Xi Ways Xi Is Changing Chinese Security
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OVERSEAS SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL XI WAYS XI IS CHANGING CHINESE SECURITY NOVEMBER 2015 The contents of this (U) presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department of State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation was compiled from various open sources and (U) embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S. private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC- derived information in a manner inconsistent with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support. XI Ways Xi is Changing Chinese Security XI I Executive Summary X II The New Normal IX ` III After decades of double-digit growth, the Chinese economy is showing signs of much more modest performance. VIII Wary of the implications of this slowdown on social stability, the Communist Party of China, led by President Xi IV Jinping, appears to be heightening measures to consolidate control and minimize any threats to its authority. VII V While suggestions that the Party is facing an existential crisis may be premature, the terms and conditions of VI operating in China are likely to become more difficult for the private sector. Compliance, Labor, & Intellectual Property I. The Communist Party and the private sector are both targeting corruption – but for different reasons – complicating the ability to conduct due diligence. II. Companies looking to scale back their operations should prepare contingency scenarios, as authorities may be reluctant to arbitrate in their favor. III. Threats to intellectual property are unlikely to disappear and could get worse as the country moves toward “innovation” as a driver of the economy. Censorship & Access to Information IV. The list of subjects that are off-limits in China appears to be growing, with hundreds of journalist detained already this year. V. Use of social media has been further restricted, as it may represent one of the most likely sources of collective resistance. VI. Lack of objective and comprehensive reporting will increasingly challenge the private sector’s ability to make real-time safety and security decisions. National Security & Foreign Policy VII. A year long “crackdown on terrorism” has done little to resolve the root causes of extremism in China and may actually exacerbate tensions. VIII. The real value of disputed maritime claims may be the conditional political capital derived from leveraging nationalist sentiment. Legislation & Regulation IX. “Rule of law” efforts may be more interested in consolidating and codifying authority than establishing a transparent legal framework. X. New laws may be used to increase pressure on foreign NGOs, whose influence is perceived to be a threat to the Communist Party. XI. Legislation could emphasize “national security” as a pretext to bolster domestic industry. Introduction A “new normal” for China China has achieved one of the most remarkable periods of sustained economic development in history. From China Annual GDP Growth (1978-2014) 1978 to 2013, the economy grew at an average annual rate of nearly 10 percent, doubling in GDP every eight years and lifting more than 400 million people out of poverty. This reliable economic performance and 16 2003-2007 consistent improvement in the Chinese quality of life became a pillar of legitimacy for the Chinese 14 11.5% Communist Party, which has ruled the country uncontested since 1949. 12 Recent figures, however, suggest China is now entering a chapter of more modest development. Though still 10 impressive in absolute terms, last year’s growth rate of 7.4 percent was the lowest in nearly a quarter century. Policymakers are faced with the tough task of implementing difficult economic reforms – which could 8 lead to even further declines – while still meeting self-imposed growth targets. This challenge is compounded 1978-2013 6 10% by increasing income inequality, environmental degradation, an aging workforce, and mounting debt. 2014 4 7.4% The economic slowdown (or “new normal” as it is referred to by Beijing) has coincided with the ascension of 2 President Xi Jinping. Drawing on lessons from the Soviet Union’s experiments with social and political reform in the late 1980s, and its subsequent collapse, Xi appears concerned about threats to the party and anxious 0 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 to reassert control. This retrenchment is evidenced by a sweeping campaign against corruption, an increasingly restrictive censorship regime, an assertive domestic security and foreign policy posture, and a Source: World Bank host of opaque and evolving security laws. Fortunately for the U.S. private sector, these trends do not necessarily indicate that the Party is facing an existential crisis or that massive political unrest is imminent – notions of the Party’s “inevitable” collapse have been around for decades but the Party has proven remarkably resilient. Nor should the evolving security environment necessarily deter private sector organizations from entering China or cause those with existing operations to reconsider their presence. The terms and conditions of operating in China, however, are changing. Even if it remains too early to determine President Xi’s ultimate impact on the private sector, risk managers and intelligence analysts who take a more holistic view of security – incorporating issues like rule of law, access to information, nationalism, due diligence, and labor – may be better equipped to address a number of potential challenges on the horizon. Xi Jinping President of China, 2013 - 3 Compliance, Labor, & Intellectual Property I. Anti-corruption campaign highlights due diligence challenges One of the hallmarks of Xi’s presidency has been his campaign against corruption. Hundreds of thousands of Party Corruption investigations on the rise members have already been investigated for “extravagance, formalism, and bureaucratism,” a euphemism for 77,606 graft, with over 70,000 punished in 2014 alone. While a majority of these cases involves officials at the local or 71,748 municipal levels, at least 80 current or former senior officials – commonly referred to in China as “tigers” – have been punished since Xi come to power. As to why, it is unlikely that Xi’s campaign against corruption can be reduced to a singular motive. A better explanation is that it accomplishes a number of strategic goals, such as 30,420 restoring public faith in the integrity of the Party; targeting prospective challengers within the Party; and improving 24,521 23,646 the efficiency of government, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the military. 7,742 The first lesson for the U.S. private sector is that Xi’s campaign highlights the prevalence of corruption in China. Number of Number Number severely Though much of the ill-gotten wealth of those who have been investigated may have come from SOEs, investigations disciplined disciplined confiscation and resale of land, or embezzlement, corruption continues to adversely impact the U.S. private sector Dec 12 - Dec 13 Jan 14 - Dec 14 as well. Organizations operating in China are encouraged to conduct due diligence to ensure the integrity of any Source: Foreign Policy potential business ventures and to be wary of individuals or enterprises who may expect bribes. Notable Senior Officials (“Tigers”) The second lesson may be a somewhat ironic derivative of the first. Regardless of the motives of the anti-graft effort, it seems to be tightly controlled. President Xi and his powerful anti-corruption czar, Wang Qishan, do not appear to need or to want help from outsiders; on the contrary, Xi and Wang may be wary of unsanctioned investigations that identify too much too fast or that condemn the wrong people. As a result, while the Party and the private sector are both attempting to identify instances of corruption, the targeted nature of the former may complicate the ability of the latter. To tighten its grip on the anti-corruption campaign, Beijing has implemented new rules restricting access to Zhou Yongkang Bo Xilai company records at local industry and commerce bureaus – information which had previously allowed compliance Sec. of Central Political & Secretary of Communist Legal Affairs Commission Party for Chongqing teams and due diligence investigators to vet potential business partners on the grounds of corruption or malpractice. Such information can be particularly valuable in China, where millions of individuals share the same surname, company documents are relatively easy to manufacture, and official records are often kept close hold. Those who trade in this information run the risk of being charged with “selling or unlawfully transferring personal information,” as was the case with a British investigator who recently spent nearly two years in a Chinese prison. Non-transparent rules regarding personal information make it difficult to provide explicit guidance. When in doubt, the private sector is encouraged to work through local experts who speak the language, understand the legal Ling Jihua Su Shulin environment, and are better equipped to avoid the pitfalls of potentially compromising due diligence investigations. Principal Advisor to Former Incumbent Governor, President Hu Jintao Fujian Province 4 Compliance, Labor, & Intellectual Property II. Economic slowdown presents labor challenges One of the principal drivers of China’s current economic slowdown has been a shrinking of