Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire Burned Area Emergency Response Process
Facilitated Learning Analysis
July • 2013
Gila National Forest
Whitewater-Baldy Complex BAER Process • Facilitated Learning Analysis 1
Photos by KC Shedden
Severe burn effects in the aftermath of the Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire.
Contents
1. Leader’s Intent…...…………………………………………………..… 3
2. Background…….………………………………….……….….……..… 4
3. BAER Team Chronology…………………………………….….…..… 6
4. Contracting……………………..….…..…………………………….… 12 A. Contracting Findings………………………………………………… 12 B. Contracting Recommendations……………………………………… 14
5. Findings and General Lessons Learned…………..…..….………….… 17
6. Recommendations………………………….……………..…...……..… 21
7. Commendations………………………….……………..….…….…..… 25
8. Facilitated Learning Analysis Team……………………….………..… 26
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1. Leader’s Intent
On February 26, 2013, Kelly M. Russell, Forest Supervisor of the Gila National Forest, requested that a Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA) be conducted to analyze and report on the Whitewater-Baldy Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) process that occurred on the Gila National Forest in the spring and summer of 2012.
Russell named Bea Day, Forest Fire Management Officer, Cibola National Forest and Grasslands, to serve as the FLA’s Team Leader—with full authority to execute and complete an FLA following the procedures described in the 2012 Facilitated Learning Analysis Implementation Guide.
In her Delegation of Authority, Russell requested the following to be included in the FLA report:
A thorough description of issues encountered during the BAER assessment and implementation process;
Areas of potential improvement to the BAER process, and
Recommendations at the Forest, Regional or National level pertaining to the BAER process and/or policy.
In addition, Forest Supervisor Russell also requested that a synopsis of the lessons learned that occurred during the Whitewater -Baldy BAER effort be addressed in the FLA report.
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2. Background
Whitewater-Baldy Complex BAER Team Purpose
A Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) Team is an interdisciplinary group of specialists whose job is to identify and assess values-at-risk from a fire’s “after effects”—such as erosion or flooding.
The Whitewater-Baldy Complex BAER Team was composed of specialists in various fields, including: hydrologists, soil scientists, wildlife biologists, geologists, ecologists, suppression team liaison, engineers, cultural resources specialists, and geographic information specialists.
From June 2-18, 2012, the team conducted field surveys, modeling and analysis of data, and prepared reports for the emergency assessment of post-fire resource conditions.
The purpose of the team’s emergency report was to:
Assess values-at-risk on the Gila National Forest and surrounding areas from the Whitewater- Photo by Kari Greer The Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire on June 2, 2012. Baldy Complex fire, and
Submit a funding request to In May and June 2012, the Whitewater-Baldy Complex secure money for implementing Fire burned approximately 450 square miles across four treatments that could potentially ranger districts on the Gila National Forest. High or lessen threats to life, property, and resources from indirect fire moderate burn severity encompassed 70,000 acres— effects such as flooding and representing 26 percent of the fire’s total burned area. debris flows.
The fire started as two separate lightning strike fires— one near Mogollon Baldy and the other located in the headwaters of Whitewater Creek in the Gila Wilderness east of Glenwood, New Mexico. On May 23, these two fires—exhibiting extreme fire behavior—joined to form the Whitewater-Baldy Complex.
The fire severely burned a large tract of land across the Gila National Forest and Gila Wilderness, including the headwaters of Whitewater Creek, Mineral Creek, and Gilita Creek— that—respectively—drain directly into the communities of Glenwood, Alma, and Willow Creek.
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Photo by Gila National Forest
The Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire severely burned a large tract of land across the Gila National Forest and Gila Wilderness.
All of these population centers are situated in the floodplains of drainages affected by the Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire. The fire eliminated much of the vegetation, duff and soil that once served to slow and hold water. Steep slopes further aggravated the situation.
BAER Team Assembled As of June 17, 2012, the Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire was 75 percent contained and had burned more than 290,000 acres.
As the fire suppression team worked to contain the fire, the Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) Team was assembled to assess the fire’s severity as well as threats to life and property and to the critical natural and cultural resources due to the fire or post- fire consequences. Photo by Kari Greer The BAER Team was to then determine and More than 290,000 acres burned on the Whitewater- Baldy Complex Fire. recommend the response actions to protect those values at risk.
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3. BAER Team Chronology
Impending Monsoon Season Challenges BAER Team Timing
In New Mexico and Arizona, the summer monsoons typically start in mid-July.
Therefore, the Gila National Forest managers knew that the timing of the Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire left a small window of opportunity for implementing preventive post-fire actions before these summer monsoons began. They realized it would be a challenge to assess and ultimately get treatments in place before the onset of the monsoons.
The Gila National Forest BAER Coordinator, a veteran BAER member, knew that this fire had caused significant damage at the higher elevations—in spruce and fir stands—and that much of the headwaters of critical streams had severely burned. The Forest BAER Coordinator realized that the BAER response would most likely be a very difficult and costly endeavor.
In addition, as the days and weeks passed, many Forest personnel were fatigued from being involved in suppression and the BAER assessment and implementation. Stress and fatigue became a common issue with everyone involved.
Whitewater-Baldy BAER Timeline
Assessment Phase
May 25, 2012
BAER Assessment Team Leader Assigned The Forest Supervisor acknowledges that a BAER assessment must be completed. Manual direction stipulates that fires over 500 acres must be assessed, thus delegates a BAER Team Leader for the assessment process.
Due to the complexity of the fire—represented by the percentage of affected communities downstream and other values-at-risk—the Forest Supervisor also agreed to an assistant,
or co-team leader. At that point, the Assessment Team Leader calls on another BAER
coordinator from a neighboring Forest to assist.
The majority of the Team is comprised of local Gila Forest employees. A few additional specialists are requested from off-Forest. The Regional BAER coordinator also recommends a trainee to serve as an Assistant Team Leader to gain some experience, and also encourages having a Public Information Officer (PIO) on the Team.
May 31
Coordination Meeting Held with Cooperators and Stakeholders The Gila National Forest hosts an early coordination meeting with partners: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE); USDA Natural Resources and Conservation Service
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(NRCS); Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); U.S. Geological Survey (USGS); New Mexico Department of Transportation (NMDOT); New Mexico Environment Department (NMED); as well as personnel from the affected counties.
This meeting’s goal is to identify where— and articulate why— the Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire could pose threats to human Photo by K. Palmrose life and safety and
Members of the Whitewater-Baldy Complex BAER Team members meet with Gila Hot Springs residents. infrastructure. The meeting is also
intended to formulate a response to the fire’s potential impacts, including: flooding, debris flows and excessive sedimentation that could impact areas on the Gila National Forest as well as on adjacent private property.
This coordination meeting met multiple objectives. Important information—such as the expedited timeframe—was conveyed. The meeting emphasized how timing was the key to the success of the emergency response effort, pointing out how BAER treatments and projects needed to be implemented prior to the onset of the monsoon season. Through this meeting, the Forest was able to gain support for its efforts and the cooperators (mentioned above) articulated what resources or funding they were able to leverage within their authorities.
In addition, the Forest started working with local communities and cooperators to formulate a response to the impacts of potential flooding, debris flows, and excessive sedimentation likely to occur that could affect areas on the Forest as well as on adjacent private property.
June 3
BAER Team Assembled and Onsite The 25-member BAER Team is onsite.
The Assessment Team Leader has provided the Team members with their assessment assignments—with a goal of completing their assessment by June 17.
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Whitewater-Baldy Complex BAER Team members meet with residents of Glenwood, New Mexico. Whitewater-Baldy
Complex BAER Team members meet with residents of Glenwood, New The Assessment Team Leader begins working with the Incident Command to determine Mexico. where the BAER Team can start its field work, as well as verifying the Burned Area
Reflectance Classification (BARC) map.
Due to a lack of lodging and the need for technical support, the Assessment Team Leader decides to keep the BAER Team in Silver City. The fire’s Incident Command is located in Reserve, two hours away. Therefore, the Assessment Team Leader must make the roundtrip drive to morning and evening briefings in Reserve. This practice is not in alignment with the required work/rest ratio.
The Team also included two Public Information Officers: PIO #1 works out of the Gila Hot Springs office, and PIO #2 works out of Glenwood office.
June 4
Another Fire Starts on Neighboring Forest The Little Bear Fire starts on the neighboring Lincoln National Forest. The BAER Team Assistant Leader and other key BAER Team members are being requested for this incident. This creates a distraction for the Whitewater-Baldy BAER Team by pulling the attention of the Assistant Team Leader away from the needs of the current assignment.
June 13
Fire is 51 Percent Contained The Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire is at 51 percent containment. Photo by Beth Mitchell
Assistant Trainee BAER Team Leader discusses burn severity on the Whitewater-Baldy Complex.
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June 14
BAER Team Completes Initial Assessment and Funding Request As a strategy to establish a job code and request funding for critical work that can begin before final assessment is complete (such as road stabilization and channel clearing) the Team submits the first initial assessment and funding request to the Regional Office..
This request identifies channel clearing, road Dismantling portions of the Catwalk National Recreation Trail include the removal of this octagonal landing. stabilization, the purchase of warning/hazard signs, and the partial removal of the Catwalk National Recreation Trail.
To protect downstream values-at-risk a difficult decision is made to remove specific, highly vulnerable portions of the Catwalk. This effort requires the input from many specialists (recreation specialists, engineers, hydrologists, and geologists) who provide their professional opinions concerning the removal of bridges and handrails.
In addition, at this time, when the initial assessment and funding request is submitted, the Assessment Team Leader realizes that the Assistant Team Leader is under pressure to return to their home unit to lead the BAER Team there.
It is apparent to the Team that the Assistant Team Leader is having difficulty keeping focus on this Whitewater-Baldy Complex BAER effort. As a result, the Assessment Team Leader takes on more of the Team’s responsibilities.
Implementation Phase
June 16
BAER Implementation Team Leader Begins Transition The Assessment Team Leader knew from experience that the successful implementation of treatments relies on a smooth transition from the assessment to implementation phase.
Typically, the Implementation Team Leader is ordered approximately midway through assessment. This timing ensures that both team leaders can discuss critical values-at-risk, areas of concern, and the various treatments that may be proposed. On this incident, the Implementation Team Leader was onsite for most of the assessment phase coordinating with the engineers and others.
The Implementation Team Leader that was requested has been on several BAER assignments in the Region. The Assessment Team Leader knew the Implementation Team Leader from previous assignments.
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Due to the complexity of this impending implementation phase, it became clear to the Assessment Team Leader that the implementation would also require the services of an assistant or co-team leader.
Thus, the Assessment Team Leader decides that he will also help with the BAER implementation.
June 17
BAER Assessment Closeout and Transition to Implementation This is an informal closeout with the Assessment Team Leader, Forest Supervisors, and a few other people. Typically, it is held with the BAER team and key line officers.
The Forest Supervisor approves the BAER assessment and recommended treatments and submits the funding request to the Regional Office. Due to the amount of funding requested, this request is sent to the Washington Office for approval. The large ticket items in this request are for seeding and mulching high-burn severity areas.
The Assessment Team Leader begins demobbing team members.
The Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire is 75 percent contained.
June 18-24
Aerial Contract Package Delayed The Assessment Team Leader is working with local contracting officers and the Regional Office to draft aerial contracts. (For more details see “Contracting” section.) Numerous conference calls occur to try to implement these contracts.
The Assessment Team Leader is frustrated with all levels of the organization. The impending monsoon season is looming.
Without these treatments, the post- fire flooding could impact the downstream communities.
Photo by Kari Greer
The Whitewater-Baldy Complex burning above homes on June 4, 2012.
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The Assessment Team leader works with the regional Acquisition Management personnel on contract specification for aerial mulching treatments—with particular focus regarding some Washington Office comments regarding the aerial mulching.
It is unclear why the aerial seeding contract—for which funds had been initially approved—were not entered or were delayed in getting entered into FedBizOps (a “Federal Business Opportunities” database of federal contracting opportunities). [The contract was entered into FedBizOps on June 25.]
July 24
Assessment Team Leader Suffers Heart Attack at Workplace The Assessment Team Leader and the Contracting Officer are on their way to a meeting with the Forest Supervisor. In the Forest Supervisor’s office hallway, the Assessment Team Leader suffers a heart attack. The Forest Supervisor rushes to perform CPR. Emergency personnel are called.
Several witnesses say that the Assessment Team Leader was actually “dead for a few minutes.” The Forest Supervisor’s quick response no doubt helped save his life. She was assisted by Forest Safety Officer. Their actions to immediately begin CPR and to utilize the office Automated External Defibrillator (AED) unit are the reason the Team Leader is alive today.
[Since, the Assessment Team Leader has made a full recovery. He will continue to work on future BAER projects. He acknowledges that stress was a major contributor to his workplace injury.]
July 25
Implementation Team Leader Takes Time Off; Project Manager Steps In The Implementation Team Leader, who had previously scheduled annual leave (time off), departs the BAER project for more than one week.
In the absence of an Assessment Team Leader, an “acting” or alternate is assigned. This new leader, from the local unit, who had been a key member of the Assessment Team, now assumes the role of overall BAER Project Manager, overseeing implementation.
The BAER Team Project Manager is concerned over lack of cost-tracking and
communication associated with the Implementation Team Leader. There are many “moving parts” and no one seems to be keeping track of contractors or the work that is being done.
Update on Outcomes
Overall, the BAER Team Assessment process went well. The treatments were implemented as prescribed and the risks were managed accordingly.
These major successes can be attributed to the hard-working BAER team; communication with the public and cooperators; and utilizing social media platforms to keep all interested parties updated.
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“Our Contracting/Acquisition shop was specifically asked to be able to do buying team and BAER team duties as well as their regular work as they felt they could do it all with no problem. I don’t believe they really realized the scope of work that would be needed. I don’t think any of us really did—as none of us had been involved in such a large incident on our own unit before. That, tied in with just the emotional trauma that people felt at seeing a beloved area of the Forest get burned so badly, really increased stress levels.”
Kelly Russell, Forest Supervisor Gila National Forest
4. Contracting
A. Contracting Findings
The FLA Team interviewed representatives from Acquisition Management (AQM) at all three levels involved in the acquisition process, including Contracting Officers (CO) at the Gila National Forest, the Deputy AQM Director at the Regional Office in Albuquerque, and the Branch Chief for Policy at the Washington Office.
Key contracting findings identified by the FLA Team:
1. Duplicated Acquisition Roles Although contracts were needed for services on the Gila National Forest, due to the estimated amounts (in excess of $5 million), the local AQM office was required to route various parts of the solicitation/award to additional offices for approval.
Specifically, prior to the advertisement of the solicitation, the acquisition strategy and “Justification for Other than Full and Open Competition Contracting” (JOFOC)1 required approval by the Washington Office AQM Policy Office while the contracts themselves were awarded by the Deputy AQM Director at the Regional Office—who possessed a Contracting Officer’s warrant with adequate authority to sign the contracts.
While the FLA Team did not quantify the actual delays, the multiple levels of review/approval were cited numerous times throughout the interviews as being one of the primary reasons the contracts were delayed.
For example, the Gila AQM office may have initiated the solicitation package, which was then either approved and passed up to the Washington Office, or edited and returned to the Gila National Forest.
There was a perception shared among the BAER Team and Gila AQM office personnel that these additional reviews added several weeks to the acquisition cycle.
1 Per the current Forest Service Acquisition Regulation (FSAR), the Regional Chief of the Contracting Office (COCO) has the authority to approve acquisition strategies and JOFOCs up to $5MM. Any proposed actions exceeding $5 million require Head of the Contracting Activity (HCAD) approval at the Washington Office. The Acquisition Strategy details the procuring office’s source selection plan, market research, estimates, and competition plan. The JOFOC is needed when the agency is contemplating “other than full and open competition” for an acquisition. In this case, the JOFOC was needed to accelerate the advertisement times and evaluation processes.
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One of the Gila National Forest’s Contracting Officers commented that the Whitewater-Baldy BAER experience was “the most stress they had ever had in 27 years” of working for the agency.
2. Approved Templates from 2011 Unacceptable in 2012
The Gila National Forest AQM office was provided with examples of solicitations, strategies, and JOFOCs by the Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest that had been approved by the Washington Office AQM Policy office the previous year on the 2011 Wallow Fire BAER response.
The Gila National Forest AQM office used these examples as a starting point and tailored them to their respective needs.
Even though the work was nearly identical for similar amounts, the versions that had been approved in 2011 where no longer acceptable in 2012 and required substantial revisions.
The Gila National Forest AQM office commented that this led to delays, as they were working with templates that—to their knowledge—were acceptable, only to find out after the fact that they needed to be revised.
3. Forest Contracting Officers Stressed
One of the Gila National Forest’s Contracting Officers commented that the Whitewater- Baldy BAER experience was “the most stress they had ever had in 27 years” of working for the agency.
Another Forest Contracting Officer stated that they “would not be helping with BAER this year” as a result of their experience the previous year.
The local AQM office was already covering its normal workload and had been actively involved in supporting the Whitewater-Baldy suppression efforts, serving as a Buying Team until a National unit arrived.
Over the course of approximately two weeks, the Gila National Forest AQM office was essentially tasked with three jobs simultaneously: 1) Forest Contracting Office, 2) Buying Team, and 3) BAER support.
This increased workload—coupled with the high-pressure nature of emergency response contracting and the additional scrutiny from the Regional and Washington offices— appears to have created considerable stress throughout the process. As a result, this negative experience has convinced these employees that they are not interested in supporting BAER in the future.
4. Preseason Contracts
The FLA Team asked most interviewees if they thought preseason contracts would be beneficial. By a near unanimous vote, they expressed support of that concept.
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For example, several Contracting Officers commented that competing and awarding a Task Order against a previously awarded contract would accelerate the acquisition cycle significantly while minimizing the cumbersome solicitation preparation and various reviews/approvals.
5. No ‘Plan B’
The Regional Office indicated they were developing preseason contracts for aerial mulching and seeding; however, the solicitation was not finalized at the time of the interview nor had the synopsis/advertisement process been initiated.
By conservative estimates, the Region is likely a minimum 60-75 days away from when the contracts could be in place and available, assuming that everything goes smoothly, there were not any protests2, etc. If the preseason contracts were not ready, the Region did not acknowledge an alternate solution.
Therefore, given the status of current solicitation and the anticipated need in a few months, the FLA Team was concerned that the Gila National Forest—or any Forest in Region 3—would find itself in a similar situation in 2013.
When asked about what options the Region had if these preseason contracts were not in place by this summer, the Washington Office AQM Branch Chief for Policy expressed that his office would be willing to accommodate a “case by case” acquisition strategy and/or JOFOC if the Region can demonstrate that it is attempting to establish these contracts on a competitive basis preseason.
B. Contracting Recommendations
With respect to the contracting effort, the FLA Team concluded that there were several steps the agency could take that would help reduce the delays in the acquisition cycle while adding value to the overall BAER effort:
1. Establishing Contracts Prior to the Need
While this sentiment was shared almost universally among the various interviewees, the FLA Team is unified in the belief that developing preseason contracts (such as Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity [IDIQ] or Blanket Purchase Agreements [BPA]), would significantly decrease the acquisition lead times. This would occur because task orders/calls could be issued against previously awarded contracts—rather than starting the process from scratch each time.
Competing an aerial mulching project among a pool IDIQ/BPA awardees, for example, would eliminate the need to develop the acquisition strategy and JOFOC each time— while simultaneously eliminating the requirement to announce/advertise the solicitation for 30-plus days3.
2 Numerous solicitations for similar requirements have been protested the past year (Regions 1, 2, 4). A protest could significantly delay awards. 3 Federal Acquisition Regulations, unless otherwise excepted, require government requirements to be announced 15 days prior to the posting of the solicitation, which is then typically advertised for at least 30 additional days.
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The Region indicated that it was pursuing the establishment of IDIQ contracts. The FLA Team encourages them to see this through.
2. Analyze the BAER Contracting Business Model
In conjunction with Recommendation #1, the FLA Team recommends that the agency analyze the current decentralized approach to BAER contracting support.
Even though these requirements—aerial mulching and seeding in particular—are needed on an annual basis in most Regions, there does not appear to be a consistent approach within the agency on how best to meet the BAER procurement needs.
For example, there has been a significant effort and investment in standardizing the suppression procurement process (such as the development of national templates, the Virtual Incident Procurement [VIPR] system, and the administration of national contracts at the Incident Support Branch at NIFC). However, a similar effort for our high-dollar BAER contracts has yet to materialize.
As a potential solution, the FLA Team proposes developing national contracts/agreements for all Regions to order from, or creating “WO approved” templates to be shared across the Regions for their respective needs.
3. Supplement AQM Staff for BAER
While it is routine for a Forest to order a Buying Team to relieve its local AQM staff of an incident’s purchasing needs, the same cannot be said for assisting with the BAER response.
On the Whitewater-Baldy incident, in addition to its normal workload, the local AQM staff was already actively serving as an ad-hoc Buying Team for the numerous fires on the Forest before being tasked with assisting the BAER implementation team with its procurement needs.
Because the aerial mulching/seeding contracts are oftentimes urgent with short response and decision times, these contracts generally require dedicated fulltime Contracting Officers working long hours in an incident-like setting.
The FLA Team therefore recommends that the Forest consider detailing or ordering additional procurement support to work specifically on the BAER effort. This would not only relieve the local AQM staff of additional duties, but also provide the BAER Implementation Team fulltime, dedicated procurement support. The procurement personnel would also ideally possess a Contracting Officer warrant high enough ($10 million) to award the contracts directly.
4. Consult the WO Policy Branch First
The FLA Team observed that some of the acquisition delays could have potentially been reduced had the Forest/Region started with an example of an “approved” contract/solicitation package.
Issuing task orders against a previously awarded IDIQ would not require these announcement/advertisement periods.
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In this case, it appears a lot of effort was exerted into the development of the various pieces—only to be returned for revision/changes after they were submitted. Granted, the Forest/Region was using an example that had been accepted the previous year.
However, because changes to personnel or regulations are frequent in the contracting world, if the need arises in the future, it is recommended that the Forest/Region consult directly with the staff responsible for approving the strategy/JOFOC/etc. to ensure that they are progressing in the correct direction—from the very beginning of the process.
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5. Findings and General Lessons Learned
The FLA team interviewed BAER Team members as well as supervisors and line officers associated with the assessment and implementation of the Whitewater-Baldy Burned Area Emergency Response process.
The lessons learned—generally recommended actions or improvements for future BAER projects—in this section were derived from these interviews. The recommendations that were gleaned from these interviews appear in the next section.
1. BAER Team Operation and Logistics
Overall, the Assessment Team was comprised of individuals who had a great deal of recent large fire experience. Many of these members had previously worked together on BAER teams, which helped provide for comfortable working conditions on this effort. This factor also resulted in a very efficient and high-quality assessment. It allowed portions of the assessment to be self-directed, permitting team leaders to work on logistics and evolving issues. Some of the following findings were minor with respect to the overall functionality of the Assessment Team.
Stress and fatigue were common themes on this BAER assignment. [See also: “8. Work- Related Stress” on page 19.] This was due in large part to the assignment’s length of time. Some BAER members were involved in pre-BAER, assessment, and implementation—representing more than a three-month period.
Location of the BAER Assessment Team in relation to the Incident Management Team (IMT) resulted in very long days for some members, compromising the work/rest ratio of 2/1. For example, this occurred when the Team Leader attended both morning and evening briefings with a two-hour drive on each end of the day travelling to and from Reserve to Silver City.
The Public Information Officer had inexperience, or a lack of understanding, regarding the BAER mission. This resulted in misinformation being provided in public briefings and additional work for the BAER Team Leader to correct.
Forest personnel involved with the BAER assessment and implementation were also expected to complete their regular program work before the end of the fiscal year. This distraction and additional work added stress to these individuals, as there was internal and external pressure to get the assessment and treatments completed.
The Team Leader and Resource Specialists were pulled away from assessment tasks to liaison with local government/publics. This resulted in longer work days to complete assigned BAER work under tight timeframes.
Initially, not all resources were adequately represented on the Assessment Team. To the credit of the team and leader, the team was able to adapt and acquire the necessary resource coverage and still meet timeframes.
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Key members of the Assessment Team were distracted by fires on their home units. This resulted in a detectable lack of focus in the Whitewater-Baldy BAER assignment. Although the team met the required timeframe, final reports were not completed prior to personnel leaving for new assignments.
2. Implementation
The Implementation Team had a rough start, with many serious problems that could have resulted in failing to complete all of the treatments prescribed. The Gila National Forest persevered through the adversity and was able to implement the plan as intended in a reasonable amount of time. This was due mainly to the efforts of key Forest and District personnel, as well as direct support from the Forest Supervisor and District Rangers.
This was a larger incident with a magnitude that exceeded the Implementation Team Leader’s capabilities. The Implementation Team Leader did not follow the implementation plan closely. The leader’s performance issues, however, were not documented.
The Implementation Team Leader was brought in prior to the start of implementation to help provide a smooth transition from assessment to implementation. It became apparent to the Forest that the designated Implementation Team Leader was not the appropriate person for the job, and the Assessment Team Leader and Forest withheld “Delegation of Authority” and “Leader’s Intent”. Line officers should communicate expectations and provide a “Leader’s Intent.” Having not received this, the Implementation Team Leader was therefore unclear of the job’s expectations. This lead to multiple issues regarding reporting, assigned work, and personnel supervision.
The Implementation Team Leader had too few people and did not complete necessary documentation and communicate adequately with the Forest. The Implementation Team leader was not available for periods throughout the implementation phase. This left gaps in direction, contract administration, and documentation.
The Implementation Team had a problem ordering ADs—ordering people for the specific job they can perform. At present, we only have the “Technical Specialist” status/availability which requires justification and a determination of what level (pay rate) is to be assigned.
A Contracting Officer Representative (COR) should have been part of the Implementation Team—ensuring that people are properly qualified to do the job they are hired to do.
Initially, no one in BAER implementation was tracking accomplishments, communication, and documentation. A person was subsequently assigned to track key contract items and found a discrepancy that potentially—if not found—would have resulted in a $1,000,000 loss to the government. The mistake was rectified and treatments were completed per the contract specifications.
The BAER Implementation Team was too small of an operation to handle the required workload. The large incident was spread out over three ranger districts, resulting in operations many miles apart. Some critical positions that are common in the Incident Command System organization were not covered. This resulted in reduced efficiency and added stress to those managing contracts and the day-to-day operations.
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3. Safety
BAER Team members were working in areas that would normally allow hazard pay for line-qualified firefighters. However, based on standard job responsibilities outlined in FSM2523, this is not allowed in BAER status. While BAER personnel are generally not supposed to be in areas of high hazard, it does occur when fires are large and field observation is necessary to complete assessments on time. By policy, there is currently no provision for hazard pay for BAER members.
Some BAER treatments were not implemented because it was not safe to get into a specific area. Due to the large size of the fire, not all areas could be intensively surveyed for treatment suitability.
4. Line Officers
There were new line officers who were not familiar with the BAER program and authorities.
5. The General BAER Organization
BAER is not as regimented as fire suppression incident management. Early in the BAER process, this lack of coordination helped lead to misinformation.
6. Duplication of Data Collection
Due to the great distance (two hours by vehicle) between the BAER Team and the IMT, Resource Advisors and others involved in the Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire suppression efforts had resource information that was not relayed to the BAER Team. Thus, there was a duplication of efforts. If this situation could have been addressed and rectified, it would have saved the BAER Team time.
7. Logistics
There was a lack of laptops available for the BAER Assessment Team.
BAER personnel from out of Region had difficulty ordering and obtaining their necessary vehicles.
8. Work-Related Stress
Many people interviewed told the FLA Team that this BAER incident resulted in the most stress that they and their coworkers had ever experienced before in any job-related situation.
We need to be more aware and understand the effects of stress on our personnel during a BAER event. This is especially true when time concerns—such as the impending start of the monsoon season—impact the assessment process.
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Problems with awarding the implementation contracts increase the stress level of all individuals involved. Several of the people in contracting have stated that—after this Whitewater-Baldy experience—they will not work on any future BAER projects.
The Assessment Team Leader acknowledges that stress served as a major contributor to the heart attack that he suffered at work during his BAER assignment.
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6. Recommendations
1. BAER Team Composition and Evaluation
There have been a number of highly successful BAER assessment teams within this Region that have a common thread—a group of skilled employees and retired personnel who volunteer to work together to complete a quality and timely assessment and plan. This document was not intended to note solely the negative aspects of this incident. This was a very successful and cost-effective Assessment Team. The following recommendations are only suggestions on how—in retrospect—some aspects could have functioned more smoothly or safely.
The size of a BAER organization should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the incident. This BAER Team may have been too small. In the future, additional help should be included—possibly using retirees (ADs) to fill personnel gaps. More personnel could have allowed completion of BAER documentation. Because this additional help was not available, this increased the Assessment Team Leader’s and members’ workload.
This BAER Team had a problem ordering ADs—ordering specific people for the job they can perform. In the future, teams should justify the need and define the specific tasks the person will do to Dispatch when ordering.
This BAER Team could have assigned a representative/liaison to the Incident Management Team. (This would have prevented the BAER Team Leader from having to drive to and from the morning and evening briefings.) This person should have a fire background (AFMO level). This BAER liaison should also coordinate with Resource Advisors and other staff—to ensure he or she is cognizant of who is doing what.
While working under IMT delegation, communication is critical for getting BAER personnel out to begin assessment work. Provide IMT planning with Assessment Team daily assignments (locations, dates, number of personnel, vehicles, etc.) early enough to allow incorporation into the Incident Action Plan for the following day. Follow protocols established by the IMT on entering and exiting divisions or zones, and ensure all BAER members are accounted for at the end of the work day.
On very large incidents, such as the Whitewater-Baldy Complex, be aware of the pros and cons of assigning people from the local unit onto the BAER Team—particularly as a sole team leader. BAER team members must be focused solely on the BAER Team assignment and should not be expected to complete normal Forest business concurrently. To meet extremely tight deadlines—because risk to life and property from flood or other hazards are often immediate—the BAER assignment should be regarded in the same light as suppression assignments.
On large incidents, provide for BAER co-team leaders to split the workload. Each incident is unique. Those with great values at risk require extensive coordination with multiple external governments and various groups. This responsibility will take away from managing the team. (On this BAER assignment, the decisions and discussions regarding the Catwalks and Whitewater Creek were sufficiently complex to distract the Team Leader from daily operations.) Therefore, splitting daily logistics and operations duties from Forest and interagency coordination may be necessary. The assistant leader position, if the person is experienced, could most likely manage daily operations.
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On long-duration BAER assignments such as this, team members need to be provided a break. We need to be attentive to “work/rest” ratios and enforce safe driving rules.4 Again, bringing in a larger, experienced workforce and team leader will help provide opportunities for sharing responsibilities—and help to alleviate the feeling that one needs to be there all the time to make sure things happen.
At least midpoint through the assessment process, imbed the Implementation Team Leader with the Assessment Team to ensure a smooth transition and to begin working through often long treatment contracting requirements. In addition, coordination with Regional BAER personnel is essential for early determinations regarding what potential projects will be considered.
The Implementation Team Leader should have an understanding of contract requirements and possess superior organizational skills to implement large and complex treatments. Forests and Regions should compile and maintain a database of qualified individuals from which to draw from.
The Forest BAER coordinator, as directed by the Forest Supervisor/Management Team, should ensure or validate that the Implementation Team has the correct personnel to coordinate, manage, and inspect the work that is being performed. This team works directly for the Forest Supervisor or District Ranger.
Recommend ordering a Type 3 Team, or at least a team member associated with Fire Operations, to assist the Implementation Team with gathering needed supplies and personnel.
Institute an evaluation process for BAER team leaders and assistant team leaders. To help to avoid unqualified personnel being assigned, send these evaluations to regional BAER coordinators.
If possible, when making BAER team assignments, consider existing working relations (or the work “history”) between personnel. Strained relations often become much worse under the pressures associated with BAER timeframes. Supervisors should inform the line personnel when (if known) these situations exist and seek replacements for one or both individuals to head off conflict.
4 Work/Rest and length of assignment is recommended to follow Fire Suppression direction in the interagency “Red Book”. Maximum work rest ratio of 2:1 is for every two hours work or travel, provide one hour of sleep or rest. Basically, no more than a 16-hour day. This does not mean BAER teams should work 16-hour days. BAER team members typically work 10-12 hour days. Supervisors are to establish work schedules based on risks and type of work. Length of Assignment: Standard is 14 days exclusive of travel to and from home. Then two days off—cannot be paid for days off, even if at home unit. BAER team members are generally under the standard 14-day work assignment. Extension to 21 days may occur when warranted. This is not automatic. A 30-day assignment is also not automatic; it is very rare. It requires two days off prior to Day 22. During extended periods of activity at the home unit, personnel will have a minimum of one day off in any 21-day period.
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2. Communication
Ensure that all BAER Team members, Forest personnel, line officers, and PIOs understand the BAER program’s objectives and limitations.
Due to potential pressure from the public and expectations of BAER, in future BAER Team assignments with similar complexity, be sure to appoint a liaison to coordinate with outside cooperators and the public.
Early in the BAER process, ensure that the Public Information Officer is knowledgeable.
Develop “talking points” in advance of public meetings. On this assignment, it wasn’t clear what BAER can and can’t do. To avoid this dilemma on future assignments, have the Team Leader provide an in-brief on the BAER program. In addition, have talking points for PIOs and others outlined on the BAER website. These talking points could also be used as handouts at public meetings.
Early in the process, coordinate with local district rangers to ensure that all BAER critical values and resources at risk are identified.
The Forest Supervisor—or representative—should be briefed often on accomplishments and developing issues to allow them to plan further action and to inform external entities of the progress and potential problems that may arise.
Clear and frequent communication between the Implementation Team Leader, project Contracting Officer Representative (COR), and budget manager for implementation is necessary. Particularly when large land treatment contracts are involved, provide the leader with inspections and weigh bills.
3. BAER Transitions and Closeout
Bring in separate teams for the assessment and implementation phases. Utilize personnel that worked as Resource Advisors on the suppression incident to help with BAER implementation.
Ensure that there is a clear transition from BAER assessment to implementation phases.
To ensure that plans are fully and clearly understood, have a three- to five-day transition period with assessment and implementation teams.
Ensure that the Implementation Team Leader transitions with local Forest line officers and resource staff.
In the event that further clarification is needed, the Assessment Team Leader should provide a BAER Team member contact list to the Implementation Team Leader.
If using contracted services, ensure that the contract documents specify requirements for project close-out and rehabilitation of contractor-disturbed areas.
Closeout with Forest Supervisor and district rangers for both assessment and implementation is strongly encouraged. The BAER Team works directly for the appropriate line officer, therefore they are responsible for the emergency work to be completed in time to mitigate hazards. Despite the identified team problems, District support to the Whitewater-Baldy BAER implementation was thought to have been exceptional once the decision was made to implement projects.
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4. BAER Training for Agency Administrators
Hold BAER training for agency administrators. Consider doing this at the annual line officer conference.
The district rangers should be prepared to provide values at risk, data, and personnel to assist completion of assessment.
Such awareness training would provide needed information on roles and responsibilities at each Forest Service organization level, including timeframes and guidance regarding type and location of potential treatments to be approved as part of the emergency.
5. Logistics
On future BAER efforts of this size and complexity, keep or order a Fire Buying Team to assist with BAER. Ensure that this team is separate from the local unit. Contracting support is a critical need to help offset additional duties assigned to Forest contracting resources.
Early in the BAER assignment, order needed equipment, including laptops and printers using expanded dispatch and ROSS. Explore revamping regional BAER Kits to supplement large BAER incidents. ADs and field personnel generally do not have laptops with proper software and database access to do complex assessments.
6. Recognizing BAER Team Efforts
BAER work tends to be a thankless job. We need to have a system that recognizes and rewards BAER teams for their efforts. Communities laud suppression teams for putting fires out. There is never enough post-fire emergency rehabilitation to satisfy the resident populations or local governments when the threat of flooding is identified or flooding begins.
Institute an evaluation process for BAER team leaders. Send evaluations to the Regional BAER coordinator. To ensure that we retain them as a valuable resource, exceptional BAER leaders need to be identified and commended.
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7. Commendations
Overall, the comments of many of those interviewed centered on how well the Assessment Team performed. This Team met tight deadlines to produce a realistic and timely BAER plan and always kept cost containment in the forefront.
BAER Team members said that the support provided by Forest Supervisor Kelly Russell as well as by the District Rangers Pat Morrison, Ray Torres, and John Pierson was outstanding.
Forest Supervisor Kelly Russell and then-Forest Safety Officer Buck Seals should be recognized for their quick and decisive response in saving the Assessment Team Leader’s life when he suffered cardiac Kelly Russell, Forest Supervisor, Gila arrest and they successfully implemented CPR. National Forest.
Loading seed plane for a BAER project on the Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire.
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8. Facilitated Learning Analysis Team
Bea Day, Team Leader Forest Fire Management Officer, Cibola National Forest and Grasslands
Anna Jaramillo-Scarborough Regional BAER Coordinator, Southwestern Region
Chris Nelson Watershed Program Manager, Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest
Ben McGrane Supervisory Contract Specialist Fire and Aviation Contracting Team Pacific Northwest Region
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