THE EMERGING CONSERVATIVE COALITION

Tom Flanagan

The 2011 federal election saw the emergence of a majority Conservative electoral coalition that may dominate Canadian politics for years to come. When he reentered electoral politics in 2002, Stephen Harper wanted to reconstitute Brian Mulroney’s coalition of western populists, traditional Tories and francophone nationalists; but when the francophone pillar of the coalition proved unstable, he was able to replace francophones with sizable elements of Canada’s ethnic communities. The resulting coalition conforms with the game-theoretic ideal of a minimum connected winning coalition and, as such, should be internally stable and difficult for opponents to break up.

La coalition d’électeurs conservateurs qui a porté au pouvoir un gouvernement majoritaire pourrait bien dominer longtemps la vie politique canadienne. En renouant en 2002 avec la politique électorale, Stephen Harper visait à reconstituer la coalition de populistes et de conservateurs traditionnels de l’Ouest, et de nationalistes québécois, coalition qui avait élu Brian Mulroney. Mais lorsque le pilier francophone de ce regroupement a commencé à s’effriter, il a su le remplacer par un nombre appréciable d’électeurs issus des communautés ethniques. Et l’alliance qu’il a ainsi formée répond à l’idéal théorique des « coalitions gagnantes minimales », dont la stabilité interne est suffisante pour rendre la tâche très difficile à ceux qui voudraient les briser.

he 2011 federal election saw the emergence of a important modification, it led to the Conservative parlia- majority Conservative electoral coalition. Built grad- mentary majority elected on May 2, 2011. T ually over the last four elections, as shown in table The basic idea that Harper laid out at the Winds of 1, it may dominate Canadian politics for years to come. Change conference was to reconstitute Brian Mulroney’s elec- When he reentered electoral politics in 2002, Stephen toral coalition, which Harper analyzed in tripartite terms: Harper wanted to reconstitute Brian Mulroney’s coalition of populists in western Canada and rural Ontario (who then western populists, traditional Tories and francophone supported the Reform Party); traditional Tories in Ontario nationalists; but when the francophone pillar of the coali- and Atlantic Canada (who were still voting PC); and fran- tion proved unstable, he was able to replace francophones cophone nationalists in Quebec (who were then voting for with sizable elements of Canada’s ethnic communities. The the Bloc Québécois [BQ]). Harper argued compellingly that all resulting coalition conforms with the game-theoretic ideal previous Conservative majorities in the 20th century, whether of a minimum connected winning coalition and, as such, led by Mulroney, Diefenbaker, Bennett or Borden, had been should be internally stable and difficult for opponents to constituted in this way. By implication, this tripartite elec- break up. After examining the process by which the new toral coalition was the only way to form a Conservative coalition was formed, I will do a simple game-theoretic majority at the federal level in Canadian politics. analysis to highlight its desirable properties. In May 1996, David Frum and Ezra Levant organized the t the same time, Harper was very aware that previous vic- Winds of Change conference in Calgary to discuss a possible A torious Conservative coalitions had not lasted very long, unification of the Reform and Progressive Conservative (PC) because they had an ends-against-the-middle quality. The parties. The most important thing that came out of the meet- francophone nationalists decamped after a few years, when ing was a statement by Stephen Harper of how a conserva- they found their demands could not be met by the rest of the tive party could regain power in Canada. Harper’s speech country; think of the way that Diefenbaker’s huge 1958 major- turned into a road map that he followed faithfully once he ity disintegrated in 1962, and Mulroney’s equally huge 1984 became leader of the Canadian Alliance; and, with one majority disappeared in 1993. Harper hoped that a future rein-

104 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN-JUILLET 2011 The emerging Conservative coalition carnation of the Conservative winning tive with the Liberals. With very little Quebec simply by constructing a cam- formula could avoid a Mulroney-style time after the leadership race to pre- paign narrative in English and trans- overreach; that is, it could recruit only pare for the June 2004 election, the lating it into French. We would have francophone nationalists who were not Conservatives were still able to bring to run a made-in-Quebec campaign, separatists, and who shared at least Paul Martin’s Liberals down to a finding Quebec communications and some elements of economic and social minority government — a foretaste of advertising people to build a narrative conservatism with western populists things to come. But the winning for- in which the BQ was the major oppo- and traditional Tories. mula was still not complete, for the nent, not the Liberals. As soon as he was chosen leader of Conservatives won no seats at all in All this work seemed to produce the Canadian Alliance in March 2002, Quebec and got less than 10 percent of few results at first, but Harper persist- ed, even though there was As soon as Peter MacKay was elected PC leader in May 2003, considerable pressure with- Harper proposed that they start discussing cooperation of the in the party to de-empha- two parties; and he pursued that project relentlessly until a size Quebec and put more stress on Ontario. The merger was achieved late in 2003. Harper insisted on only reward came in the election one condition — that the merged party be named the campaign of 2005-06. Conservative Party, not the Progressive Conservative Party — Harper’s December 19, while yielding on all other issues. 2005, speech in Quebec City outlining the Conserv- Harper sought a meeting with the popular vote in that province. The atives’ Quebec platform was extraordi- Progressive Conservative Leader Joe merged party had inherited odds and narily well received, and his polling Clark to discuss a possible unification ends of PC and Canadian Alliance sup- numbers shot up thereafter. In the of the two parties. In Harper’s mind, port, while the BQ had a lock on the end, the Conservatives won 10 seats that would have been the essential first francophone vote and the Liberals and 25 percent of the vote in Quebec, step in rebuilding a winning coalition. were still the dominant force, and which made a big contribution to Clark wasn’t interested, but Harper did- default federalist choice, among anglo- beating the Liberals and establishing a n’t give up. As soon as Peter MacKay phones and allophones. minority Conservative government. was elected PC leader in May 2003, The 2006 result seemed to validate Harper proposed that they start dis- fter the 2004 election, Harper Harper’s theory of how to reconstitute cussing cooperation of the two parties; A made it his top priority to find a Conservative coalition of majority and he pursued that project relentless- electoral support among francophones dimensions. With a beachhead of 10 ly until a merger was achieved late in in Quebec. He hired more French staff seats in Quebec, Harper thought he 2003. Harper insisted on only one con- and visited Quebec frequently to make was only one election away from har- dition — that the merged party be contacts and recruit candidates. He vesting a much larger number of seats named the Conservative Party, not the dictated that the party’s March 2005 in the province. After fulfilling cam- Progressive Conservative Party — while policy conference would be held in paign promises to Quebec — higher yielding on all other issues. He knew Montreal, and that the policy book transfer payments to correct the fiscal that if he could win the leadership of should contain certain items necessary imbalance, representation at UNESCO the merged party, he would have the for success in Quebec (such as bilin- — Harper called another election in freedom to shape it as he wished. gualism, supply management and fis- September 2008, hoping this time to Bringing the western populists cal imbalance). Those of us charged win a majority with much greater rep- and traditional Tories back together with preparing the next campaign resentation from Quebec. had the immediate effect of making reviewed what we had done in 2004 Things seemed to be on track ini- the new Conservative Party competi- and realized that we could not win in tially. After the first two weeks of the campaign, the Conservatives were run- ning neck-and-neck with the BQ in TABLE 1. ELECTORAL RESULTS CONSERVATIVE PARTY, 2004-11, CANADA AND Quebec, each party commanding QUEBEC about 30 percent of the vote. That Vote % Seats Vote % Seats looked like 25 or 30 seats for the Year (Canada) (Canada) (Quebec) (Quebec) Conservatives, until the BQ counterat- 2004 29.6 99 8.8 0 tacked effectively over the so-called 2006 36.3 124 24.6 10 “culture cuts”— small budgetary 2008 37.6 143 21.7 10 reductions to certain cultural programs 2011 39.6 166 16.5 5 financed by Ottawa. When the Bloc

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portrayed these as an insult to Quebec their issues. Beyond that it was mainly represented by the Conservatives than and a threat to the French language, the patient effort of establishing con- by any other party. Conservative support went back down tact — visits by Harper and other lead- Following Harper’s decision to to the 20 percent range, and at the end ing Conservatives, notably Jason make a serious play for ethnic voters, of the campaign the Conservatives Kenney, to ethnic events; recruiting there was a steady rise in the were lucky to escape with 10 Quebec multicultural candidates and political Conservative share of the multicultur- seats, the same number they had won organizers; printing political materials al vote through the elections of 2006, in 2006. They ended up with 143 seats in languages other than English and 2008 and 2011, to the point where the nationally, enough for an enhanced French. The steps are easy to enumer- Liberal dominance of cultural commu- minority government, but not the ate, but they took years of effort to nities has been definitively broken. majority they had hoped for. carry out. According to the 2011 Ipsos Reid exit The underlying assumption of the poll (n > 36,000), Conservatives his reversal in the 2008 campaign Conservative outreach was that many received the support of T proved to be a turning point in ethnic voters “ought” to be voting ● 43 percent of immigrants who Conservative electoral strategy. Conservative rather than Liberal. Many have been in Canada longer than Although the party did not abandon new Canadians are socially conserva- 10 years, hope of making gains, Quebec ceased tive, believing in stable traditional fam- ● 42 percent of Canadian voters to be pivotal in Conservative born outside Canada, electoral calculations. Many new Canadians are socially ● 31 percent of visible minority Increasingly, the role of third conservative, believing in stable voters, and essential pillar to comple- traditional families rather than the ● 52 percent of Jewish voters, but ment the western populists and lifestyle obsessions of Liberal elites. ● only 12 percent of Muslim traditional Tories would be voters. played by ethnic voters, new Most are religious; a surprising Although much more Canadians, mostly in Ontario number, especially among Chinese, analysis will be required, it is rather than Quebec. This would Vietnamese, Koreans and Filipinos, clear that the Conservatives, involve a direct assault on the are Christian. Many are once a largely “white bread” Liberals’ ethnic fortress of party, are now dominant or Toronto rather than on the economically conservative and competitive among most cate- BQ’s hegemonic hold over fran- entrepreneurial, running small gories of immigrant, ethnic and cophones in Quebec. businesses and concerned about the minority voters. The one obvi- This strategic shift was not a tax burden. In other words, many ous exception is Canadian totally new departure but rather Muslims, among whom foreign an increased emphasis on what immigrants look like Conservative policy issues raise barriers. had been taking place since core voters, except that they may This increase in ethnic sup- early 2005. At that time, when have a different skin colour and port released a treasure trove of same-sex marriage was under mother tongue. seats for the Conservatives. In heated debate in Parliament, the Greater Toronto Area, once Harper decided to use it as a wedge issue ilies rather than the lifestyle obsessions the Liberal equivalent of the Tory to approach ethnic voters. He ordered of Liberal elites. Most are religious; a Fortress Alberta, the Conservatives won the party to spend about $300,000 on surprising number, especially among 30 of 45 seats in the recent election, print advertisements in Canadian eth- Chinese, Vietnamese, Koreans and including many in areas such as nic newspapers, running in early 2005, Filipinos, are Christian. Many are eco- Brampton that are heavily ethnic. It to point out that the Conservatives nomically conservative and entrepre- was this batch of new seats in Ontario, were the only party opposed to same- neurial, running small businesses and mainly in the GTA, that gave the Tories sex marriage. From that point on, the concerned about the tax burden. In their majority in 2011, for they actually party put more and more effort into other words, many immigrants look had a net loss of seats outside Ontario. courting ethnic voters. like Conservative core voters, except Harper’s road map finally took him to A few policy innovations in the that they may have a different skin the goal of a majority government, but 2005-06 platform — lowering the colour and mother tongue. The task, as only after francophone nationalists immigration landing fee, an apology Conservative strategists saw it, was not were replaced by Ontario ethnics as the for the Chinese head tax, a judicial to win over these voters by promising third pillar of the coalition. inquiry into the Air India bombing — them a potpourri of new benefits; it Francophones provided an essential signalled to multicultural communi- was to help them realize that their con- boost in 2006, but their support did not ties that the Conservatives cared about victions and interests would be better prove large and durable enough to con-

106 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN-JUILLET 2011 The emerging Conservative coalition

Jason Ransom Prime Minister Stephen Harper drives home his majority message in London, Ontario, on the last day of the campaign. Tom Flanagan writes that after falling short in his efforts to recreate the Mulroney coalition of Quebec and the West, he pivot- ed after 2008 and focused most of his efforts on building an Ontario-West coalition. On May 2, he was rewarded with 73 Ontario seats and a majority government. stitute an essential pillar of the victori- they would like to have everyone’s defined so precisely but seems to be ous coalition. The Conservatives would support. However, if the purpose of a slightly less than 40 percent, given the still have a majority in 2011 even if coalition is to deliver benefits to the current state of Canada’s multiparty they had won no seats at all in Quebec, included at the expense of the exclud- system. By both standards, the current where the rising tide of support for Jack ed, it follows that the winning coali- Conservative coalition (166 seats, 39.6 Layton peaked on election day at 43 tion should be as small as possible if it percent popular vote) is ideal. percent and took out five Conservatives is to maximize benefits to the partici- Larger-than-necessary coalitions who looked set to survive had the NDP pants per capita. tend to be unstable because of the dif- risen no higher than the low 30s. In Canadian federal politics, the ficulty of satisfying too many partici- MWC for the House of Commons is pants. In international relations, think ame theory predicts that, in in- 155 (50 percent + 1 of 308 seats). In of the breakup of the victorious G person voting games, rational the real world, of course, you want to alliances after the Second World War, actors will seek to assemble a mini- have more than a bare majority of 155 the First World War and the mum winning coalition (MWC), that to guard against the possibility of res- Napoleonic Wars. The paradigmatic is, a coalition barely large enough to ignations, deaths or defections of cau- cases in Canadian Conservative history win. The theorem is counterintuitive, cus members to other parties. The are the collapse of the Diefenbaker and for politicians normally speak as if MWC for the popular vote cannot be Mulroney supermajorities earned in

POLICY OPTIONS 107 JUNE-JULY 2011 Tom Flanagan

1958 and 1984. The 2011 Conservative In contrast, francophone national- majority government, but not quite all majority will be much less unwieldy ists always present a problem, even the way. It did not get him there until and should not be subject to the stress- when they can be brought to offer sup- he made a crucial substitution of mul- es arising from unnecessary size. port to the Conservatives. They tend ticultural for francophone voters. But An even better concept than to have an instrumental orientation now that it is constructed, the MWC for analyzing political coalitions toward the federal government, seeing Conservative electoral coalition of is MCWC — the minimum connected it primarily as a source of benefits for western populists, traditional Tories, winning coalition. In the real world, Quebec. This raises resistance among and ethnic voters who share coalitions are costly to form and main- other Conservatives, who fear they Conservative economic and social val- ues should be difficult to Now that it is constructed, the Conservative electoral coalition break up. It fulfills all the of western populists, traditional Tories, and ethnic voters who requirements of a mini- mum connected winning share Conservative economic and social values should be coalition. This does not difficult to break up. It fulfills all the requirements of a mean the Conservatives minimum connected winning coalition. will win every election, but it does mean they should tain, and it is easier to bring together will have to pay for these benefits to be able to hold their core voters participants who are closer together on Quebec. Also, in the unique political together in bad times as well as good, relevant dimensions of difference than culture of Quebec, the position of the adding and subtracting other support- participants who are farther away from median voter is substantially to the left ers as conditions vary. Unlike the each other. Thus, in the aftermath of of the median Canadian voter on Diefenbaker and Mulroney coalitions, the most recent British election, the many issues. Francophone nationalists the Harper coalition will not be con- governing coalitions that received seri- are, therefore, less likely to share the stantly threatened with breakup from ous consideration were Conservative- economic and social world view of internal tensions. It has the potential Liberal Democrat and Labour-Liberal Conservatives in the rest of Canada. to dominate Canadian federal politics Democrat, but not Conservative- Also, francophone nationalists, even if for a long time. Labour (the latter would also have they are not separatists, usually see the The main threat to the dominance been much larger than necessary). A separation of Quebec as a legitimate of the Conservative coalition will be Conservative-Labour coalition would option, whereas anglophones tend to the difficulty of governing Quebec. have had to jump over the centrist see it as disloyal. For all these reasons With only five Conservative members position of the Liberal Democrats. francophone nationalists in Quebec from that province, Quebec will not be In the Canadian Conservative seem less connected to the rest of the very well represented in caucus and electoral coalition, the new multicul- Conservative coalition. cabinet. And Quebec issues may move tural pillar seems well connected to In practice, French support in front and centre for the federal govern- the older western populist and tradi- Quebec for the Conservatives was ment if, as expected, the Parti tional Tory pillars. The multicultural always fragile. Think how easily the Québécois wins the next provincial voters who have now been attracted to issue of “culture cuts” dislodged election and once again starts talking the Conservative Party (not all, to be Conservative supporters in Quebec in openly about sovereignty. Hence the sure) seem to be demographically and 2008, even after the Conservatives had Conservatives cannot afford to write psychographically similar to other built a beachhead into the province in off Quebec, for fear of another crisis of Conservative voters — middle-aged or 2006. By comparison, the support of national unity. But in their attempts to older, married with children, imbued ethnic voters in Toronto and other rebuild support in Quebec, it will be with family values, respectful of reli- metropolitan areas seems more likely reassuring to the Conservatives to gion, distressed about the impact of to be stable, precisely because the know that support in that province is crime, oriented toward the private sec- Conservatives have attracted those not pivotal to their majority coalition. tor and concerned about taxes and the ethnic voters who were already most general business climate. They make like themselves in terms of demo- Tom Flanagan is professor of political no demands on government other graphics and politics. science at the University of Calgary and than those that Conservatives general- is a former national Conservative cam- ly make. They may have some racial or t has not always been a straight paign manager. He is the author of linguistic differences, but their loca- I path for Harper and the Harper’s Team: Behind the Scenes in tion in policy space is very close to Conservatives since the party was the Conservative Rise to Power other Conservative voters. That makes refounded in 2003. Harper’s road map (McGill-Queen’s University Press) the coalition “connected.” to power took him most of the way to (www.mqup.ca).

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