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Financial and Business Statistics

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Financial and Business Statistics A1 Financial and Business Statistics A3 GUIDE TO TABULAR PRESENTATION Federal Finance A25 Federal fiscal and financing operations DOMESTIC FINANCIAL STATISTICS A26 U.S. budget receipts and outlays A27 Federal debt subject to statutory limitation Money Stock and Bank Credit A27 Gross public debt of U.S. Treasury— A4 Reserves, money stock, liquid assets, and debt Types and ownership measures A28 U.S. government securities A5 Reserves of depository institutions, Reserve Bank dealers—Transactions credit A29 U.S. government securities dealers— A6 Reserves and borrowings—Depository Positions and financing institutions A30 Federal and federally sponsored credit A6 Selected borrowings in immediately available agencies—Debt outstanding funds—Large member banks Securities Markets and Corporate Finance Policy Instruments A31 New security issues—Tax-exempt state and local A7 Federal Reserve Bank interest rates governments and corporations A8 Reserve requirements of depository institutions A32 Open-end investment companies—Net sales A9 Federal Reserve open market transactions and assets A32 Corporate profits and their distribution Federal Reserve Banks A33 Domestic finance companies—Assets and liabilities, and consumer, real estate, and business A10 Condition and Federal Reserve note statements credit A11 Maturity distribution of loan and security holdings Real Estate Monetary and Credit Aggregates A34 Mortgage markets A35 Mortgage debt outstanding A12 Aggregate reserves of depository institutions and monetary base Consumer Installment Credit A13 Money stock, liquid assets, and debt measures A15 Deposit interest rates and amounts outstanding— A36 Total outstanding commercial and BIF-insured banks A36 Terms A16 Bank debits and deposit turnover Flow of Funds Commercial Banking Institutions A37 Funds raised in U.S. credit markets A17 Assets and liabilities, Wednesday figures A39 Summary of financial transactions A40 Summary of credit market debt outstanding Weekly Reporting Commercial Banks— A41 Summary of financial assets and liabilities Assets and liabilities A19 Large reporting banks DOMESTIC NONFINANCIAL STATISTICS A21 Branches and agencies of foreign banks Selected Measures Financial Markets A42 Nonfinancial business activity— A22 Commercial paper and bankers dollar Selected measures acceptances outstanding A42 Labor force, employment, and unemployment A22 Prime rate charged by banks on short-term A43 Output, capacity, and capacity utilization business loans A44 Industrial production—Indexes and gross value A23 Interest rates—money and capital markets A46 Housing and construction A24 Stock market—Selected statistics A47 Consumer and producer prices A2 Federal Reserve Bulletin December 1996 DOMESTIC NONFINANCIAL STATISTICS— A56 Banks’ own claims on unaffiliated foreigners CONTINUED A57 Claims on foreign countries— Combined domestic offices and foreign branches Selected Measures—Continued A48 Gross domestic product and income Reported by Nonbanking Business A49 Personal income and saving Enterprises in the United States A58 Liabilities to unaffiliated foreigners A59 Claims on unaffiliated foreigners INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS Securities Holdings and Transactions Summary Statistics A60 Foreign transactions in securities A50 U.S. international transactions—Summary A61 Marketable U.S. Treasury bonds and A51 U.S. foreign trade notes—Foreign transactions A51 U.S. reserve assets A51 Foreign official assets held at Federal Reserve Interest and Exchange Rates Banks A52 Selected U.S. liabilities to foreign official A61 Discount rates of foreign central banks institutions A61 Foreign short-term interest rates A62 Foreign exchange rates Reported by Banks in the United States A52 Liabilities to and claims on foreigners A63 GUIDE TO STATISTICAL RELEASES AND A53 Liabilities to foreigners SPECIAL TABLES A55 Banks’ own claims on foreigners A56 Banks’ own and domestic customers’ claims on foreigners A64 INDEX TO STATISTICAL TABLES A3 Guide to Tabular Presentation SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS c Corrected G-10 Group of Ten e Estimated GNMA Government National Mortgage Association n.a. Not available GDP Gross domestic product n.e.c. Not elsewhere classified HUD Department of Housing and Urban p Preliminary Development r Revised (Notation appears on column heading IMF International Monetary Fund when about half of the figures in that column IO Interest only are changed.) IPCs Individuals, partnerships, and corporations * Amounts insignificant in terms of the last decimal IRA Individual retirement account place shown in the table (for example, less than MMDA Money market deposit account 500,000 when the smallest unit given is millions) MSA Metropolitan statistical area 0 Calculated to be zero NOW Negotiable order of withdrawal . Cell not applicable OCD Other checkable deposit ATS Automatic transfer service OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries BIF Bank insurance fund OTS Office of Thrift Supervision CD Certificate of deposit PO Principal only CMO Collateralized mortgage obligation REIT Real estate investment trust FFB Federal Financing Bank REMIC Real estate mortgage investment conduit FHA Federal Housing Administration RP Repurchase agreement FHLBB Federal Home Loan Bank Board RTC Resolution Trust Corporation FHLMC Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation SAIF Savings Association Insurance Fund FmHA Farmers Home Administration SCO Securitized credit obligation FNMA Federal National Mortgage Association SDR Special drawing right FSLIC Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation SIC Standard Industrial Classification G-7 Group of Seven VA Department of Veterans Affairs GENERAL INFORMATION In many of the tables, components do not sum to totals because of include not fully guaranteed issues) as well as direct obliga- rounding. tions of the Treasury. ‘‘State and local government’’ also in- Minus signs are used to indicate (1) a decrease, (2) a negative cludes municipalities, special districts, and other political figure, or (3) an outflow. subdivisions. ‘‘U.S. government securities’’ may include guaranteed issues of U.S. government agencies (the flow of funds figures also A4 Domestic Financial Statistics h December 1996 1.10 RESERVES, MONEY STOCK, LIQUID ASSETS, AND DEBT MEASURES Percent annual rate of change, seasonally adjusted1 1995 1996 1996 Monetary or credit aggregate Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 May June July Aug.r Sept. Reserves of depository institutions2 1 Total...................................................... 26.9 27.9 26.4 216.4 220.8 22.5 220.3 220.9 221.0 2 Required .................................................. 27.7 28.5 25.7 216.6 215.4 29.1 218.8 219.0 223.3 3 Nonborrowed............................................... 26.4 26.5 27.6 217.6 221.6 28.3 220.0 220.3 221.9 4 Monetary base3 ............................................. 2.7 1.5 2.1 5.8 1.0 5.7 7.6 6.2 4.5 Concepts of money, liquid assets, and debt4 5 M1....................................................... 25.1 22.7 2.7 26.9 26.8 2.5 28.9r 29.6 28.4 6 M2....................................................... 4.1 5.7r 3.8r 2.8 22.0 5.3 1.7r 3.9 3.4 7 M3....................................................... 4.6 7.0r 5.1r 4.0 2.4r 4.4r 2.5r 4.9 7.4 8 L ........................................................ 6.0 5.0 5.3r n.a. 21.2r 5.7 3.1r 6.5 n.a. 9 Debt ...................................................... 4.7 5.0 5.6 n.a. 4.6 5.0 5.2r 3.4 n.a. Nontransaction components 10 In M25 .................................................... 8.4 9.4r 5.7r 6.9 .0 7.7 6.3r 9.6 8.3 11 In M3 only6................................................ 6.4 12.3 10.0r 8.7 19.6r 1.1r 5.3 8.6 22.6 Time and savings deposits Commercial banks 12 Savings, including MMDAs ................................. 13.1 22.6 12.7 11.6 4.1 12.3 9.7 17.5 10.4 13 Small time7 .............................................. 4.8 2.5 22.9 3.5 22.9 .4r 5.4r 5.8 5.4 14 Large time8,9 ............................................. 19.5 8.0 17.3 17.0 20.3 18.9 16.4r 10.3 23.4 Thrift institutions 15 Savings, including MMDAs ................................. 22.8 2.3 8.1 .0 5.2 2.9 2.3 24.9 2.7 16 Small time7 .............................................. 4.9 22.3 23.2 2.4 22.4 23.1 22.7 4.4 4.1 17 Large time8 ............................................. 8.4 6.4 23.0 8.3 29.5 4.8 12.7 7.9 20.3 Money market mutual funds 18 Retail .................................................... 16.9 13.3r 9.4r 13.6 25.0 20.1r 13.1r 14.9 17.4 19 Institution-only ............................................. 10.3 27.9 8.7 18.6 210.3 29.1 16.8 20.4 25.7 Repurchase agreements and Eurodollars 20 Repurchase agreements10 ..................................... 214.6 1.4 4.9 215.9 80.0 270.7 224.2 210.7 18.8 21 Eurodollars10 ............................................... 26.7 17.0 7.4r 2.3 1.2r 6.2r 217.2r 7.5 21.1 Debt components4 22 Federal.................................................... 2.3 3.0 4.7 n.a. 2.0 2.1 6.0 4.5 n.a. 23 Nonfederal................................................. 5.6 5.7 5.9r n.a. 5.5 6.0 4.9r 3.1 n.a. 1. Unless otherwise noted, rates of change are calculated from average amounts outstand- amounts held by depository institutions, the U.S. government, money market funds, and ing during preceding month or quarter. foreign banks and official institutions. Seasonally adjusted M3 is calculated by summing large 2. Figures incorporate adjustments for discontinuities, or ‘‘breaks,’’ associated with time deposits, institutional money fund balances, RP liabilities, and Eurodollars, each regulatory changes in reserve requirements. (See also table 1.20.) seasonally
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