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The Patrimonial Turn in the American State Jeffrey D Published in Clio Volume 28, Issue 2 (Summer 2019), 6, 20-24. The Patrimonial Turn in the American State Jeffrey D. Broxmeyer The University of Toledo aristocracy (Cato 1787). Spoils were in fact the primary motor of party organization for nearly the entire nineteenth century. The battle to strip personal use from public office was epic, lasting decades (Hoogenboom 1986; Parillo 2013). That struggle for reform has long since receded from public memory. Still, the parallel is instructive. Trump’s reliance on partisan networks of personal loyalty is similar to how ambitious entrepreneurs built coalitions throughout the nineteenth century by disbursing the material perquisites of office. The public justification of his ongoing business enterprise recalls the most strident defenses of the spoils Trumpism signals a “patrimonial turn” in the American system during the Gilded Age. state. Consider the implications of this tendency toward Patrimonialism Then and Now rule by family and friends, and what it means for democracy. The incumbent president has superimposed What we have, then, is a tendency that feels new and the Trump Organization, a family business, and relatives strange but is hardly unique in historical or comparative who manage it, upon the political system. There has perspective. As Max Weber outlined in his classic work, simply never been a sitting president who profited from patrimonialism is a form of political authority that rests business of this scale while in office, fusing together upon the personal whimsy of a leader rather than individual wealth accumulation with public authority. In established rules or legal processes. Any separation this way, patrimonial rule is a departure from the rule between the state and the leader collapses into a bound, insulated technocratic order that has “household” model. The patriarch assumes personal characterized the modern administrative state. ownership of the means of administration (“my generals,” per Trump), and governs through kinship And yet, there are clear antecedents in American political networks and personal loyalty (Weber 1947, 341-7; Hall development. The spoils system from days of yore, run 2017, 577-8). This mode of governance is typically by personalistic exploitation of public office, is an delimited pre-modern. But there are caveats to drawing obvious point of reference. Trump’s wealth strict analytic or temporal bounds. accumulating practices suggest that he fully understands that offices of “honor, Trust or Profit,” so referenced in The “familial state” played a key role in the development the Constitution, are a species of property. Political of early merchant capitalism, particularly the joint-stock office is not necessarily a capitalist form of property or corporation (Adams 2005). We know that feudal even one that is naturally subsumed into competitive lineages carried over to America (Orren 1991). The markets (Gibson-Graham 1996, xiii). However, under nineteenth-century American state, for instance, certain historical circumstances officeholding can—and distributed monopoly resources in patrimonial fashion has been—leveraged as a mode of private wealth like access to land and other grants or privileges (Hall accumulation (Broxmeyer, Forthcoming). Such practices 2015). Mass democracy was made possible, in part, by have deep roots. There was a vibrant debate in the early channeling mobilization through clientelistic networks Republic over emoluments that codified safeguards of office-hungry partisans. Gilded Age reformers directly into the U.S. Constitution (Teachout 2014). complained that party spoils produced a host of evils: Antifederalists worried that a future president might waste, nepotism, pelf, and the appointment of distribute appointments to generate a “numerous train “dishonest henchmen or incompetent supernumeraries” of dependents,” fostering relationships that smacked of (Eaton 1881, 14). (continued on p. 20) 6 Left and the Movement for Social of Native Petitions in the Colonial Hope, David and Angelo Martelli. Democracy South The Transition to the Knowledge Theory and Society World Politics Economy, Labor Market Institutions, and Income Inequality Çınar, Alev. Negotiating the Barber, Benjamin and Charles Miller. in Advanced Democracies Foundations of the Modern State: Propaganda and Combat Motivation: The Emasculated Citizen and the Radio Broadcasts and German Nathan, Noah L. Electoral Call for a Post-Patriarchal State at Soldiers’ Performance in World War Consequences of Colonial Gezi Protests II Intervention: Brokers, Chiefs, and Distribution in Northern Ghana de Souza Leão, Luciana and Gil Bendor, Jonathan and Jacob N. Eyal. The Rise of Randomized Shapiro. Historical Contingencies in Paik, Christopher and Jessica Controlled Trials (RCTs) in the Evolution of States and Their Vechbanyongratana. Path to International Development in Militaries Centralization and Development: Evidence from Siam Historical Perspective Cirone, Alexandra and Brenda Van Heller, Patrick. Divergent Coppenolle. Bridging the Gap: Paine, Jack. Democratic Trajectories of Democratic Lottery-Based Procedures in Early Contradictions in European Settler Deepening: Comparing Brazil, India, Parliamentarization Colonies and South Africa González, Yanilda. The Social Petrova, Margarita H. Naming and William & Mary Quarterly Origins of Institutional Weakness Praising in Humanitarian Norm Development Dixon, Bradley J. ‘His One Netev and Change: Preferences, Power, Ples’: The Chowans and the Politics and Police Reform in Latin America Broxmeyer (continued from p. 6) More recently, since the 1980s. We must also see the contemporary scholars have demonstrated that elements of patrimonial turn from a comparative lens. We live in a patrimonialism exist in a wide range of historical and new golden age of state-led capitalism (Kurlantzick comparative contexts, including modern societies 2016). Goals of the nation-state and its leading firms are (Adams and Charrad 2015). Patriarchy in gender increasingly blurred. The Chinese model, managed by relations remains hegemonic at the peak of social and the so-called “princelings,” or the children of senior political institutions. Last year, 95% of all Fortune 500 officials, is one of the more successful variants. Given CEOs were men (Zarya 2018); all presidents have been China’s rising global profile, we should be wary of up to present. During the 2016 elections, Trump dismissing the possibility that the cutting-edge of demonstrated the political viability of a program to political economy might once again be patrimonial. reconstitute social hierarchies anew in the face of Why Patrimonialism? evolving gender norms and family structure. Within the economy, family businesses like the Trump Patrimonial rule is how Trump looks to solve problems Organization play an important role, even in the age of of collective action. For one, Trump’s partisanship has corporate consolidation. It is no coincidence that little to do with meaningful group affiliation or ideology dynastic inheritance itself is a defining feature of the in the conventional sense, even as he benefits from a exploding wealth gap (Picketty 2015, 24, 290-303, 411, polarized landscape. But it is also true that today’s 414). Generational wealth transfer has proven a central Republican Party itself is having difficulty coordinating project of The Long Reagan Coalition, which places a by conventional means (Noel 2018). There appears to be first-order emphasis on elimination of the Estate Tax little internal consensus outside of tax policy, and thus, (Martin 2013, 182-194). Trump’s evasion of personal there was little policy innovation during unified party and corporate taxes over the decades aligns him as a control of government from 2017-2019. Much of the beneficiary of tax policy to unburden wealthy families Republican Party’s traditional office holding caste (Barstow, Craig, Buettner 2018). declined to serve in the administration or took themselves out of party markets by signing public letters Herein lies the rub. Patrimonialism is about congealing condemning Trump. Under these circumstances, ad hoc capital into state privileges as part of an intensifying coordination by personal rule binds together, if circuit of accumulation. One major question is whether tenuously, party regulars and vested partners (single- Trump is leading the charge or following. There is a issue groups, the business lobby, or mega-donors), with general trend domestically in finance, health, and energy far right movement figures. sectors toward codifying state privileges—one way to interpret the veritable revolution in corporate lobbying 20 Most conspicuous is the patrimonial turn in staffing the wealthy individuals. When political scientists speak of executive branch. Trump appointees appear to have little the state’s “relative autonomy” from any one social class formal expertise relevant to their posts. Technocrats like or group, we identify political institutions as a force in H.R. McMaster, the former National Security Advisor, their own right (Skocpol 1985). For example, the or Gary Cohn, the former Goldman Sachs CEO turned contemporary bureaucratic rulemaking process insulates economic advisor, do not last very long or retain much policy from some direct outside pressures. Even the influence. By contrast, the president’s personal most propertied organized interests must sustain a high entourage is empowered precisely because of proximity level of collective action to influence desired outcomes, to
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