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The Decline of U.S. Export Competitiveness for Manufactures and Its Consequences for the World Economic Order

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The Decline of U.S. Export Competitiveness for Manufactures and Its Consequences for the World Economic Order The Decline of U.S. Export Competitiveness for Manufactures And Its Consequences for the World Economic Order By Ernest H. Preeg Senior Advisor for International Trade and Finance Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation 1600 Wilson Blvd, Ste 1100, Arlington, VA 22209 | T 703.841.9000 | F 703.841.9514 | mapi.net The Decline of U.S. Export Competitiveness for Manufactures And Its Consequences for the World Economic Order Policy Analysis | April 2015 By: Ernest H. Preeg, Ph.D., Senior Advisor for International Trade and Finance [email protected] PA-155i Table of Contents Introduction 1 Part One: The Decline of U.S. Export Competitiveness for Manufactures 2 The Declining U.S. Share of Global Exports of Manufactures Since 2000 2 Table 1 – Leading Exporters of Manufactures ($billions) 3 Table 2 – The BRICS Disconnect for Trade in Manufactures ($billions, 2013) 4 Table 3 – U.S. Trade in Manufactures by Region 5 The Surging U.S. Trade Deficit in Manufactures Since 2009 6 Table 4 – Trade Balances in Manufactures 7 Table 5 – U.S. Bilateral Trade With China in Manufactures* ($billions) 7 Table 6 – U.S. Trade Balances in Manufactures With Principal EU Members ($billions) 8 Table 7 – U.S. and Chinese Exports of High-Technology Industries ($billions) 9 Table 8 – U.S. and Chinese Trade Balances in High-Technology Industries ($billions) 10 The Peaking Out of the U.S. Trade Surplus for Business Services Since 2010 10 Table 9 – Trade in Business Services ($billions) 11 Table 10 – Trade in Computer and Information Services ($billions) 11 A Brave New Trading World for Technology-Intensive Manufactures 12 Part Two: The Game-Changing Consequences for the World Economic Order 14 The Multilateral Economic System in Serious Decline 14 The Dollar Twilight Dilemma 18 A Two-Track Initiative to Restore a Fair and Balanced Multilateral System 22 The Indispensable U.S. Leadership Role 27 About the Author 30 Copyright © 2015 MAPI All rights reserved. The Decline of U.S. Export Competitiveness for Manufactures And Its Consequences for the World Economic Order Policy Analysis | April 2015 By: Ernest H. Preeg, Ph.D., Senior Advisor for International Trade and Finance [email protected] PA-155i Introduction Technology-intensive manufactures make up two-thirds or more of global merchandise exports and are at the center of export competitiveness among the advanced and newly industrialized economies. The United States was the dominant exporter from the 1940s through the end of the century, but since 2000 the U.S. share of global exports of manufac- tures has declined sharply, from 18% in 2000 to 12% in 2013, while the Chinese share almost quadrupled, from 6% to 23%, and the EU share (in trade with non-members) was down only slightly, from 21% to 20%. Even more disturbing for U.S. export competitiveness, the U.S. trade deficit in manufactures surged by $206 billion from 2009 to 2013, while the EU surplus soared by $300 billion and the Chinese surplus was up by an amazing $492 billion. In 2014, the U.S. deficit rose by a further $61 billion, and the five-year increase in the deficit resulted in a net loss of about 1.7 million American manufacturing jobs. Based on early month trade and the strong dollar, the U.S. deficit is headed toward another large increase in 2015. This rapid decline in U.S. export competitiveness for manufactures is having game-changing consequences for the international trade and financial systems. U.S. leadership capabil- ity has been reduced for pursuing a more open, non-discriminatory trading system while trade relationships are shifting from the rules-based multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO) to a spreading network of preferential bilateral and regional trade agreements. And the dollarized international financial system of the past seven decades is in transition to some form of multi–key currency relationship as a growing share of trade is financed in other currencies and the U.S. official foreign debt of $11 trillion, as a result of protracted large trade deficits, continues to rise. This study addresses these issues and is in two parts. Part One traces the radical changes in the geographic composition of exports of manufactures from 2000 to 2013 and the rapid rise of the U.S. trade deficit and the Chinese surplus through 2014. For U.S. and China trade, the 10 largest high-technology sectors are examined, with Chinese exports far larger and grow- ing faster. The peaking out of the U.S. trade surplus in business services since 2010 is also addressed. A net assessment of this radical restructuring of world trade in manufactures since 2000 concludes Part One. Part Two analyzes the consequences of this radical restructuring of trade in manufactures for the world economic order and makes proposals to restore a rules-based multilateral policy framework for fair and balanced trade that will strengthen U.S. export competitiveness and reduce the trade deficit for manufactures. Issues addressed include the transition away from the multilateral WTO trading system, IMF obligations related to exchange rate policy, and the twilight of the dollarized financial system. The point of departure for the multilateral restora- Copyright © 2015 MAPI All rights reserved. 1 tion proposals is that the trade and financial systems are deeply linked, with exchange rates now the principal international trade-adjustment policy instrument for maintaining balanced access to markets, particularly for price-sensitive manufactures. The proposals are thus on two connected tracks. U.S. actions to restore the IMF obligation not to manipulate currencies to gain an unfair competitive advantage in trade, most importantly related to China, would move forward in parallel with negotiation of an open-ended pluri- lateral free trade agreement (FTA) within the WTO, which would consolidate the spreading With the sharp decline network of preferential bilateral and regional FTAs into a in oil and other broadly based, non-discriminatory trade relationship. Such an agreement could include over 70% of U.S. manufactured commodity prices in exports even if China chose not to be an initial participant. 2014, manufactures will probably be about A recurring theme throughout the study is the still indis- 75% of merchandise pensable U.S. leadership role for restoring a balanced, mul- tilateral economic system, despite waning political leverage exports in 2015 as a result of the declining U.S. share of global exports. The other principal key currency participants, China and the EU, are not up to the task, and the alternative to forceful and effective U.S. leadership is the decline of international policy management to deal with trade and financial imbalances, and the threatening rise of finan- cial market forces to do the job, which could be highly disruptive to international trade and investment. Part One: The Decline of U.S. Export Competitiveness for Manufactures Total U.S. exports in 2013 were $2,262 billion, of which $1,580 billion, or 70%, was mer- chandise, and $682 billion, or 30%, was services. The manufacturing sector dominated merchandise exports, with $1,124 billion, or 71%, while agriculture accounted for $176 billion, or 11%, and fuels for $149 billion, or 9%. With the sharp decline in oil and other commodity prices in 2014, manufactures will probably be about 75% of merchandise exports in 2015. For services exports, $171 billion, or 25%, was business services, closely integrated with manufactures, and the remainder was for travel, transportation, and other commercial services. These are the broad dimensions of U.S. exports. Part One of this study is about the decline of U.S. export competitiveness for the dominant manufacturing sector, and is in four sections. The first addresses the declining U.S. share of global exports of manufactures from 2000 to 2013 and the second the surging U.S. deficit for manufactures from 2009 to 2014. The third section presents the peaking out of the U.S. trade surplus in related business services since 2010, and the fourth provides a summary assessment of the radical changes in trade in manufactures since 2000. The Declining U.S. Share of Global Exports of Manufactures Since 2000 Table 1 presents exports of manufactures by the 13 largest exporters of manufactures from 2000 to 2013, which together accounted for $7,807 billion, or 86%, of global exports in 2013. Three overriding relationships tell the extraordinary story of the course of trade in manufactures over only 13 years. Copyright © 2015 MAPI All rights reserved. 2 Table 1 – Leading Exporters of Manufactures ($billions) % % 2000 2013 Increase 2000 2013 Increase World* 3,534 9,071 157 Canada 176 207 18 China 220 2,077 844 Switzerland 74 201 172 EU* 736 1,772 141 India 35 186 431 United States 650 1,124 73 Thailand 55 168 205 Japan 450 626 39 Malaysia 81 139 72 South Korea 155 481 210 13 Listed 3,025 7,807 158 Singapore 118 288 144 8 Asians 1,250 4,218 237 Mexico 139 285 105 2 West Europeans 810 1,973 144 Taiwan 141 253 79 3 North Americans 965 1,616 67 *EU exports to non-members, as also calculated for World, which is used throughout this study Source(s): WTO, International Trade Statistics First, all 13 exporters are from three dominant exporting regions: 8 in Asia, 2 in West Europe, and 3 in North America. Moreover, if other smaller Asian exporters are included, the 86% of global exports for the three regions would rise to 90%, leaving only 10% of global manufactured exports by the rest of the world—South and Central America, Africa, the Middle East, and East Europe including Russia. This three-region concentra- tion in export-oriented industrialization since 2000 is, if anything, intensifying, making the other regions of the world increasingly dependent on exports of fuels, industrial raw materials, and agricultural commodities, which are vulnerable to disruptive swings in prices and quantities.
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