The Image of Hungary's International Position in American Foreign Policymaking 1937-1947
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This is an authorized facsimile, made from the microfilm master copy of the original dissertation or masters thesis published by UMI. The bibliographic information for this thesis is contained in UMI's Dissertation Abstracts database, the only central source for accessing almost every doctoral dissertation accepted in North America since 1861. U-M-I Dissertation Services A Bell & Howell Company 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 1-800-521-0600 313-761-4700 Printed in 1994 by xerographic process on acid-free paper This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 68-7437 RUPPRECHT, Paul, 1924- THE IMAGE OF HUNGARY'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICYMAKING, 1937-1947. University of Minnesota, Ph.D., 1967 Political Science, international law and relations University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan THE IMAGE OF HUNGARY'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY- MAKING, 1937-1947 A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA BY Paul Rupprecht IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY October 1967 FOREWORD The idea of this dissertation grew out of direct experiences that had witnessed the exchange of one alien,-totalitarian rule in East-Central Europe for another, and that had generated an interest in the causes of the present situation in that part of the world. This interest raised the following questions: to what extent did Hungary's position play a role in American decisions; were opportunities offered by it, . which might have enhanced American objectives; were those potential advantages recognized, fostered, or utilized by the United States; were there attempts made to coordinate such available resources in the interest of peace; and what were the reasons for their failure or success. The feasibility of this study depended entirely on the availability of primary sources which provided background materials, revealed the motivations of the international actors, and unfolded the environmental influences. Recently and slowly -- very slowly -- access to official as well as private documents made a better insight into this subject possible. For the use of that material, the writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the following: The Archduke Otto von Habsburg, Tibor Eckhardt; General G. Hennyey, András Hory, the late Miklós.Kállay, Professor C.A. Macartney of Oxford, the late John F. Montgomery, Ferenc Nagy, Bernhard C. Noble and his staff of the Historic Office of the United States Department of State, the late Hubert C. Pell, Aladár Szegedy- Maszák, the late András Tamás, and Ferenc Wagner of the Library of Congress. The writer is particularly indebted to his academic advisors, Professors Charles H. McLaughlin and Harold C. Deutsch, who have guided and inspired him along his prolonged academic career. Special thanks are due to Professor McLaughlin for his enduring patience with the writer's deficiencies. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED A. C. C. - Allied (Soviet) Control Commission. D. I. M. K. - Diplomáciai Iratok Magyarország Külpolitikájához. (Diplomatic Papers Pertaining to Hungary's Foreign Policy) D. G. F. P. - Documents on German Foreign Policy F. R. U. S. - Foreign Relations of the United States M. M. V. - Magyarország és a Második Világháború (Hungary and the Second World War) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page FOREWORD . II LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED . IV TABLE OF CONTENTS . V Chapter I. INTRODUCTION . ………………………......1 II. HUNGARY’S INTERNATIONAL POSITION – A BRIEF BACKGROUND . ………………………8 III. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING IN 1937 . ..…………….25 1. The Grouping of the Great Powers . ..............................25 2. Small Power Combinations . ...................................31 3. Hungary’s Position in 1937 . ...................................38 4. The American View of Hungary’s Position in 1937 . .......52 IV. THE AUSTRIAN ANSCHLUSS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES . ..................................75 1. Background of Austria’s International Position . ........75 2. The Acute Phase of the Austrian Crisis in 1938 . ........87 3. Reactions to the Anschluss and Its Consequences : .........98 4. U. S. Reactions to Austria’s Annexation . ........107 5. Conclusion . ................................... 117 V. THE CRISES AND SUPPRESSION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA…………...........................................124 1. Czechoslovak-Hungarian Relations Before 1938...............124 2. The Prelude to Munich. ............................................136 3. Munich and the Vienna Arbitration . .............................154 4. Dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1939………………......174 5. Conclusion. ..............................................182 VI. HUNGARIAN NON-BELLIGERENCY IN 1939-1940 .........186 1. Events Leading to the German Polish War .....................186 2. Uneasy Neutrality After the Fall of Poland . ............209 . V. Chapter Page 3. The Second Vienna Award . .........................................235 4. Conclusion . .................................................248 VII. THE WARS IN THE BALKANS AND RUSSIA, 1940-1941 ...253 1. Hungary's Adherence to the Tripartite Pact . ..........................253 2. The Invasion of Yugoslavia . .............................................265 3. Hungary and the German Attack on the Soviet Union..................282 VIII.HUNGARY'S ENTRY INTO WAR WITH BRITAIN AND........292 1. Hungarian Relations with the West, Summer-Fall, 1941.............292 2. British Declaration of War on Hungary . ..........................304 3. Hungarian Declaration of War on America . .. .....................308 4. American Reaction to the Hungarian Declaration ......................317 IX.HUNGARIAN DIPLOMACY DURING THE KÁLLAY BIENNIUM . ...............................................324 1. Kállay's Concept of Hungary's Foreign Policy . ......................324 2. Kállay's Diplomacy . ..................................................336 3. The Frustration of Kállay's Diplomacy . ..........................349 X. GERMAN OCCUPATION AND HUNGARIAN ARMISTICE . 367 l. German Occupation, March 1944 . ......................................367 2. Hungary's Armistice Negotiations . .........................................387 XI. RUSSIAN OCCUPATION, PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, AND PEACE . ....................................................................408 1. Yalta and the End of the War for Hungary . ........................408 2. Hungarian Attempts to Survive, Western Attempts to Help, and Russian Successes at Making Their peace . .........................418 XII... CONCLUSION . ....................................434 BIBLIOGRAPHY . .....................................452 VI CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION On November 4, 1937, at a top-level policy meeting in Berlin, Hitler outlined his ambitions in the international field, vividly retained in the famous Hossbach minutes. 1 Ten years later, on June 1, 1947, the presentation of a forced resignation by the Prime Minister of Hungary, Ferenc Nagy, marked the day of that country's becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union.2 The decade between these two events witnessed a huge transformation in the world of international politics from an era of uneasy, post-World War calm through Hitler's attempted assertion of European dominance to the establishment of Soviet power in East Central Europe, essentially still in effect today, twenty years later. The events, developments, clashes -- both military and political -- of that fateful decade constitute the subject of this study's investigation and analysis, focussed on East-Central Europe, particularly on Hungary. Since the final outcome of the struggles of 1 U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy (hereafter DGFP), Series D, Vol.. I: From Neurath to Ribbentrop, 1937-1938 (Washington, 1949), pp. -37 2U.S Department of State, Moscow's European Satellites (Washington, 1955)s p. 3. those ten years was determined to a very large extent by the power and involvement of the United States, it appears most appropriate to study how America perceived the international situation there, to what extent the American evaluations of it were accurate, how the final decisions were influenced by them, how the opportunities inherent in that situation for America were exploited and used to obtain desired results, who and what segments of the American decision-makers actually determined the policies shaping America's actions and inactions. Situated where the major powers' spheres of influence met, in both the German-Russian and in the American-Russian contexts, Hungary provided an excellent subject on which their intertwining relationships exerted overwhelming effects. As the last country in that area coming under German occupation and one that had a relatively long period of some self-government under her own political leadership after World War 11, Hungary was able to display multifarious attempts to save her own political life and thus show many of the political possibilities that a small country has in store, even facing severe forms of foreign interference by great powers adjacent to or present on her soil. The purpose of this paper then is to examine the East- Central European scene, and occasionally even cause, of great power ambitions and rivalries as they reflected themselves in a microcosmic form in the fate of Hungary and as these reflections were viewed by the United States during the era of World War II. Such a study is useful in that it reveals the possibilities of great power interests in Central- Eastern Europe in