Fire Fighter FACE Report No. 2010-14, Volunteer Assistant
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2010 14 May 25, 2011 Volunteer Assistant Fire Chief Dies at a Silo Fire/Explosion - New York Executive Summary On April 11, 2010, a 26-year-old male volunteer Assistant Fire Chief (the victim) responded to a silo fire at a local farm. Upon arrival, he observed open doors (hatches) on top of the 60-foot metal oxygen-limiting silo. He climbed to the top of the silo via a ladder attached to the outside of the silo and closed and secured the hatches. He descended the silo and when approximately half-way down, the silo exploded. The explosion caused a section of the ladder to detach from the silo and the victim fell about 30-feet to the ground. The victim was given cardiopulmonary resuscitation by another fire fighter at the scene and then transported by ambulance to a regional hospital where he was pronounced dead. Contributing Factors • unrecognized hazards associated with a silo fire • closing and securing the hatches on top of the silo. Key Recommendations • review, revise, and enforce standard operating guidelines (SOGs) for structural fire fighting that include oxygen-limiting silos • train officers and fire fighters on the hazards associated with different types of silos and the appropriate fire fighting tactics • ensure that pre-emergency planning is completed for all types of silos located within fire department jurisdictions • consider requiring that placards with hazard warnings and appropriate fire fighting guidelines be placed on silos • consider silos as confined spaces and recognize the dangers associated with confined spaces when responding to silo fires • ensure that an Incident Safety Officer is deployed at technical or complex operations. Page i Report #F2010-14 Volunteer Assistant Fire Chief Dies at a Silo Fire/Explosion - New York Conventional silo (top) and oxygen-limiting silo (bottom) (NIOSH Photos) The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an institute within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), is the federal agency responsible for conducting research and making recommendations for the prevention of work-related injury and illness. In 1998, Congress appropriated funds to NIOSH to conduct a fire fighter initiative that resulted in the NIOSH “Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program” which examines line-of-duty-deaths or on duty deaths of fire fighters to assist fire departments, fire fighters, the fire service and others to prevent similar fire fighter deaths in the future. The agency does not enforce compliance with State or Federal occupational safety and health standards and does not determine fault or assign blame. Participation of fire departments and individuals in NIOSH investigations is voluntary. Under its program, NIOSH investigators interview persons with knowledge of the incident who agree to be interviewed and review available records to develop a description of the conditions and circumstances leading to the death(s). Interviewees are not asked to sign sworn statements and interviews are not recorded. The agency's reports do not name the victim, the fire department or those interviewed. The NIOSH report's summary of the conditions and circumstances surrounding the fatality is intended to provide context to the agency's recommendations and is not intended to be definitive for purposes of determining any claim or benefit. For further information, visit the program Web site at www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire or call toll free 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636). Page ii Report #F2010-14 Volunteer Assistant Fire Chief Dies at a Silo Fire/Explosion - New York Introduction On April 11, 2010, a 26-year-old male volunteer assistant Fire Chief 3 (the victim) suffered a fatal cervical fracture after falling from a ladder that detached from a silo when it exploded. On April 17 and September 20, 2010, telephone interviews were conducted with the Chief of the volunteer fire department who was incident commander during the fire. The NIOSH investigator met with the New York Occupational Safety and Health Administration Safety and Health inspector who investigated the incident. The investigator reviewed photographs, investigative findings, witness statements, and dispatch records of the incident. Subsequent contacts were made with the Director of County Fire and Emergency Services, the Deputy Fire Chief, and Installation Records Manager of the career fire department where the victim also worked as a fire fighter. Fire Department • The volunteer fire department involved in this incident is comprised of 65 volunteer fire fighters. The department has two stations and serves a population of 3,049 in a geographical area of 72 square miles. • Personal Protective Equipment • The victim was wearing bunker pants, bunker boots, turnout coat and gloves at the time of the incident. He was not wearing a helmet, fire hood, or a self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Training and Experience The victim had been with this volunteer department for more than 8-years and attended the New York State (NYS) Fire Academy. He completed the Recruit Fire Fighter Program which consisted of 360 hours of training that resulted in a national certification as Fire Fighter level I and II. He was also a member of a career fire department for 15-months before his death and had completed an additional 387 hours of training with the career fire department. The Incident Commander (IC) had been with this department for more than 29-years and had completed the National Certification for Fire Instructor level I, NYS certification for Fire Officer level I, National Incident Management System 300, and NYS Emergency Medical Technician. The IC had also been a NYS Fire Instructor since February 2002. Equipment and Personnel Personal-owned vehicle (POV) – Fire Chief (Incident Commander [IC]) POV – Assistant Fire Chief 3 (Victim) POV – Assistant Fire Chief 2 Page 1 Report #F2010-14 Volunteer Assistant Fire Chief Dies at a Silo Fire/Explosion - New York Engine #3 – Assistant Fire Chief 5 and fire fighter/driver Tanker #1 – Fire fighter/driver Tanker #2 – Fire fighter/driver POV – Two Fire fighters Timeline 0914 Hours The victim received a telephone call on his cellular phone from the owner of a local farm requesting assistance for a silo fire. 0915 Hours The volunteer fire department was dispatched to the silo fire. 0926 Hours Two Tankers and Engine 3 arrived on scene. 0937 Hours Approximate time of the silo explosion. 1059 Hours Time of victim’s death at the hospital. Weather Conditions The weather on the day of the incident was scattered clouds with an approximate temperature of 46°F. Winds were from the west at 10 miles per hour. Visibility was clear for 10 miles, and humidity was 71%. Structure There are two types of upright silos: conventional silos and oxygen-limiting silos or “sealed” silos. Conventional silos are typically used to store corn, hay or other foodstuff for livestock feed. These silos provide for the preservation, storage and disbursement of the feedstock. Conventional silos usually have outside doors stacked up the silo wall. Conventional silos are normally unloaded from the top (see Photo 1). Oxygen-limiting silos are sealed to prevent oxygen from entering the silo. These silos are constructed of steel or concrete and have tightly sealed openings and hatches. When the hatches are closed and the Page 2 Report #F2010-14 Volunteer Assistant Fire Chief Dies at a Silo Fire/Explosion - New York silo is filled, the oxygen concentration should be insufficient to support a fire. The silo involved in this incident was the oxygen-limiting type. The silo was approximately 60-feet high and 20-feet in diameter, and was constructed of steel. The silo was filled to one third of its volume with the previous year’s high moisture corn crop. The silo had been built over 20 years ago (see Photo 2 for an example of a similar silo). Investigation On April 11, 2010, at about 0914 hours, Assistant Chief 3 (the victim) received a telephone call on his cellular phone from the owner of a local farm requesting assistance for a silo that was on fire. The victim called fire dispatch and the local volunteer fire department was dispatched to the fire. The Chief of the department and the victim responded to the fire in their personally owned vehicles (POVs) while another assistant, Assistant Chief 2, drove to the station to help acquire the needed apparatus. The Chief, Assistant Chief 5, and the victim arrived on the scene along with Engine 3 and two tankers. The Chief assumed incident command (IC) and he and the assistant chiefs conducted a walk around of the silo. It was noted that smoke was coming from the top of the silo, and there was a glow at the bottom of the silo where the un-loader door was located. They also noticed, from ground level, that the top hatches for the silo fill tube and vent were open. The silo was not rumbling or shaking, and no smoke was coming from the un-loader door. It was also noted that the door for the un-loader at the bottom of the silo had been partiality melted away from a barn fire in which 100 cows were killed three days earlier on Thursday, April 8, 2010. The IC and assistant chiefs agreed that the best course of action in combating the fire was to use no water on the silo, but instead to attempt to smother the fire by closing all the openings on the silo, and to introduce CO2 at the un-loader door opening. Assistant Chief 5 began making preparations to obtain as many CO2 extinguishers as were available. Simultaneously the IC called the farm owners to determine if they had any information from the silo manufacturer and request that the owners come to the scene.