Formulation of NASA's Constellation Program

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NASA/SP–2007–563

FORMULATION OF NASA’s CONSTELLATION PROGRAM

IAC-07-B3.1.06

Jennifer L. Rhatigan, PhD, PE Jeffrey M. Hanley Mark S. Geyer

NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center Houston, Texas 77058

October 2007

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THE NASA STI PROGRAM OFFICE . . . IN PROFILE

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NASA/ SP–2007–563

FORMULATION OF NASA’s CONSTELLATION PROGRAM

IAC-07-B3.1.06

Jennifer L. Rhatigan, PhD, PE Jeffrey M. Hanley Mark S. Geyer

NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center Houston, Texas 77058

October 2007

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Available from:

NASA Center for AeroSpace Information National Technical Information Service 7115 Standard Drive 5285 Port Royal Road Hanover, MD 21076-1320 Springfield, VA 22161 301-621-0390 703-605-6000

This report is also available in electronic form at http://ston.jsc.nasa.gov/collections/TRS/

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Table of Contents Introduction...... 1 Background...... 1 Contextual Direction...... 2 Continue Human Spaceflight...... 2 Transition the Space Shuttle ...... 2 Plan for Level Budgets ...... 2 Lead an Agency-wide Team...... 2 Lead Culture Change ...... 2 Meet Commitments ...... 3 Improve Spaceflight Risk ...... 3 Simplify Operations...... 3 Organization Sturcture...... 3 Constellation Program ...... 3 Constellation Projects ...... 4 Program/Project Integration...... 4 Agency Governance...... 5 Decision Making Structure ...... 6 Workforce...... 6 Distributed Teams...... 7 Sage Advice...... 7 Requirements...... 8 Zero-Based Requirements Approach...... 8 Evolving the Architecture...... 8 Program Requirements Reviews...... 8 Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) Requirements ...... 9 Schedule ...... 9 Budget and Acquisition...... 10 Budget Development ...... 10 Confidence Level...... 11 Acquisition Strategy ...... 11 Operational Philosophy ...... 12 Stretch Requirements...... 12 ‘Con Ops’ Development ...... 12 Life Cycle Cost Evaluations ...... 12 Lean Efforts ...... 12 Industry Advice ...... 12 Summary...... 13 References...... 14

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Figures

Figure 1: Constellation Organization Structure. Program Management; the Program Offices adapted from the Apollo 5-box structure; Project Offices...... 4 Figure 2: Constellation work assignments at NASA Centers ...... 7 Figure 3: Constellation Program Roadmap through Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 ...... 10

Tables

Table 1: Constellation Project Descriptions...... 5

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Acronyms

CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board Con Ops Concept of Operations CLV crew launch vehicle (since named Ares I) CEV crew exploration vehicle (since named Orion) CaLV cargo launch vehicle (since named Ares II) ERTT ESAS Requirements Transition Team ESAS Exploration Systems Architecture Study ESMD Exploration Systems Mission Directorate IC Initial Capability ISS International Space Station KSC Kennedy Space Center LAS Launch Abort System LC Lunar Capability SRBs Solid Rocket Boosters SRDs system requirements documents

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ABSTRACT

NASA has recently formed the Constellation Program to achieve the objectives of maintaining American presence in low Earth orbit, returning to the moon for purposes of establishing an outpost, and laying the foundation to explore Mars and beyond in the first half of the 21st century. The Constellation Program’s heritage rests on the successes and lessons learned from NASA’s previous human spaceflight programs: Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS). This paper describes the rationale behind the formulation of the Constellation Program, including organizational structure, and workforce structure, as well as the approaches to requirements generation, budget formulation, operational philosophies, and procurement strategies.

INTRODUCTION In January 2004, The White House issued a new exploration initiative3 to return humans to the NASA’s human spaceflight history of program moon by 2020 in preparation for human formulation, development and operations was a exploration of Mars and beyond. As part of this primary resource in the formulation of the initiative, NASA will continue to use the space Constellation Program. We researched historical shuttle to fulfill its obligation to complete records from the Apollo Program, and its pre - assembly of the International Space Station and decessors Gemini and Mercury, as well as the then retire the space shuttle by 2010. NASA will more recent Space Shuttle and ISS Programs. also build and fly a new crew exploration Most importantly, consultation not only with vehicle (CEV, since named Orion) by 2014. In histories, but also with individual managers 2005, Congress expressly endorsed the involved in key decision making in past President’s exploration initiative and provided programs, formed the basis of the structure of 4 additional direction , authorizing NASA to today’s Constellation Program. Moreover, much “…establish a program to develop a sustained of the Constellation hardware traces its history human presence on the moon, including a robust to previous programs and that corporate history precursor program to promote exploration, and existing management structure have been science, commerce and U.S. preeminence in leveraged to a great extent. This paper space, and as a stepping stone to future summarizes the rationale for the Program exploration of Mars and other destinations.” structure. We note that current technical descriptions of the program content may be 1 In response to the Presidential direction, the found elsewhere . Agency formed the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) at NASA BACKGROUND Headquarters in 2004 to oversee development of Following the loss of Columbia, NASA exploration programs. The Constellation Sys- established the Columbia Accident Investigation tems Division was initiated to oversee the Board (CAIB) to perform an in-depth review of human exploration mission development. the Space Shuttle Program. As a result of this review, the CAIB concluded that it was in the In May 2005, NASA Administrator Michael best interest of the U.S. to develop a replace- Griffin commissioned the Exploration Systems ment for the space shuttle. The CAIB concluded Architecture Study (ESAS), a sixty-day study to that it should be possible using past and future perform the tasks of defining the top-level investments in technology to develop the basis requirements and configurations for crew and for a system, “significantly improved over one cargo launch systems to support exploration designed 40 years earlier, for carrying humans to objectives. The study concluded that the launch orbit and enabling their work in space”2. vehicles should be derived from existing technologies, leveraging the lessons learned from past programs. The ESAS recommended an architecture that included a crew launch

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vehicle (CLV, since named Ares I) to ferry crew Plan for Level Budgets and cargo to the ISS and to carry crew to Earth The Constellation Program should expect the orbit. A heavy-lift cargo launch vehicle (CLV, Agency’s allocation of the Federal budget to since named Ares V), to support missions to the remain at levels consistent with the current moon and Mars was also defined.5 The resulting environment. No increases other than modest architecture formed the basis of the cost-of-living increases should be expected, thus Constellation Program. the Constellation Program development is constrained by completion of the Space Shuttle In August that year, the NASA Administrator Program. formed the ESAS Requirements Transition Team (ERTT) charging them to complete an Lead an Agency-wide Team architecture-level specification that defined the The Constellation Program should leverage elements and their top level functionality; and to expertise across the Agency where possible, in complete a draft of the Crew Exploration keeping with Agency objectives to maintain all Vehicle System Requirements Document, vali- 10 NASA Centers in healthy posture. Indeed, the dating its consistency with the architecture and Program should transform the 10 NASA Centers providing the basis for subsequent prime into a unified agency-wide team. contractor selection. It is also notable that the ERTT was asked to lead the first of many As the Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Crew internal NASA cultural changes, including the Launch Vehicle organizations were previously adoption of a ‘zero-based’ requirements formed in the Fall of 2005, the Constellation philosophy, in which only the minimum Program should establish a strong program to necessary and cost-effective requirements are lead the integration of these established included. organizations.

CONTEXTUAL DIRECTION Lead Culture Change No modern program is created from whole cloth, The Space Shuttle and ISS Programs were and the Constellation Program is no exception. developed in the context of their times, facing We note here the major themes, forces, challenges and unknowns that humble us in situations, guidelines, constraints and environ- appreciation of the efforts it took to make them mental considerations underway at the time of successful. There is an inherent legacy to efforts the Constellation Program formulation. These of that magnitude; some appropriate for direct are provided for contextual understanding of the adaptation by a new program, some not. The Agency expectations of the Program. Agency leadership has given the Program license to explore new methods and approaches Continue Human Spaceflight to developing and procuring future human The Agency’s primary objectives are continued spaceflight and ground systems. We’ve also safe operations of the space shuttle and been charged with using the Constellation completion of the ISS. The human spaceflight Program to do nothing less than reconstitute work force within the Agency is engaged in systems engineering capacity within NASA’s continuous operations in support of those human spaceflight community, to smoothly objectives. transition the human spaceflight workforce to the next generation of capabilities and to lay the Transition the Space Shuttle foundation of a program that will be cost- With the retirement of the space shuttle planned effective and sustainable into the far future. for 2010, the Constellation Program should plan While remaining attentive to the lessons learned to utilize the space shuttle workforce, hardware from current and prior programs, Constellation and infrastructure that support the Constellation Program should lead the Agency in cultural mission, in a manner that enables a smooth changes—to re-invent how human spaceflight transition from one to the next, but does not development is done. interfere with on-going operations.

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Meet Commitments ORGANIZATION STURCTURE The Constellation Program should meet its Constellation Program commitments; that is, do what we said we would The structural model that most closely resembles do, when we said we would do it, within the the current mission is the Apollo “5-box” allocated budget, schedule, and technical management structure6 and was selected because requirements. If the budget is cut, let stakeholders know the impact to our schedule it worked effectively. These five organizational functions are comprised of program planning and/or technical commitments. The practice of and control; test and verification; operations maintaining unrealistic schedules in the face of integration; systems engineering and integration; budget cuts should not be continued. and safety, reliability and quality assurance. This Improve Spaceflight Risk was adapted and tailored to the Constellation Achieve an order-of-magnitude improvement in Program’s more evolutionary objectives. risk to crew and mission over that of the space Constellation is envisioned to have develop- shuttle. Current probabilistic risk assessment mental aspects throughout its life cycle in that puts the risk of loss of crew for the space shuttle new developments to support the next mission on the order 10-2. Constellation should improve will start in phases as current developments this to the order of 10-3. become operational. For instance, lunar outpost development will start after the low Earth orbit Simplify Operations portions of the Program are operational. The The Constellation Program should plan and adapted organizational structure is shown in require simplified operations such that Figure 1. Note that an advanced development operational costs are minimized, particularly function (Advanced Projects Office) has been with respect to space shuttle heritage operations. added to the Apollo “5-box” structure. This New developments for lunar and Martian organization houses research and development expeditions are only possible if budget is made activities for ‘pre-projects’ envisioned to support available due to decreased operational costs. lunar missions and beyond. Organizations Thus Constellation will only be sustainable if the outside of NASA, such as international partners and commercial parners, could be involved in operational infrastructure and workforce are 7 more efficient than today. these later phases of the Program .

Recognizing the need to establish a program The Constellation Program was staffed with recognized leadership within the Agency (e.g., office co-located with the NASA program experience base, ESMD established the Constellation from the ISS Program, Space Shuttle Program, Program at the NASA Johnson Space Center in and Mission Operations Flight Director Office) November of 2005. The following sections and the contractor/DoD space community describe the decisions that were made in its between November 2005 and March 2006, formulation in the context of the guidelines seeking project managers with demonstrated discussed above. experience in executing projects and discipline- area leaders able to assemble strong teams, articulate a clear vision of the task, and integrate horizontally and vertically.

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Figure 1: Constellation Organization Structure. Program Management (first row boxes); the Program Offices adapted from the Apollo 5-box structure (second row boxes); Project Offices (third row boxes).

Constellation Projects faces, as well as the importance of allowing The projects that comprise the Constellation projects maximum flexibility in managing their Program are listed in the bottom row of Figure assigned element. However, a detailed examina- 1. Table 1 describes major responsibilities for tion of integration processes was necessary to each project in the development and operational truly understand and assign responsibilities. The phases of the Program. program and project deputies conducted integration process decomposition in order to Program/Project Integration understand and agree upon ownership for each We know from Agency history that our success step in the integration processes. This under- depends on a strong program leading strong standing is paramount for implementation of projects. As soon as the program office was hardware and software interface agreements and staffed, we began a process of negotiating roles is a key element leading into the design and responsibilities between the Program and definition phase. projects. All recognized the importance of having a program office integrate project inter-

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Lead Function Constellation NASA Project Center Developmental Phase Operational Phase Develop and test the Orion (CEV) Provide Orion spacecraft. Project Orion JSC spacecraft to transport crew to and from space. Develop and test the Ares I (CLV) and Ares Provide Ares launch vehicles. Project Ares MSFC V (CaLV) launch vehicles. Perform ground processing and integrated Provide logistics and launch testing of launch vehicles. Plan, construct services. Provide post- Ground and/or reconfigure integration, launch, and landing and recovery services Operations KSC recovery services for Orion Crew Module, for the crew, Orion Crew Project Ares I and Ares V. Module, and spent Ares Solid Rocket Boosters. Configure, test, plan, and operate facilities, Train crew, flight controllers, Mission systems, and procedures. Plan missions and and support staff. Coordinate Operations JSC flight operations. crew operations during Project missions. Develop and test the Lunar Lander to Provide Lunar Lander. Lunar Lander transport crew to and from the lunar surface JSC Project and to provide a habitable volume for initial lunar missions. Develop EVA systems (spacesuits, tools, Provide spacesuits and tools. Extravehicular and servicing and support equipment) to Activities support crew survival during launch, JSC (EVA) Systems atmospheric entries, landing, abort Project scenarios, and outside the space vehicle and on the lunar surface. Develop systems for future applications Provide future systems as To be including Lunar Surface Systems needed. Future Projects deter- (equipment and systems for crew operation mined on the lunar surface) and systems for future human exploration activities. Table 1: Constellation Project Descriptions

Agency Governance reliability and quality assurance; and health and The Constellation Program is the first new medical standards, respectively. They also have program within the Agency to implement the the responsibility to provide informed technical NASA Governance Model that resulted from the recommendations on programmatic issues CAIB recommendations2. In brief, the throughout all stages of a program life cycle. In Governance Model provides for checks and addition, they provide an appeal path for balances between the program and the program office personnel or line organization independent technical authorities established personnel who disagree with a program decision. within the Agency. For the Constellation NASA and industry standards, ranging from Program, the Program Manager (and staff by human rating standards to conformance to the delegation) has authority over mission metric system, are owned by the technical performance, programmatic, cost, and schedule authorities. However, not all requirements in requirements. The Office of the Chief Engineer, these documents are applicable or appropriate the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, and for the Constellation Program. It is the the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Program’s responsibility, with the assistance of Officer have authority over engineering; safety, the technical authorities, to develop and

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recommend a tailored set of these requirements. dissenter is advised of the disposition. If an It is the technical authorities’ responsibility to individual or individuals disagree with a review and approve the tailored set of Program Manager or Technical Authority requirements. Risk acceptance is the Program decision, and believe that the decision poses a Manager’s responsibility, including the accep- risk to safety or mission success, there is an tance of residual safety risks that result from established appeal path. ground or flight anomalies, hazard analyses and WORKFORCE FMEA/CILs*. However, the technical authority may appeal if they determine that a risk is As noted in the Background section, the unacceptable for flight. Constellation Program has been formulated, and must execute, during continuous operations of Decision Making Structure the space shuttle (through 2010) and ISS. The Constellation Program uses a board/panel Moreover, we must be prepared to make best use structure for making decisions that affect the of the expertise resident in the space shuttle baseline, as well as for making technical workforce, when it becomes available as that implementation decisions at a program level. An program phases out. Constellation has developed example of the decisions that affect the baseline a phased development program in anticipation of would be anything that requires a change to a this workforce availability. This phased Program approved document. An example of a approach is described in more detail in the technical implementation decision would be Schedule section of this paper. whether to approve a design modification requiring additional funding. The Constellation The Program Office workforce is comprised of Control Board is chaired by the program engineers, scientists, and administrative personnel and was sized utilizing experience from past manager, and membership includes each project programs as well as guidance on availability of and program office appearing in Figure 1. key personnel to support three human In order to implement the Governance Model, spaceflight programs at the Johnson Space the technical authorities are also board members Center. The initial size estimate was based on on the Constellation Control Board. This avoids previous human spaceflight programs and was the ‘shadow organization’ that has evolved in set at approximately 8% of the total program past programs. These representatives cannot be content. After the Program System Require- program office personnel, nor can they be ments Review, there was sufficient experience in funded by the program. In this board structure, the office to attempt a reduction in the budget to program office personnel (SE&I, Program only approximately 6.5% of the total Program SR&Q, etc.) are responsible for providing a content. This was based on expected workload recommendation to the program manager for and products and a better understanding of the their functional area. It is the responsibility of Program integration responsibilities. The every board member, whether within the Program team continues to track risks incurred Program or part of the technical authority, to with this funding level and to reprioritize work ensure that the board is aware of dissenting as needed to meet the Program milestones. opinions, that they are discussed, and that the

* FEMA=failure modes and effects analysis; CIL=critical items list

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Ames Research Center Glenn Research Center Goddard Space Flight • Lead Orion Thermal • Orion Service Module and Spacecraft Center Protection System Adapter integration • Communications development • Ares Upper Stage subsystem support • Program and Project development analysis support • Integrated Orion qualification testing Langley Research Center • Manufacture Ares I • Orion Launch Abort System Upper Stage simulator integration and landing system development and testing Dryden Flight Research Center • Test vehicle integration for • Lead Orion Launch Abort initial Ares I flight tests System Flight Test development

Marshall Space Flight Center • Ares Project • Lead Earth Departure Stage Jet Propulsion Lab • Ares I Upper Stage propulsion • Program and Project testing analysis support

Kennedy Space Center • Ground Operations Project Michoud Ass’y Facility Ground processing, White Sands Test Facility/White Orion component • • launch and landing/ Sands Missile Range Johnson Space Center fabrication and assembly Stennis Space recovery • Orion Launch Abort System • Constellation Program • Possible Ares I Upper Center flight testing • Project Orion, Mission Operations Stage, Ares V Core Stage, • Ares propulsion • Orion and Ares propulsion Project, Lunar Lander Project, and and Earth Departure Stage testing EVA Systems Project assembly and manufacture

Figure 2: Constellation work assignments at NASA Centers

International Space Station or operational space Distributed Teams shuttle. To reach back and capture launch and The projects are staffed by leveraging expertise return vehicle experience, the Constellation across the Agency. Project work assignments at Program created a ready resource—SAGES - the 10 NASA Centers (and the White Sands Test Shuttle and Apollo Generation Expert Services. Facility/White Sands Missile Range) are This contract provides a simple pathway to enlist described in Figure 2. the aid of retired experts from NASA’s past We recognize that managing a team distributed (e.g., George Mueller, Chris Kraft, Glynn to this extent is a daunting challenge; indeed it is Lunney, etc). only now possible with current communications Beyond review and advice, SAGES was created technology that enables real-time electronic to transfer knowledge through mentoring. It is meetings, single-source record keeping, and based on relationships between Apollo and maintenance of the requirements baseline in a shuttle-era program managers and discipline single database accessible by all program experts, and the Constellation team. SAGES elements. All members of the workforce must provides mentors on an as-needed, targeted basis use the selected electronic tool suite in order to in areas ranging from technical design and make this distributed team work. analysis disciplines, to ground and flight Sage Advice operations, to program management. Twenty Though NASA has considerable talent in its four tasks have been initiated to date, including workforce, programs intended to carry humans margins management; relationship between to and from space are characterized by design, Level II program office and the Level III project development and testing challenges that differ office responsibilities; lunar lander require- greatly from those encountered by the orbiting

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ments; test and verification planning; and launch risk analyses. The Program base-lined the abort design and operations. Apollo-heritage J2-X engine as the primary upper stage engine for both the Ares I and Ares REQUIREMENTS V configurations. A cluster of five RS-68 engines (common with the Delta IV) was The ESAS team had developed an Exploration selected as the baseline first stage engine Architecture specification and draft system configuration for the Ares V, and the first stage requirements documents (SRDs) for both the solid rocket booster configuration was CEV (Orion) and the Ares I (CLV). In lieu of an lengthened to include 5 segments (rather than 4) established Program Office, the follow-on ERTT for both the Ares I and Ares V configurations. formulated, as its primary task, a requirement set Architecture requirements were also established consistent with the architecture defined by the for the EVA suit systems, ground operations and ESAS team and a CEV SRD sufficient to mission operations8. support a down-select of CEV contractors in 2006 as part of the Call for Improvement (CFI) Program Requirements Reviews process. Thus initial requirements for the basic The Program embarked on a season of System architecture, Orion, and Ares I were established Requirements Reviews (SRRs), commencing at the time the Constellation Program office with a Program SRR in the Fall of 2006, began work. The Program team had to quickly progressing through project SRRs, and establish processes, roles, responsibilities, and culminating in Program baseline synchroniza- team organizational structure to align an tion in May 2007. The SRR is conducted to integrated set of requirements that would unite ensure that the Program requirements are the elements together into a strong program that properly formulated and correlated with the could integrate and execute missions. Agency and ESMD strategic objectives. Specifically, the SRR assures that: the high-level Zero-Based Requirements Approach Program requirements are complete and Requirements development was the linchpin for approved, the interfaces with other programs are concurrent maturation of Program cost and approved, the Program requirements are cost- schedule. A zero-based requirements philosophy effective, the Program requirements are has been adopted in which only the necessary decomposed and adequately levied on projects, and cost-effective requirements are included. the plan for controlling changes to Program Projects are directed to “drive-out” unnecessary requirements is approved, the approach for requirements, write requirements in terms of verification of requirements is approved, and outcomes and not solutions or “how-to” and mitigation strategies for addressing major risks drive out non-value-added steps in achieving are approved. After project SRRs, the Program outcomes. This approach is requisite for all baseline synchronization was conducted to contracts and ‘in-house’ work. The need for data resolve discontinuities identified among project deliverables, reviews and applicable/reference requirements and between project and Program documents is carefully scrutinized in order to be requirements. sure that these requirements are necessary, value-added and cost-effective, and are required In January of 2007, Constellation gathered to achieve the desired outcome of a project. This Apollo and shuttle veterans (via the SAGES will be a continual process not only in the pre- contract mentioned earlier) in a “greybeard” award phase, but also in the post-award review of the program baseline to seek advice administration of contracts. and management guidance through the early phase of the program. This advice is currently Evolving the Architecture being integrated into the program, particularly in With an integrated Program team under our approach towards risk management. We development, several significant improvements intend to continue involvement of our space to the architecture outlined by the 60-day ESAS - flight veterans as we move forward towards team became apparent through trade-study and program implementation.

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Projects are beginning System Definition necessary to deploy the CEV/CLV (Orion/Ares Reviews at this writing, to ensure the readiness I) configuration that will support ISS, including of the program for making a program the ground and mission operations capabilities commitment agreement to approve project and the spacesuits (EVA systems) needed for the formulation startups and move into the program crew. The LC includes the Cargo Launch implementation phase. Vehicle (Ares V), the Lunar Lander and the Lunar Surface Systems (e.g., rovers, habitats, Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance scientific equipment). The current focus of the (SR&QA) Requirements Program is development of lunar capable It is the goal of the Constellation Program to elements that support the ISS. Many of the achieve an order-of-magnitude improvement in elements of the IC now under development are risk to crew and mission over that of the space accelerating the LC. For example, the J2-X shuttle. Some of this improvement can be engine is the primary engine on the upper stage achieved through design improvements. The of both the Ares I and Ares V vehicles. This Ares I/Orion system is estimated to be much aggressive development for the Ares I will more reliable for the crew than the space shuttle, provide higher confidence during the Ares V primarily due to its in-line design and vehicle development. The five-segment solid incorporation of the Launch Abort System for rocket motor first stage of the Ares I is common crew escape. with the twin solid rocket motors on the first stage of the Ares V. In addition, the crew’s EVA Other improvements must focus upon changing and pressure suits for the IC are being developed the way we ‘do’ SR&QA. This centers around: as a modular single-suit system with capability the early identification of requirements driving to add/exchange elements necessary for the LC. safety and mission success, the performance of safety and mission success analyses throughout While the continued operations of the space the life cycle, but early enough to influence shuttle constrain the budget and workforce design and operations, and an assurance available to develop Constellation through 2010, framework that verifies that the system is we also must prepare to make best use of the designed, built and operated in accordance with experienced workforce as it becomes available requirements. though the phased retirement of the space shuttle. Responding to that need, targeted SCHEDULE activities in the LC development have begun. Requirements must be developed to a level to The primary schedule requirements for the enable contract acquisitions in the 2010 Constellation Program are to develop the CEV timeframe in order to deploy and utilize the (Orion) to transport humans to and from ISS by † resident expertise in the Space Shuttle 2014 , and to return humans to the moon by Program’s civil servant and contractor work 2020. These two goals lead to a phased schedule - force to the extent possible. Initial concept approach, illustrated in Figure 3 (through 2011). development of the lunar lander and Ares V are Figure 3 shows two primary elements of underway to mature the requirements set to the schedule execution: Initial Capability (IC) necessary level. development and Lunar Capability (LC) development. The IC includes the elements

† Reference discussion of confidence level in following section resulting in current commitment to field Orion and Ares I by 2015.

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Constellation Program Roadmap (2007-2011)

Fiscal Year 2007 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Initial Post SRR Post SDR Post PDR Post CDR Post LC SDR Capability (IC) Program Baseline Program Baseline Program Baseline Program Baseline Program Baseline Synch-Up Synch-Up Synch-Up Synch-Up Synch-Up •CLV 5/23 •CEV SDRs •Ground Ops Project PDRs Initial Capability Content Execution •Mission Ops Project CDRs •EVA Systems IC Project Acquisition Process

IDAC 3 IDAC 4 IDAC 5 IDAC 6 IDAC 7 Lunar Capability (LC) LCCR •CaLV •Lunar Lander CxP LC SRR CxP LC SDR •Surface Systems Pre-Project Activities (Studies/Assessments/Trades) Project SRRs Project SDRs Project PDRs Pre-Project Project Execution (Processes and products) Formulation LC Project Acquisition Process Test Flights KSC ARES 1-X WSMR •Ascent Abort Tests AA-1 AA-2 AA-3 AA-4 •Pad Abort Tests PA-1 PA-2

DATES UNDER REVIEW 1 Figure 3: Constellation Program Roadmap through Fiscal Year (FY) 2011

The lower portion of Figure 3 illustrates the BUDGET AND ACQUISITION flight test program planned for the remainder of this decade. The Orion design incorporates a Budget Development The ESAS team had assembled a preliminary Launch Abort System (LAS) that would pull the budget estimate for execution of the crew module to a safe landing if necessary in the recommended architecture. In the spring of event of an abort during launch and early phases 2006, the Constellation Program developed an of ascent to orbit. While this system is based on Apollo heritage, it must be thoroughly tested unconstrained “bottoms-up” budget estimate for the purposes of establishing a “first cut” prior to utilization with a crew on board. A understanding of the drivers for costs and series of flight tests of the LAS is planned for schedule from present to the lunar landing phase the White Sands Missile Range that will include of the Program. This analysis provided the both pad abort and ascent abort tests. In 2009, element break-down and the raw data for Ares I-X—the first developmental flight test of building a subsequent budget that was the ‘integrated stack’—will be launched from realistically constrained by Agency priorities the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Ares I-X will and needs. By the summer 2006, the Program test the integration and performance of a was able to establish the first budget baseline simulated Ares/Orion ‘stack’ prior to Critical meeting Agency schedule commitments of Design Review so that resulting design changes deploying Orion by 2014, and landing on the could be incorporated before production of flight moon by 2020. articles. Further flight testing at KSC is planned into the next decade.

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These were updated in the Fall of 2006 as strategies already in place. The Integrated Program requirements matured. Completion of Acquisition Roadmap Team has been chartered the Program’s SRR, provided a further level of to map all existing and planned space shuttle, requirements development that allowed for more ISS and Constellation contracts and to identify refined estimates in the Agency’s FY07 budget opportunities to save costs, including life cycle development cycle. costs, to utilize lessons learned and best practices, to address transitions across Program Confidence Level phases, to maximize the effective use of both the The history of human spaceflight is replete with existing civil service and contractor workforce, examples of cost overruns due to confluence of and to facilitate strategic competitive under-funding, insufficient or poorly phased opportunities. reserves, misunderstood risks and complexities, overly aggressive schedules, and difficulties Where appropriate, the Constellation Program is meeting ambitious technical requirements. We utilizing current, proven technology in order to have no illusions that we will not encounter achieve safer, more reliable and affordable these challenges; therefore the Constellation solutions. For example, the Ares I and the Ares Program is pioneering within NASA the V are based on proven systems from the Space implementation of probabilistic techniques to Shuttle and Apollo Saturn V Programs, enabling assess the confidence level expected that the NASA to reduce development costs compared to Program can achieve given schedule milestones designing and building an entirely new launch within the budget allocated9. Our guidance vehicle. This approach maximizes the value of within the Agency is to maintain a confidence existing facilities, certified parts, production level of 65% that we can meet our schedule tools and expertise. Common propulsion commitments within the allocated budget and elements help reduce operation costs for a more technical base-line. Program confidence level is sustainable exploration program. The calculated incorporating project-level confidence Constellation Program has entered into sole levels, project-level risks, and program-level source production contracts for heritage-based risks, along with assumptions on dependencies elements; ATK-Thiokol for the Ares I first stage among the risks. The Program conducted and Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne for the J2-X confidence level assessments during the budget engine. development process, and plans to refine these during annual budget cycles. This analysis is key Lockheed-Martin was selected as the prime to assuring that we maintain our commitments to contractor for the Orion development through our stakeholders and have underpinning full and open competition. The production rationale for dialogue when requirements contract for the Ares I upper stage was recently changes to the baseline are under consideration. awarded to Boeing through full and open competition. Further prime contract awards are During 2007, the Program was allocated less expected over the coming year. funding than planned in the Federal appropria- tion bill. Since the Constellation Program The Constellation Program acquisition strategy proceeds as a ‘go as you can afford to pay’ places an emphasis on the criticality of reducing program, this resulted in a 6-month delay in our and controlling life cycle cost in each acquisition commitment to fielding the first Orion crew phase because NASA plans to produce and fly vehicle and Ares I launch vehicle for Initial these vehicles for decades to come. Under- Operating Capability. This date is now March standing and managing life cycle cost is pivotal 2015, rather than 201410. to the overall long-term success and viability of the Program. Acquisition Strategy As plans are made for the retirement of the space shuttle, NASA is assessing possible synergies to be gained between the contracts and acquisition

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OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY development. Design reference missions have been developed for ISS missions, lunar sortie As noted in the contextual discussion in the missions, lunar outpost missions, and a Mars Background section, the cost burden of space mission so that operational design drivers are shuttle operations cannot be inherited by this identified early. Program if the Lunar Capability and the eventual Mars Capability is to be developed concurrently Moreover, we’ve also initiated similar but with Initial Capability operations. It is perhaps unique con ops efforts for targeted interesting to note that minimization of life- processes that can influence life cycle costs. For cycle costs, particularly operational costs, was example, the current practice of quality an important objective of the Space Shuttle 11 assurance in the Space Shuttle Program is being Program during its development . This is not to bench-marked for efficiency improvements. By point out folly, but indeed to illustrate how developing a con ops for how quality assurance difficult this objective can be even under is conducted through the life of the program, a proactive management. We believe that we have more efficient path to quality assurance may be the advantage of a much simpler system to determined a priori. operate, but are also cognizant that we inherit operational processes ingrained over a 30-year Life Cycle Cost Evaluations history. To that end, the Program has undertaken Change evaluations to the Program baseline a number of efforts aimed at life cycle cost must include an assessment of the life cycle cost reductions. Examples are discussed below: impact of each change to the baseline. Constellation procurements – both ‘end-item’ Stretch Requirements and ‘award fee’ types – include incentives to The architecture requirements include ‘stretch reduce life-cycle cost. requirements’ defined as those that enable ground and flight system supportability and Lean Efforts reductions in operational life cycle costs. Lean six-sigma and Kaizen studies were Modeled after the Boeing 777 development, conducted on some early developments, such as stretch requirements specify a desired outcome the Ares 1-X test flight. This has proven believed to simplify operations. For instance, a successful and the Program is seeking further ‘clean pad’ concept has been specified to opportunities to gain process time reduction and challenge designers to minimize services and simplification. interfaces required at the launch pad as well as location/access on the vehicle. Each service or The ‘handoff’ between designers and the sus- umbilical (e.g., cooling) attached to the launch taining engineering and operational communities vehicle is thus challenged for relevance or ‘must is being studied for efficiency improvements. have’ capability. The Ground Operations Project Current practice includes overlapping respon- and Mission Operations Project are focal to sibilities and designer involvement in post- manage the stretch requirements; these are design processes. Efforts are underway to incorporated into flight design via negotiation of identify and minimize this to ultimately reduce Interface Requirements Documents with each of costs. the flight projects (Orion, Ares, EVA, and Lander). Industry Advice The Ground Operations Project conducted ‘Con Ops’ Development feasibility studies under the Broad Area Announ- Constellation has developed a Concept of cement capability; requesting novel ideas from Operations (Con Ops) for operation of the industry on how to streamline processing, launch Program through its mission phases, in order to and recovery operations. The concepts are drive out operational features that influence intended to produce ‘cleaner’ techniques and hardware, software and interface requirements. processes in the belief that fewer anomalies are This is a typical best practice in NASA program possible with simpler processes. Examples of

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concepts include new approaches to emergency the same: to develop the flight systems and egress system for the crew, isolation of the ground infrastructure requireed to enable launch pad lightening protection system, and continued access to space and to enable future alternatives to hypergolic fuel loading to reduce crewed mission to the ISS, the moon, Mars and processing time. beyond.

If we are truly successful in driving down The initial formulation of the Program require- operations costs such that the cost per flight is as ments baseline was completed in November low or lower than we project, and we’ve 2006 at the Cx Program SRR. The Program is designed the supremely operable system that can evolving within this structure of organization, be processed, flown, recovered and refurbished requirments and funding as its foundation. A with a minimum of effort, then we’ve opened major challenge is to stand up an organization the door to other acquisition strategies in the that draws on the best expertise in the Agency production phase that would not be open to us while maintaining primary focus on the with a more labor intensive system. Specifically, currently operational Space Shuttle and ISS the option to buy services as a commodity would Programs. be available so that we can then devote our expertise to designing the next Constellation The formulation of the Constellation Program is element in the plan. a robust system, based on the best of NASA’s heritage, and designed to evolve as technical and SUMMARY programmatic needs demand. As the long-term objectives of U.S. space exploration evolve, the near-term goals remain

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REFERENCES

1 NASA 2007. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Constellation Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. August 2007.

2 NASA 2003. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Columbia Accident Investigation Board—Report Volumes I-VI. August 2003.

3 TWH 2004. The White House. A Renewed Spirit of Discovery—The President’s Vision for Space Exploration. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/space/renewed_spirit.html.

4 Pub. L. 109-155. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005. Public Law no. 109- 155, 119 Stat 2895 (2005).

5 NASA 2005. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NASA’s Exploration Systems Architecture Study— Final Report. NASA—TM—2005-214062. November 2005. NASA, Washington, DC.

6 NASA 1968. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Apollo Program Development Plan; NASA-TM-X- 68310. October 15, 1968, NASA, Washington DC.

7 NASA 2006a. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Global Exploration Strategy and Lunar Architecture Study. Available at http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/exploration/mmb/why_moon.html.

8NASA 2006b. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Constellation Architecture Requirments Document (CARD). Dec. 21, 2006 Baseline. Available at: http://exploration.nasa.gov/documents/constellation.html

9 GAO 2007. Government Accountability Office. Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and Managing Program Cost. GAO-2007-1134SP. July 2007.

10 M. Griffin, NASA Administrator’s Statements to the House Committee on Science and Technology and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies. March 15, 2007.

11 R. F. Thompson, Von Karman Lecture: The Space Shuttle—Some Key Program Decisions. AIAA-84-0574. AIAA 22nd Aerospace Science Meeting, Jan. 1984.

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Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED October 2007 NASA Special Publication 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Formulation of NASA's Constellation Program

6. AUTHOR(S) Jennifer L. Rhatigan, Jeffrey M. Hanley, Mark S. Geyer

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBERS Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center S-1020 Houston, Texas 77058

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER National Aeronautics and Space Administration SP-2007-563 Washington, DC 20546-0001

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Available from the NASA Center for AeroSpace Information (CASI) 7121 Standard Hanover, MD 21076-1320 Category: 12

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) NASA has recently formed the Constellation Program to achieve the objectives of maintaining American presence in low Earth orbit, returning to the moon for purposes of establishing an outpost, and laying the foundation to explore Mars and beyond in the first half of the 21st century. The Constellation Program’s heritage rests on the successes and lessons learned from NASA’s previous human spaceflight programs: Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS). This paper describes the rationale behind the formulation of the Constellation Program, including organizational structure, and workforce structure, as well as the approaches to requirements generation, budget formulation, operational philosophies, and procurement strategies.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF 16. PRICE CODE PAGES Exploration, space flight, planetary aerial vehicles, planetary environments, long term space flight 26

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Unlimited Standard Form 298 (Rev Feb 89) (MS Word Mar 97) NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 Downloaded from http://www.everyspec.com

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