GRECO Group of States against Corruption 15th General Activity Report (2014)

Fighting corruption Promoting integrity

Mission Thematic article: Results and impact Corruption in Sport – Interaction Manipulation of Sports Competitions GRECO Group of States against Corruption 15th General Activity Report (2014)

Adopted by GRECO 67 (23-27 March 2015) Thematic article: Corruption in Sport – Manipulation of Sports Competitions

Council of Europe French edition: 15e Rapport général d’activités (2014) du Groupe d’États contre la corruption The opinions expressed in this work are the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily refect the ofcial policy of the . All requests concerning the reproduction or translation of all or part of this document should be addressed to the Directorate of Communication (F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex or [email protected]). All other correspondence concerning this document should be addressed to the GRECO Secretariat, Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law. Cover and layout: Document and Publications Production Department (SPDP), Council of Europe © Council of Europe, June 2015 Printed at the Council of Europe Contents

FOREWORD 5 Marin MRČELA, President of GRECO 5 MISSION AND WORKING FRAMEWORK 7 Objective 7 Anti-corruption standards of the Council of Europe 7 Membership 8 Composition and structures 8 Methodology – Evaluation 9 Methodology – Compliance 9 Enhancing compliance 10 Evaluation Rounds 10 Transparency 11 CORE WORK 12 Evaluation procedures and key fndings 12 Emerging trends from Fourth Round Evaluations 19 Compliance procedures and key results 22 NEWS FROM MEMBER STATES 25 THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE – A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO CORRUPTION 29 EXTERNAL RELATIONS 33 GOVERNING STRUCTURES AND MANAGEMENT 35 Plenary and Bureau 35 Statutory Committee – Budget and Programme of Activities 35 Secretariat 35 THEMATIC ARTICLE 36 Corruption in Sport – Manipulation of Sports Competitions 36 APPENDICES 43 APPENDIX I – Representatives in GRECO (at 23/12/14) 43 APPENDIX II – Meetings held/attended 55 APPENDIX III – Secretariat 59

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Foreword

Marin MRČELA, President of GRECO

he Secretary General’s 2014 Report on the State – and trust in – a democracy. I would like to use this T of Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law opportunity to express my gratitude to the authori- makes a compelling case for continued engage- ties of Austria and Monaco and to the International ment in the fght against corruption at all levels. Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) for the support they provided for the holding of the Laxenburg conference Too many people in Europe still face corruption in at which we took stock of emerging trends from the their daily lives. Moreover, the fnancial and economic frst two years of work on the Fourth Round. crisis has drawn attention to the pervasive efects of mismanagement, conficts of interest and corruption In 2014 it was a real pleasure to exchange views in in both public life and the private sector. the plenary with my predecessor as GRECO President Drago KOS who now chairs the OECD Working Group The Council of Europe with its 47 member States from on in International Business Transactions. across Europe has the capacity to direct signifcant From the unique perspective of his experience in both political and intellectual resources at dismantling the bodies he was able to dispel any fear of overlap of the legislative and institutional gaps that let corruption two and put a positive stress on the broad range of in. Work in the Organisation on developing a set of Council of Europe legal standards GRECO can draw standards for regulating lobbying – the only initiative on and the clear advantage that comes from the geo- of its kind worldwide – is an example that warrants graphic proximity of our broad membership. support. When the time comes, the Committee of Ministers might consider giving GRECO a clear man- EU accession to GRECO remains a major issue, espe- date to monitor implementation of that new instru- cially now that a new European Commission has ment. Another example is the work on corruption in taken up its functions. It is widely known that formal sport which is presented in the thematic article of participation of the European Union in GRECO has this report. been under discussion since the adoption by the EU of the 2010 Stockholm Programme and the publica- GRECO’s 49 member States (all Council of Europe mem- tion of the European Commission’s “Anti-corruption bers, Belarus and the United States of America) are package” in June 2011. Although quite some time has currently focusing their eforts in the Fourth Evaluation since passed ‒ and without any real breakthrough ‒ Round on strengthening the capacity of members of it is clear that EU participation in GRECO will help parliament, judges and prosecutors to prevent and strengthen the impact of the many anti-corruption tackle corruption within their own ranks. The institu- activities undertaken in Europe. The Secretary General, tions and services these professional groups represent Thorbjørn Jagland, has discussed these matters with are of paramount importance for the functioning of President Barroso and Commissioner Malmström.

► Page 5 In February 2014, the Commission presented the frst European Union. It is to be hoped that real progress EU Anti-Corruption Report. It extensively refects and in this area will be achieved in a not too distant future. references GRECO’s fndings, which is a clear tribute to our work. GRECO’s plenary also had a fruitful exchange The changes forged as a result of our work are proof of views with representatives of the Commission in that GRECO is not a public relations exercise; the aim March 2014 and expressed its willingness to pursue is to secure efective improvements in anti-corruption ad hoc cooperation with the Commission pending legislation and practice. We have all heard of the four formal accession. In June the Justice and Home Afairs eyes principle; in GRECO forty-nine pairs of eyes are Council urged the Commission to include in its next involved in validating the fndings of our evaluation anti-corruption report a review of the integrity poli- teams, formulating recommendations and tracking cies put in place in the EU institutions. The Council progress through a process that provides plenty also expressly called for the full accession of the EU of room for debate, critical analysis and peer pres- to GRECO as soon as possible and for the ensuing sure and little room for evading scrutiny. I invite the evaluation of the EU institutions by GRECO. By joining public, professional associations and NGOs wishing GRECO as a full member, the EU will add credibility to support our work to consult our country reports to its Anti-Corruption Report and eforts to address (www.coe.int/greco) and to lobby for full implementa- corruption, including within the institutions of the tion of our recommendations.

Fourteenth General Activity Report (2013) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 6 Mission and working framework

Objective others, the establishment of criminal ofences for active and passive bribery (as well as aiding and abet- ting in such ofences) of domestic public ofcials, RECO has been in operation since 1999. It is the domestic public assemblies, foreign public ofcials, G anti-corruption body of the Council of Europe, foreign public assemblies, members of international constituted as a monitoring body under an parliamentary assemblies and judges and ofcials of enlarged agreement, meaning that its member states international courts; for active and passive bribery in have actively chosen to participate in its evaluation the private sector and for trading in infuence. Parties procedures and make a frm and long-term commit- to the convention are required to make provision for ment to being proactive in preventing and counter- corporate liability, the protection of collaborators acting corruption. of justice and witnesses and to establish in respect The clear stated objective of the political deci- of the above ofences efective, proportionate and sions taken by the governments represented in the dissuasive sanctions. Its provisions on international Organisation to establish GRECO was to strengthen cooperation are designed to facilitate direct and swift the capacity of its members to fght corruption. The communication between national authorities. An monitoring model in place is designed to provide Additional Protocol to ETS 173 (ETS 191) requires each member state with a detailed analysis and set the establishment of criminal ofences for active and of recommendations that are tailored to addressing passive bribery of domestic and foreign arbitrators shortcomings in national anti-corruption policies, laws, and jurors. regulations and institutional set-up that have been The Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 174) validated by its peers. Subsequent impact assessments deals with compensation for damage, liability, con- (“compliance procedures”) serve to verify achieve- tributory negligence, limitation periods, the validity ments and actively encourage progress towards the of contracts, protection of employees, accounts and implementation of the recommendations. Multiple auditing, the acquisition of evidence, interim measures layers of result validation and a high level of process and international cooperation in relation to corruption ownership are salient features of this model where defned as “requesting, ofering, giving or accept- the dynamics of mutual evaluation and peer pressure ing, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue are brought into play. advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or behaviour required Anti-corruption standards of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or of the Council of Europe the prospect thereof”.

The three unique treaties developed by the Council It should be noted that within GRECO, the same evalu- of Europe deal with corruption from the point of view ation criteria and level of detailed scrutiny apply to of criminal, civil and administrative law. Corruption is states whether they have ratifed these treaties or not. seen not only as a threat to international business or The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) to fnancial interests but to the values of democracy, has been ratifed by forty-fve GRECO member states human rights and the rule of law that are upheld by and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 174) the Organisation. The Criminal Law Convention on by thirty-fve member states. Thirty-seven members Corruption (ETS 173) sets out common standards are now bound by the Additional Protocol to the for corruption ofences – without limiting itself to a Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191) uniform defnition of corruption. It has an all-inclusive which was ratifed by , Malta, Poland and range of anti-corruption provisions requiring, among in 2014.

► Page 7 The treaties are complemented by the following legal Members (49) by date of accession instruments: ► Twenty Guiding Principles for the fght Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, against Corruption (Committee of Ministers , Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Resolution (97) 24) Luxembourg, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden (founding states – 1 May 1999) ► Recommendation on Codes of Conduct for Public Poland (date of accession: 20 May 1999), Hungary Ofcials (including a model code) (Committee (9 July 1999), Georgia (16 September 1999), the of Ministers recommendation to member states (18 September 1999), Bosnia No. R(2000) 10) and Herzegovina (25 February 2000), Latvia ► Recommendation on Common Rules against (27 July 2000), (3 August 2000), the Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties United States of America (20 September 2000), and Electoral Campaigns (Committee of Ministers “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” recommendation to member states Rec(2003)4) (7 October 2000), Croatia (2 December 2000), Norway (6 January 2001), Albania (27 April 2001), Anti-corruption components are included in the fol- Malta (11 May 2001), the Republic of Moldova lowing legal instruments adopted by the Council of (28 June 2001), the Netherlands (18 December Europe in 2014: 2001), Portugal (1 January 2002), the Czech ► Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Republic (9 February 2002), Serbia (1 April 2003), Competitions (CETS 215) which was opened for Turkey (1 January 2004), Armenia (20 January 2004), signature in September 2014 Azerbaijan (1 June 2004), Andorra (28 January 2005), Ukraine (1 January 2006), Montenegro ► Recommendation on the Protection of (6 June 2006), Switzerland (1 July 2006), Austria Whistleblowers (Committee of Ministers recom- (1 December 2006), the Russian Federation mendation to member states CM/Rec(2014)7) (1 February 2007), Italy (30 June 2007), Monaco Council of Europe Treaty Ofce: (1 July 2007), Liechtenstein (1 January 2010), San www.conventions.coe.int Marino (13 August 2010), Belarus (1 July 2006 – efective participation as of 13 January 2011). Membership Composition and structures Membership in GRECO is open, on an equal footing, to the 47 Council of Europe member states and to non- The monitoring processes rely on the combined exper- member states that participated in the work leading to tise of practitioners who act as evaluators and the state its establishment (of the latter, Canada, the Holy See, representatives who compose the GRECO plenary – their Japan and Mexico have not yet joined). Ratifcation by input is substantial; expert and technical support is pro- those states of the Criminal or Civil Law Conventions vided throughout by the Secretariat. The evaluators and on Corruption (ETS Nos. 173 and 174) leads to auto- state representatives are nominated for each evaluation matic accession to GRECO. The Committee of Ministers round. As they provide expert input to the monitoring of the Council of Europe may invite other non-member that is carried out, their professional profles are matched states to accede to the conventions and/or GRECO. with the themes under evaluation. Evaluators or state representatives are designated to act as Rapporteurs in received such an invitation in December compliance procedures. The list of national delegations 2013; its accession is not yet efective, pending the in GRECO can be consulted in Appendix I. conclusion of a related agreement. Other countries from a variety of regions across the Structures globe – Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Morocco, Tunisia – ► The Plenary – delegations of permanent repre- have shown a well-informed interest in the Council sentatives nominated by the authorities of each of Europe’s standard-setting instruments and in the GRECO member State GRECO model. ► The Bureau – President, Vice-President and up During a visit to Morocco, the Deputy Secretary to fve representatives from the plenary General of the Council of Europe had met with the ► GRECO Evaluation Teams – ad hoc teams of Head of the central body for corruption prevention practitioners/experts selected by the Plenary (Instance central de Prévention de la Corruption – ICPC) ► The Statutory Committee – The Permanent and ofcially invited the country to become a party Representatives to the Council of Europe of to the ETS Nos. 173 and 174. member states of the Organisation, as well as specially designated representatives of GRECO GRECO’s membership today spans the whole European member states that are not members of the continent and also includes the United States of Council of Europe America.

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 8 ► associations/unions of the judicial and legal Observers professions The granting of observer status gives other inter- ► training institutions national organisations access to the work of the plenary and provides a formal avenue for consulta- ► anti-corruption agencies tion and coordination. ► NGOs (including national chapters/representa- tives of Transparency International (TI) and the ► International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) Global Organisation of Parliamentarians against ► Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Corruption (GOPAC)) Development (OECD) ► research institutions and academics ► Organization of American States (OAS) ► representatives of the business community ► United Nations, represented by the United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) ► the media ► international technical cooperation providers pres- ent in certain countries Other Council of Europe bodies invited to designate a representative The country-specifc reports that are drawn up describe and analyse the current situation from data ► Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) provided, collected and tested in and outside the ► European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) country. Problems or challenges are identifed and ► European Committee on Legal Co-operation the action required to address them is set out in rec- (CDCJ) ommendations to the government. Rigorously high technical standards are maintained and balance is ► Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe sought between defning the policies that might be (PACE) applied in all members and designing recommenda- tions tailored to individual national profles and short- comings. These are GRECO trademarks. The evaluation Methodology – Evaluation reports adopted contain a wealth of information on anti-corruption policies in Europe and the United Teams of evaluators collect information on which States of America, with a focus on both achievements to base their analysis frst through questionnaires and shortcomings. and then during country visits which allow them to solicit further information through discussions with key domestic institutions and civil society represen- Methodology – Compliance tatives. Evaluation teams spend a week on site and Measures taken in response to GRECO recommen- discussions are frank. In the current Fourth Evaluation dations are subject to a specifc impact assessment Round, teams generally meet with: – compliance procedure – that provides meaningful ► parliamentarians, political parties (irrespective follow-up to GRECO evaluations. In the frst of two of whether they have a seat in parliament) and main phases a compliance report is adopted which parliamentary committees assesses measures taken by each state to implement recommendations within the 18 months following ► special parliamentary bodies and administrative an evaluation. Assessments are repeated, following services a further implementation period of 18 months, in an ► lobbyists addendum to the compliance report (First and Second ► departments and bodies dealing with regulations, Round compliance procedures) or a second compli- professional standards, career and oversight of ance report (Third and Fourth Round compliance judges and prosecutors procedures). Intermediate or additional reporting duties and assessment phases occur if GRECO consid- ► judges (including non-professional judges) and ers that the response to recommendations has been prosecutors from all court instances “globally unsatisfactory”. Compliance procedures ► court and prosecution administrative services related to previous evaluation rounds run in parallel (caseload management and quality/performance to monitoring within the current evaluation round. checks) ► investigating judges and their administrative services ► councils for the judiciary and other oversight bodies ► complaints bodies/ombudsman

Mission and working framework ► Page 9 Rule 30 – Rules of Procedure a. the President of GRECO sending a letter, with a copy to the President of the Statutory 1. Members of GRECO shall comply with the Committee, to the Head of Delegation recommendations contained in the evalua- concerned, drawing his/her attention tion report and implement them fully, within to non-compliance with the relevant the time limit set by GRECO. recommendations; 2. In conformity with article 15, paragraph 6, of b. GRECO inviting the President of the Statutory the Statute members shall address to GRECO Committee to send a letter to the Permanent a situation report (hereinafter “RS-report”) Representative to the Council of Europe indicating the measures taken to follow the of the member concerned, drawing his/ recommendations in the evaluation report. her attention to non-compliance with the GRECO will examine these reports and decide relevant recommendations; whether or not the recommendations have been complied with. c. GRECO inviting the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to send a letter to the Minister of Foreign Afairs of the member Enhancing compliance State concerned, drawing his/her atten- tion to non-compliance with the relevant In comparison with the Second and the Joint First and recommendations. Second Evaluation Rounds, there has been a slump in the track record for compliance with recommenda- iii. At any stage of the non-compliance procedure, tions issued under the Third Evaluation Round. This GRECO may request the member concerned is partly explained by the sensitivity of some of the to receive a high-level mission (including issues at stake, for example the transparency of politi- the President and the Executive Secretary cal party and campaign funding. of GRECO, the Director General of Human Rights and Rule of Law and selected Heads When the performance of a member state is catego- of delegation) with a view to reinforcing the rised as “globally unsatisfactory”, Rule 32 procedures importance of complying with the relevant are applied in order to enhance prospects for greater recommendations. compliance. The organisation of a high-level mission (Rule 32, paragraph 2(iii)) has been contemplated in iv. Without prejudice to Rule 33, GRECO may one or two cases. terminate the procedure in respect of a non- complying member after due consideration Rule 32 – Rules of Procedure of the efect of the measures taken pursuant to paragraphs 2 i, ii and iii and the duration of 1. Any action in respect of non-complying the procedure. In this case, GRECO shall publish members shall be guided by the following a declaration of non-compliance along with principles: a record of the action taken by the member – equality of treatment between GRECO concerned in response to the recommenda- members; tions issued in the mutual evaluation report. – a proportionate approach for dealing with non-complying members; – approval by the Plenary of the measures to Evaluation Rounds be taken, whilst allowing for some fexibility regarding their application and timing. GRECO’s monitoring work is organised in evaluation rounds. Each has its own thematic scope and makes 2. The procedure for dealing with non-complying reference to the Council of Europe’s standard-setting members is as follows: texts. The plenary has started to refect on the thematic i. GRECO shall require the head of delegation scope of its Fifth Evaluation Round (launch planned of the non-complying member to provide a in 2017). In the context of the decisions that the ple- report or regular reports on its progress in nary needs to take in that respect, member States implementing the relevant recommendations have an opportunity to again choose an evaluation within a fxed time-frame. theme that is of political relevance and that will help to efectively respond to public concerns, notably by ii. If the member concerned is still found to be in prompting policies to counter practices that under- non-compliance with the recommendations mine governance and democratic security and to take after the application of paragraph 2 (i) GRECO into account the often signifcant social and fnancial shall apply one or several of the following cost that results from corruption, abuse of ofce and measures: similar practices.

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 10 The current Fourth Evaluation Round – the Prevention Theme II: Political funding of Corruption in respect of Members of Parliament, ► Transparency of books and accounts of political Judges and Prosecutors – opened in January 2012. parties and election campaigns Each of the three professional groups is examined in ► Monitoring of party and campaign funding relation to its place within a wider country and demo- cratic context, bearing in mind the necessary balance ► Enforcement of the relevant funding rules that must be struck between fundamental principles: ■ Second Evaluation Round between promoting transparency and protecting (1 January 2003-31 December 2006) privacy; earning trust and taking responsibility; and ► Identifcation, seizure and confscation of corrup- encouraging good conduct and enforcing rules. tion proceeds To foster essential support from national parliaments ► Public administration and corruption (auditing and the professional bodies of the judiciary for the systems, conficts of interest, reporting of corrup- implementation of recommendations issued by tion and whistleblower protection) GRECO, representatives of both branches are associ- ► Prevention of legal persons being used as shields ated with GRECO’s work. for corruption A full set of reference and working materials related ► Fiscal and fnancial legislation to counter corruption to the Fourth Evaluation Round is available at: ► Links between corruption, organised crime and www.coe.int/greco. money laundering. ■ Fourth Evaluation Round ■ First Evaluation Round (launched on 1 January 2012) (1 January 2000-31 December 2002) Prevention of corruption in respect of members of ► Independence, specialisation and means available parliament, judges and prosecutors to national bodies engaged in the prevention and ► Ethical principles and rules of conduct fght against corruption ► Conficts of interest ► Extent and scope of immunities from criminal liability. ► Recruitment, career and conditions of service (judges and prosecutors) Members that join GRECO after the close of an evalua- tion round undergo evaluations on the themes of previ- ► Transparency of the legislative process (members of parliament) ous rounds before joining the current one, starting with the frst two rounds that are restructured into Joint First ► Remuneration and economic benefts (members and Second Round Evaluations. GRECO’s most recent of parliament) members – Belarus, Liechtenstein and San Marino will ► Prohibition or restriction of certain activities be subject to Third Round Evaluations in 2015. ► Declaration of assets, income, liabilities and interests ► Supervision and enforcement of rules and Transparency regulations The long-standing practice whereby GRECO member ► Advice, training and awareness states lift the confdentiality of evaluation and com- ■ Third Evaluation Round pliance reports shortly after their adoption goes well (1 January 2007-31 December 2011) beyond what is provided for in its Rules of Procedure. Members are also urged to provide easy public access Theme I: Incriminations to translations into their national languages. This dem- ► Essential concepts to be captured in the defnition onstration of transparency can signifcantly facilitate of passive and active bribery ofences as well as the implementation of recommendations at domes- trading in infuence tic level by raising awareness of GRECO’s fndings ► Limitation periods across society. The release of a report for publication is coordinated with the member state concerned and ► Jurisdiction the Directorate of Communications of the Council of ► Special defences Europe to maximise media attention.

Mission and working framework ► Page 11 Core work

Evaluation procedures Albania and key fndings Following parliamentary elections in June 2013, a he key fndings summarised below are drawn new Government was formed shifting the power from T from evaluation reports adopted by GRECO in the Democratic Party to a coalition of the Socialist 2014 in the Fourth Evaluation Round on the Party and the Albanian Movement for Integration. prevention of corruption in respect of members of Consequently, Albania was, at the time of the evalu- parliament, judges and prosecutors. ation, in a transition phase with consequences for high-level appointments and legislative reviews. Perceived levels of corruption have remained ele- On-site evaluation visits carried out in 2014 vated (cf. Transparency International’s Corruption Fourth Evaluation Round: Perception Index. ► Germany (10-14 March) Albania has adopted very detailed anti-corruption and ► Ireland (10-14 March) conficts of interest regulations applicable to members ► Azerbaijan (14-18 April) of parliament, judges and prosecutors. Nevertheless, ► Lithuania (2-6 June) the legislative framework, which consists inter alia of the constitutional provisions and laws on the preven- ► Malta (23-27 June) tion of conficts of interest and asset declaration, is ► Bulgaria (20-24 October) highly complex, and its stability and legal certainty ► Hungary (27-31 October) have been undermined by numerous and frequent ► Montenegro (3-7 November amendments which are, moreover, often subject to contradictory interpretation. The existing regula- ► Serbia (24-28 November) tions mainly focus on restrictions and prohibitions, to ► Greece (1-5 December) the detriment of public disclosure and transparency, Evaluation reports adopted in 2014 which curtails their efect. Further eforts are therefore www.coe.int/greco needed not only to close the implementation gap but also to ensure that the information on persons exercis- Fourth Evaluation Round: ing an ofcial function, which is considered to be in ► Albania the public interest, is disclosed in a timely and efcient ► Azerbaijan manner. Moreover, the lack of a clear commitment to ethical conduct has been marked, the mechanisms ► Belgium for obtaining help, advice or training limited and the ► Croatia procedures for responding to ethical violations non- ► Denmark efective. Available data confrms that the reforms ► Germany implemented so far have not yielded signifcant results or impacted on citizen’s views regarding the level of ► Ireland misconduct in the country. ► Lithuania ► Malta The openness and transparency of the National Assembly’s work is hampered by the lack of access to ► Norway pieces of draft legislation before their formal adoption.

► Page 12 The vulnerability of MPs to possible undue infuence is At least two aspects are common to members of apparent but is not subject to regulation. The impor- parliament, judges and prosecutors. The frst is their tance of having clear, enforceable, publicly-shared allegiance to the executive. In respect of members of standards of professional conduct is not considered parliament this is due to the fact of their belonging to a priority, and a system for case by case notifcation or supporting the party led by the President. A weak of conficts of interest does not exist. Moreover, the opposition is a characteristic of the political system contents of asset declarations made by MPs are not and it can be argued that this – and the restrictions published promptly on an ofcial web site and their imposed on parliamentary debates of certain legis- full audit is carried out only every three years. Most lative proposals – signifcantly limits parliamentary importantly, despite largely praised amendments oversight and the legislative process. In respect of to the Constitution which limited MPs’ (and judges’) judges and prosecutors this is due to their direct or immunity, their implementation has been obstructed indirect appointment by the President and the subser- by the absence of corresponding amendments to the vience of the Judicial Legal Council – the key judicial Criminal Procedure Code. self-governing body – to the Ministry of Justice. Such a framework can create real or perceived opportuni- For years, the Albanian judiciary has been sufering ties for undue infuence and political interference in from a low level of public trust and high corruption the independent functioning of the legislature and perception rate. This is partly explained by its weak the judiciary, erodes the checks and balances system position vis-à-vis other branches of power. The judi- and generates signifcant corruption risks. The second ciary lacks control over the selection of High Court is the lack of controls on accessory activities and justices, and only the Minister of Justice has the right asset disclosure as well as on MPs’ conficts of inter- to initiate disciplinary proceedings against district and est. The law on asset disclosure adopted in 2005 is appeal court judges. The National Judicial Conference still not enforced. It provides for sealed, confdential – the principle judicial self-governing body – was not asset declarations. Moreover, information on com- fully operational for a long time, which had a negative panies’ organisational structures and ownership was impact on the selection of judges, career progression, withdrawn from the public domain in 2012. Building training and disciplinary proceedings, and last but accountability of individual MPs, judges and prosecu- not least, ownership and controls of judicial ethics. tors and their respective institutions appears to be problematic also in the context of restrictions on and In the Prosecution Service, the requisite objective self-censorship of the media. and transparent criteria have not been established for evaluating whether candidates have the high ethical To be credible and to reach top level elected or qualities expected, a set of clear ethical standards or appointed ofcials, the anti-corruption reforms need code of professional conduct has not been established to be further deepened and institutionalised and also for the Service as a whole, and mandatory, regular, need to be and be seen to be enforced impartially. in-service training on ethics has not been provided. Other specifc concerns are also to be addressed. These include notably the development and enforcement of standards of conduct for parliamentarians, more Azerbaijan consistent integration in the judges’ and prosecutors’ periodic evaluation of the integrity standards forming Over the last decade, the level of corruption per- part of their respective codes of professional ethics. ception in Azerbaijan has remained stably high (cf. Last, but not least, they are to beneft from guid- Transparency International’s Corruption Perception ance, confdential counselling and regular training Index). Corruption is often referred to as being a sys- and communication activities to boost reputation, temic problem that broadly afects society. Despite ethical behaviour and corruption prevention within some serious eforts undertaken since 2011 to tackle their own ranks. low level public sector corruption, there is little evi- dence of it being pursued with determination among Belgium the political elite and the upper echelons of the public service. Although regular surveys have shown that over 70% of the population still consider that corruption is a major Although the principles of independence and separa- problem in Belgium, people say that they encounter tion of powers are enshrined in the Constitution and little corruption in their daily lives. In international key laws, the institutional set up grants particularly comparisons the perception of corruption is moreover strong powers to the President and the executive, at a relatively low level. The justice system is generally which exercise considerable infuence on the legis- well regarded, unlike the political institutions and lature and the judiciary, including the Prosecutor’s elected ofcials, which are among those considered Ofce. This creates an environment lacking transpar- most afected by integrity issues. At the same time, ency and prone to political favouritism and corruption. Belgium reportedly no longer attaches the same

Core work ► Page 13 importance to fghting corruption, and the judicial and prosecution service should be developed for the same prosecuting authorities have to contend with funding reasons. Overall, even though the judiciary seems to and stafng shortages. The drive to make savings has be scarcely afected by breaches of integrity and to also led to an in-depth reform of the Senate, which enjoy public confdence, it would beneft from mea- will gradually come into efect in 2014. sures to raise awareness of the standards of conduct required of “magistrats” in their daily activities and No MPs have been convicted of corruption in con- the manner in which those who breach the rules in nection with their mandates (as far as those people this area are dealt with. Lastly, meeting the highest interviewed on-site could recollect). Preventive mecha- standards of judicial integrity is a requirement that nisms include a system for the declaration of dona- concerns all parts of the judicial system, including the tions, ofcial appointments, other positions held and administrative courts. However, to date the organisa- assets. The recent introduction of codes of deontology tion of the system of administrative justice has not by the parliamentary chambers as well as of a Federal been fnalised and there is not even a list of all the Ethics Committee, which shall all become efective in administrative courts. Belgium should ensure that the course of 2014, are welcomed additional initia- appropriate measures to guarantee integrity are also tives. The country also relies on mutual supervision in place concerning this branch of the justice system. within society at large and between political parties to limit misconduct. This approach nonetheless has its limits. For the time being, the regulations put in Croatia place are sometimes unnecessarily complex or of limited applicability, notably concerning donations, In the run-up to accession to the European Union in gifts and other benefts, and it sufers from a lack of July 2013, Croatia made signifcant eforts to adapt efectiveness. The risks are augmented by the fact and step up its legislative and institutional frame- that relations with third parties, in particular lobbyists, works to meet those of its EU counterparts. It is now have not been regulated, despite recurring contro- time to absorb the changes, as well as to efectively versies in this area. Belgium must therefore remedy embed them in working practices and culture. On the these shortcomings and supplement its system with anticorruption front, a dedicated Strategy and Action more ambitious arrangements, including in respect Plan has been in place since 2008 and continues to be of the declarations of MPs’ fnancial situations, which updated and monitored – through joint oversight by should be public including their income and assets. government, parliament and civil society organisations More efective supervisory mechanisms to ensure – on a regular basis. The establishment of the Ofce compliance with the obligations and the accuracy for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised of declarations made (including sanctions of a disci- Crime (USKOK), in 2001, constitutes a key milestone plinary or criminal law nature) are also needed both of the process, which has led to an increasing number inside and outside parliament. A reinforcement of the of successful prosecutions and asset confscations, measures to safeguard MPs’ integrity could also be an including some of a high political profle. opportunity for parliament to afrm its undertakings Despite the many encouraging steps taken, and the in these matters, especially as the reformed Senate attention paid to public involvement and scrutiny of will no longer play the role of watchdog habitually the pace of reform, Croatian citizens perceive corrup- assumed by the upper chamber in a bicameral system. tion as a major problem. This negative perception is particularly troublesome with respect to the judiciary The Belgian justice system can be seen to be indepen- and politicians. The notion of confict of interest is not dent and decentralised. To ofset the lack of means always well understood as there is a tendency to asso- and understafng problems considerable recourse is ciate it with incriminating behaviour. Moreover, some had to lawyers, in particular, to serve as judges and instances of confict of interest have not, in citizens’ prosecutors (the umbrella term “magistrat” is used to eyes, been satisfactorily resolved. The Commission for refer to both functions), which raises various prob- the Prevention of Conficts of Interest has an important lems, not least an undesirable confusion as to these role to play in providing tailored guidance and advice professions’ diferent roles. Since the courts are self- on the applicable rules and the rationale behind them, managed, there is also currently no general system and in promoting self-governance and compliance to assess their functioning on the basis of periodical within distinct areas of public service. reports. To make good this defciency, the role of the High Council of Justice could be reinforced, including Regarding members of the parliament (Sabor), mea- its auditing activity. It would then be able to identify sures have been introduced to enhance the trans- reasons for the apparent disparities in the quality of parency of their work and public participation in the work done by comparable courts and for certain the legislative process. A culture of prevention and practices reported by legal practitioners, which they avoidance of possible conficts of interest needs to describe as “little arrangements between friends”. be fully rooted in the Sabor: a code of ethics must The managerial function within the courts and the be adopted and internal mechanisms for self-control

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 14 and responsibility must be articulated in-house. Since That said, GRECO is of the opinion that the current most of the scandals afecting the Sabor involved MPs system based on trust might not always provide who were also mayors (the corrupt deals had taken sufcient safeguards against corruption risks in the place in relation to the local mandate), special atten- future, and it wishes to stress that the risks related tion would need to be devoted to integrity matters to conficts of interest must not be underestimated. that may emerge when developing this dual func- GRECO’s recommendations – as well as several further tion. Safeguarding an ethical culture in parliament suggestions – are aimed at raising awareness among is crucial for winning citizens’ trust in the institution. members of parliament, judges and prosecutors of Completing the ethics infrastructure in parliament such risks, further enhancing transparency and public requires continued attention and full adherence to trust in them and the institutions they represent. the concepts of political accountability and zero tol- Areas have been identifed in corruption prevention erance to corruption. The more attention that is paid among members of parliament where there is room to prevention, the less enforcement may be needed for improvement. In particular, it is recommended in the long run. that a code of conduct be established, that ad hoc Judicial reform has substantially improved judicial disclosure of actual and potential conficts of interest independence and efciency. Resolving the extensive be required, regular public registration of the occupa- backlog of cases remains an important challenge, tions and fnancial interests be made mandatory and particularly given that the economic crisis has trig- enforcement of the rules be ensured. Such measures gered an increase in their number (e.g. bankruptcy should be seen as safeguards for ensuring that the proceedings). Systematic research on the reasons for parliamentary process is free from – and seen to be public mistrust in the judiciary is lacking although free from – improper external infuence. there is no evidence of structural corruption in the The development, dissemination and publication system. It is important to identify the roots of this of sets of clear ethical standards/codes of conduct perception gap and to develop targeted measures – tailor-made for judges and prosecutors – are recom- to tackle it. This also requires the development, in mended, coupled with complementary measures for parallel, of a targeted communication policy, which their implementation, including dedicated training. It refects the important reforms already introduced is crucial that such training is also provided to expert and those in the pipeline. The available mechanisms judges and lay judges, who play an important role in to preserve the independence of the judiciary, not the judicial system. only in law, but also in practice when confronted with political, non-evidence based defamation could also be stepped up. While both judges and prosecutors Germany have their own codes of ethics and are subject to fnancial disclosure, there is still room for improvement Germany is generally considered to be in the top ranks of the counselling and accountability mechanisms for internationally for fghting corruption and to have judges and prosecutors which would make unethical provided a good repressive and preventive framework. behaviour harder to commit and easier to prevent and Furthermore, it would appear that public perception of detect and could ultimately recast public confdence corruption in general – and with respect to members in justice. of parliament, judges and prosecutors in particular – is clearly below EU average levels. Corruption preven- tion appears to be quite efective in practice. While Denmark GRECO takes account of this context, it still sees room for improvement. Its recommendations – as well as Public perception of the level of corruption in Denmark a range of further suggestions and considerations – has historically been very low. Corruption prevention are aimed at raising awareness among members of – including with respect to members of parliament, parliament, judges and prosecutors of the risks of cor- judges and prosecutors – relies to a large degree on ruption and other improper behaviour resulting from trust, openness and public scrutiny and appears to conficts of interest, at further increasing transparency be quite efective in practice. Integrity levels of all and ultimately at fostering public trust in them and categories of persons under review seem to be high. the institutions they represent. Moreover, GRECO identifed several strong struc- tural points – for example, the independence of the The authorities are to be commended for the Code of judiciary was further strengthened in 1999 by the Conduct for members of parliament and the inherent establishment of several bodies such as the Court disclosure requirements – concerning in particular Administration and the Judicial Appointment Board income from secondary activities and donations. and appears to be exemplary. Additional activities Further development of the rules would make it by judges are closely regulated. Ethical questions easier to identify conficts of interest and to further are included in the training ofered to judges and the culture of prevention and avoidance. In the cur- prosecutors. rent absence of clear rules on ad hoc disclosure, it is

Core work ► Page 15 recommended to require parliamentarians to publicly well aware of this and reforms are underway. The declare potential or actual conficts of interest as they legislative process in parliament is very transparent; arise in relation to their parliamentary work and to a culture of openness has been developed, built on provide them with adequate guidance. Moreover, a solid legal framework, within which modern com- more can be done to improve access to information munication techniques are used to a large extent in in the legislative process, in particular on third party order to provide for broad public access and partici- involvement in decision-making, such as lobbying. pation. The conduct of parliamentarians is governed Finally, while self-control and responsibility must by a wide range of standards, including constitutional come frst from within the house, the monitoring principles, norms in the Ethics Acts and several codes mechanism also needs to be enhanced in order to of conduct and guidelines. However, the complexity efectively prevent violations of the rules on parlia- of this structure is striking and the various norms mentary comportment – which, if they remain subject are not always fully compatible with each other. As mainly to ex-post scrutiny by the public, might give rise a result, interpretation of the standards can be chal- to mistrust of politicians and damage the reputation lenging and a consolidated values-based normative of the system over time. framework – for ethical principles and conduct of MPs in various situations of conficting interests – would The judiciary and the prosecution service in Germany be benefcial. Members of parliament are obliged to are of high quality. However, growing dissatisfaction provide asset declarations; however, these obliga- among professionals with the human and fnancial tions also need to be broadened, for example, to resources made available to the judicial system gives cover liabilities as well as the interests of persons rise to concern about its efcient functioning in the connected to members. Moreover, the monitoring of future. While the independence and impartiality of MPs’ adherence to standards, codes of conduct and individual judges and public prosecutors have been other obligations also needs to be consolidated, made undisputed to date, some controversy surrounds the more uniform and preferably given a higher degree of issue of the structural independence of the govern- independence vis-à-vis parliament and its members. ing bodies of the judiciary – which decide on funda- mental issues such as judges’ appointment – and of the prosecution service, in particular with respect to The Judiciary and the Prosecution Service are among the right of Ministers of Justice to give instructions the most trusted public institutions. The indepen- in individual cases. Steps should be taken to ensure dence and professionalism of judges is undisputed. that the justice system is free from – and seen to be However, recent measures taken to reduce public free from – political infuence. While judges and public salaries, following the fnancial crisis, have been of prosecutors have a strong sense of public service and particular concern for judges as their constitutional of dedication to public duty, preparing a compendium safeguard for the protection of fnancial benefts of the existing rules for ethical/professional conduct has been amended. This has triggered a discussion for each of the two professions is recommended. In within the judiciary on how to uphold the historically addition, it is recommended to further enhance the high ethical standards of an independent and profes- transparency and monitoring of secondary activities sional judiciary in the future. In this connection, the of judges. establishment of a judicial council and reforms of the current system for appointing and promoting judges, Ireland are in the focus as necessary measures to maintain judicial integrity and independence. Furthermore, Despite substantial reforms in the past relating to pub- there is a need to establish a code of conduct/ethics lic administration including, for example, the adoption connected to an accountability mechanism for judges of the Freedom of Information Act, the Ethics Acts and to institutionalise ongoing training. Such mea- and the establishment of connected accountability sures, which enjoy strong support from the judiciary mechanisms, there is growing concern about corrup- itself, require substantial additional resources. The tion in Ireland. From rather low perceived corruption administrative situation in respect of prosecutors levels, Ireland’s ranking in Transparency International’s in Ireland is very diferent to the one concerning perception index fell signifcantly in 2012. The drop judges for one major reason: prosecutors are subject could possibly be connected with the fndings of a to the well-developed legislation, codes of conduct, domestic enquiry, the “Mahon Tribunal”, investigating guidelines, appointment procedures etc. of the civil corruption allegations in relation to planning permis- service, complemented by dedicated measures target- sion and rezoning issues, involving the business sector ing the particularities of the profession. That said, it as well as politicians. would appear that the Prosecution Service needs to enhance the organisational structures for receiving Similar to trends in several other countries, political and handling complaints concerning the integrity and parties and politicians have low levels of trust, accord- ethical conduct of prosecutors and also to be more ing to international surveys. The Irish authorities are transparent vis-à-vis the general public in this respect.

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 16 Lithuania by improving their communication. These welcome eforts have to be pursued and reinforced, with par- Lithuania has developed a comprehensive normative ticular attention being paid to education in order to and institutional framework to prevent and fght cor- improve the drafting of court decisions. Institutional ruption. Key pieces of legislation apply indistinctively discussions among judges on conficts of interest and to all persons in the civil service, including members ethical issues must be stimulated in order to develop of parliament (MPs), judges and prosecutors, and a commonly agreed awareness of what is ethical; an overarching anti-corruption strategy defnes pri- making this debate visible to the public may also help orities and identifes institutions responsible for their increase confdence in the judiciary. The procedure for implementation. the appointment of judges is another area of concern Many institutions hold responsibilities in this feld: which must be addressed in order to increase judicial the Commission for Ethics and Procedure of the independence and public confdence. Seimas (parliament), the Judicial Ethics and Discipline The prosecution service (PPO) is facing similar chal- Commission, the Judicial Court of Honour and the lenges as the judiciary: it is also perceived as a closed Commission on Ethics of Prosecutors have a specifc institution and there is mistrust of recruitment and mandate with regard to the conduct of MPs, judges promotion processes. The PPO must address this and prosecutors respectively. Others, namely the by stepping up its communication with the public Special Investigation Service and the Chief Ofcial and increasing transparency and objectivity. Finally, Ethics Commission, have a more general competence. greater attention must be paid to integrity matters by They all need to establish closer co-operation in rais- developing more practical guidance, raising awareness ing awareness and enforcing anti-corruption rules, and stimulating discussions among prosecutors on particularly as regards conficts of interest. commonly shared ethical values. Despite these eforts, the perceived levels of corrup- tion in Lithuania are still above the EU average. Public Malta trust in the parliament and the judiciary is particularly low, although some surveys show a certain improve- The geographical situation and population size of ment in recent years. To address this problem, the Malta has a signifcant efect on personal and profes- authorities need to shift their focus to ensuring that sional relationship networks and in shaping domestic the existing legal norms are well understood and policies. This can, on the one hand, help ensure trans- properly enforced. The Law on the Adjustment of parency and act as a restraint on power and wrong- Public and Private Interests in Civil Service (LAPPICS) doing in its community, but, on the other hand, also especially contains key provisions for the prevention of involves risk factors which can increase vulnerability corruption. It defnes conficts of interest, provides for to corruptive practices. To mitigate the risk, openness restrictions and rules to avoid them or manage them and accountability, not only at central, but also at local if they do occur. Furthermore, the law establishes the level, are essential at all times. For parliamentarians, duty for persons in the civil service, MPs, judges and judges and prosecutors the handling of interpersonal prosecutors to declare their private interests along relationships and addressing real or potential conficts with a mechanism for supervision and enforcement. of interest are clearly critical challenges. The law is comprehensive and contains positive fea- In recent years, Malta has carefully considered corrup- tures, but to ensure the credibility of the system, more tion prevention policies and has signifcantly improved determined implementation action must be taken. disclosure practices in the work of its public institu- The Seimas in particular needs to demonstrate its com- tions, thereby making them more open to public mitment to addressing matters of ethics and integrity scrutiny. Two reforms are currently ongoing in the in a more proactive manner. In order to ensure that areas under evaluation, notably aimed at strengthen- a culture of prevention and avoidance of conficts of ing answerability of members of parliament in the interest takes root among MPs, compliance with rules performance of their duties and at increasing ef- in this area as well as other rules on conduct must ciency in the justice system. If adopted, and ultimately be properly monitored and enforcement action be implemented, with pace and determination, these taken when necessary. In-house channels must also reforms have the potential to instil greater transpar- be developed in order to promote and safeguard insti- ency, accountability and integrity in the legislative tutional and individual integrity. In addition, access and judicial branches. to information in the legislative process needs to be Parliamentarians are generally part-time legislators improved in selected areas, notably as regards the who maintain their private practices. The potential work of committee meetings and third party involve- for a confict of interest due to the personal and pro- ment (lobbying) in decision-making. fessional networks and business links built across The judicial authorities have been trying to address the Malta, make maintaining decision-making indepen- gap in public confdence in recent years, for instance dence, and being able to publically demonstrate

Core work ► Page 17 this independence, a live issue. A number of good guidelines from the executive. In this connection, the disclosure rules and practices have been introduced AG Ofce has secured a track record of independence in recent years and the House of Representatives in its action, and is a trusted institution. In the course does now have a notable level of transparency in of justice reform, key attention must be attached to its formal legislative processes. While the House of formalising conditions of service (including appoint- Representatives must be commended for institut- ment, promotion and dismissal mechanisms, as well as ing a Code of Ethics for its members almost 20 years working protocols) and to further refning the ethical ago, that code is now due for thorough revision and and accountability frameworks for prosecutors. update: it does not sufciently cover some topics that one might expect to see in such a code (e.g. third party contacts, misuse of confdential information, Norway misuse of public resources – money, ofces, equip- Public perception of corruption has historically been ment, facilities, staf, etc.) and several of its provi- low in Norway and the public has a higher trust in the sions raise substantial questions and ambiguities country’s institutions than in many other European with regard to their application (e.g. acceptance of countries. No integrity incidents have been reported gifts, honoraria, disclosure of personal interests at regarding members of the professional categories the outset of parliamentary debates, etc.). There is no under review. Several reasons concur to explain this designated source of counselling or training on the phenomenon: the high moral standards and inde- code, and it also lacks an adequate supervision and pendence of public ofcials combined with a zero enforcement mechanism. A Standing Committee is tolerance approach to corruption on the one hand, currently working to address ethical issues in parlia- and the wide transparency of institutions and public ment; draft legislation is now underway to reinforce scrutiny performed by the media, on the other. ethical conduct and accountability in public life. This legislation is a step forward that, if adopted, will apply The high levels of public trust extend to members of not only to members of parliament in general, but also parliament. The system relies mainly on openness, to ministers, parliamentary secretaries, parliamentary trust and public scrutiny. GRECO notes several positive assistants, as well as employees in a position of trust elements, such as the transparency of the legislative and persons engaged as advisors or consultants to process and of public records and the Ethical Guidelines government and any statutory body. adopted by the Presidium of the Storting (parliament) in June 2013. It takes the view, however, that these In general, the justice system experiences rather long guidelines need to be further developed and comple- delays. Moreover, some scandals in recent years involv- mented by practical awareness-raising measures in ing judges have somewhat tarnished the tradition- order to provide better guidance to members of par- ally acknowledged sound reputation of the judicial liament on integrity issues. Moreover, transparency system and have triggered a debate on integrity and regarding potential and actual conficts of interest has accountability matters within the judiciary. As a result, to be improved by the introduction of a requirement popular satisfaction with justice as a whole has never to disclose such conficts as they emerge. A public been so low. There are certainly some shortcomings in declaration system of members of parliament’s outside the current system which could constitute problems appointments, activities and economic interests exists in the future, and opportunities which have not been and has been gradually developed over time. GRECO fully exploited for anti-corruption purposes. More recommends further developments to this system, in particularly, the system governing the appointment order to ensure that the public has a more complete and discipline of judges is due for an overhaul with picture of the relevant interests. Finally, appropriate the overall aim of instilling greater transparency and measures need to be taken for the supervision and independence; this would additionally help to clarify enforcement of those standards. the qualities and standards of behaviour the public can expect from those in judicial ofce. Likewise, the Members of the Norwegian judiciary have a long development of training and dedicated channels of standing reputation of independence and compe- support on judicial ethics and behaviour can only tence. Public trust in their integrity is equally high. prove to be an asset for the professionals concerned. GRECO assesses positively the system for ensuring A holistic reform of the judicial system is underway, integrity and preventing misconduct among judges concrete measures have been proposed to increase and prosecutors. Limited areas deserve further atten- the efciency and efectiveness of the justice system tion. Such is the case for transparency of the process and increase public trust as a result; these measures of appointment of short-term judges. Prosecutors currently await implementation action. also need to adopt a specifc code of professional conduct; training and awareness activities on ethics Prosecutorial activity is shared between the police and and expected conduct need to be further developed the Attorney General (AG). The AG is free to choose how for all categories of judges, including lay judges, and to handle cases and is not subject to directives or policy for prosecutors.

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 18 Emerging trends of Europe have drawn our attention to this, and from Fourth Round Evaluations the example given yesterday of the situation in Slovenia was also enlightening. The following conclusions of the conference held in Laxenburg (Austria) on 10-11 April (cf. section 5 of this The legal arsenal for the repression of corruption report under “The Committee of Ministers”), drawn up has been considerably enhanced, notably under the infuence of international conventions. Conversely, by the General Rapporteur, Mr Yves-Marie Doublet, corruption prevention is a more recent idea and Deputy Director, National Assembly of France and still at a very early stage. At the same time, the GRECO Evaluator, provide his overview of the lessons public now legitimately nurtures higher expec- that can be drawn from the frst two years of the Fourth tations regarding the prevention of corruption, Evaluation Round with respect to strengthening the particularly in these times of fnancial crisis when capacity of parliamentarians, judges and prosecutors everyone must play their part in the eforts. As to prevent corruption in their own ranks. already mentioned, distrust of public decision- makers has also grown. As a consequence, safe- Conference on strengthening the capacity of guarding these public players against the risks of parliamentarians, judges and prosecutors to conficts of interest, the common denominator of prevent corruption in their own ranks: emerg- GRECO’s Fourth Round, has become essential as ing trends from two years of GRECO Round IV a means of consolidating ties between citizens evaluations (Laxenburg, 10-11 April 2014) and their institutions and simultaneously making Conclusions by the General Rapporteur, public decisions more safe. Yves-Marie DOUBLET Over the last day and a half of discussions two messages have been conveyed and one question When the problem of corruption is raised today, a has been raised: number of points spring to mind. ► Preventing corruption of parliamentarians, Firstly, there are the factors behind this issue. judges and prosecutors is not a fad but a The great complexity of our societies, with ever- necessity. more intensive interaction between economic, ► GRECO’s Evaluation Round on this topic is bring- political and social players, leads to a growing ing positive results and serves as a stimulus for number of situations in which bribery and conficts reforms. of interest may arise, which in turn generates a vital ► Is it necessary to take things further? need for rules of ethics. Conficts of interest were not a risk for Robinson Crusoe on his desert island. A culture of integrity and ethics is not innate. The risk arises when living in society. As Jane Ley pointed out, it cannot rely solely on individual consciences. It requires vigilance, Then there is the way the problem is perceived by discernment and guidance and must be a collec- society itself. The culture of transparency that has tive approach based on personal responsibilities. developed in recent years also means that what Whether in the case of MPs, judges or prosecutors, was formerly deemed harmless and tolerated is the lessons drawn from GRECO’s evaluations show now disapproved and condemned. that the member states’ rules and regulations are Lastly, there is the impact of corruption on society. as yet incomplete or just being developed. These rules and regulations now need to: The preamble to the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 1999 ofers a good ► Defne conficts of interest. The importance of illustration of the consequences: «Corruption threat- perceptions and the degree of intensity of inter- ens the rule of law, democracy and human rights, ests must be taken into account. This is because undermines good governance, fairness and social it is not sufcient that interests simply co-exist, justice, distorts competition, hinders economic devel- or that they converge or diverge, but there must opment and endangers the stability of democratic be a real confict, that is to say a contradiction. institutions and the moral foundations of society». The time criterion is also a factor. Conficts of interest must be prevented in respect of inter- Members of parliament, judges and prosecutors are ests held not only before and during the term at the centre of this debate. Whether in parliament of ofce but also after, as a representative from or the courtroom, they all take public decisions that Luxembourg said. However, the law must not commit society. Elected representatives embody go too far, as there is a genuine risk of triggering democratic values, and judges and prosecutors excessive and constant judgment. All members the rule of law. However, if the public no longer of parliament and all judges and prosecutors trusts them, democracy is in danger. The ministers have interests, but not all interests in themselves and the Deputy Secretary General of the Council result in conficts.

Core work ► Page 19 ► Identify critical or problematic situations from organisation’s anti-corruption treaties and impos- the ethics standpoint; ing uniform rules, GRECO’s approach in the Fourth ► Encourage the introduction of obligatory decla- Round has been to evaluate each country purely rations, since these foster the emergence of an on its own merits and context and to design tailor- ethics culture, above all if they are made public, made recommendations. and contribute tangibly to the prevention of Evaluation team members know full well that the conficts of interest; recommendations targeting MPs, judges and pros- ► Establish the possibility of obtaining advice ecutors encounter strong corporatist resistance. from third parties or authorities either within MPs jealously guard their independence and are the system itself or on its margins. Guidance on used to determining their own rules of conduct. questions of ethics is needed. Parliamentarians, Judges and prosecutors are wary of any interfer- judges and prosecutors must not be left alone ence with their status by the executive or legisla- to deal with these issues. A related discussion tive branches of power. Mention was made this took place yesterday with the UK representative morning of the mufed discord in France between concerning the comparative merits of internal the Judicial Service Commission and the justice and external control. minister, reminding us of the sensitive nature of such relationships when it comes to the appoint- One of the lessons drawn from the evaluations is ment of judges. Judges and prosecutors in the that ethics is not so much a matter of prohibition more recent democracies know from experience and punishment as of values and positive prin- that independence has its price. ciples, which must be implemented preventively, as Ms Artukovic-Kunst underlined. However, there Should one then simply give in and leave these is no sure and certain recipe for preventing corrup- public players exposed to a risk of potential or real tion of MPs, judges or prosecutors. This justifes conficts of interest? Should registers of lobbyists the UN Convention’s prudent approach, to which be operated solely on a voluntary basis? Should Mr Manquet appropriately referred this morning. grey areas be tolerated in respect of the accep- A culture of preventive ethics can nonetheless tance of gifts by MPs? Must one await hypothetical prove efective, as criminal and disciplinary penal- national laws, which are likely to emerge only under ties, albeit useful and dissuasive, are not the right the pressure of the media attention surrounding answer in every case. certain scandals? Yesterday, we heard a presen- tation from an NGO concerning the example of The representative of Liechtenstein raised the the half measures taken with regard to Austrian question of the penalties that should be imposed parliamentarians. for non-compliance with the rules on conficts of interest. The sanctions must be proportionate. Conversely, in the case of judges and prosecu- Ones that are disproportionate may be unconsti- tors, the appointment and promotion proce- tutional, as the French courts decided with regard dures in Germany described in Mr Hornung’s very to a penalty of deprivation of civic rights for fve detailed presentation, the work of the International years pronounced following a conviction for cor- Association of Judges mentioned by Mr Reissner, ruption. It should be recalled here that GRECO has the progress noted in Croatia regarding the com- insisted that penalties be efective, dissuasive and position of the Council of Prosecutors, the very proportionate. complete integrity programme in the Dutch pros- ecution service, which Ms Nooy has just outlined GRECO’s Fourth Round certainly can have positive for us, and Poland’s experience of applying GRECO’s outcomes and encourage states to pass appropri- recommendations, presented by Ms Lewandowska, ate legislation and undertake policy, institutional are all good practice examples which could pro- and judicial reforms. vide GRECO’s evaluators with very useful food for I am aware of the arguments of those who enter- thought. tain doubts about this exercise. At frst glance, it GRECO’s considerations have the merit of situating might appear that the Fourth Round is not based the problems in an international context. While on any particular legal instrument. In reality, as avoiding any kind of naive optimism, three lessons mentioned by Mr Mrčela, GRECO’s evaluations can be drawn from this initial experience. are anchored in the fundamental principles and standards for credible and efective democratic Firstly, this is an area where we are nearly start- institutions as endorsed by the Council of Europe ing from scratch. Codes of ethics are still virtually and its “variable geometry” of inter-governmental unknown at the level of parliamentarians and, and inter-parliamentary bodies. Rather than moni- to a lesser degree, among judges and prosecu- toring compliance with specifc provisions of the tors. In our sample of 17 countries evaluated so

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 20 far, one-third has a code of conduct for judges. Why attach importance to «revolving doors» for As Mr Duro Sessa told us concerning Croatia, judges, when most of the latter only look to retire those codes that do exist have their strong and once their judicial career is over? Is there a real need weak points. It must also be said that everything for a declaration of assets by judges and prosecu- depends on how the term is interpreted. It has tors, as compared with the holders of executive been announced that the Polish Sejm has a code power who are far more exposed to corruption of conduct. GRECO is not entirely in agreement, risks? since it considers that principles of ethics which Clearly, in a democratic society, parliaments, courts invite Polish MPs to exercise objectivity and to and prosecution services are vested with signif- be broad-minded do not constitute corruption cant public authority and expected to be in the prevention guidelines. vanguard of corruption prevention. The increasing Also, virtually none of the countries in our sample public demand for integrity and incorruptibility has a defnition of a confict of interests. GRECO extends to both institutional settings and persons, will therefore be providing a powerful spur to act, particularly when these are elected or appointed to since most countries will be unable to take refuge such important public positions as that of MP, judge behind pre-existing rules. or public prosecutor. The striking reality has how- ever been widespread mistrust and the perception The second point I wish to make is that by choosing in some GRECO member states that politicians and parliamentarians, on one hand, and judges and members of the judiciary are particularly tainted prosecutors, on the other, GRECO has shown dis- by corruption. That explains the focus and scope cernment. The recent political history of Southern of GRECO’s Fourth Round. However, by raising Europe ofers frequent examples of tense relations these questions I may already be sketching out the between politicians and prosecutors. Evaluating direction to be taken by GRECO’s future evaluation one camp while deliberately ignoring the other rounds, which could concern the executive, public would have engendered an imbalance. Submitting administration, where there is often well-advanced both to the same evaluation exercise in respect of legislation, and, as I suggested yesterday, local very similar problems obliges the two camps to elected representatives, since conficts of interest respond to GRECO’s observations. can also arise at that level.

Lastly, many of us here today deal with reports However, whether in the current round or a future by international organisations and NGOs relat- round, the issues that GRECO has chosen to address ing to corruption. However, without wishing to bring to mind what Max Weber said in his famous hurt anyone’s feelings, we can but acknowledge lecture of 1919: “It is immensely moving when a that these reports are variable in quality. One of mature man – no matter whether old or young in years GRECO’s undisputed strengths is that its reports – is aware of a responsibility for the consequences of are based on well-founded, sound, precise and his conduct and really feels such responsibility with verifed legal analyses, avoiding generalities and heart and soul. He then acts by following an ethic of biased surveys whose questions point respondents responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point towards the desired answers. As Mr Manquet said, where he says ’Here I stand; I can do no other.’ That is peer review also lends the process considerable something genuinely human and moving. And every legitimacy. GRECO’s fndings of weaknesses are one of us who is not spiritually dead must realize the hard to evade. It is this approach which makes possibility of fnding himself at some time in that GRECO an authoritative body and has over time position. In so far as this is true, an ethic of ultimate earned it its reputation. ends and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in uni- By choosing the hitherto unexplored theme of son constitute a genuine man – a man who can have prevention of corruption of parliamentarians, the ’calling for politics’.” judges and prosecutors GRECO has broken new By making its contribution to the development of ground. Should things be taken further in future? corruption prevention tools, GRECO is in its own way participating in shaping this public fgure to I am asking this question because any observer of whom Max Weber pays tribute. the Fourth Round is entitled to ask why GRECO is taking an interest in the legislature and the judiciary and ignoring the executive branch of power. Why is the focus on preventing corruption of judges, when scandals involving government members are much more frequent than those concerning Full report of the meeting, published by the judges? International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA)

Core work ► Page 21 Compliance procedures The bulk of compliance procedures conducted in 2014 and key results were those that constitute follow-up to Third Round evaluations and Joint First and Second Round evalu- ations. Examples of the impact GRECO monitoring Compliance reports adopted in 2014 has had are highlighted below: www.coe.int/greco Compliance with recommendations from the Third Evaluation Round Fourth Evaluation Round ► ratifcation of the Criminal Law Convention on ► Compliance Reports on Poland, the United Corruption ETS 173 (Austria, Italy); Kingdom – procedures ongoing ► ratifcation of the Additional Protocol to the Rule 32 procedures1 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption ETS 191 ► Compliance Report on Slovenia – procedure (Austria, Belarus, Monaco, Malta, Poland, Turkey); opened ► establishment of a coherent system of legal provi- sions on bribery and trading in infuence (Greece); Compliance with recommendations from the Third Evaluation Round ► criminalisation of several types of corruption-related ► Compliance Reports on Austria, Italy, Monaco, activities in respect of trading in infuence and/or the Russian Federation, the United States of active bribery ofences, namely: trading in infu- America, – procedures ongoing ence as defned by the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption ETS 173 (Austria, Monaco, Turkey); indi- ► Second Compliance Reports on Azerbaijan, rect active trading in infuence (Latvia); requesting Bulgaria, Hungary – procedure ongoing an undue advantage as passive bribery (Monaco, ► Second Compliance Reports on Armenia, Latvia); unrequested receipt of an undue advantage Montenegro, Serbia, “the former Yugoslav (Latvia); ofering/promising an undue advantage Republic of Macedonia” – procedures closed (Latvia); “accepting an ofer or promise” as pas- ► Addenda to the Second Compliance Reports on sive bribery (Monaco, Latvia); ofering/promising/ Latvia, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia – requesting a bribe irrespective of whether or not procedures closed the parties have agreed upon the bribe (Turkey); ► Addendum to the Second Compliance Report use of (and acting as) intermediaries (Monaco, on Spain – procedure ongoing Turkey); all corrupt acts/omissions in the exercise of the functions of a public ofcial, irrespective of Rule 32 procedures whether or not they constitute a breach of duty ► Second Compliance Reports on Romania, Turkey, and whether or not they lie within the scope of the – Rule 32 procedures opened ofcial’s competence (Turkey, Greece); ► Interim Compliance Reports on Bosnia and ► criminalisation of bribery ofences committed by Herzegovina, (2nd report), diferent public actors: members of public assem- Denmark (3rd report), France (2nd report), blies (Austria, Monaco), members of government Greece (2nd report), Malta, Switzerland, Turkey and mayors (Monaco), foreign public ofcials, mem- – procedures ongoing bers of foreign public assemblies and international ► Interim Compliance Reports on Belgium (3rd public ofcials (Monaco, Turkey), members of inter- report), Germany (3rd report), Sweden (4th national parliamentary assemblies, judges and report) – Rule 32 procedures closed ofcials of international courts (Monaco, Russian Federation, Turkey), domestic, foreign and interna- Compliance with recommendations from Joint tional judges, arbitrators and jurors (Greece), inter- First and Second Round Evaluations mediaries and third party benefciaries (Greece); ► Compliance Report on San Marino – procedure ► ongoing; broader incrimination of bribery ofences commit- ted by diferent public actors: members of public ► Fourth Addendum to the Compliance Report assemblies (Germany), members of foreign assem- on Ukraine – procedure ongoing blies (Germany), members of international parlia- Rule 32 procedures mentary assemblies (Germany); ► Compliance Report on Belarus – Rule 32 pro- ► establishment of jurisdiction over bribery ofences cedures opened committed by national public ofcials abroad (Austria); 1 ► reinforcement of the sanctions provided for in cases of trading in infuence and/or bribery ofences 1. Non-compliance (see Methodology – Enhancing compliance). (Austria, Italy, Latvia);

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 22 ► reform of the statute limitations for prosecuting ► the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring bribery and trading in infuence (Monaco, Latvia); political fnancing (Armenia, Sweden); ► abolishment of automatic exemptions from pun- ► the allocation of additional resources (fnancial and ishment for bribery in the public sector in cases of personnel) to the body responsible for the control efective regret (Armenia, Austria); of political fnancing (Poland); ► amendments to legislation in respect of bribery ► introduction of clear rules on mandatory auditing in the private sector in order to clearly cover the of the fnancial activities of political parties (Italy, full range of persons who direct or work for, in any Poland); capacity, private sector entities (Monaco, Serbia); ► introduction of measures to enhance the coop- ► abolition of the requirement of a prior complaint eration between the authorities responsible for in order to start prosecutions in respect of bribery the enforcement of political fnancing legislation in the private sector (Austria); (Poland); ► introduction of a systematised and comprehensive ► establishment of clear rules ensuring the efective- legal framework on the fnancing of political parties ness and necessary independence of auditors called and election campaigns, including the transparency upon to certify the accounts of political parties and thereof (Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Sweden); election candidates (Austria, Slovenia); ► adoption of a new legal framework on the fnanc- ► introduction of efective sanctions and/or sanc- ing of election campaigns, including transparency tioning mechanisms for violations of the rules on rules and the establishment of an independent political funding (, Slovenia, Sweden, “The monitoring body (Monaco); former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”); ► introduction of rules requiring parties and election campaign organisers to disclose their income and expenditure in greater detail, including the nature Joint First and Second Evaluation and value of individual (cash and in-kind) donations Rounds and loans (Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden); ► establishment of bribery as a criminal ofence which ► introduction of measures increasing the transpar- is dealt with only under the criminal justice process ency of donations to political parties or campaign and not under an administrative sanctions system participants (Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, (Ukraine) Slovakia); ► the introduction of liability for legal persons in ► the prohibition of donations from legal persons to respect of corruption (San Marino, Ukraine); political parties (Slovenia); ► enhancement of the level of specialisation to handle ► introduction or lowering of the disclosure thresh- corruption investigations within the responsible olds for donations to political parties or candidates body as well as regular training for law enforce- (Italy, Russian Federation, Sweden); ment staf on the typology of corruption and the ► adjustment of the current spending limits for elec- prevention and detection of corruption ofences tion campaigns, in order to promote transparency (Belarus); of the actual costs of campaigns (Slovenia); ► creation of a hotline for reporting suspicions of ► elaboration of measures aiming to increase the corruption which can be used by the public (San transparency of the accounts of entities which are Marino); related to political parties, or otherwise under their ► provision for in rem confscation of the proceeds control (Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden); of corruption, accompanied by the pertinent ► introduction of a requirement on political parties safeguards under the principle of the rule of law to keep proper books and accounts and of ways to (Belarus); support them in complying with these transparency ► introduction of regulations with respect to confs- regulations (Azerbaijan); cation and seizure of proceeds from crime which ► improved accessibility to fnancial reports of politi- would make it possible to apply measures with cal parties and campaign participants (Austria, regard to direct as well as indirect (converted) Slovakia, Slovenia); proceeds, the value of the proceeds and in respect of proceeds held by a third party (Ukraine); ► introduction of guidelines and regular training for political parties on the applicable political fund- ► introduction of regulations for handling and audit- ing regulations (Slovakia, “The former Yugoslav ing of the seizure/confscation of cash by police Republic of Macedonia”); ofcers (San Marino);

Core work ► Page 23 ► introduction of accounting legislation in compli- ► strengthening of the existing mechanisms for ance with international accounting standards and recruitment and advancement in the public service provision for the uniform implementation of such in order to ensure that they are fair, merit-based standards in respect of legal persons (Belarus); and transparent (San Marino). ► enhanced sanctions for account ofences in order to ensure that they are efective, proportionate and dissuasive (San Marino); Further reading: Directorate General Human Rights ► introduction of a ban on the deductibility of cor- and Rule of Law (2014), Practical impact of the Council ruption-related expenses (San Marino); of Europe monitoring mechanisms, Council of Europe

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 24 News from member states

orruption is a constant feature of public con- Azerbaijan C cern, debate and scrutiny and as a result it holds a prominent place on national agendas. The ► The State Agency for Public Service and Social plenary (Item 4 – Topical developments/events) also Innovations set up the ASAN Service that delivers serves as a forum for member states to share informa- a centralised public access point to a wide range tion outside the formal reporting cycles. Examples of services provided i) by State entities: issuing include: identity documents, residence permits, notarised documents, birth and death certifcations, renewal of driving licences, etc. and ii) by private service Albania providers operating in a public-private partnership: banking, insurance, legal consultancy, translation, ► Amendments were adopted to the Law on the utility services, etc. The key benefts sought are Declaration and Control of Assets and the Law transparency, broad accessibility, minimised sub- on Conficts of Interest – legislation that provides jectivity through a range of e-services and reduced the legal basis for the functioning of the High opportunity for corruption – for example, cash Inspectorate of Declaration of Assets of Albania payments are not accepted. (HIDAA). The prohibition on entering into con- tractual relations with public bodies and of hold- ing shares or other interests in legal persons was Croatia extended to frst instance and appellate judges and prosecutors. The obligation on public ofcials, ► A former Prime Minister was sentenced to eight and their spouses, adult children and parents to declare a half years in prison for accepting bribes and the their assets was extended to include cohabitants. 5 million euros taken in bribes were confscated. The threshold of expenditure and assets that must be declared by public ofcials was lowered signif- ► Based on GRECO’s Fourth Round Evaluation Report cantly (from ca. 3 930 Euros to 235 Euros) and they and the frst edition of the EU Anti-corruption are also prohibited from holding sums in cash of Report, the main strategic focus of the Anti- above ca. 11 800 Euros – to end a practice whereby corruption Strategy for 2015-2020 was preven- newly appointed ofcials could declare large cash tion. Other goals include work with respect to the sums they did not possess in order to later account protection of whistleblowers, conficts of interest for sums acquired through corruption. and lobbying. ► A parliamentary inquiry into the legality of the appointment of the Chief Inspector of the HIDAA, had been politically sensitive. Ultimately, the Estonia appointment was revoked on the grounds that the previous parliament had exceeded its powers ► Advances were made towards ratifying the by appointing a person who did not meet the legal Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention criteria for appointment. on Corruption (ETS 191).

► Page 25 Finland Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) in the framework of a project funded by the European ► A high-level panel discussion was opened by the Commission. Minister of Justice at a public event organised on International Anti-Corruption Day (9 December) ► The question of the reform/restructuring of the and that will be repeated annually to raise public tasks of the Corruption Prevention and Combating awareness of the risks of corruption to society. Bureau (KNAB) was on the agenda of the govern- ► Progress was made on draft legislation to make ment – this issue was followed particularly closely disclosure (registration and publication) of outside by GRECO given the customary support it voices for ties by members of parliament mandatory and pro- the provision of sufcient means and independence posals were made for written guidance to be made to such bodies. available to them on the proper interpretation of article 32 of the Constitution as regards conficts of interest, and for the rules on gifts to be expanded. Liechtenstein ► In-depth training on ethical principles and rules ► With the entry into force of the new Professional was provided to judges and defence lawyers and Trustee Act and an addition to the Law on Persons inception training on the same themes was pro- and Companies, the scope of responsibilities of the vided to new lay judges. independent Financial Market Authority for the ► A set of ethical rules prepared by a working party set supervision of trustees and trust companies was up by the Prosecutor General was communicated substantially expanded to encompass the granting throughout the prosecution service for feedback of licences, monitoring of ongoing compliance with and then incorporated into the training programme licencing conditions and enforcement of supervi- for prosecutors. sion (including withdrawal of licences). ► Amendments to the Police Act and the Criminal Germany Code introducing a system for the protection of witnesses were approved by parliament and revi- ► The process for ratifcation of the United Nations sions to the State Personnel Act to provide for Convention against Corruption was completed. The the protection of whistleblowers and a reporting legislative amendments adopted in the context of obligation were submitted by the government for that process (extension of criminal liability for active public consultation. and passive bribery of members of public assem- blies) also constituted a signifcant step towards ratifcation of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Luxembourg Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) for which additional legislative measures were being taken. ► A Code of Ethics for Parliamentarians came into efect. It provides for the fling of declarations of Ireland income and fnancial interests, regulates prohibi- tions on accepting gifts and other advantages and ► Draft legislation was under preparation: i) the the conduct to be followed when dealing with Criminal Justice (Corruption) Bill – including an lobbyists. A consultative committee supervises autonomous ofence of trading in infuence; ii) the application of the Code. Electoral (amendment) (referendum spending and miscellaneous provisions) Bill; and iii) the Electoral ► A Grand Ducal Order of 14 November stipulates the (amendment) (political funding) Act. In addition, ethical rules applicable to government members. guidelines on the publication of accounts by politi- An ad hoc Ethics Committee can provide advice cal parties were being prepared by the Standards confdentially. The Order provides a defnition of in Public Ofce Commission and preparatory work confict of interests and any member who feels for the establishment of an Electoral Commission exposed to a confict is obliged to remedy the was commenced. situation immediately. All remunerated activities over the 10 years before joining the government, Latvia information on fnancial interests, on the profes- sional activities of spouses or partners are to be ► The Ofce of the Prosecutor General had published declared. End of mandate restrictions and limita- on-line up-dated details of the procedure for fling tions on the acceptance of gifts, hospitality, decora- complaints. Training on ethics, conficts of interest, tions and other honours are also imposed and fees lobbying and trading in infuence was provided to received for public speaking engagements are to be prosecutors, judges, lawyers and the staf of vari- declared to the Ethics Committee and donated to ous law enforcement bodies and of the Corruption a charitable, social or environmental organization.

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 26 Malta Poland

► The process for ratifcation of the Additional ► The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), with Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention (ETS 191) fnancial support from the Prevention of and was completed. Fight against Crime Programme of the European Commission, set up an e-learning platform (Polish ► Progress was made in the examination by parlia- and English) that gives access, free of charge, to ment of a draft Financing of Political Parties Act. comprehensive learning and awareness-raising resources on corruption organised in three thematic Monaco modules – corruption in public administration, corruption in the business sector and, the social ► A Municipal Decree on the ethical obligations of efects of corruption. municipal ofcials of September 2014 – that com- plements decrees that apply to state ofcials and to Serbia ofcials of the judicial services – covers in particu- lar the receipt of gifts, stipulating that those that ► New legislation was adopted: i) the Law on the might infuence partiality or constitute a reward Protection of Whistleblowers; and ii) amendments for actions/decisions are prohibited. Potential or to the Law on the Financing of Political Parties. The real conficts of interest are to be reported to the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) had voiced concerns appropriate persons in the hierarchy. over one element of the latter piece of legislation ► A draft law to amend the law on the funding of as it allows political parties to buy real estate with election campaigns in the light of recommenda- money allocated from the State budget. tions addressed to Monaco was submitted to the ► The occasion of International Anti-Corruption appropriate parliamentary commissions. Day had been used by the ACA to promote and raise awareness of a draft Model Law on the Anti- Montenegro Corruption Agency which is an ACA initiative.

► New legislation was adopted: i) the Law on the Slovak Republic Prevention of Corruption which establishes an Agency for the Prevention of Corruption that inher- ► The Law on Certain Measures related to Reporting its supervisory functions from the Directorate for on Anti-social activities would enter into force on Anti-corruption Initiative and the Commission for 1 January 2015. It provides for the protection of the Prevention of Conficts of Interest; and ii) a those who, by blowing the whistle on corruption new Law on the Financing of Political Parties and or other activity termed as “anti-social” (i.e. illegal) Electoral Campaigns and the Law on Lobbying. they acquire knowledge of in the context of their ► In cooperation with its counterpart in Slovenia, the job or functions, signifcantly contribute to the Directorate for Anti-corruption Initiative created identifcation of such behaviour and to the detec- a new web platform for establishing and evaluat- tion and conviction of a perpetrator. ing the integrity plans all government bodies are obliged to develop and implement. It will also serve as a useful resource for the Agency for the Slovenia Prevention of Corruption. ► The Slovenian Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC) was a partner in a national project Norway that focused on women managers and their career paths, particularly obstacles they face. Corruption ► A web tool – the Political Parties’ Portal – was set risks with respect to top management, including up to handle applications and the disbursement corruption in recruitment procedures had been of state grants, and for the collection, manage- identifed. ment, monitoring and publication of the fnancial ► The CPC had celebrated its 10th anniversary with accounts of the 20 national political parties and a series of events such as a roundtable bringing their 3 380 subordinate entities. Information fow, together former Chief Commissioners and represen- decision-making and auditing are facilitated as the tatives of the media and civil society organisations relevant ministry, the 19 county governor ofces, and an anti-corruption flm festival. the political party monitoring/control authority and the party auditing committee can interact ► A former CPC Chief Commissioner, Mr Goran with the portal. KLEMENČIČ was appointed Minister of Justice.

News from member states ► Page 27 Spain to the chambers, initiation of investigations into HCJP members, etc). A new Judicial Reform Law ► Four draft bills were presented to parliament by the (17 June 2014) was passed in order to respond to government: i) the draft Economy Act (including a the Constitutional Court’s ruling and earlier provi- ban on the cancellation of a political party’s debts sions were restored to the Law on the High Council by the banks); ii) a draft act on the status of high of Judges and Prosecutors. senior ofcials (prevention of conficts of interest and setting up of an ofce responsible for register- ing conficts of interest); iii) a draft Bill amending Ukraine the Criminal Code with respect to its bribery and main criminal provisions (corruption in the private ► New legislation was adopted as part of a reform sector and trading in infuence); and iv) a draft Bill package that includes an Anti-Corruption Strategy amending the Criminal Procedure Code (to speed for 2014-2017: i) a law establishing the National up procedures especially in corruption cases by Anti-corruption Bureau which is a law enforce- imposing a limit on the length of procedural steps). ment body focused on counteracting corruption ► Measures were being envisaged by the Judicial among high-level ofcials; ii) the Law on Corruption Council to reinforce and support judicial activity in Prevention with stipulations on policy making connection with the investigation and adjudication and the attainment of objectives and which also of corruption cases, including the setting up of a provides for mechanisms for preventing and resolv- dedicated oversight and supervisory unit. ing conficts of interest and modern methods for fnancial disclosure by ofcials; and iii) a law that provides for the identifcation and publication of Switzerland information on company ownership and the pub- ► A bill was submitted to parliament proposing the lication of information from the property register. extension of the criminalisation of private sector ► Via other legislation, sanctions for corruption bribery to cover non-proft organisations. ofences were raised, criminal liability of all private sector employees was established, promising an “The former Yugoslav Republic illegal beneft was criminalised and provision was of Macedonia” made for the criminal liability of legal persons that do not have proper corruption prevention ► The capacities and role of the State Audit Ofce measures in place. were due to be strengthened via a constitutional amendment. ► A major programme funded by the European Union United Kingdom Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) was being implemented. The main benefciary is the ► The Lords Reform Act (May 2014) introduced State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption additional sanctions whereby Peers cease being and the Federal Ofce of Administration of Germany members if convicted in the UK and sentenced (BVA) is the designated twinning partner. The proj- to a custodial sentence of more than 12 months, ect components include: improving the institu- and if they do not attend the House during session tional anti-corruption framework, improving the without good reason. management of conficts of interest policies, new software solutions for the verifcation of asset dec- ► A study of awareness and impact of the 2010 Bribery larations, a new methodology for producing sta- Act among small and medium-sized enterprises was tistics on corruption cases and training of judges commissioned. and prosecutors. ► The UK Anti-corruption Plan was published and would be reviewed on a regular basis as part of Turkey the UK’s commitment to the Open Government Partnership process developed with civil society. ► The Constitutional Court had ruled that a number of amendments made to the Law on the High ► New sentencing guidelines by the Sentencing Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HCJP) in 2014 Council took efect from October in respect of were unconstitutional, notably with respect to fraud, bribery and money laundering – ensuring the powers given to the Minister of Justice, in his that the impact on victims is central to decisions role as President of the HCJP (appointments to and making clear the serious consequences for the Inspection Board, assignment of members ofenders, both individual and corporate.

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 28 The Council of Europe – a multidisciplinary approach to corruption

The Committee of Ministers parliaments, to securing concrete action in response to GRECO’s fndings is highly valued.

n the occasion of his annual exchange of views In that context, Gabriella BATTAINI-DRAGONI, with the Committee of Ministers (1203rd Deputy Secretary General participated in a Hearing O on Reporting on Corruption: Journalists and Meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 18 June 2014) GRECO’s President underlined the importance Parliamentarians Investigating Together at which she of the continued support provided by the political underlined the important role played by the media bodies of the Council of Europe and the role they can and investigative journalism in revealing cases of play in stimulating political commitment to fghting corruption, abuse of ofce and illicit enrichment and corruption in order to recast confdence in democratic drew attention to the recommendations GRECO has governance and the rule of law. addressed to parliaments and political parties for example on transparency of political funding. Later in Under the auspices of the chairmanship of Austria of the year, in the framework of the Platform, a confer- the Committee of Ministers, a Conference on strength- ence-debate on Gender Dimensions of Corruption ening the capacity of parliamentarians, judges and was organised jointly with the PACE Committees prosecutors to prevent corruption in their own ranks: on Equality and Non-Discrimination and on Rules emerging trends from two years of GRECO Round IV of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Afairs. evaluations (Laxenburg, 10-11 April 2014) was organ- Mr Matthias KOPETZKY, member of the Board of the ised jointly with the Ministry of Justice of Austria and Institute of Internal Audit – Austria and Leader of the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA), its Anti-Fraud Study Group, who has been associ- with additional fnancial support from the Government ated with GRECO’s work on gender, and Ms Helena 2 of Monaco . LIŠUCHOVÁ, GRECO’s Gender Equality Rapporteur GRECO contributed in cooperation with the Action provided examples to illustrate why and how the against Crime Department to the organisation of a integration of a gender perspective adds value to the Conference on the fght against corruption: inter- prevention and fght against corruption. national standards and national experiences (, 30 June-1 July 2014) that was held under the auspices The Secretary General of the chairmanship of Azerbaijan of the Committee of Ministers. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe reit- erated the importance he attaches to the work of The Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) GRECO and to the matter of EU accession to GRECO in the Strategic Vision paper issued when he took up In April 2014, the Committee on Rules of Procedure, his second term in ofce in 2014. Immunities and Institutional Afairs launched the PACE The 2014 edition of the Secretary General’s Report Anti-corruption Platform. It brings together parliamen- on the State of Democracy, Human Rights and the tarians, anti-corruption experts and other stakehold- Rule of Law in Europe refects some key concerns ers to share information, spread good practices and highlighted by GRECO’s monitoring and makes four debate and in that context promotes the Council of anti-corruption recommendations to guide eforts Europe instruments and standards and implementa- in Europe. They call for integrity in the judiciary, law tion of GRECO’s recommendations. The contribution enforcement and prosecution bodies to be reinforced, PACE members can make, in their respective national for the commitment of MPs to corruption prevention in their own ranks to be furthered, the setting up of 2. Cf. the conclusions drawn up by the General Rapporteur, in independent bodies to monitor political fnancing section 3.2 of this report). and, for the protection of whistleblowers.

► Page 29 The report also calls on monitoring bodies to look into Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, amending their operational practices with a view to Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine); the closing improving their capacity for rapid reaction in emer- conference, held in December 2014 summarised gency situations or in response to urgent requests the lessons learned and envisages the next steps from member states. After careful consideration, of anti-corruption reforms needed in the region GRECO decided that its main strategy for dealing ► in Morocco an overarching assessment of the entire with such situations related to its monitoring mandate anti-corruption regime (based on GRECO method- and the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption stan- ologies) was carried out; a signifcant reinforce- dards would involve conducting an ad hoc focused ment of the institutional capacities of its leading dialogue with a member State and has adopted a anti-corruption authority and development of specifc framework for such dialogue. It will not favour systemic interagency coordination was achieved; however over-hasty reactions that might not secure contributions were also made to setting-up a risk- lasting results. GRECO has already some experience based anti-corruption framework and training and in reacting to pressing issues in its member states, capacity building (EU funded regional programme for example legislative initiatives thought to infringe – Promotion of good governance: fght against international anti-corruption standards or run counter corruption and money-laundering in the South to GRECO recommendations and changes that might Neighbourhood (SNAC1)) negatively afect specialised anti-corruption bodies. ► in Tunisia extensive technical and legal advice for the preparation of the legal framework of a new Congress of Local and Regional Good Governance and Anti-corruption Authority Authorities was provided; (EU funded regional programme – Promotion of good governance: fght against GRECO’s President participated in a conference on corruption and money-laundering in the South Combating Corruption – Preventive and Repressive Neighbourhood (SNAC1)) Measures on European, National, Regional and Local ► development of an Investigation Guide for Level, co-organised by the Regional Parliament of the Inspectors and training of public sector inspec- Tyrol and the Congress (Innsbruck, 8-9 May 2014). On tors from Turkey by the United Kingdom’s National that occasion, he stressed how corruption undermines Crime Agency and the European Union Anti-Fraud people’s confdence in all levels of government and Ofce on modern investigation techniques in cor- that at the local and regional levels corruption preven- ruption and fraud cases (EU/Council of Europe joint tion mechanisms and procedures are not always up programme – Strengthening the coordination of to the challenges that stem from the transfer of many anti-corruption policies and practices in Turkey competences previously exercised by central authori- (TYSAP)) ties. A signifcant number of GRECO recommendations addressed to national governments need also to be ► support was given to strengthening the capacities implemented at local and regional level where the of the Federal and Regional Business Ombudsman decentralisation of decision-making, management ofces through advice, training and sharing of good of signifcant sums of public money and the relation- anti-corruption practices from Council of Europe ships between local business and local politicians or member states in preventive measures against civil servants can create a climate which does not the abuse of public authority in the corporate sec- necessarily favour integrity and fair play. tor; measures for the protection of whistleblow- ers; corruption risks and protection mechanism Further reading and contacts: www.coe.int/congress for entrepreneurs in the Russian Federation (EU/ Council of Europe joint project – Protection of Rights Technical assistance and cooperation – of Entrepreneurs in the Russian Federation from Economic Crime and Cooperation Unit Corrupt Practices (PRECOP)) (ECCU) ► delivery of certifed Council of Europe training on Basic anti-corruption concepts for civil servants, The work of the ECCU is one of the three pillars of judges and prosecutors and publication of a Manual coordinated action deployed by the Council of Europe for Practitioners for continuous vocational training, in the fght against corruption: the setting of norms developed with input from Russian specialists and legal standards, monitoring, and technical assis- ► conduct of corruption risk analysis on obstacles to tance. Examples of the technical cooperation and efcient criminal investigations and proceedings assistance and capacity-building delivered in 2014 and on corruption risks within law enforcement and that included specifc anti-corruption components: the judiciary; expert assistance for the drawing up ► completion of the four-year EU funded EaP Facility of the Law on Whistleblower Protection; delivery regional project – Strengthening good gover- of a large-scale training programme on corruption nance and the fght against corruption in Eastern and economic crime to judges, prosecutors and

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 30 police ofcers; development of a comprehensive gender-specifc issues in anti-corruption policy mak- training curriculum on judicial ethics, integrity and ing. One of her roles is to ensure that gender issues conficts of interest (EU/Council of Europe joint are highlighted at various stages of GRECO’s moni- programme – Strengthening the capacities of law toring procedures and related statistical data is now enforcement and the judiciary in the fght against presented in GRECO’s Fourth Round evaluations. The (PACS)) impetus created by the exchange of research and ► completion of the 2nd assessment cycle on the ideas at an international conference organised by compliance of Kosovo3* with international stan- GRECO under the Senate of the Parliament and the 4 dards in the area of the fght against corruption, Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic in 2013 lead money laundering and fnancing of terrorism based to further initiatives in 2014 involving cooperation on GRECO and FATF/MONEYVAL methodologies with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of (EU/Council of Europe Joint Programme – Project Europe and the United Nations (cf. under those titles against Economic Crime in Kosovo* – PECK) in sections 5 and 6 of this report). ► a project proposal was developed for techni- Further reading and contacts: www.coe.int/equality cal assistance to the National Anti-corruption Coordinator – Greece The European Committee on Crime ► project proposals were developed for technical Problems (CDPC) assistance and cooperation projects for Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (Council of Europe/ The CDPC consulted GRECO on whether it saw any EU Eastern Partnership Programmatic Co-operation need to review or further promote the Criminal Law Framework (PCF)) Convention on Corruption (ETS 173). In the course of Further reading and contacts: www.coe.int/corruption its monitoring work so far GRECO has not identifed any particular shortcomings in the text and all Council of Europe member states have either ratifed or are European Commission for Democracy working towards ratifying it. GRECO did however feel through Law (Venice Commission) that it would be highly desirable for the CDPC to carry out a feasibility study on amending or complement- The Venice Commission adopted (98th plenary session, ing ETS 173 with a view to covering the non-proft March 2014) a report drawn up in cooperation with sector (e.g. private associations – including those Mr Yves-Marie DOUBLET, GRECO Evaluator, entitled operating at international level, foundations, labour The Scope and Lifting of Parliamentary Immunities. The unions, charities, churches involved in service delivery report presents a description, analysis and assessment to the community, etc.) as it is a sector that does not of rules on the scope and lifting of parliamentary receive much attention as regards corruption risks immunity – a basic distinction is made between what and the legal framework that is applicable. The CDPC is usually referred to as “non-liability” (freedom of (67th Plenary Session, 1-4 December 2014) decided speech) and “inviolability” (protection against arrest, nevertheless to maintain its previous conclusion that in detention, prosecution, etc.). It includes proposals for a majority of member states such matters are covered common criteria and guidelines, inspired by rules and by existing legislation but has suggested that GRECO practices already developed at the European level by might choose to return with a renewed and reasoned the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe opinion as to the need for additional provisions in and the European Parliament. connection with the implementation of the Council Further reading and contacts: www.venice.coe.int of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (CETS 215). The Gender Equality Commission (GEC) Further reading and contacts: www.coe.int/cdpc The GEC has approved of GRECO’s approach and substantial contribution to the implementation of The European Committee the Council of Europe’s Gender Equality Strategy. on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ) GRECO’s Gender Equality Rapporteur, Ms Helena LIŠUCHOVÁ (Czech Republic) has played a key role In light of a feasibility study it had commissioned, the in that process by promoting the concept of gender CDCJ decided to start work on drafting a Council of mainstreaming and a changed mind-set as regards Europe legal instrument on lobbying. That exercise is the frst of its kind as no international body has developed a legal instrument to provide guidance on 3. *All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, insttutons or populaton, shall be understood in developing national regulations on lobbying activities. full compliance with United Natons Security Council Resoluton 1244 and without prejudice to the status 4. Conference on the Gender Dimensions of Corrupton of Kosovo. (Prague, 13 December 2013).

The Council of Europe – a multidisciplinary approach to corruption ► Page 31 The study points to a Committee of Ministers recom- the member States of the Conference – which is the mendation as possibly being the most practical format only political forum addressing sports issues at pan- for the instrument and indicates that its implementa- European level – and representatives of FIFA and tion might be monitored by GRECO which has looked UEFA took part in the debate and a resolution was into the issue, mainly from the standpoint of how adopted calling, among other things, for the promo- members of parliament should be expected to react tion of a zero tolerance policy regarding corruption in response to solicitations from third parties, in its in sport. The Conference also invites states all over the Fourth Evaluation Round. world to ratify the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (CETS 215, Further reading and contacts: www.coe.int/cdcj opened for signature on 18 September 2014), which had resulted from two years of work within EPAS Conference of Ministers responsible that also involved consultations with sports organ- for Sport and Enlarged Partial isations and betting operators. For further details, Agreement on Sport (EPAS) please refer to the thematic article on Corruption in Sport – Manipulation of Sports Competitions by the One of the main themes of the 13th Council Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible (cf. section 8 of this report). for Sport (Magglingen/Macolin, Switzerland, 18 September 2014) was the Risk of Corruption in the Governance of Sport. National delegations from Further reading and contacts: www.coe.int/epas

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 32 External relations

olicitations for input to other activities are fre- Migration, Home Afairs and Citizenship includes mat- S quent and potential for cooperation is regu- ters related to the fght against corruption and GRECO. larly brought to the attention of the plenary. Some longstanding contacts are maintained, others International Anti-Corruption Academy result from the specifc thematic focus of the current (IACA) evaluation round or other topical issues. The highly dynamic interplay of initiatives in the international IACA has had observer status in GRECO since 2011. anti-corruption community undeniably favours real GRECO’s partnership with this respected academic and progress in the fght against corruption. Sustained training institution – to which references can be found eforts are made by GRECO’s secretariat to ensure in various sections of this report – is highly valued. coordination of monitoring activities and to promote synergies in work plans and outputs. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) European Union (EU) The ICC takes an active interest in GRECO’s work and Cooperation, including in the felds of EU neighbour- provides visibility to it in the framework of meetings hood, external action and enlargement policies has of its Anti-Corruption Commission (ICC-ACC) where, operated for some time through well-established for example, thought is being given not only to man- Council of Europe/EU consultation frameworks. aging the risk of bribes being ofered by business but also the risk to business of attempts at extortion The frst edition of the EU Anti-Corruption Report was by elected ofcials. Information on the experiences published by the European Commission in February. of the business community can be enlightening for The engagement of the Commission in the fght GRECO evaluation teams. against corruption was welcomed by GRECO which held an exchange of views with Mr Reinhard PRIEBE, Director for Internal Security, DG Home Afairs of the International Institute for Democracy European Commission at the March plenary meeting. and Electoral Assistance (International The Council of Europe’s anti-corruption standards had IDEA) served as important references for the assessments Regular inter-secretariat contacts are maintained made in the report, extensive use was made of GRECO’s with this intergovernmental organisation. Mr Samuel fndings and, furthermore, it promotes the importance JONES, Programme Ofcer presented to GRECO’s June of implementing GRECO recommendations. plenary meeting a study entitled Funding of Political The participation of the EU in GRECO is provided for Parties and Election Campaigns: A handbook on politi- under Article 5 of GRECO’s Statute. It is a matter that cal fnance that was published in September. A second has held a prominent place in discussions between publication entitled Political Finance Regulations the Council of Europe (and GRECO) and the European around the World: An overview of the International Commission for some time and which has been sup- IDEA Database was made available to the plenary ported by the European Council. At the time of writ- later in the year. The mission of International IDEA is ing, the Commission was still carrying out an impact to support sustainable democracy worldwide. Its work assessment regarding possible EU membership of ties in closely with GRECO’s Third Round, Theme II on GRECO in consultation with other EU institutions. political funding where thirty member states have Other details pertaining to 2014 are referred to by the yet to complete (or commence) the work related to President of GRECO in the foreword to this report. In compliance procedures. On invitation, International the new Commission formed by President Jean-Claude IDEA can act as a facilitator by bringing interested JUNCKER for the period 2014-2019, the portfolio of parties together to discuss and provide advice to Mr Dimitris AVRAMOPOULOUS, Commissioner for support national initiatives.

► Page 33 Organisation for Economic Co-operation Transparency International (TI) and Development (OECD) MM Mark PERERA and Carl DOLAN from the The OECD has had observer status in GRECO since Transparency International EU Ofce in Brussels pre- 2002. GRECO is an observer in the OECD Working sented, at GRECO’s June plenary meeting, the main Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions fndings of TI’s EU Integrity System Report, published and a member of the Steering Group of the OECD in April 2014. It is a study of 10 EU institutions that Anti-Corruption Network (ACN) for Eastern Europe complements TI’s 2012 National Integrity Studies and Central Asia. (23 EU member states and Norway and Switzerland) and the EU’s frst Anti-corruption Report, which in its GRECO’s work on political fnancing, the work of the frst edition does not address its own institutions. The Venice Commission and the standards of the Council report assesses how the institutions deal with internal of Europe are particularly relevant to the OECD Trust corruption risks, foster public sector integrity and Strategy with respect to seeking a response to per- contribute to the fght against corruption in Europe ceptions of declining trust in governments and par- and includes recommendations that can be used as liaments. In that context in 2014, comments and a tool to close integrity gaps. input were provided by the Secretariat for the OECD Meetings with the national chapters of this leading publication entitled Lobbyists, Government and Public global non-governmental organisation are regularly Trust: Volume 3 Implementing the OECD Principles included on the schedules of GRECO evaluation visits. for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying. A GRECO Expert and a member of the Secretariat moderated panel discussions on legislative loopholes, and fnance UNITED NATIONS regulations and their impact on an (un)even playing feld among actors respectively, at an the OECD Forum United Nations Ofce on Drugs and on Financing Democracy and Averting Policy Capture. Crime (UNODC) GRECO’s former President, Mr Drago KOS (Slovenia) UNODC has had observer status in GRECO since 2006. took up the chairmanship of the OECD Working Group Coordination is ensured through participation, in on Bribery in International Business Transactions in particular, in the work of the Conference of the States January 2014. He participated in an exchange of views Parties to the United Nations Convention against with GRECO’s Plenary in October. Corruption (UNCAC) on implementation review and of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on the Prevention of Corruption. The latter structure Organisation for Security and Co- functions as an observatory that gathers information operation in Europe/Ofce for on good practices in corruption prevention and deliv- Democratic Institutions and Human ers technical assistance. Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)

The OSCE/ODIHR has engaged in work in the anti- United Nations Development corruption feld and continues to seek to cooperate Programme (UNDP) with GRECO, particularly in relation to work on political GRECO’s Gender Rapporteur, Ms Helena LIŠUCHOVÁ funding (see also the section on the OECD). GRECO (Czech Republic), Ms Vita HABJAN BARBORIČ, Bureau has observer status in the OSCE/ODIHR Core Group of member (Slovenia) and a member of GRECO’s secretariat Experts on Political Parties which facilitates the transfer had collaborated with the UNDP on the methodology for of information and expert advice relating to GRECO the Survey on men and women in civil service conceived standards and national practices. Comments and by the UNDP Regional Centre for Europe and input were provided by the Secretariat for the OSCE the CIS. The survey is designed to measure perceptions Handbook of Best Practices in Combating Corruption of men and women’s vulnerabilities and risks associated that was published in 2014 and for a revision of the with transparency, accountability and corruption within ODIHR-Venice Commission Guidelines on Political the civil service. The main questions posed are broadly Party Regulation. how male and female civil service employees perceive and experience transparency, accountability and corrup- Organization of American States (OAS) tion in the work place and what are the diferentiated impacts of corruption and a lack of transparency on The OAS has had observer status in GRECO since 2011. the recruitment and career development of male and Contacts between the secretariats of the OAS Follow-up female civil service employees. Consent was given by UNDP for all GRECO member States to participate in Mechanism of the Inter-American Convention against the survey and they have been encouraged to do so. Corruption (MESICIC) and of GRECO are maintained normally in the framework of the activities of fora such A full list of events and meetings is available in as the United Nations and the OECD. Appendix II.

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 34 Governing structures and management

he permanent, specifc bodies constituting The expertise provided by evaluators and national rep- T GRECO are the Plenary, the Bureau and the resentatives which is not remunerated has been key to Statutory Committee. The Statute also provides the cost-efectiveness of this monitoring mechanism. for ad hoc bodies, principally evaluation teams but It is becoming apparent that technical adjustments also working parties. applied to budgets across the Organisation might afect negatively GRECO’s ability to maintain its current rhythm of activities as, however much priority is given Plenary and Bureau to its work, its budget cannot beneft from a transfer of funds within the Organisation due to GRECO’s status GRECO elects a President, Vice-President and Bureau for as an enlarged agreement. GRECO hopes that this will each new evaluation round. The positions of President be borne in mind in future discussions on its fnancial and Vice-President for the duration of the Fourth resources. Evaluation Round were taken up in 2012 by Mr Marin MRČELA, Justice at the Supreme Court of Croatia and Mr Christian MANQUET, Head of Department, Secretariat Directorate for Penal Legislation, Ministry of Justice The Secretariat, headed by Wolfgang RAU, Executive of Austria respectively. Secretary, provides substantial analytical and technical input to GRECO’s monitoring work and is responsible The plenary is composed of representatives of member for the management of the budget and programme of states appointed on a “permanent” basis (Rule 3 of the activities as well as external relations (organisational Rules of Procedure). The intention is to thus ensure chart of GRECO’s Secretariat – see Appendix III). consistency in GRECO’s monitoring work – due to the direct involvement of representatives in the peer review process during the examination and adoption of evalu- ation and compliance reports. The plenary also takes fnal decisions on the focus of GRECO’s monitoring, policy and planning.

Statutory Committee – Budget and Programme of Activities

The Statutory Committee is composed of the Permanent Representatives to the Council of Europe of GRECO member states and representatives of the two states that are GRECO members but not members of the Council of Europe (Belarus and the United States of America). Its principle task is to adopt GRECO’s bud- get. In line with the biennial programme and bud- get method implemented by the Organisation, the Statutory Committee, chaired in 2014 by Ambassador Peter GUNNING, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the Council of Europe, approved GRECO’s budget for 2015.

► Page 35 Thematic article

Corruption in Sport – Manipulation euro business while the structures are sometimes still of Sports Competitions those of an amateur club, with limited accountability requirements. With checks and balances, transparency and accountability lacking, many sport organisations Wendela KUPER, Head of sports, security and inter- are struggling with misuse of power and corrup- national afairs, Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport tion. These are not isolated problems as, due to the (Netherlands), Chair of the Governing Board of the high media attention on sport, any negative incident Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport (EPAS) becomes a scandal which tarnishes the image of sport As a very competitive activity and even a multi- and shatters the trust in sport’s contribution to society. million euro business, sport can be subject to cor- ruption. The continuing scandals reinforce this. Good governance in sport is needed to uphold the While the implementation of good governance values inherent to sport and to ensure sport organ- principles is key, sports organisations, as well as isations are taken seriously. The Council of Europe governments which support them fnancially, need addressed the issue of Good governance in Sport at to follow a “zero tolerance” policy as outlined herein. its 10th Conference of European Ministers responsible for Sport (Budapest, 2004); published a European survey on it and the Recommendation Rec(2005)8 of Introduction the Committee of Ministers to member states on the principles of good governance in sport. As a value-oriented organisation, the Council of Europe has stressed for decades that sport pre-supposes In 2009, the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport efort, commitment, personal empowerment, respect (EPAS) decided to focus on the manipulation of sports for opponents and rules, solidarity and team spirit, competitions (match-fxing), putting aside the more among other things. Far beyond the visible activity general issue of the fght against corruption in sport, itself, sport provides role modelling and a means of to be addressed at a later stage (see for further infor- 5 conveying these values to members of society, and mation ref. No. 1) . to young people in particular. In addition to its edu- cational role, sport contributes to public health, social Since then, allegations and cases of corruption in sport inclusion and is an increasingly important economic have continued to surface making action more urgent. activity. Sport organisations which enjoy the right On 25 April 2012 the Parliamentary Assembly of the to freedom of association, are expected to provide Council of Europe adopted a resolution on “Good numerous social benefts, in an autonomous way but governance and ethics in sport” (ref. nos. 3 & 14), based with the support of states and within the framework on a report mentioning recent scandals and decisions of the applicable law. The two key Recommendations in the governance of international football. Other of the Committee of Ministers to member states on international organisations have addressed the issue of the revised Code of Sports Ethics (Recommendation corruption in sport as well. The Declaration of the Fifth CM/Rec(2010)9) and on the European Sports Charter UNESCO International Conference of Ministers and (Recommendation No. R (92) 13 rev) refect this Senior Ofcials responsible for Physical Education and approach. Sport (MINEPS V, in Berlin) in its section on “Integrity of Sport”, addresses corruption in sport on an equal However, as in any other sector of society sport is not footing with doping and the manipulation of sports immune to corruption, on the contrary, as a very com- competitions. petitive activity it is exposed to specifc risks, especially as nowadays parts of it have become a multi-million 5. Refers to the number in the Bibliography atached.

► Page 36 ► fairness in dealing with membership, including gender equality and solidarity. Similarly, issues of corruption in sport governance or in the bidding for or preparation of major sports Following the adoption of this recommendation, a events have been addressed by national governments number of notable initiatives have backed similar and parliaments, e.g. in Switzerland (see for instance principles and further elaborated or operationalised ref. No. 9) and the United Kingdom (see for instance them into indicators. ref. No. 11). Considering the European involvement in the international sports movement, the role of In 2008, the IOC Basic Universal Principles of Good European states hosting events or headquarters of Governance (ref. No. 12), were approved by the XIIIth sport organisations, and the fnancial involvement Congress, (Copenhagen, 2009) and referred to in of public authorities in sport, the 13th Council of the 2011 update of the Olympic Charter. Eventually, Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Sport the principles of good governance were enacted in (18 September 2014) had the risk of corruption in the an explicit way in the 2013 update of the Code of governance of sport as its main topic. Ethics: its article C1 mentions that “The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Corruption in the governance of sport has been dif- Sports Movement, in particular transparency, respon- fcult to address at intergovernmental level. It had sibility and accountability, must be respected by all sometimes been alleged that the issue fell within the Olympic constituents”. Moreover, the quite detailed remit of the private, autonomous sport movement, Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the or that cases were anecdotal. It appears today that Olympic and Sports Movement were set out as an the issue is indeed a serious one because it matters Implementing Provision of the IOC Code of Ethics. to millions of people involved in sport and involves However, so far, the IOC Code of Ethics is not self- huge amounts of money. Far from being restricted executing in every international federation. Some to a few international sports federations, corruption sports organisations have adopted the IOC standards in sport represents the tip of the iceberg of corrupt and started to review their governance or to consider practices which are widespread at national level. statutory updates, whereas others are hesitant, either Turning a blind eye to such behaviour is not accept- because they do not agree with IOC policies or they able for an organisation which advocates the Rule of feel insecure about what is expected of them. Law at international level. In parallel, the Council of the European Union, in the Towards better governance in sport framework of the implementation of the Work Plan for Sport 2011-2014 (Resolution of the Council and of the The promotion and enforcement of good governance Representatives of the Governments of the Member principles is considered to be the key to prevent- States, meeting within the Council, on a European ing and addressing the issue of corruption in sport. Union Work Plan for Sport for 2011-2014), set up an Moreover, better governance is likely to build more Expert Group on Good governance which adopted a efcient, open and reliable sports organisations. number of deliverables, including “Principles for good Indeed, the governance of sports organisations needs governance in sport” (ref. No. 8), which set a framework to be transparent, accountable and responsive and to within which sports organisations should operate. In allow stakeholders a share in the strategic decision- 2011, the European Commission supported a number making process. A system of checks and balances of projects in the feld of good governance in sport, needs to be installed in all sports organisations to within the framework of the “preparatory actions in enable trust between all stakeholders. the feld of sport” (e.g. ref. Nos. 14 & 4).

The Recommendation Rec(2005)8 on good gover- The rationale underlying the EU principles is that there nance in sport (ref. No. 2), specifed efective policies is a link between the autonomous self-regulation and measures of good governance in sport, which of the sports movement, and its compliance with include as a minimum requirement: good governance principles. The IOC process was ► democratic structures for non-governmental sports possibly also infuenced by this approach, since the organisations based on clear and regular electoral Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the procedures open to the whole membership; Olympic and Sports Movement were frst elaborated in a seminar on the Autonomy of Olympic and Sport ► organisation and management of a professional Movement, following the high profle case of Meca‐ standard, with an appropriate code of ethics and Medina and Majcen (C-519/04) in 2006 in which the procedures for dealing with conficts of interest; Court of Justice of the European Union rejected a ► accountability and transparency in decision-making “sports exception” tailored for sports organisations and fnancial operations, including the open pub- and reinforced the legal uncertainty of the environ- lication of duly audited yearly fnancial accounts; ment in which they operate (ref. No. 7).

Thematic article ► Page 37 In addition, two recent specifc football processes organisations. Implementation, identifcation and resulted in the improvement of policies and practices exchange of good practices should be further sup- according to good governance principles. Following a ported and enforced. number of allegations of corruption and of legislative interference, leading to the suspension of high level Much has been done by sports organisations, to ofcials, the 2011 FIFA Congress, at the request of improve their governance. Although reform processes the FIFA President, ordered an independent Review have often been initiated as a reaction to public scan- on the “Governance of FIFA” (ref. No. 15), and subse- dals, they have exercised an in-depth infuence on quently set up a temporary “Independent Governance the processes of international sports organisations. Committee (IGC)”. The IGC proposed a number of However, the promotion of good governance is an recommendations, some of which were adopted by on-going process which needs to be continued and the 2012 and 2013 Congresses of FIFA. There were supported. The commitment of the IOC to further reforms regarding the organisation of the disciplinary enforcing good governance as part of its Agenda 2020 bodies and the function of the audit and compliance is welcomed (see ref. no 13). One should keep in mind Committee, and the ushering in of a code of ethics, that the sports movement is a complex network of the setting-up of a whistle-blower mechanism, etc. organisations linked by political relations. Addressing A number of the IGC’s recommendations were not the issue at the level of key players such as the IOC or endorsed as such by the competent FIFA bodies, but FIFA or enhancing the legal framework in Switzerland, were followed up with other measures (e.g. transpar- where most sports organisations have their seats, ency in the area of remuneration, external observers is necessary but not sufcient. The efort needs to in the Executive Committee and revision of bidding be extended to all International Federations and at processes) or were rejected by the Congress (e.g. on national level. At their level, governmental authorities term limits). The fnal report by IGC was released on should take note of this phenomenon and be pre- 22 April 2014. While concluding his mandate, Prof. pared to pay attention to good governance in sport Mark Pieth, Chair of the IGC, strongly advised the and to support its implementation, at national level. FIFA stakeholders to continue focusing on the reform Trans-national cases and the reaction of key players process and challenged the leadership to demonstrate have created a momentum for increased co-operation that the organisation’s culture has changed. between sports organisations and governments: the Olympic movement recognises today that autonomy From a diferent background, UEFA went through a and good governance of sport are two sides of the process of enhancing the fnancial transparency of its same medal. It is seeking close co-operation with clubs over the same period. In order to safeguard the public authorities on the fght against corruption, ethical management of clubs, it decided to introduce acknowledging that it does not have all the necessary the principle of “fnancial fair play”. The idea behind assets in its own hands. FIFA, which claimed the right the term is that professional clubs should not spend to wash its dirty laundry in private a few years ago, has more than they earn, which would avoid overspending referred the “Qatargate” case to the Swiss prosecutor. and bankruptcy. This set of rules goes hand in hand with enhanced mechanisms for fnancial oversight, which should improve the transparency of budgets The fght against corruption in the and put fnancial management on a sound footing. governance of sports organisations UEFA also established a task force on good governance In addition to the promotion of good governance in in autumn 2013. sport (which is a long-term process involving cultural In this context, the Parliamentary Assembly of the changes), sports organisations and governments need Council of Europe is preparing a report on “The to recognise that corruption in sport damages not only Governance of Football”. The report, prepared by MP the image of sport, its organisations and leaders, but Michael Connarty (UK), was approved by the relevant also undermines the positive infuence that sport has Committee in January 2014 and is due to be adopted in spreading benefts to society. Therefore, acting to by the plenary session in June 2015. This report reviews eliminate corruption in sport goes to the very heart the progress made and points out some shortcomings of the Council of Europe’s mission, which includes in the regulation of UEFA’s and FIFA’s governance, and the promotion of the Rule of Law and Democracy. echoes worries about workers’ rights and corruption allegations related to recent adjudications of major At a more operational level, protecting sport against sport events. corruption not only makes sport more efective and its organisations more reliable partners, but also sends an Over the last decade, the issue of good governance important message on the need to fght corruption in in sport has established itself as a top priority on society. Governments granting large sums of money the sports policy agenda of sports organisations, to sports organisations and events, both directly and NGOs (Transparency International, Play the Game), indirectly, have a responsibility to their taxpayers that parliaments, governments and intergovernmental their money is well spent. To preserve the autonomy

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 38 of sport and check that the funds are used for the The United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime purpose for which they were allocated is a challenge (UNODC), within the framework of its United Nations for governments. Obviously, both – autonomy and Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), has per- transparency – are important; governments have to formed intergovernmental expert work and published be careful that they audit how public money has been a handbook called “The United Nations Convention spent but also that they do not use good governance against Corruption: A Strategy for Safeguarding as an excuse to interfere in the decision-making of against Corruption in Major Public Events” (ref. No. 18), sports organisations. This brings up once again the which is relevant to sports events but covers a much Council of Europe’s mission for the rule of law and broader range of events. This strategy uses UNCAC as freedom of association. the underlying standard for building up transparency and accountability at major public events. It gathers Corruption in sport can take many forms. The most good practice examples such as the adoption of spe- prominent one is “match-fxing” – EPAS focused on it cialised legislation to set up a governance framework over the last fve years, developing the Convention on and the identifcation or creation of specialised anti- o the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (CETS N 215. corruption supervisory bodies. Other examples are club owners requesting kick- backs for player transfers; companies and govern- Anti-corruption standards and risk-reduction mecha- ments rigging bids for sports events or construction nisms should be included in the terms of reference contracts. Indeed, any procurement and tendering for the organisation of major sports events, as well as process can be marred by illicit practices. Members compliance with other international standards (e.g. on of decision-making bodies of sports organisations the protection of workers, spectator violence, match- can take bribes in exchange for promises to vote for fxing, etc.). Objective, transparent and competitive a certain candidate. Doping tests can be falsifed and bidding processes will help prevent corruption when related procedures thwarted. Risky processes should cities or venues are chosen to host sporting events. be identifed, and the integrity of the decision-making They are also essential in bids for major projects, such process ensured, through appropriate preventative as the building of stadiums. Bids need to be run in good governance measures. a transparent way and monitored independently6. National federations could ask for more accountabil- The threat of corruption in sport needs to be recog- ity in their continental and international structures. nised. Sports organisations as well as governments Athletes could be further engaged in decision-making. should follow a “zero tolerance” policy towards corrupt Other actors should have a role too. Sponsors can practices and co-operate at national and international play their part by promoting ethics in sport as part level. The most efective fght against corruption may of their corporate responsibility programmes. Civil occur when the competent jurisdictions, as well as society already holds sport organisations and govern- independent sports disciplinary bodies, are entrusted ments accountable. The media also has the power to with investigating and sanctioning such practices. raise awareness about corruption in sport. With these Private corruption – in sports as well as in other areas changes to the rules of the game, the sector can regain – could be prosecuted ex ofcio and not only at the its reputation for fair play. instigation of the injured party, as very few cases are reported by injured parties. Possible loopholes in the existing legislation and sports regulations should Conclusion be identifed and addressed. The defnition of pri- Much can be done to break the ties between sport vate corruption in international treaties – the Council and corruption. Measures required include support- of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption ing the setting up of a framework for awareness rais- (ETS No 173), as well as the United Nations Convention ing and educating leaders, board members, ofcials, against Corruption – focused on “business activities”. athletes and other stakeholders. Moreover, there is a In some countries, the fact that sport organisations need to attend to, and discuss with all interested par- are established as non-proft associations may place ties, the importance of developing enforceable and them outside the remit of anti-corruption provisions. measurable ethical rules and efective anti-corruption A special case of relevance for the prevention of and practices. fght against corrupt practices in sport is the organisa- tion of sports events. Law-abiding procedures are of importance to the public authorities, the public sector The case of international sports organisations requires and the sports organisation concerned, from the bid- increased co-ordination. Countries which bid for or ding process to the running of the event. Such events are sometimes organised with high political priority and 6. In this connection cf. “Sponsorship and corruption: the under time pressure due to a fxed deadline. They often German model”, feature article in GRECO’s Eleventh General Activity Report (2010) – http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/ involve ad hoc bodies and structures, whose statute monitoring/greco/documents/2011/Greco(2011)1_Act. and operating framework should be clearly defned. Report2010_EN.pdf

Thematic article ► Page 39 host international sports events, as well as those that Annotated bibliography are home to the headquarters of international sports organisations, are expected to play a leading role. Since most international sports organisations are Adopted Texts located in Council of Europe member states, around 1. Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)10 of the 75% of the positions as president and secretary gen- Committee of Ministers to member states on pro- eral in international sports federations are held by motion of the integrity of sport against manipulation Europeans and many international sports events are of results, notably match fxing taking place in European states. Those countries bear a special responsibility. In this Recommendation the Committee of Ministers acknowledges the pressures on sport while insist- ing that fair play and ethical practices need to be In international sport, sponsors have a key responsibil- enforced. It calls for the prevention of manipulating ity to secure best practice and good governance. These sports results. stakeholders are able to exert the largest amount of infuence and also stand to lose if something goes 2. Recommendation CM/Rec(2005)8 of the wrong. Committee of Ministers to member states on the principles of good governance in sport Transparency in decisions and policies is vital as well This Recommendation asks member states to adopt as the avoidance of conficts of interest and too close policies and measures of good governance, defnes links between sport, politics, business and the media. the minimum requirements and states that this applies Sports organisations should include anti-corruption to governments as well as non-governmental sectors measures in their constitutions and codes of conduct, of sport. and infringements should be followed by independent 3. Resolution 1875 (2012)1 on good governance disciplinary procedures or other relevant enforcement and ethics in sport of the Parliamentary Assembly of action. Additionally, clear regulations and openness on the Council of Europe player transfers will protect the employment market and reduce the risk of tax evasion. In the longer term, The Resolution takes note of the rising fnancial pres- the implementation of such standards should become sures on sport and the criminal consequences which a requirement for sports organisations to engage in follow, of the growing discrepancy in competitors’ formal co-operation with international organisations resources and the opacity in decision-making. It rec- (co-operation in terms of programmes, consultative ommends that governing bodies strengthen fnancial status, etc.) and states (organisation of events, location fair play, improve governance mechanisms and take of headquarters, agreements, etc.). Governmental and note of the Guidelines appended to the Resolution. other public authorities, which are supporting sport at all levels, are entitled to set conditions to ensure that Reports and handbooks their subsidies are used for their intended purpose, and that the benefciary organisations comply with 4. Alm J. (ed.) (2013), Action for Good Governance standards for good governance. in International Sports organisations, fnal report, Danish Institute for Sports Studies/Play the Game, Within governmental authorities, as well as between Copenhagen. the sports movement and public authorities, enhanced As part of the European Commission’s call for prepa- co-operation should be sought between anti-corrup- ratory actions in sport, Play the Game conducted a tion and criminal law authorities. I welcome the fact project on good governance in international sports that within the Council of Europe bodies, continu- organisations. The result is a new measuring tool for ous dialogue is taking place between EPAS, which governance in sport called “The Sports Governance is in charge of sports policies, the Group of States Observer”. against Corruption (GRECO), and the Departments in charge of anti-corruption. In this connection, the 5. Andersen J. S. (2012), Playing by the rules: fnancial fair play and the fght against corruption in sport, at a work of GRECO, notably its country monitoring reports, public hearing organised by the European Parliament, can be a valuable source of inspiration. Information Play the Game. identifed through monitoring mechanisms on the implementation of anti-corruption standards could In this speech, Mr Andersen focuses on good gover- provide guidance for the development of co-operation nance and the role of the European Union “in getting between the sports movement and public authorities, sport back on a democratic track”. He gave examples with a view to the development of an environment of how corruption is prevalent in international sports safe from corruption, preserving the values, the image federations. He ofers six actions that can be taken and the social benefts of sport. without compromising the autonomy of sport.

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 40 6. Bures R. (2008), Why Sport is not Immune to 10. Geeraert a., Alm J. and Groll M., in International Corruption, EPAS (2008) INF10rev., Council of Europe, Journal of Sport Policy and Politics (2013), Good gov- Strasbourg. ernance in international sport organizations: an analysis of the 35 Olympic sport governing bodies, International After ofering several examples of corruption, the Journal of Sport Policy and Politics author states that corruption occurs in many aspects of sport and should not be neglected nor defned in The article sums up the result of the test survey into limited terms. Sport provides many opportunities the governance standards of 35 Olympic sport gov- for corruption, attracts organised crime, is difcult to erning bodies prosecute, occurs in amateur as well as professional sport, is difcult to accept as not seen as “dirty” and 11. House of Commons, Culture, Media and Sport is difcult to reveal due to the closed nature of its Committee, 2018 World Cup Bid, Sixth Report of Session clubs/federations. 2010–12;

7. Chappelet J-L. and Mrkonjic M. (2013), Basic The report analyses FIFA’s Role during the Bidding Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport Process as well as the English bid. (BIBGIS): An assessment tool for international sport governing bodies, IDHEAP Working Paper 1/2013, 12. International Olympic Committee (2008), Basic Switzerland. Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement, seminar on Autonomy of As there already exists quite a number of sets of prin- Olympic and Sport Movement, IOC. ciples of good governance, this paper focuses on indicators of measurement for better governance. Seven basic universal principles are highlighted, with From the analysis done, a tool was developed to assess their sub-themes and elements to be considered. and measure the state of governance of international sport governing bodies: the Basic Indicators for Better 13. International Olympic Committee (2014), Olympic Governance in International Sport (BIBGIS). Agenda 2020 IOC.

8. EU Expert Group “Good Governance” (2013), The Agenda 2020 is the strategic roadmap for the Deliverable 2: Principles of good governance in sport, future of the Olympic Movement; it was unanimously EU Work Plan for Sport 2011-2014, European Union. adopted at the 127th IOC Session in Monaco on 8 and 9 December 2014. It includes 40 recommendations, As part of the work of the EU Expert Group on Good and cover topics such as “Foster gender equality”, Governance, good governance principles were “Comply with basic principles of good governance”, decided upon. They are based on 10 main principles “Increase transparency” and “Strengthen the IOC Ethics which are accompanied by detailed practical guidance Commission independence”. in this report. The main purpose of the principles is to serve as guidance providing minimum standards that 14. International Sport and Culture Association can inspire sports bodies at all levels in the implemen- (ISCA) and Transparency International Germany (2013), tation of good governance across diferent disciplines Guidelines for Good Governance in Grassroots Sport, and countries. The results of EU-funded feld projects ISCA, Copenhagen. on good governance were used to complement the list of principles by providing evidence-based data Using the EU principles of good governance (democ- and identifying examples of good practices. racy, accountability, transparency and inclusion of stakeholders), this document reviews the elements 9. Federal Council Switzerland (2012), Lutte contre included in the 4 basic principles. It ends with a tool la corruption et les matchs truqués dans le sport, report for sports leaders and organisations to help them in response to postulate 11.3754 fled June 28, 2011 understand their role and adhere to the principles. by the Commission of Science, Education and Culture of the Council of States. 15. Pieth M. (2011), Governing FIFA: concept paper and report, Universität Basel, Basel. The Federal Council was mandated to report on what measures existed nationally and internationally to The large increase in funds received by sports gov- fght against corruption and match-fxing, to verify erning bodies such as FIFA have changed their role, if existing legislation was sufcient or if improved their traditional structure is not adapted to the new means were necessary. The report covers corruption role. There has been some gradual reform, but more in international sports federations and manipula- is needed. The report assesses FIFA as a commercial tion of sport competitions. Recent developments entity, as a quasi-public body and looks at its compli- are described and a legal analysis made of the situa- ance with anti-corruption practices and its relation tion. Available legislation on fghting corruption and with its members, recommendations are made and match-fxing is reviewed. the creation of a Task Force suggested.

Thematic article ► Page 41 16. Rochebloine F. (2012), Rapporteur, Good gover- This report presents the legal and legislative situa- nance and ethics in sport; report by the Committee on tion in Switzerland as concerns corruption in sport. Culture, science, Education and Media; Doc. 12889, It also ofers practical suggestions on prevention and Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. awareness-raising for sports clubs and federations. This report contains the draft resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly on good governance and 18. United Nations Organization on Crime and ethics in sport as well as the explanatory memoran- Drugs (2013), The United Nations Convention against dum by the Rapporteur. The memorandum explains Corruption: A Strategy for Safeguarding against why good governance is necessary and investigates Corruption in Major Public Events, UN, New York. the associated problems; it goes on to cover fnancial fair play and protection of young migrant sportspeople The United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime and fnishes with suggestions for improvement. (UNODC), guided by the principles in the United 17. Transparency International Swiss (2013), Nations Convention against Corruption, has developed Corruption dans le Sport Dossier, Trasparency this handbook featuring a set of practical measures International Suisse, Berne. designed to counter the threat of corruption.

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 42 Appendices

APPENDIX I – Representatives in GRECO (at 23/12/14)

ALBANIA / ALBANIE

Mrs Eridana ÇANO (Head of delegation) Ms Edlira NASI Chief of Staf Inspector/Coordinator Minister of State on Local Issues/ Unit for Internal Administrative Control and National Coordinator on Anti-corruption Anti-Corruption Prime Minister’s Ofce General Directorate of Legal Issues, Monitoring of Programmes and Anti-corruption Prime Minister’s Ofce

ANDORRA / ANDORRE

Mrs Clàudia CORNELLA DURANY (Head of Ms Meritxell SALVAT PERARNAU delegation) Specialist in International Relations Head of International Relations Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance

ARMENIA / ARMÉNIE

Mr Arthur OSIKYAN (Head of delegation) Mr Karen GEVORGYAN Head of the Criminal-Executive Department Deputy Dean of International Relations Ministry of Justice Faculty of Law Yerevan State University Substitut/e Substitut/e Ms Anna MARGARYAN Mr Gevorg KOSTANYAN Chair of Criminal Law and Criminology Assistant Yerevan State University Ofce of the President of the Republic Faculty of Law

AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE

Mr Christian MANQUET (Head of delegation) Vice-President of GRECO / Vice-président du GRECO Head of Department Directorate for Penal Legislation Ministry of Justice Substitut/e Substitut/e Ms Martina KOGER Ms Verena WESSELY Head of Unit 4.2 – Department 4 Department 4 Bureau of Anti-Corruption International Instruments and Cooperation Ministry of the Interior Bureau of Anti-Corruption Ministry of the Interior

► Page 43 AZERBAIJAN / AZERBAIDJAN

Mr Vusal HUSEYNOV (Head of delegation) Mr Kamran ALIYEV Senior Advisor Deputy Prosecutor General Law Enforcement Coordination Department Director Administration of the President of the Republic Anti-Corruption Directorate Secretary of the Commission for Combating General Prosecutor’s Ofce Corruption Substitut/e Mr Elnur MUSAYEV Senior Prosecutor Anticorruption Department General Prosecutor's Ofce

BELARUS

Mr Uladzimir KHOMICH (Head of delegation) Mr Sergey AZEMSHA Director Public prosecutor of Gomel Region Research and Practical Centre for Problems Prosecutor General’s Ofce of Reinforcing Law and Order of the General Prosecutor’s Ofce Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Pavel SASCHEKO Ms Maryna ZHDANAVA Head of Department Chief Specialist of the International Legal Research and Practical Centre for Problems Department of the Prosecutor General’s Ofce Minsk

BELGIUM / BELGIQUE

M. Frederik DECRUYENAERE (Chef de délégation) M. Marc VAN DER HULST Attaché au Service des Infractions et Procédures Secrétaire Général Adjoint Particulières Parlement fédéral Service Public Fédéral Justice (SPF Justice) Substitut/e Substitut/e Mme Claire HUBERTS Mme Ria MORTIER Attachée au Service des Principes de Droit pénal Présidente du Conseil supérieur de la Justice et de et de la Procédure pénale la Commission de nomination et de désignation Service Public Fédéral Justice (SPF Justice) néerlandophone Avocat général à la Cour de Cassation Conseil supérieur de la Justice

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA / BOSNIE-HERZÉGOVINE

Mr Vjekoslav VUKOVIC (Head of delegation) Assistant Minister Sector for Fight against Terrorism, Organised Crime and Drugs Abuse Ministry of Security

BULGARIA / BULGARIE

Mr Georgi RUPCHEV (Head of delegation) Mr Petar PETKOV Head of Criminal Law Division Public Prosecutor Directorate of International Legal Cooperation and Supreme Prosecutor’s Ofce European Afairs Ministry of Justice

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 44 Substitut/e Mr Florian FLOROV Chief Expert Directorate of Intn’l Legal Cooperation and European Afairs Ministry of Justice

CROATIA / CROATIE

Mr Marin MRČELA President of GRECO / Président du GRECO Justice at the Supreme Court Mr Dražen JELENIĆ (Head of delegation) Deputy State Attorney General Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Davor DUBRAVICA Mr Krěsimir SIKAVICA Magistrate General Police Directorate Chairman of the Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative Economic Crime and Corruption Department for South Eastern Europe (RAI) Division for Corruption Department Ministry of the Interior

CYPRUS / CHYPRE

Mr Philippos KOMODROMOS (Head of delegation) Mrs Rena PAPAETI-HADJICOSTA Counsel of the Republic Senior Counsel of the Republic Ofce of the Attorney General Law Ofce of the Republic of Cyprus Substitut/e Ms Despo THEODOROU Counsel of the Republic Law Ofce of the Republic of Cyprus

CZECH REPUBLIC / RÉPUBLIQUE TCHÈQUE

Ms Helena LIŠUCHOVÁ (Head of delegation) Ms Kateřina ČERMAKOVA Bureau Member / Membre du Bureau – Expert Gender Rapporteur International Cooperation Department Head of the International Cooperation Department Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice Substitut/e Substitut/e Ms Julie BUZALKOVA Mr Václav MLYNAŘÍK Expert Security Expert Security Policy Department Security Policy Department Ministry of the Interior Ministry of the Interior

DENMARK / DANEMARK

Ms Marie TULLIN (Head of delegation) Mr Flemming DENKER Senior Prosecutor Special Advisor The State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and The State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime International Crime Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Lars LICHTENSTEIN Mrs Alessandra GIRALDI Head of Section Deputy Chief Prosecutor Ofce of the Director of Public Prosecutions Ofce of the Director of Public Prosecutions

Appendices ► Page 45 ESTONIA / ESTONIE

Mrs Mari-Liis SÖÖT (Head of delegation) Mr Urvo KLOPETS Head of Analysis Division Advisor, Analysis Division Criminal Policy Department Criminal Policy Department Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice Substitut/e Substitut/e Mrs Kätlin-Chris KRUUSMAA Mr Tanel KALMET Advisor Advisor Analysis Division Penal Law and Procedure Division Criminal Policy Department Criminal Policy Department Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice

FINLAND / FINLANDE

Ms Tiina KANGAS-ALKU (Head of delegation) Mr Aarne KINNUNEN Ministerial Adviser Deputy Head of Department Department of Criminal Policy Department of Criminal Policy Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice

Substitut/e Mr Jouko HUHTAMÄKI Ministerial Adviser Police department Ministry of the Interior

FRANCE

M. Michel GAUTHIER Président d’Honneur du GRECO / Honorary President of GRECO Head of delegation – nomination pending M. François BADIE Chef du Service Central de Prévention de la Corruption (SCPC) Ministère de la Justice Substitut/e Substitut/e M. Jérôme SIMON M. Lionel SABATER-BONO Magistrat au bureau du droit économique et fnancier Conseiller Direction des Afaires Criminelles et des Grâces Service Central de Prévention de la Corruption (SCPC) Ministère de la Justice Ministère de la Justice

GEORGIA / GEORGIE

Head of delegation – nomination pending Ms Rusudan MIKHELIDZE Director of Analytical Department Secretariat of the Anti-Corruption Council Ministry of Justice Substitut/e Substitut/e Ms Natalia BARATASHVILI Mr Zurab SANIKIDZE Coordinator of Anti-Corruption Issues Legal Advisor at Analytical Department Analytical Department Secretariat of the Anti-Corruption Council Secretariat of the Anti-Corruption Council Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 46 GERMANY / ALLEMAGNE

Mr Markus BUSCH (Head of delegation) Mr Stefan SINNER Head of Division Head of Division PM1 Economic, Computer, Corruption-related and Remuneration of Parliamentarians Environmental Crime Administration of the Bundestag Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection

Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Danny POLK Mr Frank RAUE Administrative Ofcer Deputy Head of Division PM1 Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection Remuneration of Members Criminal law suppression of economic crime, Administration of the Bundestag computer crime, corruption-related crime and environmental crime

GREECE / GRÈCE

Mrs Maria GAVOUNELI (Head of delegation) Professor in International Law University of Athens Faculty of Law

Substitut/e Substitut/e Mrs Panagiota VATIKALOU Mr Dimosthenis STINGAS Investigative Judge Chairman of the Court of First Instance of Serres Court of First Instance of Chania Presiding Judge of the District Court of Serres

HUNGARY / HONGRIE

Ms Nóra BAUS (acting Head of delegation) Anti-corruption Ofcer Department for European Cooperation Ministry of the Interior

ICELAND / ISLANDE

Mr Björn THORVALDSSON (Head of delegation) Mr Helgi Magnús GUNNARSSON Public Prosecutor Deputy Director of Public Prosecution Special Prosecutors Ofce Ofce of the Director of Public Prosecution Substitut/e Substitut/e Ms Hildur DUNGAL Mr Pall THORHALLSSON Legal Adviser Legal Adviser Ministry of the Interior Prime Minister’s Ofce

IRELAND / IRLANDE

Mr Andrew MUNRO (Head of delegation) Ms Aileen HARRINGTON Principal Ofcer Assistant Principal Ofcer Criminal Law Reform Division Criminal Law Reform Division Department of Justice and Equality Department of Justice and Equality

Appendices ► Page 47 Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Kieran SHEEDY Mr Martin SWITZER Government Reform Unit Justice Attaché Department of Public Expenditure and Reform Deputy to the Permanent Representative Permanent Representation of Ireland to the Council of Europe

ITALY / ITALIE

Mr Giuseppe SANTALUCIA (Head of delegation) Mr Benedetto PROIA Deputy Chief of the Legislative Ofce International Relations Ofcer Ministry of Justice Department for Public Administration Presidency of the Council of Ministers Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Stefano PIZZICANNELLA Mme Vania MAFFEO Director of International Relations Professeur de Droit à l’Université de Naples Civil Service Department “Federico II Presidency of the Council of Ministers

LATVIA / LETTONIE

Mr Jaroslavs STRELCENOKS (Head of delegation) Mr Alvils STRIKERIS Director Senior Specialist Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau Division of Corruption Prevention Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau Substitut/e Substitut/e Ms Dace DUBOVA Ms Daiga DAMBITE Senior specialist Senior Specialist International Cooperation Ofcer Legal and Human Resources Division Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau

LIECHTENSTEIN

Mr Patrick RITTER (Chef de délégation) Mr Harald OBERDORFER Deputy Director Lawyer Ofce for Foreign Afairs Ressort Justiz Substitut/e Substitut/e Mrs Isabel FROMMELT Mr Michael JEHLE Diplomatic Ofcer Judge Ofce for Foreign Afairs

LITHUANIA / LITUANIE

Mr Paulius GRICIUNAS (Head of delegation) Ms Elena KONCEVICIUTE Vice Minister International Relations Ofcer Ministry of Justice International Cooperation Division Special Investigation Service

LUXEMBOURG

Mme Doris WOLTZ (Chef de délégation) M. Jean BOUR Procureur d’Etat adjoint Ancien Procureur d’Etat Tribunal d’Arrondissement de Luxembourg Parquet du Tribunal d’Arrondissement de Diekirch Substitut/e Substitut/e Mme Claudine KONSBRUCK M. Laurent THYES Conseiller de direction, 1ère classe Attaché du Gouvernement Ministère de la Justice Ministère de la Justice

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 48 MALTA / MALTE

Mr Kevin VALLETTA (Head of delegation) Ms Nadia CAMILLERI Ofce of the Attorney General Ofce of the Attorney General Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Peter GRECH Ms Victoria BUTTIGIEG Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Ofce of the Attorney General Ofce of the Attorney General

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA / RÉPUBLIQUE DE MOLDOVA

Mme Cornelia VICLEANSCHI (Chef de délégation) Mr Valeriu CUPCEA Procureur Senior Inspector Chef de la Section Générale Legislation and Anti-corruption Expertise Bureau du Procureur Général Directorate National Anti-corruption Centre Substitut/e Mr Alexandru CLADCO Prosecutor Head of Unit for analysis and implementing of ECHR General Prosecutor’s Ofce

MONACO

Mme Marie-Pascale BOISSON (Chef de délégation) M. Eric SENNA Directeur du Service d’Information et de Contrôle sur Conseiller à la Cour d’Appel les Circuits Financiers (SICCFIN) Département des Finances et de l’Economie Substitut/e Substitut/e M. Jean-Marc GUALANDI Mme Antonella SAMPO-COUMA Conseiller Technique Administrateur Principal Service d’Information et de Contrôle sur les Circuits Direction des Services Judiciaires Financiers (SICCFIN) Département des Finances et de l’Economie

MONTENEGRO

Ms Vesna RATKOVIC (Head of delegation) Director Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative Substitut/e Substitut/e Ms Mirela BAKALBASIC Mr Dušan DRAKIC Advisor Senior Advisor Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative

NETHERLANDS / PAYS-BAS

Mr Don O’FLOINN (Head of delegation) Ms Anneloes van der ZIJDE Senior Policy Advisor Policy Advisor Ministry of Security and Justice Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Law Enforcement Department Substitut/e Mr Richard HAGEDOORN Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations

Appendices ► Page 49 NORWAY / NORVÈGE

Mr Atle ROALDSOY (Head of delegation) Mr Jens-Oscar NERGARD Policy Director Senior Adviser Section for European and International Afairs Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation Ministry of Justice and Public Security Substitut/e Substitut/e Ms Ingrid SAND Mr Anders Schiøtz WORREN Special Adviser Adviser Constitutional Department Section for European and International Afairs Parliament Ministry of Justice and Public Security

POLAND / POLOGNE

Mr Rafał KIERZYNKA (Head of delegation) Ms Alicja KLAMCZYNSKA Judge in European Criminal Law Division Chief specialist Criminal Law Department European Criminal Law Division Ministry of Justice Criminal Law Department Ministry of Justice Substitut/e Mr Krzysztof KRAK Director of the Analysis Department Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA)

PORTUGAL

Mr António FOLGADO (Head of delegation) Mr Daniel MARINHO PIRES Head of Unit of Criminal Justice Legal Adviser Directorate General for Justice Policy Directorate General for Justice Policy International Afairs Department International Afairs Department Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice

ROMANIA / ROUMANIE

Mr Cornel Virgiliu CALINESCU (Head of delegation) Ms Anca JURMA Head of the National Ofce for Crime Prevention Chief Prosecutor and Asset Recovery International Cooperation Service Ministry of Justice National Anticorruption Directorate Prosecutors’ Ofce attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Andrei FURDUI Ms Oana Andrea SCHIMIDT HAINEALA Legal Advisor Prosecutor National Ofce for Crime Prevention and Asset Member of the Superior Council of Magistracy Recovery Ministry of Justice

RUSSIAN FEDERATION / FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE

Mr Aleksandr BUKSMAN (Head of delegation) First Deputy Prosecutor General Prosecutor General’s Ofce Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Aslan YUSUFOV Mr Andrei ILIN Bureau Member / Membre du Bureau Advisor Deputy Head of Directorate Administration of the President Head of Section of supervision of anti-corruption legislation Prosecutor General’s Ofce

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 50 SAN MARINO / SAINT-MARIN

Mr Eros GASPERONI (Head of delegation) Ms Sabrina BERNARDI First Secretary Head of the State Lawyers’ Ofce Ministry of Foreign Afairs Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Stefano PALMUCCI Ms Marina MARFORI Ofcial at the Department of Foreign Afairs State Lawyers’ Ofce Expert in Legislative Studies

SERBIA / SERBIE

Ms Mirjana MIHAJLOVIC (Head of delegation) Mr Vladan JOKSIMOVIC Adviser to the Minister Deputy Director of Anti-Corruption Agency Ministry of Justice Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Radomir ILIC Mr Jovan COSIC Adviser to the Minister Head of Department for Normative Afaires Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice

SLOVAK REPUBLIC / RÉPUBLIQUE SLOVAQUE

Ms Alexandra KAPISOVSKA (Head of delegation) Ms Dagmar FILLOVA Legal Adviser Criminal Law Legislation Division Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice

SLOVENIA / SLOVÉNIE

Ms Vita HABJAN BARBORIČ (Head of delegation) Mr Matjaž MEŠNJAK Bureau Member / Membre du Bureau Adviser Chief Project Manager for Corruption Prevention Public Integrity and Prevention Commission for the Prevention of Corruption Commission for the Prevention of Corruption

SPAIN / ESPAGNE

Ms Ana ANDRES BALLESTEROS (Head of delegation) Mr Rafael VAILLO RAMOS Deputy DG for Justice Afairs in the EU and Technical Adviser International Organisations DG for International Cooperation Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Rafael BLAZQUEZ Mr Angel SANZ MERINO Technical Counsellor Technical Counsellor in the DG for Interior Policy DG for International Cooperation Ministry of the Interior Ministry of Justice

SWEDEN / SUÈDE

Ms Elin CARBELL-BRUNNER (Head of delegation) Mr Mattias LARSSON Legal Advisor Deputy Director Division for Criminal Law Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Walo VON GREYERZ Mr Andreas KRANTZ Legal Adviser Deputy Director Division for Criminal Law Division for Constitutional Law Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice

Appendices ► Page 51 SWITZERLAND / SUISSE

M. Ernst GNAEGI (Chef de délégation) M. Olivier GONIN Bureau Member / Membre du Bureau Conseiller scientifque Chef de l’unité du droit pénal international Unité du droit pénal international Ofce fédéral de la Justice Ofce fédéral de la justice Substitut/e Substitut/e M. Jacques RAYROUD M. Jean-Christophe GEISER Procureur fédéral en chef Conseiller scientifque Ministère public de la Confédération Ofce fédéral de la justice

“THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA” / «L’EX-RÉPUBLIQUE YOUGOSLAVE DE MACÉDOINE»

Ms Aneta ARNAUDOVSKA (Head of delegation) Mrs Elena SAZDOV Judge Ministry of Justice Director of the Academy for Judges and Public Prosecutors

TURKEY / TURQUIE

Mr Harun MERT (Head of delegation) Mr Mete DEMIRCI Judge Chief Inspector Deputy General Director Prime Ministry Inspection Board General Directorate of International Law and Foreign Relations Ministry of Justice

Substitut/e Substitut/e Mrs Ayben İYİSOY Mr Ferhat KARAKAŞ Judge Chief Inspector General Directorate of International Law and Foreign Deputy Head of the Prime Ministry Inspection Relations Board Ministry of Justice

UKRAINE

Mr Oleksandr DANYLUYK (Head of delegation) Mr Robert SIVERS Representative of the President of Ukraine within the Head of the Anticorruption Policy Department Cabinet Ministry of Justice of Ministers Substitut/e Substitut/e Mr Andrii KUKHARUK Mr Oleksii SVIATUN Deputy Head of the Anticorruption Policy Department Senior expert Ministry of Justice Administration of the President International Legal Issues Sector, Department of Foreign Policy, the Main Department of Foreign Policy and European Integration

UNITED KINGDOM / ROYAUME-UNI

Mr David MEYER (Head of delegation) Ms Amrita OHBI Head of International Relations International Relations Law Rights and International Division Justice Policy Group Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 52 Substitut/e Ms Fiona SALEM Senior Adviser | International Relations Law Rights and International Division Justice Policy Group Ministry of Justice

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA / ÉTATS-UNIS D’AMÉRIQUE

Mr Robert LEVENTHAL (Head of delegation) Mr Michael OLMSTED Director Senior Counsel for the European Union Anticorruption and Governance Initiatives U.S. Mission to the European Union Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Afairs U.S Department of State Substitut/e Substitut/e Ms Jane LEY Mr John BRANDOLINO Senior Anticorruption Advisor Senior INL Advisor International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau International Narcotics and Law Enforcement U.S Department of State Bureau U.S Department of State

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE / ASSEMBLÉE PARLEMENTAIRE DU CONSEIL DE L’EUROPE

Mr Robert NEILL (United Kingdom) Substitut/e Member of the Committee on Legal Afairs Mr Kimmo SASI (Finland) and Human Rights Member of the Committee on Legal Afairs and Human Rights

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CDCJ / REPRÉSENTANT DU CDCJ

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REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CDPC / REPRÉSENTANT DU CDPC

Ms Helena LIŠUCHOVÁ Head of International Cooperation Department Ministry of Justice

PRESIDENT OF THE STATUTORY COMMITTEE OF GRECO / PRÉSIDENT DU COMITÉ STATUTAIRE DU GRECO

Mr Peter GUNNING Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative Permanent Representation of Ireland to the Council of Europe

COUNCIL OF EUROPE DEVELOPMENT BANK (CEB) / BANQUE DE DEVELOPPEMENT DU CONSEIL DE L’EUROPE (CEB)

Ms Katherine DELIKOURA Chief Compliance Ofcer

Appendices ► Page 53 OBSERVERS / OBSERVATEURS

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) / Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques (OCDE) M. Patrick MOULETTE Ms Olga SAVRAN Division de Lutte contre la Corruption Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies Direction des Afaires Financières, Fiscales et des within Anti-Corruption Division Entreprises Ms Inese GAIKA Anti-Corruption Division Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Afairs

United Nations, represented by the UN Ofce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)/Nations Unies, représentées par l’Ofce des Nations Unies contre la Drogue et le Crime (ONUDC) Mr Dimitri VLASSIS Ms Brigitte STROBEL-SHAW Chief of the Crime Conventions Section Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Ofcer Division for Treaty Afairs Corruption & Economic Crime Section Treaty and Legal Assistance Branch

International Anti-corruption Academy (IACA) / Académie internationale de lutte contre la corruption (IACA) Mr Martin KREUTNER Mr Ernst SCHMID Dean – Executive Secretary of the Assembly of Parties Head of External Relations & Protocol Ms Christiane POHN-HUFNAGL Chief of Staf

Organization of American States (OAS) / Organisation des États amÉricains (OEA) Mr Jorge GARCIA-GONZALES Director Department of Legal Cooperation Secretariat for Legal Afairs

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 54 APPENDIX II – Meetings held/attended ► Bilateral consultations with the European Commission, DG Enlargement (Strasbourg, 15 May) – Secretariat BODIES CONSTITUTING GRECO ► Conference on New challenges for anti-corruption Plenary Meetings measures and for the protection of EU fnancial interests, organised by the Austrian Association for GRECO 63 (24-28 March) European Criminal Law, the European Anti-Fraud GRECO 64 (16-20 June) Ofce (OLAF) and the International Anti-Corruption GRECO 65 (6-10 October) Academy (IACA) together with the University of GRECO 66 (8-12 December) Vienna (Laxenburg and Vienna, 15-16 May) – Mr Christian MANQUET, Vice-President Bureau Meetings ► Council of Europe/European Union Senior Ofcials’ Bureau 67 (21 February) Meeting (Strasbourg, 17 June) – Secretariat Bureau 68 (23 May) International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) Bureau 69 (5 September) Bureau 70 (30 October) ► Third session of the Assembly of Parties (Baku, 19-21 November) – President Statutory Committee Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 19th Meeting – Approval budget 2015 (22 October) Development (OECD) – Observer in GRECO ► Forum on Integrity (19 March) – Secretariat Exchanges of views ► Forum on Financing Democracy and Averting Policy Capture – OECD in cooperation with International Exchanges of views were held between the plenary IDEA and the Organization of American States (Paris, and the following: 3-4 December) – Secretariat ► Mr Reinhard PRIEBE, Director for Internal Security Organization for Security and Co-operation in and Ms Anabela GAGO, Head of Unit, DG Home Europe (OSCE)/Ofce for Democratic Institutions Afairs, European Commission (GRECO 63) and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) ► Mr Drago KOS, Chair of the OECD Working Group ► Political Party Expert Seminar (Warsaw, 1-2 July) on Bribery in International Business Transactions – Secretariat (GRECO 65) ► Annual meeting of the Core Group of Experts on Political Parties (Warsaw, 3 July) – Secretariat External relations United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) GRECO − represented by the President, his represen- – Observer in GRECO tative or by the Secretariat − provided input at the ► Cooperation meeting on Gender Dimensions following meetings: of Corruption (Vienna, 9 April) – Ms Helena European Union LIŠUCHOVÁ, GRECO’s Gender Equality Rapporteur ► Annual Forum on Combating Corruption in the EU ► 5th meeting of the Open-ended Intergovernmental organised by the Academy of European Law with Working Group on the Prevention of Corruption support from the European Anti-Fraud Ofce (OLAF) (Vienna, 8-10 September) – Secretariat (Trier, 27-28 February) – Secretariat ► United Nations Convention against Corruption ► European Commission Local Administration Facility Implementation Review Group – 5th and resumed seminar on Anticorruption and Confict of Interest 5th sessions (Vienna, 2-6 June and 13-15 October) for local and regional representatives (Brussels, – Secretariat 19-21 March) – Secretariat Others ► Rule of Law Platform for Central Asia of the European ► International Symposium on the Rule of Law and Union External Action Service Working Group on Justice (Istanbul, 8-9 May) – Ms Helena LIŠUCHOVÁ, Judicial Capacity (Brussels, 24 April) – Secretariat Bureau member ► European Centre for Parliamentary Research and ► Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Workshop on Documentation (ECPRD) seminar on Structures and Judicial ethics and corruption prevention: compara- Procedure with regard to the Code of Conduct for tive experience and common challenges (Belgrade, MPs and the Integrity of Parliamentary Staf (Skopje, 16 May) – Mr Markus BUSCH, Head of Delegation, 8-9 May) – Secretariat Germany ► European Parliament Youth Event – EYE 2014 ► Judicial Academy seminar (Skopje, 22 May) (Strasbourg, 9 May) – Secretariat – President

Appendices ► Page 55 ► Anti-Fraud Ofce of Catalonia and Consorci Tyrol and the Congress of Local and Regional Universitat Internacional Menéndez Pelaya Summer Authorities of the Council of Europe (Innsbruck, course on Lobbies and Confict of Interest: regula- 8-9 May) – President tion and experiences (Barcelona, 30 June- 1 July) ► EU/Council of Europe joint project to promote good – Secretariat governance and the fght against corruption and ► Conference of Ministers of Justice of Ibero-American money laundering (SNAC Tunisia): study visit by Countries (COMJIB) international seminar on senior national authorities and institutions, par- Improving International Cooperation regarding liamentarians and civil society bodies (Strasbourg, Corruption and Economic Crime (La Antigua, 12 June) – Secretariat Guatemala, 8-9 July) – Mr Fernando JIMENEZ ► Project funded by the European Union and the SANCHEZ, GRECO Evaluator Ministry for Foreign Afairs of Finland and imple- ► Classroom Law Project seminar (Portland, USA, mented by the Venice Commission – Supporting 22 July) – President constitutional justice, access to justice and electoral ► University of Barcelona international semi- reform in the countries of Central Asia: study visit nar: European Anti-corruption Criminal Policy by senior judges and ofcials from Kazakhstan, (Barcelona, 16-17 October) – Secretariat Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Strasbourg, 17 June) – Secretariat ► 4th Experts Meeting on Corruption held by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the G20 ► Venice Commission 11th European Conference Anti-corruption Working Group (Paris, 18 October) of Electoral Management Bodies: Combating the – Secretariat Misuse of Administrative Resources during Electoral Processes (Helsinki, 26-27 June) – Mr Yves-Marie ► Federal Ministry of Justice of Switzerland workshop DOUBLET, GRECO evaluator on drafting legislation related to the fnancing of political parties and election campaigns (Berne, ► Conference organised under the auspices of the 11 November) – Secretariat chairmanship of Azerbaijan of the Committee of Ministers on The fght against corruption: interna- ► International Chamber of Commerce Commission tional standards and national experiences (Baku, on Corporate Responsibility and Anti-corruption 30 June-1 July) – President; GRECO representatives (Paris, 2 April, 18 November) – Secretariat and experts; Secretariat ► Regional Anti-corruption conference (South Eastern ► EU/Council of Europe joint programme on Europe) to mark the 10th Anniversary of the open- strengthening democratic reform in the south- ing for signature of the United Nations Convention ern Neighbourhood: Information seminar on key against Corruption (Sarajevo, 9-10 December) – Council of Europe conventions (Jerusalem, 7-8 July) Ms Vita HABJAN BARBORIČ, Bureau member – Secretariat ► EU/Council of Europe joint project – Support to Council of Europe the Efciency of Justice (SEJ): study visit by legal GRECO − represented by the President, his represen- assistants of the Constitutional and High Courts of tative or by the Secretariat − provided input at the Albania (Strasbourg, 8 July) – Secretariat following meetings: ► Lisbon Forum: Electoral processes and democratic ► EU/Council of Europe joint programme on consolidation in the countries of the southern strengthening democratic reform in the south- Mediterranean (Lisbon, 15-16 September) – Mr ern Neighbourhood: Information seminar on key Yves-Marie DOUBLET, GRECO evaluator Council of Europe conventions (Amman, 3 April) ► Parliamentary Assembly immediate measures pack- – Ms Vita HABJAN BARBORIČ, Bureau member age for Ukraine: capacity building seminar for the ► Conference organised under the auspices of the members of the staf of diferent committees of chairmanship of Austria of the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada (Strasbourg, 16 September) Ministers: Strengthening the capacity of parliamen- – Secretariat tarians, judges and prosecutors to prevent corrup- ► Parliamentary Assembly hearing on Gender tion in their own ranks: emerging trends from two Dimensions of Corruption (Strasbourg, 1 October) years of GRECO Round IV evaluations (International – Ms Helena LIŠUCHOVÁ, GRECO’s Gender Equality Anti-Corruption Academy, Laxenburg, 10-11 April) Rapporteur and Mr Matthias KOPETZKY, expert – President; GRECO representatives and experts; associated with GRECO’s work on gender Secretariat ► Venice Commission Intercultural Workshop on ► International conference Combating Corruption Democracy: Transparency and the Rule of Law – Preventive and Repressive Measures at the as Pre-conditions of Equitable and Sustainable European, National, Regional and Local Level, Development (Rome, 9 October) – Mr Fernando organised jointly by the Regional Parliament of JIMENEZ SANCHEZ, GRECO Evaluator

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 56 ► EU/Council of Europe Joint Programme – Project BENELUX and the European Union and Ms Oyunm against Economic Crime in Kosovo7 (PECK): Face- ANGAR, third Secretary of the Embassy in Brussels to-Face meeting between the Expert Assessment (4 March) Team and representatives of benefciary institu- ► Mr Andrew BRADLEY, Director, Ofce of International tions to discuss the Draft Final Assessment Reports IDEA to the EU (29 April) on compliance with international standards in ► Mr Azamat SHAMBILOV, Project Coordinator, Penal Anti-Corruption and Anti-Money Laundering and Reform International, Kazakhstan-PRI (4 June) Combating the Financing of Terrorism (Strasbourg, 3-4 November) – Secretariat ► Mr Scott McPHERSON, Director of Law, Rights and International and Ms Farah ZIAULLA, Deputy ► EU/Council of Europe joint project – Protection Director, Human Rights and Security Policy, Ministry of Entrepreneurs in the Russian Federation from of Justice, United Kingdom (27 June) Corrupt Practices (PRECOP): study visit by Regional Business Ombudsmen from the Russian Federation ► Prosecutor General of Armenia and the Permanent (Strasbourg, 13 November) – Secretariat Representative of Armenia to the Council of Europe (7 July) ► Exchange of views with the Gender Equality ► Ms Amy P. WESTLING, Consul General of the Commission (Strasbourg, 19-21 November) – United States of America in Strasbourg, Deputy GRECO’s Gender Equality Rapporteur Permanent Observer to the Council of Europe and ► Project funded by the European Union and imple- Mr Dan MANGIS, Senior Desk Ofcer for France mented by the Venice Commission and the UNDP and Monaco, Ofce of Western European Afairs, to provide support to the Constitutional Chamber Bureau of European and Eurasian Afairs, U.S. State of Kyrgyzstan: study visit by judges and staf of the Department (9 October) Constitutional Chamber (Strasbourg, 26 November) ► Ms Anamara OSORIO SILVA, Chief Public Prosecutor, – Secretariat State of São Paulo (17 October) ► Secretary General’s working lunch with the ► Mr Ioannis-Spyridon TENTES, National Anti- Presidents of the monitoring and advisory bodies Corruption Coordinator, Greece (joint appoint- of the Council of Europe (Strasbourg, 2 December) ment with Mr Johannes KLEIJSSEN, Director of – President, Secretariat Information Society and Action against Crime and Mr Ivan KOEDJIKOV, Head of Action against Crime Individuals of the Council of Europe) (21 October) ► Mr Yves LETERME, Secretary-General of International The Executive Secretary and/or his representatives IDEA (3 November) met with: ► Mr Thomas VENNEN, Head of Democratization, ► Ms Kerstin LUNDGREN, member of the OSCE/ODIHR (4 November) Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Sweden, ALDE) and Rapporteur on “The imple- Briefngs on GRECO mentation of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Groups of study visitors to the Council of Europe Union” to speak about cooperation between GRECO ► Department of State Representation before the and the EU (30 January) International Courts of Human Rights, Georgia ► delegation from Kyrgyzstan, headed by the Vice (7 February) Speaker of the Parliament, Ms Asiya SASYKBAEVA ► Sorbonne University – Master’s students in (30 January). European law, France (11 March) ► Mr Khishigdelger DAVAADORJ, Ambassador ► journalists, Ukraine (12 March) Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Mongolia ► deputy judges – organised by the Swedish Judicial to Benelux and the European Union, Mr Lundeg Academy (9 April) PUREVSUREN, National Security and Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of Mongolia (4 February) ► doctoral students from a variety of countries (10 April) ► A delegation from Mongolia: Mr Chadraabal ► UNURBAYAR, Legal Policy Advisor to the President, judges of the Administrative Court of Malmö, Mr Khishigdelger DAVAADORJ, Ambassador Sweden (11 April) Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Mongolia to ► Salzburg regional parliament, Austria (15 April) ► Human Rights Committee of the League of Arab 7. All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institu- States (6 May) tions or population, shall be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and ► University of Poitiers – Master’s students in criminal without prejudice to the status of Kosovo. law, France (15 May)

Appendices ► Page 57 ► business representatives (legal and compliance ► Bar Association of Thonon-les-Bains, France services), France (23 May) (24 September 2014) ► local chapter of Anticor (Anticor67), France (4 June) ► Ecole nationale de la magistrature, France (24 June, 30 September) ► students of political science, Bosnia-Herzegovina ► journalists, Belgium (3 October) (26 June) ► assistant judges, Sweden (15 October) ► judges and prosecutors, Republic of Moldova ► judicial practitioners and public audit employees, (9 July) Brazil (26 November) ► Norwegian Bar Association (12 September) ► Young Lawyers Association, “the former Yugoslav ► law professors, judges and prosecutors, Belarus Republic of Macedonia” (4 December) (24 September 2014) ► judges and prosecutors, Bulgaria (9 December)

15th General Activity Report (2014) of the Group of States against Corruption ► Page 58 APPENDIX III – Secretariat

(within the Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law)

Executive Secretary

Wolfgang Rau, Executive Secretary Elspeth Reilly, Personal assistant Penelope Prebensen, Administrative assistant

Section I Section II Björn Janson, Head Christophe Speckbacher, Head Laura Sanz-Levia, Administrator Michael Janssen, Administrator Sophie Meudal-Leenders, Administrator Lioubov Samokhina, Administrator Marie-Rose Prevost, Assistant Laure Pincemaille, Assistant Evaluation and compliance procedures Evaluation and compliance procedures in respect of: in respect of: Albania Andorra Belarus Armenia Bosnia and Herzegovina Austria Croatia Azerbaijan Denmark Belgium Estonia Bulgaria Finland Cyprus Hungary Czech Republic Iceland France Ireland Georgia Italy Germany Malta Greece Montenegro Latvia Poland Liechtenstein Russian Federation Lithuania San Marino Luxembourg Serbia Republic of Moldova Slovenia Monaco Spain Netherlands Sweden Norway “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” Portugal Turkey Romania Ukraine Slovak Republic United Kingdom Switzerland United States of America

Central Ofce – logistics

Penelope Prebensen, Head Marie-Rose Prevost Laure Pincemaille

Appendices ► Page 59

Corruption represents a serious and ongoing threat to the functioning of democratic institutions and is an afront to human rights which are at the very heart of the values of the Council of Europe. The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) monitors the implementation of the package of anti- corruption instruments of the Council of Europe. Within the mechanism, 49 member States – the entire European continent and the United States of America - are working together to improve their capacity to prevent and fght corruption. GRECO’s evaluations comprise an in-depth analysis of legislation, institutional set-ups and anti-corruption policies which is confronted with the reality on-site during evaluation visits to each member State. The visits introduce an adversarial element into the process which is critical for its overall credibility, and constructive peer pressure comes into play during the reviews carried out by the GRECO Plenary. The recommendations addressed to each member State form the core of GRECO’s evaluation reports. Their implementation and impact is assessed in the various stages of GRECO’s compliance procedures which are designed to ensure that efective reform is actively sought and put into practice by the countries. PREMS 057415

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The Council of Europe is the continent’s leading human rights organisation. It comprises 47 member states, 28 of which are members of the European Union. All Council of Europe member states have signed up to the European Convention on Human Rights, a treaty designed to protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights oversees the implementation of the Convention in the member states.