Understanding the Effect of Government Spending
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United Arab Emirates (Uae)
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: United Arab Emirates, July 2007 COUNTRY PROFILE: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) July 2007 COUNTRY اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴّﺔ اﻟﻤﺘّﺤﺪة (Formal Name: United Arab Emirates (Al Imarat al Arabiyah al Muttahidah Dubai , أﺑﻮ ﻇﺒﻲ (The seven emirates, in order of size, are: Abu Dhabi (Abu Zaby .اﻹﻣﺎرات Al ,ﻋﺠﻤﺎن Ajman , أ مّ اﻟﻘﻴﻮﻳﻦ Umm al Qaywayn , اﻟﺸﺎرﻗﺔ (Sharjah (Ash Shariqah ,دﺑﻲّ (Dubayy) .رأس اﻟﺨﻴﻤﺔ and Ras al Khaymah ,اﻟﻔﺠﻴﺮة Fajayrah Short Form: UAE. اﻣﺮاﺗﻰ .(Term for Citizen(s): Emirati(s أﺑﻮ ﻇﺒﻲ .Capital: Abu Dhabi City Major Cities: Al Ayn, capital of the Eastern Region, and Madinat Zayid, capital of the Western Region, are located in Abu Dhabi Emirate, the largest and most populous emirate. Dubai City is located in Dubai Emirate, the second largest emirate. Sharjah City and Khawr Fakkan are the major cities of the third largest emirate—Sharjah. Independence: The United Kingdom announced in 1968 and reaffirmed in 1971 that it would end its treaty relationships with the seven Trucial Coast states, which had been under British protection since 1892. Following the termination of all existing treaties with Britain, on December 2, 1971, six of the seven sheikhdoms formed the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The seventh sheikhdom, Ras al Khaymah, joined the UAE in 1972. Public holidays: Public holidays other than New Year’s Day and UAE National Day are dependent on the Islamic calendar and vary from year to year. For 2007, the holidays are: New Year’s Day (January 1); Muharram, Islamic New Year (January 20); Mouloud, Birth of Muhammad (March 31); Accession of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi—observed only in Abu Dhabi (August 6); Leilat al Meiraj, Ascension of Muhammad (August 10); first day of Ramadan (September 13); Eid al Fitr, end of Ramadan (October 13); UAE National Day (December 2); Eid al Adha, Feast of the Sacrifice (December 20); and Christmas Day (December 25). -
Djibouti Health Expenditure Profile
Djibouti Health expenditure profile HEALTH SPENDING IN BRIEF WHO PAYS FOR HEALTH? 0.6% Health spending (% of GDP) 3.5 27.8% Health expenditure per capita (US$) 70 Public Out-of-pocket 45.8% Public spending on health per capita (US$) 32 Voluntary prepayment External Other GDP per capita (US$) 2,004 25.8% Life expectancy, both sexes (years) 62 RICHER COUNTRIES SPEND MORE ON HEALTH… …BUT NOT NECESSARILY AS A SHARE OF GDP 10,000 25 20 1,000 15 10 100 Health spending % of GDP 5 Health spending per capita (US$, log scale) 10 0 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 GDP per capita (US$, log scale) GDP per capita (US$, log scale) MORE GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON HEALTH IS ASSOCIATED WITH LOWER OUT-OF-POCKET SPENDING DOES GOVERNMENT SPEND ENOUGH ON HEALTH? 100 100 10 80 80 8 60 60 6 % US$ 40 40 4 20 20 2 Out-of-pocket spending % of health 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Public spending on health % of GDP Health spending per capita (US$, bars) Government health spending % of total government spending (line) Djibouti PRIORITY OF HEALTH IN BUDGET ALLOCATION IS A POLITICAL CHOICE 25 20 15 10 5 Government health spending % of total government spending 0 India Egypt Kenya Congo Nigeria Angola Kiribati Ghana Bhutan SudanBoliviaJordan Tunisia Djibouti Vanuatu Armenia Ukraine Zambia Morocco Georgia Eswatini Lao PDRPakistan Myanmar TajikistanMongolia IndonesiaSri LankaViet Nam Honduras Cameroon MauritaniaMicronesia Cambodia Philippines Uzbekistan GuatemalaNicaraguaEl Salvador Timor-LesteBangladesh Côte d'Ivoire Cabo Verde Solomon -
Trends Gross and Net Spending Non-Cash Benefits
8. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON PENSIONS Key Results Public spending on cash old-age pensions and survivors’ benefits in the OECD increased from an average of 6.6% of gross domestic product (GDP) to 8.0% between 2000 and 2015. Public pensions are often the largest single item of social expenditure, accounting for 18.4% of total government spending on average in 2015. Greece spent the largest proportion of national income Trends on public pensions among OECD countries in 2015: 16.9% of Public pension spending was fairly stable as a GDP. Other countries with high gross public pension proportion of GDP over the period 1990-2015 in spending are in continental Europe, with Italy at 16.2% and ten countries: Australia, Germany, Iceland, Israel, Lithuania, Austria, France and Portugal at between 13% and 14% of New Zealand, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland. GDP. Public pensions generally account for between one- fourth and one-third of total public expenditure in these Public pension expenditure increased by more than 4 countries. points of GDP between 2000 and 2015 in Finland, Greece, Portugal and Turkey, and between 2 and 3 percentage points Iceland and Mexico spent 2.1% and 2.2% of GDP on in France, Italy, Japan and Spain. public pensions, respectively. Korea is also a low spender at 2.9% of GDP. Mexico has a relative young population, which Gross and net spending is also the case but to a lesser extent in Iceland, where much of retirement income is provided by compulsory The penultimate column of the table shows public occupational schemes (see the next indicator of “Pension- spending in net terms: after taxes and contributions paid on benefit expenditures: Public and private”), leaving a lesser benefits. -
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES ARTIFICIAL STATES Alberto
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES ARTIFICIAL STATES Alberto Alesina William Easterly Janina Matuszeski Working Paper 12328 http://www.nber.org/papers/w12328 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 June 2006 We thank Jean Marie Baland, Alberto Bravo-Biosca, Ernesto dal Bo, Ashley Lester, and participants at conferences at Brown, NBER and a seminar at Harvard for useful comments. For much needed help with maps we thank Patrick Florance, Kimberly Karish and Michael Oltmans. Alesina gratefully acknowledges financial support from the NSF with a grant trough NBER. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. ©2006 by Alberto Alesina, William Easterly and Janina Matuszeski. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Artificial States Alberto Alesina, William Easterly and Janina Matuszeski NBER Working Paper No. 12328 June 2006 JEL No. F43, F50 ABSTRACT Artificial states are those in which political borders do not coincide with a division of nationalities desired by the people on the ground. We propose and compute for all countries in the world two new measures how artificial states are. One is based on measuring how borders split ethnic groups into two separate adjacent countries. The other one measures how straight land borders are, under the assumption the straight land borders are more likely to be artificial. We then show that these two measures seem to be highly correlated with several measures of political and economic success. -
Mauritius Budget Highlights 2020-2021
Mauritius Budget Highlights 2020/21 June 4, 2020 KPMG.com/mu Contents 03 KPMG View 08 Budget Financials 10 Economic Outlook Global Business & 14 Regulatory 19 Corporate Tax 23 Personal Tax 26 Indirect Taxes 31 Tax Administration 34 Appendices © 2020 KPMG,KPMG Taxa Mauritian Services partnership Ltd, a Mauritian and a limited member liability firm of company the KPMG and network a member of independent firm of the KPMG member network firms ofaffiliated independent with KPMG memb Inteer firmsrnational affiliated Cooperative, with KPMG a Swiss International entity. All Cooperative, rights reserved.. a Swiss 2 entity. All rights reserved.. Document Classification: KPMG Confidential FOREWORD KPMG View An array of social measures for economic revival The Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and economy, building of a pharmaceutical industry and Development, presented on 4 June 2020 the 2020- promotion of regional partnerships. 2021 budget speech entitled “Our new normal: the The tourism industry received a number of incentives economy of life”. such as the possibility to convert hotels into service The Government has embarked into the post COVID- apartments which can be sold individually, a two year 19 era with measures presented under a “Plan de no-licence fee period for Tourism and Beach Authority Relance de L’Investissement et de L’Economie”, operators, a waiver of rental of State land for one year, “Major Structural Reforms” and “Securing and the increase in the rebate scheme for renovation Sustainable and Inclusive Development”. and restructuring to 100% until 2022. As the country navigates its way out of the COVID-19 Reducing concentration and promoting local pandemic with a projected contraction of 11% this manufacturing year, we also face an ageing population and a high Local manufacturers will benefit with supermarkets gross public sector debt ratio of 83.4% (net 72.7%). -
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Analysis of Economic Studies
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Analysis of Economic Studies James K. Jackson Specialist in International Trade and Finance June 30, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44551 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Analysis of Economic Studies Summary Congress plays a major role in formulating and implementing U.S. trade policy through its legislative and oversight responsibilities. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the authority to regulate foreign commerce, while the President has the authority to conduct foreign relations. In 2015, Congress reauthorized Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) that( 1) sets trade policy objectives for the President to negotiate in trade agreements; (2) requires the President to engage with and keep Congress informed of negotiations; and (3) provides for Congressional consideration of legislation to implement trade agreements on an expedited basis, based on certain criteria. The United States is considering the recently-concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among the United States and 11 other countries. The 12 TPP countries signed the agreement in February 2016, but the agreement must be ratified by each country before it can enter into force. In the United States this requires implementing legislation by Congress. The agreement is viewed by the participants as a “comprehensive and high standard” mega- regional free trade agreement that may hold the promise of greater economic opportunities and closer economic and strategic ties among the negotiating parties. For Members of Congress and others, international trade and trade agreements may offer the prospect of improved national economic welfare. Such agreements, however, have mixed effects on U.S. domestic and foreign interests, both economic and political. -
Fairness and Redistribution
Fairness and Redistribution By ALBERTO ALESINA AND GEORGE-MARIOS ANGELETOS* Different beliefs about the fairness of social competition and what determines income inequality influence the redistributive policy chosen in a society. But the composition of income in equilibrium depends on tax policies. We show how the interaction between social beliefs and welfare policies may lead to multiple equi- libria or multiple steady states. If a society believes that individual effort determines income, and that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, it will choose low redistribution and low taxes. In equilibrium, effort will be high and the role of luck will be limited, in which case market outcomes will be relatively fair and social beliefs will be self-fulfilled. If, instead, a society believes that luck, birth, connec- tions, and/or corruption determine wealth, it will levy high taxes, thus distorting allocations and making these beliefs self-sustained as well. These insights may help explain the cross-country variation in perceptions about income inequality and choices of redistributive policies. (JEL D31, E62, H2, P16) Pre-tax inequality is higher in the United support the poor; an important dimension of States than in continental West European coun- redistribution is legislation, and in particular the tries (“Europe” hereafter). For example, the regulation of labor and product markets, which Gini coefficient in the pre-tax income distribu- are much more intrusive in Europe than in the tion in the United States is 38.5, while in Europe United States.1 it is 29.1. Nevertheless, redistributive policies The coexistence of high pre-tax inequality are more extensive in Europe, where the income and low redistribution is prima facia inconsis- tax structure is more progressive and the overall tent with both the Meltzer-Richard paradigm of size of government is about 50 percent larger redistribution and the Mirrlees paradigm of so- (that is, about 30 versus 45 percent of GDP). -
Budget Analysis for Investments in Children in Saint Lucia
Budget Analysis for Investments in Children in Saint Lucia BUDGET ANALYSIS FOR INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN IN SAINT LUCIA Published by UNICEF Office for the Eastern Caribbean Area First Floor, UN House Marine Gardens, Hastings Christ Church Barbados Tel: (246) 467 6000 Fax: (246) 426 3812 Email: [email protected] Website: www.unicef.org/easterncaribbean This Study was commissioned by the UNICEF Office for the Eastern Caribbean Area and UN Women Multi-Country Office - Caribbean The contents do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of the organizations. Authors: Zina Nimeh, Arthur Van de Meerendonk, Franziska Gassmann, Jouke Wortelboer, Eli Stoykova and Daphne Francoise Nimeh, Z., Van de Meerendonk, A., Gassmann, F., Wortelboer, J. and Stoykova, E., Francoise, D. (2015). Budget Analysis for Investments in Children in Saint Lucia, UNICEF Office for the Eastern Caribbean Area. All rights reserved. 2015 Budget Analysis for Investments in Children in Saint Lucia CONTENTS Acknowledgments x Executive summary 2 1 Introduction 12 1.1 Structure of the report 13 1.2 Government actors 13 1.3 Data and methodology 13 1.4 Limitations 14 1.5 Process 14 2 Economic and Social Context 16 2.1 Economic and fiscal environment 16 2.2 Fiscal operations and management and the social budget 19 2.3 Demographic trends 21 2.4 Labour market 23 2.5 Poverty and child well-being 25 2.6 Conclusion 30 3 Education 32 3.1 Short overview of the education system in Saint. Lucia 32 3.2 Policies and planning 33 3.2.1 Laws and other basic regulations concerning education -
Fiscal and Structural Reforms in Saint Lucia: Towards a Comprehensive
FISCAL AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN SAINT LUCIA: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA NOVEMBER 2016 FISCAL AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN SAINT LUCIA: TOWARDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA vi Disclaimer Copyright © Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). The opinions, findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the staff of CDB and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of CDB, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. This work may be reproduced, with attribution to CDB, for any non-commercial purpose. The use of CDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of CDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written licence agreement between CDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this licence. No derivative work is allowed. CDB does not necessarily own each component of the content contained within this document and therefore does not warrant that the use of any third-party owned individual component or part contained in this work will not infringe on the rights of those third parties. Any risks of claims resulting from such infringement rest solely with the user. CDB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. Any dispute related to the use of the works of CDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. Nothing herein shall constitute or be deemed to constitute a waiver of the privileges and immunities of CDB, all of which are specifically reserved. FISCAL AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN SAINT LUCIA: TOWARDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA ii Acknowledgements The Caribbean Development Bank expresses appreciation to the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank for its contribution to the Report, as well as to the Staff of the Ministry of Finance, especially the Research and Policy Unit, who provided invaluable assistance on this project. -
A) the Economic Rationale for Trade Net Effect on the Terms-Of-Trade, but Lead to a Agreements Contraction of Trade Volumes Which Reduces Overall Welfare (See Box 1
II – B FLEXIBILITY IN TRADE AGREEMENTS B FLEXIBILITY IN TRADE AGREEMENTS The aim of this section is to: (a) clarify what Economists have identified several rationales for justifies the inclusion of contingency measures in the existence of trade agreements, such as those trade agreements; (b) provide an account of all embodied in the WTO, and its antecedent, the circumstances when a suspension of commitments General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). may make economic sense; and (c) identify the Two main approaches can be distinguished.1 The flexibility measures built into WTO agreements. first states that in the absence of a trade agreement, The section provides a framework for the discussion a country may be tempted to manipulate the of specific contingency measures in the subsequent terms-of-trade (i.e. the price of its exports relative sections of the Report. to its imports) in order to increase its national income at the expense of its trading partners. The 1. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF second approach stresses the economic and political TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE difficulties that governments face in setting trade policy. As discussed below, trade agreements allow ROLE OF FLEXIBILITIES governments to escape terms-of-trade conflicts and/ or to resist pressures from the private sector and Trade agreements aim to strike a balance between special-interest groups urging the government to flexibility and commitments. If there is too deviate from a liberal trade policy. much flexibility, the value of the commitment is undermined. If there is too little flexibility, countries i) The traditional approach to trade agreements may refuse to make deep commitments or may easily renege on such commitments. -
Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogeneous Growth
Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogeneous Growth The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Barro, Robert J. 1990. Government spending in a simple model of endogeneous growth. Journal of Political Economy 98(S5): 103-125. Published Version doi:10.1086/261726 Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3451296 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth Robert J. Barro Harvard Universityand National Bureau of Economic Research One strand of endogenous-growth models assumes constant returns to a broad concept of capital. I extend these models to include tax- financed government services that affect production or utility. Growth and saving rates fall with an increase in utility-type expendi- tures; the two rates rise initially with productive government expen- ditures but subsequently decline. With an income tax, the decen- tralized choices of growth and saving are "too low," but if the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the optimizing government still satisfies a natural condition for productive efficiency. Empirical evidence across countries supports some of the hypotheses about government and growth. Recent models of economic growth can generate long-term growth without relying on exogenous changes in technology or population. Some of the models amount to theories of technological progress (Romer 1986; this issue) and others to theories of population change (Becker and Barro 1988). -
English.Pdf Purchasing Power Parity [PPP])—Much Lower Than 2 World Bank
CENTRAL Public Disclosure Authorized AFRICAN REPUBLIC ECONOMIC Public Disclosure Authorized UPDATE FOURTH EDITION Investing in Public Disclosure Authorized Human Capital to Protect the Future JULY 2021 Public Disclosure Authorized © 2021 The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org Some rights reserved This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: “World Bank. 2021. Central African Republic Economic Update: Investing in Human Capital to Protect the Future. © World Bank.” All queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625;