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Logical Structure the of O B J E C T I V I THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF OBJECTIVISM “Beta” Version By William Thomas and David Kelley Working draft: not for duplication or resale Copyright 1999 The Logical Structure of Objectivism “Beta” Version By William Thomas and David Kelley i Preface to the “Beta” Version This volume is a working draft, produced for the “Logical Structure of Objectivism” course at the 1999 Institute for Objectivist Studies Summer Semi- nar. The purpose of the “beta” version is to provide the course participants with a textbook, and to allow us, the authors, to obtain a wider reader response be- fore we do our final revisions on the first edition. In effect, we are inviting the course participants to contribute to the re-writing process. Readers may notice that this is a rough document in several respects. The earlier chapters are more polished that the later ones. The notes are still incomplete, and although it is mentioned at several points in the text, there is as yet no “fold out diagram” to show the entire pattern of argument in one page. The text has not received the meticulous proof-reading for typographical errors that one expects of a book published for sale. All these shortcomings are the sign of a work-in-progress. As such, this “beta” version is not for resale or scholarly citation. Of course, all rights to the text and diagrams are reserved. Nevertheless, this version is the product of a thorough composition process, and it is essentially sound. We stand behind the logic of the arguments and the appropriateness of the evidence on which they are based. Although we anticipate further revisions before publication, we expect these to be largely stylistic. The “beta” version is home cooking, but it is an intellectual meal for all that. But first, a word of thanks: We are especially grateful for the com- ments and support we have received from Frank Bubb, Eyal Mozes, David Ross, Roger Donway, and Donald Heath, and also for the contributions of many oth- ers. We thank them for the improvements that have resulted from their com- ments, but, to practice what we preach, we take full responsibility for the final product. Feel free to dig in. William Thomas and David Kelley June 5, 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ............................................................................. i Introduction ................................................................... 1 The Systematic Level of Understanding .................................... 2 The Structure of Knowledge ...................................................... 7 Induction and Deduction............................................................. 9 Context ......................................................................................12 Diagramming the Logical Structure ......................................... 14 Notes ......................................................................................... 17 Chapter 1: Knowledge ................................................. 19 Axioms ..................................................................................... 19 Perception as the Basis of Knowledge ..................................... 30 Knowledge is Hierarchical and Contextual .............................. 37 Reason and Objectivity ............................................................ 40 Emotions and Reason ............................................................... 43 Conclusion ................................................................................ 47 Notes ......................................................................................... 48 Chapter 2: Life and Needs ...........................................51 Life as the Ultimate Value ........................................................ 51 Life and Happiness ................................................................... 60 The Basic Logical Structure of the Objectivist Ethics..... 64 Context and Ethics .................................................................... 66 Needs ........................................................................................ 68 Capacities ................................................................................. 71 Flourishing and Survival .......................................................... 72 Notes ......................................................................................... 76 Chapter 3: Material Values and Reason .........................81 The Logical Structure of Values ............................................... 81 The Role of Reason in the Logical Structure of the Ethics ...... 84 Production and Life .................................................................. 86 Reason and Production ............................................................. 89 Unit-Economy and the Need for Reason .................................. 92 Thinking in Principles .............................................................. 95 Conclusion ................................................................................ 99 Notes ......................................................................................... 99 Chapter 4: Spiritual and Social Values .................... 101 The Cardinal Values ............................................................... 101 Reason as a Cardinal Value .................................................... 104 Purpose as a Cardinal Value ................................................... 107 Self as a Cardinal Value .......................................................... 109 Other Spiritual Values ............................................................. 113 Education ................................................................................ 113 Career ..................................................................................... 115 Philosophy as a Value ............................................................. 116 Art as a Value ......................................................................... 124 Social Values .......................................................................... 129 Economic Exchange ............................................................... 129 Communication ...................................................................... 130 Visibility ................................................................................. 130 Conclusion .............................................................................. 134 Notes ....................................................................................... 135 Chapter 5: Virtues ...................................................... 139 Virtues and Character ............................................................. 139 Rationality .............................................................................. 140 Virtues and Rationality ........................................................... 142 Integrity .................................................................................. 146 Integrity and Principles ........................................................... 147 Character and Integrity ........................................................... 150 Productiveness ........................................................................ 158 Productive Work as One’s Central Purpose ............................166 Productiveness, Achievement, and Responsibility ................. 170 Honesty ................................................................................... 173 Pride ....................................................................................... 184 Conclusion .............................................................................. 190 Notes ....................................................................................... 191 Chapter 6: Social Virtues ................................................... 197 Autonomy: Cognitive Independence ..................................... 198 Justice ..................................................................................... 204 Moral Judgment ...................................................................... 208 The Trader Principle (Introduction) ....................................... 215 Elements of the Trader Principle ............................................ 216 Non-Self-Sacrifice .................................................................. 217 Existential Independence ........................................................ 221 Non-Coercion ......................................................................... 228 The Trader Principle (Conclusion) ......................................... 233 Benevolence ........................................................................... 236 Notes ....................................................................................... 240 Chapter 7: Freedom and Government ..................... 245 Freedom and Rights ................................................................ 246 Property Rights ....................................................................... 251 Government and Law ............................................................. 254 Limited Government ............................................................... 261 Conclusion .............................................................................. 262 Notes ....................................................................................... 263 Conclusion .................................................................. 267 Feedback Loops .....................................................................
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