme in isolation; it must include Jobcentre Plus delivery and the Work Capability Assessment – the entire customer experience.
2. About Community Links
2.1 Community Links has been established as a local charity working with 30,000 people each year since 1977. We deliver a wide range of children’s, youth and adult projects, which include employment support.
2.2 Based in Newham, the east London borough with one of the highest rates of long-term unemployment in the country, we delivered the New Deal for 18-24yrs from 1999 and became the most successful prime contractor in London and the South East for over four years. Since July 2011 we have been delivering the Work Programme as a subcontractor to the Careers Development Group (CDG). The majority of our clients have complex needs and require intensive support to help them into employment and remain there. We deliver the ESF Families programme as a subcontractor for Reed in Partnership and the DWP Innovation Fund. We also deliver a range of GLA and Local Authority employment support programmes targeting a wide range of needs.
2.3 Through our existing programmes we have identified a need for highly targeted and specialist, tailored support to tackle, multiple and complex problems that
prevent people from engaging with school, training or employment. We specialise in locally designed, personalised one to one interventions. Not all unemployed people need such interventions and therefore we design services based on the level of need identified, not targeted at a number of specific groups of people or benefit types.
3. Policy Responses
3.1 The differential payments model including: the extent to which it is incentivising providers to help all participants and thereby addressing "creaming and parking"; how effectively the model reflects claimants' relative needs; and variations in job outcomes between the different payment groups
3.1.1 The department’s intension behind the design of the differential payments model for the Work Programme should be recognised as a positive attempt at preventing providers from simply creaming the easier to help clients, and parking the clients who are further from the labour market.
3.1.2 Community Links participated in a number of discussions with potential prime contracts and other specialist third sector providers in early 2010, as the Work Programme was being designed. At the time there was agreement amongst all organisations that in principle, differential pricing was a positive and necessary design feature. However there was concern expressed by many organisations over a set price for a cohort of people as opposed to something close to the concept of personalised budgets.
3.1.3 However as we continue to deliver the Work Programme it is increasingly apparent that the differential payments model, which in its current state, is designed around benefit type rather than the needs of customers. This means that payments providers receive in both the initial attachment fee and in the outcome fees do not necessarily reflect the level of intensive support required to support all customers coming onto the Work Programme.
3.1.4 As it stands, the current differential payment model incentivises creaming and parking within the JSA groups as a result of the point above.
3.1.5 Therefore the differential payments model should be designed around the level of need customers have when they come onto the Work Programme, rather than the type of benefit they are allocated.
3.1.6 It is however at times appropriate to "park" customers as hard outcomes like maintaining full time employment may not be the best option for a customer of particular circumstances, at least at the earlier stage of their journey into employment.
3.1.7 The emphasis should be on ensuring that the parking is meaningful to the individual, that they still receive substantial support to overcome particular barriers they face, such as addiction, homelessness etc.
3.1.8 Softer outcomes that recognise the distance travelled towards employment should be built into the design of the payment by results model in order to incentivise providers to support all customers to move into, or closer to the labour market.
3.2 The prime provider model including: its impact on subcontractors; and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs
3.2.1 The introduction of a Prime – Sub contractor model on the Work Programme has significantly altered the industry, bringing in new providers and seeing others leave this programme. 3.2.2 Each Contract Package Area is much larger than has been seen under previous programmes. A proportion of organisations that successfully bid as a prime contactor may of had no previous history of delivering in that geographic area.
3.2.3 Therefore the local knowledge and local track record of their supply chain is of most importance to ensuring they deliver a high quality service that meets all customer needs.
3.2.4 The more sophisticated the prime contractor’s knowledge of their customer needs is, the more accurately they will be able to develop their supply chain. As customer needs are not being properly identified until they are placed with the prime contracts, and in some cases with the subcontractor, prime contracts may need to modify their supply chain throughout the life of the contract, especially in relation to the second tier specialist providers.
3.2.5 At Community Links we talk about the real, perceived and hidden barriers and needs of our customers. All of these are of equal importance and need to be addressed in a package of support. What may appear a real barrier to a customer may in fact be a perceived barrier, and if we preserver it may transpire that there is a very serious hidden barrier to work, such as addiction, depression from recent family breakdown etc underneath the surface.
3.2.6 Therefore we recommend that much more of an emphasis is placed on the early detection of customer’s needs and barriers to employment. Ideally this would occur at Jobcentre Plus and allow for each prime to refer customers to the most appropriate organisation within their supply chain.
3.2.7 In terms of the impact the prime model has had on subcontractors, Community Links is well placed to answer this. Until the Work Programme we were a prime contractor for the New Deal for under 25’s in east London. We wished to go in as a prime contractor for the Work Programme, however we were unable to as we didn’t have the cash flow that was necessary.
3.2.8 However we do feel we have benefited from having a large prime contractor with a greater financial capacity to invest in our service delivery.
3.2.9 Prime providers can add more capacity to subcontracting organisations, for example more sophisticated case management systems, employer engagement support and good practice sharing.
3.2.10 When it works well, primes can bring together diverse supply chains to ensure tailored services are delivered.
3.2.11 Additionally, primes taking a non prescriptive approach and allowing subcontractors to play to their strengths has long term benefits for performance and quality of customer service. The relationship with our prime contractor ensures that we can use our own service delivery model, which has an excellent track record as the leading provider in London and the south East under the New Deal. I.e. primes passing on the benefits of a ‘black box service delivery model’ to subcontractors is a positive thing.
3.2.12 However, the model can cause issues around access to Jobcentre Plus and DWP, particularly when addressing customer benefit issues and resolving longer term problems around the programme. For example planning issues around unpredictable referrals and uncertainty in relation to longer term projections of flows.
3.2.13 We would call for the committee to request DWP to ensure there is more clarity around the level and use of management fees applied by primes.
3.3 The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups including: whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP; and the rigour and effectiveness of DWP's monitoring and complaints procedures.
3.3.1 It is hard to comment on variations on quality of service between different payment groups as we have seen very few Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) customers come through to the Work Programme.
3.3.2 However, due to the existing differential payments model we believe there is variation in the level of high quality support all customers receive as some
may require much more intensive support that the current payment model does not allow for.
3.3.3 This could be improved by a modification to the differential payments model or improvements in the diagnostic assessments, including the Work Capability Assessment to ensure people are placed in the right benefit group and therefore providers receive sufficient resource to support them adequately.
3.3.4 The minimum service standards vary across the industry as they were put forward by each prime provider. From our experience they are clear and well communicated down the supply chain.
3.3.5 We are not as convinced that these standards are being adequately enforced by DWP. Equally we do not believe the minimum service standards set out by Jobcentre Plus are adequately enforced.
3.3.6 We recognise there is a balance to be achieved between ensuring a standard of quality within the industry is set and enforced, and to retain the non prescriptive approach the black box brings.
3.3.7 However we recommend there could be positive modifications made to the existing Minimum Service Standards, particularly in terms of the relationships that are at the heart of all employment support services. We have developed our own set of ‘Deep Value1’ Minimum Service Standards that we are testing out amongst the industry.
3.3.8 We would argue that the quality of service, in relation to the relationship between staff and customer, should be of a similar level within the sector – including Jobcentre Plus.
3.3.9 From our experience the monitoring procedures are adequately in place and complaints procedures appear to be robust, however as a subcontractor it is hard for us to assess the effectiveness at this stage.
3.4 The "black box" approach to service delivery including: whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups; and DWP's role in monitoring this.
3.4.1 The "black box" model in theory fosters innovative delivery by removing prescriptive elements and encouraging providers to utilise best practice drawn from past delivery experience
3.4.2 However, the impact of "black box" is limited by funding constraints.
1 See framework in index
3.4.3 For smaller subcontracting organisations, the payment by results model (very commonly passed down from prime to subcontractor) can cause significant cash flow issues, which ultimately can impact on delivery and an organisations ability to really tailor and individualise services, or allow room for innovation to develop.
3.5 Regional variations in job outcome statistics: including whether competition between providers is driving up performance in contract package areas where the economy is particularly depressed; and how provider performance could be improved in these areas.
3.5.1 It is difficult to assess this at a subcontractor level. Limitations around data sharing and comparisons between different supply chains in the same CPA hinder comparisons.
7 December 2012
Index
Community Links Deep Value Minimum Service Standards
A framework for measuring how well advisers establish and maintain effective relationships with customers.
We have looked at the practical skills that frontline staff need in order to establish and maintain effective relationships. The idea is to be able to observe staff and see how well they do across the areas set out below. The purpose is to have a better idea of performance, to identify any training needs and to capture where people are doing things particularly well so we can share this good practice.
The following is drafted with employment support programmes in mind and so refer in places to action plans and unemployment. The background to this is the definition of effective relationships which we produced out of the Deep Value work (http://www.community-links.org/uploads/documents/Deep_Value.pdf . In that work, we found that core elements of an effective relationship are:
• Understanding – the service provider seeks to understand the needs and circumstances (economic, personal, emotional, cultural) of the person using services and treats people with dignity and respect demonstrating that they are ‘on their side.’ In return people using services acknowledge the pressures on service providers and their need to make judgements about good use of public funds.
• Collaboration – there is trust, founded in part on demonstrable competence of the professional, both sides have confidence in each other, both are honest and achieve a position where agenda setting and decision making are shared.
• Commitment – where both sides demonstrate dynamism and take responsibility, for example by being well prepared for meetings / appointments.
• Communication – where the service provider listens and opens new lines of questioning to draw out relevant deeper issues.
• Empowerment – where relevant, an aim of public services should be to support people to learn and develop positive behaviours so as to cope differently with issues in the future. This may involve challenge and confrontation but if the other elements of effective relationships are in place, the result can be powerful for the individual and cost effective for the public purse.
• Time – having the time is important, but this is not open-ended. With the right skills and systems in place people can quickly put these elements of effective relationships in place.
The competency areas are as follows:
1 Communicating with customers
Insufficient Needs Further Competent Excellent Evidence Development
From the Develops a Explores the Incorporates the available working customer’s skills customer’s evidence, the relationship with and interests. perspective and Advisor’s the customer, but context e.g. in performance focuses on Draws out discussions or in cannot be placed problems rather emotional and negotiating action on a higher point than the person. social information plans. of this to place the developmental customer in scale. context. Produces a Works in Whenever standard action partnership with the possible, adopts a plan but does not customer, plan that enables take into account negotiating a the customer to the customer’s mutually agreed make the right own action plan. decisions circumstances. themselves.
Skilfully uses constructive challenge to achieve better outcomes.
Provides Provides Uses a variety of explanations that explanations in communication the customer finds language that the techniques and it difficult to customer materials to adapt understand. understands, and explanations to checks this the needs of the understanding. customer.
2 Gathering and interpreting information
Insufficient Needs Further Competent Excellent Evidence Development
From the Obtains Uses open Proficiently available information from questions to draw identifies the evidence, the the customer that out relevant deeper nature and scope Advisor’s describes their issues. of issues needing performance circumstances. to be addressed. cannot be placed Identifies and on a higher point follows up the of this implications of the developmental Uses interview and information scale. conversation gathered. techniques that are appropriate.
3 Understanding and responding to people’s circumstances and context
Insufficient Needs Further Competent Excellent Evidence Development
From the Enquires into both Demonstrates an Uses an available physical and understanding of understanding of evidence, the emotional aspects the customer in emotional, socio- Advisor’s of the customer’s relation to their economic and performance circumstances. emotional, socio- cultural cannot be placed economic and background to on a higher point cultural inform discussion of this background. and to generate developmental Recognises the practical scale. impact of Additionally, suggestions. unemployment on recognises the the customer. impact of unemployment on the customer’s wider relationships e.g. with family.
4 Managing the customer journey
Insufficient Needs Further Competent Excellent Evidence Development
From the Oversees Monitors progress Uses available implementation of and identifies discretionary evidence, the the action plan in a early any issues judgement in Advisor’s rigid way. which may grow relevant performance to have an situations. cannot be negative impact placed on a on securing a higher point of good outcome this developmental Agrees changes scale. to action plans in the light of additional information.
Thinks flexibly around issues, generating workable solutions.
Maintains a positive Consistently Encourages the attitude to the encourages the customer to customer’s customer. participate in progress. appropriate wider strategies such as healthy lifestyle.
Appropriately uses skills such as constructive challenge to achieve better customer outcomes.
Uses him / herself Makes Checks the as the sole means connections with effectiveness of of supporting the additional other support customer. appropriate services accessed support agencies by the customer. that can help address the Identifies and needs of the encourages the customer. development of new resources Ensures the where these are customer needed. accesses the appropriate support available.
Responds to Appropriately and Ensures that unforeseen rapidly follows-up support is co- developments in the customers who ordinated within customer’s life that have experienced the Work may need an unforeseen Programme team. addressing. development.
Written evidence submitted by London Voluntary Service Council
Summary
LVSC represents the voluntary and community sector in London.
This submission is based on: • an analysis of the Work Programme performance data for London, focusing on outcomes for groups who often disadvantaged in the labour market, and on any differential in outcomes for London versus the rest of the UK; • a survey of VCS Work Programme subcontractors in London, conducted in November 2012; and • wider evidence gathering from VCS organisations who delivery employment support but who are note
The key findings and recommendations in this submission are: • Evidence From the first year of delivery in London suggests that the Work Programme is struggling to meet the needs of more disadvantaged customers. • The number of VCS Work Programme subcontractors playing a meaningful role in the Work Programme is still very low. Most VCS subcontractors have received far fewer referrals than expected, many have received none at all. • The Work Programme’s differential payment system must be altered to take into account a range of factors relating to labour market disadvantage. • The payment by results model must be altered to recognise milestones on the journey to work for harder to help customers • Good practice in prime-subcontractor relationships exists in a few cases – it must be identified, highlighted, and promoted. • Greater supply chain transparency would benefit programme performance. Primes should be encouraged to report to their supply chain on their own performance and that of their subcontractors, for example. • The government and Work Programme providers need to work with employers to lift wages and improve working conditions. Pushing Work Programme customers into jobs which pay poverty wages is not good enough.
1. Introduction
About LVSC
1. London Voluntary Service Council (LVSC) provides a strategic and independent voice for London’s voluntary and community sector (VCS). We support London's voluntary and community organisations to improve the lives of Londoners.
2. Since 2010 LVSC has convened a network of VCS employment and skills providers, called the London Employment and Skills Policy Network. Over 200 organisations are now members of that network, from very small community groups, to large national charities.
3. For further information about the evidence and findings in this paper, please contact: Steve Kerr, Policy Officer – Employment and Skills, LVSC, phone 0207 832 5811, [email protected].
2. Work Programme performance in London
Overall Performance
4. The table below shows referrals, job outcomes, and performance (job outcomes as a percentage of referrals) for each contract and contract package area (CPA) in London.
Work Programme performance in London Job Referrals Outcomes Performance Ingeus (West London) 19,160 910 4.7% Maximus (West London) 18,830 760 4.0% Reed in Partnership (West London) 18,870 690 3.7% Careers Development Group (East London) 26,630 910 3.4% A4E (East London) 26,690 860 3.2% Seetec (East London) 26,550 680 2.6% West London Contract Package Area 56,860 2,360 4.2% East London Contract Package Area 79,870 2,450 3.1% London Total 136,730 4,810 3.5%
5. Performance of the programme has nevertheless fallen far below expectations. Just 4810 Work Programme customers were successfully sustained in work in London in the period to July 2012. This represents 3.5% of total referrals.
6. There was a wide spread of performance between the prime contractors, with Ingeus achieving a performance rate of 4.7% (910 job outcomes), and Seetec just 2.6% (680 job outcomes).
7. West London had had significantly fewer referrals than East London (57,000 versus 80,000) and is achieved a significantly better rate of job outcomes than East (4.2% versus 3.1%).
Work Programme performance in London by payment group
8. The bar chart below shows that for the JSA 25+ payment group, Work Programme performance was higher in London (3.9%) than in the rest of the UK (3.3%). For every other payment group, job outcomes in London were lower than in the rest of the UK.
9.
10. In the ex-Incapacity Benefit payment groups, there have been no job outcomes in London at all, in contrast with the rest of the UK. This is despite the fact that Work Programme providers receive much higher payments for placing these customers in work, than for other payment groups.
11. In both London and in the rest of the UK job outcomes are highest in the JSA Early Entrants payment group. Work Programme providers receive a higher payment for placing these customers in work, than for other JSA payment groups.
12. The evidence is mixed, therefore, on whether the Work Programme’s ‘differential pricing’ mechanism is succeeding in incentivising providers to
support harder to help customers, by offering higher outcome payments.
13. There is a clear pattern, however, of the harder to help payment groups achieving lower job outcomes (in some cases, no job outcomes) in London, as compared with the rest of the UK. This is a concern for many London VCS organisations, who specialise in working with clients facing significant barriers to work.
Work Programme performance in London by ethnicity and age
14. The cohort of Work Programme customers in London is far more ethnically diverse than in the rest of the UK. In London, BAME Work Programme customers outnumber White Work Programme customers, and one third of Work Programme customers are Black or Black British. In the rest of the UK, nearly 90% of Work Programme customers are White.
15. Work Programme performance is fairly consistent across all ethnic groups, both in London and in the rest of the UK, as shown in the bar graph below.
16.
17. Work Programme customers in London tend to be older than in the rest of the UK. A significantly smaller proportion of Work Programme customers in London are in the 18-24 years age group (19%), as compared to the rest of the UK (31%). There are also proportionately more 50+ Work Programme customers in London (20%), versus the rest of the UK (16%).
18. Job outcomes for these age groups, who tend to face disadvantage in the labour market, are lower in London than in the rest of the UK. For the 18-24 age group, job outcomes in London are 3.1% in London versus 3.9% in the rest of the UK. For the 50+ age groups, job outcomes in London are 2.7% in London versus 3.1% in the rest of the UK.
3. Experience of VCS subcontractors
19. This section summarises the results of a survey of VCS Work Programme subcontractors carried out by LVSC in November 2012.
20. All organisations on the July 2012 DWP supply chain list for the two London contract package areas were contacted. 1 The DWP list includes 64 organisations, 31 of which responded to the survey.
Referral volumes
21. Survey respondents were asked how many customers had been referred to them to date, and how this compared with expectations. Four respondents said referrals were ‘much higher’ or ‘a bit higher’ than expected, four said ‘as expected’; and 20 responded ‘a bit lower’ or ‘much lower’.
22. Thirteen organisations reported that they had had zero referrals to their tier 2 subcontract. Two further organisations had had negligible (fewer than 5) referrals to their tier 2 contract. This suggests that while there is still a systemic failure within the Work Programme to access the expertise of specialist tier 2 subcontractors. In a few cases, however, primes are making use of the ‘spot purchase’ model with in their supply chains.
23. The comments from respondents offer some clues as to what the blockages are with referrals to specialist subcontractors. A key problem was that the attachment and assessment processes of JCP and the primes are not identifying customers’ needs:
‘No referrals received at all ... Official response from Prime was that they were not identifying people with significant mental health needs but find this hard to believe.’
24. Some subcontractors had been very proactive in trying to promote their own services, to no avail:
‘We offered a 50% discount for a defined period as an incentive to get the ball rolling, and no referrals were forthcoming.’
1 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/wp-supply-chains.xls
‘We have presented DVD's and run two engagement workshops as well as pitching to open day of business managers from different regional offices.’
‘There have been about 4 separate meeting with [the prime] to finalise paperwork, contract, etc. They have changed managers at least 3 times. I believe there is no interest in referring any customers.’
25. Seven respondents reported that they had had customers referred to them who they believed were in the wrong customer group. Most of the specific examples given reflect wider issues relating to the Work Capability Assessment:
‘People on JSA who are unable to work, including people with severe mental health problems and long term health conditions. We have had referrals for people who are terminally in but in ESA work ready group.’
‘We have had a few instances where customers are on JSA and have clear health issues and as such shouldn't be on JSA.’
Contract performance
26. Next, respondents were asked how their contract was performing against contractual targets, in terms of job outcomes to date. Four organisations answered ‘a bit higher’ ; three reported being on target; three ‘a bit lower’; and 11 organisations reported that performance was ‘much lower’ than contractual targets.
27. When asked what key factors had determined contract performance to date, by far the most common response was a lack of referrals from (and communication with) the prime:
‘Lack of referrals from prime provider’
‘A total lack of engagement from both the prime contractor and any of the tier 1 end-to-end providers.’
‘It took us time to scale up provision to match referral numbers.’
28. Organisations who were performing well cited as factors the quality of their frontline staff, and the fact that their prime and other providers understood the need for their service.
Relationships between primes and subcontractors
29. None of the subcontractors had received financial support from their prime to manage the risk of Work Programme delivery (for example, by providing additional upfront payments). However, nine reported that they had been
supported by their prime in other ways: for example through with transparent reporting on supply chain performance, employer engagement, and access to improved IT systems.
30. Eighteen respondents reported having some problems with their prime contractor. Predictably, overwhelmingly the most common complaints related to a lack of referrals and lack of communication from the prime. Other problems included late payments and inappropriate referrals.
31. Overall levels of satisfaction with prime-subcontractor relationships are low among VCS organisations. When asked ‘how satisfied are you with your relationship with your main prime contractor?’, seven replied ‘very satisfied’ or ‘fairly satisfied’; four ‘neutral’; and 17 ‘fairly unsatisfied’ or ‘very unsatisfied’.
32. None of the respondents had invoked the Merlin Standard to address any issues or concerns within the Work Programme.
Harder to help customers
33. Respondents were asked whether they thought that the differential payments model ensures that all Work Programme customers get effective support. Four believed it does; 11 believed it does not; and 11 were unsure.
‘My understanding- based on own experience - is that those furthest form employment don't get help.’
34. Many respondents believe the current differential payments model is not sophisticated enough to ensure support proportionate to an individual’s needs:
‘We have many people with complex disabilities who need a lot of support but are on JSA so we get less money for them.’
‘Differential payments are flawed. For example, we have some JSA customers who have greater needs and more complex barriers than some of our ESA customers.’
‘The model is based on benefit type rather than need’
35. A number of respondents mentioned the very low up front attachment fee paid to providers in the Work Programme’s payment by results system as an obstacle to customers receiving the support they need:
‘The fact that no additional payments were made to the Primes up front made referrals to some provision options prohibitive.’
‘There simply isn't enough upfront money to support the needs of customers.’
36. Respondents were asked whether they are able to deliver innovative and personalised interventions for all the Work Programme customers they support. Thirteen answered yes; 12 answered no. Among those who answered no, the most common reasons given was the lack of sufficient funding available (in particular, up front funding):
‘The financial constraints do not make fully innovative and personalised interventions possible.’
‘Innovation in the form of the ‘black box’ model is undermined by contractual obligations, delivery models imposed by prime contractors, and the setting of minimum service standards. This restrains frontline organisations from truly innovating and tailoring approaches.’
37. One organisation reported that they were able to achieve personalisation only by securing additional funding from other sources.
38. These responses suggest that the Work Programme’s strict payment by results model (in which a job outcome is the only ‘result’ which pays) may work for those closest to labour market, but is not serving the needs of customers with more complex barriers.
4. Impact of Work Programme on wider VCS services
39. Because it is universal (all jobseekers, even the hardest to help, fall within its scope) and mandatory (customers can face sanctions if they fail to follow instructions from providers), the introduction of the Work Programme has impacted on many VCS organisations delivering employment services, who are not part of Work Programme supply chains.
40. The introduction of the Work Programme also coincided with the largest suite of public spending cuts in living memory. These cuts directly impacted on funding for specialist employment support provision, in particular local authorities’ Working Neighbourhoods Fund and the London Development Agency (which funded a wide range of specialist employment provision) were both scrapped.
41. VCS organisations who deliver specialist employment services but who are not Work Programme subcontractors face a dilemma over whether or not to support clients who are mandated onto the Work Programme.
42. To explore these issues, LVSC collected additional evidence from VCS employment and skills providers who are not Work Programme subcontractors.
Feedback on quality of Work Programme support
43. Organisations were asked whether any of the individuals they work with are receiving support through the Work Programme, and if so what did those individuals have to say about the quality of that support. Many organisations reported general feedback from their clients the quality of support on offer was poor:
‘I have one client who has not been seen or contacted for 2 months and I have another client who stopped going to see the provider but was not contacted or sanctioned.’
44. Some organisations described clients coming under pressure from Work Programme providers to take on poor quality work, often leaving them in poverty:
‘One of our users… was encouraged by the Work Programme caseworker to set up as a self-employed because she had not been able to find work and he could not help her otherwise. She felt under pressure that she had to do something so she registered as self- employed to do any kind of jobs. She has only had a few small pieces of work in the last six months. She is living most weeks only on the income she gets from child benefit and child tax credits.’
‘A client of ours was sent to work for a well-known hotel chain as a room attendant. …On starting work, she was told that she would only be receiving £1.40 per room cleaned. She told her provider she could not afford to work for that rate of pay as she was living in a hostel and taking on this job would result in her having rent arrears and then becoming homeless. The advisor assured her that there was a mistake and that the employer will in fact be paying the minimum wage and instructed her to return to work. After 6 days work, she received a total of £46. … As a result of this… she went into rent arrears and received a Notice to Quit from her hostel instructing her to vacate her room. We had to write to them to explain the situation and request that they review their decision. Fortunately, the decision was overturned.’
45. Other organisations who deliver highly specialist services report that the support their clients are getting is generic, light touch, and far from adequate for their needs:
‘Twelve of our clients [with learning disabilities] have been referred to the Work Programme and all say that they are not being supported in the right way. …The clients say that the onus is on them doing their own job search. Little support is offered. One client reported being laughed by other attendees because he got upset during his session because he could not cope with the demands of the programme. … Other clients have reported having 2-3 Work Programme Advisers in the year and describe infrequent meetings and a lack of understanding by the Adviser of the individual’s special needs.’
‘We have concerns about the quality of the Work Programme support
for people with a learning disability. We are currently following one case where the Work Programme is more hindrance than help. The nature of the service this client receives amounts to little more than the opportunity to sit in front of a computer for independent job search. This client will require a robust employer engagement programme with reasonable adjustments/job carving to find work. Independent job search does not go far enough.’
Supporting Work Programme customers
46. Organisations were asked if they had turned away, or reduced the support they offer to, individuals who are Work Programme customers, and if so, why.
47. Some organisations reported that they would not support to Work Programme customers, usually because the conditions of other funding precluded it:
‘We consciously don’t support [Work Programme customers] as we are now grant funded and we won’t double up.’
‘We run one particular self-employment programme for which the funders specifically exclude Work Programme customers from eligibility.’
48. Other organisations reported that they continued to support clients who were Work Programme customers. Most had serious concerns about offering this unpaid support, however:
‘We are unhappy ‘subsidising’ the work programme from our own reserves and resources where its customers access our services, however as a local charity we are happy to accept referrals of local people to us because we feel we should provide our service (which is much needed) for as long as it is viable for us to do so.’
‘We are frustrated by the fact that Work Programme providers claim job outcomes we have secured for clients who have not told us that they are on the Work Programme. When we have delivered support to those clients, Work Programme Providers will not reimburse us for our efforts.’
Unpaid referrals from Work Programme providers
49. Organisations were asked if they had had Work Programme customers referred to them on an unpaid basis. The responses showed that this is common practice.
‘As local specialists in enterprise and self-employment advice and support, a number of organisations (including Jobcentre Plus) are referring Work Programme customers to us for advice, training, and finance services for which we are not being paid.’
‘Yes we have had customers being referred to our advice surgeries for assistance with housing or other benefit needs.’
50. This practice is in part a legacy of the pre-cuts funding environment, when local VCS organisations were able to access funding from alternative sources, often local authorities. As organisations face increasing financial pressure, such arrangements are being reconsidered:
‘We are currently in consultation about reviewing our service delivery. It is unreasonable for us to continue supporting clients on the WP as we will be subsidising the providers. We have already supported a number of clients on WP into employment and we cannot justify the expense when the provider will receive a monetary pay out as a result of our efforts.’
5. Conclusions and recommendations
51. London’s labour market is offers great opportunity, but also very high levels of worklessness and deprivation. Analysis by Inclusion has shown that large welfare to work programmes have tended to underperform in London, with its highly competitive labour market, high levels of disadvantage, and high overhead costs.2 As ‘the only game in town’, it is vital that the Work Programme effectively tackles entrenched labour market inequalities in London.
52. The balance of evidence of the first year of delivery in London suggests however, that the Work Programme is failing to meet the needs of more disadvantaged customers: • Outcomes for all payment groups other than JSA25+ were proportionately lower in London than the rest of the UK; • Performance for the JSA25+ payment group in London was still very low (3.9%), and anecdotal evidence suggests that the harder to help customers within that groups are receiving far from adequate support; • For some of the hardest to help customers, ex-Incapacity Benefit claimants, there were no job outcomes in London at all; and • Outcomes for 18-24 year old jobseekers and 50+ were proportionately lower in London than the rest of the UK.
53. Customers facing significant barriers to work benefit from the tailored, local support of specialist VCS organisations. LVSC would expect that the greater the role of those groups in delivery, the better the Work Programme will perform for disadvantaged groups.
54. However, the number of VCS Work Programme subcontractors playing a meaningful role in the Work Programme is very low. Most VCS subcontractors
2 http://lseo.org.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/Work_Programme_report.pdf
have received far fewer referrals than expected, many have received none at all.
55. Further, because it has displaced so much funding for other employment programmes, and because it is mandatory for its customers, the Work Programme is negatively impacting on other specialist VCS employment service delivery.
Recommendations
56. The differential payment system must be altered to take into account a range of factors relating to labour market disadvantage. The current differential payments model does not ensure that customers receive support adequate for their needs and must be reviewed. The fact that no ex-IB customers have been placed in work in London – despite the strong financial incentives for providers – is alarming. However, the relatively good performance of the JSA Early Entrants payment group (which is based on barriers to the labour market, rather purely on benefit claimed) suggests that differential payments can work. Of course, any customer categorisation system will only succeed if it is based on a robust assessment of a customer’s needs.
57. The payment by results model must be altered to recognise milestones on the journey to work. People who have been out of work for decades, or with mental health problems, or poor literacy, need time and intensive support to move into work. The current narrow focus on job outcomes incentivises ‘parking’ Work Programme customers who are hardest to place in work. If providers were rewarded for delivering intermediate outcomes for the most disadvantaged customers we would see outcomes improve. Retaining or even increasing the upfront attachment fee for the most disadvantaged customers would also improve support.
58. Good practice in prime-subcontractor relationships exists in a few cases – it must be identified, highlighted, and promoted. After a year and a half of Work Programme delivery, the majority of specialist tier 2 providers have still had no customers referred to them at all. They suffered the indignity of being ‘bid candy’, and have lost time and money trying to resolve the situation. Our evidence suggests that the prime-subcontractor relationships can work well, however, where the prime develops an understanding of the value of the specialist provision, actively encourages its advisers to draw on that support, and ring-fences budget for that support.
59. Greater supply chain transparency would benefit programme performance. The demand for improved communication from primes on customer flows and referrals is a consistent message from VCS organisations. Primes should be encouraged to report to their supply chain on their own performance and that of their subcontractors. Subcontractors should be permitted to publish data on their own performance and user satisfaction. The current tight restrictions around sharing data limit the spread of good practice.
60. The government and Work Programme providers need to work with employers to lift wages and improve working conditions. In-work poverty and underemployment are increasing in London. The ultimate aim of employment programmes is to improve lives and lift individuals and families out of poverty. Pushing Work Programme customers into jobs which pay poverty wages, as described in the case studies above, is not good enough. Welfare to work providers and government should lead the way by paying a living wage, and ensuring their supply chains do the same.
7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by the National AIDS Trust (NAT)
1. Summary of Recommendations
1.1 NAT recommends that the Department of Work and Pensions’ new HIV and AIDS Customer Awareness Training Module, or a suitable alternative, should be extended to the Work Programme providers to ensure a consistency of HIV awareness and approach across the Work Programme. If this is not possible then providers and sub-contractors should be required to have their own HIV training.
1.2 NAT recommends that Work Programme providers are encouraged to work with local HIV support organisations to improve the support they offer people living with HIV.
2. Introduction
2.1 NAT is pleased that the Work and Pensions Committee is holding an inquiry into the experience of different user groups involved in the Work Programme and welcomes this opportunity to submit evidence.
2.2 NAT is the UK’s leading charity dedicated to transforming society’s response to HIV. We provide fresh thinking, expertise and practical resources. We champion the rights of people living with HIV and campaign for change.
2.3 HIV is a disability. Many people with HIV find that their health places no limit on their ability to work, but for others complications related to HIV create a real barrier to finding and staying in employment.
2.4 Research shows that unemployment among people living with HIV may be as high as 50%, and many people living with HIV who aren’t in employment are recipients of ESA or JSA, others are on Incapacity Benefit and will be part of the ongoing migration to ESA.
2.5 Individual experiences of living with HIV vary greatly, and the impact upon someone’s ability to take up work is equally varied. Some people may be in very poor health as a direct result of HIV-related illness, others may experience less visible, fluctuating or short-term barriers such as fatigue.1
2.6 NAT conducted its own research into the experiences of people living with HIV and in the Work Programme, as well as contacting local HIV support organisations who serve HIV positive people including Positive East.
2.7 NAT’s response is structured around the Committee’s inquiry questions.
3. The differential payments model including: the extent to which it is incentivising providers to help all participants and thereby addressing “creaming and parking”; how effectively the model reflects claimants’ relative needs; and variations in job outcomes between the different payment groups.
3.3 NAT has not seen enough evidence of the impact of incentivisation on the Work Programme, or the impact it can have on how providers support participants, including those living with HIV. We would have concerns if there was evidence of
1 ‘'Fluctuating Symptoms of HIV' August 2011 www.nat.org.uk
“creaming and parking”, but as we outline below we are more concerned about the potential lack of support for people with complex and fluctuating needs like HIV.
3.4 While people living with HIV are disabled people, and therefore providers receive extra money for supporting them back into work. There appears to be a lack of specialised support being targeted at those living with HIV to reflect this higher level funding.
3.5 Some people living with HIV have indicated that they have only received very basic support such as CV drafting advice, or have only been invited to attend group workshops offering again only very general employment advice.
4. The prime provider model including: its impact on subcontractors; and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs.
4.1 The use of prime providers and sub contractors does offer the opportunity to tailor support to local and individual needs, and could have the potential to deliver more specialised support to individuals with more complex needs.
4.2 NAT believes that the problems faced by people living with HIV getting helped back into work can often start with the Work Capability Assessment, which frequently fails to adequately capture the needs of people living with HIV, resulting in them being assessed as ready for work.2
4.3 People living with HIV can then find themselves in the Work Related Activity Group and in the Work Programme. While the model could result in support being more tailored to an individual’s needs, without the ability to monitor the support people living with HIV receive, it is hard to assess the quality of the system; the prime providers; or sub-contractors and the programmes they provide.
4.4 As we outline elsewhere in this response, the critical issue for NAT is the level of training and awareness that the different providers and organisations involved in the Work Programme have in relation to complex and fluctuating conditions like HIV.
4.5 In addition, it is unclear given the ‘black box’ approach whether it is the DWP, prime providers, or the subcontractors who are responsible for ensuring the right training and support is put in place for people living with HIV or who is responsible for monitoring this area of performance.
4.6 Alongside providing tailored support around work and employment, being aware of HIV and the needs of people living with HIV in our view should part of any basic training providers offer their staff. One consistent criticism from HIV positive people, who have told NAT about their experience of the Work Programme, has been a total lack of awareness or understanding of HIV from staff involved in the Programme.
4.7 While this inquiry is not looking into the assessment process many of the same concerns that arise with the WCA continue when people start experiencing the Work Programme. Although providers aren’t there to make medical judgements they do need to be aware and sensitive to the complexity of living with a condition like HIV.
2 ‘Employment and Support Allowance Work Capability Assessment review: Making it work for fluctuating conditions’ April 2011 http://www.nat.org.uk/media/Files/Publications/Apr-2011- Employment-and-support-allowance-WCA-review.pdf
There is again evidence from people who have contacted NAT that even where individuals supply medical information, to for example, justify missed appointments or other problems, it is often ignored and not responded to properly.
5. The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups including: whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP; and the rigour and effectiveness of DWP’s monitoring and complaints procedures.
5.1 As we outline below, it is often difficult to build up a clear picture how participants in the Work Programme are being served by providers. From the evidence NAT has seen, however, the service appears to be patchy and potentially superficial given the complex needs of individuals.
5.2 We have been told about people living with HIV in London being advised by a provider to consider becoming self employed. In these cases, there was no assessment of their skills or whether the individual had a viable business idea. Window-cleaning or gardening was even suggested, but no assessment was made as to whether the claimants’ were capable of doing such work.
5.3 The claimants in these cases were told there would a financial incentive if they set up their own businesses, but were not given any clear information about how this might work or what further support would be available. They were also not given advice about how self-employment would affect the other benefits they were receiving such as housing benefit and council tax benefit.
5.4 While it wasn’t clear why this approach may have been suggested to these individuals; anxiety and depression can be one of the symptoms that people living with HIV report and it was picked up in NAT’s ‘Fluctuating Symptoms’ report.3 We fear that a simplistic response to such issues and how they might manifest themselves in terms of employment; such as anxiety towards going out to work could lead providers to inappropriate suggestions and responses.
5.5 Advice on working from home, self employment, or even starting your own business maybe appropriate in certain circumstances, but unless the support is tailored to the individual, and is meaningful, it is unlikely to add value and in the long- term help clients into sustainable work.
5.6 We have heard about more positive experiences from people living with HIV, and in the Work Programme, including someone with depression who was referred to group cognitive behavioural therapy and is now no longer as isolated as before. It is hard without having access to information from providers to know whether such experiences are common across the Work Programme, and whether such sensitive and tailored support is the norm.
5.7 People living with HIV and other long-term fluctuating conditions require tailored support, from well trained professionals who understand their condition and have the right skills and experience to support them back to work. The Work Programme needs to offer support that is realistic and appropriate; and the system and providers should not promote quick fix solutions which aren’t sustainable in the long-term.
5.8 NAT working with the Terrance Higgins Trust (THT) and DWP recently developed a training module for all DWP staff, which is being actively promoted for frontline Job
3 ‘'Fluctuating Symptoms of HIV' August 2011 www.nat.org.uk
CentrePlus staff and covers HIV and AIDS and Customer Awareness. This module was created in response to reported poor awareness of HIV amongst staff and the lack of suitable training. The finished module, and the way it has been adopted and actively promoted by DWP shows what can be achieved through collaboration between DWP and HIV policy organisations.
5.9 RECOMMENDATION NAT would recommend that this module, or a suitable alternative, should be offered to the Work Programme providers to ensure a consistency of HIV awareness and approach. If this isn’t possible then providers should be required to have their own HIV training.
6. The “black box” approach to service delivery including: whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups; and DWP’s role in monitoring this.
6.1 The purpose of the ‘black box’ approach to service delivery is to foster innovation and more personalised support to claimants. However, it also makes it harder for individuals, and the organisations that support them, to compare providers and ensure that claimants are receiving the tailored and personalised support they entitled to and need.
6.2 With complex and often misunderstood, long-term conditions like HIV it is especially important that the support offered is responsive and tailored to the needs of claimants living with HIV.
6.3 While a ‘black box’ approach may encourage and allow innovation, it also makes it harder to understand which approaches are working and which are not. There is also a risk that it can be used both by providers and the Department for Work and Pensions to discourage scrutiny and transparency. Not publishing of policies and training that directly impacts on the experience that people living with HIV have of the Work Programme, helps no one, and NAT is clear that releasing this information shouldn’t require the publishing of commercially sensitive material.
6.4 Recommendation NAT recommends that Work Programme providers are encouraged to open up and work with local HIV support organisations to improve the support they offer people living with HIV.
6.5 From our own ad hoc research with people living with HIV and in the Work Programme NAT has heard of examples where training and support has been tailored to an individual’s needs, leading to employment opportunities where other approaches had failed in the past. While these experiences are positive for the individuals involved, they seem to be in the minority when it comes to the experience of people living with HIV and in the Work Programme.
6.6 Is also unclear how such successes or failures within the Work Programme are monitored, and whether given the use of a ‘black box’ system, best practice or even common standards can be easily shared.
6.7 NAT have attempted to find out what support is being offered to people living with HIV who following a Work Capability Assessment have been placed in the Work Programme by using surveys of HIV support organisations and HIV positive people.
6.8 More recently we attempted to survey Work Programme providers. This followed a Freedom of Information request made to DWP, which gave NAT a list of providers who were supporting people living with HIV in the Work Programme. NAT wrote to
them all including a brief survey of how they responded to the needs of people living with HIV.
6.9 The questions NAT asked included:
6.9.1 If clients on ESA are referred to you, do you record the nature of their disability or health condition?
6.9.2 How many people living with HIV have been referred to you?
6.9.3 Of these, how many have completed the programme?
6.9.4 Of these, how many have found employment?
6.9.5 Have your staff received specific training about HIV?
6.9.6 How do you determine the support needs of each client?
6.9.7 Do you provide specific support tailored to particular disabilities?
6.9.8 Do you provide specific support tailored to people living with HIV?
6.9.9 What is the typical programme of employment support someone living with HIV could expect to receive from your organisation? (If there are different support options please indicate how many people living with HIV have taken up each option.)
6.9.10 Do you provide additional support for clients who are in receipt of ESA compared to JSA?
6.10 This project is ongoing, but the response so far has been poor from these providers, and this illustrates the difficulties in finding out the level of support a person living with HIV is receiving from a provider, what they should be receiving, or whether or not that level of support has been met. It is also not enough to know statistics on X number of people helped into work, unless you have more information about the type of support they received and how or why it helped.
6.11 NAT also previously sent Work Programme providers information and guidance on the legal position in relation HIV and recruitment; HIV and the workplace; and HIV and sick leave and disability leave.4 It is unclear again whether providers are using this information or alternatives in the work they do with HIV positive people.
7. Regional variations in job outcome statistics: including whether competition between providers is driving up performance in contract package areas where the economy is particularly depressed; and how provider performance could be improved in these areas.
7.1 Given the small amount of information available on the experience of people living with HIV and taking part in the Work Programme it is hard have a clear sense of whether there are any regional variations in outcomes, or a difference in performance between contract areas or providers exists. We would also support further investigation into this area.
4 ‘HIV + Recrutment: Advice for Employers’ July 2012, ‘HIV@Work: Advice for Employers’ July 2012 and ‘Sick leave and disability leave’ September 2012 http://www.nat.org.uk/
7 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by the National Institute of Adult Continuing Education
1. The National Institute of Adult Continuing Education (NIACE) is the UK’s leading independent, non-governmental organisation and charity for lifelong learning. The purpose of NIACE is to advocate on behalf of adult learners and to promote more, different and better learning opportunities.
2. NIACE welcomes the opportunity to comment on the proposed Universal Credit and related regulations. We have limited our comments specifically to the “black box” approach to service delivery including: whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups; and DWP’s role in monitoring this.”
3. Since early 2011, NIACE has been heavily involved in supporting learning providers firstly to prepare for and more recently to deliver skills provision through the Skills Funding Agency Unit Offer for the Unemployed. Through our involvement, we have become keenly aware of the provision’s positive impact for the many unemployed adults referred to it, primarily by Jobcentre Plus (JCP) during the pre-Work Programme stage of their benefit claim.
4. Pre-employment skills provision like this comprises a vital component of an integrated employment and skills system as advocated for in the Leitch Review, HMSO, 2006 and more recently by the OECD, which recommended in Employment Outlook: Tackling the Jobs Crisis, OECD, 2009, that all OECD countries shift,
“From a ‘Work-first’ approach to active labour market policy to a ‘train-first’ approach for those at high risk of long term unemployment in the context of the downturn”
5. To facilitate the earliest entry into employment for its customers, JCP naturally wants skills to be acquired in the shortest possible time. However, even using the most intensive formats, it is not possible to deliver the guided learning hours necessary to address the needs of people with below Level 1 skills in English and maths before they are referred to the Work Programme, typically nine months or one year into their benefit claim. In fact to reach Level 1 in English and maths and then to gain labour market relevant vocational skills, many people require skills provision to continue well into the two year maximum duration of their Work Programme.
6. In an attempt to encourage innovation and creativity, through the Black Box arrangement, Work Programme Prime Providers have been given full control over the approach they take to support their participants into employment. In some cases, Work Programme Prime and Sub-Prime Providers are incorporating skills interventions as part of that approach. Several case studies within a new NIACE guide on the provision of skills within the Work Programme to be published on December 13th and available on request describe how participation in skills provision led directly to people on the Work Programme securing sustained employment.
7. However, disappointingly in many locations in England, Work Programme participants are not accessing skills provision. Skills needs at below Level 1 are common amongst unemployed adults and even more frequent among people on the Work Programme because people without skills needs tend to find work more easily before becoming eligible for the Work Programme. Skills needs are also more prevalent among unemployed adults who due to other forms of disadvantage have missed out on formal education and found it difficult to participate in adult learning subsequently.
8. Although there are some instances of Work Programme providers referring participants to skills provision, this appears to be the exception rather than the rule. NIACE is concerned that some Work Programme Prime and Sub-Prime contractors appear to be unaware of the benefits of skills provision and are wedded to a Work First approach to such an extent that it is quite common for people referred to skills provision by JCP to be required to permanently leave this skills provision to take part in Work Programme induction activities. Hence the pressing need for the NIACE guide out this month which highlights the benefits of skills provision, gives Work Programme providers advice about working in partnership with learning providers and clears up any uncertainty about the eligibility of Work Programme participants to be fully funded to participate in Skills Funding Agency funded skills provision.
9. Underpinning the appropriateness of taking a Black Box approach to commissioning any form of support is a pre-requisite that providers are already fully aware of both the needs of their service users and the already established, effective means to address these needs. Where providers are ignorant of the needs of their service users and the means to address these needs, they could:
• spend years struggling to support their service users in other ways only to finally discover what others knew all along i.e. in the case of the Work Programme that many long term unemployed people are held back drastically by their skills needs; and • then spend further time ‘reinventing the wheel’ i.e. in this case by establishing skills provision that is already available through learning providers and available on a fully funded basis through the Adult Skills Budget to all unemployed adults.
10. Although only a few Work Programme providers appear appreciate the full value of gaining skills, it is widely recognised elsewhere that:
• employers increasingly expect job applicants to possess a basic level of English; maths, employability and language skills; • vocational skills confer a distinct advantage to any job seeker that possesses them; • skills protect against redundancy because employers tend to be reluctant to make their skilled employees redundant; and • that the higher productivity of a skilled workforce can sometimes enable an employer to stave off making redundancies altogether.
11. The Black Box approach and the consequent lack of specification about skills needs assessment and provision of skills up to a certain level of English, maths, employability and language proficiency is hindering the chances for many people to not only secure work, but also reducing the chances of them staying in that work.
12. NIACE believes that unless and until prime contractors address these basic needs, Government should at the very least encourage and showcase how this can assist in positive outcomes. A more effective approach though would be to mandate primes to assess their clients’ skills needs at the start of their relationship.
10 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by Citizens Advice
1. This submission sets out the submission of Citizens Advice to the Work and Pensions Committee inquiry The Work Programme: the experience of different user groups, launched on 26 October 2012.
2. Citizens Advice is the national body for the 400 independent advice centres that constitute the CAB service in England & Wales. In 2011/12, these Citizens Advice Bureaux dealt with 6.9 million problems brought by some two million people, including over 2.3 million welfare benefit and tax credit problems.
The experience of Citizens Advice Bureaux directly engaged in the Work Programme
3. The CAB service in England & Wales has relatively limited direct engagement in the Work Programme. Citizens Advice is a subcontractor to two of the prime contractors (Seetec and Working Links), subcontracting down to six Citizens Advice Bureaux to deliver the contract. A further six Citizens Advice Bureaux are direct subcontractors to three of the primes (EOS, Interserve and Ingeus). In each case, the role of the bureau is to deliver our free, confidential and impartial advice (on issues such as welfare benefits, debt, and housing), and also money management training, to Work Programme participants. As participants take steps towards employment, it is likely that they will see major changes in their circumstances; changes that may require information or assistance (e.g. eligibility for certain welfare benefits or revised repayment agreements with creditors due to an increase or drop in income).
4. In all cases, the bureaux offer a combination of telephone advice, face- to-face advice, and group training on money management for Work Programme participants. They also deliver awareness training for providers’ front-line staff, depending on the individual contract. All these services are complementary services, not mandatory elements of the Work Programme, and there is no ‘payment by results’ link between our contact with a client and their return to work. Citizens Advice was keen to be involved in the Work Programme, in order to help the most vulnerable of our clients deal with any problems that they might encounter in the course of their participation in the Programme.
5. We have recently surveyed these 12 lead bureaux on their experience of the Work Programme to date, and have had responses from ten bureaux. The key findings from this survey are as follows:
• Three of the bureaux have renegotiated the terms of their contract since first signing, two of them in relation to pricing variations for telephone advice, and the third to increase the provision of its service.
• Eight of the ten bureaux are ‘very satisfied’ with their relationship with their prime contractor to date. One bureau has had significant issues in receiving timely payment for work done.
• Referral rates for the majority of the ten bureaux are lower than expected (significantly so for three bureaux). One bureau has had significantly higher than expected referrals. All have had more than 50 referrals to date.
• However, eight of the ten bureaux consider their contract to be viable for the whole of the contract period. One of the other two bureaux considers the risk to be more down to local funding factors.
• Two of the ten bureaux believe that Work Programme participants who might benefit from their services are kept ‘in house’ by the prime contractor.
• Overall, the experience of the 12 lead bureaux to date is generally positive. All 12 bureaux are making money on the contract. They report that their relationships with the prime contractor are mostly constructive, and that the primes are generally receptive to suggestions about how things might work better. However this does vary between prime contractors. Building up a personal relationship with providers is key to success, and that does need a level of resource.
• Feedback from participants/clients is good, and the feedback from providers is that the services offered by the bureaux are valuable to clients and the providers themselves. The range of issues we are able to advise on is especially valued by most contractors although there is a need to reinforce the positive impact that advice can make on outcomes and enabling customers to be better prepared for work. This is particularly true where the prime contractor has subcontracted Work Programme activities to other suppliers.
The experience of CAB clients more generally
6. In addition to the direct engagement of these 12 lead Citizens Advice Bureaux, bureaux throughout England & Wales do of course deliver advice on a whole range of matters to clients who happen also to be Work Programme participants. And, of course, Work Programme participants can and do approach bureaux for advice in relation to a problem experienced in the course of that participation. As some 40 per cent of all CAB clients are unemployed or permanently sick or disabled, a significant proportion are likely to have experience of the Work Programme at some point.
7. Whilst our case recording system does not provide meaningful data for the number of CAB clients seeking advice specifically in relation to a problem with the Work Programme itself, we have seen a steady increase in the volume of evidence of such advice work reported to us by bureaux. The following case studies are illustrative of this evidence.
A 24-year-old, illiterate man with mental health problems who sought assistance from a CAB in Southampton in August 2012 had been sanctioned for nine months because of failures to undertake Work Programme placements. As a result, he had had no income for the past four months, and had accrued rent arrears of over £1,000. He had recently applied for, but been refused, a hardship payment, and his reason for approaching the CAB was to request a food parcel. The CAB notes that “it is unrealistic to sanction a person for nine months with no other income”.
A 59-year-old woman who sought advice from a CAB in London in April 2012 had been sanctioned for three months after failing to attend a Work Programme appointment due to illness. She reported that she had telephoned the provider on the day to report her illness and request an alternative date, but this had been refused. As a result of the sanction, the client’s Council Tax benefit had also been suspended. The CAB notes that “since losing her job the client has signed on without missing a day, has attended two training days on CV production and work skills, and attends mandatory courses in English, maths and computing. The mandatory Work Programme is too inflexible and a heavy sanction has been imposed out of all proportion”.
A 37-year-old man who sought advice from a CAB in the Midlands in July 2012 had been unemployed and in receipt of income-based JSA for the past four years, and was living with his elderly parents. He reported that he had attended a Work Programme placement with a voluntary sector provider, but had been sent home as the placement had been overbooked by JCP and there was no work for him. He had subsequently received a letter from JCP warning him that he might be sanctioned, to which he had responded, but had then been sanctioned for three months. The CAB notes that “the client depends on his JSA for his day-to-day living … and does not know how he will support himself for the next three months”.
A 31-year-old woman with severe, long-term mental health problems who sought advice from a CAB in Cambridgeshire in October 2011 was in receipt of ESA and had been placed in the WRA Group. She was determined to return to work, an ambition supported by her doctors, and had recently found herself a part- time job. However, her Work Programme provider was requiring her to actively seek work and attend training appointments. The client and her doctors were concerned that the combined level of work and Work Programme attendance was detrimental to her mental health, and that her (permitted) work should have priority.
A 56-year-old man who sought advice from a CAB in Lincolnshire in October 2012 had completed most of a six-week Work Programme placement but was unable to attend the final day due to a short-notice hospital admission. He tried to telephone the provider to inform them of this, but was unable to get through or leave a message. After leaving hospital three days later, he called the provider again, and informed them of the reason for this non-attendance. He did not hear further from the provider, but was subsequently sanctioned for 14 days. The sanction letter also informed him that he would not be eligible for JSA after the 14-day period had ended, as he had not paid sufficient NI contributions. The CAB subsequently established that this was incorrect (and the JCP helpline told the CAB that many letters had gone with such incorrect information). The CAB notes that “the client was very distressed and unsure how to make his normal payments for utilities and food”.
A 20-year-old woman living with her parents who sought advice from a CAB in Merseyside in November 2012 had been sanctioned for six months in August. The decision letter indicated that the client had failed to attend 15 separate Work Programme appointments, but she maintained that she had not known of any of these appointments prior to receiving the sanction letter.
A 22-year-old woman with mental health problems who sought advice from a CAB in Derbyshire in September 2012 had been sanctioned for six months in May, due to failures to attend Work Programme appointments. As a result, the client had no income and had been forced to move to live with her partner’s parents. She reported that she had now fully re-engaged with the Work Programme, and had tried repeatedly to contact JCP to try and get her JSA re-instated, to no avail. She was now heavily in debt and this was exacerbating her mental health problems.
A 48-year-old man living in a hostel for the homeless who sought advice from a CAB in Newcastle in October 2012 was deeply unhappy about the level of support and assistance that he received from his Work Programme provider over more than 12 months, during which he had not found any work.
Conclusion
8. The experience to date of the small number of Citizens Advice Bureaux in England & Wales that are directly engaged in the Work Programme is generally positive. However, the relatively limited but steadily growing volume of evidence from Citizens Advice Bureaux to date indicates that, for some CAB clients, participation in the Work Programme has been a difficult and/or unrewarding experience. This evidence suggests that sanctions are sometimes applied inappropriately or disproportionately, and that this can impact severely on the well-being of vulnerable individuals. And it suggests that some participants are not receiving the necessary level of personalised, specialist support that they need to move into employment. This evidence is similar to that relating to welfare benefits more generally (i.e. those supported by JCP but not referred to the Work Programme). Over the coming year, we intend to pro-actively investigate the experience of CAB clients in the Work Programme, with a view to identifying good practice by providers in supporting our clients move closer to work as well as ways in which client experience might be improved.
10 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by the Social Market Foundation
Summary
• This is an evidence submission from the independent think tank the Social Market Foundation. The SMF has many years of experience of analysing employment programmes and this note draws on a range of past analysis and thinking. • Creaming and parking are not unique to either the Work Programme nor other employment programmes with private providers. Parking is always the result of scheme design. Any effort to ascribe prices to individual jobseekers will result in parking (or, less pejoratively, efforts to get the most job outcomes for the least public money), but there are ways to design schemes that avoid this outcome, if it is considered to offer poor value for money. • The prime provider model prevented small organisations from bidding for work programme contracts on the grounds that providers with small balance sheets would be unable to bear substantial outcome risk. This was sensible. However, the lack of regulation of the sub‐ contractor relationship is resulting in subs facing more risk than primes. This inefficient allocation of risk is bad for innovation and diversity in the supply chain. Ultimately it is bad for jobseekers. • Initial SMF analysis shows that there is disparity between the best and worst prime contractors in the first year of the Work Programme. On average, the best provider in each region appears to have secured 60% more jobs than the worst during year 1. This is a promising sign that competition will work to improve performance. It also gives impetus to the idea that a relative payment system for providers would represent a sensible reform of the Work Programme to prevent it draining spending on employment services at the time they are most needed.
Creaming and Parking
1. Concerns about so‐called creaming and parking of welfare to work clients are not new. The Flexible New Deal was criticised for its flat‐rate outcome payment scheme, which encouraged providers to identify which clients were easiest to help into work and focus their efforts prominently on them, to the cost of ‘harder to help’ clients. However, it is important to recognise two things about creaming and parking. a. First there is no reason to believe that it is more prevalent among private providers than in Jobcentre Plus. The first six months of the JSA regime – under the remit of JC+ ‐ effectively parks all jobseekers, since most will move back into work quickly and of their own accord. Another way to view this is getting the maximum job outcomes for the minimum expenditure. But, whether it is considered to be a technique that offers good or bad value for money, it is one that is reflected in both the public and privately provided parts of the system. b. Second, parking is not inevitable in a payment by results scheme. It is, instead, the result of the payment schedule designed by the commissioners. If parking is going on in the Work Programme, it is either the result of poor policy design or of deliberate efforts to maximise the number of jobs achieved for a given amount of money (note this may not be the same as achieving good value for money).
2. The differential payments model under the Work Programme seeks to mitigate the parking problem through assigning different payments to (nine) different client groups. However, there is growing concern that creaming and parking persists under this scheme too.
3. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, while there are more payment bands under the Work Programme than under eFND, ther is also a much more diverse range of jobseekers. Most adult JSA claimants therefore still offer providers a uniform outcome payment as part of ‘payment group 2’. But second, previous SMF analysis suggests that any attempt by commissioners to attach different prices to different clients – how ever granular the assessment – will not remove incentives for creaming and parking.
4. This is because no amount of statistical evidence can fully predict who in any given group of people will be easier or harder to get into work. Some determining factors will be almost unobservable. For example, the motivation levels of different jobseekers varies, but that characteristic is impossible to set a price for. As a result, compared to broad payment group characteristics, providers will always have privileged information their clients, and can therefore refine this judgement on the client’s employment prospects ‐ identifying the best and parking the worst prospects ‐ as soon as they meet them. The ‘black box’ system in place under the Work Programme has the virtue of encouraging providers to do whatever they need to in order to get the most jobs for the least money. But it also has the consequence of heavily encouraging parking.
5. If it is believed that parking does not offer good value for money in the long term, there is a way to tackle it within the payment by results system. The SMF has suggested a system of graduated outcome payments, under which providers are paid at increasing rates as they get more of their caseload into work. In previous research, the SMF has argued that the Department for Work and Pensions could make a minimal outcome payment at the time when the client moves into work. At fixed intervals, the DWP would calculate additional top‐ up payments according to then proportio of a given cohort of jobseekers whom contractors succeeded at getting into work. So long as the payment schedule accurately reflects the cost of finding a full cohort of jobseekers sustained work, it will provide the necessary incentives for profit‐making providers to work with all clients. This approach avoids the need for government to set prices for given individuals, which will either afford too little or too much resource compared to that needed to get them into work.
6. The SMF recommends that the Committee examine the feasibility of introducing such a system into the next iteration of the Work Programme.
The prime provider model
7. The Work Programme design raises real concerns for the viability of the (predominantly) voluntary and community sector (VCS) organisations subcontracted by prime providers to deliver the scheme.
8. Small organisations were effectively prohibited from bidding for Work Programme prime contracts if they had turnover of less than £20m. This restriction was, not unreasonably, imposed on the grounds that smaller organisations do not have sufficiently large balance sheets to bear the financial risk of an outcome‐based payment scheme on this scale.
9. However, no such restrictions apply to prime contractors in their dealings with sub‐ contractors. The scheme therefore effectively devolves a huge degree of outcomes risk to sub‐contractors anyway. Indeed the risk borne by the sub‐contractors is if anything greater than that borne by primes for three reasons:
a. Sub‐contractors are dealing with small numbers of people, while primes diversify their risk by having thousands of clients. This means the former are vulnerable to statistical blips. b. Sub‐contractors, particularly in supply chains where the prime provider provides front‐line employment services, tend to get the hardest‐to‐help clients. In many cases these may be the jobseekers who have been parked by primes. c. Sub‐contractors may face more precarious financial terms than those offered by DWP. Prime contractors are able to benefit from the guaranteed referral fees that come with new clients, but evidence from the National Council for Voluntary Organisations suggests that this security isn’t necessarily passed down the chain.
10. NCVO has already highlighted worrying signs that Work Programme subcontractors are bearing a large amount of financial risk. While primes were designed to be risk‐bearers in the Work Programme, there is much evidence to suggest that they are in fact cascading risk onto others.
11. The SMF suggests that the DWP should therefore set limits to how much outcome risk is passed on to sub‐contractors if it wants to ensure that there remains a viable sub‐ contracting tier.
12. Related to this is the question of the Work Programme’s suitability in a persistently weak labour market, when outcome risk is highest. The design of the Work Programme means that the scheme ends up cutting the funding of frontline services at the very point when unemployment is mounting. During economic stagnation, when job outcome payments slow to a trickle, the only response for a firm or charity that doesn't want to go bust is to cut costs and hence services – just when people need them most. This perverse outcome raises the question of whether a relative performance payment mechanism would be a better way to re‐engineer the Work Programme to avoid such consequences, while maintaining competitive pressure on providers to work for their jobseekers (see below).
Regional variations 13. There is substantial variation in provider performance across contracts and across Contract Package Areas in the Work Programme. While we have not yet been able to analyse the performance of providers relative to their local labour market conditions, the SMF has looked at the variation in provider performance over the first 12 months of the scheme. These figures should be interpreted with some caution since variation in performance may well diminish as volumes increase. Nevertheless, there are some interesting points to draw out. 14. Chart 1, below, shows provider performance, with contracts grouped by provider. On these early figures there are five providers averaging above 2.5% ‐ ESG, Ingeus, Maximus, EOS and G4S – with another distinct group between about 2% and 2.5%. There are then five providers whose performance is at or below 1.5%.
Chart 1: Year 1 provider performance
3.50%
3.00%
2.50%
2.00%
1.50%
1.00%
0.50%
0.00%
15. Chart 2 shows a distribution of the performance of individual contracts (i.e. not grouped by provider). The distribution ranges from Prospects operating in Devon, Cornwall, Dorset and Somerset CPA, to Ingeus operating in the East of England and attaining performance over 4%. All contracts are well short of the minimum performance level expected by DWP. Indeed all contacts are well below DWP’s do‐called ‘non intervention’ level of 5%. This throws huge doubt on the worth of these benchmarks.
Chart 2: Distribution of contract performance
Provider Year 1 performance distribution 8 DWP 7 6 5 4 providers
3 No. 2 1 0
Performance band (percentage points)
16. Perhaps most interestingly, there is very significant variation in performance between providers operating within the same CPAs. The SMF’s analysis indicates that within the first 12 months, the performance of the best provider in each CPA was around 60% higher than that of the worst. In other words, the best providers are getting 60% more people into sustained employment than the worst. Again, these figures should be treated with caution: that discrepancy is likely to fall as volumes rise. Nevertheless, it indicates that there are important performance differences between providers with similar clients. Where these differences persist, the laggards will either have to improve or be replaced. There is consequently good reason to think that competition is helping to sort the good from the poor providers and therefore to give jobseekers a better service.
17. This local variation in performance also lends weight to the idea that providers might more effectively be paid on their performance relative to each other, rather than relative to an arbitrary benchmark. This approach would be particularly effective at sustaining investment in frontline services at a time when the labour market is weak – exactly the point at which effective services for the most disengaged jobseekers are vitally important.
10 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by the Camden Society
Executive Summary
1. Our experience of delivering employment and training services to people with disabilities has shown us that illness or disability is no barrier to work and participation in society1. We have brought that belief and commitment to our work supporting long term unemployed people with health conditions and disabilities to return to work through the Work Programme.
2. We have learnt a great deal in our first year of delivery about how the structure of the programme enables us to realise this vision. We recommend strategic and operational changes that will improve the quality of the work programme services that people with health conditions and disabilities receive on their pathway to finding and keeping work. Key recommendations include introducing: • a differentiated payment structure based on client’s needs not their benefit type • minimum service standards which meet the needs of all clients • performance standards which recognise the achievement of softer skills • personalised action plans for people referred onto the work programme • reports on service innovation and programme changes based on client feedback • Professor Harrington’s recommendations for improving the Work Capability Assessment process in full as a matter of urgency.
3. Our submission addresses three of the Work and Pensions Select Committee’s areas of enquiry regarding the work programme user groups’ experiences. We offer recommendations which we hope will improve outcomes for people with long term health conditions and disabilities on the Work Programme.
1www.thecamdensociety.org.uk/ourservices; Dame Black, 2008. Dame Carol Black’s Review of the health of Britain’s Working Age Population: Working for a Healthier Tomorrow. London, TSO, page 88.
Introduction to The Camden Society
4. The Camden Society is a registered charity delivering supported living, employment and community services to people with learning disabilities across Londonand in Oxfordshire. Our Employment and Learning Service has a 25-year track record of managing and successfully delivering supported employment projects funded, among others, by the Learning and Skills Council, European Social Fund, London Development Agency, Jobcentre Plus and several local authorities. We are an innovative organisation continually seeking ways in which we can improve the lives of people with disabilities, helping them to explore options and make choices. Our Employment Service is Matrix and Autism Accredited and we have been commended for our person-centred approach and our ability to support the progression of ‘the most difficult cases’.
5. We currently deliver bespoke employment and training projects in Camden, Southwark, Greenwich and Lambeth; we are a sub contractor for the Work Programme supporting clients with disabilities and long term heath conditions in the East London region; and we are sub- contracted by Leonard Cheshire to deliver an end to end employment service in Hackney and Tower Hamlets, funded by the GLA ESF Youth Programme, for young Londoners with learning disabilities, who are NEET or at risk of becoming NEET. We deliver employment projects with a range of partners including voluntary sector organisations, further education colleges and schools.
6. We have a number of social enterprise cafes, where we train and employ people with disabilities and through which we deliver our own NAS recognised Apprenticeship Scheme enabling people to gain qualifications and on the job experience in catering and customer service. We are a City and Guilds and Open College Network certified training provider and we can deliver NVQs in Hospitality & Catering, Retail and customer service, IT and administration, Healthy Eating and Nutrition Sports and Leisure.
Work Programme User Groups Experiences – reference to enquiry points
7. The Camden Society (TCS) has delivered the Work Programme sub contract as a specialist end-to-end provider for long term unemployed clients with health conditions and disabilities in East London since June 2011. In this capacity we work with clients living in 18London Boroughs. South - Lambeth, Merton, Lewisham, Southwark, Croydon, Sutton, Greenwich, Bexley, Bromley, Wandsworth, and North - Tower Hamlets, Newham,, Hackney, Waltham Forest, Islington, Camden, Havering, Redbridge. To date we have received 1188 referrals, which cross each of the programme groups as set out in Table 1.
Table 1. Caseload by Programme Group
Programme Group Total Caseload
WP ESA ex-IB 112 WP ESA Flow 534 WP ESA Volunteer 71 WP IBIS Volunteer 10 WP JSA 18-24 53 WP JSA 25+ 294 WP JSA Early Access 107 WP JSA Ex-IB 6 WP JSA Prison Leavers 1 Total 1188
The Differential Payments Model 8. The extent to which it is incentivising providers to help all participants and thereby addressing “creaming and parking”. The payment model does not encourage providers to support all participants equally to find and keep work as the only performance target is the achievement of jobs. Working with long term unemployed people with health conditions and disabilities, many of whom have multiple barriers, is resource intensive work which may increase the person’s confidence, motivation and employability which may not result in a job within the two years of the work programme, a fact accepted by the government. Payment by results therefore acts in part as a disincentive for providers in investing the significant resources required to support the clients furthest from the employment market. The DWP’s research supports the fact that payment by results is not driving the support offered to work programme clients by providers2.
2Newton, Becci, Meager, Nigel, Bertam, Christine, Corden, Anne, George, Anitha, Lalani, Mumtaz, Metcalf, Hilary, Rolf, Heather, Sainsbury, Roy, and Weston, Katherine. 2012 Work Programme evaluation: Findings from the first phase of qualitative research on programme delivery. DWP andUniversity of Yorkand National Institute of Economic and Social Research, page 28 and 107.
9. The DWP does not provide differential payments to Work Programme providers for clients when they are begin the programmeor are attached– this is a fixed fee for all programme groups which clients are placed in based on their benefit type. Differential payments are made to providers when a client finds a job and stays in the job for 6 months based on their benefit type. This does not recognise the different levels of resources required to support clients within the same payment group to prepare for, find and stay based on their multiple barriers tofind work, as noted by other providers and observers of the Work Programme3.
10. Of the clients we have supported into work, 62% of those clients are from the two groups for which we receive the lowest payment – JSA 18-25 and JSA 25+, as set out in Table 2 below. In contrast, the clients for whom we receive the highest payment – ESA Ex-Incapacity Benefit and ESA Flow – represent 22% of our clients who have found jobs. Contrasting these figures against our total client caseload, JSA 18-25 and JSA 25+ represent 29.5% of our caseload, while ESA Ex-IB and ESA Flow represent 54%.
3Community Links, 2012. Making the Work Programme Work; Homeless Link, 2012. The Programmes Not Working – Experiences of Homeless People on the Work Programme, page 5; NCVO, 2012. The Work Programme – Perceptions and Experiences of the Voluntary Sector.
Table 2 – Job Outcomes by Programme Group
Programme Total No of % of As a % of our Caseload by clients clients total caseload of Programme in in work clients in this Group work programme group
JSA 18-24 53 15 28% 4.5%
JSA 25+ 294 55 19% 25%
JSA Early 107 12 11% 9% Access
JSA Ex IB 6 1 16% 0.05%
ESA volunteer 71 3 4% 6%
ESA Flow 534 23 4% 45%
ESA Ex IB 112 2 2% 9%
IBIS volunteer 10 1 10% 1%
Total 1188 112 10% 10.0%
11. The payment model is ineffective in reflecting claimants’ relative needs. Table 2 below shows that the inverse relationship between programme group and job outcomes is partially explained by the greater length of time invested in claimants from each programme group to achieve jobs. What it does not show is the intensity and type of support we provide or the variations of this support within each payment group.
12. We provide our clients with support that is tailored to their particular situation which we agree with the client within the Action Plan. Options include: employability skills training (job searching, interview skills, job searching, time keeping, prioritising), job coaching, group job searching, signposting and referral to specialist services to assist them with their health condition or disability, arranging work trials and volunteering.
13. We have finite delivery options due to the payment model and the resources this offers us for our client group. Our clients’ health conditions and disabilities often exclude group work as an effective or
appropriate method to deliver services to our clients. Consequently we deliver a high proportion of our activities on a one-to-one basis as this is the most effective way for our clients to engage with the service, it is also more resource and time consuming.
14. We work solely with clients with health conditions and disabilities across the 9 client payment groups. Approximately 70% of our clients have significant barriers to work, both related to the health and or disability and other factors such as lack of experience, housing, work history, literacy, English as a Second Language, criminal history, and lack of qualifications issues all recognised in the Harrington Review and Black/Frost reports as significant detractors of job success4. We estimate that at least half of this group will not be well enough to work within the 2 years of the work programme, as this case study shows.
A woman was referred to us a year ago for Work Programme services on an ESA (IR) WRAG 3/6 month programme. Her barriers to employment included dyslexia, anxiety attacks, suicidal thoughts, inability to focus, inability to travel alone, difficulties remembering appointments, limited work history. One year on she is volunteering with a local charity and has received some counselling. However her literacy, anxiety and depression remain significant barriers to her finding paid work.
15. The work programme’s ability to meet clients’ relative needs is undermined by how their fitness to work is assessed by the DWP and how this conflicts with their perception of their capability. Many clients who do not believe that they are fit to work, often supported by evidence from health professionals, do not understand why they have been to referred to the work programme when they have yet to complete their work capability assessment. This view is shared by people who have been assessed as fit for work who disagree with the WCA decision, again supported by their health care professionals. They do not view the WCA as a credible process nor the work programme a valid service for them given their situation. This is a common experience for clients who are have chronic, fluctuating and degenerative illnesses, like the client in this case study, which shows how little we are able to offer clients in this situation on the programme.
A 57 year old woman was referred onto the Work Programme on an ESA (IR) WRAG 3/6 month mandatory programme one year ago. Her barriers to work included being unable to climb stairs or walk
4 Black, Carol, and Frost, David. 2011. Health at Work – An Independent Review of Sickness Absence. DWP; Harrington, Malcolm. 2012. An Independent Review of the Work Capability Assessment – year three. DWP, page 36.
far due to acute arthritis in her neck, shoulders, legs and arm, experiencing chronic pain and migraines, and having not worked for over 10 years. During the year her health and wellbeing deteriorated and she was admitted to hospital for treatment. As a result her ability to engage with work related activity has been limited. Despite this, at her Work Capability Assessment 6 months after joining the programme, she was found to be fit for work, a decision she has appealed. She is now a non-mandatory client while she waits for the outcome of her appeal and has recently been readmitted to hospital for treatment. Her Advisor maintains monthly contact with her to monitor any changes in her situation which indicate that she is able to engage with work related activity.
16. The variations in job outcomes between programme groups appear to reflect client needs. Our ESA clients, once in work, tend to remain in work. However our JSA clients, particularly those receiving JSA 25+, have a 30% drop out rate. Interestingly this is far lower for JSA Early Access and JSA 18-24 years. There are several explanations for these variations: • Clients in these programme groups have fluctuating health conditions and disabilities such as drug and alcohol misuse and mental health conditions which affects their ability to remain in work. • Adapting to work is a process as reflected in the fact that four of our ESA clients (3 ESA Flow and 1 ESA Volunteer) had had one previous jobs before remaining in work, while one JSA 25+ customer had two jobs before remaining in their current job, see Table 3 below. • Job opportunities and support vary across the East London region as evidence in the spread of clients in work across each of the London Boroughs in Table 4 below. • People who have worked prior to joining the work programme are more likely to find work. • Those ESA clients who are able to work will tend to find work within 12-18months, while the estimates for JSA clients are 6- 12months.
Table 3 – Work Outcomes by Length of Support
Programme No of Number still Number who Length of clients in in work have Support - work sustained (excls in work support)
JSA 18-25 15 11 3 1-34 weeks
JSA 25+ 55 33 0 1-36 weeks
JSA Early Access 12 10 9 2 days – 24 weeks
JSA Ex IB 1 0 3 11 weeks
ESA volunteer 3 3 0 14-24 weeks
ESA Flow 23 20 1 1-21 weeks
ESA Ex IB 2 1 0 30-60 weeks
IBIS volunteer 1 1 2 58 weeks
Total 112 79 23
Table 4- Job Outcomes by London Borough
Borough JSA JSA 25+ JSA Early JSA Ex ESA ESA Flow ESA Ex IBIS Total 18-24 Access IB Volunteer IB Volunteer
Barking 3 4 1 8 &Dagenham
Bexley 2 1 3
Bromley 1 7 1 4 13
Croydon 2 5 2 1 2 4 1 1 18
Greenwich 5 1 6
Hackney 1 10 2 1 14
Havering 6 4 10
Lambeth 1 3 4 1 9
Lewisham 1 3 6 10
Merton 1 1
Newham 1 1
Redbridge 1 1
Southwark 2 1 3
Sutton 2 1 3
Tower Hamlets 3 1 1 5
Waltham Forest 4 1 1 6
Wandsworth 1 1
Total 15 55 12 1 3 23 2 1 112
17. We work closely with our clients to address their health and employability barriers, recognising that “the adequate provision of appropriate and targeted health services” is important if they are to return to work5. However our clients are finding it increasingly difficult to get the health and social care services they need to recover/manage their conditions. Clients are increasingly looking to us for help to fill the gaps in health and social care provision, which we cannot provide. Consequently client’s wellbeing is deteriorating, undermining our ability to develop their employability and sustain their engagement with the programme, as this case study shows.
A man was referred to us a year ago in the ESA (IR) WRAG 3/6 month group. His barriers to work are lack of work experience and mental health. He last worked 7 years ago and been taking strong mental health medication for many years. 12 months on and he is still waiting for anger management counselling as social services and local mental health charities have been unable to help. Our client’s mental health issues have increased and he is unable to focus on searching for work.
The prime provider model 18. The prime contractor model can be a valuable programme delivery tool. It can enable each prime to develop the supply chain it needs to deliver the appropriate services for its clients in its contract package area. Through the Primes, subcontractors can share best practice, employer engagement activity, and develop solutions.
19. The relationship between primes and the JCP has made communicating about operational matters difficult for us as providers. Until very recently Primes were the sole communication point with the JCP on Work Programme matters - strategic and operational. This was inefficient as providers often needed operational information quickly, which is not supported by the WP07 information request process. It also limits innovation and information sharing across the Contract Package Area with the JCP and other providers to help ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs. We are addressing this by developing relationships with each of the 20 JCPs where our clients have claims.
The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups 20. We vary the level of service we provide to participants in different payment groups according to their needs both in frequency and type, as demonstrated in Table 3 and paragraph 5. We endeavour to respond to our clients’ needs providing them with options and choice,
5 Dame Black, 2008, page 88.
while setting simple, measurable, achievable, realistic, time-limited objectives designed to move them into work or work related activities.
21. The DWP has issued minimum performance targets for each programme group i.e. the number of clients to find work in each year of the programme. The DWP has not issued minimum service delivery standards, this has been for each prime contractor to set out. These standards vary significantly limiting the ability to evaluate and compare the experience of all clients that receive work programme services. Also the standards only support the narrow objective of getting clients into work. They largely overlook service standards for those clients who are not expected to find work, people with multiple barriers, because their progress on the programme is not counted towards the performance targets for the programme.
22. To support improved performance our prime recently introduced changes to the service standards for its supply chain’s work programme delivery. They aim to increase job outcomes by increasing client activity, with a focus on those clients in programme groups who are seen to be work ready. An overall minimum standards framework would ensure appropriate service levels for all clients and discourage such inefficiency6.It would, as in other countries, give those clients who the government does not expect to find work with information about how they can expect to be treated, what service levels they can expect, and how providers will anticipate and deliver services.7
23. The DWP’s monitoring of minimum standards does not consider the varied activities needed for different programme groups to ensure that clients’ needs are being met. A minimum standards framework would enable the DWP to monitor consistent service standards across programme groups, for example, ensuring that the sanctioning is being used appropriately, “as a last resort to change behaviour or ensure compliance rather than as a prod to get customers into employment”.8
24. Including developmental outcomes in the minimum service standards framework, and linking this to the payment structure, is key to incentivising providers to support the people who hardest to help and often the least likely to secure sustained employment.9Providers would then be monitored on their clients’ achievement of softer outcomes that clients achieve as they prepare to find work. Indicators should include increased self confidence, resilience, and capability the client has developed.
6 Webster, Russell. 2012. Payment By Results – Calling in the Auditors.; Audit Commission, 2012. Local Payment by Results – Briefing: Payment by results for local services. 7 Profressor Ian Finn. 8 February 2012. Evidence to the Public Accounts Select Committee, question 36. 8 Community Links, 2012. 9 Community Links, 2012.
The “black box” approach to service delivery 25. We support the principle of the black box approach as a route to designing and achieving employment outcomes with each client that addresses their specific barriers to finding and staying in employment. Supporting people to find work must focus on their individual needs and provide them with options and choice. To deliver a black box approach for all clients an overall minimum service standard framework linked to a differential payments model that reflects clients’ different support needs.
26. A black box approach also requires reliable access to appropriate and targeted health and social care services. As stated in paragraph 10, this has not been our clients’ experience. Resources and partnership working needs to improve. This is complex work particularly in the context of the public sector transformation.
27. We provides additional resources to clients who are close to finding work who have simple barriers to employment such as needing a license to operate machinery, a health and safety qualification, or work clothing. We continue to integrate our services with health and social care services to sign post and refer clients as necessary, and are exploring co-location and drop in services to bring services closer to some clients with particular needs such as drug and alcohol misuse.
28. The action plans that JCPs send to each prime, who send it to us on referring a client, regarding our clients’ pathway to work prior to the work programme is basis on which we plan inductions, assess clients’ needs, and developing a working relationship. Unfortunately the action plans we receive are often patchy, dated, and in some cases, absent, something we are currently working on with our partner JCPs. This has resulted in clients being sent to us for a service without any warning that they were potentially violent or may pose safeguarding issues to clients and staff, clients have to retell their story which is frustrating and often upsetting, and critically it undermines our ability to work effectively with our clients. This is echoed in the DWP’s evaluation of the programme.10
10 Ibid, page 40-41
Recommendations
Please find below our recommended actions which we believe will improve the experiences and outcomes for all work programme clients.
29. The DWP to introduce a differential payment model that is based a client’s needs rather than on benefit type. This personalisation would be based on an in-depth needs assessment delivered by Jobcentre Plus as the service with a holistic understanding of local customers’ needs. This needs assessment will give prime contractors the information they need to create a “sophisticated and effective supply chain” that responds to the specific needs of the clients in their CPA11.
30. The DWP to implement Professor Harrington’s recommendations for ESA reform in full as a matter of urgency.
31. The DWP to work with local authorities and the NHS to prioritise access to appropriate and targeted health and social care services for people on The Work Programme.
32. The DWP to introduce an overall minimum service standards framework for the work programme which would then be used to evaluate the performance of primes and their supply chains. 33. Linked to recommendation 25, the DWP to issue guidance to JCPs on what information is required in action plans based on the personalisation principle set out in paragraph 23, and ensure that this is shared in full with primes and their supply chains during the referral process.
34. The DWP to publish the programme improvements that have been introduced following contract monitoring including the customer satisfaction surveys.
10 December 2012
11 Community Links, February 2012. Making the Work Programme Work, policy briefing.
Written evidence submitted by Gingerbread
1. Gingerbread is the national charity working with and for single parents. Employment issues form an important part of our policy and service delivery. We provide information, deliver employability programmes, and campaign on key aspects of the welfare system as they affect single parents seeking to get into and stay in work, and have recently launched a new campaign, Make it work for single parents, which includes the objective to get 250,000 more single parents into work by 2020.
2. Gingerbread is currently working on a research project exploring single parents’ experiences of employment support through both Jobcentre Plus and the Work Programme; however we are still in the process of analysing and writing up the research results so at this stage we are only able to give a brief outline of our findings as they relate to this inquiry. We aim to publish the research in early 2013 and would be keen to share the results with the committee at that stage in the hope that they can still influence the inquiry report. We would also be very willing to provide oral evidence if the timings for this fit with the inquiry and our report publication schedule.
3. The Work Programme data published on 27 November 2012 showed that: - 62,330 single parents were attached to the Work Programme between June 2011 and July 2012; this represented 7.44% of all participants out of the 836,940 attachments in totali - 1,650 single parents achieved job outcomes to the end of July 2012; out of 31,240 job outcomes in totalii. This equates to a single parent job outcome rate of 2.65%, compared to an overall job outcome rate of 3.73%iii
4. The following chart looks at performance on this basis across different providers:
5. Based on our research to date, and on the kinds of calls we have had through to our helpline from single parents on the Work Programme, our key concerns to date about how the Work Programme is working for single parents are as follows: - We believe there is a lack of understanding about single parents’ specific circumstances and employment barriers among Work Programme advisers - We believe that, in most cases, single parents are not receiving the tailored and personalised support that was intended to be a key feature of Work Programme provision - There is limited evidence of investment in skilling up. This is vital for the job sustainability that the Work Programme is intended to encourage. Single parents are disproportionately low-qualified and 68% enter work in the three lowest occupational groups which tend to be the least secure and lowest paid. This may partly account for the high rates of churn among this group (22% of single parents who start a job are back on JSA within 12 months)iv - We have seen particularly patchy understanding of and (financial) support for accessing childcare in order to take part in Work Programme activities, including regular meetings / appointments as well as training courses - We have concerns about the apparently weak awareness of minimum service guarantees and complaints processes (including the Independent Case Examiner) among single parent participants on the Work Programme.
7 December 2012 i http://83.244.183.180/WorkProg/wp_cuml_jo/lp_flag/contract/a_cnatt_r_lp_flag_c_contract_jul12.html ii http://83.244.183.180/WorkProg/wp_cuml_jo/lp_flag/contract/a_cnjo_r_lp_flag_c_contract_jul12.html iii To note that we recognise this is imperfect data given that job outcome payments can only be made, in most cases, 6 months after a participant has been in employment – but as a like-for-like comparison we believe it is a legitimate set of data to use iv Newis, P (2012) It’s off to work we go? Moving from income support to jobseeker’s allowance for single parents with a child aged five, Gingerbread Written evidence submitted by Ross Bradford
1 My name's Ross Bradford and I've been claiming Employment and Support Allowance since January 2010. I'm in the work related activity group (WRAG) and was put on the Work Programme in February 2012. I left it in June that year to join Work Choice. My provider was Triage Central who are a subcontractor to Ingeus UK who operate in Fife, Scotland where I live.
2 I had seven appointments with my provider Triage Central over the course of almost five months, six of which were Jobsearch appointments. Jobsearch is where they tell you to sit at a PC for an hour and use it to look for vacancies online. There's also some local newspapers on a desk. I've always looked for work online using my own PC at home and Triage Central didn't offer any extra support by making me do it on their premises. By forcing me to attend these appointments they made my Ulcerative Colitis harder to manage as travelling and attending extended appointments is very difficult. This is because I suffer a range of problems due to the Colitis, the main one being an inability to control my bowels. The only thing I ever received was an A4 sheet with some jobsites on it, four of which no longer worked. There was no privacy as computer screens faced the small room and only four phones were placed next to PCs enabling conversations and information sharing to be overheard by everyone.
3 At my induction with Triage Central, they simply handed me a bunch of forms to fill in and sign. The provider's own forms didn't make me aware that giving them extra personal information or permission to contact 3rd parties, was entirely optional. When I queried their right to demand I do so, one of the staff members wrote “mandatory” on the top of my form, effectively lying to me in order to get me to sign an optional consent form. I then sent in a letter telling them I withdrew consent which they claimed never to have received. They then admitted they had a record of it being delivered to their office but that they no longer had it in their possession. They also lost one of the forms I filled in for them at my induction. Both these lost documents contained personal data so I complained to the Information Commissioner's Office about it as they broke the rules of the Data Protection Act.
4 Two months after being referred I was supposed to have my first appointment with an adviser. When I arrived, I was told she was off sick. They rearranged my appointment for a month and a half later. When I turned up they told me my adviser was still off-sick. Another adviser was quickly found and she took me through the first appointment which was cut short when the PC broke down. At my next adviser appointment I turned up only to be told they would have to rearrange my appointment again as the computer system wasn't working that day. At that point I asked them to refer me back to Jobcentreplus so that I could try Work Choice, which I had only recently been made aware of. It took Triage Central three months to refer me back to Jobcentreplus which delayed my joining Work Choice and making use of that service.
5 At one appointment, I was told to record details of my job search and give the provider a copy of the form. I told them I didn't have to do this – as confirmed by a Freedom of Information request. They told me I would be sanctioned if I didn't do what they asked. I was then quoted regulations only relating to JSA claimants despite the fact I am, and always have been, on ESA. When I complained about this, the provider told me they saw nothing wrong with this person's conduct, even though she lied about the form being mandatory and tried to bully me into doing something optional by threatening me with a benefit sanction. Throughout my time with Triage Central they always seemed indifferent to me and only interested in what benefited them. There was no attempt to shape the service to suit my needs or even understand what those needs were.
6 Since I am disabled by my Colitis, I was worried that I would either be late for an appointment or miss it altogether due to being ill. When I asked Triage Central to confirm that they would acknowledge my disability and allow me to rearrange any appointments I had to miss, they refused to do so. I was only told it “would be a problem”. It wasn't until after I'd left the Work Programme and received a reply to my complaint that they confirmed they would rearrange appointments due to illness/disability. However, they refuse to tell participants this at their inductions. I don't think it's right that disabled people should be left in the dark and made to fear that if their illness/disability prevents attendance, they might risk their benefits being sanctioned.
7 When I left the Work Programme I complained about my experience. My complaint is ongoing and Triage Central has done nothing other than ignore, deny or point the finger of blame at anyone other than themselves. A copy of the complaints procedure is supposed to be given to each person at their induction. I not only didn't receive a copy but was fobbed off with a leaflet saying I was to “take it to my adviser in the first instance”. It took me two appointments and asking four different people before they finally printed off a copy of the complaints procedure for me. The DWP is not involved in complaints against providers – I can only complain to the provider subcontractor, then the provider prime then take it to the Independent Case Examiner.
8 The whole experience was an enormous waste of time. I didn't receive any help or support whatsoever nor did they ever take my disabilities into consideration. They had no awareness of the problems I faced in trying to find work and made no attempt to understand. The whole of the Work Programme service seems badly designed and poorly delivered. There is no redeeming feature.
Summary
• Lied to by provider about forms requesting consent and personal data. • Loss of personal data they held on me. ▪ Threatened with benefit sanctions when making a choice not to do something the DWP rules state are not mandatory. • Made no accommodation of the disabilities and illness I have. • Jobsearch appointments that didn't provide any help or support. • Failure to provide an adviser and implement the Work Programme fully. • Computers that kept breaking down. • Taking three months to refer me back to Jobcentreplus. • Failure to deal with my complaint.
6 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by David Marshall
1. My name is David Marshall, I’m 27 years old and I have qualifications in the Teaching and ICT profession. I have been on Jobseekers Allowance since January 2011 and have been job seeking ever since. I am limited to what jobs I can do due to physical and mental disabilities and ailments. However I fulfil my jobseekers agreement by applying for the jobs I can do. I am writing to you in response to the invitation this committee has extended towards participants on the Work Programme. I was placed on this government scheme in January 2012 and referred to Pertemps in York. Sufficed to say my experience there has been very unpleasant!
2. I have found my experience there to be unpleasant because they have failed to fairly assess my needs. They keep forgetting about my physical and mental problems and have on 2 occasions tried to get me work experience in a supermarket and also working in a bar. If they bothered to look at the health records they have of me, they will see I am incapable of doing this work and if I was capable I would apply for those jobs.
3. To further increase the unpleasantness of my experience there, they have constantly called me in for appointments there when I have been at York College training to get my teaching qualifications. York College have kindly given me 6 hours a week of work experience in order to attain my teaching qualification and thus increase my job prospects. However as mentioned Pertemps arranged appointments for me on the day I was having my training and made me miss and be late for important meetings with my manager in which we discuss student progress and my chances of getting a job at the college. I find this to be inconvenient and as such disrupt not only my education but also my job prospects too.
4. Also they persist to put me on training courses that I find unreasonable this is because I have had the training they provide at a level 4 standard at York College compared to the lowly level 1 that they cater for. The employment training was also unreasonable as there was no discussion prior to the meeting on August 8th about placing me on this training course. I will now go into more detail about this by stating an incident at Pertemps that occurred earlier this year:
5. During my previous meeting prior to August 8th my employment coach had a discussion with a female colleague about suitable courses for me. The employment coach stated my qualifications to his colleague and then he asked her: “Would there be any training we’ve got, that would actually benefit him?” His colleague then replied: “Probably not, in fairness.” She went on to say: “If you want to enter IT teaching, the only thing I think is useful is EPD. I think EPD is probably quite useful to be fair with you, the other reason being working as part of a team, following procedures, teamwork and all that.”
We agreed to discuss this further in my next meeting, however when that came on August the 8th I was informed that the EPD course had been discontinued and that I would be doing a training course about applying for jobs. I stated to my employment coach that I do not need help in doing job application forms as I know how to fill out a job application form as I did this training at college and on New Deal. My employment coach response to this was: “If your skills were up to scratch in relation to finding work, you wouldn’t be here; you’d be in a job.” My employment coach has not even once asked to see a job application from me in order to determine if I needed to do the Job Application training course. As a jobseeker who has gained teaching and training qualifications, I know when it comes to dealing with your students or customers; you need to fairly assess their needs using initial assessment in order to assist them appropriately. On a programme like this, it is important for a trainer to see the skills their customer has; this would include seeing their CV and their job applications.
6. My employment coach’s comments infer everyone unemployed cannot correctly fill out a job application form. I also have Dyspraxia (which prevents me from filling out job applications by hand), so any job applications are done on the computer. I have also shown a copy of a job application form I did on computer to a staff member of Ryedale Jobcentre Plus and they said it was: “Cracking”
7. Further on this matter I have found that from January up until September that Pertemps did not adhere to correct procedures (according to Work Programme Provider Guidance). I was not mandated correctly. The procedures Pertemps failed to follow were: • Did not issue a MAN (Mandatory Activity Notification) • A separate MAN for each activity • Notification the activity is mandatory • Does not display the Jobcentre Plus Logo • I also believe the activity to be unreasonable and unnecessary in my particular circumstances. • Also makes no provision for food throughout the day. (According to guidance, no participant should be out of pocket in regards to money when asked to do a Mandatory Activity)
8. To summarise what has being said in this document: I find my experience on the Work Programme to be unpleasant and it is disruptive to my attempts to find employment and training. Further I have found that Pertemps break the rules set out by your guidance and to be unprofessional, as they infer that all unemployed are incapable of filling out job application forms and don’t take into account a participants circumstances as to why they are unemployed. As mentioned my circumstances are that I have physical and mental problems that prevent me from doing certain jobs. Also my lack of work experience prevents me from finding employment. However as mentioned I have attained a work experience placement to improve my job prospects and I did this before even been assigned to the Work Programme, but as mentioned they interfere in that to make me attend appointments that could be done on any other day of the working week. I find the training and experience provided by Pertemps to be demeaning, degrading and unsuitable. While what they offer may be of help to an unemployed person with no education and training whatsoever, it is not suitable or acceptable for a person who has being educated and trained to a university standard. Further as shown by recent figures the Work Programme isn’t meeting Government targets and it has being found that people who are unemployed and NOT on the Work Programme have better luck of finding employment. This initiative requires a major overhaul that should cater for the individual needs of the unemployed to make sure they are getting the appropriate assistance they need, be it suitable training or work placements not just putting them in totally irrelevant and non-essential training and work experience.
7 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by Douglas Coombs Executive Summary
The philosophy and ideas underpinning the Work Programme are well intended; to provide ‘tailored support’, to assist people back into employment.
However, the transition from Work Programme philosophy and policy, to delivery at ground level, in order to benefit Work Programme customers has failed, to a large and unacceptable degree. The current Work Programme environment requires a purposeful review, in a timely manner with appropriate stakeholders to help facilitate a marked improvement, to the Work Programme statistics released by the Government in November 2012.
Having consulted a variety of stakeholders and investigated a number of issues, the Work Programme appears to be inherently weak from a structural, strategic and operational perspective.
The Black Box approach appears to have failed in many instances. The idea of enabling contractors (prime and subcontract) to be creative using their skills and experience, towards helping customers back into sustained work has not happened. Instead, in my experience, staid, old fashioned, inappropriate, ineffective approaches have been used to help customers; with an overt reliance on the use of job websites.
There are many areas of concern related to the competence and capability skillsets of Work Programme contractors. Of particular interest are two areas, Fit for purpose and Understanding of the job market.
Fit for Purpose
There has been an inability of some subcontractors to make the sizable upwards step change in order to provide a fit for purpose successful Work Programme operation. The Government strategy in reducing a number of welfare to work contracts down to one Work Programme has meant a seismic transition for Work Programme contractors, some of whom have failed to grasp the need for the use of proper change management. They have struggled to adapt to a changed size and scope in the welfare to work landscape and have failed to make the considerable transition to a very different business and job provision environment, the Work Programme.
Understanding of the Job Market
In reviewing three contractors there is no evidence found of the development, maintenance and management of job market knowledge, to a satisfactory level, in order to aid working with customers and employers, (to help get customers back into work).
In summary, I have never experienced such a disorganised, out of control, high value programme.
There is a need for change as a matter of urgency. It is personally not accepted that the failings of the Work Programme are only due to the economic downturn and the ‘ramp up’ period (for contractors). The basics of having a fit for purpose organisation in position, which delivers a good service and clearly understands its chosen market place (eg Welfare to Work sector), and meets customer needs, is as essential as has ever been, in order for an organisation to survive and hopefully thrive.
This is basic management.
In my opinion, the Government is getting very poor value for money from the current Work Programme.
1. Introduction
My interest primarily stems from being a customer of the Work Programme. I am a senior professional manager who has a career background in programme management, change management, fraud investigation and operations management, with experience across the private, public and charity sectors. This has included working on high value programmes (up to £4 billion) with responsibility for £400m budgets & 400+ staff. Of particular relevance is my experience working on a number of Government programmes and initiatives, including the audit investigation of a welfare to work contract.
2. Personal Experience of the Work Programme
The following 2 statements are found at the start of the DWP Work Programme Policy, where it is stated:
‘The Work Programme provides tailored support for claimants who need more help to undertake active and effective jobseeking. Participants receive support to overcome barriers that prevent them from finding and staying in work. It is delivered by DWP contracted service providers who have been given complete autonomy to decide how best to support participants while meeting their minimum service delivery standards’.
‘The Work Programme represents a step change for Welfare to Work in this country, creating a structure that treats people as individuals and allows providers greater freedom to tailor the right support to the individual needs of each claimant’.
2.1 I will reflect on my personal Work Programme journey, to share and highlight some of the problems I have experienced.
2.2 Personal Work Programme Journey ‐ I have been a customer on the Work Programme since August 2011, initially with Subcontractor one, which went into administration in October 2012. I was then transferred to Subcontractor two.
2.3 After joining the Work Programme, the process; from Subcontractor one, to understand my career, business background and personal barriers to finding work, and thereafter to identify a solution to help secure employment, took some 14 months to achieve, September 2012. This length of time to ascertain barriers and needs by the subcontractor is quite extraordinary – even this was only achieved after I wrote to the CEO of the Prime contractor.
2.4 During this period of 14 months it was established that my specific individual needs required specialist resources from outside of the Work Programme providers, to deliver an agreed appropriate and tailored solution for my Work Programme journey towards a return to employment.
2.5 Subcontractor one fully accepted the findings of an expert outplacement consultant appointed by the prime contractor and thereafter, Subcontractor one fully engaged with a suitable provider to investigate the delivery of such an appropriate service and tailored solution.
2.6 In October 2012, Subcontractor one unfortunately went into administration and I was transferred as a Work Programme customer to Subcontractor two. Even though I was informed on numerous occasions that there would be a “seamless transition” during the transfer of my support between Subcontractor one and Subcontractor two, this has not been the case at all, not only with regard to the continued engagement with the external provider but in other areas also. The handover took ten weeks, where there was no support.
2.7 After having now completed a number of meetings with Subcontractor two, some major issues have now become clear, namely:
2.8 (1) The specific, appropriate and tailored solution, as identified and agreed as both necessary and appropriate, both by an external outplacement specialist, (appointed by the prime provider), other professionals and Subcontractor one, this solution has been ignored. This solution meets the ‘tailored approach’ as determined by the DWP Work Programme Policy. In effect , such an about turn , means that 14 months is wasted and also a return to the old, staid and inappropriate approach to Job search, which was tried by Subcontractor one and failed over a long duration. Why repeat a failed approach? In effect it is to a large degree like starting the Work Programme again.
2.9 (2) The Subcontractor two advisor has stated on numerous occasions that he is only interested in the ‘visible 10% of the senior management job marketplace’ and as such has stated that he is not interested in the remaining 90%. This is very concerning; ignoring a possible 90% of the job market is not the correct approach to moving forward.
2.10 I have now spent a considerable time trying to resolve these two mentioned issues, with Subcontractor two to no avail. wI am no working with my MP to move matters forward after having been through a number of complaints procedures across 16 months and discussions with the ICE (Independent Case Examiner).
2.11 Ironically, perhaps the biggest barrier for me as a Work Programme customer is the Work Programme itself, which I have found though personal experience to be structurally, strategically and operationally weak.
3. Recommendations
3.1 Extend the duration of the Work Programme for customers to three years. This is due to the extended ‘ramp up’ period by contractors and the continuing economic downturn.
3.2 There is a need for the welfare to work environment to be regulated effectively. This needs to be explored as a matter of urgency with a consideration to open accounting procedures being introduced.
3.3 Consideration of a grant to review the training of staff who work in the welfare to work sector. The Institute of Employability Professionals may be able to assist in this matter.
3.4 Soft Systems Methodology to be employed as a management solution tool – this is particularly relevant for complex problems and could be of benefit to the Work Programme.
3.5 The current Black Box approach needs to be addressed as (1) contractors often default to a minimum service level, where cost considerations are placed ahead of quality and (2) the black box can transform to become a Pandora’s Box, if not managed correctly.
3.6 Symposium – it is proposed a symposium is held early in 2013. Its prime function would be to understand and improve the key supply chain process at high level, between representatives of Work Programme customers, contractors and also employers, at the final and very important end stages of the supply chain (job search to job secured). The problem definition and terms of reference for the symposium would need to be carefully thought through, be purposeful and focussed. The conclusions would then be reviewed by appropriate parties, to provide agreed objectives, prior to the development of a fast track project in order to re engineer current processes and governance structures. This approach could help provide a more effective Work Programme to get increased numbers of customers back into sustained work. 10 December 2012 Written evidence submitted by Prospects Services
1. Background:
1.1 Prospects is a leading education, employment and training services company, working nationally and internationally. We estimate we help more than one million people each year, through an extensive range of high quality services. We are one of the first and largest new public sector mutuals, with shares allocated to managers and staff, as an employee-owned company.
1.2 Our services include:
Careers services for adults and young people, including the face-to-face element of the National Careers Service in three regions
Advice and guidance for offenders in Greater London and Yorkshire & Humber
The Work Programme, the government's major initiative to help long term unemployed back to work, in the South West and London.
Ofsted Early Years Inspection Services in the Midlands and North of England
Youth Contract, targeted support for NEET (Not in Education, Employment or Training) young people in the West Midlands and Yorkshire and Humber
An extensive range of education consultancy and school improvement services.
1.3 We are also widely recognised for expertise in event management, recruitment, community regeneration and educational resources. Gabbitas, one of the most trusted names in independent education, is part of the Prospects Group.
2. Summary
It is Prospects’ experience and belief that:
2.1 The differential payments model is suitably flexible for all payment groups and does not encourage creaming or parking.
2.2 The prime provider model provides an overarching framework but does not preclude innovation and flexibility at subcontractor level in response to local circumstances.
2.3 There could be some standardisation in service standards across providers, and there is room for rationalisation of measures used for monitoring. This would lead to greater consistency and reduced duplication of effort.
2.4 The complaints procedures operated internally and by DWP are both rigorous and effective.
2.5 The black box approach ensures innovation and allows for greater flexibility responding to changes in the needs of different payment groups.
2.6 Competition is a valuable element of the model. It would be useful to share more performance data on conversions and job starts.
2.7 We would welcome greater co-ordination through a CPA steering group, involving relevant stakeholders in an area.
3. Differential Payments Model including: the extent to which it is incentivising providers to help all participants and thereby addressing “creaming and parking”; how effectively the model reflects claimants’ relative needs; and variations in job outcomes between the different payment groups;
3.1 The differential payments model is flexible enough to cover all payment groups.
3.2 We do not believe that the model incentivises creaming and parking by our own staff or our subcontractors, and have not seen evidence of this in our own internal monitoring and contract management.
4. The prime provider model including: its impact on subcontractors; and the extent to which it helps ensure that participants receive services tailored to their particular needs
4.1 We believe the prime provider model’s key impact is in securing adherence by subcontractors to an overall approach and methodology.
4.2 Our “ASCENT” model is highly innovative and is specifically designed to allow for maximum flexibility to ensure an individualised programme can be developed.
4.3 Subcontractors are able to adapt delivery to take account of local labour market conditions and available resources.
4.4 Ongoing training and support is offered to subcontractors as the ASCENT model is developed and finessed on the basis of delivery experience.
5. The level of service provided to participants in different payment groups including: whether minimum service delivery standards have been specified in sufficient detail by providers and DWP; and the rigour and effectiveness of DWP’s monitoring and complaints procedures;
5.1 We believe it could be helpful to move to greater consistency in minimum service delivery standards. At present some Prime Contractors have devised less stringent service standards than others and this makes comparison between providers more difficult.
5.2 All customers have a copy of the minimum service standards they should expect, issued by JCP advisers. No concerns have been raised by customers in relation to this.
5.3 We have found subcontractors are happy with the level of detail specified in the minimum delivery standards, and have not encountered any concerns. An example is that we have made a commitment to meet customers within 30 minutes travel time from their home. This could have been an issue for some subcontractors due to the rural nature of parts of the South West covered by the contract area, but subcontractors have not raised any issues regarding this standard.
5.4 DWP monitoring is, in our experience, rigorous and effective. We believe the schedule of meetings, audits and reviews is an appropriate mechanism for monitoring contract performance and also protecting against fraud and managing risk in a complex programme. The stringent PAT audit is a rigorous process to monitor a variety of contractual obligations.
5.5 We do believe there are potential areas for improvement in monitoring procedures and a review of current arrangements might lead to greater consistency and reduce duplication of activity by different groups involved in monitoring. We believe rationalisation could give rise to potential cost savings, without reduction in the effectiveness of audit and performance management processes.
5.6 Our complaints process has operated effectively, and this is demonstrated by the low number of complaints (five in number) being escalated to the Independent Case Examiner.
5.7 It has been our experience that some complaints arise because of unrealistic expectations on the part of customers, arising from the way the programme was explained to them by Jobcentre Plus staff. In some cases additional training and explanatory resources could be needed to ensure clear and realistic expectations are fully understood by both referring staff and their customers.
6. The “black box” approach to service delivery including: whether it is proving to be effective in fostering innovative and personalised interventions for claimants in all payment groups; and DWP’s role in monitoring this
6.1 The “Black box” approach has been fundamental to ensuring innovation and personalisation within the Work Programme.
6.2 The approach allows a greater degree of flexibility, so for example in the last month we have seen an increasing number of customers in payment groups six and seven. We have been able to respond much more easily and quickly than would have been the case with a more prescriptive delivery model.
7. Regional variations in job outcome statistics: including whether competition between providers is driving up performance in contract package areas where the economy is particularly depressed; and how provider performance could be improved in these areas
7.1 We believe that competition between providers in an area is healthy and drives up performance.
7.2 We would welcome the opportunity to compare conversion rates, with more comparative data on job starts as well as job outcomes at a regional level.
7.3 There are unique factors affecting CPA area 11, including the rural nature of many customers’ locations, higher than average deprivation levels, adequacy of public transport, and a tradition of seasonal employment.
7.4 Provider performance could be improved by challenging the culture of seasonal workers taking six months off work when the season ends, by a greater “job stitching”
approach. This would seek to establish a pipeline of opportunities as seasonal work ends.
7.5 Greater co-ordination could be achieved through a CPA Steering group involving all local authorities and other relevant organisations in the region, providing an opportunity for more strategic forward planning. For example, in Bridgwater our awareness of plans for new Tesco and Mulberry sites have allowed us to work with these employers to identify suitable opportunities for Work Programme participants, putting in place bespoke training for these customers in advance, helping employers with selection of employees.
11 December 2012
Written evidence submitted by Crisis
Introduction
1. Crisis, the national charity for single homeless people, welcomes this inquiry into the Work Programme (WP) and the experience of different user groups.
2. Crisis has a wealth of experience supporting vulnerable people into work. Within our Crisis Skylight centres, we have a dedicated employment team which helps people to prepare for, find and sustain work. We work in partnership with a range of organisations including employers, training providers, colleges and other homeless organisations, matching people to appropriate opportunities and jobs.
3. We have an excellent track record of supporting homeless people into employment. In 2011-12, Crisis supported 5,940 homeless people into formal and informal learning, 423 into paid employment, and 305 into volunteering. We also have a WP contract in the North East.
4. In addition, the Crisis Welfare Network is part funded by the European Social Fund specifically to bring small and specialist organisations together to empower them to support homeless people into suitable, sustainable and progressive employment. The Crisis Welfare Network holds regular seminars and forums across every English region for its members and also gathers the views and experience of current and former clients of its members.
5. The following response reflects Crisis’ clients’ experiences and those of the members of the Crisis Welfare Network. In particular, it draws on research1 recently carried out by Crisis, St Mungo’s and Homeless Link, exploring to what extent the WP is helping single homeless people to find work. The researchers spoke to people who are homeless across England; 81 people responded across two surveys, one by Crisis/St Mungo’s and one by Homeless Link. 20 in-depth qualitative interviews were also undertaken with people experiencing homelessness and who are or have been on the WP.
Summary
6. Crisis is concerned that people who are homeless are not currently being identified as such by Jobcentre Plus and so are not being placed in the correct WP payment group. Providers therefore do not receive increased payments to offer the more intensive support required to help people who are homeless into sustained employment.
7. Our experience and research suggests that homeless people’s barriers to employment are not being effectively identified and assessed by WP providers. 58 per cent of the homeless people we surveyed had not been talked to by their WP adviser about their barriers to employment.
8. We have found that standards of service received by homeless people on the WP are worryingly low and many of our clients feel they have been largely ignored by their WP providers. More than half of the homeless people
1 Crisis, Homeless Link and St Mungo’s (2012) The Programme's Not Working: Experiences of homeless people on the WP. http://www.crisis.org.uk/publications-search.php?fullitem=374
surveyed saw their adviser once a month or less and 58 per cent felt that their WP adviser did not treat them with dignity and respect.
9. We do not believe the WP is delivering the kind of personalised, specialist support that people who are homeless need to get into employment. A contributory factor to this is that sub-contractors are not being effectively used to support people into employment with some smaller specialist organisations having withdrawn from the programme entirely. As an example there are now no specialist providers of homeless employment support for people on the WP in London.
10. We are extremely concerned that people’s vulnerability is not being considered before they are sanctioned and that those who face the most severe barriers to employment are being unfairly punished. More than a fifth of people we surveyed had been sanctioned and lost some or all of their benefits. Homeless people are amongst the most vulnerable in society and it is very worrying that so many appear to be subject to sanctions.
11. We believe a different approach is required for those who face the most severe barriers to finding work and that the WP’s funding model should be reconfigured to better reflect those barriers.
12. We are also concerned that charities, including Crisis, are in effect subsidising the WP. When organisations that are not part of the WP support homeless people into work, the Prime Contractor will still receive the job outcome payment even though they did not contribute towards helping someone find employment. As well as being unfair to the charities involved, this is a terrible waste of tax payers’ money.
Identifying claimants who are homeless and their barriers
13. Through the work of the Crisis Welfare Network and discussions with several other homelessness service providers we have learned that many people who are homeless - including a number of people who are actually sleeping rough on the streets - are not being identified as such by Jobcentre Plus when they are referred into the WP.
14. If people who are homeless are not being placed in the correct claimant group then WP providers will not be receiving additional payments in order to give the more intensive support that is required for helping homeless people into work. This undermines a central principle of the WP and brings a risk that providers will direct resources away from people who are homeless and towards those who need less help, and are less expensive to support, to enter work.
15. We believe Jobcentre Plus should work closely with local homelessness agencies to better understand the needs of the client group. Jobcentre Plus should have staff who specialise in working with people in housing need.
16. When reviewing a benefit claim, Jobcentre Plus staff need to be able to see whether a provided address is supported accommodation. Benefit claim forms should therefore ask people whether they are homeless and/or live in supported accommodation, such as a hostel.
17. It would also be beneficial if DWP introduced a quick review process for cases in which WP providers believe an individual has been referred to the wrong customer group. Claimants should be quickly reassessed by Jobcentre Plus and payments to WP providers adjusted accordingly.
18. It also appears that many WP providers are not assessing other barriers that people on the WP may face. We have heard of WP providers failing to ask participants about the issues that may be making it more difficult for them to find a job. We know that many homeless people suffer problems with drug or alcohol dependency and that this is not always being identified as a barrier by WP providers. The survey we conducted revealed that 58 per cent of homeless people had not been talked to by their WP adviser about their barriers to employment.
19. WP Prime Contractors need to be identifying the many factors that often prevent people who are homeless from entering employment. To improve their processes, we suggest WP providers, in partnership with the homelessness sector, continually review the effectiveness of their diagnostic tools; the better they understand their customers’ barriers to work, the easier it will be to support them to find and secure employment.
Improving standards of service and delivering personalised, specialist support
20. We have found a mixed picture in regards to the standards of service homeless people have experienced on the WP. Some have told us that they felt they have been treated well, with respect and that it has been easy to access and talk to advisers.
21. It should also be noted, however, that this is not the case for many - more than half of people surveyed saw their adviser once a month or less and 58 per cent felt that their WP adviser did not treat them with dignity and respect. In addition, many of the people we spoke to had been largely ignored by their providers, others reported not being listened to and a range of other negative experiences. One Crisis member reported that his WP provider did not want to see him for four months. He believes that he has been treated “very poorly – meant to be helping me back to work, appalling that they are waiting four months to see me again”.
22. This is a particular problem for many people who are homeless as it often reinforces feelings of low self-worth and trust which can stem from being repeatedly let down by services in the past. It also makes it more difficult for people to build structure into their lives, which is an important part of recovering from homelessness.
23. Most of the people we interviewed and surveyed had received support with their CV, searching for work and interview training. It is particularly concerning, however, that in many cases specialist support which addresses individual need is not being delivered. Instead it seems that WP providers are taking a standardised approach, without sufficient regard or response to individual need and barriers.
24. For example, in an in depth interview, Crisis client Tom told us he was referred to an English class by his WP provider, even though he had a GCSE
in English language: “They did not look at what I can do but because I was black I was told to do English based on that fact that I was from Africa.”
25. We have found instances where being referred to the WP has meant that people are unable to attend existing employment related courses. Homeless people that we talked to had been told that while Jobcentre Plus would have paid for these courses, their WP provider will not. As they were now on the WP, Jobcentre Plus could no longer pay for them.
26. There also seems to be much confusion amongst both people who are homeless and Jobcentre Plus in identifying who is actually on the WP.
27. In order to encourage more individualised action planning, to reflect the type of service each person needs and increase the frequency they receive it, WP providers should develop more specific minimum service offers which help people to understand what level of service they can expect. This minimum offer should not be determined by the type of benefit an individual is receiving. Payments should instead reflect the numbers of barriers individuals face when attempting to move into work.
28. It would also help if WP providers ensured that participants are aware of these minimum service offers and know where to address complaints, if these standards are not being met.
Considering vulnerability before sanctioning
29. The number of people subject to sanctions has increased dramatically since the introduction of the WP.2 Jobcentre Plus whistleblowers have previously suggested that those ‘easiest’ to sanction, including those who have learning difficulties, are targeted3.
30. In this context it is very worrying that such a high proportion (22 per cent) of the homeless people on the WP that were surveyed by Homeless Link have been sanctioned.
31. We understand that DWP and WP providers see the possibility of sanctions as providing a useful motivational tool, but we are extremely concerned that a consequence of sanctioning may be to unfairly punish those who face the most severe barriers to employment.
32. We are also concerned that, given the findings of our research, it is likely that many people who are homeless have been sanctioned without receiving the support that they are entitled to from their WP provider.
33. We firmly believe that providers and Jobcentre Plus should do more to consider people’s vulnerabilities before they are sanctioned. In order to help achieve this, DWP should extend the existing ESA duty to consider an
2 Corporate Watch (2012) Revealed: the punishing reality of the coalition’s welfare reforms. http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=4371 3 Domokos, J. Guardian, 8 April (2011) Government admits Jobcentres set targets to take away benefits. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/apr/08/jobcentres-benefits-sanctions- targets
individual’s vulnerability prior to raising a compliance doubt so that it also applies to the JSA Early Access group.
Reconfiguring the funding model to better reflect barriers to employment
34. The maximum payment a Prime Contractor can receive for helping someone from the group that specifically includes people who are homeless (JSA Early Access) into sustained employment is £6,600 over a two year period.
35. A report from Off the Streets and into Work (OSW) estimates that the cost of someone remaining homeless to be £28,567 per year.4 Moving into work can be crucial in enabling people to make a sustainable move out of homelessness.5 Another report by the Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion for OSW estimated in 2010 that moving people in hostels into employment saves the Government £197.83 per person per week.6
36. Given the scale of these potential savings, there is clearly a strong case for investing more in supporting those further from the labour market including offering intensive and highly specialised services.
37. We would like to see DWP change the payment structure so that providers are better incentivised to invest time and resources in supporting those who face the most severe barriers to employment. There should be recognition of how vitally important ‘distance travelled’ measures are for homeless individuals’ journey towards employment.
38. There is also a need for a preparatory ‘pre-work programme’ for those who are the least likely to succeed on the WP. This type of support is already offered by Crisis and others outside of the WP and we would like to see specific pre-WP funding made available.
Role of the voluntary sector
39. Much of the expertise in understanding and supporting people with vulnerabilities, whether within or outside of the WP, lies with voluntary organisations, some of whom are WP sub-contractors.
4 Fothergill, M. (2008) The right deal for homeless people, A report for Off the Streets and into Work http://www.crisis.org.uk/data/files/admin_uploads/3xE/navigable_pdf_final_version_15042008 .pdf 5 Lownsbrough, H, Crisis and Demos (2005) Include me in: how life skills help homeless people back into work http://www.socialfirmsuk.co.uk/resources/research/include-me-how-life- skills-help-homeless-people-back-work 6 Inclusion, prepared for Off the Streets and into Work (2010) Report of the cost-benefit evaluation of the Transitional Spaces Project, http://www.cesi.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/OSW_cost_benefit_report_transitional_s paces_project_0.pdf
40. Recent research has, however, found that sub-contractors across the WP are not receiving as many referrals as they expected from Prime Contractors7. This is despite the Government’s assertion that “the WP is likely to represent an investment of several hundred million pounds in the voluntary sector.”
41. This disappointing picture is borne out by Crisis Employment Services’ sub- contracting experience in the North East, where there have been just 16 referrals from the WP provider since January 2012.
42. Several other organisations with expertise in helping homeless people into work became WP providers in June 2011. In early 2012, however, St Mungo’s left the WP after not receiving a single referral over nine months. Single Homeless Project (SHP) also withdrew, citing a lack of referrals. A recent NCVO survey of charities on the WP found that 47 per cent of respondents felt that their contracts were at risk of failure within the next six months and 26 per cent thought they were at risk of failure before the end of their contract.8 There is currently no specialist provider of employment support for people who are homeless available on the WP in London.
43. As involvement in the WP becomes financially unsustainable for charities, more may be forced to leave. This could mean that there is less effective support available for the most disadvantaged and those furthest from employment, as it is often these people that charities specialise in supporting.
44. We believe WP rules should be changed to ensure that sub-contractors are able to plan their services better. The Merlin Standard9 should require Prime Contractors to give an indication of how many referrals an organisation can expect to receive when they first join the WP, so that sub-contractors can better plan their future delivery. Where actual referrals fall below these indicative volumes, prime providers should be required to give an explanation.
45. In addition to those providing specialist support within the WP, many voluntary agencies, including Crisis, continue to provide employment support outside of the WP including to clients who are on the WP.
46. Many of our clients, as well as other homeless people we surveyed and talked to as part of our research, have received very little support from their WP provider and have been encouraged to carry on accessing support from Crisis and other homelessness charities. The perverse consequence of this is that while charities continue to support homeless people into work, the Prime Contractor will ultimately be paid thousands of pounds for a job outcome they did not contribute towards, with charities effectively subsidising the WP.
47. There have been a number of occasions where Crisis have supported people into work who have effectively been ‘parked’ by the WP provider. One client who has been supported by Crisis since 2010 was referred to the WP in 2012, and when his WP adviser found out he was volunteering with Crisis,
7 National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 2012, The WP: Perceptions and Experiences of the Voluntary Sector, http://www.ncvo- vol.org.uk/sites/default/files/sig_survey_june_2012_report_17.9.12.pdf 8 National Council for Voluntary Organisations (2012) The WP: Perceptions and Experiences of the Voluntary Sector. http://www.ncvo- vol.org.uk/sites/default/files/sig_survey_june_2012_report_17.9.12.pdf 9 See Merlin Standard website: http://www.merlinstandard.co.uk/
effectively left him to his own devises, offering no meetings, advice or guidance. Crisis has since employed the client and the prime contractor will now get paid for the employment outcome and work that Crisis have done.
48. Crisis relies largely on charitable income and so our employment services only have a limited capacity. We are concerned that if we have to continue to subsidise the WP due to the lack of specialist services available and as demand increases, we may find ourselves in a position where we cannot support as many people as we would like and as who need our assistance.
49. We are also concerned that, without the correct, targeted support from specialist organisations, successful employment outcomes for homeless people will be few and far between. We believe Prime Contractors, Jobcentre Plus and specialist organisations should work more closely together to deliver a WP that better supports the most vulnerable and those furthest from the labour market into employment.
About Crisis Crisis is the national charity for single homeless people. We are dedicated to ending homelessness by delivering life-changing services and campaigning for change. Our innovative education, employment, housing and well-being services address individual needs and help people to transform their lives.
As well as delivering services, we are determined campaigners, working to prevent people from becoming homeless and advocating solutions informed by research and our direct experience. Crisis has ambitious plans for the future and we are committed to help more people in more places across the UK. We know we won’t end homelessness overnight or on our own but we take a lead, collaborate with others and, together, make change happen.
12 December 2012