The Desire for Happiness and the Virtues of the Will

Journal of Moral Theology, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2014): 18-38 The Desire for Happiness and the Virtues of the Will Jean Porter EAR THE BEGINNING of the prima secundae of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas says that every rational agent necessarily desires and seeks his or her own happiness (ST I-II q. 5, a. 4, ad. 2; I-II q. 5, a. 8). This was a commonplace forN Aquinas and his interlocutors, and it might seem that he only af- firms it out of deference to a long-established tradition.1 But Aquinas is very well able to distance himself from traditional claims when his overall position requires him to do so, and that is not what we see him doing here. On the contrary, he takes this claim as the starting point for the extended analysis of human actions that comprises the secunda pars, in accordance with the program set out in the prologue to ST I-II q. 1, a. 6. What is more, he interprets it in terms of the met- aphysical analysis sketched in the prima pars, in such a way as to integrate the doctrine of God with the analysis of the actions through which the rational creature returns to God—thus following the program set out at the beginning of the Summa theologiae, in the introduction to ST I q. 1, a. 2. Finally, as we will see further on, Aquinas maintains this claim even though it generates internal difficulties for his overall analysis. Briefly, he says at different points that the agent necessarily aims at her own happiness in every act, and that the virtuous will, informed by justice or charity, is disposed in such a way as to aim at something beyond the agent’s own good as an individual. Aquinas is the most systematic of thinkers, and even a prima facie inconsistency of this sort indicates that he has something of some importance at stake in these claims. Until recently, it was hard to see what this might be. Aquinas’s remarks about happiness place him at odds with a widespread modern view, associated with Kant as well as with some strands of Re- formed theology, according to which the desire for happiness is at best distinct from and secondary to moral commitment, or at worst, 1 For an excellent overview of the classical origins of this tradition, and specifically the link between happiness and virtue, see Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 27-47. The Desire for Happiness 19 sinful and reprehensible.2 In this context, it has proven hard for some interpreters even to acknowledge that Aquinas says what he plainly does say about the universal desire for happiness, much less to try to understand why he says it.3 However, recent developments in moral philosophy have opened up possibilities for a fresh appraisal of Aquinas’s remarks on happiness. Specifically, there is a growing sense among our contemporaries that we have exaggerated the dif- ference between Aristotelian and Kantian theories of morality.4 Whatever we may say about Aristotle and Kant themselves, their followers do at least share commitments to the rationality of morality, the normative or constitutive function of practical reason, and the importance of the unity of agency as an ideal, or perhaps a precondi- tion, for moral judgment and choice. Precisely because they share these key commitments, Aristotelian and Kantian moral philosophers have disagreed, deeply and yet fruitfully, about what each means and how they should be fitted together. But these disagreements, while deep, are not radical—on the contrary, they share common roots in very long-standing traditions of normative reflection on reason, ac- tivity, and the overall shape of one’s life. The Aristotelian Aquinas, who also anticipates some key elements of Kant’s moral thought, is plainly part of this extended tradition. In common with contemporary Aristotelian and Kantian moral philosophers, he is committed to an account of moral judgment which displays its rationality, on the one hand, and its integral con- nection to rational agency and action on the other. Recent developments in moral philosophy open a space within which to see the point and significance of these commitments, for Aquinas himself and for moral thought generally. Seen in this light, his more specific claims about the centrality and pervasiveness of the desire for happiness make sense, and indeed, emerge as necessary elements within his overall theory. At the same time, contemporary work on practical 2 For a comprehensive analysis of modern philosophical and theological perspectives on self-love and the desire for happiness, see Gene Outka, Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 55-74. 3 See, for example, John Finnis, Aquinas. Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 103-110. On his view, the happiness that Aquinas identifies as the proper end of life would be equivalent to a condi- tion of secure, unrestricted participation in the basic goods, which constitute the genuine, and irreducibly plural aims of human action. It is difficult to see how this analysis can be squared with Aquinas’s insistence that happiness itself, considered both as a subjective state and in terms of its objective target, is the ultimate, unitary end of human life. 4 In addition to the authors discussed below, see the essays collected by Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Hap- piness and Duty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Their introductory essay, “Introduction,” 1-18 offers a good overview of the issues at stake in this reap- praisal. 20 Jean Porter reason offers new perspectives on these claims, suggesting a way to resolve the internal tension mentioned above. This will call on an extended interpretation that goes beyond what Aquinas says, but not in such a way as to undermine or distort the overall contours of his account. In this paper, I will accordingly offer an analysis of Aquinas’s treatment of the universal desire for happiness, focusing on his remarks in the Summa theologiae, within which the idea of happiness plays a central organizing role. My aims will be primarily interpreta- tive—I hope to illuminate what Aquinas himself says, and to draw out the immediate implications of his views. The scope of this paper will not allow for a more extended examination of Aquinas’s overall position and its significance for theological as well as philosophical debates. However, this paper is motivated by the conviction that Aquinas is, fundamentally, right on the key questions. His metaphys- ically informed analysis of the unity of agency leaves ample room for what our contemporaries call self-constitution and the determina- tion of one’s own aims, and in addition it offers what they cannot, namely, a well-grounded and systematic account of the givens, the starting points and parameters, without which practical reason could not function in a coherent way at all. What is more, he interprets the universal desire for happiness in such a way as to show that this desire is in no way contrary to Christian charity, which is oriented out- wards, towards God and neighbor. Again, a defense, or even a full explication of these larger claims would go well beyond the scope of this paper, but I do hope to at least lend them plausibility by what follows. In the first section of this paper, I will argue that Aquinas’s claim that the will is necessarily oriented towards the agent’s happiness follows from his overall account of the metaphysics of agency, not only human agency, but causal agency of any kind. He says that all men and women necessarily desire happiness, because otherwise, human beings would not be causal agents at all. At the same time, Aquinas interprets happiness in such a way as to identify connatural happiness with the practice of the virtues. This line of analysis im- plies that the universal desire for happiness is not inconsistent with virtuous dispositions, but it does not account for the distinctively other-regarding orientation that is characteristic of the virtues of the will. In the second section, I attempt to lay the groundwork for re- solving this problem through an analysis of the objective and subjective components of inclination, choice, and motivation, taking ad- vantage of recent work on practical reason, virtue, and motivation in order to draw out what I take to be implicit in Aquinas’s own thought. In the third section, I will apply these distinctions to Aqui- nas’s account of virtues of the will, in order to show how the virtuous will can be said to incline towards the agent’s own perfection, The Desire for Happiness 21 understood in one sense, while genuinely desiring the good of the other for her own sake, in another sense. PERFECTION, HAPPINESS, AND VIRTUE: FRAMING THE ISSUES In the first question of the prima secundae, Aquinas unequivocal- ly says that every human being acts for some one end, towards which all his actions are directed (ST I-II q. 1, aa. 5, 6). Formally considered, this end is the same for all—namely, the individual’s own perfection, or equivalently, his beatitude, or happiness (ST I-II q. 1, aa. 6, 8). This presupposes that the individual is in fact capable of acting in a characteristically human way, that is to say, rationally, implying that he is capable of directing his own activities in accordance with a reasoned idea of goodness (ST I-II qq.

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