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The Emerging Conservative Coalition THE EMERGING CONSERVATIVE COALITION Tom Flanagan The 2011 federal election saw the emergence of a majority Conservative electoral coalition that may dominate Canadian politics for years to come. When he reentered electoral politics in 2002, Stephen Harper wanted to reconstitute Brian Mulroney’s coalition of western populists, traditional Tories and francophone nationalists; but when the francophone pillar of the coalition proved unstable, he was able to replace francophones with sizable elements of Canada’s ethnic communities. The resulting coalition conforms with the game-theoretic ideal of a minimum connected winning coalition and, as such, should be internally stable and difficult for opponents to break up. La coalition d’électeurs conservateurs qui a porté au pouvoir un gouvernement majoritaire pourrait bien dominer longtemps la vie politique canadienne. En renouant en 2002 avec la politique électorale, Stephen Harper visait à reconstituer la coalition de populistes et de conservateurs traditionnels de l’Ouest, et de nationalistes québécois, coalition qui avait élu Brian Mulroney. Mais lorsque le pilier francophone de ce regroupement a commencé à s’effriter, il a su le remplacer par un nombre appréciable d’électeurs issus des communautés ethniques. Et l’alliance qu’il a ainsi formée répond à l’idéal théorique des « coalitions gagnantes minimales », dont la stabilité interne est suffisante pour rendre la tâche très difficile à ceux qui voudraient les briser. he 2011 federal election saw the emergence of a important modification, it led to the Conservative parlia- majority Conservative electoral coalition. Built grad- mentary majority elected on May 2, 2011. T ually over the last four elections, as shown in table The basic idea that Harper laid out at the Winds of 1, it may dominate Canadian politics for years to come. Change conference was to reconstitute Brian Mulroney’s elec- When he reentered electoral politics in 2002, Stephen toral coalition, which Harper analyzed in tripartite terms: Harper wanted to reconstitute Brian Mulroney’s coalition of populists in western Canada and rural Ontario (who then western populists, traditional Tories and francophone supported the Reform Party); traditional Tories in Ontario nationalists; but when the francophone pillar of the coali- and Atlantic Canada (who were still voting PC); and fran- tion proved unstable, he was able to replace francophones cophone nationalists in Quebec (who were then voting for with sizable elements of Canada’s ethnic communities. The the Bloc Québécois [BQ]). Harper argued compellingly that all resulting coalition conforms with the game-theoretic ideal previous Conservative majorities in the 20th century, whether of a minimum connected winning coalition and, as such, led by Mulroney, Diefenbaker, Bennett or Borden, had been should be internally stable and difficult for opponents to constituted in this way. By implication, this tripartite elec- break up. After examining the process by which the new toral coalition was the only way to form a Conservative coalition was formed, I will do a simple game-theoretic majority at the federal level in Canadian politics. analysis to highlight its desirable properties. In May 1996, David Frum and Ezra Levant organized the t the same time, Harper was very aware that previous vic- Winds of Change conference in Calgary to discuss a possible A torious Conservative coalitions had not lasted very long, unification of the Reform and Progressive Conservative (PC) because they had an ends-against-the-middle quality. The parties. The most important thing that came out of the meet- francophone nationalists decamped after a few years, when ing was a statement by Stephen Harper of how a conserva- they found their demands could not be met by the rest of the tive party could regain power in Canada. Harper’s speech country; think of the way that Diefenbaker’s huge 1958 major- turned into a road map that he followed faithfully once he ity disintegrated in 1962, and Mulroney’s equally huge 1984 became leader of the Canadian Alliance; and, with one majority disappeared in 1993. Harper hoped that a future rein- 104 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN-JUILLET 2011 The emerging Conservative coalition carnation of the Conservative winning tive with the Liberals. With very little Quebec simply by constructing a cam- formula could avoid a Mulroney-style time after the leadership race to pre- paign narrative in English and trans- overreach; that is, it could recruit only pare for the June 2004 election, the lating it into French. We would have francophone nationalists who were not Conservatives were still able to bring to run a made-in-Quebec campaign, separatists, and who shared at least Paul Martin’s Liberals down to a finding Quebec communications and some elements of economic and social minority government — a foretaste of advertising people to build a narrative conservatism with western populists things to come. But the winning for- in which the BQ was the major oppo- and traditional Tories. mula was still not complete, for the nent, not the Liberals. As soon as he was chosen leader of Conservatives won no seats at all in All this work seemed to produce the Canadian Alliance in March 2002, Quebec and got less than 10 percent of few results at first, but Harper persist- ed, even though there was As soon as Peter MacKay was elected PC leader in May 2003, considerable pressure with- Harper proposed that they start discussing cooperation of the in the party to de-empha- two parties; and he pursued that project relentlessly until a size Quebec and put more stress on Ontario. The merger was achieved late in 2003. Harper insisted on only reward came in the election one condition — that the merged party be named the campaign of 2005-06. Conservative Party, not the Progressive Conservative Party — Harper’s December 19, while yielding on all other issues. 2005, speech in Quebec City outlining the Conserv- Harper sought a meeting with the popular vote in that province. The atives’ Quebec platform was extraordi- Progressive Conservative Leader Joe merged party had inherited odds and narily well received, and his polling Clark to discuss a possible unification ends of PC and Canadian Alliance sup- numbers shot up thereafter. In the of the two parties. In Harper’s mind, port, while the BQ had a lock on the end, the Conservatives won 10 seats that would have been the essential first francophone vote and the Liberals and 25 percent of the vote in Quebec, step in rebuilding a winning coalition. were still the dominant force, and which made a big contribution to Clark wasn’t interested, but Harper did- default federalist choice, among anglo- beating the Liberals and establishing a n’t give up. As soon as Peter MacKay phones and allophones. minority Conservative government. was elected PC leader in May 2003, The 2006 result seemed to validate Harper proposed that they start dis- fter the 2004 election, Harper Harper’s theory of how to reconstitute cussing cooperation of the two parties; A made it his top priority to find a Conservative coalition of majority and he pursued that project relentless- electoral support among francophones dimensions. With a beachhead of 10 ly until a merger was achieved late in in Quebec. He hired more French staff seats in Quebec, Harper thought he 2003. Harper insisted on only one con- and visited Quebec frequently to make was only one election away from har- dition — that the merged party be contacts and recruit candidates. He vesting a much larger number of seats named the Conservative Party, not the dictated that the party’s March 2005 in the province. After fulfilling cam- Progressive Conservative Party — while policy conference would be held in paign promises to Quebec — higher yielding on all other issues. He knew Montreal, and that the policy book transfer payments to correct the fiscal that if he could win the leadership of should contain certain items necessary imbalance, representation at UNESCO the merged party, he would have the for success in Quebec (such as bilin- — Harper called another election in freedom to shape it as he wished. gualism, supply management and fis- September 2008, hoping this time to Bringing the western populists cal imbalance). Those of us charged win a majority with much greater rep- and traditional Tories back together with preparing the next campaign resentation from Quebec. had the immediate effect of making reviewed what we had done in 2004 Things seemed to be on track ini- the new Conservative Party competi- and realized that we could not win in tially. After the first two weeks of the campaign, the Conservatives were run- ning neck-and-neck with the BQ in TABLE 1. ELECTORAL RESULTS CONSERVATIVE PARTY, 2004-11, CANADA AND Quebec, each party commanding QUEBEC about 30 percent of the vote. That Vote % Seats Vote % Seats looked like 25 or 30 seats for the Year (Canada) (Canada) (Quebec) (Quebec) Conservatives, until the BQ counterat- 2004 29.6 99 8.8 0 tacked effectively over the so-called 2006 36.3 124 24.6 10 “culture cuts”— small budgetary 2008 37.6 143 21.7 10 reductions to certain cultural programs 2011 39.6 166 16.5 5 financed by Ottawa. When the Bloc POLICY OPTIONS 105 JUNE-JULY 2011 Tom Flanagan portrayed these as an insult to Quebec their issues. Beyond that it was mainly represented by the Conservatives than and a threat to the French language, the patient effort of establishing con- by any other party. Conservative support went back down tact — visits by Harper and other lead- Following Harper’s decision to to the 20 percent range, and at the end ing Conservatives, notably Jason make a serious play for ethnic voters, of the campaign the Conservatives Kenney, to ethnic events; recruiting there was a steady rise in the were lucky to escape with 10 Quebec multicultural candidates and political Conservative share of the multicultur- seats, the same number they had won organizers; printing political materials al vote through the elections of 2006, in 2006.
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