"There Is Probably No God" a Quantitative Study of Anti-Religiosity in Western Europe
FACULTEIT SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN
"There is probably no God" A quantitative study of anti-religiosity in Western Europe
Egbert RIBBERINK
Proefschrift aangeboden tot het verkrijgen van de graad van Doctor in de Sociale Wetenschappen
Promotor KU Leuven: Prof. Dr. Dick Houtman Copromotor KU Leuven: Prof. Dr. Rudi Laermans Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek Copromotor Universiteit Tilburg: Prof. Dr. Peter Achterberg Onderzoeksgroep: Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Sociology
2017
FACULTEIT SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN
"There is probably no God" A quantitative study of anti- religiosity in Western Europe
Egbert RIBBERINK
Proefschrift aangeboden tot het verkrijgen van de graad van Doctor in de Sociale Wetenschappen
Nr. 334
2017
Samenstelling van de examencommissie:
Prof. Dr. Bart Kerremans (voorzitter, KU Leuven)
Prof. Dr. Dick Houtman (promotor, KU Leuven)
Prof. Dr. Peter Achterberg (copromotor, Universiteit Tilburg)
Prof. Dr. Rudi Laermans (copromotor, KU Leuven)
Dr. Loek Halman (Universiteit Tilburg)
Prof. Dr. Joep de Hart (Protestantse Theologische Universiteit)
Dr. Lois Lee (University College London)
Prof. Dr. Marc Swyngedouw (KU Leuven)
De verantwoordelijkheid voor de ingenomen standpunten berust alleen bij de auteur.
Gepubliceerd door: KU Leuven, Faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen - Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologische Onderzoek [CeSO], Parkstraat 45 bus 3601- 3000 Leuven, België.
2017 by the author.
Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de auteur / No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without the permission in writing from the author.
D/2017/8978/22
Contents CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 NON-RELIGIOSITY AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY IN WESTERN EUROPE 1 1.2 BACKGROUND 2 1.2.1 NON-RELIGIOSITY IN WESTERN EUROPE 2 1.2.2 STUDYING NON-RELIGIOSITY AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY 4 1.2.3 DIFFERENTIATING NON-RELIGIOSITY AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY 5 1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 7 1.3.1 RELIGIOUS PRESENCE AND ANTI-RELIGIOUS REACTIONS 7 1.3.2 RELIGIOUS CULTURAL IDENTITIES AND ANTI-RELIGIOUS REACTIONS 9 1.4 RESEARCH OUTLINE 11 1.4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS 11 1.4.2 RESEARCH SCOPE AND LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 13 1.4.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 14
CHAPTER 2. DEPRIVATIZATION OF DISBELIEF? NON-RELIGIOSITY AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY IN 14 WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 18
2.1 INTRODUCTION 18 2.2 EXPLAINING ANTI-RELIGIOSITY: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 19 2.2.1 ANTI-RELIGIOSITY AS THE OUTCOME OF RATIONALIZATION 20 2.2.2 ANTI-RELIGIOSITY AS THE OUTCOME OF DEPRIVATIZATION OF DISBELIEF 21 2.2.3 HYPOTHESES 23 2.3 DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION 23 2.4 RESULTS 26 2.5 CONCLUSIONS 31
CHAPTER 3. ARE ALL SOCIALISTS ANTI-RELIGIOUS? ANTI-RELIGIOSITY AND THE SOCIALIST LEFT IN 21 WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 35
3.1 INTRODUCTION: SOCIALISM AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY 35 3.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 36 3.2.1 SOCIALISM AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY IN WESTERN EUROPE 36 3.2.2 THE RELIGIOUS PRESSURE THESIS ON ANTI-RELIGIOSITY AND SOCIALISM 37 3.2.3 HYPOTHESES 39 3.3 DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION 40 3.4 RESULTS 44 3.5 CONCLUSIONS 48
CHAPTER 4. SECULAR TOLERANCE? ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE 52
4.1 INTRODUCTION 52 4.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 53 4.2.1 SECULARIZATION AND ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT 53 4.2.2 RELIGIOUS COMPETITION 54
4.2.3 NON-RELIGIOUS PEOPLE AND ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT 55 4.3 DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION 57 4.4 RESULTS 62 4.5 CONCLUSIONS 68
CHAPTER 5. RELIGIOUS POLARIZATION: CONTESTING RELIGION IN SECULARIZED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 71
5.1 INTRODUCTION 71 5.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 71 5.2.1 WILKINS-LAFLAMME’S POLARIZATION THESIS 71 5.2.2 SECULARIZATION AND ANTI-RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES 74 5.2.3 PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC DISTINCTIONS IN ANTI-RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES 75 5.3 DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION 77 5.4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 80 5.5 DISCUSSION 84
CHAPTER 6. SYNTHESIS: WHO IS READING RICHARD DAWKINS? 87
6.1 SHEER CURIOSITY 87 6.2 MAIN FINDINGS 88 6.3 IMPLICATIONS 92 6.3.1 POST-SECULAR CRITIQUE ON PRIVATIZATION THEORY 92 6.3.2 PRIVATIZATION, RELIGIOUS INDIFFERENCE AND OTHER CULTURAL ATTITUDES 95 6.3.3 APPLYING AN AUGMENTED PRIVATIZATION THEORY 97 6.4 QUANTITATIVELY RESEARCHING NON-RELIGIOSITY AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY 99 6.4.1 NON-RELIGIOSITY IN EUROPEAN SURVEYS 99 6.4.2 ANTI-RELIGIOSITY IN EUROPEAN SURVEYS 101 6.5 SO, WHO IS READING RICHARD DAWKINS? 103
APPENDIXES 105
SAMENVATTING 109
BIBLIOGRAPHY 113
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 131
CV 133
DOCTORATEN IN DE SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN EN DOCTORATEN IN DE SOCIALE EN CULTURELE ANTROPOLOGIE 134
Chapter 1. Introduction
One common misattribution is to gloss the secularization paradigm as predicting that everyone becomes an atheist
(Bruce 2002: 41)
1.1 Non-religiosity and anti-religiosity in Western Europe
Beginning in January 2009, buses with the words “There’s probably no God. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life” drove around London and other British cities (Lee 2015a, 81). Later, atheists launched a similar campaign in other European countries, like Italy, Spain, Germany, Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, as well as in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Brazil. This campaign, initiated by British comedian Ariane Sherine and supported by the well-known author Richard Dawkins, professes atheism in an assertive, sometimes even provocative way. In January 2013, a social gathering in North London also attracted much attention, but not because it was some kind of protest. This initiative, called the Sunday Assembly1, was held in a church building, with a main speaker, moments of meditation and beautiful music. Only God was absent from the proceedings. It marked the start of a growing secular church movement, which now has over one hundred initiatives in many Western countries. This movement organizes contemplative services without belief in God, not anti- religious protests against belief in God. Now, this Sunday Assembly and the atheist bus campaign are just two examples of a wide variety of non-religious initiatives, movements, ideologies and group identities that have lately emerged across Western Europe (Amarasingam 2010, Beaman and Tomlins 2015, Lee 2014, Zuckerman 2009).
The contrast between non-religious expressions that assertively and sometimes provocatively advocate non-belief, like the atheist bus campaign does, and those radiating a contemplative, tolerant, and inviting atmosphere as for example the Sunday Assembly does, is very remarkable. Whereas the former group opposes religions and religious influence on society, the latter group seem to be almost religious itself, notwithstanding its non-belief2. Another illustration of this remarkable contrast in non- religious attitudes is the manifestation of protest of the Pegida-movement, directed against the presence of Muslim immigrants in Germany, Norway, the Netherlands and other countries (Dostal 2015), which challenges and contrasts the tolerant and inclusive image secularized countries generally have (Mudde 2010). Similarly, in Western Europe there is a surprising diversity among people with socialist political ideals. For example, on the one hand, French socialism traditionally boasts and promotes disbelief and
Introduction 1
secularism, aiming to remove all references to God from education and public administration (Knutsen 2004, Waller and Fennema 1988). On the other hand, in countries like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, socialists traditionally show an indifferent, or tolerant attitude towards religion, or they are themselves religiously motivated (Bas 1999, Brown 2001, Cort 1988, Waller and Fennema 1988). This dissertation consists of four empirical studies, which study these contrasting attitudes and their relation to the context in which they surface. Its central research question is:
Where and why do some non-religious Western European people develop anti-religious attitudes, whereas others are benevolent and tolerant towards religion?
Each of the four empirical studies approach this question from a different angle, based on theories from the secularization debate. This is a very broad and complex debate. Therefore, before turning to this theoretical framework, I will first present a background section, which among other things, discusses this debate’s surprising lack of attention for non-religiosity and anti-religiosity. Following this background section and the theoretical framework, the research outline and research methodology are presented.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Non-religiosity in Western Europe The presence of anti-religious attitudes among non-religious Western Europeans is quite surprising considering the supposed secularization of this region (Bruce 2011). Why would people worry about religion if their society has become secular? This anti-religious attitude begs for explanation. Yet, before turning to possible explanations for this attitude, I will pinpoint some general historical processes that give a picture of the religious landscape in Western Europe. This entails a discussion of Western Europe’s current situation and in part, the process of secularization that has led to this situation.
However, what I will not do, is go in depth to discuss explanations for secularization proper3. That has been done elsewhere extensively (Bruce 2002, Dobbelaere 2002, Martin 1978, 2005, Stark and Finke 1999, Wilson 1986), and as far as relevance prompts, it will be done in the theoretical framework section. For now, I will outline how the place of the non-religious in Western Europe has changed through the years.
For centuries, the Christian religion dominated Western Europe. The scarce empirical data from
1800 show that almost 100% of the Western European population was religiously affiliated4. Of course, this does not imply that these affiliates were deeply religious, went to church twice every Sunday and obeyed the church’s rules and regulations in all aspects of their lives. Nonetheless, these data do indicate
2 Introduction
how in those days, the church had a central place in the religious, cultural and political domain. There might have been non-believers among the Western Europeans, but they would have wanted to be ‘under the radar’. Being Christian was the norm, also because it tied in with national identities and ideas about being a good citizen (Martin 2014a). This changed following the Enlightenment, the French revolution and the growing popularity of the natural sciences. Non-religiosity became a more viable option, first among the elite, later also among the population at large. Atheist and rationalist initiatives, like rationalist press associations and rationalist societies, gained popularity (Campbell 1971, see also Dostoyevsky’s brilliant illustration of this movement in his book Demons from 1872). In addition, other non-religious movements manifested themselves, like French scientific materialism, which offered secular alternatives for Catholic last rites (Hecht 1997), and Russian socialism, which aspired to build up a society completely based on a scientific atheist ideology (Froese 2008). Nevertheless, in most countries being non-religious at that time still meant that one had to make a conscious decision to deviate from bourgeois conventions, as religious institutions still had a dominant hold on European societies (McLeod 1982, 1997). Consequently, this generally meant that in choosing non-religiosity, one opted for a position that was anti-religious.
These developments coincided with a period of great technological and economic change. As a result of among others industrialization and urbanization, European societies changed dramatically and a traditional way of life gave way to a modern way of life (Inglehart 1997). The European societies differentiated, which means that institutions like the state, the church, the economy, and politics became more and more independent of each other, whereas before they were intricately bound together (Berger 1967, Casanova 1994, Gorski 2000). This major shift of power on all levels of society resulted in a decline of religious authority. That is, it became harder for religions to enforce their truth claims on society and coerce a population into belief (Chaves 1994, Dobbelaere 1981). Not only did religion change, becoming more diverse, individualized and less institutionalized (Campbell 2007, Houtman and Mascini 2002), gradually also non-religiosity became a normal option for many people; in some countries, even the most common option (Bruce 2002). Now, one would expect that this growing group of non-religious people and their distinctive attitudes towards religion would have attracted much scholarly attention. However, the opposite is true. Instead of studying the consequences of religious decline, namely the emergence of secularity and secular societies, the debate in sociology was by and large limited to the debate on religious change and the consequences for the traditional religions.
Introduction 3
1.2.2 Studying non-religiosity and anti-religiosity The secularization debate has dominated the sociology of religion for decades. It covered issues like the historical causes leading up to secularization (Berger 1967, Bruce 2011, Wilson 1966), the consequences of religious decline for the traditional religions (Davie 1994, Greeley 2003), and the way religions and individual religiosity changed (Campbell 2007, Luckmann 1967, Wilson 1982). Moreover, many sociologists concerned themselves with debating the definitions of secularization (Chaves 1994, Calhoun et al. 2011, Davie 2007, Dobbelaere 1981, 2002), whether America was the exception to the European secularization rule or not (Berger 1999, Bruce 2011), not to mention the accusations of dreaming and wishful thinking that heated up as well as clouded this debate (Berger 2012, Hadden 1987: 588, see also Bruce 2011, Stark and Bainbridge 1987, Stark and Finke 2000). However, surprisingly non-religiosity as the outcome of these secularization processes received scant attention. As far as it was present in the abovementioned publications, it mainly featured as a leftover category, which was not deemed interesting enough to explore. In contrast to the extensive coverage that secularization process received, the number of studies addressing non-religiosity is relatively small. There is an occasional historical case study (Budd 1977), a conference organized by the Catholic Church on unbelief (Caporale and Grumelli 1971), Campbell’s theory of irreligion (Campbell 1971), and references to socialism as a ‘secular religion’ (Berger 1967, Martin 1978, Campbell 2007: 224).
Sociologists essentially neglected non-religiosity. Hence, they did not develop a thorough theoretical framework, a strong conceptualization and the methodological tools to distinguish one type of non-religiosity from the other. Recently this lacuna in the sociology of religion has been addressed, among other things, with the ‘discovery’ of the religious ‘nones’ (people not affiliated with a religion) as a new sociological category (Baker and Smith 2009a, 2009b) and the growing popularity of the study of
4 Introduction
atheism (in particular after popular atheist Richard Dawkins published his The God Delusion in 2006, see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1 Number of publications with topic ‘Atheism’ in ISI Web of Knowledge per year.
Many of the latter studies address the growth and raised public profile of atheism within the religious context of the United States (for example Amarasingam 2010, Beaman and Tomlins 2015, LeDrew 2015, Smith 2011, 2013a, 2013b). In addition, a few studies address atheism in the United Kingdom (Lee 2015b, Mumford 2015) and in some of the Scandinavian countries (Zuckerman 2009). This literature explores the diversity in the non-religious category, enhances conceptual clarity and increases the availability of empirical data. Nevertheless, there are some shortcomings to this literature as well. For example, most aforementioned studies address the United States context, which leaves the different attitudes towards religion in other Western contexts underexposed. Furthermore, whereas the qualitative studies into atheism focus on highly religious contexts too much, the quantitative studies on religious ‘nones’ hardly give attention to differences in anti-religious attitudes. In addition, although non-religiosity and anti-religious attitudes have a subordinate position in the secularization debate, I think that studies of non-religiosity can make much more use of the richness in theoretical explanations that this debate provides. This dissertation on anti-religiosity demonstrates that this is possible. Before turning to these explanations, the next section addresses the conceptual question how non-religiosity and anti-religiosity are defined.
1.2.3 Differentiating non-religiosity and anti-religiosity In the Western European context, sociologists generally conceptualize religiosity by referring to people’s beliefs, church attendance or church affiliation. These are indicators of the traditional, predominantly Christian religion, but his religion is changing. There are new forms of believing without belonging (Davie 1994), an influx of immigrant religions, there is a growth of new age and different kinds of in
Introduction 5
spirituality (Houtman and Mascini 2002), and even the new age category is much more complex than a spiritual or religious dichotomy implies (Ammerman 2013). What I try to do here, notwithstanding, is to define non-religiosity in opposition to traditional indicators of religion, without filling in how it looks like. My question is not, who the non-religious are and what their non-religiosity is like, but I try to assess solely where and why they might become opposed to religion. Therefore, this study uses the contrasting terms non-belief, non-attendance and non-affiliation when referring to non-religiosity. This leaves completely open what attitudes these non-believers or non-attenders have towards religion.
Basically, two common mistakes are made concerning these attitudes. One is to think that all non- religious people must be militant atheists, who oppose and reject religion in every way they can (Bruce 2002:41), another is to consider it as a left-over category not worth exploring. This is problematic, as contemporary literature more and more describes the non-religious as people with very diverse and meaningful positions vis-à-vis religion, both individually and collectively (see Bullivant and Lee 2012 for an overview). There are people who have no idea about religion, no affinity with religion and no interest to know more about religion. Lee calls this type a-religious (2012). Then, there are people, for whom being non-religious is something meaningful, as in the case of someone saying: “I’d like to believe in God, but I just can’t” (Lee 2014 calls this type ‘indifferentism’, see also Schnell 2010). Again, other people are fascinated by religions without having religious beliefs themselves (like Weber’s religious unmusicality, see Campbell 1971: 26, Quack 2014). A person can also choose to ignore matters of religion and be conscious of the rejection of its demands. This attitude of conscious ignoring matters of religion comes close to anti-religiosity. In fact, for Campbell, one of the first to study non-religious people’s attitudes towards religion, indifference and anti-religiosity are almost the same thing5 (1971: 21). Perhaps this was due to the fact that in the 1960’s and 1970’s, being indifferent out of ignorance was no option due to the strength of religion in Western cultures. Nowadays, indifference is mostly seen as a different attitude than anti-religiosity (Bruce 2014, Lee and Bullivant 2016).
How then, do I define anti-religiosity? In The Oxford Dictionary of Atheism, two ways of defining anti-religiosity are mentioned (Lee and Bullivant 2016). It is defined as a generalized oppositional stance to religion, and as an umbrella term for the opposition to the specific religious traditions. Both definitions are relevant for this dissertation, but when I speak of anti-religiosity, I use in this first way. This general opposition to religion is central to chapters 2, 3 and 5. General opposition to religion still is quite a broad category. People can oppose the presence of religion in public life, without opposing the privately held religious convictions and practices. What is more, both atheists and new agers can be opposed to religion in this general way, notwithstanding their differences in terms of what they belief in
6 Introduction
other matters6. What this definition does not contain, is the competition between different religious traditions, for example the rivalry between Protestants and Catholics. This other way of defining anti- religiosity is used in chapter 4. There, I assess anti-religiosity as the opposition to a specific religious tradition, whereby this specific tradition is Islam. In contrast with anti-religiosity in chapters 2, 3 and 5, this opposition can also come from other religious groups and minorities. Nonetheless, even there the main question remains whether this anti-Muslim sentiment is anti-religiosity, or perhaps something else, like ethnocentrism or racism.
In this dissertation, anti-religiosity is thus defined as an individual attitude of opposition to religion, religious institutions and/or religious influence on society by the non-religious. This might include political ideals, which promote the strict separation of all religious influences from state institutions and which reject the way religious leaders might influence politics, (i.e. secularism, which is different from the secular, secularity and secularization, see Calhoun et al. 2011), but I investigate a wide range of anti-religious attitudes, not only this political version. Anti-religiosity also entails negative attitudes towards traditional church morality, distrust of the church as an institution, protests against the presence of religion or religious symbols in public buildings or in education, the use of negative stereotypes of religion etc. Although this broad definition is used in this dissertation when discussing theories on anti-religiosity, on the methodological level, and due to data availability, there are only a few anti-religious attitudes that can be assessed. These are the secularist political ideals, the distrust in the church as an institution, the rejection of religiously informed intolerance and the rejection of religion as a source of conflict (see also 1.4.2., and a further reflection on data and methodology in chapter 6). The next section discusses the different explanations from the secularization debate on where to expect these anti-religious attitudes to surface.
1.3 Theoretical framework
1.3.1 Religious presence and anti-religious reactions The secularization literature is a conglomerate of different theories on religious decline, change, resurgence and resilience, and not many of its contributors have concerned themselves with the outcome of secularization: non-religiosity, let alone anti-religiosity. Nevertheless, there are several theories about opposition to religion in secularized contexts. In the following section, I discuss these theories and delineate the general hypothesis that they propose in terms of where to expect anti- religious attitudes and why. These explanations come from rationalization theory, privatization theory and secular majority theory. In addition, based on this discussion, the next section (§ 1.3.2) presents a complementing thesis on religious culture, which forms this dissertation’s main thesis.
Introduction 7
The first theory discussed here is rationalization theory7. This theory maintains that anti- religiosity is the inevitable outcome of secularization. A central tenet of this theory is that scientific and technical progress has made the world a rational place, with the expansion of mass education in the twentieth century understood as the major vessel of this process. According to this theory, religion is unscientific and irrational and, because of the rationalization of society, religion is inevitably doomed to die out (Wallace 1966). The idea is that, as societies have become increasingly rational and secular, people who see the irrationality of religion will not only disaffiliate, but also oppose religious irrationality, and try to ban it from society (Campbell 1971). Rationalization theory thus implies that secularization follows from growing levels of rationalization and this rationalization explains negative attitudes towards religion (Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001, also, see Stark, Iannaccone and Finke 1996, Stark and Finke 2000). In other words, as a consequence of rationalization, non-religious people are anti-religious, always and everywhere.
Another view on the relation between non-religiosity and anti-religiosity is found in privatization theory. This theory starts with the process of structural differentiation8, where religion lost its ability to morally overarch all of society as a sort of ‘sacred canopy’, to use Peter Berger’s (1967) famous metaphor. Instead, religion became just one separate sphere besides other institutional realms. In effect, religion lost its collectively shared status and recedes from the public realm to become a matter of strictly personal choice. For religion to function in these modern, differentiated societies, it needs to accept secular rules of engagement, and in this way, it loses its public and political significance (Bruce 2011, Luckmann 1967, Wilson 1982). This impacts the place religion has on the societal level, but also on the organization level and individual level (Dobbelaere 2002). Organizations are no longer related to religious institutions, they start to function completely separate and without reference to religion, and they promote values and ideas different from or contrary to religious values and ideas. For example, a scientific approach to the world and the teaching of technical knowledge increasingly replaced a religious-literary formation. At the same time, as a result of migration and pluralization, the rise of alternative truth claims results in a more subjective and privately held religious worldview. Strict and orthodox beliefs in God, Biblical authority and church dogmas are replaced by agnostic beliefs and beliefs in a spirit or life force, Eastern meditation and a mixture of religious views (Campbell 2007).
But this privatization of religion also has consequences for the non-religious and their attitudes towards religion. Applied to the subject at hand, namely the possible incidence of anti-religiosity, this theory leads to the hypothesis that in contexts wherein religion has become privatized, non-religious people will not oppose religion, as there is nothing to oppose, and they will become indifferent to
8 Introduction
religion instead (Bagg and Voas 2010, Bruce 2002, Voas 2009). The non-religious assume that religion is ‘compartmentalized’ to the religious sphere, and as far as they are concerned, it does not interfere with other institutional spheres, let alone with their lives (Billiet et al. 2003). It has become irrelevant. Bruce even argues that privatization of religion leads to a complete ignorance of religion, referring to the situation in Britain, where religion has become ‘alien’ to people (2014: 18). Subsequently, only in contexts where religion has public significance and where it influences other institutional spheres (e.g. politics, economy or the media), anti-religious attitudes can be expected (Bruce 2002, 2011: 38). The stronger this religious influence in a certain context is, the more reasons the non-religious will have for opposing religion. This dissertation presents this hypothesis in different versions (see §1.4.1 on why this is so). Chapter 2 calls it the deprivatization of disbelief thesis, chapter 3 calls it the pressure thesis and chapter 5 discusses it as the polarization thesis.
Thus, the privatization theory maintains that the non-religious expect the religious to accept normatively the quintessentially modern understanding of religion as privatized and in effect without public significance beyond the boundaries of churches and congregations. Many Muslims in Western Europe have, however, not just retained their religious beliefs, but their religious identities have strengthened through their encounter with the secularized cultures in which they have come to find themselves: the latter are ‘Made in Europe’ (Phalet et al. 2013, Voas and Fleischmann 2012). As an augmentation of the privatization theory, chapter 4 presents the secular majority theory, which maintains that anti-Muslim sentiment as a particular type of anti-religiosity does proliferate in secular contexts. As some of the Muslims challenge the secularist accommodation of religion, this sparks new controversies over the place of religion in Western European countries (Cesari 2002: 36, Glendinning and Bruce 2011: 504, Modood 2009). The secular celebration of individual freedom after all entails a rejection of traditional religiously informed morality, i.e., traditional gender roles, marriage and sexual norms (Akkerman 2005, Berger 1967, 2004: 140, Houtman et al. 2011). The more people identify with secular values like these, the more they will oppose those who do not share them (Beaman and Tomlins
2015, Betz 2003, Smith 2013a, Taylor 2006: 14), so that secular identity9 can become a primary motivation for anti-Muslim sentiment (e.g. Bruce 2002: 33). In secularized countries, anti-Muslim sentiment can thus be expected to be strongest among the non-religious, because it is they who are the principal carriers of secular values.
1.3.2 Religious cultural identities and anti-religious reactions The above-mentioned theories provide distinct expectations of where to expect strongest anti-religiosity and why. Yet, they are not conclusive. Typically, they approach religion as a one-dimensional concept
Introduction 9
of which there can be more or less. However, there is a particular aspect they overlook, namely the impact of distinctions in religious identity. These distinctions have proven to be relevant in explaining a wide array of cultural, economic and political phenomena, ranging from capitalism (Weber [1930]), values like sincerity (Magill 2012) and authenticity (Lindholm 2013), nativist politics (Casanova 2012), particular voting behavior (Knutsen 2004), etcetera. In fact, they are central to understanding trajectories of both secularization and anti-religious attitudes. In the literature on religious change in Western Europe, the one-dimensional way of seeing religion is particularly criticized, based on the differentiation of Protestant trajectories of secularization from Catholic ones (Martin 2005). The next paragraphs delineate this critique and based on this argumentation, develop what I call the religious culture thesis.
Religious culture is one of the main determinants of non-religious people’s attitudes towards religion (Martin 1978). Whereas Protestantism has historically tended to retreat from strong political involvement, as long as its religious freedom was guaranteed (Woodhead 2004), Catholicism has a tendency to incite a split between the Catholic social order, in which God, Church and State are virtually synonymous, and its secular rivals like socialism, communism and even freemasonry (Martin 1978: 38). Catholic values, like solidarity, respect for authority and nationalism, foreground the importance of the collective realm and create strong and dominant monocultures (Martin 1978: 18ff, Woodhead 2004). The church here provides a sense of unity, community and belonging, closely intertwined with family-bonds and notions of national identity. What is more, Hervieu-Léger (2006: 51) argues that many issues in Catholic countries (even in ‘secular’ France), which have nothing to do with religion as such (i.e. food quality or demands for workers' rights), are nonetheless imbued with Catholic values. The reason to oppose religion in these Catholic contexts, then, is very much informed by this religion’s all-pervasiveness and omnipresence. Becoming non-religious in such contexts entails a marked act of deviance that places one outside the community; hence anti-religious attitudes can be expected.
This is different in Protestant societies. After the Reformation, Protestants maintained a more demystified and rationalized faith in a transcendent and independent God (Bruce 2011). This opened up the way for the exploration of nature with scientific methods and for a more rational assurance of salvation, and a stress on individual spirituality and purity (McCleary 2007, Lindholm 2013). This Protestant focus on individual salvation, rationality, and purity made that the authority of the church was replaced by the individual reading of the Bible, and this opened up the way for pluralism (sectarianism), relativism, doubt, and ultimately disaffiliation (Berger 1967, Bruce 2011). In effect, in Protestant countries, non-religiosity is less of a problem, and more common, because Protestantism does
10 Introduction
not dominate the public domain or national culture in the way Catholicism does. However, this is not to say that all Catholic countries are deeply religious and all Protestant countries are deeply secular. Although the latter countries are relatively more secularized, they are still quite religious in terms of affiliation levels. In addition, there are secularized Catholic countries as well. The religious culture thesis maintains that notwithstanding the effect declining levels of affiliation and church attendance, the cultural identity of these religions enduringly influences Western European societies. This augments the privatization theory’s hypothesis as it maintains that non-religious people could still be anti-religious (instead of indifferent) in post-Catholic secular contexts when they protest against the Catholic church’s dominant hold on their culture or community, and not against the presence of Catholics per se.
Summing up, the literature provides several theories on where to expect strongest anti-religiosity and why: rationalization theory focuses on incompatibility of religion and science and does not attend to differences in context; privatization theory points to indifference as the primary reaction in contexts with high levels of secularity; the religious culture thesis addresses explanations based on differences in the religious identity of Western European contexts. The next section explains which theory is treated in what chapter.
1.4 Research outline
1.4.1 Overview of the empirical chapters This dissertation is the final reflection of a PhD-research, largely done in a self-funded part-time setting next to a full-time job for eight years. The initial outcomes of this research are four separate journal articles recently published or accepted for publication10. These form the basis of this dissertation. Due to the knowledge and insights gained during this process and the requirement of the PhD-school at KU Leuven not to change the content of published articles, in chapters 2-5, some overlap and some differences exist between conceptualization and operationalization. Sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 discuss issues concerning research methodology and operationalization, but first I will present the ways in which the different chapters relate to my theoretical framework.
Chapter 2 refers to the privatization theory and rationalization theory as described above (§ 1.3.1), both delivering hypotheses on the role of levels of secularity in explaining anti-religiosity. It derives three hypotheses from the rationalization theory, expecting levels of anti-religiosity to be higher for non-believers in secular contexts, especially when they are higher educated and born in younger birth cohorts. Three hypotheses derived from the privatization theory present the opposite picture, expecting lower levels of anti-religiosity for the same three groups in secular contexts. The results of this
Introduction 11
analysis show the privatization theory to have more value for explaining where to expect anti- religiosity, as this latter theory predicted strongest anti-religiosity in religious contexts, which indeed I found.
Chapter 3 zooms in on reactions to different religious identities and analyzes what kind of religious pressure influences socialists’ anti-religious attitudes. The political situation in the Soviet Union during the twentieth century has led some to suggest that socialism is some kind of secular religion as opposed to ‘normal’ religion. In modern Europe, however, there have also been vibrant Christian socialist movements. This chapter addresses these different attitudes, and answers the question in what way religious culture affect socialists’ anti-religiosity. It includes two aspects of religious culture, as it focuses on levels of secularity (more religiosity leads to increased opposition) and of countries’ Protestant and Catholic religious identity (a Catholic national identity gives more reason for opposition, as it is more authoritarian, communal and nationalistic than a Protestant national identity). The results of this chapter indicate that a Catholic identity incites particular anti-religious opposition and thus point to an influence of countries’ religious identity apart from how active adherents practice this religion. Incidentally, this chapter’s operationalization of religious identity differs from later chapters (4 and 5) in the way the latter use historical affiliation levels instead of levels of current affiliation (see § 1.4.3 for a further discussion on matters of operationalization).
Chapter 4 is the only study that focuses on a type of anti-religiosity that targets a specific group, namely Muslims. Here, anti-religiosity is not only brought into relation with differences in context, but by addressing anti-Muslim sentiment, it also clarifies how opposition to religion in general can be differentiated from opposition to a specific (immigrant) religion. In particular, it addresses the contrast between the supposed tolerance of secularized Protestant countries, and the prevailing anti-Muslim protests and conflicts in these countries. This chapter derives hypotheses from the secular majority theory and religious competition theory. The latter theory is a critique on secularization theories, and maintains that when religions lose their privileged monopoly as a state religion, some people will disaffiliate, but those that remain loyal will become more active, fervent and committed. The religious competition theory therefore understands anti-Muslim sentiment in terms of the conflict between Muslims and the remaining core of fervent religious minorities (i.e. Protestants with strict, orthodox beliefs). Alternatively, the secular majority theory understands anti-Muslim sentiment as resulting from a value conflict between Muslims and the non-religious majority. The findings from this chapter, however, do not support either theory completely and point to a third explanation, which questions the idea that anti-Muslim sentiment actually is a form of anti-religiosity.
12 Introduction
In light of recent claims about increasing religious polarization in secularized countries, the last empirical chapter (5) studies the extent to which the non-religious contest religion in Western- European countries and whether and how these countries’ Protestant and Catholic identity plays a role in this. Analyzing data from the International Social Survey Program data (ISSP 1998 and 2008) by means of multilevel analysis, this chapter demonstrates that religious polarization is stronger in the most secularized countries and in countries with a Catholic religious identity. In secular countries, polarization moreover stems from religious fervency, whereas in countries with a Catholic identity it stems from anti-religious fervency.
Chapter 6 discusses the findings from these chapters and presents a synthesis of their theoretical contribution to the understanding of anti-religiosity in Western Europe. The next subsection discusses this dissertation’s research scope and level of analysis. Following, a next subsection zooms in on the data and research methods used.
1.4.2 Research scope and level of analysis This study addresses anti-religious attitudes in Western Europe. The choice for Western Europe originates with and echoes an argument voiced in the debate on secularization. In the discussion on the decline of religion in some regions and the resurgence of religion in others, Western Europe is commonly seen as ‘the odd one out’ (Martin 2005: 47, see also Berger 1999, Greeley 2003). Unlike in other Western countries, such as the United States, in many Western European countries the church has lost most of its former strength, adherence and influence. It is the region with the highest level of secularity. However, the majority of recent studies on atheism and anti-religious attitudes addresses the American context (i.e. Amarasingam 2010, LeDrew 2015, Smith 2011, 2013a). Anti-religiosity might be more visible there, but in Western Europe there have been anti-clerical and rationalist movements in several countries too (Budd 1967, Campbell 1971). There are several ‘new’ atheist expressions (like Richard Dawkins’ publications and initiatives), particular demonstrations against Muslims (Dostal 2015) and in many countries secular-liberal values limit the room for religions to operate in the public domain (Akkerman 2005, Duyvendak 2004). By focusing on Western Europe, I explore whether these expressions are exceptions to a general rule of secular tolerance, what influence secular contexts have on anti-religious attitudes and whether or not a country’s religious identity (Protestant or Catholic) affects the way people oppose religion. In order to address these issues and relate anti-religious attitudes to the two dimensions of religious culture (levels of secularity and religious identity), Western Europe thus provides a fitting and relevant context.
Introduction 13
The choice for countries as the highest level of analysis needs elaboration as well. This choice is not motivated by the idea that they have the singular strongest cultural influence on what people think and do (i.e. some version of methodological nationalism, see Chernilo 2006), although some argue they do (Inglehart and Welzel 2003). Some countries do form a relative cultural unity (the Danes), but others are culturally divided into, regions (i.e. Belgium, Spain), while in others, cities can be seen as separate cultural identities (like London, which in fact is larger in terms of population than Belgium or Denmark, see also Martin 2005). The main reason for choosing countries is the relation between religious culture and the presence of state churches. Almost all of the Western European countries have had either a Protestant, Catholic or an Orthodox state church, which influenced the national, cultural, political and economic domains. Sometimes, churches still have a formal relation with the state (for example the British queen still is the head of the Church of England), but in most cases this position is only formal. Nevertheless, the centuries of interweaving between national and religious identities is a strong determinant of cultural values for the religious and non-religious alike (Hervieu-Léger 2006). Values like solidarity, nationalism and respect for authority (Catholic), sincerity, frankness, and individuality (Protestant) originate from theological differences, which date back to the Reformation (Gillespie 1999, Martin 2014a). In fact, as the Reformation (and Catholic counter-reformation) deeply influenced the formation of Western European countries and their cultures, they are characteristic of these cultures up to this day (Gorski 2000, Lindholm 2013, Magill 2012, Woodhead 2004). In sum, the influence of state churches on countries’ cultural patterns give reason to expect that country-level conditions have a particular influence on people’s anti-religious attitudes, hence cross-country comparison is appropriate.
In addition, a more pragmatic reason is that almost all quantitative studies in sociology of religion, particularly those on secularization, compare countries (Bruce 2011, Casanova 1994, Greeley 2003, Martin 1978, 2005). In part, this relates to the fact that national agencies are responsible for gathering data on religious affiliation, observance and beliefs. Discussing these data, the literature focuses on cross-national differences and similarities. As this literature provides me with the necessary theoretical and empirical material for developing my own theoretical explanations and hypotheses, I follow suit. I will investigate to what extent the country level contextual variables affect the attitudes of individual Western Europeans.
1.4.3 Data and methodology All four empirical chapters (2-5) present a similar quantitative methodology, primarily using survey data from either the International Social Survey Program Religion (ISSP) waves or the European Values Study (EVS) waves. The ISSP Religion data are very rich in religious characteristics and attitudes. This is
14 Introduction
important for operationalizing the diverse measures of religion, anti-religiosity and religious culture. Unfortunately, ISSP Religion data lack a similar richness in political attitudes and characteristics, which are necessary for operationalizing socialism, anti-Muslim sentiment and secular liberal values. The EVS is broader in covering both political and religious attitudes, but has fewer variables on specific religious attitudes. Each chapter presents the argumentation for which of the two large-scale surveys is used. In several chapters, the data are complemented with specific data on a country’s gross domestic product (GDP, United Nations data), political parties (Manifesto research group data) and historical religious affiliation (ARDA data).
In each empirical chapter, the analytical method used is ordinary least squares linear multilevel analysis with maximum likelihood estimation. This is done for two reasons. First, multilevel analysis makes it possible to simultaneously estimate effects of individual-level variables and country-level variables. The data are structured in such a way that there are two levels: individuals with certain characteristics (e.g. affiliation, attitudes, etc.) are embedded in countries with certain characteristics (e.g. aggregated level of secularity or religious identity). In such cases, multilevel analysis is the most suitable option. Second, as my hypotheses aim at investigating how individuals respond differently to differences in country-level variables, multilevel analysis is very suitable as it allows for testing cross-level interactions. This means that I estimate in what way the effect of individual variables, like non-belief or level of education, varies as a function of differences in country-level variables, like GDP or type of religious identity.
In terms of operationalization of concepts used, there are some differences between the empirical chapters. Some of these relate to the datasets used and concomitant differences in variables available. The largest difference lies with the operationalization of dependent variables used in chapters 2 and 5 using the ISSP datasets on the one hand, and chapters 3 and 4 using the EVS datasets on the other. Chapters 2 and 5 use four items indicating opposition towards religions and religious people as a measure of anti-religiosity. Two of these ask for the attitude of the respondents towards religious leaders influencing governments’ decisions and peoples’ votes. The other two ask for responses on statements about intolerance of religious people and whether or not religion creates conflict. Chapter 3, which focuses on the relation between political and religious attitudes, could not use the ISSP Religion datasets, because these datasets do not contain enough items on political and economic values. Therefore, this chapter measures anti-religiosity with a combination of items available in the EVS dataset, indicating distrust of church institutions and self-identification as a convinced atheist (see section 3.3. for a detailed discussion). Chapter 4 focuses on anti-Muslim sentiment and therefore uses variables that relate to
Introduction 15
Muslims in particular instead of religion in general. Here again, the EVS datasets have a more relevant range of variables available for more Western European countries than the ISSP datasets.
There are some other minor differences in operationalization, for example in non-religiosity (non- belief, non-affiliation or non-attendance), and the already referred to difference in religious identity (current proportion of Catholics or Protestants per country, versus historical proportion of Protestant and Catholic affiliates per country). I do not discuss them here, but each chapter accounts for the operationalization of all relevant concepts used in detail. Apart from presenting a general synthesis on the theoretical relevance of my research, chapter 6 also reflects on how these differences in operationalization may have affected my findings. Discussing the limitations of researching anti- religiosity given the present availability of survey data, chapter 6 also includes suggestions for enhancing the quality of survey research on anti-religiosity.
1 http://sundayassembly.com/ (Web 12 Feb. 2016). 2 See for example non-believing philosopher Alain de Botton (2012), who argues that although all supernatural claims of religions are entirely false “agnostics and atheists should steal from religions – because they’re packed with good ideas on how we might live and arrange our societies.” 3 Let alone on what constitutes religion. Most of this dissertation deals with the traditional Christian religion that has been dominant in Western Europe for centuries. I am aware that there is a huge debate on what exactly is religion, also in discussions on how to assess and explain its change and decline. My approach is uses a social definition of religion predominantly, especially when I discuss attitudes of anti-religiosity, as these per definition depend on how people define and experience religion and how they relate to this religion (also see Laermans 1998) 4 See ARDA data archives on religious characteristics of states (http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/BROWN.asp, Web 21 Apr. 2016). 5 Campbell speaks of irreligion in this way: “Irreligion is those beliefs and actions which are expressive of attitudes of hostility or indifference toward the prevailing religion, together with indications of the rejection of its demands” (1971: 21). Strangely enough, since its publication, Campbell’s work hardly received any attention. See Campbell’s own reflection on this lack of attention here: https://blog.nsrn.net/2014/01/09/the-resurrection-of-the-sociology-of- irreligion/ (Web 2 Sep. 2016). About the term irreligion: I prefer the terms non-religiosity and anti-religiosity. Herein, I follow Lee, who picked up the discussion on Campbell’s definition of irreligion (2012). She argues that there is need for an alternative for ‘irreligion’, as this term is hardly used, or even understood, outside a small group of specialists (:132) and she proposes to use non-religion. 6 In several chapters, the distinction between different non-religious groups are not made, and the measures are so broad, that new agers, or believers without belonging, are included in the models measuring anti-religion, whereas in theory, they should only deal with the strictly non-religious. By using scales instead of dichotomous categories, this is pragmatically solved in my analyses. 7 Perhaps a better name for the theory discussed here would be ‘scientific rationalization theory.’ The notion of rationalization has different connotations in different contexts. I use it here in a quite narrow way. For others, like Weber and Berger, rationalization had to do much more with Christianity, prophets, ascetism and the assurance of salvation, than with science. Wilson, Martin and Bruce link rationalization with the rational organization of society, and the development of technological consciousness, which leads people to trust in scientific procedures and efficiency, without expecting God to play any role in everyday life (see Bruce 2011 for an overview). However, as I present the theories used in my empirical chapters here, I follow chapter 2’s use of the term rationalization here. 8This can lead to, but does not necessitate a situation of religious decline, where more people become less and less religious, due to the disappearance of the religious monopoly and the subsequent emergence of a range of co-existing and competing truth claims (see Berger 1967 and 2012 on the way that this undermines the plausibility of the latter, resulting in a decline of religion, also see Bruce 2011: 27, Houtman 2017 on differentiation and privatization). 9Although secular people usually do not identify themselves as such and relate more to a humanist or atheist identity, the consistent identification with secular values might create this shared identity (see Lee 2015b). In this study, secular identity is used as an analytical concept, not as an empirical concept.
16 Introduction
10 Chapters 2 and 3 were published in 2013 and 2015 respectively, chapters 4 and 5 are both accepted for publication and forthcoming in 2017.
Introduction 17
Chapter 2. Deprivatization of Disbelief? Non-Religiosity and Anti- Religiosity in 14 Western European Countries1
2.1 Introduction “There’s probably no God. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life”. Buses with these words drove around London and other British cities from the beginning of January 2009. It was the start of a British atheistic campaign, later also launched in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Italy, Spain, Germany, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. Even though these campaigns aroused considerable media attention in most of these countries, this assertive type of “new atheism” and its social and cultural support bases are only beginning to be explored (e.g. Amarasingam 2010). This is because students of religion have traditionally treated “non-religiousness” not so much as a domain of systematic empirical study, but rather as one of speculation. Some assume for instance that the predominant attitude towards religion in today’s massively secularized Western European countries is not so much one of hostility, but rather of disinterest (Bruce 2002), whereas others tacitly assume that non-religiosity logically and inevitably manifests itself as rationalist anti-religiosity (see for an overview: Stark, Iannaccone, and Finke 1996).
Remarkably, then, students of religion have made major efforts to compare religious traditions and to study how the latter are shaped and transformed by the historical, social and cultural circumstances they find themselves in, but a similar sensibility to specificity, particularity and variation is hard to find when it comes to non-religiosity. One consequence is that people without religious beliefs are often referred to as “atheists” (e.g. Becker and Vink 1994, Norris and Inglehart 2004: 186); even though research in the United States by the Pew Forum suggests that the latter label has narrower connotations than “non-religiosity”. Only about a quarter of those who are non-religious are willing to identify themselves as “atheists” and the remaining three quarters reject this label.11
Ribberink and Houtman (2010) refer to processes of “coming out” as an atheist (Smith 2011) as processes of “deprivatization of disbelief”. They note that in the Netherlands more and more disbelievers appear to express anti-religious sentiments on weblogs and social media and to argue for a removal of religion from politics and the public domain. These disbelievers have hence apparently transformed an indifferent “non-religiosity” into an assertive “anti-religiosity”. The study of such processes of
1 Originally published in Politics and Religion 6(3):101-20, with Peter Achterberg and Dick Houtman, 2013. Only the first person plural form of the original article is replaced by the singular form in this chapter. This is also true for chapter 3, 4, and 5.
18 Deprivatization of disbelief
deprivatization of disbelief necessitates the application of a distinction between private and indifferent “non-religiosity” on the one hand and public and assertive “anti-religiosity” on the other. Such an opening up of the traditional catch-all category of the non-religious “leftovers” for critical empirical scrutiny (see also Baker and Smith 2009a, 2009b) is especially important, because assertive anti- religiosity has more potential for political mobilization against public manifestations of religion than indifferent non-religiosity.
Against this background, I study how this type of “anti-religiosity” can be explained, with special reference to the role of national religiousness. This study thus feeds into the more general debate on how religious and secular fundamentalisms and violence shape the late-modern societies of the twenty- first century (e.g. Achterberg et al. 2009, Calhoun et al. 2011). I focus on Western Europe, because it is there that I find on the one hand some of the most massively secularized countries of the world (particularly in the North West, e.g., Scandinavia, United Kingdom, the Netherlands) and on the other hand countries where religion has retained much more of its former foothold (particularly in the South West, e.g., in Catholic countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy) (Martin 2005). I start with an elaboration of two theories that both relate anti-religiosity to national religious contexts, the rationalization theory and the deprivatization theory, but that do so in strikingly different ways. I then discuss my data and measurements, test the relevant hypotheses, and summarize and discuss my findings.
2.2 Explaining Anti-Religiosity: Theory and Hypotheses
There are two major theories that may be able to explain anti-religious attitudes. On the one hand, there is a long intellectual tradition that can be called the “rationalization theory”. It understands reason as the ultimate authority and religion as an irrational force, so that the unfolding of the former stimulates not simply non-religiosity, but anti-religiosity (see for an overview: Campbell 1971). On the other hand, I bring forward a strand of theory that I call the “deprivatization theory”, which leads to predictions that are diametrically opposed to those that can be derived from the rationalization theory. This is because it understands anti-religiosity as evoked by a massive public presence of religion (Cimino and Smith 2007, Stahl 2010), whereas it associates indifferent non-religiosity with secularized contexts (Taylor 2007: 12- 13). In what follows, I discuss both theories in more detail to derive the hypotheses that need to be tested to ascertain their empirical validity.
Deprivatization of disbelief 19
2.2.1 Anti-Religiosity as the Outcome of Rationalization The notions that there is no god and that religion is a false idea have often been grounded in rationalist convictions, central to which is a firm adherence to reason and science, as for instance in Kant, Marx and Freud12. Campbell (1971) describes how this has led to the development of a range of “rationalist” movements in the nineteenth and twentieth century, with rationalist societies, rationalist papers, rationalist press associations, and so on and so forth. This line of thinking has deeply influenced the social-scientific study of religion, especially in classical sociology, where Durkheim, Weber and others expected a growing influence of rational thinking in modern times to contribute to the demise of religion (Durkheim 1969: 29113, Weber 1991 [1920]). Stark, Iannaccone and Finke point out that some sociologists refer to rational thinking not only as the reason for why people do not become religious, or stop being religious, but even for becoming anti-religious (1996: 436, italics in original):
For many leading scholars, religion was not so much a phenomenon to be explained, as it was an enemy to be overcome. Starting with the assumption that religion is false, and thus less rational than other behaviors, these scholars employed unique theoretical principles to explain (and dismiss) it and, above all, to pronounce its inevitable demise.
This notion that reason inevitably defines religion as its enemy and will eventually undermine it has meanwhile been extensively critiqued. For one thing, Stark and Finke (2000) have argued against the notion that religion is irrational and cannot be explained rationally. Instead, they refer to rational behavior as the principal reason for why people are religious. For another thing, it has been argued that we increasingly live in a postmodern world, where not only religion, but also science has lost much of its former aura and plausibility (Davie 2007: 95, Houtman and Mascini 2002, Inglehart 1997: 79). Despite these critiques, rationalization theory continues to inform studies aimed at the explanation of disaffiliation from religion until the present day. These studies typically conceive of rationalization and religion as communicating vessels, measuring the former as level of education (at either the individual, country, or historical-period level) and assuming it to be hostile to and undermining the latter (e.g., Baker and Smith 2009a, Need and De Graaf 1996, Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2009, Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001: 594).
This rationalization theory has clear implications for where to expect to find most anti-religiosity. Given the assumed incompatibility of reason and religion, anti-religiosity is seen as the logical outcome of the spread of reason and the concomitant decline of religion, so that disbelievers in the least religious countries should be more anti-religious than disbelievers in more religious (“less rationalized”) countries.
20 Deprivatization of disbelief
This informs the hypothesis that in countries with lower levels of religiosity, disbelievers will feature higher levels of anti-religiosity than in countries with higher levels of religiosity (Hypothesis 1).
A central tenet of the rationalization theory is that scientific and technical progress will gradually make the world a more rational place, with the expansion of mass education in the twentieth century understood as the major vessel of this process. Because rationalization is seen as a gradually but ultimately inevitably unfolding historical process, disaffiliation from religion becomes ever more likely, which shows up in differences in religiosity between birth cohorts (Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001: 603):
This has nothing to do with growing older (an age effect), for it is related to the fact that people born in the 1930s and 1940s experienced much lower levels of rationalization during adolescence compared to people born in the 1970s and 1980s.
Because of its tenet that rationality and religion are incompatible, so that non-religiosity takes the shape of anti-religiosity, the rationalization theory predicts that in countries with lower levels of religiosity (more “rationalized” countries), younger birth cohorts will feature higher levels of anti-religiosity than older birth cohorts will (Hypothesis 2).
Finally, the assumption that an individual’s level of education reflects the degree to which he or she has been exposed to rationalization (e.g., Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2009) applies of course particularly if he or she has received his or her education in a less religious (“more rationalized”) society. This means that the rationalization theory also predicts that in countries with lower levels of religiosity, the higher educated will feature higher levels of anti-religiosity than the lower educated (Hypothesis 3).
2.2.2 Anti-Religiosity as the Outcome of Deprivatization of Disbelief A second explanation of anti-religiosity focuses on religion’s power to define what is “normal” and what is “deviant” in more and less religious national contexts. Until the 1960s, in all of the Western European countries under study here, being non-religious was an identity that needed to be defended or at least accounted for. Most Western Europeans were connected to a religious institution of some sort, the church had a major influence on politics and society, and the small number of non-religious people were firmly connected to anti-establishment and anti-religious institutions (McLeod 1997). Being non- religious at the time meant that one had to make a conscious decision to deviate from bourgeois conventions, and this generally meant that one needed to opt for a position that was more anti-religious than non-religious. This has changed since the sixties and seventies, when the Christian churches and Christian religion declined in adherence as well as public significance in all Western European
Deprivatization of disbelief 21
countries, albeit of course in different degrees. In the process, religion lost much of its former taken-for- granted public role, the discursive power of the religious institutions declined, and being non-religious became a more viable option, less subject to social sanctions than before. This means that it became easier to adopt a non-religious position that was less necessarily an anti-religious one. In fact, many Western Europeans did not even face the need to actively “choose” to become non-religious any longer, because religion lost its “natural” and self-evident character, so that it was hardly needed anymore to defend or justify a non-religious position (Taylor 2007: 12).
A second theory about the relationship between national religious context and anti-religiosity suggests that the existing cross-national variation in the public presence, visibility and vitality of religion does not remain without consequences, but evokes differences pertaining to “deprivatization of disbelief”. More specifically, it predicts that disbelievers in countries with low levels of religiosity are less anti-religious than disbelievers in countries like the United States, where religion is virtually omnipresent – a possibility that is at least hinted at in articles by Baker and Smith (2009b), Edgell, Gerteis and Hartmann (2006) and Hout and Fisher (2002). The deprivatization theory hence predicts that in countries with higher levels of religiosity, disbelievers will feature higher levels of anti-religiosity than in countries with lower levels of religiosity (Hypothesis 4), which is the mirror image of the hypothesis derived above from the rationalization theory.
In this case, too, formative experiences of having grown up in a more religious or a more secular society do logically make a difference. When someone has been born in the first half of the twentieth century, he or she has grown up in a context where most people were a member of a religious institution and where religion had a major influence on culture and politics. In the 1960s, large numbers of young people (who are today’s older generation) choose against this and actively disaffiliated from the churches for a wide range of reasons (Streib and Klein 2012). Because of this, today’s older birth cohorts will feature higher levels of anti-religiosity than younger ones, because the latter have grown up in a secular context that the former has not experienced during its formative years. Indeed, research by Ecklund and Scheitle (2007) and Sherkat (2008: 542) suggests that this generational difference does not exist in the United States, presumably because it has remained a much more religious country since the 1960s. Be this as it may, the deprivatization theory predicts that in countries with lower levels of religiosity, older birth cohorts will feature higher levels of anti-religiosity than younger birth cohorts (Hypothesis 5). Note that this hypothesis once again contrasts with the hypothesis derived above from the rationalization theory.
22 Deprivatization of disbelief
Finally, unlike the rationalization theory, the deprivatization theory does not assume that a high level of education is incompatible with religion because of their inherent “rationality” and “irrationality”, respectively. What it does assume, is that the high educated will oppose religion and rejected it if it constitutes an obstacle to individual liberty and acceptance of cultural difference. According to any number of studies, after all, a high level of education is one of the major sources of cultural and political tolerance in the Western democracies (see for an overview: Houtman 2003) and there are no good reasons to assume that this is any different for tolerance of religion. Indeed, Bruce (2002: 117) suggests that the relativism that is induced by higher education extends to tolerance of religion, so that a high level of education leads not so much to anti-religiosity, but rather to religious indifference. Again in contrast to the rationalization theory, then, the deprivatization theory predicts that in countries with lower levels of religiosity, the higher educated will feature lower levels of anti- religiosity than the lower educated (Hypothesis 6).
2.2.3 Hypotheses Both of the theories about anti-religiosity that I have discussed above relate anti-religiosity to national religious contexts, but they do so in strikingly different ways. All three hypotheses derived from one theory are contradicted by the three hypotheses derived from the other. They predict the highest levels of anti-religiosity for disbelievers in respectively the least (rationalization; Hypothesis 1) and the most religious countries (deprivatization; Hypothesis 4). They predict stronger anti-religiosity among respectively the younger (rationalization; Hypothesis 2) and the older generation (deprivatization; Hypothesis 5) in the most secularized countries. Finally, they predict stronger anti-religiosity among the higher than among the lower educated in respectively the least (rationalization; Hypothesis 3) and the most religious countries (deprivatization; Hypothesis 6).
2.3 Data and operationalization
In order to be able to test these hypotheses, I have used the dataset of the International Social Survey Program: Religion III (ISSP 2008). The ISSP 2008 dataset is optimal for my research purpose as it contains questions that focus on respondents’ attitudes to religion and religious people. As I am interested in anti-religiosity in countries where religion is thought to be disappearing, I focus on Western Europe. In the discussion on the decline of religion in some regions and the resurgence of religion in others, Western Europe is commonly seen as ‘the odd one out’ (Martin 2005: 47, see also Berger 1999, Greeley 2003). Unlike in other Western countries, such as the United States of America, in most Western European countries the church has lost most of its former strength, adherence and influence. This provides a very interesting background for the study of the dynamics of anti-religious
Deprivatization of disbelief 23
attitudes as a product of rationalization or as a deprivatized reaction against religion. For this reason, I selected the data from 14 countries in the ISSP dataset that are located in Western Europe (N=23,567). These countries are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), France (FR), Finland (FI), Great Britain (GB), Ireland (IE), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH) and Germany (DE).
The national church attendance is measured as the share of people going to church at least once a month or more in a particular country.
Anti-religiosity is measured by a scale tapping the respondents’ attitudes towards religious influence on public life. Largely based on Bruce (2011: 221) who used the same data, I use four questions that straightforwardly ask for people’s views on the influence religion may have on the public domain. Two of these ask for the attitude of the respondents towards religious leaders influencing governments’ decisions and peoples’ votes. The other two questions ask for response on statements about intolerance of religious people and whether religion creates conflict or not.14 I linearly combined the four abovementioned Likert items, with answer categories ranging between 1 (strongly agree) – 5 (strongly disagree), that together yield a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α: .72, see Table 2.1). Normally, the lower scores would indicate agreement with anti-religious sentiments. I reversed this scale, so that higher scores indicate higher levels of anti-religiosity. Scores that were not on the scale of 1– 5 were coded as missings.
Table 2.1. Factor and reliability analysis for the anti-religiosity scale Questions Factor Loading How much do you agree or disagree that: Religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote in elections? 0.81 Religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions? 0.79 Looking around the world, religions bring more conflict than peace? 0.67 People with very strong religious beliefs are often too intolerant of others? 0.66 Eigen value 2.17 R2 0.54 Cronbach’s α 0.72 N 23,567 Source: ISSP 2008.
Disbelief is measured by looking at those people who answered the question what describes best their belief with ‘I do not believe in God’. They were labeled ‘disbelievers’ (=1) and the others were labeled ‘non-disbelievers’ (=0). The latter are not to be called believers, since this group also includes agnostics, people that are not sure what to believe and those who belief in ‘a higher being’. Between 0% (Austria) and 5.5 % (Belgium) of respondent were missing on this variable.
24 Deprivatization of disbelief
The different birth cohorts are coded into three groups. People born after 1974 are coded as young, (age 15-34, 26.5 % of respondents), people born between 1959 and 1973 are coded as middle (age 35-54, 36.4 % of respondents), and people born before 1958 are coded old (age 55+, 37.1 % of respondents).
Education is measured as the number of years people were enrolled in full-time schooling.
The two theories that can explain anti-religiosity as described above, led to three hypotheses that focus on disbelief, birth cohort and level of education. Other literature suggests that there are more variables that are related to attitudes towards religion. These are marital status and gender (e.g. Bainbridge 2005, Ecklund and Scheitle 2007, Miller and Hofmann 1995, Miller and Stark 2002). Marital status has the values 1) ‘Married’ (54.2 %), 2) ‘Widowed’ (7.6%), 3) ‘Divorced’ (7.3%), 4) ‘Separated’ (1.9%), 5) ‘Not/Never Married’ (25.9%). Of all respondents 3.3 % did not answer this question and were coded as missings. Gender has the values 1) Male (46.4%) and 2) Female (53.6%). I use these variables as control variables to test my model.
Deprivatization of disbelief 25
2.4 Results
Before I start testing my hypotheses, first, I will look at where I can find the highest levels of anti- religiosity. Figure 2.1 presents the average level of anti-religiosity (y-axis) as a function of the level of national church attendance.
Figure 2.1. Predicted mean anti-religiosity and national church attendance per country for 14 Western European countries. Source: ISSP 2008
Figure 2.1 shows that anti-religiosity is most prevalent in the more secularized countries and least prevalent in the highly religious countries. There appears to be a very simple correlation between the level of national church attendance in a certain country and the average anti-religious attitude in that country: The more religious a country is, the higher its religious tolerance and vice versa. This is not surprising. However, even if there is a direct correlation between low levels of national church attendance and anti-religiosity, I have no answer to the question if lower levels of church attendance can explain anti-religiosity best or if there are other variables that correlate stronger with anti- religiosity. Through a discussion of two theoretical paths, I have come to two sets of opposing hypotheses that helps me answer this question.
I used ordinary least squares linear multilevel analysis with maximum likelihood estimation for two reasons to test these hypotheses. First and foremost, multilevel analysis allows one to simultaneously
26 Deprivatization of disbelief
estimate effects of individual-level variables, and of country-level variables. As my data is structured in such a way that there are two levels, 23,567 individuals with certain characteristics (e.g. birth cohort, disbelief, etc.) are nested in 14 countries with certain characteristics (national church attendance), multilevel analysis is the most suited option. Second, as my hypotheses aim at investigating how individuals react differently to different country-level church attendance, multilevel analysis, which allows for the estimation of two equations, one for the main effects and one for the slopes of the effects, is very suited as it allows for testing cross-level interactions. For each set of hypotheses, I ran a separate model estimating so-called fixed effects. These are effects of the variables at either individual- or national level, and the interactions between them. Each of the models also contains so-called random effects. These random effects, noted as deviances, are estimations of the variance of the intercept of anti- religiosity, which show that the level of anti-religiosity varies across countries. In addition, there are estimations of the variances of the slopes of disbelief, age and education showing that the effects of these variables in model 1, 2 and 3 respectively vary across countries as well. Unfortunately, the N at the highest, national, level is rather limited (14) so I cannot estimate an unlimited number of covariates in my models. Table 2.2 shows the results of my analysis, which will be discussed below15.
Table 2.2. Explaining anti-religiosity (OLS multilevel analysis, Maximum Likelihood, N=23,567 in 14 countries) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Constant 0.14*** 0.20*** 0.37*** (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) Age low -0.04** -0.08~ -0.03* (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) Age medium 0.03** -0.01 0.04*** (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) Age old (ref.) 0 0 0 National church attendance -0.57** -0.73*** -1.47*** (0.18) (0.20) (0.23) Disbelief 0.29*** 0.36*** 0.35*** (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) Education -0.01~ -0.01*** -0.02*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married -0.02~ -0.01 -0.02~ (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Widowed -0.07** -0.06* -0.06** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Divorced/separated 0.05** 0.06** 0.05** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Unmarried (ref.) 0 0 0 Female -0.03** -0.03* -0.03** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Male (ref.) 0 0 0
Deprivatization of disbelief 27
Disbelief X National church attendance 0.28 -- -- (0.22) Age low X National church attendance -- 0.28~ -- (0.19) Age medium X National church attendance -- 0.24 -- (0.18) Age old X National church attendance (ref.) -- 0 --
Education X National church attendance -- -- 0.07*** (0.01) -2loglikelihood 41559.77 41505.98 41514.77 Deviance individual level 0.50 0.50 0.50 Deviance country level 0.01 0.01 0.01 Deviance disbelief X10-2 0.01 -- -- Deviance age X10-2 -- 0.01 -- Deviance education X10-2 -- -- 0.01 ~p<-0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (one-tailed test for significance)
Table 2.2 shows a number of effects of the variables on anti-religiosity. As said, I included a number of interaction effects, each of them testing another set of opposing hypotheses. To enable interpretation of these effects, I plotted each of these effects in a figure. Figure 2.2 shows a visual presentation of the fact that disbelievers have higher levels of anti-religiosity than non-disbelievers. Secondly, and more importantly, it shows that relative to the non-disbelievers, disbelievers have higher levels of anti-religiosity in the context of high national church attendance. Although it is true that the general level of anti-religiosity in secular countries is higher than in religious countries (which may be predicted by rationalization theory), the effect of religiosity on the anti-religiosity of disbelievers relative to non-disbelievers is more significant to me (and confirms deprivatization theory). Therefore, I confirm Hypothesis 4 (deprivatization) and refute Hypothesis 1 (rationalization).
28 Deprivatization of disbelief
Figure 2.2. Predicted anti-religiosity for Non-Disbelievers and Disbelievers in contexts of low and high national church attendance in 14 countries, 2008
The second set of opposing hypotheses concerns the relation between the religious context of a country and the influence of birth cohort on anti-religiosity. Here, I predicted that if the rationalization theory is right, in a context with low levels of national church attendance, people from younger birth cohorts will have higher levels of anti-religiosity. Deprivatization theory would have it the other way around (higher levels of anti-religiosity for older birth cohorts in context with low levels of national church attendance, Hypotheses 2 and 5 respectively). Table 2.2 visualizes that the influence of birth cohort on anti-religiosity is limited. In general, older people tend to be more intolerant towards religion than younger people. In Figure 2.3, the influence of the variable birth cohort on the predicted anti- religiosity is presented in the context of low and high national church attendance. Here, the older birth cohort is very much affected by the religious context. It shows that older cohorts tend to be relatively less anti-religious in a context of high national church attendance. This illustrates how national church attendance is important for analyzing the influence of birth cohorts on anti-religiosity, because the rationalization hypothesis would have had it the other way around. When comparing birth cohorts in different contexts, it becomes clear that the deprivatization hypothesis fits better with the findings. The effect of the religious contexts on the older birth cohorts is as expected, based on the deprivatization theory (disaffiliation of earlier generations leads to higher levels of anti-religiosity in contexts with low levels of national church attendance). It is also in line of the deprivatization theory that younger cohorts
Deprivatization of disbelief 29
would be less anti-religious in contexts with low national church attendance, since they have no need for being intolerant to a religion that they hardly notice. Research done by Ecklund and Scheitle and Sherkat suggests that younger generations are less anti-religious than the middle birth cohorts are. This is confirmed by my findings.
Figure 2.3. Predicted anti-religiosity for three age cohorts in contexts of low and high national church attendance in 14 countries, 2008
The third set of hypotheses predicted the influence of education on anti-religiosity. Here, the expectation was that in a context with low levels of religiosity, people with higher levels of education would be more anti-religious, according to the rationalization theory (hypothesis 3). Hypothesis 6, derived from the deprivatization theory, says the opposite. Table 2.2 shows that the variable education in itself does not correlate with anti-religiosity strongly. Looking at the combination of the variable education and national church attendance, however, major differences occur. Figure 2.4, which again illustrates the interaction-term found in the multilevel analysis, shows how higher educated people in a climate of high national church attendance are far more anti-religious than their counterparts in countries with low religiosity. In addition, for the people with a low level of education, in a country with low levels of national church attendance there is a higher score on level of anti-religiosity, than in countries with higher levels of national church attendance. Thus, the religious context has a major impact on how anti-religious people from different levels of education are. Both for the higher educated (who are highly anti-religious in religious contexts, but not in non-religious contexts) as for the lower educated (who are highly anti-religious in non-religious contexts, but not in religious contexts). This
30 Deprivatization of disbelief
influence of religious context on anti-religiosity of the higher and lower educated is exactly as I expected from the deprivatization theory point of view. Thus, Hypothesis 6 (deprivatization) is confirmed and Hypothesis 3 (rationalization) refuted.
Figure 2.4 Predicted anti-religiosity for lower educated and higher educated in contexts of low and high national church attendance in 14 countries, 2008
To sum up, my analysis shows that all three hypotheses from the deprivatization theory can be confirmed and that I did not find much empirical evidence supporting the three rationalization hypotheses. At the same time, this analysis answers the question what conditions will make non- religious more likely to have an anti-religious attitude. My findings demonstrate that religion matters to disbelievers a lot, but in a context of high religiosity, they have relatively higher anti-religiosity rates than non-disbelievers do. In the findings on the role of education on anti-religiosity, I discovered that it is the context of high or low levels of religiosity that influences the outcomes significantly.
2.5 Conclusions
I started this article with the presentation of atheistic bus campaigns and the debate on ‘new atheism’ that has intensified over the last couple of years. However, instead of joining this debate with another opinion, I wanted to address the question on how these anti-religious ideas resonate with the people in the streets of Western Europe. I focused on two theories that brought up a possible explanation for the anti-religious zeal in Western European countries and investigated under what conditions people
Deprivatization of disbelief 31
without religious beliefs will grow an anti-religious attitude. The analysis presented above shows that anti-religiosity does resonate well with people in the streets of Western Europe. However, it does so most, with disbelievers in highly religious contexts, preferably when they are younger and higher educated. In the streets of the countries with lower levels of religiosity, the older, lower educated disbelievers are attracted to anti-religious ideas. The deprivatization theory offered the best theoretical framework to assess these differences. The bottom-line of this theory is that anti-religiosity is not something that comes with either age, disbelief or education, but it is the context of religion that triggers this reaction.
I have focused my attention on Western Europe, but I think that this analysis of anti-religiosity is relevant for the study of what is currently happening in the United States as well. Here, atheists (as a specific group of disbelievers) are seen as immoral and dangerous for the national values (Edgell, Gerteis and Hartmann 2006), but they are more and more finding ways to establish their identity as a minority over and against the more fundamentalist religious groups (Cimino and Smith 2007, Davie 2007: 95, Hout and Fisher 2002, Stahl 2010). This is a kind of conflict that fits with the politicized “cultural war” idiom, commonly used in the United States (Hunter 1991). My analysis indicates that anti-religiosity in the first place is a reaction against religion. It would be interesting to see what kind of religion is the trigger in this cultural conflict and if this “cultural war” is something only the higher educated and the cultural elite are part of (like Campbell describes discussing humanism in Britain, 1971: 96), or if this is a broader cultural conflict with other social classes in society as well.
For Western Europe, my conclusions are relevant to the debate on the cultural conflicts that arise from what has been called the ‘twin maladies of modernity’ (Achterberg 2006, Houtman, Aupers and De Koster 2011, Zijderveld 2000). With the falling apart of institutional “plausibility structures” (Berger 1967), more and more people feel alienated and experience a sense of anomie. This has also implications for the non-religious Westerners (Campbell 2007). My findings show that especially the education one has had influences how people react to this situation. Recently Kronjee and Lampert (2006: 194) and Ribberink and Houtman (2010: 222) hinted at the possibility that the lower educated would be a new group with anti-religious sentiments in the Dutch society. My findings confirm these inclinations. More research should be done to exemplify and expand the understanding of this relationship and to find out what exactly motivates the lower educated to take up this intolerant position towards religion. I would expect that it does influence their voting behavior (for example through anti-Islamic populism), where they want to live (not in areas where people live with other religious values) and how they express themselves online. An example of such a cultural conflict over political and religious identities is the
32 Deprivatization of disbelief
case of Anders Breivik, the Norwegian mass killer. Although he refers to himself as a Crusader, actually his hatred was pointed towards the (in his words) anti-individualist, pro-Islamic/anti-Jewish, and cultural Marxist/multicultural politics of Norwegian and European governments and politicians.16 He and other Right-wing extremists position themselves as conservative Christians as well as secular Europeans against the influx of Muslim culture. The relation between this anti-religiosity (anti-Islam in this case) and the perceived threat of national and individual identities in a multicultural setting should receive more attention by sociologists. It can help us understand the way our societies accommodate differences in values and opinions, be they religiously or politically inspired.
An interesting expansion of this research would be to see if there is a correlation between the growth of anti-religiosity and the decline of religious adherence over time. I would expect that the outcome of anti-religious action might as well be religious tolerance in some countries as a revival of religion in others (a kind of “purified” religion). Barro and McCleary (2005) demonstrate that the result of the anti-religious agenda of Communism has had a short-term effect. Stalin tried to extinguish religion, but 10-15 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, religion has made a huge comeback in many ex-Soviet countries (Froese 2008, Greeley 2003). The authors of “new atheism” also clearly advocate an anti-religious agenda. Is this anti-religiosity of the higher educated in religious countries a harbinger of a decline in religion, which leads to a situation of non-religion? On the other hand, if it are the younger higher educated disbelievers that become more and more anti-religious, as some authors already noticed for the younger religious groups (see Roeland et. al. 2010, Stahl 2010), this could lead to serious cultural conflicts as well. My findings suggest that over time, when the influence of religion decreases, and birth cohorts grow older, this might lead to religious tolerance. More longitudinal research should be done to see whether a climate of religious intolerance really affects religious growth in a positive or negative way. In addition, this kind of research can help us to see if there is a tendency towards secular-religious polarization in the more secular countries, or a growing tolerance between religious and non-religious groups.
11 http://pewforum.org/Not-All-Nonbelievers-Call-Themselves-Atheists.aspx (Web 29 June 2011) 12 E.g. ‘The Richard Dawkins Foundation: for reason and science’ or the British Humanist Association that promotes an ethical life on the basis of ‘reason and humanity’. See also Kant, I, (1960 [1796]) Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (translated by Theodore Greene and Hoyt Hudson), New York, Harper and Row; Marx, K. (1844) Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3 (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1975): 176. See also Geoghegan 2004. 13 “Because it becomes more rational, the collective conscience becomes less imperative, and for this very reason, it wields less restraint over the free development of individual varieties”. See Casanova (1994) for a further discussion. 14 Bruce (2011: 221) uses the same four questions, studying sympathy for religions in Britain in 1998 and 2008, but adds two more on tolerance of religious power and confidence in religious organizations. An alternative would be to also include the questions that relate tolerance of religion to the dichotomy between science and faith (questions 11a and 11b), but we follow Greeley (2003) in his concern that these questions are biased and do not measure a general
Deprivatization of disbelief 33
attitude of anti-religiosity but a very specific pro-science attitude. The same counts for the questions that ask for reaction on religious extremists, which is not a general religious phenomenon, but a very specific type of religious practice. Therefore, we chose not to include them in my analyses. Note, however, that additional analysis revealed that inclusion of these items does not make a difference for the results obtained and reported in this paper. 15 Even though Denmark and Ireland seem to jump out in Figure 2.1, removing these countries from my analyses presented here in Table 2.2, does not substantially affect the results obtained in this paper. Even without Denmark and Ireland, the patterns found in this paper remain generally the same. 16 http://www.scribd.com/doc/60791867/2083-a-European-Declaration-of-Independence, page 828. (Web 24 February 2012)
34 Deprivatization of disbelief
Chapter 3. Are all socialists anti-religious? Anti-religiosity and the socialist left in 21 Western European countries2
Socialism is man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the abolition of religion
Karl Marx17
3.1 Introduction: socialism and anti-religiosity For Karl Marx, socialism was about the realization of an ideal society that had overcome the problems associated with capitalism and religion. This did not necessarily involve fighting religion at all cost. He did not envision an anti-religious society, but a society that no longer needed to be concerned about religion at all. Followers of Marx, however, did concern themselves with religion. Much of the history of the 20th century is marked by the Russian attempt to become a world power based on a socialist ‘scientific atheistic’ ideology. Froese (2004: 37) notes that “post-revolutionary Russia appeared the ideal place to spread the doctrine of scientific atheism. Leading up to the Russian Revolution, many Russians were completely disillusioned with their political and cultural traditions and after the Tsarist regime was overthrown, many believed in the promises of a new socialist utopia”. Indeed, the Russian Orthodox state religion boasted adherence rates of no less than 76 percent in 1900, with 0 percent non-religiosity, whereas during the Soviet rule these numbers had by 1970 declined to 28 percent and increased to 52 percent respectively (Barro and McCleary 2005).
However, the marriage between Soviet socialism and the anti-religious agenda the Soviet rulers advocated has not been the only way in which socialists have concerned themselves with religion. Contemporary socialist movements boast a wide range of different attitudes towards religion, ranging from fiercely anti-religious to mild and tolerant. In Western Europe for example, French socialism traditionally boasts and promotes disbelief and secularism on the one hand, aiming to remove all references to God from education and public administration (Knutsen 2004, Waller and Fennema 1988). On the other hand, in countries like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, socialists traditionally show an indifferent or tolerant attitude towards religion (Brown 2001, Waller and Fennema 1988). Apparently, there is nothing inherently ‘anti-religious’ about socialism. It can be both tolerant and
2 Originally published in Journal of Contemporary Religion 30(3):435–52 with Peter Achterberg and Dick Houtman, 2015.
Are all socialists anti-religious? 35
intolerant towards religion. This raises the question what makes socialists have anti-religious attitudes in some countries, while in others they are tolerant towards religion.
This paper addresses this question and aims to develop and test a theory about variations in anti- religious attitudes among socialists across national contexts in Western Europe. First of all, I will develop what I call the ‘religious pressure’ thesis, on the basis of a literature review. I will derive two hypotheses from the latter about how the religious context affects the degree to which socialists embrace anti- religious attitudes. I will then test these hypotheses by means of a multilevel analysis of survey data from the European Values Study for 21 Western-European countries (1990-2008). I will summarize my conclusions in the final section.
3.2 Theory and hypotheses
3.2.1 Socialism and Anti-Religiosity in Western Europe For long, socialism has been associated with the opposition to religion, the church and faith in many European countries. This has not only been the case in Communist Eastern Europe; anti-religiosity has also surfaced in Western European countries like France, Italy and Germany. The historian McLeod describes how in the latter country, to become a socialist was part of a larger trend of dechristianisation during the imperial period, especially for working class people (McLeod 1982). He presents German socialism as a much needed ideological alternative for the Lutheran church. Socialists “tried to escape from the influence of the state and its ideological allies by creating a comprehensive range of counter- institutions within which their distinctive identity could be preserved and their distinctive ideas propagated” (ibid: 335). By the end of the 19th and during the 20th century, this pattern has been visible in many Western European countries. In France, the need for an alternative to the religious worldview became so pressing that there were groups on the political left that not only rejected religion, but developed alternative rites and rituals modelled after religious behaviors (e.g. the ‘Society of Mutual Autopsy’, Hecht 1997).
Nevertheless, the anti-religiosity of these socialists is not the whole story. The popularity and growth of socialism did not only inspire apostates and non-religious people; it also influenced the theologians and religious philosophers of that time. To many Christians, the egalitarian and social program of socialism was very appealing. As a result, a Christian socialist movement developed from the beginning of the 20th century and onwards which received wide recognition, amongst others by the famous German theologian Karl Barth. He supposedly said that ‘A true Christian must be a socialist (if he is serious about the reformation of Christianity). A true socialist must be a Christian (if he is concerned
36 Are all socialists anti-religious?
with the reformation of socialism)’ (Barth quoted in Busch 1976: 83). Other well-known proponents of this view were Paul Tillich in the United States and Gustavo Gutierrez in Latin America (Gill 1998, Stenger and Stone 2002). This popularity of socialism among Christians led to the formation of Christian socialist parties in several Western European countries, many of which later merged with social democratic or green parties (this happened in Britain and the Netherlands, for example, Bas 1999, Cort 1988).
From the anti-religious ‘Society of Mutual Autopsy’ (Hecht 1997) to the progressively Christian ‘Evangelische Volkspartij’ (‘Evangelical People’s Party’, Bas 1999), socialists have developed a wide variety in attitudes towards religion. An indication of a possible explanation for this variation is given by Steve Bruce, who notes that the values and practices of the British political left are heavily influenced by the Protestant sects (2011: 8): ‘The British labour movement always owed far more to the Methodists and Baptists than it did to Karl Marx’. This suggests that the variety in attitudes towards religion could be explained by the local religious context (also see Brown 2001). This idea can also be found in the works of David Martin on secularization (1978, 2005). He states that politics and religion are ‘isomorphic’ in the sense that ‘historic religious moulds of European societies are mirrored in characteristic secular mutations and transpositions’ (2005: 80), as if ‘you read one from the other’ (ibid: 47). This implies that the differences in attitude of socialists towards religion can be explained by the differences that can be found in the various religious contexts. The specific pressure exerted in this religious context will determine the attitude of socialists towards religion. This is what I call the ‘religious pressure thesis’. My aim is to further develop this thesis and test the hypotheses that can be derived from it.
3.2.2 The religious pressure thesis on anti-religiosity and socialism The religious pressure thesis focuses on the role of the religious context in explaining anti-religiosity. This approach is primarily based on David Martin’s writing on secularization. Central to his secularization theory is the way in which different religious cultures shape the trajectories of secularization in those countries (Martin 2007). For Martin, religion does more than provide for the religious needs of some individuals. It penetrates into the cultural make-up of a country and continues to do so long after people have stopped going to church. Talking about nationalism and religious identities, he states that ‘[r]eligion carries national identity under threat: after all, religion almost always fulfils other roles than what we today label purely religious’ (Martin 2014a). This is an important observation for the theoretical understanding of what a religion does to a culture. Martin speaks of ‘religious cultures’, looking into the way religion influences elements of the broader culture like language,
Are all socialists anti-religious? 37
architecture, art, and literature. Thus, when one speaks of those who are no longer connected to a religious institution of some sort (the non-religious or the secular), or those who are opposed to a religious institution of any kind (the anti-religious or the secularist), and when one speaks about the process that tries to describe these processes of changing roles for and attitudes towards religion (trajectories or narratives of secularization), one must look at the specific religious culture in which these processes occur (1978, 2005, see also Berlinerblau 2012, Calhoun et al. 2011, Casanova 2008, Lee 2012, Ribberink and Houtman 2010).
Martin’s ‘religious cultures’ argument counters the arguments of those who still see the overcoming of religion by the secular as the next phase in the development of modernity, or in his words the ‘interim formation prior to the secular denouement’. He continues to say that ‘[t]here are, for example, numerous accounts of Christian socialism which treat it as ‘only’ an interim anticipation of real secular socialism’ (2005: 8, see also Taylor 2007). Instead, Martin suggests one should look at both the religious and the political phenomena as closely interrelated. This implies that anti-religious movements are connected to a religious culture in such a way that they can be seen as mirror images of the religious movements they despise (compare Asad 2008, Bruce 2011: 8, Williamson and Yancey 2013).
In the literature on this topic, it is almost always Catholicism and socialism that feature when it comes to the mirroring of religious culture. For example, Martin distinguishes various types of national religious cultures, amongst other things on the basis of the presence of a Catholic or Orthodox religious monopoly. This type of religious culture, he explains, is particularly susceptible to manifestations of the secular - not so much merely non-religious in a benevolent and tolerant fashion, but rather as a sort of secular religion in itself, leavened with anti-religious zeal (1978: 24):
[A] Catholic or Orthodox monopoly creates a militant counter-image of itself. The nexus of the French Enlightenment doctrines resembles a Catholicism inverted and the secular religions produced by France are sometimes a form of Catholicism without Christianity.
According to Martin, religious cultures dominated by a Catholic or Orthodox religion are more likely to evoke unequivocally anti-religious reactions than more pluralistic Protestant religious cultures. Also, as several authors have argued, in the context of Catholic and Orthodox cultures this reaction almost always has a socialist political agenda (Bruce 2002: 10, Campbell 2007: 224, Martin 1978, 2005, McLeod 1997, Taylor 2008, Van Rooden 2004).
What these authors do not make clear, however, is what it is in the Catholic or Orthodox religious cultures, as opposed to Protestant cultures, that makes socialists develop anti-religious attitudes. Is it
38 Are all socialists anti-religious?
related to the notion that Catholics are more religiously active and that this activity is experienced as more repressing towards non-Catholics? Or is their collective identity itself seen as a larger threat to socialist ideals than the Protestant identity? In other words, what kind of religious pressure does effectively evoke an anti-religious attitude in socialists? Is it pressure of religious activity or pressure of religious identity that leads these socialists into resisting religion18? Based on a discussion of available literature, I will now develop two hypotheses in order to answer this question.
3.2.3 Hypotheses A first hypothesis looks at the religious pressure formed by religious activity in a certain context. Since the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the overarching power of the Christian churches has declined significantly, although this has been a more manifest process in the Protestant countries than in the predominantly Catholic and Orthodox ones (Berger 1970, Bruce 2011, Martin 1978, Taylor 2008). In the changing religious climate that affected all these churches, those that remained strong became even more active, while others, especially those that had a more formal and nominal following, lost much of their presence and influence (Achterberg et al. 2009). In general, it can be said that the Catholic and Orthodox churches were part of the first group and the Protestant churches part of the latter. This implies that in Catholic or Orthodox countries nowadays, religion is more of a cultural force to reckon with than in Protestant countries, since it is more active, present and socially visible. I expect that the personal confrontation between actively religious people and socialists will harden the negative attitude of socialists towards religions and the religious, and lead them to consider a more activist anti-religious position (e.g. Visser 2003). The first hypothesis that can be formulated is that the higher the national level of active religious involvement, the more socialists tend to have anti-religious attitudes (Hypothesis 1).
Apart from David Martin, authors like Peter Berger (1970) and Charles Taylor (2008) have also pointed to the collective national identity that Catholicism and Orthodoxy have been able to create. In those countries where the Catholic or Orthodox Church has deeply impacted the sense of national identity people have, socialists who want to reform society according to their political ideas, find their main obstacle to be the dominating cultural force that the Catholic or Orthodox Church is. Taylor argues that when a collective religion overlaps with the political identity, and that religion claims total power and control, this will call for anti-clerical reactions of total control by the state as well (2008: 226).
Martin argues that the countries with Catholic or Orthodox monopolies19 feature predominantly collective values, like solidarity, nationalism and respect for authority, which are the basis for social and cultural monocultures (Martin 1978). I expect socialists to mirror these collective religious structures by
Are all socialists anti-religious? 39
building political counter-structures, which in this context will inevitably be anti-religious. Martin calls those structures ‘rivalrous secular universalisms’ (1978: 76). Here, the argument is centered on the pressure formed by the collective instead of the active type of religiosity. This leads me to formulate the following hypothesis: In countries with high levels of Catholic or Orthodox affiliation, people with high levels of socialist ideals will also have high levels of anti-religious attitudes (Hypothesis 2).
3.3 Data and operationalization
In order to be able to test these two hypotheses, I have used the following data sets of the European
Values Study20: EVS 1990 (2nd wave), EVS 1999 (3rd wave), EVS 2008 (4th wave). These data sets are the most commonly used data sets that deal with economic, political and religious values in Western Europe. I excluded the 1981 data set, because it contained too few variables that were included in the other three waves as well. Only in the last three waves did I find enough overlap in the questions asked to use them as a single combined data set. The reason that I wanted to use more than one wave has to do with the fact that it gives me a larger number of countries to work with, since each country that was part of more than one EVS-wave counts double (or more) in the country-level data-analysis. This is important for the multilevel analysis design, since it gives me a larger country-level sample size21. In the discussion on the decline of religion in some regions and the resurgence of religion in others, Western Europe is commonly seen as ‘the odd one out’22 (Martin 2005: 47, see also Berger 1999, Bruce 2011, Greeley 2003). Unlike in other Western countries, such as the United States of America, the church has lost most of its former strength, adherence and influence in most Western European countries. Its diverse pattern of religious cultures and large shares of non-religious people provide a very interesting background for my study of non-religiosity, socialism and anti-religiosity. The Western European countries under study here are (year of EVS-wave between brackets): Austria (1990, 1999, 2008) Belgium (1990, 1999, 2008),
Cyprus (2008)23, Denmark (1990, 1999, 2008), Finland (1990, 1999, 2009), France (1990, 1999, 2008),
Germany (1990, 1999, 2008), Greece (2008)24, Great Britain (1990, 1999, 2009), Iceland (1990, 1999, 2008), Ireland (1990, 1999, 2008), Italy (1990, 1999, 2009), Luxembourg (1999, 2008), Malta (1990, 1999, 2008), the Netherlands (1990, 1999, 2008), Norway (1990, 2008), Portugal (1990, 1999, 2008), Spain (1991, 1999, 2008), Sweden (1990, 1999 2008), Switzerland (2008), and Northern Ireland (1990, 1999, 2008) with a N=68,918 in 58 country/waves.
Socialist ideology is measured by looking at the respondents’ preference for voting for a political party that is based on socialist ideology, combined with the creation of a scale tapping the respondents’ attitudes towards socialist political-economic views. I am interested to see under what circumstances a wide variety of people adhering to a socialist ideology take on anti-religious ideals. For the voting
40 Are all socialists anti-religious?
preferences therefore, I did not only include the far left, but also the mainstream social democratic parties that are promoting economic equality and a large role for the state in providing for its citizens. Based on the classification done by the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project
(MRG/CMP)25, I coded all political parties of Western Europe either as ‘socialist’ (including communist and social democrats) or ‘else’ (including the greens, liberals, conservatives and nationalists). People indicating a preference for socialist parties were coded 1, all others were coded 0.
For the political/economic views that are part of the socialist ideology scale, I had to limit myself to those items that have been included in all three waves of the European Values Study. One question was whether respondents would prefer businesses to be owned by private people or by government on a scale of 1-10, where a higher score (10) would indicate preference for the latter. A similar question was asked to measure whether respondents would see competition as something good (1) or harmful (10) for people’s work ethic and creativity. Again a similar question was asked, looking at whether respondents would hold individuals or the state responsible to provide for people’s well-being, where again a higher score (10) would indicate preference for the latter. All items were standardized and linearly combined in
order to create a scale for ‘socialism’ (see Table 3.126).
Table 3.1. Factor and reliability analysis for the Economic values scale Item Factor Loading Preference for government ownership? 0.75 Preference for competition as harmful? 0.73 Preference for state responsible for providing? 0.71 Eigen value 1.59 R2 0.53 Cronbach’s α 0.56 N 55,010 Source: EVS 1990-2008.
Anti-religiosity is measured by looking at the two items that can be seen to measure the respondents’ hostility towards religion. One item asks whether the respondent is a religious person. The answers to this item differentiate between religious, non-religious and ‘convinced atheist’. Although the term ‘atheist’ is very much contested and can mean many different things, in this case it is clear that people have to see it as something different from religious and non-religious. I assume that most respondents will have read the term ‘convinced atheist’ meaning ‘anti-religious’, since the other options do include the religious and non-religious category. Read in this way, people react to this question positively (religious), neutral (non-religious) or negatively (convinced atheist). Therefore, I coded people with religious preference as 1, non-religious preference as 2, and convinced atheist as 3 (answer category ‘do not know’ was coded as missing).
Are all socialists anti-religious? 41
The item that asks for people’s confidence in the church as an institution can also be seen as an expression of religious tolerance (or the opposite: intolerance). Its answer category is a 4-point scale, ranging from ‘a great deal’ to ‘none at all’. I used the mean of the standardized results of this measure (which has already been coded in such a way that high scores indicate mistrust of the church), together with the standardized score for the ‘convinced atheist’ item, to create an index for anti-religiosity. The factor and reliability analysis of this scale is presented in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. Factor and reliability analysis for the Anti-Religiosity scale Item Factor Loading Convinced Atheist? 0.75 Confidence in church low? 0.75 Eigen value 1.50 R2 0.75 Cronbach’s α 0.67 N 64,280
Source: EVS 1990-2008.
Central to my hypotheses are the different ways in which religious pressure can lead socialists to develop an anti-religious attitude. The first measure of religious pressure is based on the active religiosity per country. Attendance rates indicate the actual presence and activities of religion in a certain culture. I could look at all kinds of measures of active religiosity, but the most straightforward way here, is to look at how many people in a country actually go to church and how regularly. Therefore, the measure I use is church attendance rates on a national level. I use the specific item that asked for church visits besides weddings and funerals and similar occasions, and coded all people that attended once a month or more positive (answers 1-3 = 1) and those that only went on religious holidays, just once a year or never neutral (answers 4-8 = 0). I calculated an average score per country on this item, which is a percentage of the total population that actively visits church services. Table 3.3 gives an overview of the frequencies of this measure.
Table 3.3. Percentage of actively religious people per country Country 1990 1999 2008 Austria 0.45 0.43 0.28 Belgium 0.35 0.28 0.18 Cyprus 0.56 Denmark 0.11 0.12 0.10 Finland 0.11 0.10 France 0.17 0.12 0.12 Germany 0.33 0.35 0.23 Greece 0.43 Iceland 0.09 0.12 0.12 Ireland 0.88 0.75 0.57
42 Are all socialists anti-religious?
Italy 0.51 0.53 0.48 Luxembourg 0.30 0.19 Malta 0.90 0.87 0.84 Netherlands 0.31 0.25 0.26 Norway 0.13 0.12 Portugal 0.48 0.53 0.48 Spain 0.41 0.36 0.26 Sweden 0.10 0.09 0.08 Switzerland 0.20 Great Britain 0.25 0.19 0.20 Northern Ireland 0.69 0.60 0.54 Source: EVS 1990-2008.
The second measure of religious pressure is related to the collective identity of a religious culture. The most straightforward way of measuring this is the level of affiliation with Catholic or Orthodox churches27 in a country. I call this variable the Catholic/Orthodox Religiosity. All respondents were asked if they were a member of a religious denomination (yes=1, no=0) and if so, which their religious denomination was. I selected the respondents that had indicated to be a member of a Catholic or an Orthodox denomination. These scores were combined, so that I could create a score per country that indicates the share of a country’s population that is affiliated with either the Catholic or the Orthodox denomination. I used the same calculation to create a similar variable for Protestant Religiosity (including the Free Church) as a control variable on a national level. Table 3.4 presents an overview of the frequencies of this measure.
Table 3.4. Catholic/Orthodox and Protestant Religiosity per country Catholic/Orthodox Protestant Country 1990 1999 2008 1990 1999 2008 Austria 0.78 0.81 0.74 0.07 0.06 0.06 Belgium 0.68 0.56 0.51 0.01 0.03 0.01 Cyprus 0.98 0.00 Denmark 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.89 0.88 0.86 Finland 0.01 0.01 0.86 0.74 France 0.58 0.54 0.45 0.01 0.02 0.01 Germany 0.45 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.38 Greece 0.95 0.00 Iceland 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.94 0.91 0.88 Ireland 0.93 0.89 0.84 0.02 0.02 0.04 Italy 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.01 0.00 0.00 Luxembourg 0.66 0.63 0.03 0.03 Malta 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.00 0.01 0.01 Netherlands 0.29 0.22 0.27 0.17 0.18 0.22 Norway 0.01 0.03 0.88 0.73 Portugal 0.77 0.86 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.01 Spain 0.85 0.81 0.59 0.00 0.01 0.00 Sweden 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.76 0.71 0.64
Are all socialists anti-religious? 43
Switzerland 0.35 0.31 Great Britain 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.46 0.63 0.39 Northern Ireland 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.61 0.45 0.41 Source: EVS 1990-2008.
As control variables at the individual level, I used gender, age and education28. Age is an item with answers ranging from 15 years to 108 years. Level of education is measured by the variable that asks for the age when people finished formal education29. In order to get a feel for the variables that were thus created, the descriptive statistics for each of the variables have been presented below in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5. Descriptive Statistics of Variables used for Multilevel Analysis Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Age respondent 68,638 15 108 46.25 17.655 Gender 68,882 1 2 1.53 0.499 Years of education 66,408 0 94 18.38 5.913 Anti-Religiosity 68,625 -1.53 4.11 0.01 0.812 Active Religiosity 68,918 0.08 0.90 0.34 0.205 Socialism30 47,803 -1.11 1.84 -0.01 0.674 Catholic / Orthodox Religiosity 68,918 0.00 0.98 0.51 0.332 Protestant Religiosity 68,918 0.00 0.94 0.25 0.320 Valid N (listwise) 46,141 Source: EVS 1990-2008.
3.4 Results
With the analysis of my pooled data set on political/economical and religious values, I intend to test the validity of two hypotheses. My aim with this test is to validate the religious pressure thesis, which describes how in some specific religious cultures, socialists tend to react more strongly against religious pressure than in others. I expect that socialists have higher levels of anti-religiosity as a reaction to both active religiosity and the collective religiosity of the Catholic/Orthodox churches.
I use ordinary least squares linear multilevel analysis with maximum likelihood estimation to test these hypotheses for two reasons. First, multilevel analysis makes it possible to estimate effects of individual-level variables and of country-level variables simultaneously. As my data is structured in such a way that there are two levels, 68,918 individuals with certain characteristics (e.g. age, education, voting behavior, etc.) are nested in 58 countries/waves with certain characteristics (active religiosity based on national attendance rates and level of Catholic/Orthodox religiosity), multilevel analysis is the most suitable option. Secondly, as my hypotheses aim at investigating how individuals react differently to differences in country-level religiosity, multilevel analysis is very suited as it allows for testing cross- level interactions. I estimate different models with a different number of effects. These are effects of the
44 Are all socialists anti-religious?
variables either at the individual or at the national level, and I estimate the interactions between these variables. Each of the models also contains so-called random effects. These effects, noted as variances, are estimations of the variability of the mean level of anti-religiosity in a country, and of the variability of the level of anti-religiosity at the individual level. Each model that shows lower levels of these two types of variability explains anti-religiosity a bit better. Table 3.6 shows the results of my analysis.
Table 3.6. Explaining anti-religiosity (OLS multilevel analysis, Maximum Likelihood, N=46,141 in 58 country/waves.) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Constant 1.94*** 2.82*** 2.81*** 2.81*** 2.81*** (0.03) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) Age -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -- (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Gender Male 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Gender Female (ref) ------Years of education 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -- (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic/Orthodox religiosity country -0.53** -0.50** -0.50** -0.50** -- (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) Protestant religiosity country -0.66*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.65*** -- (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) Active religiosity country -0.65*** -0.65*** -0.66*** -0.66*** -- (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) Socialism -- 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.12*** (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) Active religiosity country X socialism 0.07 -0.27** ------(0.06) (0.09) Catholic/Orthodox religiosity country 0.17** ------X socialism (0.06) -2loglikelihood 94490.69 89895.66 89667.43 89669.97 89665.07 Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 94494.69 89899.66 89673.43 89675.97 89671.07 N (in 58 country/waves). 68,918 46,141 46,141 46,141 46,141 Variance individual level 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 Variance country level 0.052 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.015 Variance socialism -- -- 0.008 0.008 0.006
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed test for significance).
First, I will explain what the different models of Table 3.6 mean. The first model shows that anti- religiosity can be explained both at the individual level and at the context level. Roughly 10% of variance (0.052/(0.45+0.052)*100) can be explained by country-level factors. The rest can, potentially, be explained by individual factors. As the first model does not include any variables, any inclusion of
Are all socialists anti-religious? 45
variables at either the individual level or the context level almost automatically results in lower levels of unexplained variance. This is indeed the case in model 2. Model 2 shows the significance of the independent variables, age, gender, education, socialism, and different measures of religiosity. The proportion of unexplained variance at the individual level has been reduced (from 0.45 to 0.41). The unexplained variance at the context level has been reduced considerably (from 0.052 to 0.017). As my hypotheses assume, the positive effect of socialism on anti-religiosity which I found in model 2 actually varies in strength between contexts. In other words, a necessary precondition is that in some contexts, socialists are apt to be more anti-religious than in other contexts. In model 3, I test and verify exactly that assumption. This model, which is identical to the previous one with respect to the number of effects of variables estimated, shows that the effect of socialism varies between contexts (0.008). Model 4 includes the interaction-effect for active religiosity and socialism, which I use to test my first hypothesis. This model does not appear to be a significant improvement of the third model. I will discuss below how this leads me to refute this hypothesis. The fifth model then also includes the interaction-effect for Catholic/Orthodox religiosity; this model does show to be a significant improvement of the third and fourth model31. In this model, I find two significant effects. Beside the positive and significant interaction term for Catholic/Orthodox religiosity in a country and socialism, I also find a negative effect for the interaction between active religiosity in a country and socialism. This can be explained by the facts that there is a high correlation (.78***) between the two indicators for country-level religiosity and that the cross-level interactions of these variables with socialism cancel each other out. I will discuss what this means for my hypotheses below.
Table 3.6 shows how socialism and anti-religiosity are generally positively correlated. Thus, it can be said that on average people with socialist political views are more inclined to hold negative views about religion, than people with other political views do. The same can be said of males, who have higher levels of anti-religious attitudes than females (e.g. Bainbridge 2005, Sherkat 2008). That this effect for gender is even stronger than the socialism-effect indicates that there is greater variety in anti- religious attitudes between socialists and non-socialists, than there is between males and females32. In addition, this model shows how people that live in countries with high levels of religiosity, regardless the type – Protestant, Catholic/Orthodox and active religiosity – are less likely to have anti-religious attitudes. This is not surprising, since this variable is a mean score per country. Religious people will naturally have a more tolerant view of religion than non-religious people will. However, what interests me most is what the interaction effect of these types of religiosity and the effect of socialism is on the anti-religious attitudes. In other words, I want to know if the context influences the anti-religious attitude of socialists in a significant way, as my hypotheses suggest.
46 Are all socialists anti-religious?
Following hypothesis 1, I expect that the country-level active religiosity, as measured by attendance rates, influences the tendency of people with socialist ideals to have anti-religious attitudes positively. However, in countries with high levels of active religiosity, the effect of socialist ideals on anti-religiosity is not significant according to model 4 and negative according to model 5. This is surprising, since I already showed that in general, socialists tend to be anti-religious. Apparently, they are less so when they live in countries where they are surrounded by actively religious people. This contradicts the expectation as laid out in hypothesis 1, for which reason this hypothesis must be refuted. The outcomes in model 5 point to a possible continuation of the influence of socialism on Christian thought mentioned earlier and the different Christian-socialist movements that have proliferated in countries like England and the Netherlands. Figure 3.1 shows a visual representation of this effect (based on model 5 of Table 3.6).
Figure 3.1. Effect of socialism on anti-religiosity in countries with low and high active religiosity score in 58 country/waves
My second hypothesis deals with the religious affiliation in a country. It expresses the expectation that in countries with high levels of Catholic/Orthodox affiliation, people with socialist ideals will have higher levels of anti-religious sentiments. Figure 3.2 shows a visual representation of the results from Table 3.6 (model 5), concerning this hypothesis.
Are all socialists anti-religious? 47
Figure 3.2. Effect of socialism on anti-religiosity in countries with low and high Catholic/Orthodox religiosity score in 58 country/waves
This figure illustrates how socialism, Catholicism/Orthodoxy and anti-religiosity are related. Both in the Catholic/Orthodox countries and in the non-Catholic/Orthodox countries, people with higher levels of socialist ideals tend to have higher levels of anti-religious sentiments. However, it is interesting to see that this effect is stronger for the Catholic countries than for the non-Catholic countries. As tables 3.3 and 3.4 show, the countries with higher levels of Catholic/Orthodox membership levels also tend to have a higher level of active religiosity. What, then, exactly is the trigger? In my analysis, both types of religiosity have been taken into account in their interaction with socialism. Model 5 in Table 3.6 shows that for socialists, an environment of Catholic/Orthodox religiosity functions as a trigger, not because contexts with a large share of Catholics/Orthodox happen to be contexts with a large share of actively religious people, but just because they live in countries with a larger share of people that are affiliated with the Catholic and/or Orthodox churches. This confirms the expectation as formulated in hypothesis 2. I will now conclude by discussing how these results are relevant for the current debate in the sociology of politics and religion.
3.5 Conclusions
The central question of this paper was whether it is pressure of religious activity or pressure based on religious identity that makes socialists resist religion. My results point specifically to the countries marked by the collective identity of the Catholic and Orthodox religions, based on the level of affiliation and not on the level of involvement. This shows how, in the case of socialist anti-religiosity, religious and cultural identity is a stronger influence than religious and cultural practice (see also Berger 1970,
48 Are all socialists anti-religious?
Noomen, Aupers and Houtman 2011: 6, Norris and Inglehart 2004: 17). What lies beyond the scope of my analysis is to assess the individual motivation of socialists to react to religious identity more strongly than to religious activity in the Catholic/Orthodox contexts. In the discussion on hypothesis 2, I mentioned a historical/political aspect of Catholic/Orthodox cultures, namely the way in which the Church and the state are entwined with each other, and a mono-cultural aspect, which involves the collective cultural values like solidarity and respect for authority, and creates a culture with a high level of homogeneity. Further research could explore which of the two aspects is more relevant for socialists and what individual characteristics those socialists have. My inclination would be that a historical/political hypothesis that suggests that these churches have been foundational to the power- distribution in the state and therefore trigger opposition, would resonate predominantly with the higher educated socialists. At the same time, I think that a cultural solidarity hypothesis that suggests that due to relative high levels of solidarity and homogeneity in Catholic/Orthodox contexts, socialists feel excluded as an out-group, both politically as religiously, would predominantly resonate with the lower educated working class (Houtman, Achterberg and Derks 2012).
What I could not endorse is the expected positive correlation between the anti-religiosity of socialists and the context of active religiosity. There was no significant interaction-effect in the fourth model and there was a significant negative correlation with the interaction-effect in the fifth model. This implies that when there is an active religious community, this in itself does not lead socialists to oppose religiosity. This coincides with the finding of Ribberink, Achterberg and Houtman (2013), who point to a stronger effect for the anti-religiosity of the lower educated, but only in contexts with low levels of active religiosity and vice versa (lower educated people have weaker anti-religious attitudes in contexts with high levels of active religiosity). This could possibly explain the negative relation between socialists’ anti-religious attitude and the level of active religiosity, as it suggests that there is some similarity in the perception of religion by lower educated people and socialists. This asks for more research in order to expand our understanding of these processes and their interrelatedness.
The mirroring of religious and political identities with opposed ideologies, which I have discussed and analyzed, also underlines the importance of the debate on religious, post-religious and secular identities. This debate, that has long transcended the private/public dichotomy over de place of religion in the modern societies, has taken center stage in some recent European Union controversies, for example in the discussion on the possible admittance of Turkey to the European Union (Casanova 2008, see also Berlinerblau 2012, Bruce 2013). I think my findings can help to specify exactly what (post-)
Are all socialists anti-religious? 49
religious cultural identities are and how they work, but also in what way religious identities have a different influence on these controversies than religious activity has.
In what kind of religious cultures will a socialist become anti-religious and why? I have been stressing the central place of religious cultures in my analysis. Although my ‘religious pressure thesis’ could not be fully endorsed, I think my analysis opens up many more lines of inquiry that can follow its logic. Since I mainly looked at socialism as a mirror-image of Catholicism and Orthodoxy, one of those lines of inquiry is what kind of mirror-images can be found for the Protestant mono-cultures of Scandinavia, the mixed religious cultures of the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom and what mirror-image the growth of Islam in Europe will result in. In order to assess the empirical tenability of the religious pressure thesis further, more research could use this thesis in the exploration of the rise of anti-Islamism in countries like Norway, Switzerland and the Netherlands (and not in countries like Spain and Portugal), and the popularity of new atheism in the United Kingdom and the United States (see Cook, Cottrell and Webster 2015).
17 ‘Since the real existence of man and nature has become evident in practice … the question about an alien being, about a being above nature and man—a question which implies the admission of the unreality of nature and of man— has become impossible in practice. Atheism, as the denial of this reality, has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, and postulates the existence of man through this negation; but socialism … no longer stands in any need of such mediation … Socialism is man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the abolition of religion’. Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Vol. 3, 305–6 quoted in Geoghegan 2004: 589. 18 I follow Dalton in using this distinction in types of religiosity. 19 Martin argues that Protestant monopolies also exist, mainly in Scandinavia, but that there they feature individualistic values. This creates a different cultural dynamic in which there is no collective anti-religious reaction as can be seen in Catholic countries. Instead, there is a climate of religious indifference. 20 I used the integrated dataset that has been made available through the Gesis.org-website. 21 see Maas and Hox (2005), who state that for this kind of analysis a country-level sample size of at least 50 is preferred. This does not mean that some respondents are counted double, since these datasets do not consist of panel data. 22 Others would say that not Western Europe, but the United States is the odd one out (e.g. Bruce 2011). For the sake of my argument this is not important and I follow Martin here in his view on Western Europe’s secularization. 23 I excluded Northern Cyprus since it is part of Turkey 24 I left out Greece 1999 because it has no results for 3 out of the 4 items concerning economic values, hence producing a lot of missings on that score. 25 https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/ (Web 8 March 2013).
50 Are all socialists anti-religious?
26 The modest score on the Cronbach’s alpha is partly because only 3 items were measured. However increasing this measure with other indications of socialist values, as available in the EVS dataset, does not significantly increase the reliability, nor does it influence the outcomes of the multilevel tests that we did. In fact, it decreases the number of valid respondents, because several of the items that would be included contain a large number of missings, because they were not consistently asked in all countries and/or in every wave of the research. Therefore, I have worked with this measure and the measure of voting behavior. 27 Although there are many differences between the two church denominations, in literature they are seen as cultural counterparts, both creating collective national identities. This leads me to consider them as a single variable in this operationalization. 28 I also checked for level of income. Including this variable did not significantly alter my findings. However, it is a variable with a lot of missing (23%), therefore I did not include it in my model. I also did a model check with the different EVS-waves as dummy variables, which also did not influence my findings. For the sake of overview, I left these dummy variables out of the model presented. 29 The alternative that asked for people’s level of education was not consistently asked in all countries and in all three waves of the survey. 30 This measure has a high number of missing values, which is caused by the fact that there are many missing values on the political choice question. Apparently, many respondents refused to answer this question. As it is the only question that asks for political affinity, we have to include it and accept this relative high number of missing values. 31 This fifth model is a better fit on a .900 probability scale. The explained variance of socialism (0.006) has a standard error of 0.0015, and thus measures a significant score. 32 The effects in my model are not standardized, but a standardized model would give a similar output, with gender showing a 50% stronger effect than socialism. Since this is consistent with other findings and not directly relevant to my hypotheses, I have not elaborated on this difference further.
Are all socialists anti-religious? 51
Chapter 4. Secular Tolerance? Anti-Muslim sentiment in Western Europe3
4.1 Introduction Long before the PEGIDA demonstrations at the beginning of 2015, anti-Muslim expressions were front- page news in many European countries. Geert Wilders’ Fitna movie in the Netherlands, protests against the construction of mosques in Switzerland, the head-scarf controversy in France, and protests against the integration of Turkey into the EU in countries like Austria, France and Germany suggest that anti- Muslim sentiment in Western Europe is common (Betz and Meret 2009, Gerhards and Silke 2011). Particularly striking is its marked presence in some of the most secularized Western European countries, such as the Netherlands (Theo van Gogh and Geert Wilders), Germany (PEGIDA), Norway (Anders Breivik), France (Charlie Hebdo) and Denmark (Mohammed-cartoon riot). This anti-Muslim attitude after all contradicts the common notion that these countries constitute secular bulwarks of tolerance, inclusiveness, and broadmindedness (Bruce 2002: 43, Emerson and Hartman 2006: 130, Inglehart 1997, Norris and Inglehart 2012, Penninx 2006).
This paper therefore studies anti-Muslim sentiment in these alleged tolerant and inclusive secularized Western European countries, focusing on who constitute its principal carrier groups, and why exactly. There have been various studies on anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe recently, to be sure (e.g. Cesari 2011, Fetzer and Soper 2003, Strabac and Listhaug 2008), but none of these draws a direct link with the literature about secularization. A growing body of literature does however link processes of secularization to newly emerging tensions between groups (Achterberg 2006, Bornschier 2010, McLeod 1997), including non-religious ones and Muslims (Mudde 2010, Sniderman and Hagedoorn 2007, Van Bohemen et al. 2011). I intend to contribute to this literature, both empirically and theoretically, by comparing, analyzing and explaining anti-Muslim sentiment in Western European countries.
In the literature on secularization, two distinct theories propose quite different answers to the question among which groups in secularized countries strongest anti-Muslim sentiment can be expected and why. The first theory understands it as an outcome of religious competition between Muslims and the remaining minority of orthodox Protestants. The second theory relates it to the growth of a secular culture and ensuing value conflict between Muslims and the non-religious. I elaborate the two theories
3 Originally published in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 56(2):259-276, with Peter Achterberg and Dick Houtman, 2017.
52 Secular tolerance?
below and test the relevant hypotheses by means of a multilevel analysis of the data of the European Value Studies 2008. After the presentation of my findings, I conclude with a brief summary of my findings and a discussion of their implication for the relationship between secularization and hostility towards Muslims in Western Europe.
4.2 Theory and hypotheses
4.2.1 Secularization and anti-Muslim sentiment When Muslim immigrants from North and East Africa, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey and the Middle East initially arrived in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, they were warmly welcomed (Nielsen 2004). They were willing to do jobs that Europeans did not want to do against wages that Europeans did not accept for themselves. However, those immigrants did not leave Europe when jobs became scarce in the 1980s. Instead, they started to bring their families from their home countries or started new families with partners from their ethnic groups. They were there to stay (Peach and Glebe 1995). Ever since they arrived, but with increasing ferocity since the 1990s, hostility towards Muslims has surfaced throughout Europe, for many different reasons (Casanova 2012, Laurence 2012). In light of the received notion that the secularized countries distinguish themselves by religious indifference, tolerance and broadmindedness (Bruce 2002:43, Emerson and Hartman 2006:130, Inglehart 1997, Norris and Inglehart 2012, Penninx 2006), it is particularly striking to observe the strained relationships with Muslims and Islam in these countries (Mason and Poynting 2006).
In the past, problems with religion in secular societies could be attributed to governments imposing a privatization of religion, as was the case in secularist33 countries like Albania, Russia, and East Germany. In contemporary Western Europe, however, anti-Muslim sentiment appears not simply to be imposed from above by the political system, but to emerge largely from the general public itself (Froese 2004). For example, in the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, rightist-populist politicians like Geert Wilders, apparently aware of the popularity of secular liberal discourse, use the latter to critique Muslims and Islam as intolerant and basically incompatible with secular modernity (Akkerman 2005, De Koster et al. 2014). So who are those who lend support to this anti-Muslim rhetoric in secularized societies? Are these indeed the non-religious, who feel the secular foundations of liberal secular democracy to be under threat by increasing Muslim public presence? That may the case (Mudde 2010), but a competing theory suggests rather that anti-Muslim sentiment stems from feelings of religious threat and competition among remaining faithful Protestants, who find themselves under pressure of secularization too (Casanova 1994). I elaborate both theories below, starting with the latter.
Secular tolerance? 53
4.2.2 Religious competition A first possible explanation for hostility towards Muslims in secularized countries is offered by the religious competition theory, which addresses the consequences of secularization for the remaining faithful (e.g. Stark and Bainbridge 1987, Stark and Finke 2000, see also Einstein 2008, Scheepers et al. 2002). In Western Europe, Protestantism has lost more of its former dominance than Catholicism (Berger 1967, Bruce 2011), because the values embedded in Protestantism have played a major role in stimulating the process of secularization (Bruce 2002, Martin 1978, 2005). The Protestant Reformers had a strong aversion against the central authority of the Roman Catholic Church and its decisive role in people’s salvation, which stimulated a primacy of the individual believer and the local church over central church authorities. This not only sparked rationalization of faith in Western Europe but also religious pluralism, i.e., an enormous variety of Protestant denominations (Berger 1967, Bruce 2002), which over time led to cultural and religious relativization (Bruce 2011). As a result, many Protestants lost their faith and stopped attending church, and if they continued to believe, they did so in increasingly non-dogmatic ways. Nonetheless, this trend of secularization has not led to a complete demise of Protestantism. Although currently, ‘post-Protestant’ or ‘secular’ best characterizes many of the Western European countries, there are still sizable numbers of Protestants around. There are even indications that they are becoming not less, but more orthodox and stricter, precisely in response to the secularizing forces they are facing up to (Achterberg et al. 2009, Roeland et al. 2010).
According to the religious competition theory, the process of secularization increases competition among the remaining religious groups (e.g. Einstein 2008, Scheepers et al. 2002, Stark and Finke 2000). Indeed, Starke and Finke propose that in the absence of a regulated religious market, i.e., in the absence of a state-sponsored religious monopoly, the smaller religious communities will reinvigorate:
This theoretical emphasis on competition (…) suggests that individual religious groups will be more energetic and generate higher levels of commitment to the degree that they have a marginal market position—lack market share. That is, other things being equal, small religious minorities will be more vigorous than will firms with a large local following. (Finke and Stark 2004: 103)
In the secularized, post-Protestant countries of Western Europe, where religiosity is less and less the norm, religious reinvigoration, fundamentalism and dogmatism are hence predictable behavioral patterns among the remaining Protestants (Berger and Zijderveld 2009, Betz and Meret 2009, Roeland et al. 2010). Casanova (1994) refers to this as ‘religious deprivatization’ and suggests that religious groups pressured into a privatized role tend to become more assertive and activist. The religious competition
54 Secular tolerance?
theory thus predicts that in secularized countries anti-Muslim sentiment will be strongest among the remaining Protestants (Hypothesis 1a).
Religious competition theory also explains why Protestants will be the ones who are most strongly opposed to Muslims in their vicinity. As explained above, Protestant churches have decline much more than Catholic and Orthodox churches in Western Europe. The remaining Protestant groups now find themselves in a setting of increased competition with religious others. In the case of Muslims, these religious others compete with Protestants in two ways. First, they compete for ‘switchers’, people who are looking for a religious alternative, although switching from Christianity to Islam can entail an ‘expensive loss of religious capital’ (Stark and Finke 2000:119). This is a larger threat in secularizing societies, because there, people experience ‘greater freedom to switch affiliations’ (Stark and Bainbridge 1987: 302). Secondly, they compete with rival truth claims, which are a serious threat to Protestants who believe their salvation solely depends on their personal faith (Berger 1967). This increased competition with religious others, then, will make believers ‘move back up the tension dimension’ (Stark and Finke 2000: 216). ‘Tension refers to the degree of distinctiveness, separation and antagonism between a religious group and the “outside” world. At the high end of the tension axis, serious antagonism exists, sometimes erupting into bloody conflict’ (ibid: 143). Historically, orthodoxy with respect to the tiniest of issues (considered far from tiny by those concerned, to be sure) have sparked many a conflict and schism in Protestantism, sometimes more or less peacefully, other times very violently. Moving up the tension dimension also implies that Protestants will become more orthodox and stricter (ibid: 216), which in turn generates more vigorous religious action (ibid: 258). Consequently, opposition against Muslims can be expected to be strongest among those Protestants who hold on to strict, orthodox beliefs (see Fetzer and Soper 2003, Immerzeel, Jaspers and Lubbers 2013, Johnson 2006). This leads to the extended hypothesis that strongest anti-Muslim sentiment in secularized countries can be found among Protestants with the most orthodox beliefs (Hypothesis 1b).
4.2.3 Non-religious people and anti-Muslim sentiment An alternative explanation for anti-Muslim sentiment in secularized societies does not focus on religious competition and orthodox Protestants, but on the non-religious (Casanova 2004, Modood 2009, Mudde 2010, Van Bohemen 2011). Although many people may still be church members, and even though there are many religious manifestations such as church buildings and references to God in public speech and public institutions (such as the monarchy or the oaths that public officials take), these manifestations have lost their former specific religious function, such as worship, salvation or blessing (see Bruce 2011, 2013). For Norwegians, for example, it is still common to call themselves Lutheran. However, this is an
Secular tolerance? 55
aspect of national identity rather than of religiosity (Campbell 2007, Martin 2005). Similarly, the expression ‘Oh my God’ was initially used as a prayer for forgiveness and an act of worship, but is nowadays commonly used as an expression of surprise or excitement. Its meaning has secularized. Indeed, the non-religious expect the religious to accept normatively the quintessentially modern understanding of religion as privatized and in effect without public significance beyond the boundaries of churches and congregations.
Muslims in Western Europe have however not just retained their religious beliefs, but their religious identities have even strengthened through their encounter with the secularized cultures in which they have come to find themselves: the latter are ‘Made in Europe’ (Phalet et al. 2013, Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Muslims begin to challenge the secularist accommodation of religion that has evolved in Western societies over the last hundred years, claiming right to confessional education, protection of their faith from criticism and ridicule, and remedying of inequalities in laws and policies on the freedom of religious expression (Glendinning and Bruce 2011: 504, Modood 2009). Whereas outside remaining pockets of orthodoxy the typical Christian has transformed his or her religiosity into a strictly personal affair, Muslims are seen as insisting on public recognition and state support for their faith (Cesari 2011). In doing so, they challenge the secular truce, i.e., the social contract that guarantees religious freedom yet relegates religion from the public sphere to the private realm (Achterberg et al. 2009, Casanova 1994, Luckmann 1967). This sparks new controversies over the place of religion in Western European countries, as observed by Cesari with respect to Islam in France: “Through the decades, major religious groups – Christian and Jewish – have made uneasy peace with laïcité by relegating religious expression to private domains. Muslim settlement in France has disrupted that peace. It has introduced new confusion over boundaries between public and private space and led to renewed controversy over religious freedom and political tolerance” (2002: 36). Because Muslims hence challenge the secularized Western European countries, the non-religious are expected to be the principal carriers of anti-Muslim sentiment. This leads me to formulate the hypothesis that in secularized countries, anti- Muslim sentiment will be strongest among the non-religious (Hypothesis 2a).
Besides religious freedom, gender equality and gay rights are central values that foreground the freedom of individuals to shape their own life and their own identity in secular liberal democracies (Mudde 2010). The secular celebration of individual freedom after all entails a rejection of traditional religiously informed morality, i.e., traditional gender roles, marriage and sexual norms (Akkerman 2005, Berger 1967, 2004: 140, Campbell 2007: 351, Houtman et al. 2011, Modood 2003, Norris and Inglehart 2012: 247, Van Bohemen et al. 2011). Observers suggest that the more people identify with secular
56 Secular tolerance?
values like these, the more they will oppose those who do not share them (Beaman and Tomlins 2015,
Betz 2003, Smith 2013a, Taylor 2006: 14), so that secular identity34 becomes a primary motivation for anti-Muslim sentiment (e.g. Bruce 2002: 33). The underlying argument here is that secular liberal democracies cannot tolerate Islam, because the latter is not compatible with these secular values and hence “intolerant” (i.e., Asad 2008, Casanova 2012). ‘[W]hile conservative religious people are expected to tolerate behavior they may consider morally abhorrent, such as homosexuality, liberal secular Europeans are openly stating that European societies ought not to tolerate religious behavior or cultural customs that are morally abhorrent in so far as they are contrary to modern liberal secular European norms’ (Casanova 2004: 10, see also Modood 2003: 110). In secularized countries, anti-Muslim sentiment can thus be expected to be strongest among the non-religious, because it is they who are the principal carriers of secular values, which leads to the hypothesis that in secularized countries, anti-Muslim sentiment will be strongest among the non-religious who identify most with secular values (Hypothesis 2b).
4.3 Data and operationalization
In order to be able to test these hypotheses, I used the most recent European Values Study data set: EVS 2008. These data deal with economic, political and religious values and attitudes in Western Europe. I am interested in attitudes towards Muslims in Western European countries with a varying degree of secularity, and therefore I included all Western European countries available in this data set. The
Western European countries studied are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus35, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Northern Ireland with an N of 26,138 in 21 countries.
Anti-Muslim sentiment is my dependent variable. There is only one question in the dataset that inquires about respondents’ attitude towards Muslims, and it does so only indirectly. It is a so-called “social distance” question, about which groups of people respondents find undesirable as neighbors. The question is as follows: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” The list consists of fourteen groups, among which “Jews”, “Homosexuals”, “Drug addicts”, “Large families” and “Muslims”. Response to the last item, concerning Muslim neighbors, is coded into a dummy variable, with score 1 if the respondent mentions Muslim neighbors as undesirable and 0 if not. Since this is a somewhat crude measure to use singularly, I also use several items that ask for anti-immigrant attitudes. There are two reasons to do so. Firstly, almost all larger immigrant minorities in Western Europe have a Muslim background (with the exception of Indian people in Great Britain). When people are asked to think of immigrants, they tend to think about
Secular tolerance? 57
Muslims most of the time36 (Spruyt and Elchardus 2012, see also Strabac and Listhaug 2008). And several studies have shown that anti-Muslim sentiment is closely related to other types of prejudice, like ethnocentrism (Van Bohemen et al. 2011) cultural and economic xenophobia (Elchardus and Spruyt 2014) and other general measures of prejudice and authoritarianism (De Koster et al. 2010). Secondly, using the dichotomous ‘Muslim as neighbor’ item, I conducted a linear probability multilevel analysis to check whether the results from the extended scale are comparable with the responses to the dichotomous variable. I found the results to be similar in such a way that I am confident that my more robust, combined scale measures anti-Muslim sentiment as effectively as the dichotomous social distance variable does37. The items used (8) inquire about the respondents’ attitude towards immigrants getting jobs, undermining cultural life, place in welfare system, influence on crime, and about the number of immigrants. All items were coded in such a way that high scores indicated negative attitudes towards immigrants and Muslims. The items were standardized and linearly combined to create a scale for anti- Muslim sentiment.
Table 4.1. Factor and reliability analysis for the anti-Islamic attitudes scale Item Factor Loading Immigrants will become a threat to our society 0.85 There are too many immigrants 0.80 Immigrants undermine our cultural life 0.79 Immigrants are a strain on our welfare system 0.79 Immigrants take jobs away from our people 0.78 Immigrants increase crime problems 0.74 Immigrants make me feel a stranger 0.67 When jobs are scarce, give priority to native inhabitants 0.63 I do not like having a Muslim as a neighbor 0.39 Eigen value 4.75 R2 0.53 Cronbach’s α38 0.87 N 24,662 Source: EVS 2008. The measure of non-religiosity is based on two indices of religiosity. First, I included respondents indicating no religious affiliation (coded as 1, religious affiliation is coded as 0). Second, I included those people who indicated to be a member of a religious denomination, but hardly ever or never go to church
(attendance measure, coded monthly attendance or more as religious, others non-religious)39.
The measure for country’s level of secularity is based on this same calculation, aggregated at the country level.
58 Secular tolerance?
Individual Protestants are coded as such when they indicated to be a member of a Protestant denomination (all Protestant churches, including the Free Church) and attended church at least on a monthly basis.
I created a Muslim presence variable, which simply indicates the percentage of Muslims per country, as provided by the Pew Templeton Religious Futures Project40 (see Table 4.2). Based on Strabac and Listhaug (2008), I did not have particular expectations for this indicator, but I use it as a control variable. The overview of the unstandardized41 percentages of Muslims per country, and the country’s level of secularity measure can be found in Table 4.2. This table also includes the aggregated levels of regular attending Protestants and Catholics/Orthodox per country for comparison reasons, but these are no country-level variables in the multilevel analysis.
Table 4.2. Overview of country-level religiosity measures Country Level of secularity Muslim presence Protestant culture Catholic/Orthodox culture Sweden .93 .05 .05 .01 Denmark .91 .04 .08 .00 Finland .90 .01 .09 .00 Norway .89 .04 .09 .01 France .88 .08 .01 .09 Iceland .88 .01 .11 .00 Germany .84 .06 .06 .08 Belgium .83 .06 .01 .14 Great Britain .81 .05 .10 .04 Luxembourg .81 .02 .01 .16 Switzerland .80 .05 .06 .11 Netherlands .75 .06 .14 .09 Spain .75 .02 .00 .19 Austria .72 .05 .01 .25 Greece .56 .05 .00 .43* Portugal .53 .01 .01 .44 Italy .52 .04 .00 .47 Northern Ireland .47 .05 .24 .26 Cyprus .45 .25** .00 .54* Ireland .42 .01 .02 .54 Malta .16 .01 .01 .83
Source: EVS 2008, Pew Research Forum 2010 (*Orthodox affiliation, **Includes Northern Cyprus).
Secular tolerance? 59
As stated above, secular values center on the freedom of an individual to decide one’s fate, unhindered by religious authorities. I used the variables that express support for sexual permissiveness (homo-sexuality, cohabitation, abortion), a non-traditional view of marriage (women can also work, men can take care of children, people do not have a duty to society to have children) and a non- traditional view of gender-patterns (having a job can be as fulfilling for women as raising children, preschool children suffer when their mother is working, etc.). I grouped sixteen items around these three themes and created three scales that indicate agreement with that theme42. The Cronbach’s α for these three scales range between .62 and .65. I calculated a combined score for these three scales to create the secular values variable. Table 4.3 presents the factor analysis of this combined scale.
Table 4.3. Factor and reliability analysis for the secular values scale Item Factor Loading Non-traditional gender values 0.85 Non-traditional marriage values 0.84 Sexual permissiveness values 0.80 Eigen value 2.05 R2 0.68 N 24,468
Source: EVS 2008.
In order to measure orthodox beliefs, I used several indicators of religious convictions. I constructed a combined scale of five items that ask for respondents’ belief in God, life after death, heaven, hell and sin (with answers “yes” coded as 2, “no” coded as 0, and “don't know” as an intermediate position, coded as 1). The average score for these five items was calculated and standardized to create the variable for orthodox beliefs43. Table 4.4 presents the reliability and factor analysis of this measure.
Table 4.4. Factor and reliability analysis for the orthodox beliefs scale Item Factor Loading Belief in heaven 0.87 Belief in hell 0.81 Belief in sin 0.79 Belief in afterlife 0.75 Belief in God 0.73 Eigen value 3.14 R2 0.63 Cronbach’s α 0.85
60 Secular tolerance?
N 27,714
Source: EVS 2008.
As individual control variables I used gender, age (16-108 years), level of education (as coded in EVS in six stages) and income (recoded in five categories: €0-1500/month, €1500-2500/month, €2500-
5000/month, €5000 or more/month and a non-reporting category44). In order to gain insight into the variables that were thus created, Table 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables.
Table 4.5. Descriptive statistics for all variables used N Minimum Maximum Mean/ Percentage Std. Deviation Anti-Muslim sentiment scale 27,053 -1.76 1.51 0.006 .71380 Country-level secularity 21 .16 .93 .7137 .19969 Muslim presence country 21 .01 .25 .0461 .04473 Non-religious (ind.) 28,075 .00 1.00 .7133 .45224 Protestant denomination (ind.) 28,075 .00 1.00 .0441 .20539 Secular values 28,155 -4.56 4.25 -.0035 1.56286 Orthodox beliefs 27,714 .00 2.00 1.0307 .72513 Age 28,306 16 108 48.86 17.961 Sex respondent 28,391 1 2 1.55 .498 Education level (recoded) 28,062 0 6 2.99 1.46 Income <1500 (dummy) 28,403 0 1 25.6 Income 1500-2500 (dummy) 28,403 0 1 28.6 Income 2500-5000 (dummy) 28,403 0 1 14.6 Income >5000 (dummy) 28,403 0 1 8.2 Income non-report (dummy) 28,403 0 1 23.1 Valid N (list wise) 26,138 Source: EVS 2008
Before moving to the analysis and results section, two preliminary observations can be made that give a general overview of the religious situation in Western Europe. Firstly, in the discussion of the theory leading up to the hypothesis on religious competition, it was argued that Protestants would be most prone to oppose Muslims as they have undergone the effect of secularization more than other religious groups. Table 4.2 indeed shows very low percentages for the number of Protestants in Western European countries. Most Protestants can be found in Northern Ireland (24 percent of population), followed by Iceland (14%), Netherlands (11%) and Great Britain (10%). To compare, based on the same calculation for the number of Catholics and Orthodox people, the scores are vastly different, with Malta showing 83% of the population being Catholic and attending church monthly or more often, followed by Ireland (54%) and Italy (47%). For the Orthodox countries, Cyprus (54%) and Greece (43%) show
Secular tolerance? 61
similar numbers. These numbers indicate that Protestant countries have indeed secularized much more than the Catholic and Orthodox countries.
Secondly, in Figure 4.1 an overview of the average levels of anti-Muslim sentiment for all countries in my model is given. It shows that the countries with most negative scores on anti-Muslim sentiment are also among the most secularized countries and vice versa. In statistical terms, the country- level indicator of secularity is negatively correlated with anti-Muslim sentiment (Pearson’s r is -0.741).
Figure 4.1. Country level anti-Muslim sentiment in 22 Western European countries. Source: EVS 2008.
Against this background, I will now present the analysis of two sets of hypotheses that each proposed quite distinct answers to the question which groups would be the carriers of this anti-Muslim sentiment in these countries and why.
4.4 Results
With the analysis of my dataset on political/economic and religious values, I intend to test the two hypotheses concerning anti-Muslim sentiment in secularized Western Europe. Firstly, I developed the hypothesis that relates anti-Muslim sentiment to the reinvigoration of Protestantism in secularized countries, with a sub-hypothesis expecting the strongest opposition among the most orthodox believers. Secondly, I developed a hypothesis that relates anti-Muslim sentiment to the non-religious in secularized countries, with the sub-hypothesis that the strongest aversion against Muslims would be explained by the identification with secular values.
62 Secular tolerance?
I used ordinary least squares linear multilevel analysis with maximum likelihood estimation to test these hypotheses for two reasons. First and foremost, multilevel analysis makes it possible to simultaneously estimate effects of individual-level variables and of country-level variables. As my data are structured in such a way that there are two levels, 26,138 individuals with certain characteristics (e.g. age, education, beliefs, attitudes, etc.) are nested in 21 countries with certain characteristics (percentage of Muslims per country, country-level secularity), multilevel analysis is the most suitable option. Secondly, as my hypotheses aim at investigating how individuals respond differently to differences in country-level religiosity, multilevel analysis is very suitable as it allows for testing cross- level interactions. I estimated different models with a different number of effects. These are effects of the variables either at the individual or at the national level, and I estimated the interactions between these variables. Each of the models also contains so-called random effects. These effects, noted as variances, are estimations of the variability of the mean level of anti-Muslim sentiment in a country, and of the variability of the level of anti-Muslim sentiment at the individual level. Each model that shows lower levels of these two types of variability explains anti-Muslim sentiment a bit better. Table 4.6 presents the results of my analysis.
Table 4.6. Explaining anti-Islamic attitudes (OLS multilevel analysis, Maximum Likelihood, N=26138 in 21 countries.)
Secular tolerance? 63 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.02 Constant (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.14*** Country-level Secularity -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** Muslim presence -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Gender = male (ref.) -- 0 0 0 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 Gender = female -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** Age -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** Education -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Income >€5000 (ref.) -- 0 0 0 0 0 0.02* 0.02** 0.02* 0.02* 0.02** Income €2500-5000 -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** Income €1500-2500 -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** Income <€1500 -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** Income non-reported -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** Non-religious -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03*** Protestant denomination -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.23*** Secular values -- (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.00 0.00 Orthodox beliefs -- (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) Country-level Secularity X -0.00 ------Protestant denomination (0.01) Country-level Secularity X -0.06*** ------Orthodox beliefs (0.01) Country-level Secularity X 0.08*** ------Non-religious (0.01) Country-level Secularity X -0.03*** ------Secular values (0.01) -2loglikelihood 72956.83 67856.26 67659.96 67588.41 67536.23 67407.49 Variance individual level 0.97 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 Variance country level 0.044 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.027 0.026 Variance Protestant denom. -- -- 0.000 0.000 -- -- Variance orthodox beliefs -- -- 0.013 0.013 -- -- Variance non-religious ------0.001 0.001 Variance secular values ------0.017 0.016
64 Secular tolerance?
~p<0.10, *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed test for significance). Source: EVS 2008
The individual control variables in my models, i.e. gender, age, income and education, result in stable individual effects on anti-Muslim sentiment. The direction of these effects is in accordance with the literature on these variables. Females are slightly less anti-Muslim in their attitude than males, older people tend to score slightly higher on anti-Muslim sentiment, lower income people too (Savelkoul et al. 2011) and education leads to significantly less anti-Muslim attitudes (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts 2002). In addition, at the country level, the presence of Muslims gives a stable positive effect in all models. This is different from what I expected, based on the results obtained in earlier studies. However, it is not surprising, because in countries where there are hardly any Muslims, I would not expect to find strong anti-Muslim sentiment. Although these control variables show consistent effects, the other variables relevant to my hypotheses show strong significant effects as well and these are not diminished by the control variables. I will discuss the outcomes relevant to my hypotheses next.
As discussed in the operationalization section, there is a negative correlation between anti-Muslim sentiment and country-level secularity. This is also visible in this multilevel model (model 2 in Table 4.6). Thus, secularized countries on average score less high on anti-Muslim sentiment than religious countries. The question is who in this climate of relative tolerance, is most prone to oppose to the presence of Muslims. My first hypothesis stated that in secularized countries, levels of anti-Muslim sentiment will be higher among Protestants (H1a), and that this can be explained by their level of religious orthodoxy (H1b). To begin with the first, my analysis shows no individual effect for
Protestantism45. Inclusion of the random slopes effect for Protestant denomination (Model 3) or the interaction effect for Protestants in secularized countries (not significant, see Model 4) does not alter this picture. In other words, people with Protestant affiliation do not specifically score high on anti-Muslim sentiment, nor is this altered when living in secularized countries. Hypothesis 1A must therefore be rejected.
Looking at the most orthodox among this group, there is no significant relationship at the individual level. Only in secularized countries, there is an interaction effect, showing them to be even more tolerant towards Muslims than less orthodox believers. See Figure 4.2 for a visual representation46 of this effect on anti-Muslim sentiment in secularized countries. I thus find that instead of competing with, orthodox believers identify and associate with Muslims, as they probably experience the same pressure from their secular environment. Therefore, hypothesis 1B must also be rejected. The religious competition theory fails to explain opposition against Muslims in secularized countries.
Secular tolerance? 65
Figure 4.2. Predicted effect of orthodox beliefs on anti-Muslim sentiment in different secularized countries. Source: EVS 2008
My second hypothesis stated that anti-Muslim sentiment could be expected to be stronger among the non-religious in secularized countries (Hypothesis 2a) and that this sentiment could be attributed to those who identified with secular values most (Hypothesis 2b). Indeed, non-religious respondents score higher on anti-Muslim sentiment than religious people (Models 2-6 in Table 4.6). The inclusion of the interaction effect (Model 6) shows how the non-religious are even more intolerant in contexts that are more secular. Figure 4.3 (based on Model 6), illustrates the effect of non-religiosity on anti-Muslim sentiment in secularized countries. The descending slope shows that the gap between the non-religious and the religious groups grows wider the more secular a country is. This growing divide between religious and non-religious in their tolerance towards Muslims is striking. However, it cannot be answered conclusively whether this finding must be attributed to the tolerance of the religious, who are a minority in secularized contexts or to the intolerance of the non-religious, who are a majority in those contexts. Still, within the (more tolerant) secularized countries, the non-religious are more intolerant towards Muslims than the religious, which confirms my expectation as laid out in hypothesis 2a.
66 Secular tolerance?
Figure 4.3. Predicted effect of non-religiosity on anti-Muslim sentiment in different secularized countries. Source: EVS 2008
The question is, whether this intolerance by the non-religious can be explained by their identification with secular values, as hypothesis 2b argues. The answer is no. Models 2-6 all show how people that identify with secular values score lower on anti-Muslim sentiment, than those who do not identify as much with secular values. Including the interaction effect does not change this picture at all. If anything, it even strengthens this trend somewhat (Model 6). See Figure 4.4 for a representation of these effects.
Secular tolerance? 67
Figure 4.4. Predicted effect of secular values on anti-Muslim sentiment in different secularized countries. Source: EVS 2008
This implies that people with secular values are on average very tolerant towards Muslims, and that a country’s level of secularity influences this attitude slightly positively, too. For these reasons, I find no support for hypothesis 2b, which stated that in secularized countries, the more people identify with secular values, the more intolerant they will become towards people with opposing values. This hypothesis must therefore be rejected.
A country’s level of secularity does influence people’s attitude towards Muslims, but not exactly in the way I expected. The opposition towards Muslims neither comes from competition with the orthodox Protestants, nor from people who identify with secular values most, but it does show to divide the religious from the non-religious groups in secularized societies. I thus find evidence for a polarization between these groups around the accommodation of Muslims, which explains the controversies and debate that are so prominent in the more secularized countries.
4.5 Conclusions
In secularized Western European countries, anti-Muslim sentiment is widespread. This article was aimed at finding out who constitute its principal carrier groups and why. Following the religious
68 Secular tolerance?
competition thesis, I expected the Protestants to be most intolerant, especially when they are more orthodox. However, I could not find confirmation for this thesis. Instead, my results point out that Protestants who take their faith most seriously are most tolerant towards Muslims. There seems to be some sort of solidarity between these religious groups that struggle to hold on to their religion and their values in a secular context (Fetzer and Soper 2003). An example of this interpretation of my finding might be that many religious believers are frequently found to be particularly welcoming towards refugees from Syria and Iraq in Western Europe.
Based on a discussion of secularization and conflicts around secular values, I also derived a hypothesis that expected the strongest opposition towards Muslims among the non-religious and that argued that this could be explained by their identification with secular values. The first part of this hypothesis was endorsed, the second part was not. There is a consistent relationship between non- religiosity and anti-Muslim sentiment. This association is even stronger in secular contexts. In these contexts, there is more polarization between the religious and the non-religious than in religious contexts (i.e. Ribberink, Achterberg, and Houtman 2013). These two categories are divided on the issue of Muslim integration in secular contexts more than in religious contexts. Consequently, this explains the controversies and debate that seem to be primarily prominent in relatively ‘tolerant’ secular countries. The expectation that identification with secular values would trigger anti-Muslim sentiment among the non-religious could not be endorsed, however. Although secular liberal values have repeatedly been argued to be the major reason for the rejection of Islam in Europe, I find this not to be the case (Casanova 2004, Modood 2003, Mudde 2010). This issue requires further investigation.
An extended longitudinal analysis of Western European countries could perhaps establish whether this polarization is a final spasm of public religious conflict in a trend towards a broadly embraced religious indifference (2002:43), or another example of the continuing religious contestation of the ‘secular truce’ (Achterberg et al. 2009, Davie 2007:197). A longitudinal analysis could also assess the extent as to which the growth of secularity in a country creates less or more conflicts over the values that are seen as foundational to liberal secular democracy. One of the cultural conflicts that is at hand in Western Europe, is the popularity of right-wing populists and its relation with issues of (Muslim-) immigrant integration, enlargement of the European Union and loss of the sacred canopy (Achterberg 2006). My findings suggest that the relationship between non-religiosity and extreme voting behavior is stronger, when a context has secularized more (compare Arzheimer and Carter 2009, Ribberink, Achterberg, and Houtman 2015).
Secular tolerance? 69
33 The term ‘Secularism is ‘mostly used in connection with the nationalist agenda of political secularists in countries like Eastern Germany (at the time), Estonia and France (Martin 2005). It is also used to describe the ideology of militant atheists, primarily in the United States context (Cimino and Smith 2007). In this way, it is distinct from ‘the secular’ or ‘secularity’ that are mostly used to describe non-religiosity. 34Although secular people usually do not identify themselves as such and relate more to a humanist or atheist identity, the consistent identification with secular values might create this shared identity (see Lee 2015b). In this study, secular identity is used as an analytical concept, not as an empirical concept. 35 We excluded Northern Cyprus since it is part of Turkey 36 Of course, this is a generalization or even a bias. Even within the Muslim-category, there are many differences in attitudes, convictions and beliefs (Modood 2003). However, what I use here is the way in which people have a similar attitude towards Muslims as to immigrants in general in Western Europe. 37 For example, country-level secularity scored between .04*** and .07*** on the ‘no-Muslim-neighbor-item’, secular values .11*** and .12*** and orthodox beliefs .03 and .04***. Non-religiosity did not score as strongly as in my normal model (between .00 and .03***). The interaction-items did score similarly, albeit less strongly (orthodox beliefs*country level secularity scored -.04*** and non-religiosity* country level secularity scored .05***). In addition, this extra model has much higher levels of explained variance as a result with a maximum of 3% explained variance at the individual level, whereas the models in Table 4.6 have a maximum of 22% variance. 38 The Cronbach’s alpha per country for this scale ranges between .74 (Malta) to .91 (Austria), which shows that this is a reliable scale for each of the countries we well. The difference between Malta and Austria does indicate, that for people in Malta, there is more variation in how people evaluate the different anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim items, than there is for Austrians, who are much more singular in their attitude towards immigrants and Muslims. 39 Especially for the Scandinavian countries, this combined measure gives a better indication of non-religiosity. For example, in Denmark around 12% of the people indicate no denomination, but around 91 % is included in the combined measure of no denomination and members of a denomination that indicate less than monthly attendance. This indicates the latter percentage to be more precise in establishing Danes’ level of religiosity, since they relate their church membership more to citizenship than to religious convictions or practices (Campbell 2007, Martin 2005). 40 www.globalreligiousfutures.org (Web 23 Feb. 2016) 41 In the multilevel analysis, I worked with the standardized score in order to be able to compare the effects better. 42 The 16 items are: Children need both parents to grow up happily; Women need children to be happy; Women should not be single when parenting; Men need children to be happy; To have children is a duty towards society; It’s child’s duty to take care of ill parent (Non-traditional gender scale – 6 items - Reliability: Cronbach’s α is .65). Pre- school kids suffer from a working mother; Women want to be at home and have children; Long-term relationship is necessary in order to be happy; Working mother cannot establish warm and secure relationship with child; Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay; What is important for a happy marriage: to have children (Non- traditional marriage scale – 6 items - Reliability: Cronbach’s α is .62), Do you approve of abortion when: women in not married; Do you approve of abortion when: married couple does not want more children; How do you feel about: it is all right for a couple to live together without getting married; How do you feel about: a homosexual couple to adopt children (Sexual permissiveness scale – 4 items - Reliability: Cronbach’s α is .62). 43 The orthodox beliefs measure and the secular values measure are negatively correlated (.45***), but not in such a way that they cannot be put in the model together. 44 The EVS-dataset has 23.1% missings on this income-measure. Following Savelkoul et al. (2011) I added the category of non-reported-income, to my list of dummy variables, in order to include all respondents. This category gives similar results as the lower income groups. 45 Apart from a small effect of Protestant denomination in the sixth model, but this was designed to measure the effects of non-religiosity and secular values. Models 2, 3 and 4 were designed to measure the effect of Protestant denomination and there it appears that this variable does not influences people’s anti-Muslim attitudes. 46 This representation is based on a calculation developed by Golder (2003).
70 Secular tolerance?
Chapter 5. Religious polarization: contesting religion in secularized Western European countries4
5.1 Introduction
Whether secularization leads to cultural conflict between the religious and the non-religious in Western Europe has recently become a deeply contested question (Achterberg et al. 2009, Bagg and Voas 2010, Bruce 2002, Fox 2016, Kaufmann, Goujon and Skirbekk 2012). Kaufmann, Goujon and Skirbekk predict the emergence of anti-clerical European atheism in the coming decades, in response to a combination of religious decline bottoming out and religious growth due to demographic factors – hence the title of their article, “End of Secularization”. Authors like Bruce (2002, 2011), Voas (2009), and Bagg and Voas (2010) argue against such a dual revival of religion and anti-religiosity alike for a continued, gradual and generational process of religion losing its individual, social and public adherence and significance. This process of religious decline does not so much produce militant atheist contention of religion, but rather widespread attitudes of non-religious indifference vis-à-vis religion. The question that underlies this disagreement, i.e., whether secular contexts spark either “anti-clerical atheism” (Kaufmann, Goujon and Skirbekk 2012) or “religious indifference” (Bagg and Voas 2010) among the non-religious has itself however not been conclusively answered yet. Building on recent contributions by Sarah Wilkins- Laflamme in the Journal of Contemporary Religion (2016) and the Sociology of Religion journal (2014) about increases in religious polarization, this chapter therefor addresses this problem by means of the data of the International Social Survey Program Religion II and III modules (ISSP 1998 and 2008). It applies multilevel analysis to study whether country-level secularity affects the degree to which the non-religious contest religion, and whether Protestant or Catholic religious heritages play a similar role.
5.2 Theory and hypotheses
5.2.1 Wilkins-Laflamme’s polarization thesis
The principal thesis Wilkins-Laflamme brings forward in her articles on religious polarization is that as a result of religious decline, a remaining core of fervently religious people and a growing non-religious majority increasingly come to stand opposite to each other. In both articles, she relies on statistical analyses of repeated cross-sectional survey data from the United States, Great Britain and Canada (1985- 2012), conceiving of religious polarization as the combination of a proportional decline of those who are merely nominally religiously affiliated on the one hand and a proportional increase (or at least non-
4 Paper accepted for publication in the Journal of Contemporary Religion on April 23 2017, with Peter Achterberg and Dick Houtman.
Religious polarization 71
decline) of those who are either religiously unaffiliated or seriously religiously committed. This polarization proves to be most visible in regions and countries with higher shares of Protestant affiliates (i.e. Alberta/British Columbia, Great Britain) and not so much in those with higher shares of Catholic affiliates (i.e. among others Northern Ireland, Ontario, Quebec [2014: 290]). Following up on this finding in “Distinctions”, she uses the same datasets and geographical locations to demonstrate that although Protestants have lost more ground than Catholics in terms of belief and affiliation, the remaining Protestant core is nonetheless more religiously committed in the more rather than the less secular contexts.
In fact, Wilkins-Laflamme demonstrates that Catholic resilience to secularization does not show in stable attendance rates, but in affiliation rates, which she associates with strong cultural and identity ties: Catholics tend to hold on to their religious identity, even if they are no (longer) religiously active. This is different for Protestants, who tend to either disaffiliate or become more fervent and committed to their religion. Wilkins-Laflamme explains this Protestant tendency by referring to Protestantism’s marked individualism, which can also be seen in its foregrounding of sincerity and authenticity (Lindholm 2013) and accounts for its marked proneness to fragmentation. This individualism leads inactive, liberal Protestants to disaffiliate, as this choice is understood as more logical, sincere and honest than remaining merely nominally affiliated. The fragmented Protestant landscape reinforces this trend, as the absence of strong boundaries between Protestants and non-Protestants makes it socially quite acceptable to disaffiliate. Basically, the same Protestant logic encourages religious fervency among the remaining core of ‘pure’ believers by the foregrounding of individual salvation through personal faith and the marked emphasis on ‘born again’ experiences in more evangelical Protestant groups rather than the mere fact of being born into a religious community (also see McCleary 2007). The outcome is greater polarization between fervently religious minorities and non-religious majorities in Protestant contexts, whereas in Catholic contexts much more of a nominal religious midfield remains intact (Wilkins- Laflamme 2016: 168).
This analysis has far-reaching implications for the issue of the religious-secular polarization in secular societies. Wilkins-Laflamme after all suggests, but does not actually demonstrate, increased contestations of religion among the non-religious. In her “Polarization” article, she refers to secular47 reactions to the Muslim presence in Great Britain and other European countries, such as the ban on religious dress in schools and public buildings and opposition to the construction of mosques (2014: 287, referencing Cesari 2005, Husbands 1995). Whether or not such intolerance of religion is merely targeting Islamic religious manifestations or pertains to religion more generally speaking does not
72 Religious polarization
become very clear in Wilkins-Laflamme’s argument (see for an extended discussion of this point Bornschier 2010, Van Bohemen et al. 2011), but in “Distinctions”, she writes that “[t]hose opposed to religion, such as members of active atheist and humanist movements, hope for a religion-free future where scientific reasoning and forms of secular morality trump all. But rather than disappearing into obscurity, religion appears to have become even more contentious in contemporary Western societies, with debates surrounding issues as home-grown extremism and the presence of religious symbols in public settings” (2016: 166). She indeed suggests that the polarization of a “fervent, vocal and politically active religious core with values starkly different from non-religious individuals […] harbors the potential for social conflict with secular society and between religious minorities” (ibid: 177).
Yet, Wilkins-Laflamme’s analysis does not provide empirical support for these suggestions. First, her analysis is based on polarization in levels of religious commitment, not on the contestation of religion among the non-religious. She hence focuses on polarization at the religious pole, not taking into account what is happening at the secular pole. Indeed, “Distinctions” excludes non-Catholics and non- Protestants from the analysis (ibid: 174), so that religious groups are compared with each other rather than with their non-religious environment. Like many others before her, she treats the non-religious group as basically one homogeneous ‘left-over’ category. Non-believers and non-attenders are for instance referred to as ‘atheists’ by Becker and Vink (1994) and Norris and Inglehart (2004), respectively, notwithstanding the fact that the latter constitutes a contested identity (Edgell, Gerteis and Hartmann 2006, Smith 2013b), so that those thus categorized are unlikely to understand themselves in this, or indeed any other, homogeneous and unitary way. Indeed, several recent publications have raised awareness that there is a significant difference between atheists as non-believers and atheists as religion- haters (Bainbridge 2005, Bullivant 2008, Guenther 2014, Lee 2012, Ribberink and Houtman 2010, Zuckerman 2009). In 2012, the Journal of Contemporary Religion even dedicated a special issue to the diversity in the non-religious category (Bullivant and Lee 2012).
A second reason why Wilkins-Laflamme’s analyses do not provide empirical support for increased contestations about religion among the non-religious in the most secularized countries, is that they are confined to the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. Although these countries have indeed undergone processes of religious decline, it is clear that they do not represent the advanced levels of secularization the Western European countries do (Bruce 2011, Voas and Chaves 2016). Studying the latter would moreover allow including the path dependencies of Protestant and Catholic religious heritage, which Wilkins-Laflamme refers to (see also Inglehart and Baker 2000, Martin 1978). An
Religious polarization 73
analysis of the contestation of religion among the non-religious in Western Europe hence promises to add considerably to the understanding of religious-secular polarization in secular contexts.
5.2.2 Secularization and anti-religious attitudes Wilkins-Laflamme’s analysis centers on the process of religion losing its taken-for-grantedness and cultural legitimacy, and becoming a matter of choice and voluntary commitment (2014: 287). On the one hand, in contexts of secularity people allegedly no longer understand it as necessary to remain even loosely linked to a religious institution. On the other hand, if they do remain religious in those contexts, they are allegedly more likely to participate fully and with increased commitment, as this constitutes an active and positive choice. This in turn leads to a focus on religious piety and purity amongst the religious, i.e., to distancing and detaching oneself from secular society (ibid).
Whereas Wilkins-Laflamme appears to assume that the non-religious react to these increased religious commitments with a similar fervency, she does not actually study whether this is indeed the case. Indeed, other relevant literature suggests rather the opposite, i.e., less instead of more anti-religious opposition among the non-religious in secular contexts. Comparing religious and non-religious parents, for instance, Kelley and De Graaf (1997) maintain that in secular countries, non-religious parents constitute the majority, which implies they have less to fear from a shrinking religious minority. Hence, if they worry less, why should they bother or have very anti-religious feelings? Only when the non- religious find themselves in a minority position in religious contexts, they might become more fervent and committed (Asad 2008, Stahl 2010), similar to the way the experiences of religious minorityhood in secular contexts appear to spark religious fervency among the religious (Achterberg et al. 2009). What is more, Kelley and De Graaf argue that in fact, this might work out differently for the non-religious than it does for the religious (1997: 642). They point out that in religious contexts (let alone in secular contexts) non-religious parents have little problems with their children learning religious beliefs and values at school, as these are rarely seen as onerous, and the emotional support and sense of meaning and purpose religion provides are seen as valuable (ibid). By contrast, religious parents aim to insulate their children as much as possible from secular influences in order for them to acquire and retain their orthodox beliefs and in order to find devout friends and marriage candidates. This provides us with two reasons why to expect religious indifference, rather than militant secular and atheist attitudes among the non-religious in secular contexts.
Even though some scholars suggest that religion can also trigger anti-religious responses in massively secular contexts (Casanova 2004, Kaufmann, Goujon and Skirbekk 2012, Putnam and Campbell 2010), there is not much empirical support for this in Western Europe (Bruce 2011, 2014,
74 Religious polarization
Glendinning and Bruce 2011). Indeed, most recent studies of non-religious and atheist contention of religion support the argument that anti-religious sentiments are particularly pronounced in the United States and the relatively religious countries in Western Europe (Amarasingam 2010, Zuckerman 2009, Chapter 2). Considering the contemporary situation in Western Europe, I thus expect the non-religious to oppose religion most strongly only in contexts where the latter has a strong hold on society: I expect weakest anti-religious attitudes among the non-religious in the most secular countries (Hypothesis 1).
5.2.3 Protestant and Catholic distinctions in anti-religious attitudes In her 2016 article, Wilkins-Laflamme argues that it is worth revisiting the classic divide between Protestantism and Catholicism, in order to understand “more advanced patterns of secularization” (165). Indeed, throughout the literature on secularization, references are made to the resistance and opposition Catholicism has faced from ‘rivalrous secular universalisms’ (Martin 1978: 76) like the French revolutionaries of the 18th century and 20th-century socialist movements (see also Bruce 2011: 31, Campbell 2007: 224, Martin 2000, Chapter 3). Whereas Protestants have historically tended to retreat from strong political involvement, as long as their religious freedom was guaranteed (Woodhead 2004), Catholic societies have rather tended to incite a split between the Catholic social order, in which God, Church and State were virtually synonymous, and its secular rivals. Whatever their precise political or social ideology (rationalist, freemason, socialist, etc.), secular and even mildly religious movements became basically anti-religious in contexts where Catholicism constituted the dominant cultural power and where its cultural and political values became deeply imbued in society48.
These values, like solidarity, respect for authority and nationalism, foreground the importance of the collective realm and create strong and dominant monocultures (Martin, 1978: 18 ff) that stem from the Catholic notion of the church as God’s city on earth, as the representative through which He reveals himself (Troeltsch 1922, Woodhead 2004). The church here provides a sense of unity, community and belonging, closely intertwined with family-bonds and notions of national identity. Even more, Hervieu- Léger (2006: 51) argues that many issues in Catholic countries (even in ‘secular’ France) which have basically nothing to do with religion as such (i.e. food quality or demands for workers' rights) are nonetheless imbued with Catholic values. This cultural aspect of Catholicism makes is more difficult for the typical Catholic in doubt to disaffiliate from the church than it would be for the typical Protestant, which also accounts for the higher Catholic levels of nominal affiliation indicated above (Wilkins- Laflamme 2014). This Catholic hold on national cultures has empowered the defense of national identities and values against competing totalitarian powers, as for instance in Poland during the Cold War (Martin 1978), and in doing so, it has also played a major role in withstanding secularizing forces
Religious polarization 75
(for the time being, see Bruce 2002). Apart from political rivalry, and even apart from contemporary moral outrage about scandals of sex abuse (De Graaf 2013, Gambetta 1994), then, the reason to oppose religion in Catholic contexts is very much informed by religion’s cultural all-pervasiveness and omnipresence. Becoming non-religious in such a context entails a marked act of deviance that places one outside the community.
This is different in Protestant societies. After the Reformation, Protestants maintained a more demystified and rationalized faith in a transcendent and independent God (Bruce 2011), which opened up the way for the exploration of nature with scientific methods and for a more privatized spirituality, not focused on establishing God’s Kingdom in the here and now, but on seeking moral and spiritual purity in small communities of ‘elect’. This Protestant focus on individual salvation, rationality, and purity opened up the way for pluralism, relativism, doubt, and ultimately disaffiliation (Berger 1967, Bruce 2011). In Protestant countries, non-religiosity is in effect less of a problem, and more common, because Protestantism does not dominate the public domain or national culture in the way Catholicism does.
Protestant and the Catholic value patterns have been instilled upon Western European countries from the Reformation period and the political turmoil that followed it onwards (1517-1648) (Daiber 2002, Gillespie 1999, Gorski 2000, Woodhead 2004). Although there have been major political, cultural and social changes and upheavals (like the Enlightenment, modernization and two world wars, to name a few), and despite massive secularization, the distinct value patterns associated with Catholicism and Protestantism continue to be recognizable in Western Europe (Hervieu-Léger 2006, Martin 2014a). Even in everyday life, values like prudence, tactfulness and conflict avoidance (Catholic), and the need to demonstrate purity of the soul and honesty of intentions, putting a premium on sincerity, frankness, and openness (Protestant), although not religious in and of themselves, have their roots in respective religious heritage (Lindholm 2013, Magill 2012). Likewise, we argue that these heritages continue to influence Western European countries, influencing non-religious people’s attitudes towards morality and politics (Inglehart and Baker 2000, Norris and Inglehart 2012) and attitudes towards religion among the non-religious (Chapter 3). The non-religious in Protestant countries will see no harm in the relatively small–scale, privatized, and individualized religion, which stimulates moral living without dominating the public domain. By contrast, the non-religious in Catholic countries will feel strong aversion against the Catholic monoculture, which despite declining levels of belief and attendance imbues all segments of society. They might have stayed within the church for a long time, perhaps partly to avoid conflict with their community, but when they become openly non-religious, this constitutes an
76 Religious polarization
act of defiance against a strong cultural dominance. My second hypothesis then reads that anti-religious attitudes among the non-religious will be strongest in countries with a Catholic rather than a Protestant heritage (Hypothesis 2).
5.3 Data and operationalization
I am interested in how the level of secularity and the Protestant and Catholic religious heritage influence understandings of religion among the non-religious in Western European countries. In order to test my hypotheses about this, I have used two waves of International Social Survey Program (Religion II and Religion III datasets) that contain the questions about the religious practices and attitudes that I need for the analysis. I wanted to use every ISSP-wave that is available for each country, but I could not include the first wave (Religion I), since it has no data on two of the four variables that I used to construct my dependent variable. I included all Western European countries available in the
ISSP datasets, which are: Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, East and West Germany49, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Northern Ireland with N=41,146 in 32 country/waves.
My dependent variable is anti-religiosity, which is measured by a scale tapping the respondents’ attitudes towards the influence religion can have on the public domain. I used four questions that straightforwardly ask for people’s views on this matter. Two of these ask for respondents’ attitude towards religious leaders influencing governments’ decisions and peoples’ votes. The two others address intolerance of religious people and whether religion creates conflict or not. I linearly combined the four abovementioned Likert items, with answer categories ranging between 1 (strongly agree) – 5 (strongly disagree), that together yield a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α: .71, see Table 5.1). I reversed the scale, so that higher scores indicate higher levels of anti-religiosity50.
Table 5.I. Factor and reliability analysis for the anti-religiosity scale Questions: Factor Loading How much do you agree or disagree that: Religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote in elections 0.81 Religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions 0.79 Looking around the world, religions bring more conflict than peace 0.65 People with very strong religious beliefs are often too intolerant of others 0.65 Eigen value 2.13 R2 0.53 Cronbach’s α 0.71 N 42,092 Source: ISSP 1998 and 2008.
Religious polarization 77
Non-religiosity is measured as non-belief. There are also other ways in which non-religiosity could have been measured, like non-affiliation or non-attendance. I choose non-belief because it is the most open and neutral measure, in the sense that it does not say anything about either commitment to religious institutions or religious identity. It purely indicates reluctance to believe, and later on we will see how this is related to attitudes towards religious institutions and religious identities. Respondents who answer either “I do not believe in God” or “I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out” to the question what best describes their belief are coded as ‘non-believers’ (1) and all others as ‘believers’ (0). To be comprehensive, I control for the effect of non-attendance, with answer categories ranging from several times a week (coded 1) to either never or not religious (coded 8). This measure correlates moderately with the non-belief measure (Pearson’s r =0.423, p<0.001), but not enough to create multicollinearity in the multilevel model.
Country-level secularity is measured by aggregating the individual scores for non-attendance for each country per wave. Here, I use the non-attendance measure, which is the most commonly used measure for assessing country level secularity (Bagg and Voas 2010, Bruce 2013, Ribberink, Achterberg and Houtman 2013, Voas 2009). I include wave as a separate variable to control for the time-effect.
The Catholic heritage measure is operationalized using the Religious Characteristics of States dataset (RCS), which includes all available historical data on religious affiliation (Barrett 1982, Barrett, Kurian and Johnson 2001, Bennett and Stam 2000, Johnson and Grim 2013, Mitchell 1998, United
Nations 2012)51. This variable shows that in 1900 almost 100% of the Western European population was registered as religiously affiliated and that countries were almost completely either Protestant, Catholic or Orthodox, with some countries having a mixed background. An overview of this variable together with the country level secularity measure is given in Table 5.2 and a visual mapping of countries’ religious heritage according to these measures is given in Figure 5.1.
Table 5.2. Country level Secularity and Catholic heritage for 32 Western European country-waves. Country Secularity Proportion Catholics 1900 Ireland '98 3,17 ,74 Ireland '08 3,78 ,74 Cyprus '98 3,97 ,78 Cyprus '08 4,49 ,78 Northern Ireland '98 4,45 ,32 Northern Ireland '08 4,74 ,32 Portugal '98 4,61 1,00 Portugal '08 4,89 1,00 Italy '98 4,67 ,96 Italy '08 4,52 ,96 Austria '98 5,20 ,89
78 Religious polarization
Austria '08 5,60 ,89 Spain '98 5,34 ,97 Spain '08 5,78 ,97 Switzerland '08 6,06 ,42 Switzerland '98 5,67 ,42 Germany (West) '98 6,06 ,36 Germany (West) '08 5,84 ,36 Sweden '98 6,14 ,00 Sweden '08 6,65 ,00 Netherlands '98 6,24 ,35 Netherlands '08 5,76 ,35 Great Britain '98 6,36 ,13 Great Britain '08 6,70 ,13 Denmark '98 6,46 ,00 Denmark '08 6,28 ,00 France '98 6,55 ,97 France '08 6,64 ,97 Norway '98 6,70 ,00 Norway '08 6,77 ,00 Germany (East) '98 7,34 ,36 Germany (East) '08 7,15 ,36 Source: ISSP 1998 and 2008, RCS
Religious polarization 79
Figure 5.1. Representation of Protestant and Catholic heritage and level of secularity of 32 country- waves in 1998 and 2008 (ISSP).
In order to validate this measure, i.e., to assess whether these historical patterns can still be recognized today, I designed a variable based on the aggregated shares of religious affiliates of either
Catholic/Orthodox52 or Protestant churches, ranging from 0 (100% Protestant heritage) to 1 (100% Catholic heritage). An overview of this variable is presented in appendix A. The correlation coefficient between this measure of a country’s share of Protestant and Catholics in 2008 and the historical data from 1900 is very high (Pearson’s r =0.971, p<0.001). This indicates that, despite the degree to which it has secularized, a country’s religious identity has not changed significantly in one hundred years. I did not include the ISSP-based measure of shares of religious affiliates in my model, but ran a separate multilevel model with this measure replacing the RCS 1900 measure, which yields almost identical results.
As control variable on the macro level, apart from the earlier mentioned wave-variable, I used the country’s GDP per capita ($) (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Baker 2000), using the UN statistics website53 for data on this variable. On the individual level, I also controlled for gender, level of education and age (Houtman 2003). I standardized all variables used. See Table 5.3 for the descriptive statistics of the variables that were thus created.
Table 5.3. Descriptive statistics of all variables used N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Secularity country-wave 32 3.17 7.34 5.6869 .98615 Proportion Catholics in 1900 country 32 0 1 .5326 .37767 GDP ($) per capita 32 24,789 96,683 53,033.7359 16,875.5861 Wave (1998=0, 2008=1) 42,769 0 1 .5435 .49811 Male (1) or female (2) 42,769 1 2 1.5354 .49875 Age 42,747 16 98 47.57 17.332 Level of education 42,378 .00 5 2.5773 1.46943 Anti-religiosity 42,636 1 5 3.9453 .78135 Non-belief 42,344 0 1 .2389 .42645 Non-attendance 41,996 1 8 5.6914 2.2446 Valid N (listwise) 41,146 Source: ISSP 1998 and 2008
5.4 Results and analysis
I used ordinary least squares linear multilevel analysis with maximum likelihood estimation to test my hypotheses. I did so for two reasons. First and foremost, multilevel analysis makes it possible to simultaneously estimate effects of individual-level variables and country-level variables. My data are
80 Religious polarization
structured in such a way that there are two levels: 41,146 individuals with certain characteristics (e.g. affiliation, attitudes, etc.) are nested in 32 country-waves with certain characteristics (aggregated level of secularity, religious heritage, GDP). In such cases, multilevel analysis is the most suitable option. Second, as my hypotheses aim to investigate how individuals respond differently to differences in country-level secularity and religious heritage, multilevel analysis is particularly suitable as it allows for testing these expected cross-level interactions. I estimated different models with different effects. These are effects of variables, either at the individual or at the country level, and I estimated the interactions between these variables. Each of the models also contains so-called random effects. These effects, noted as variances, are estimations of the variability of the mean level of anti-religiosity in a country, and of the variability of anti-religiosity at the individual level. Each model that shows lower levels of these types of variability explains anti-religiosity a bit better. Table 5.4 shows the results of my analysis.
Table 5.4. Explaining Anti-Religiosity (OLS multilevel analysis, Maximum Likelihood, N=41,146 in 32 country-waves)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Constant 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) Wave 1998 (ref. =2008) -- -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Secularity country-wave -- -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Proportion Catholics country 1900 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) GDP ($) per capita country -- 0.02 0.02 0.02 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Non-belief -- 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Non-attendance -- 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Gender male (ref. = female) -- 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Education -- 0.01 0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age -- 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Catholic heritage country* ------0.02* Non-belief (0.01) Secularity country* ------0.04** Non-belief (0.01) -2loglikelihood 115231.22 110612.60 110542.41 110544.66 Variance individual level 0.96 0.86 0.85 0.85
Religious polarization 81
Variance country level 0.035 0.030 0.031 0.031 Variance non-belief -- -- 0.0030 0.0016 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed test for significance).
Looking at the outcomes of my analysis, I notice that, apart from country level secularity, none of the country level variables has a significant effect on people’s anti-religious attitude54. This means that anti-religious attitudes are primarily related to people’s individual characteristics. This is also visible in the relatively high level of explained variance on this level, compared to the country level. To the extent that this attitude is more prevalent in some countries rather than others, this must hence be attributed to that country’s composition (more people living there with that attitude). The control variable education has no independent effect on people’s opposition to religion. Only males and older people appear to oppose to religion a bit more than females and younger people respectively.
Considering the two indicators of non-religiosity, namely non-belief and non-attendance, it is noticeable that non-attenders have higher scores on anti-religiosity than non-believers. This could be explained by the fact that non-attenders already speak with their behavior, i.e. for them not going to church is an expression of not liking the church, whereas among non-believers there is more diversity. Among them, for example, some might feel a sense of belonging without believing (Davie 1994). This would mitigate the score on anti-religious attitude for this group. Nevertheless, compared to believers, non-believers are on average significantly more anti-religious in their attitude, which is of course what I would expect to find. The strong anti-religiosity among non-attenders also explains the negative effect of country-level secularity, as these variables are related (the country variable is an aggregation of the individual-level variable). Leaving out the individual variable from this model, gives a positive effect for country-level secularity (.02 n.s.) and increases the non-belief effect (.19***).
Considering the question in what context the non-believers have the strongest anti-religious attitudes, I expected less instead of more anti-religiosity among non-religious in the most secular contexts (hypothesis 1). In model 4 of table 5.4, the cross-level interaction effect between non-belief and country secularity is however positive. At first sight, this is a refutation of my hypothesis. It shows that the polarization between non-believers and believers over the place of religion is stronger when a country is more secular. See figure 5.2 for a representation of this finding55. In appendix B, a marginal effects plot for this interaction is also presented, to show its substantive and statistical significance (based on Golder 2003).
82 Religious polarization
0,10
0,00
-0,10
-0,20
-0,30 religiosity
- non-believer -0,40 Anti believer
-0,50
-0,60
-0,70
Secularity country Figure 5.2. Predicted anti-religiosity for believers and non-believers in countries with low and high levels of secularity in 32 country-waves in 1998 and 2008 (ISSP).
However, figure 5.2 also demonstrates how in secular contexts in particular believers have relatively low levels of anti-religiosity. This implies that stronger religious-secular polarization in secularized contexts can be attributed mostly to the remaining religious fervent core, who of course maintain strong pro- religious attitudes. In secular contexts, then, my findings point to heightened contention of religion really because of fewer religious people creating more turmoil over religious issues (Casanova 1994, Achterberg et al. 2009). In effect, this nuance confirms my hypothesis, and Wilkins-Laflamme’s polarization thesis. I find the religious and non-religious to lie further apart in their anti-religiosity, whereas Wilkins-Laflamme observed these groups to lie further apart in their religious commitment. However, her suggestion that this increased polarization could lead to social conflict with secular society finds no support in my findings as far as the non-religious are concerned. Not the secular majority, but the religious minorities are the ones we can attribute this polarization to, first and foremost.
Now considering my second hypothesis, I expected to find a stronger religious-secular polarization, indicated by higher levels of anti-religiosity among non-believers, in countries with a Catholic heritage. Again, in table 5.4, model 4, I find the cross-level interaction effect between non- belief and Catholic heritage on anti-religiosity to be positive, this time confirming my hypothesis. Figure 5.3 is a visual representation of this finding (also see appendix C for a marginal effects plot for this interaction).
Religious polarization 83
0,12
0,10
0,08
0,06
non-believer religiosity - 0,04
believer Anti 0,02
0,00
-0,02
Catholic heritage Figure 5.3. Predicted anti-religiosity for believers and non-believers in countries with a Protestant and Catholic heritage in 32 country-waves in 1998 and 2008 (ISSP).
This figure indicates that the polarization between believers and non-believers is higher in countries with a Catholic heritage, compared with Protestant heritage countries. The ascending slope for non- believers indicates that in countries with a Catholic heritage, this polarization between religious and non-religious can be attributed to relatively high levels of anti-religiosity among the non-religious. Since my operationalization measures a historical presence of Catholicism and I included country’s level secularity in my model as well, I can interpret this finding as a specific link between a country’s Catholic cultural identity and anti-religious opposition. Both this stronger polarization and the fact that it can be attributed to non-religious fervency support my hypothesis. In light of Wilkins-Laflamme’s analysis that these countries have lower levels of religious polarization, this is quite an interesting finding (2016: 168).
5.5 Discussion
In this chapter, I set out to do a complementary analysis of Wilkins-Laflamme’s polarization thesis by looking at the religious-secular polarization from the side of the non-religious. In particular, I analyzed the contention of religion in secularized contexts, as Wilkins-Laflamme suggested this was a growing phenomenon. Interestingly enough, I found the contestation of religion in secular contexts to be related to religious fervency and in contexts with a Catholic heritage to non-religious fervency. The former form of polarization is similar to the one Wilkins-Laflamme found. The latter situation is different. Wilkins-Laflamme concluded that the religious-secular polarization was strongest among the Protestants living in secularized countries. As for Catholics in secular countries, they would embrace nominal religious commitment as an expression of their cultural and identity ties, and would not become more
84 Religious polarization
committed. Although this might well be true for religious Catholics, my analysis points to stronger anti- religious attitudes among the non-religious in countries with a Catholic religious heritage. This indicates that the same cultural climate that encourages nominal affiliation by the religious, encourages opposition to religion by the non-religious. This corresponds with Campbell’s expectation that anti-religious protests are more often than not cries of moral outrage and ethical rebellion (1971: 125) directed to the norms and values which have become dominant in a group or community (see also Campbell 2007: 224, Lehmann 2013, Martin 1978: 24, McLeod 1997: 214, Chapter 3).
As far as the most secular countries are concerned, my findings confirm Wilkins-Laflamme’s picture of stronger religious commitment and larger polarization in secular environments. In the debate on conflicts over the place of religion in Western Europe, some have expressed the expectation that these conflicts counter the arguments for a continuation of secularization (Achterberg et al. 2009, Casanova 1994, 2004, Gorski et al. 2012). For some Western Europe even has arrived at a post-secular stage, where religion again takes center stage in public life (Beckford 2012, Dillon 2010, Fox 2016, Gorski 2000, Moberg, Granholm and Nynäs 2012). However, my findings show that the contestation of religion in secularized societies cannot be attributed to the non-religious. Anti-religious protests must be seen as a stage in a process of religious decline, since it challenges and desacralizes religious commitment, which opens up the room for apostasy (Campbell 1971: 125). This is what I find, with lower levels of anti-religiosity among the non-religious in countries where already many people have left the church, and higher levels of anti-religiosity in the case of the Catholic countries, where religious affiliation and cultural ties with the church continue to influence these countries’ cultures, notwithstanding lower levels of religious commitment. This leads me to expect that the trend of religious decline will not be reversed in the near future. Hence, referencing to the incidence of religious- secular polarization as signaling some kind of post-secular stage is untimely in my view (see also Bruce 2013). Admittedly, due to lack of data, our multilevel analysis did not allow for an analysis of whether and how religious decline affects anti-religiosity among the non-religious. Clearly, this is a vital issue that needs to be addressed by future research that can rely on longitudinal data (see Te Grotenhuis et al. 2015).
When the distinctive religious heritage of Catholicism and Protestantism continues to influence secular Western Europeans, as I have found, this is also relevant for the study of secular cultural values, attitudes and practice. As David Martin maintained: “[t]he post-Protestant North still preens itself on its capacity to internalize rules and laws, rather than to accept them in principle while venally evading them in practice” (Martin 2005: 77). My findings have implications for other fields of study as well, then,
Religious polarization 85
as for example European politics (Lehmann 2013). As an illustration, a recent newspaper article on the euro crisis referred to religious heritage, i.e., the divide between a “Calvinist Northern Europe that doesn’t want to forgive sinners, and a Catholic Europe that wants to turn the page.” This was a quote from the French minister of Economy Emmanuel Macron, talking about the clash between the Greek government and the European Union, dominated by the German Prime Minister Merkel, on the conditions for Greece to stay within the EU (Chassany, Politi and Spiegel, 2015 np). Religious heritage then, emerges as an interesting explanatory variable, not only in studies of religion and religious conflict, but also in the field of culture, economics and politics.
47 Wilkins-Laflamme calls these responses ‘secular’ where others would perhaps use the term ‘secularist’, as they are mostly political in nature, coming from governments who want to enforce a strict separation of church and state (see Casanova 2004 and 2012). 48 Martin convincingly argues that the cultural heritage of the Orthodox Church that can be found in countries like Cyprus, but also in Greece, is very similar to the Catholic heritage and thus speaks of a Catholic/Orthodox monopoly (2005: 86-87, also Bruce 2011: 8). In terms of its value pattern, it shares with Catholicism and differs from Protestantism in its tendency to monopolize the religious domain of a national culture and compete with secular authorities for power. 49 These are separate countries in this dataset. 50 In order to limit the number of missing values, I recoded “don’t know” to the middle (3: neither agree nor disagree), which gives 1.6% missing values instead of 9.3%. 51 When data was not available, the dataset-editors calculated data based on an extrapolation from the available sources, so that comparisons are made possible. See the codebook and explanations on method and design here: http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/BROWN.asp (Web 18 Nov. 2015). 52 Cyprus is the only Orthodox country in this selection of Western European countries. See note ii and Martin 2005:86-87, also Bruce 2011: 8. 53 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnlList.asp (Web 8 Dec. 2015). 54 Te Grotenhuis et al. (2015) note that comparing countries at one particular moment in time does not necessarily produce the same results as comparing historical contexts within countries. We are aware of this risk, but we could not follow up on their suggestion to include as many waves as possible, for two reasons. First, the ISSP, only consists of three waves on Religion (1991, 1998 and 2008). Even if we would have included the third wave, this would not have allowed for testing the within country cross level interaction, which Te Grotenhuis et al. point out as relevant. Second, even if three waves would be sufficient and we had included the nine Western European countries from the 1991 wave, we would have had to settle for a limited and insufficient measurement of anti-religiosity for that year, because the questions about religious conflict and religious people’s intolerance were not asked in 1991. This would have left us with only the two items about political influence for that year. 55 This figure is an illustration of the interaction effect only. Because interaction effects cannot be interpreted in isolation of the other effects, they need to be interpreted carefully. Our illustrations satisfy the criteria developed by Brambor et al. (2006).
86 Religious polarization
Chapter 6. Synthesis: Who is reading Richard Dawkins?
If this book works as I intend, religious readers who open it will be atheists when they put it down
(Dawkins 2006: 28)
6.1 Sheer curiosity This project started out of sheer curiosity. Since I discovered that many of my friends in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom read Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion (2006), I wondered what explained their interest in Dawkins’ missionary atheist zeal. Were our countries not secularized? Did religion still have any particular influence on non-religious people? In other words, who is reading Richard Dawkins, and why? Diving deeper into this subject, I discovered that atheism meant very different things to different people and that not many sociologists had seriously studied atheism. Nor was it clear, reading more on secularization, how secular our countries really were. As many more questions continued to pop up, this motivated me to do a PhD-research on anti-religiosity in secular contexts, starting in 2009 next to a full-time job. This dissertation is the final reflection of this stretched out research project. Its central research question was where and why some non-religious Western Europeans develop anti- religious attitudes, while others are benevolent and tolerant towards religion.
This question opened up the non-religious category, which at the time of the start of this project hardly received any attention from scholars of religion. Opening up this category entailed differentiating anti-religiosity from non-religiosity, and theorizing on where to expect the non-religious to be anti- religious and why. Furthermore, this research explored and evaluated relevant secularization narratives, both theoretically and empirically. The secularization debate is at times quite heated and even ferocious. For example, Rodney Stark says that the ‘secularization faithful’, like Bryan Wilson and Steve Bruce are ‘ridiculing everyone who fails to agree with them that religion has nearly disappeared already’ (2015: 6). Bruce, on the other hand calls Stark’s theory vacuous (2011: 196), and acknowledges that he writes out of frustration and annoyance, as he has often been confronted with ill-informed arguments, caricatures, and accusations of naivety (2011: vi). To contribute to this debate, then, is to tread on thin ice, but at the same time, by providing an empirically tested theoretical contribution, perhaps this debate can cool down a bit more (and subsequently create stronger ice layers for future contributions).
This sixth chapter synthesizes the main findings from the four empirical chapters and discusses their theoretical relevance. Steering away from counting who considers themselves atheist or not, and
Synthesis 87
examining explanations related to religious tolerance, polarization, cultural values and anti-Muslim sentiment, these chapters’ findings provide insight in much broader debates than anti-religiosity proper. In fact, the implications of my findings bear upon debates about the religious heritage of Western European countries, post-secularity and the privatization of religion, the different constellations in the balance between religion and politics, and the emergence of cultural conflicts in the wake of secularization. Before turning to these implications in section 6.3, some more reflections on the methodological obstacles encountered during this research project in section 6.4, and a final thought on who would be most likely to read Richard Dawkins in section 6.5, I will first present my main findings in section 6.2. Throughout these sections, I will come up with suggestions for further research.
6.2 Main findings
Anti-religiosity refers to an attitude of opposition to religion or the religious. My main research question was where this attitude surfaces and why there. Now, I started the empirical part of this dissertation by presenting a figure (2.1), which showed how the most secular countries featured highest average levels of anti-religious attitudes. Formulated differently, the more religious a country is; the more tolerant attitude people on average have towards religion. The simple answer to my where-question then would be in the most secular countries. These are the least favorable contexts for religious people to live in and practice their religion. Even though this might not seem remarkable, we have to be careful to jump to conclusions here. Why would non-religious people have negative attitudes towards religion, when their countries are secular? Is it intrinsic to non-religious people to oppose religion? This would not only disprove my personal observation of most non-religious people I know, but also some of the major contributions in to the secularization debate, which predict religious indifference and even ignorance by the non-religious in secular contexts (i.e. Bagg and Voas 2010, Bruce 2011, 2014, Voas 2009). The crux of the matter then is that an explanation needs to be given, not for the average levels of anti-religiosity, but for the attitudes of non-religious people in those contexts. This is where my analysis in chapter 2 starts.
While reviewing the rationalization theory in chapter 2, I explained how this theory simplifies what religion is, equating it with unscientific irrationality (Wallace 1966, Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001, also see Stark, Iannaccone and Finke 1996). The logical outcome of breaking with religion is not anti-religiosity per se, and non-religiosity is not always a position opposing religion. Chapter 2 highlights the diversity in non-religious attitudes and points out how the non-religious are opposed to religion most strongly in the most religious contexts. I refer to this theory as the ‘deprivatization of disbelief’ theory. The hypotheses derived from this theory were confirmed, whereas those based on rationalization theory were refuted. For example, I found the higher educated to be highly anti-religious
88 Synthesis
in religious contexts, but to be most tolerant in secular contexts. Their education does not lead them to be opposed to religion necessarily (my model even shows a small negative individual effect for level of education on anti-religiosity), which disproved the rationalization hypothesis on education and confirmed the one derived from deprivatization theory. The relation between higher education and lower levels of anti-religiosity in secular contexts is explained by the fact that it is one of the major sources of cultural and political tolerance (Houtman 2003). Yet, some questions remain, as the higher educated are less tolerant towards religion in religious contexts. Does this point to a role ‘Enlightened elites’ play in opposing religion and perhaps in opening up the room for apostasy on a larger scale, as Martin asserts (2005: 69)? This would be interesting to explore further, also because it seems to contradict Campbell’s assertion that “the actual transition from religious commitment to religious rejection is much more a matter of moral outrage and ethical rebellion than one of intellectual doubt and rational persuasion” (1971: 125). A more qualitative research design could assess the role the higher educated play in the spread of anti-religious attitudes in religious contexts and in what ways anti- religiosity in general is disseminated. This study could also assess the way anti-religious elites might challenge religious authority and power, and the bearing this has on the increase in disregard of religious authority among the population at large (see Chaves 1994).
Chapter 2’s analysis further shows that, depending on where they live, generations differ in their anti-religiosity. In secular contexts, older generations are more anti-religious, which is explained by the fact that older generations were born in a more religious context, before secularization set in. In addition, I find that the younger generations are more anti-religious in the most religious countries and tolerant of religion when contexts are secular. In latter contexts, religion is no obstacle or hindrance for them. These findings support the deprivatization of disbelief thesis that a strong presence of religion incites stronger anti-religious reactions. Here, I have not included a time-effect in my analysis. In other words, these findings make sense theoretically, but could be verified more substantially with longitudinal data. Coming back to chapter 2’s main findings, I conclude that differences in beliefs, age, education all influence non-religious people’s anti-religiosity, but this influence varies considerably as a function of differences in the religiosity of a context. What I suggest in this chapter’s discussion, is to complement this analysis with the inclusion of the religious identity of a context, as I expect that this affects people’s anti-religiosity as well. This is what I examine in chapter 3.
Chapter 3 addresses socialists’ anti-religiosity, comparing contexts based on two dimensions of religious culture (levels of secularity and religious identity, see chapter 1). In European history, socialists have developed a wide variety in attitudes towards religion, ranging from tolerant to fiercely anti-
Synthesis 89
religious. Writing on differences in religious culture, Martin asserts that ‘historic religious moulds of European societies are mirrored in characteristic secular mutations and transpositions’ (2005: 80). According to Martin, religion and politics are isomorphic, i.e. you can read one from the other. In chapter 3, I derive hypotheses from this thesis on where to expect socialists to oppose religion most strongly. In particular, I hypothesize that Catholic religiosity would trigger more opposition from socialists than Protestant religiosity, because of collective national identities the Catholic religion has been able to create, as opposed to the individualist cultures in Protestant countries (Martin 1978, Taylor 2008). Particularly, I hypothesize that the collective values, like solidarity, nationalism and respect for authority, which are typical for these Catholic cultures, would attract opposition. I expect socialists to mirror these religious collective identities by building political counter structures which in this context will inevitably be anti-religious. Martin calls those structures ‘rivalrous secular universalisms’ (1978: 76). Indeed, my analysis shows socialists to have considerably stronger anti-religious attitudes in contexts with a Catholic identity than in Protestant ones (see also Berger 1970, Noomen, Aupers and Houtman 2011: 6, Norris and Inglehart 2004: 17). Seemingly, the Catholic religious identity particularly leads to fervent reactions against religion, even when we these countries are largely secular. This empirically grounds the often made suggestion that socialism mirrors and opposes Catholicism, hence its name ‘secular religion’ (Berger 1967, Martin 1978, Campbell 2007: 224). In other words, my findings indicate that the main obstacle for socialists is not people’s church visiting or religion’s public visibility but religion’s cultural consequences. When religion has been able to dominate and monopolize a national- political culture, this will lead to anti-religious reactions. As the literature regularly refers to conflicts between Catholicism and anti-religious movements, this finding was not surprising in and of itself, but it does illustrate how important it is to account for the religious identity of a certain context when explaining anti-religiosity (see also Lehmann 2013).
Now, observing this relationship between socialist anti-religiosity with Catholicism, I wondered whether I also could find a typical form of anti-religiosity in contexts with a Protestant identity. Protestantism also has been able to build ‘monopolies’, but with very different cultural consequences (Martin 1978). It features a much more tolerant, pluralist and individualist mindset (Berger 1967). Nonetheless, noting the many expressions of anti-Muslim sentiment in the Protestant Northern European countries, this led me to investigate anti-Muslim sentiment. The paradox I noted was that the same countries that featured this sentiment are generally known for their tolerance (Mudde 2010). Chapter 4 then analyzes who are responsible for this specific type of anti-religiosity. First, I derived a hypothesis from religious competition theory that expects fierce (even violent) competition between religious minorities in secularizing contexts (see Stark and Bainbridge 1987). However, I tested this
90 Synthesis
hypothesis and found the opposite to be true. Strict religious Protestants appear to react towards Muslims with solidarity and religious tolerance, not with rivalry, antagonism or in ‘moving up the tension dimension’ (Stark and Finke 2000:216). Thus, religious competition and fervency do not lead to intolerance towards other religious minorities. Instead, the non-religious were the ones most intolerant.
How is this to be explained? Arguably, Muslims manifest themselves more assertively and self- consciously in recent years (Phalet et al. 2013). In doing so, they contest the secular truce, i.e. the social contract that guarantees religious freedom, yet relegates it to the private realm. Presumably, this refusal to be religiously ‘privatized’ arouses secular opposition. Therefore, a hypothesis was developed that the non-religious will have higher levels of anti-Muslim sentiment, especially so in the most secular contexts. This hypothesis finds support in my findings (see Figure 4.3). However, there was no support for the complementary hypothesis that this intolerance was due to the way the non-religious embrace secular, non-traditional values. People with a progressive sexual morality and a non-traditional view on gender issues did not have higher levels anti-Muslim sentiment. Thus, what I found was that whereas on average, secular countries are more tolerant towards Muslims, the polarization between religious and non-religious people on this matter is larger, when the secularity of these contexts is higher. This polarization does explain why there is more contentiousness over the place Muslims have in these societies, but the reason why the non-religious, who are generally indifferent towards religion, particularly oppose Muslims remains unclear. I will come back to this question in section 6.3.
In chapter 5, I discussed what Wilkins-Laflamme calls the religious-secular polarization, which explains how Catholic people (more than Protestants) embrace nominal religious commitment as expression of cultural identity ties (2016:168). Here, Wilkins-Laflamme addresses the polarization at the religious pole. My contribution complements her approach by addressing the polarization at the non- religious pole. I consider the question whether non-religious people are more anti-religious when they live in a more secular context. My analysis demonstrates that in secular contexts the non-religious are largely indifferent to religion, whilst the remaining religious core is very much concerned over (their) religion. This finding is similar to the one in chapter 2 where strongest anti-religiosity among the non- religious was found in religious contexts, and to the one in chapter 4, where I found that more orthodox believers are more tolerant towards Muslims in secular contexts. Nonetheless, chapter 5’s analysis points to an increase in anti-religiosity among the non-religious when living in countries with a Catholic identity, even when our measure of this identity uses church affiliation data from 1900. This highlights the relevance of European countries’ religious culture - which can date back several hundred years - for explaining non-religious people’s attitudes towards religion. The finding of stronger anti-religious
Synthesis 91
attitudes among the non-religious in countries with a Catholic religious identity indicates that the same cultural climate that encourages nominal affiliation by the religious (membership, but no active religious practice, Wilkins-Laflamme 2016), seems to encourage opposition to religion by the non-religious. In Protestant countries, non-religiosity seems to lead to anti-religious attitudes less often, as Protestantism does not dominate the public domain or national culture in the way Catholicism does. Anti-religiosity thus relates strongly to norms and values which have become dominant in a group or community. This difference between the public and cultural significance of the Christian religions, can be linked to the debate on the privatization of religion (Berger 1967, Bruce 2011). In other words, the theoretical implications of my findings bring me back to the secularization debate, wherein privatization theory plays a major role. This is what I will discuss in the next section.
6.3 Implications
6.3.1 Post-secular critique on privatization theory In chapter 1, I introduced the readers to the secularization debate. Now, I will return to this debate, and discuss the bearing my findings have on one of the theories introduced there, i.e. privatization theory. Although this theory is a contested aspect of secularization theory, it is presented as one of the key elements in understanding the process of secularization, next to structural differentiation and religious decline (see Casanova 1994, Bruce 2011:38). Privatization theory maintains that due to processes associated with modernization, most importantly the process of structural differentiation, religion lost its ability to morally overarch all of society as a sort of ‘sacred canopy’, to use Peter Berger’s (1967) famous metaphor. Instead, religion became just one separate sphere besides other institutional realms. In effect, religion lost its collectively shared status and receded from the public realm to become a matter of strictly personal choice. This can lead to, but does not necessitate, a situation of religious decline, where more people become less and less religious, due to the disappearance of the religious monopoly and the subsequent emergence of a range of co-existing and competing truth claims (see Berger 1967 and 2012 on the way that this undermines the plausibility of the latter, resulting in a decline of religion). What it leads to in any case, is that religion had to follow secular rules of engagement in the public sphere (Bruce 2011: 38).
Based on this theory, I presented the general hypothesis that in societies where religion has privatized, non-religious people will be indifferent instead of hostile to religion and vice versa (Bagg and Voas 2010, Bruce 2002: 43, Voas 2009). Now, privatization theory has been discussed and criticized extensively (Casanova 1994, Davie 2007, Dobbelaere 1999). Some of these critiques focus on the problematic nature of the public-private dichotomy and the problematic use of this dichotomy by some
92 Synthesis
ideologies to legitimate a conceptualization of the world in which the only place reserved for religion in modern societies, is in the privatized sphere. However, more recently, the general hypothesis of privatization theory presented above is critiqued as being passé. In the following, I will discuss this new critique, the so called post-secular theory, and based on my findings, I will argue that not post-secular theory, but privatization theory still provides the relevant explanation on where to expect some non- religious people to become anti-religious and why.
Post-secular theory critiques the notion that religion has increasingly become privatized, pointing to recent conflicts around religion in the public sphere. One of the first to formulate this point was Jürgen Habermas. Based on several examples of religious strife, he argued that in secularized societies public consciousness has changed from secular to post-secular. “In these societies, religion maintains a public influence and relevance, while the secularistic certainty that religion will disappear worldwide in the course of modernization is losing ground” (Habermas 2008: 21). Following Habermas, many other sociologists began to speak of a post-secular turn (Gorski et al. 2012, Kaufmann, Goujon and Skirbekk 2012, McLennan 2010, Moberg, Granholm and Nynäs 2012, Stevenson et al. 2010). These authors point out how religion has once again become paramount to public and political debate. What is less explicit, but nonetheless quite central to these contributions, is that this public influence of religion in secularized societies is attributed to the assertively voiced critiques of Muslims and Islam (Gorski et al. 2012: 6, Kaufman et al. 2012:90, McLennan 2010, Moberg et al. 2012:4, Stevenson et al. 2010:345). Referring to terrorism, issues of immigration, the debate on the integration of Turkey into the EU, and controversies over Islamic dress in public functions, these authors argue that Western Europe is not as secular as ‘secularizationists’ like Steve Bruce demonstrate (Casanova 2008, 2012) or according to some, assume (Wood 2015). As the ‘secularistic’ theory of privatization predicts religious indifference instead of anti-religiosity in secularized contexts, this raised profile of Muslims and Islam and the examples of anti-Muslim sentiment would indeed question this theory’s core hypothesis.
My findings from chapter 2 indicate that the non-religious do not contest religion more in the most secular countries, but in contrast, that they ‘deprivatize’ in religious contexts. In these contexts, religion has a public role and significance. The non-religious minorities, especially the younger and higher educated segments are markedly opposed to this role of religion. In secularized contexts, only the older generations and the lower educated oppose religious influences. This is explained by the fact that in these contexts, older people will have experienced the time that religion still had a dominant role in the public domain and becoming non-religious for them meant a conscious decision to deviate from the religious majorities’ conventions. In addition, lower educated people do not share the relativist tolerance
Synthesis 93
induced by higher education and they have more problem with cultural diversity, which also explains their anti-religiosity in secular contexts (Houtman et al. 2011). These findings are in line with predictions from privatization theory. This also holds true for the findings from chapter 5, where the polarization between the religious and the non-religious in secular contexts is not attributed to non- religious intolerance but to religious fervency. In sum, predictions of privatization theory on the lack of public contention of religion by the non-religious in secularized societies find support in my findings.
Now, these two chapters both measure anti-religiosity as an attitude of opposition towards religion in general. Chapter 4, instead, addresses anti-Muslim sentiment as a particular type of opposition to religion. Does privatization theory also explain where this attitude is strongest? Arguably, Muslims may contest the secular truce, i.e. the social contract that guarantees religious freedom, yet relegates religion to the private realm. The non-religious, on the other hand, expect the religious to accept normatively the quintessentially modern understanding of religion as privatized and in effect without public significance beyond the boundaries of churches or mosques. Therefore, I hypothesized that according to an augmentation of the privatization thesis - what I call the secular majority theory in chapter 4 - the non-religious will have higher levels of anti-Muslim sentiment. This hypothesis finds support in my findings. In secular contexts, the non-religious contest Islam stronger than in religious contexts. This confirms Dillon’s contention that “across Europe, where one might expect that a deeply rooted secular culture might welcome the freedom of expression of different standpoints, this is not so” (2010). Yet, in trying to understand opposition to Muslims from the side of the non-religious better, I derived the hypothesis that a value-conflict over non-traditional values like sexual morality and gender roles explains this antagonism. This latter hypothesis was the only hypothesis derived from the privatization theory that I could not confirm. Apparently, as far as the non-religious are concerned, the Islam does not interfere with their values and ideas about marriage or sexuality. In that sense, the non- religious can be as secular as they want. People who cherish these progressive values thus also maintain a tolerant position towards religious diversity. In fact, in my view to say that they have to consider religious traditional standpoints (Habermas’ post-secular consciousness), is to overstate Islamic public significance. Even Habermas himself acknowledges that in fact, it is the other way around, i.e. when religious citizens participate in public debate they must necessarily do so by translating their religious norms into a secular idiom (2008: 11, also see Dillon 2010 for a discussion of this point and a critique on Habermas’ apprehension of religion). In a way, this again confirms the general thesis of privatization theory, although I admit it is a reasoning with hindsight. It also leaves unexplained why the non- religious then oppose Muslims in secular contexts, if it is not for this value-conflict. I will come back to that presently (in § 6.2.2).
94 Synthesis
As several observers noted that the increased visibility of Islam in Europe and the increased public consciousness among Europeans of Muslims seems to be at issue, I investigated whether negative attitudes towards religion in general among the non-religious are similar to negative attitudes towards Muslims. Indeed, I find that in secularized contexts, the non-religious will have higher levels of anti- Muslim sentiment. This confirms Dillon’s contention that “across Europe, where one might expect that a deeply rooted secular culture might welcome the freedom of expression of different standpoints, this is not so” (2010). Apparently, in secularized societies the place of Islam is a contested one. Nonetheless, I cannot endorse the post-secular idea of a general secular opposition to religion in these societies. The differences between anti-religious attitudes and anti-Muslim sentiment are very large. In fact, I think the opposition to Islam is mistaken for a general religious contention. My analysis fits with the idea of religious indifference among the non-religious when it comes to general religiosity. I think this is good reason to let go of the confusing discourse on post-secularity as some kind of next phase in secularization all together. Religion in general is very much privatized still, and even when religion ‘deprivatizes’, this does not change the general privatization notion that much more than in the past, religions have to follow secular rules of engagement (Glendinning and Bruce 2010). Studying the non-religious by using as an aspect of the ‘old-fashioned’ secularization theory, i.e. privatization, thus opens debates and lines of inquiry that sometimes seem to have evolved into a trench warfare (cf. Stark 1999, 2015, Bruce 2002, 2011). This leaves unaffected the fact that there are aspects of this theory that need more and better study. I will turn to these aspects next.
6.3.2 Privatization, religious indifference and other cultural attitudes In secular contexts, where religion has privatized and largely lost its public significance, the non- religious are religiously indifferent for the most and are not opposed to religion as such (see Bruce 2011, Voas 2009). All of my analyses and findings, even some which seemed to contradict it at first glance, support this general hypothesis derived from privatization theory. In spite of all the critiques it received, the privatization theory proves to be most relevant and acute in explaining where the non-religious turn anti-religious. Nonetheless, two questions about privatization theory’s explanations remain unresolved. Both of these relate to the way privatization theory focuses narrowly on religious attitudes, whilst they are very much related to cultural attitudes in a broader sense. Following many others, I would suggest that students of religion (including those of non-religion and secularism) make a ‘cultural turn’ (see Davie 2007). First, this applies to the conceptualization of religious indifference as the main outcome of the privatization of religion. Second, this applies to the question whether anti-Muslim sentiment in fact is not more related to ethnocentrism or racism than to anti-religiosity. I will start with a discussion on religious indifference.
Synthesis 95
Privatization theorists (Bruce, Voas, Bagg etc.) typically use the term ‘religious indifference’ to describe the way they expect most people in secular contexts to relate to religion. Now, religious indifference is mostly defined as the absence of religious concern (Lee and Bullivant 2016), although, as I mentioned in chapter 1, it is also used to describe very different attitudes, like a-religious ignorance, religious unmusicality and anti-religious hostility (Bruce 2014, Campbell 1971, Lee 2014). Sometimes, there is no concern for this category at all and similar to the way sociologists of religion treated atheism before (see Lee 2012); they use indifference as the leftover category in the measurement of religious convictions (Siegers 2010). However, what I think is most problematic is not the differences in definitions, but the lack of serious study that the people in this category receive. To my mind, ignorant, indifferent or apathetic attitudes towards religion cannot be seen separately from wider cultural tendencies, for example in the field of politics. Could religious indifferent people, who are so alienated from religion that they blame ‘religion’ for any trouble a specific religious expression creates (Bruce 2014: 18), not also be the ones who blame politics for any trouble politicians make and do they refrain from political involvement consequently (Abts, Swyngedouw and Jacobs 2011)? In addition, could there not be a relation between religious indifference and a person’s civic disengagement, (un)willingness to protest, to pay taxes or to do volunteering work (Bennett 1998, Herzfeld 1993, Norris 2011)? How do these attitudes of indifference relate to the observed anomie of non-religious lower-educated people in secular societies (De Koster, Achterberg and Van der Waal 2010)? As far as I know, the literature does not link these attitudes together and consequently overlooks many relevant research questions and hypotheses.
Related to this point, an approach that takes into account this link between religious and cultural attitudes could be relevant for a second explanation from privatization theory. As said, privatization theory predicts religious indifference among the non-religious. Yet, I found this group to display very negative attitudes towards Muslims. This rejection of Islam by the non-religious still asks for further explanation as the presumed value-conflict (Muslims not accepting the secular truce and secular reactions to Muslims’ traditional morality) could not explain it proper. People who are non-religious but not attached to the so-called progressive, non-traditional values seem to be more opposed to Muslims than those who do maintain these values. When the more traditional, non-progressive non-religious are responsible for anti-Muslim sentiment, this suggests that perhaps an explanation can be found in the direction of racism or ethnocentrism and thus beyond religious attitudes as such (Billiet 1998). Even though that clearly calls for further in-depth research, indeed anti-Muslim sentiment appears to have more in common with ethnic prejudice and xenophobia than with anti-religiosity in general (cf. De Koster et al. 2014). In fact, our finding that the lower educated are most anti-religious in secular contexts
96 Synthesis
provides support for this thesis. What is more, it supports the idea that a post-Christian cultural conflict is looming, central to which is a cultural polarization between lower and higher educated about the question how to deal with ethnic diversity (Houtman et al. 2011). Perhaps not religion as such reclaims central stage in the public domain, but cultural conflicts between different non-religious segments of society. As these conflicts seem to enliven in the wake of secularization, I hope more attention is given by contributors to privatization theory, to these intertwining of religious and cultural attitudes (Achterberg 2006, Bornschier 2010). This would also increase the relevance of this theory for other debates, for example in political sociology on cultural cleavages and the way these inform voting for political populists (Swyngedouw 1993, Van der Waal, Achterberg and Houtman 2007)
6.3.3 Applying an augmented privatization theory Although they share a long history together, as well as many dogmas and moral convictions, the differences between Catholicism and Protestantism are widely known. These differences have been deployed to explain a wide array of cultural, economic and political phenomena, ranging from capitalism (Weber [1930]), values like sincerity (Magill 2012) and authenticity (Lindholm 2013), nativist politics (Casanova 2012), certain voting behavior (Knutsen 2004), etcetera. In this dissertation, I have been able to contribute to this literature by showing how the cultural heritage of these Christian traditions, interwoven as they are with the historical trajectories of Western European countries, helps us understand the anti-religiosity of non-religious people in general (chapter 5) and of socialists in particular (chapter 3). In fact, for me, showing how religious culture still influences non-religious people’s attitudes is one of this dissertation’s major findings. This focus on the non-religious enlarges the applicability of the privatization theory and it points to the relevance of including religious identity in studies of culture at large, even in secular contexts. In the next paragraphs, I will elaborate these two points.
This religious culture thesis (that anti-religiosity can be explained by the historical presence of religious identities, notwithstanding high levels of secularity) can be seen as an augmentation of the privatization thesis. In studies of secularization, it is known that Protestantism features a more privatized spirituality, not focused on establishing God’s Kingdom in the here and now, but on seeking moral and spiritual purity (Martin 1978, Lindholm 2013). In contrast, Catholicism dominates the national public domain and culture much more than Protestantism does. Catholic values, like solidarity, respect for authority and nationalism, foreground the importance of the collective realm (Martin 1978:18ff, Woodhead 2004). The church provides a sense of unity, community and belonging, closely intertwined with family-bonds and notions of national identity. The reason to oppose religion in these
Synthesis 97
Catholic contexts, then, is very much informed by religion’s all-pervasiveness, omnipresence. By using church affiliation data from 1900 in chapter 5, I have been able to highlight this long-lasting influence. Whereas privatization theory mostly focuses on religions’ social significance in general terms (more or less religious influence or presence), this dominant cultural influence of Catholicism and the way it attracts anti-religious opposition differently from the more privatized culture of Protestantism augments the privatization theory. It points to the relevance of distinguishing the religious heritage of Catholicism and its influence on Western European countries, from that of Protestantism.
In my view, sociologists underestimate this lasting influence of the Christian culture on 21st century Western Europe. Perhaps the influence of these religions is not noted anymore, as people are so familiar with the presence of churches, chapels, and crosses. Yet, when one considers this influence, there is no tradition, ideology or religion that has defined Western Europe more than Christianity. National and international laws, holidays, healthcare systems, architecture, language, industries; a public domain that has not been influenced by these churches really is hard to find (Hervieu-Léger 2006, Martin 2005). In fact, I think this is not only very relevant for understanding attitudes towards religion, but just as well for understanding everyday life of European citizens. For example, looking at thoroughly secularized countries like the Netherlands and Belgium, one can wonder how their respective Protestant and Catholic cultural heritage still determines the way people relate to each other and communicate with each other. I think there is a strong case to say it does. Whereas Catholic Church authority has historically stimulated prudence, tactfulness and conflict avoidance as key values in everyday life, Protestantism has emphasized the need to demonstrate purity of the soul and honesty of intentions, putting a premium on sincerity, frankness, and openness (Lindholm 2013, Magill 2012). Indeed, despite massive secularization in Flanders and the Netherlands alike, observers of Flemish and Dutch culture like Van Istendael (2005), Wouters (2007), Pleij (2011) and Gerritsen (2002) point out striking differences in everyday manners and etiquette along these lines. Students of religion have largely neglected these differences, even though comparative cultural studies do hint at their roots in religious heritage (Hofstede 2001: 63, Inglehart and Baker 2000). Even the realm of everyday manners and etiquette, at first sight radically distinct from religion, hence appears informed by the religious heritage of the past. This illustrates how a much broader application of the religious culture thesis is possible, and perhaps desirable.
98 Synthesis
6.4 Quantitatively researching non-religiosity and anti-religiosity
6.4.1 Non-religiosity in European surveys Studies of religion and secularization painstakingly discuss what percentages, shares and figures signify, for example whether a country’s religiosity is in decline or not (cf. Lechner 1991). One can criticize these studies for having useless discussions on whether the glass is half-full or half-empty, yet it is evident that data on people’s religiosity are a complex matter and that choosing one way of measuring over another, needs to be based on convincing reasoning. I, for one, encountered several challenges in operationalizing my religiosity measures, most notably with country level secularity (i.e. non-religiosity; definitions of these two concepts are a discussion in itself, see Lee 2014). The next paragraph first discusses the challenge in using survey questions that seemingly asks for exactly similar response. After a discussion on how I dealt with this challenge, I will point out how the differences in operationalization of country-level secularity used in the different chapters could have changed the analysis and conclusions presented there.
In general, when measuring religiosity, scholars of religion distinguish practice, beliefs and affiliation as three different aspects of religiosity. Non-religiosity is measured in the same manner, but in the opposite direction. One of the challenges is, however, that there are remarkably different frequency distributions, depending on which aspect one chooses, and even which question from a survey is used. For example, considering non-belief, in the European Value Studies (EVS) the most commonly used question is: ‘Do you believe in God?’ with the answer categories ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’. The EVS also contains an item that asks what statement comes closest to describing respondents’ beliefs. The answers are ‘I don’t really think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force’, ‘I don’t really know what to think’, ‘there is some sort of spirit or life force’, and ‘there is a personal God’. Comparing the outcomes for these two different measures of non-belief reveals huge differences in the percentage of non- believers in Western European countries. For example, the percentage of Norwegians indicating to be a non-believer is 45% when using the two-answer category question (45% of respondents indicate ‘no, I do not believe in God’). However, it is only 18% when the four-answer category question is used (18% of respondents indicate ‘I don’t really think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force’)56. Considering the other aspects, i.e. religious affiliation and attendance rates, the differences between European countries are even more striking (see Table 6.1, based on the International Social Survey Programme Religion III dataset).
No belief No affiliation No attendance Denmark 18% 14% 91% Finland 11% 18% 92%
Synthesis 99
Norway 18% 16% 93% Sweden 19% 29% 94% Germany 24% 34% 84% Netherlands 20% 41% 80% Great Britain 14% 33% 72% Table 6.1. Percentage of non-believers, non-affiliates, and non-attenders per country (Source: ISSP 2008).
Compared to other former Protestant countries, the Scandinavian countries particularly boast low levels of non-affiliates and high levels of non-attendance. In these countries, belonging to the Lutheran church ties in with the national identity and only for a few people it involves religious practice. When assessing these countries’ secularity, one can thus argue a country like Denmark or Finland is highly religious (referring to affiliation measures) or highly secular (referring to attendance measures), depending on which aspect of religiosity one uses. This is important for students of non-religiosity (and media reportages quoting them), as they should be well aware of the differences in what these measures mean to the people involved when reading and discussing religion and secularity. In this dissertation, I used this insight to focus on religious attendance, as it is an indication of people’s active, day-to-day religious practice or lack thereof.
My theories dealt with the public visibility and presence of religion. Therefore, in all of my empirical chapters, I use the attendance measure for determining country-level religiosity and secularity. This gives a better indication of religions’ influence in a society than belief (which gives insight in a much more open and non-committed religiosity) and affiliation (which in many cases is much more an index of cultural religion than religious commitment and influence). Nevertheless, there are some minor differences between the exact operationalization based on this measure between different chapters. In chapters 2, 3 and 5, I present a mean score of non-attendance on a monthly basis per country. In chapter 4, I use a combined calculation of non-affiliation with non-attendance, also to include the more cultural religious index that this latter measure provides. In chapter 5, I use the same attendance measure, but in response to an anonymous reviewer’s suggestion, I create an ordinal variable instead of a dichotomous variable, in order to attain higher levels of variance on that measure. This did not alter the outcomes of my model, but increased the explained variance for the total model. It would have been preferable that the concepts used are operationalized in the exact same way. Nonetheless, these differences would not have led to other outcomes in other chapters. To give an illustration, in chapter 3’s multilevel analysis, keeping everything the same, but calculating the level of secularity based on a scale instead of a dichotomous variable changes the interaction effect of socialism with Catholic religiosity (on which the interpretation about this chapter’s main hypothesis is based) from .17** to .15**, (compare table 3.6). It does give a 15% higher explained variance on the country level, but also 14% less
100 Synthesis
explained variance on the intercept of the interaction effect. In other words, there are some changes to the outcomes of the models used, but not to the conclusions based on these models. Differences in operationalization thus have major consequences for the frequency distributions that are obtained. It is however much less evident that they have equally dramatic consequences for conclusions about the tenability of hypotheses about relationships between variables, where the exact size of the latter is less important than their direction and significance.
6.4.2 Anti-religiosity in European surveys My research addresses anti-religiosity and thus naturally entailed assessing how people relate to religion. However, this is quite an onerous task. It certainly is not as straightforward as the question “would you consider yourself a religious person?” - asked in both EVS, ISSP and many other surveys - implies. It would already be hard to estimate what people’s motives are, when they would answer this question with yes or no. It is especially hard, considering the awkward response categories this question currently has, namely “I am a religious person”, “I am a non-religious person”, and “I am a convinced atheist”. As explained in section 3.3, I made the most of this question by interpreting the latter response category as an anti-religious attitude, but I am aware that this is not an optimal measurement. Problems like these arise with more questions and variables used in the large-scale European surveys. The next paragraphs discuss some of these obstacles encountered during this research.
To assess what about religion it is that people reject, I created a scale of anti-religiosity, using factor analysis. My scale is similar to the one Steve Bruce uses when assessing people’s opposition to pubic religion. Using the same 4 items I use from the same dataset (ISSP 1998 and 2008), Bruce includes two more items, i.e., one which asks for people’s trust in the church as an institution and another asks whether the church has too much power or not. In terms or reliability, the scales are comparable (the 6- items scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of .72 versus .71 for the 4-item scale57, see appendix D). My preference for the 4-item scale has to do with the fact that it has fewer missing values (1,6% against
6,8% on the 6-item scale). In terms of interpretation, they are also comparable58. If anything, the 6-item scale shows even better that the differences between the ‘political influence’ items on religious leadership, the items on distrust of the church, and the intolerance of the religious are not so large as some tend to think. One could imagine that religious people are likely to express positive attitudes to religiosity in general, but advocate the non-interference of religious leaders in politics. However, if this was the case, one would expect that this scale would not be reliable for the religious countries like Portugal, Italy or Northern Ireland, but yet it is. Granted, Portugal is the weakest of all countries in this dataset in terms of reliability (Cronbach’s alpha is .59), but Italy, Northern Ireland and other religious
Synthesis 101
countries all have reliability scores around .70. In other words, these scales do measure a common attitude of opposition towards religion, and although there might be individual variation and variation between contexts, it is strong enough to use it in the way I did.
Nevertheless, the way people might evaluate public religiosity differently from individual or private religiosity remains an interesting avenue for further research. I would comment more qualitative research into this distinction to enrich our understanding of why people have strong antipathy towards religion. What is more, I think more qualitative research can also better assess the way anti-religiosity is organized and effective on the meso-level, for example in education, in the (popular) media or in (local) politics. Of course, there is also much room for improvement in quantitative analysis. For example, one of the questions from the ISSP survey used above asks for a response on the statement that religion creates more conflict than peace. This question refers to religion as a quite abstract concept. This is not problematic per se, but it is good to consider its implications. When answering a question like this, do people think of the medieval religious wars, the conflict in Northern Ireland, terrorism, or the intolerance of their religious neighbors? In large-scale surveys, there is no room for asking whether people differentiate between these examples. Nonetheless, it is worth considering at least whether people would be able to do so. Steve Bruce argues that in stages of “late secularization”, people do not understand differences between religions, because the stock of knowledge on religious dogmas and theories has lessened considerably over the last decades (2014: 18). He argues that religion has become alien to the majority of people living in ‘late’ secular countries. If he is right, then there is not a big problem and negative answers to general questions relating to religious attitudes and religious presence in society are good indicators of an anti-religious attitude. However, to make sure he is right, we need to be able to assess the way people relate to different religions and religious practices.
To make these suggestions for better survey data more concrete, I would like to suggest some relevant survey questions. Do Western European people have more affinity and less problems with a Catholic or Protestant leader who tries to influence governmental decisions, than with the Dalai Lama or a Muslim imam doing the same? Are they more tolerant towards immigrants, when those immigrants are Christian, than when they are Muslims (or vice versa)? Do people differentiate between their national religion (as in religious cultural heritage) and other religions? As many Europeans embrace the different types of spirituality associated with the Easternization of the West, is it ‘religion’ in general what they oppose, or do they oppose the traditional Christian religion that has been a dominant authority for centuries in Europe (Campbell 2007, Chaves 1994)? In a way, all scientific research entails simplification and quantitative research most certainly does. However, in order to be able to study
102 Synthesis
something as complex as religious attitudes, broad generalizations cannot pass muster. If we want to improve our assessment of distinctions in anti-religiosity quantitatively, we really need more survey data that cover these diverse attitudes towards religions and religious practices. This would enable us to differentiate between different kinds of anti-religiosity, which in turn would help much in understanding this phenomenon.
Having said this, I do not want to disparage my own findings. It is impossible to outline all the private motives and personal reasons of respondents to oppose religion when using large-scale surveys. Still, I think I have made the most of the available data. For example, my inclusion of anti-Muslim sentiment in this dissertation helped in differentiating between general sense of anti-religiosity and particular opposition to Muslims. It showed how the religious minorities become more tolerant towards each other in secular contexts and how the intolerance of the non-religious is not connected to an expected value-conflict. Granted, the measurement of this attitude still is troublesome, due to a lack of variables that target Islam and Muslims (see section 4.3 for more discussion on this item). It is not easy to interpret my findings, as there are no data on what people oppose when they say they do not want to have Muslims as their neighbors. Adding questions on people’s interpretation of the freedom of religion, the possible conflict between individual choice and religious doctrines and the perceived incompatibility of Islam with democratic values – to name just a few options - would all help to deepen our insight in why people are opposed to Muslims as a particular group. I think it is relevant that survey-makers include such items, as these attitudes influence people’s political views, their choice on where to live or on which school their kids go to, how they relate to cultural diversity in the workplace and so forth. Perhaps the scope of the large-scale surveys like ISSP and EVS are too broad and general to include these specific items, but I think the relevance for understanding these attitudes, their relation with the religious-secular polarization in secular societies, the popularity of populist politicians, and the looming cultural conflicts described above might lure even the makers of these surveys to include them.
6.5 So, who is reading Richard Dawkins?
Finally, all of these reflections allow me to answer my initial question that made me study anti- religiosity in the first place: who is reading Richard Dawkins? In general, people tend to associate Richard Dawkins’ books with reason and rationality. Not surprisingly, perhaps, as he refers to reason and science many times59. Interestingly enough, then, based on this dissertation one could say that reason or rationality are probably not what explains Dawkins’ readership primarily. At least, as far as his ‘mission against religion’60 is concerned, my findings indicate that whether or not people appreciate an anti- religious message, like Dawkins’ message, depends very much upon their religious context. The more
Synthesis 103
religious someone’s context is, the more likely a non-religious person will appreciate anti-religious expressions. In addition, only when living in a religious country, a non-religious reader of Dawkins will be more likely than not be higher educated and born in a younger birth cohort. When a person has socialist political ideals, he or she will be most likely to appreciate books like that of Dawkins, when living in (formerly) Catholic country. Recently, Richard Dawkins has become particularly controversial because of his opinion on Islam (Malik 2013, np). My dissertation demonstrates that on average in largely secular countries, like Great Britain where this controversy took place, people do not maintain strong aversion against Islam. In these countries, the higher educated elite who are commonly seen as more rationalized, are also more tolerant of religious diversity and indifferent to both religious and anti- religious missionary activity. That might explain the fierce negative reactions Dawkins received in the media on his Islam-standpoint. At least it explains why many of my higher educated, non-religious friends, if they had enough concern to even read Dawkins’ works, disliked his message and his style. For them, he is much too intolerant, fanatical, and like the Guardian newspaper columnist postulated, perhaps even irrational (Malik 2013, np, also see Kluun 2009).
56 Both items are calculated using the EVS 2008 data. 57 This is consistently so across all countries. The Cronbach’s alpha per country for the two scales ranges between .59 to .86 for the 4-item scale and per country .61 to .78 for the 6-item scale. 58 Which is also expressed in a very high correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r = .934, p<0.001) 59 See for examples his foundation’s website: https://richarddawkins.net/ (web 15 Feb. 2016) 60 See for a lengthy portrait of Dawkins’ mission: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jun/09/is-richard- dawkins-destroying-his-reputation (web 15 Feb 2017)
104 Synthesis
Appendixes
Appendix A. Percentage of religious affiliates per country in year 1800, 1900, 1998, and 2008 Country Religious RCS RCS ISSP ISSP Share Prot/Cath affiliation 1800 1900 1998 2008 religious 2008 5 Austria Catholic 89 89 81 73 .92 Protestant 2 3 7 6 .08 6 Cyprus Orthodox 59 77 100 100 1.00 Catholic 1 1 0 0 .00 Protestant 0 0 0 0 .00 Denmark Catholic 2 0 0 1 .01 Protestant 98 99 87 83 .99 France Catholic 95 97 50 52 .98 Protestant 4 3 2 1 .02 7 Germany Catholic 37 36 21 29 .40 Protestant 61 63 36 33 .60 8 Ireland Catholic 82 74 90 88 .96 Protestant 18 25 5 4 .06 Italy Catholic 99 96 90 89 .99 Protestant 0 0 1 0 .01 Netherlands Catholic 38 35 19 28 .51 Protestant 60 60 17 26 .49 Norway Catholic 0 0 0 1 .01 Protestant 100 99 89 82 .99 Portugal Catholic 100 100 90 89 .97 Protestant 0 0 2 3 .03 Spain Catholic 100 97 85 76 .99 Protestant 0 0 0 1 .01 Sweden Catholic 0 0 1 2 .03 Protestant 99 99 69 67 .97 9 Switzerland Catholic 41 42 48 35 .56 Protestant 59 58 39 35 .44 United Kingdom Catholic 2 13 9 9 .17 Protestant 61 65 43 41 .83 Unknown 36 19 0 0 .00 Northern Ireland10 Catholic 32 39 36 .41 Protestant 67 51 50 .59 Source: RCS, ISSP 1998 and 2008
5 Data of 1800 are in fact from 1857. 6 Data of 1800 and 1900 include Northern Cyprus, which has a large share of Muslim population. ISSP data exclude Northern Cyprus. 7 ISSP data of East and West Germany taken together 8 Data of 1800 are in fact from 1801 and include Northern Ireland. 9 Data of 1800 are in fact from 1816. This also holds true for Germany in 1800. 10 Data of 1900 is based on calculation extracting Northern Ireland census data of 1921 from 1920 census total of Ireland.
Appendixes 105
0,6
0,5 religiosity
- 0,4
0,3
belief on anti on belief - 0,2
0,1 Effect of non ofEffect
0
Secularity country Appendix B. Predicted effect of non-belief on anti-religiosity for countries with different degree of secularity, 32 country-waves in 1998 and 2008 (ISSP).
0,14
0,12
0,1
religiosity -
0,08
0,06
belief on anti on belief -
0,04
Effect of non ofEffect 0,02
0
Catholic heritage 1900
Appendix C. Predicted effect of non-belief on anti-religiosity for countries with a Catholic heritage, 32 country-waves in 1998 and 2008 (ISSP).
106 Appendixes
Appendix D. Comparing two scales of anti-religiosity, using ISSP 1998 and 2008 Questions Factor Loading 4 items / 6 items How much do you agree or disagree that: Religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote in elections? 0.81 0.75 Religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions? 0.79 0.71 Looking around the world, religions bring more conflict than peace? 0.65 0.66 People with very strong religious beliefs are often too intolerant of others? 0.65 0.64 How much do you trust the church? 0.58 The church has too much power? 0.52 Eigen value 2.13 2.50 R2 0.53 0.42 Cronbach’s α 0.71 0.72 N 42,092 39,843 Source: ISSP 1998 and 2008.
Appendixes 107
108 Samenvatting
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Er zijn atheïsten die fel protesteren tegen religie, terwijl er ook atheïsten zijn die zich niet bezighouden met religie. Sommigen van hen komen zelfs bij elkaar op zondagmorgen om te mediteren, te zingen en naar een overdenking te luisteren. Dit verschil in houding ten opzichte van religie is zeer interessant, niet alleen onder atheïsten, maar ook onder niet-religieuze mensen in het algemeen. Die groep is zeer verdeeld in de manier waarop men zich verhoudt tot religie. In het licht van de secularisatie van West- Europa, roept dit de vraag op waarom sommige niet-religieuzen zich fel tegen religie keren, terwijl anderen dat niet doen.
Diverse theorieën over secularisatie geven een mogelijke verklaring voor deze verschillende houdingen ten opzichte van religie. Zo is er een theorie die religie benadert als een irrationeel verschijnsel en voorspelt dat met toename van rationalisering van de maatschappij, men aan de ene kant religie vaarwel zal zeggen (secularisatie), maar aan de andere kant ook religie zal willen uitbannen (anti- religie) (Te Grotenhuis en Scheepers 2001, zie ook Stark Iannaconne and Finke 1996). Er is ook de privatiseringstheorie, die voorspelt dat met het seculariseren van West-Europa, de mensen steeds onverschilliger ten opzichte van religie zullen worden (Bagg and Voas 2010, Bruce 2002, Voas 2009). In het licht van toegenomen spanningen rondom de integratie van Moslims in Westerse landen, behandel ik ook een doorontwikkeling van de privatiseringstheorie, namelijk de seculiere meerderheidstheorie. Deze gaat er kort weg van uit dat omdat Moslims de seculiere veronderstelling van een geprivatiseerde religie niet aanvaarden, en met hun traditionele waarden botsen met progressieve seculiere waarden, de niet-religieuze in seculiere contexten het felst gekant zullen zijn tegen de aanwezigheid van Islam in hun omgeving.
Wat deze theorieën gemeen hebben, is dat ze de afname of toename van religie beschouwen als een eendimensionaal gegeven. Dat is echter discutabel. Er zijn goede redenen om aan te nemen dat er grote verschillen zijn tussen landen in zowel de wijze van secularisatie als de houding die men heeft ten opzichte van religie (Martin 2005). Vooral de wijze waarop het Protestantisme en Katholicisme de Westerse maatschappijen hebben beïnvloed, is bepalend in dezen (Hervieu-Léger 2006, Lindholm 2013). Dit aspect van een religieuze erfenis in het Westen heeft een centrale plek in de theorie van anti- religiositeit, welke ik ontwikkel in deze dissertatie. Ik noem dit de religieuze cultuur these. Het doel van deze dissertatie is om te beschrijven en te verklaren hoe deze religieuze erfenis én de secularisatie van West-Europe zich verhoudt tot de bloei van anti-religiositeit.
Samenvatting 109
Terwijl in veel media vooral over ‘nieuwe’ atheïsten wordt gesproken, richt hoofdstuk 2 zich op de verklaring van anti-religiositeit onder de totale bevolking van veertien verschillende West-Europese landen. Door het analyseren van data van het International Social Survey Program (Religie III, 2008), toetst dit hoofdstuk twee theorieën over hoe de religiositeit van een land de anti-religiositeit van haar bewoners kan beïnvloeden. Een theorie gaat uit van de rationaliserings-these, de ander van de deprivatiserings-these. De hypothesen gebaseerd op de eerste theorie worden verworpen, terwijl die van de laatste genoemde worden aangenomen. De bevindingen laten zien hoe anti-religiositeit onder niet- gelovigen en onder de hoger opgeleiden voornamelijk in de religieuze landen het sterkst is. In de meer seculiere landen zijn het vooral de ouderen die zich het sterkst verzetten tegen religie.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat verder met een ander aspect van de religieuze cultuur these, namelijk de afzonderlijke invloed van het Protestantisme en Katholicisme op West-Europese culturen en de gevolgen die dit heeft voor de anti-religiositeit van socialisten. Deze laatste groep wordt vaak geassocieerd met anti-religiositeit, zijnde een seculiere religie, welke zich verzet tegen ‘normale’ religie. Er zijn echter ook veel religieus geïnspireerde socialistische bewegingen bekend. Dit hoofdstuk bekijkt dan ook hoe dit verschil in houding ten opzichte van religie voor deze groep verklaard kan worden vanuit de aanwezigheid van religie in een samenleving aan de ene kant, en de religieuze identiteit van die samenleving aan de andere kant. Het resultaat van een multilevel analyse van drie golven van het Europese waarden studies (EVS 1990-2008) voor 21 West-Europese landen laat zien hoe de anti- religieuze houding van socialisten wordt aangewakkerd door een Katholieke religieuze cultuur en niet zozeer door de aanwezigheid van actieve vormen van religie in die cultuur.
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt hoe in de meest seculiere contexten, mensen zich verhouden tot Moslims. Op basis van een bespreking van twee theorieën uit de secularisatie literatuur, worden twee hypothesen ontwikkeld. Een eerste theorie benadrukt dat de competitie tussen religieuze minderheden in seculiere contexten het sterkst zal zijn en aangezien de meeste seculiere landen voornamelijk Protestants waren, verwacht deze theorie daarom dat het vooral de Protestanten zullen zijn die zich negatief ten opzichte van Moslims verhouden. Een tweede theorie verklaard de tegenstand ten opzichte van Moslims uit een waarde conflict tussen Moslims en de niet-religieuze meerderheid. Een multilevel analyse van de EVS (2008) wordt gebruikt om deze hypothesen te toetsen. Mijn bevindingen zijn dat, hoewel seculiere landen gemiddeld genomen toleranter zijn ten opzichte van Moslims, het vooral de niet-religieuzen zijn die sterke anti-Moslim sentimenten koesteren. Tegelijkertijd blijkt dit niet voort te komen uit hun seculiere waarden, waardoor de vraag open blijft staan wat dan maakt dat zij zich tegen Moslims verzetten.
110 Samenvatting
Het laatste empirische hoofdstuk (H5) analyseert de twee aspecten van de religieuze cultuur these in relatie tot het argument van Wilkins-Laflamme over een groeiende polarisatie tussen religieuzen en seculieren in een seculiere omgeving (2014 en 2016). Dit hoofdstuk analyseert de wijze waarop de niet-religieuzen religie sterker afwijzen naarmate ze in een meer seculier land wonen, en op welke wijze de Protestante en Katholieke erfenis van deze landen van invloed is op deze houding. Een discussie van Wilkins-Laflammes artikelen en meer relevante literatuur leidt tot de ontwikkeling van de hypothesen dat de niet-religieuzen religie het strengst afwijzen in de meest seculiere landen en in de landen met een Katholieke religieuze erfenis. In de operationalisering-sectie wordt het aspect van religieuze erfenis onderscheiden van het effect van secularisering om op die wijze de religieuze cultuur these zo zuiver mogelijk te toetsen.
Hoofdstuk 6 laat zien hoe de contextualisatie van een antireligieuze houding tot nieuwe inzichten leidt over de plaats van religie in seculiere contexten. Het toepassen van de theorieën uit het secularisatie debat geeft zicht op de manier waarop anti-religie vooral in Katholieke contexten zich manifesteert, terwijl in seculiere contexten de kloof tussen religieuzen tot niet-religieuzen groeit. Dit laatste is vooral op het conto te schrijven van de religieuzen, die daar feller en fanatieker lijken te zijn. Tegelijkertijd worden zij niet intoleranter ten opzichte van andere religies, zoals bijvoorbeeld Moslims, maar blijken de niet-religieuzen toch relatief intoleranter te zijn. In mijn synthese werp ik de vraag op of dit anti-Moslim sentiment misschien niet meer een uitdrukking van etnocentrisme is, in plaats van een specifieke vorm van anti-religiositeit. Sterker nog, misschien zijn mijn bevindingen over de verschillen in anti-religiositeit tussen hoger en lager opgeleiden en de non-religieuze afwijzing van Islam wel eerder een teken dat er een cultureel conflict aan het groeien is langs de scheidslijn van opleidingsniveau in plaats van religieuze affiliatie. Tot slot behandel ik de uitdagingen die gepaard gaan met de metingen door grote surveys van non-religie, maar ook van het onderscheid tussen anti-religie in het algemeen en de houding ten opzichte van verschillende religies in het bijzonder. Deze dissertatie heeft een aanzet gegeven tot verdieping van de vragen en surveys op dit terrein, maar roept ook op tot verdere ontwikkeling en onderzoek omdat hier nog een wereld te winnen valt.
Samenvatting 111
112 Bibliography
Bibliography Abts, Koen, Marc Swyngedouw, Dirk Jacobs. 2011. “Politieke betrokkenheid en institutioneel wantrouwen: de spiraal van het wantrouwen doorbroken?”, in Nieuwe tijden, nieuwe mensen: Belgen over arbeid, gezin, ethiek, religie en politiek, edited by Koen Abts, Karel Dobbelaere and Liliane Voyé, pp. 173-214. Leuven: Lannoo Campus.
Achterberg, Peter. 2006. Considering Cultural Conflict: Class Politics and Cultural Politics in Western Societies. Maastricht: Shaker Publishers.
Achterberg, Peter, Dick Houtman, Stef Aupers, Willem de Koster, Peter Mascini and Jeroen van der Waal. 2009. “A Christian Cancellation of the Secularist Truce? Waning Christian Religiosity and Waxing Religious Deprivatization in the West.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 48(4):687-701.
Akkerman, Tjitske. 2005. “Anti-immigration Parties and the Defence of Liberal Values: The Exceptional Case of the List Pim Fortuyn.” Journal of Political Ideologies 10(3):337-54.
Amarasingam, Amarnath, ed. 2010. Religion and the New Atheism. A Critical Appraisal. Leiden: Brill.
Ammerman, Nancy. 2013. “Spiritual but not Religious?: Beyond Binary Choices in the Study of Religion.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 52(2):258-278.
Arzheimer, Kai and Elisabeth Carter. 2009. “Christian Religiosity and Voting for West European Radical Right Parties.” Western European Politics 32(5):985-1011.
Asad, Talal. 2008. “Reflections on Blasphemy and Secular Criticism.” In Religion: Beyond a Concept, edited by Hent de Vries, pp. 580-609. New York: Fordham University Press.
Bagg, Samuel and David Voas. 2010. “The triumph of indifference: Irreligion in British society.” In Atheism and Secularity, Volume 2: Global Expressions, edited by Phil Zuckerman, pp. 91-111. Praeger.
Bainbridge, William. 2005. “Atheism.” Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 1(1):1–24.
Baker, Joseph and Buster Smith. 2009a. “The Nones: Social Characteristics of the Religiously Unaffiliated.” Social Forces 87(3):1251–63.
Baker, Joseph and Buster Smith. 2009b. “None Too Simple: Examining Issues of Religious Nonbelief and Nonbelonging in the United States.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 48(4):719–33.
Bibliography 113
Barrett, David B. 1982. World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Survey of Churches and Religions in the Modern World AD 1900–2000. Nairobi: Oxford University Press.
Barrett, David B., George T. Kurian, Todd M. Johnson. 2001. World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Survey of Churches and Religions in the Modern World AD 1900–2000. 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
Barro, Robert J. and Rachel M. McCleary. 2005. “Which Countries Have State Religions?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(4):1331-70.
Bas, de, Jan. 1999. De Muis die Even Brulde. De Evangelische Volkspartij 1981-1991 (proefschrift). Kampen: Kok.
Beaman, Lori G. and Steven Tomlins, eds. 2015. Atheist Identities. Spaces and Social Contexts. London: Springer.
Becker, Jos and René Vink. 1994. Secularisatie in Nederland, 1966-1991: de Verandering van Opvattingen en enkele Gedragingen. Den Haag: Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau.
Beckford, James A. 2012. “SSSR Presidential Address. Public Religions and the Postsecular: Critical Reflections.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 51(1):1–19.
Bennett, Scott D. and Allan C. Stam. 2000. “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual”. International Interactions 26(2):179.
Bennett, Stephen E. 1998. “Young Americans' Indifference to Media Coverage of Public Affairs.” PS: Political Science & Politics 31(3):535-541.
Berger, Peter. L. 1967. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. Garden City, NY: Doubleday
Berger, Peter. L. 1970. A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural. New York: Allen Books.
Berger, Peter L., ed. 1999. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Berger, Peter. L. 2001. “Reflections on the Sociology of Religion Today - The 2000 Paul Hanly Furfey Lecture.” Sociology of Religion 62(4):443-54.
114 Bibliography
Berger, Peter L., Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner. 1973. The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness. New York: Vintage Books.
Berger, Peter L. and Anton Zijderveld. 2009. In Praise of Doubt: How to Have Convictions Without Becoming a Fanatic. New York: Harper Collins Publishers
Berlinerblau, Jacques. 2012. How to Be Secular: A Call to Arms for Religious Freedom. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Besecke, Kelly. 2005. “Seeing Invisible Religion: Religion as a Societal Conversation about Transcendent Meaning.” Sociological Theory 23(2):179-96.
Betz, Hans-George. 2003. “Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe.” Socialist Register 39(1):194-210.
Betz, Hans-George and Susi Meret. 2009. “Revisiting Lepanto: The Political Mobilization Against Islam in Contemporary Western Europe.” Patterns of Prejudice 43(3-4):313-34.
Billiet, Jaak. 1998. “Social Capital, Religious-Philosophical Involvement and Social Integration in Belgium. An Empirical Investigation, in Secularization and Social Integration. Papers in Honor of Karel Dobbelaere, edited by Rudi Laermans, Bryan Wilson and Jaak Billiet, pp. 233-51. Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven.
Billiet, Jaak, Karel Dobbelaere, Ole Riis, Helena Vilaça, Liliane Volé, Jerry Welkenhuysen-Gybels. 2003. “Church Commitment and Some Consequences in Western and Central Europe” in Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, edited by Ralph L. Piedmont and David O. Moberg, pp. 129–59. Leiden: Brill.
Bornschier, Simon. 2010. Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right. The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Botton, Alain de. 2012. Religion for Atheists: A Non-Believer’s Guide to the Uses of Religion. London: Hamish Hamilton.
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder. 2006. “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” Political Analysis 14(1):63–82.
Brown, Callum. 2001. The Death of Christian Britain. London: Routledge.
Bruce, Steve. 2002. God is dead: Secularization in the West. Oxford: Blackwell.
Bibliography 115
Bruce, Steve. 2011. Secularization. In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory. New York: Oxford University Press
Bruce, Steve. 2013. “Post-Secularity and Religion in Britain: An Empirical Assessment.” Journal of Contemporary Religion 28(3):369–84.
Bruce, Steve. 2014. “Late Secularization and Religion as Alien.” Open Theology 1(1):13–23.
Budd, Susan. 1967. “The Loss of Faith. Reasons for Unbelief among Members of the Secular Movement in England, 1850-1950,” Past & Present 36(2):106-25.
Budd, Susan. 1977. Varieties of Unbelief. Atheists and Agnostics in English Society 1850-1960. London: Heinemann.
Bullivant, Stephen. 2008. “Research Note: Sociology and the Study of Atheism.” Journal of Contemporary Religion 23(3):363-68.
Bullivant, Stephen and Lois Lee. 2012. “Interdisciplinary Studies of Non-religion and Secularity: The State of the Union.” Journal of Contemporary Religion 27(1):19-27.
Busch, Eberhard. 1976. Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.
Calhoun, Craig, Mark Juergensmeyer and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, eds. 2011. Rethinking Secularism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Campbell, Colin. 1971. Toward a Sociology of Irreligion. London: Macmillan.
Campbell, Colin. 2007. The Easternization of the West: a Thematic Account of Cultural Change in the Modern Era. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
Caporale, Rocco and Antonio Grumelli, eds. 1971. Culture of Unbelief. Berkeley. University of California Press.
Casanova, José. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Casanova, José. 2004. “Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration.” Transit 27(2) http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html (Web 10 September 2013).
116 Bibliography
Casanova, José. 2008. “The Problem of Religion and the Anxieties of European Secular Democracy.” In Religion and Democracy in Contemporary Europe, edited by Gabriel Motzkin and Yochi Fischer, pp. 63-74. London: Alliance Publishing Trust.
Casanova, José. 2012. “The Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe, Catholicism in the United States.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 38(4-5):485–95.
Cesari Botman, Jocelyne. 2002. “Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority,” in Muslims in the West, from Sojourners to Citizens, edited by Yvonne Haddad-Yazbek, pp. 36-51. Oxford University Press.
Cesari Botman, Jocelyne. 2005. “Mosque Conflicts in European Cities: Introduction.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31(6):1015–24.
Cesari Botman, Jocelyne. 2011. "Muslims in Europe and in the US: A Shared but Overrated Risk of Radicalism." In Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge, European and American Experiences, edited by Rik Coolsaet, pp. 101-16. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Chassany, Anne-Sylvanie, James Politi and Rene Spiegel. 2015. “Greece Clash Sparks Fear over German Power.” Financial Times 17 July 2015. Web 12 May 2016.
Chaves, Mark. 1994. “Secularization as Declining Religious Authority.” Social Forces 72(3):749-74.
Chernilo, Daniel. 2006. “Social Theory’s Methodological Nationalism: Myth and Reality.” European Journal of Social Theory 9(1):5-22.
Cimino, Richard and Christopher Smith. 2007. “Secular Humanism and Atheism beyond Progressive Secularism.” Sociology of Religion 68(4):407-24.
Cook, Corey L., Catherine A. Cottrell and Gregory D. Webster. 2015. “No Good Without God: Anti- atheist Prejudice as a Function of Threats to Morals and Values.” Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 7(3):217-25.
Cort, John C. 1988. Christian Socialism: An Informal History. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
Daiber, Karl-Fritz. 2002. “Mysticism: Troeltsch’s Third Type of Religious Collectivities.” Social Compass 49(3):329-41.
Bibliography 117
Dalton, Russell J. 1996. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western Democracies. London: Chatham House.
Davie, Grace. 1994. Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing Without Belonging. Oxford: Blackwell.
Davie, Grace. 2007. The Sociology of Religion. London: Sage.
Dawkins, Richard. 2006. The God Delusion. London: Bantam Press.
De Graaf, Nan Dirk. 2013. “Secularization: Theoretical Controversies Generating Empirical Research.” In Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research, edited by Rafael Wittek, Tom Snijders and Victor Nee, pp. 322-54. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
De Koster, Willem, Peter Achterberg, Dick Houtman and Jeroen van der Waal. 2010. Van God Los: Post-Christelijk Cultureel Conflict in Nederland.” Sociologie 6(3):27-49.
De Koster, Willem, Peter Achterberg, Jeroen Van der Waal, Samira Van Bohemen and Roy Kemmers. 2014. “Progressiveness and the New Right: The Electoral Relevance of Culturally Progressive Values in the Netherlands.” West European Politics 37(3):584-604.
Dillon, Michele. 2010. “Can Post-Secular Society Tolerate Religious Differences?” Sociology of Religion 71(2):139-56.
Dobbelaere, Karel. 1981. Secularization: A Multi-dimensional Concept. London: Sage.
Dobbelaere, Karel. 2002. Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels. Brussels: Peter Lang.
Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. “The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay?” The Political Quarterly 86(4):523–31.
Durkheim, E. 1969. The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press.
Duyvendak, Jan Willem. 2004. Een Eensgezinde, Vooruitstrevende Natie. Over de Mythe van dé Individualisering en de Toekomst van de Sociologie. Amsterdam: Vossius pers. (Inaugural lecture)
Ecklund, Elaine Howard and Christopher P. Scheitle. 2007. “Religion among Academic Scientists: Distinctions, Disciplines, and Demographics.” Social Problems 54(2):289-307.
Edgell, Penny, Joseph Gerteis and Douglas Hartmann. 2006. “Atheists as ''Other'': Moral Boundaries and Cultural Membership in American Society.” American Sociological Review 71(2):211-34.
118 Bibliography
Elchardus, Mark and Bram Spruyt. 2014. “Universalism and Anti-Muslim Sentiment.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 38(1):75-85.
Einstein, Mara. 2008. Brands of faith; Marketing Religion in a Commercial Age. Oxford, UK: Routledge.
Emerson, Michael O. and David Hartman. 2006. “The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism.” Annual Review of Sociology 32(1):127–44.
Felling, Albert, Jan Peter and Osmund Schreuder. 1988. “Religion and Politics in the Netherlands: A Causal Analysis.” Journal of Empirical Theology 1(1):55-72
Fetzer, Joel and Christopher Soper. 2003. “The Roots of Public Attitudes Toward State Accommodation of European Muslims: Religious Practices Before and After September 11.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42(2):247-58.
Finke, Roger and Rodney Stark. 2004. “The Dynamics of Religious Economies.” In Handbook of the sociology of religion, edited by Michele Dillon, pp. 96-109. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fox, Jonathan. 2016. “Secular–Religious Competition in Western Democracies: 1990 to 2014.” Journal of Religious and Political Practice 2(2):155-74.
Froese, Paul. 2004. “Forced Secularization in Soviet Russia: Why an Atheistic Monopoly Failed.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 43(1):35-50.
Froese, Paul. 2008. The Plot to Kill God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment in Secularization. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gambetta, Diego. 1994. “Inscrutable Goods.” Rationality and Society 6(3):353–68.
Geoghegan, Vincent. 2004. “Religion and Communism: Feuerbach, Marx and Bloch.” The European Legacy 9(5):585-95.
Gerhards, Jürgen and Silke Hans. 2011. “Why not Turkey?: Attitudes Towards Turkish Membership in the EU Among Citizens in 27 European Countries,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49(4):741- 66.
Gerritsen, Marinel. 2002. “De Communicatieve Gevolgen van Cultuurverschillen tussen Vlaanderen en Nederland.” Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing 24(1):50-62.
Bibliography 119
Gill, Anthony. 1998. Rendering unto Ceasar, the Catholic Church and the State in Latin America. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Gillespie, Michael Allen. 1999. “The Theological Origins of Modernity.” Critical Review 13(1):1-30.
Glendinning, Tony and Steve Bruce. 2011. “Privatization or Deprivatization: British Attitudes about the Public Presence of Religion.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 50(3):503–16.
Golder, Matt. 2003. “Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies 36(4):432-65.
Gorski, Philip S. 2000. “Historicizing the Secularization Debate: Church, State, and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ca 1300 to 1700.” American Sociological Review 65(1):138– 67.
Gorski, Philip S., David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen. 2012. "The Post- Secular in Question." In The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society, edited by Philip S. Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, pp. 1-22. New York: New York University Press.
Greeley, Andrew. 2003. Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Guenther, Katja M. 2014. “Bounded by Disbelief: How Atheists in the United States Differentiate themselves from Religious Believers.” Journal of Contemporary Religion 29(1):1-16.
Habermas, Jurgen. 2008. “Notes on Post-Secular Society.” New Perspectives Quarterly 25(3):17–29.
Hadden, Jeffrey K. 1987. “Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory.” Social Forces 65(3):587-611.
Halman, Loek. 1996. “Individualism in Individualized Society? Results from the European Values Surveys.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 37(3):195-214.
Hecht, Jennifer Michael. 1997. “French Scientific Materialism and the Liturgy of Death: The Invention of a Secular Version of Catholic Last Rites (1876-1914).” French Historical Studies, 20(4):703-35.
Hello, Evelyn, Peer Scheepers and Mérove Gijsberts. 2002. “Education and Ethnic Prejudice in Europe: Explanations for Cross-national Variances in the Educational Effect on Ethnic Prejudice.” Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 46(1):5-24.
120 Bibliography
Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 2006. “The Role of Religion in Establishing Social Cohesion.” In Conditions of European Solidarity, vol. II: Religion in the New Europe, edited by Krzysztof Michalski, pp. 45-63. Central European University Press.
Hofstede, Geert. 2001. Culture's Consequences (Second Edition). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Hout, Michael and Claude S. Fischer. 2002. “Why More Americans Have no Religious Preference: Politics and Generations.” American Sociological Review 67(2):165-90.
Houtman, Dick. 2003. Class and Politics in Contemporary Social Science: ‘Marxism Lite' and Its Blind Spot for Culture. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Houtman, Dick. 2017 (forthcoming). “Pure Religion and Real Sacrality: The Cultural Logic of an Anti- Institutional Religious Tradition.” In Religion and Culture in a Globalized World: New Paradigms and Research, edited by Robert Hefner, Christiane Timmerman, Luc Braeckmans and Sara Mels, Berlin: Peter Lang.
Houtman, Dick and Peter Mascini. 2002. “Why Do Churches Become Empty, While New Age Grows? Secularization and Religious Change in the Netherlands.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 41(3):455-73.
Houtman, Dick, Stef Aupers and Willem de Koster, eds. 2011. Paradoxes of Individualization: Social Control and Social Conflict in Contemporary Modernity. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Houtman, Dick, Peter Achterberg and Anton Derks. 2012. Farewell to the Leftist Working Class. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Hunter, John D. 1991. Culture wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: Basic Books.
Husbands, Christopher T. 1995. “‘They Must Obey Our Laws and Customs!’: Political Debate about Muslim Assimilability in Great Britain, France and The Netherlands.” In Racism, Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Europe, edited by Alec G. Hargreaves and Jeremy Leaman, pp. 115–30. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Immerzeel, Tim, Eva Jaspers and Marcel Lubbers. 2013. “Religion as Catalyst or Restraint of Radical Right Voting?” West European Politics 36(5):946–68.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Bibliography 121
Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne Baker. 2000. “Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values.” American Sociological Review 65(1):19-51.
Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2003. “Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages.” Comparative Politics 36(1):61-79.
Johnson, Stephen. 2006. “Religion and Anti-Islamic Attitudes.” Review of Religious Research 48(1):5-16
Johnson, Todd M. and Brian J. Grim. 2013. World Religion Database. Leiden: Brill.
Kaufmann, Eric, Anne Goujon, and Vegard Skirbekk. 2012. “The End of Secularization in Europe? A Socio-demographic Perspective.” Sociology of Religion 73(1):69–91.
Kelley, Jonathan and Nan Dirk De Graaf. 1997. “National Context, Parental Socialization, and Religious Belief: Results from 15 Nations.” American Sociological Review 62(4): 639-59.
Kluun. 2009. God is Gek. De dictatuur van het atheïsme. Kampen: Ten Have.
Knutsen, Oddbjørn. 2004. “Religious Denomination and Party Choice in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study from Eight Countries, 1970-97.” International Political Science Review 25(1):97-128.
Kronjee, Gerrit and Martijn Lampert. 2006. “Leefstijlen en zingeving.” In Geloven in het publieke domein: Verkenningen van een dubbele transformatie, edited by Wim van de Donk, Petra Jonkers, Gerrit Kronjee en Rob Plum, pp. 171-208. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Laermans, Rudi. 1998. “From the classics to Luhmann and back again? Notes on Karel Dobbelaere's sociology of religion.” in Secularization and social integration. Papers in honor of Karel Dobbelaere, edited by Rudi Laermans, Bryan Wilson, Jaak Billiet, pp. 25-34. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Laurence, Jonathan. 2012. Emancipation of Europe's Muslims: The state's role in minority integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lechner, Frank J. 1991. “The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal.” Social Forces 69(4):1103-19.
LeDrew, Stephen. 2015. The Evolution of Atheism: The Politics of a Modern Movement. Oxford: Oxford University Press
122 Bibliography
Lee, Lois. 2012. “Research Note: Talking about a Revolution: Terminology for the New Field of Non- religion Studies.” Journal of Contemporary Religion 27(1):129-39.
Lee, Lois. 2014. “Secular or Nonreligious? Investigating and Interpreting Generic ‘Not Religious’ Categories and Populations.” Religion 44(3):466-82.
Lee, Lois. 2015a. Recognizing the Non-religious: Reimagining the Secular. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lee, Lois. 2015b. “Ambivalent Atheist Identities: Power and Non-Religious Culture in Contemporary Britain.” Social Analysis 59(2):20-39.
Lee, Lois and Stephen Bullivant. 2016. Oxford Dictionary of Atheism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lehmann, David. 2013. “Religion as Heritage, Religion and Belief: Shifting Frontiers of Secularism in Europe, the USA and Brazil.” International Sociology 28(6):645–62.
Lindholm, Charles. 2013. “The Rise of Expressive Authenticity.” Anthropological Quarterly 86(2):361- 95.
Luckmann, Thomas. 1967. The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society. New York: Macmillan.
Maas, Cora and Joop Hox. 2005. “Sufficient Sample Sizes for Multilevel Modeling.” Methodology 1(3):86–92.
Magill, R. Jay, Jr. 2012. Sincerity. New York: Norton.
Malik, Nesrine. 2013. “Richard Dawkins' tweets on Islam are as rational as the rants of an extremist Muslim cleric.” The Guardian, 8 August 2013. Web 15 February 2017.
Martin, David. 1978. A General Theory of Secularization. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Martin, David. 2000. “Canada in Comparative Perspective.” In Rethinking Church, State and Modernity: Canada between Europe and America, edited by David Lyon and Marguerite Van Die, pp. 23–33. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Martin, David. 2005. On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory. Ashgate: Aldershot.
Bibliography 123
Martin, David. 2007. “What I Really Said about Secularisation.” Dialog 46(2):139–52.
Martin, David. 2014a. “Nationalism and Religion; Collective Identity and Choice: The 1989 Revolutions, Evangelical Revolution in the Global South, Revolution in the Arab World.” Nations and Nationalism 20(1):1–17.
Martin, David. 2014b. “Secularization: An International Debate from a British Perspective.” Society 51(4):464–71.
Mason, Victoria and Scott Poynting. 2006. “"Tolerance, Freedom, Justice and Peace?": Britain, Australia and Anti-Muslim Racism Since 11 September 2001.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 27(4):365-91.
McCleary, Rachel M. 2007. “Salvation, Damnation and Economic Incentives.” Journal of Contemporary Religion 22(1):49-74.
McLennan, Gregor. 2010. “The Postsecular Turn.” Theory, Culture & Society 27(4):3-20.
McLeod, Hugh. 1982. “Protestantism and the Working Class in Imperial Germany.” European History Quarterly 12(3):323-44.
McLeod, Hugh. 1997. Religion and the People of Western Europe 1789-1989. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mitchell, Brian R. 1998. International Historical Statistics series; Europe 1750-1993. New York: Stockton Press.
Miller, Alan S. and John P. Hoffman. 1995. “Risk and Religion: An Explanation of Gender Differences in Religiosity.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 34(1):63–75.
Miller, Alan S. and Rodney Stark. 2002. “Gender and Religiousness: Can Socialization Explanations Be Saved?” American Journal of Sociology 107(6):1399–423.
Moberg, Marcus, Kenneth Granholm and Peter Nynäs. 2012. “Trajectories of Post-Secular Complexity: An Introduction.” In Post-secular Society, edited by Peter Nynäs, Mika Lassander and Terhi Utriainen, pp. 1-25. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Modood, Tariq. 2003. “Muslims and the Politics of Difference.” The Political Quarterly, 74(1):100–15.
124 Bibliography
Modood, Tariq. 2009. “Muslims, Religious Equality and Secularism.” in Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship edited by Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood, pp. 164-85. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mudde, Cas. 2010. “The Intolerance of the Tolerant.” http://www.opendemocracy.net/cas- mudde/intolerance-of-tolerant (Web 10 September 2013)
Mumford, Lorna. 2015. “Living Non-religious Identity in London.” In Atheist Identities: Spaces and Social Contexts, edited by Lori G. Beaman and Steven Tomlins, pp. 153-70. London: Springer.
Need, Ariana and Nan Dirk De Graaf. 1996. “'Losing My Religion': a Dynamic Analysis of Leaving the Church in the Netherlands.” European Sociological Review 12(1):87-99.
Nielsen, Jørgen S. 2004. Muslims in Western Europe. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Noomen, Ineke, Dick Houtman and Stef Aupers. 2011. “In Their Own Image? Catholic, Protestant and Holistic Spiritual Appropriations of the Internet.” Information, Communication and Society 14(8):1097-117.
Norris, Pippa. 2011. Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited. Cambridge University Press.
Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. Sacred and Secular: Reexamining the Secularization Thesis. New York: Cambridge University Press
Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2012. “Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations.” Political Studies 60(2):228-51.
Peach, Ceri and Günther Glebe. 1995. “Muslim Minorities in Western Europe.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 18(1):26-45.
Penninx, Rinus. 2006. “Dutch Immigrant Integration Policies Before and After the Van Gogh Murder.” Journal of International Migration and Integration 7(2):241-54.
Phalet, Karen, Mieke Maliepaard, Fenella Fleischmann and Derya Güngör. 2013. “The Making and Unmaking of Religious Boundaries; Comparing Turkish and Moroccan Muslim Minorities in European Cities.” Journal of Contemporary Migration Studies 1(1):123-45.
Pleij, Herman. 2011. ‘Moet kunnen’: Op zoek naar een Nederlandse identiteit. Amsterdam: Prometheus.
Bibliography 125
Putnam, Robert and David E. Campbell. 2010. American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Quack, Johannes. 2014. “Outline of a Relational Approach to ‘Nonreligion’.” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 26(4-5):439-69.
Ribberink, Egbert and Dick Houtman. 2010. “‘Te ongelovig om atheïst te zijn’: Over de-privatisering van ongeloof.” Religie & Samenleving 5(3):209-26.
Ribberink, Egbert, Peter Achterberg and Dick Houtman. 2013. “Deprivatization of Disbelief; Non- Religiosity and Anti-Religiosity in 14 Western European Countries.” Politics and Religion 6(1):101-20.
Ribberink, Egbert, Peter Achterberg and Dick Houtman. 2015. “Are all Socialists Anti-religious? Anti- religiosity and the Socialist Left in 21 Western European Countries (1990-2008).” Journal of Contemporary Religion 30(3):435-52.
Ribberink, Egbert, Peter Achterberg and Dick Houtman. 2017. “Secular Tolerance? Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Western Europe.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 56(2):259-276.
Ribberink, Egbert, Peter Achterberg and Dick Houtman. 2018. “Religious Polarization: Contesting Religion in Secularized Western European Countries.” Journal of Contemporary Religion 33 (forthcoming).
Roeland, Johan, Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman, Martijn de Koning and Ineke Noomen. 2010. “The Quest for Religious Purity in New Age, Evangelicalism and Islam: Religious Renditions of Dutch Youth and the Luckmann Legacy.” In Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion. Volume 1. Youth and Religion, edited by G. Giordan, pp. 289-306. Leiden: Brill.
Rooden, van, Peter. 2004. “Oral History en het Vreemde Sterven van het Nederlandse Christendom.” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 119(4):524-51.
Ruiter, Stijn and Frank van Tubergen. 2009. “Religious Attendance in Cross‐National Perspective: A Multilevel Analysis of 60 Countries.” The American Journal of Sociology 115(3):863-95.
Savelkoul, Michael, Peer Scheepers, Jochem Tolsma and Louk Hagendoorn. 2011. “Anti-Muslim Attitudes in the Netherlands: Tests of Contradictory Hypotheses Derived from Ethnic Competition Theory and Intergroup Contact Theory.” European Sociological Review 27(6):741– 75.
126 Bibliography
Scheepers, Peer, Mèrove Gijsberts and Evelyn Hello. 2002. “Religiosity and Prejudice Against Ethnic Minorities in Europe: Cross-national Tests on a Controversial Relationship.” Review of Religious Research 43(3):242-65.
Seidman, Steven. 2013. Contested Knowledge; Social Theory Today (Fifth Edition). Malden: Wiley Blackwell.
Sherkat, Darren E. 2008. “Beyond belief: Atheism, Agnosticism, and Theistic Certainty in the United States.” Sociological Spectrum 28(5):438–59.
Sherkat, Darren E. 2011. “Society Without God: What the Least Religious Nations Can Tell Us about Contentment.” Contemporary Sociology 40(4):499–500.
Siegers, Pascal. 2010. “A Multiple Group Latent Class Analysis of Religious Orientations in Europe”. In Cross-Cultural Analysis: Methods and Applications, edited by Eldad Davidov, Peter Schmidt, and Jaak Billiet, pp. 387–413. New York: Routledge.
Smith, Jesse M. 2011. “Becoming an Atheist in America: Constructing Identity and Meaning from the Rejection of Theism.” Sociology of Religion 72(2):215-37.
Smith, Jesse M. 2013a. “Creating a Godless Community: The Collective Identity Work of Contemporary American Atheists.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 52(1):80–99.
Smith, Jesse M. 2013b. “Comment: Conceptualizing Atheist Identity: Expanding Questions, Constructing Models, and Moving Forward.” Sociology of Religion 74(4):454-63.
Sniderman, Paul M. and Louk Hagendoorn. 2007. When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Spruyt, Bram and Mark Elchardus. 2012. “Are anti-Muslim Feelings More Widespread than Anti- foreigner Feelings? Evidence from Two Split-sample Experiments.” Ethnicities 12(6):800-20.
Stahl, William. 2010. “One-Dimensional Rage: The Social Epistemology of the New Atheism and Fundamentalism.” in Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Amarnath Amarasingam, pp. 98–108. Leiden: Brill.
Stark, Rodney. 1999. “Secularization, R.I.P.” Sociology of Religion 60(3):249-273.
Stark, Rodney. 2015. The Triumph of Faith. Why The World Is More Religious Than Ever. Intercollegiate Studies Institute.
Bibliography 127
Stark, Rodney and William S. Bainbridge. 1987. A Theory of Religion. New York: Lang & Toronto Studies in Religion.
Stark, Rodney, Laurence R. Iannaccone, and Roger Finke. 1996. “Religion, Science, and Rationality.” American Economic Review 86(2):433-37.
Stark, Rodney and Roger Finke. 2000. Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Stenger, Mary Ann and Ronald H. Stone. 2002. Dialogues of Paul Tillich. Mercer University Press.
Stevenson, Deborah, Kevin Dunn, Adam Possamai and Awais Piracha. 2010. “Religious Belief across ‘Post-secular’ Sydney: the multiple trends in (de)secularization.” Australian Geographer 41(3):323- 50.
Strabac, Zan and Ola Listhaug. 2008. “Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Europe: A Multilevel Analysis of Survey Data from 30 Countries.” Social Science Research 37(1):268–86.
Streib, Heinz and Constatin Klein. 2012. “Atheists, Agnostics, and Apostates.” In APA handbooks in Psychology: APA Handbook of Psychology, Religion and Spirituality. Vol. 1. Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association.
Swidler, Ann. 1986. “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” American Sociological Review 51(2):273-86.
Swyngedouw, Marc. 1993. “Nieuwe breuklijnen in de Vlaamse politiek? De politieke ruimte van de Vlaamse kiezer na de verkiezingen van 24 november 1991.”, in Kiezen is verliezen: onderzoek naar politieke opvattingen van Vlamingen, edited by Marc Swyngedouw, Jaak Billiet, Ann Carton and Roeland Beerten, pp. 85-112. Leuven: Acco.
Taylor, Charles. 2006. “Religion and European Integration.” In Religion in the new Europe, edited by Krzysztof Michalski, pp. 1-22. Budapest: Central European University Press.
Taylor, Charles. 2007. A Secular Age. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Taylor, Charles. 2008. “The Future of the Religious Past.” Religion: Beyond a Concept, edited by Hent de Vries, pp. 178-244. New York: Fordham University Press.
128 Bibliography
Te Grotenhuis, Manfred and Peer Scheepers. 2001. “Churches in Dutch: Causes of Religious Disaffiliation in the Netherlands, 1937-1995.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40(4):591-606.
Te Grotenhuis, Manfred, Marijn Scholte, Nan Dirk de Graaf and Ben Pelzer. 2015. “The between and
within Effects of Social Security on Church Attendance in Europe 1980–1998: The Danger of
Testing Hypotheses Cross-Nationally.” European Sociological Review 31(4):643–54.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 1922. Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, Gesammelte Schriften Band 1. Tübbingen, Ger.: Mohr.
United Nations. 2012. United Nations Population Statistics. New York: United Nations
Van Bohemen, Samira, Roy Kemmers, Dick Houtman, Stef Aupers, and Willem de Koster. 2011. “Secular Intolerance in a Post-Christian society: The Case of Islam in the Netherlands.” In Paradoxes of Individualization: Social Control and Social Conflict in Contemporary Modernity, edited by Dick Houtman, Stef Aupers and Willem de Koster, pp. 123-40. Farnham: Ashgate.
Van Der Waal, Jeroen, Peter Achterberg, Dick Houtman. 2007. “Class is not dead - It has been buried alive: Class voting and cultural voting in postwar western societies (1956-1990).” Politics & Society 35(3):403-426.
Van Istendael, Geert. 2005. Mijn Nederland. Amsterdam: Atlas.
Visser, Harm. 2003. Leven Zonder God. Elf Interviews over Ongeloof. Amsterdam: L.J. Veen.
Voas, David. 2009. “The Rise and Fall of Fuzzy Fidelity in Europe.” European Sociological Review 25(2):155-68.
Voas, David and Fenella Fleischmann. 2012. “Islam Moves West: Religious Change in the First and Second Generations.” Annual Review of Sociology 38(1):525-45.
Voas, David and Mark Chaves, 2016. "Is the United States a Counterexample to the Secularization Thesis?" American Journal of Sociology 121(5):1517–1556.
Wallace, Anthony F. C. 1966. Religion: An anthropological view. New York: Random House.
Bibliography 129
Waller, Michael and Meindert Fennema, eds. 1988. Communist Parties in Western Europa; Decline or Adaptation. Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell.
Weber, Max. 1991 [1920-21]. From Max Weber: Essays on the Sociology of Religion. Trans. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, New introduction by Bryan Turner. Abingdon: Routledge.
Weber, Max. 2001 [1930]. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Routledge Classics.
Wilkins-Laflamme, Sarah. 2014. “Towards Religious Polarization? Time Effects on Religious Commitment in US, UK and Canadian Regions.” Sociology of Religion 75(2):284–308.
Wilkins-Laflamme, Sarah. 2016. “Protestant and Catholic Distinctions in Secularization.” Journal of Contemporary Religion 31(2):165-80.
Williamson, David and George Yancey. 2013. There is no God. Atheists in America. Lanham: Rowman and Littefield.
Wilson, Bryan. 1966. Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment. London: C.A. Watts.
Wilson, Bryan. 1982. Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wood, Matthew. 2015. “Shadows in Caves? A Re-Assessment of Public Religion and Secularization in England Today.” European Journal of Sociology 56(2):241–270.
Woodhead, Linda. 2004. Christianity: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika and Tom Kaden. 2014. “Exploring the Non-Religious; Societal Norms, Attitudes and Identities, Arenas of Conflict.” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 167(1):105-25.
Wouters, Paul. 2007. België-Nederland: Verschil moet er zijn. Rotterdam: Lemniscaat.
Zijderveld, Anton C. 2000. The Institutional Imperative: The Interface of Institutions and Networks. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Zuckerman, Phil. 2009. “Atheism, Secularity, and Well-Being: How the Findings of Social Science Counter Negative Stereotypes and Assumptions.” Sociology Compass 3(6):949–71.
130 Bibliography
Acknowledgements
Finally, almost nine years of hard work, I can present this dissertation and write these acknowledgements. I have many people to thank. In the first place, I would like to thank my supervisors Dick Houtman and Peter Achterberg. This book would not have been written, if Dick did not respond so enthusiastically to my wild ideas about doing a PhD-research next to my job. Dick, your passion for the sociology of culture and religion, your encouragement at times when I was lost for words and your patient guidance have helped me tremendously. At times, I feared your red pencil and your reproof, but I always admired the way you could restructure my chaotic writings into something relevant and valuable. True to your post-Protestant nature, you have been unashamedly direct, radically dedicated and highly demanding of quality and commitment. Without this attitude, the quality and reach of my work would not have been, what is currently is. I think I have been extremely lucky with having you as my supervisor and I am glad I can repay you a little bit by finishing the job.
I am really glad as well that Peter Achterberg joined Dick in supervising me, 6 years ago. His contribution to this project started with me dropping in at his office with random questions about statistical methods, but grew into an enormous positive, constructive, informative and pleasant relationship. Peter, apart from helping me grow into a quantitative sociologist, you have taught me to write better, be sensitive about the politics of journal reviews and to become more self-confident. True to your post-Catholic nature, you have made reaching high standards an entertaining endeavor and you helped me with a sense of belonging and community. I regret that Tilburg University’s bureaucracy kept you from claiming a formal role as joint supervisor in this project. For me, you have undoubtedly functioned as one, and your time, energy, hospitality and dedication have been decisive in the successful completion of this dissertation (and the four published papers, of course). Thank you!
Four years ago, the three of us left Erasmus University as Dick moved to KU Leuven and Peter moved to Tilburg University. I am extremely grateful for the way Rudi Laermans and his team welcomed me at KU Leuven and helped me during this transition. As co-supervisor, you have contributed with critical reflections, thoughtful questions and helpful comments and you helped me in fulfilling the requirements of the truncus communis. Thanks a lot! There are many other people who have stimulated me, inspired me and helped me during the last 8 years, both in Rotterdam, Leuven and Tilburg. Staff, students, discussants and reviewers, I have learned many things from you and you have made me enjoy this time so much. I salute you.
Acknowledgements 131
One of the reasons for me to start this project was that I did not want to bore my colleagues from the Agapè foundation with my writings, analyses and complicated thoughts. By focusing on this research on the one hand, I had more attention for my team and colleagues on the other and I think this was better for all of us. Thank you so much for giving me this space, also during the difficult period I had in 2011-2012. I would like to thank Henk Veltman and Mark de Boer in particular, as they have supported me in pursuing this research all the time, even when this meant that I could not take up responsibilities that they wanted me to take on me.
In the academic year 2015-2016, I was supported financially by the Flemish government with the FWO special fellowship, to finish this book in a full-time setting. Thanks to the Flemish taxpayers and review commission for entrusting this fellowship to me.
Of course, there are many more people in my immediate environment that have supported me during this PhD-project: my parents, the Ribberink and Stoel extended families, my friends in Apeldoorn and Utrecht and the support-group from Agapè. I know I fall short in expressing my gratitude by referring to you as groups, but there are just too many of you to mention by name. This leaves unaffected that I am thankful for every one of you, for conversations, proofreading, encouragements and prayers. Most of all, I want to thank Sieneke for supporting, loving and believing in me. Thank you for being you, my wife and the mother of my children. I also want to thank Jopke, Bram and Siemen. Jullie zijn mijn kostbaarste bezit, ik ben super blij dat ik jullie vader mag zijn. Bedankt dat jullie zo veel geduld hebben gehad in de tijd dat ik dit boek schreef of uitgeput op de bank zat na een dag schrijven. Ik houd van jullie! Lastly, true to my Protestant nature, I thank the Father and Son, for making me father and son. SDG.
Leuven/ Tilburg/ Utrecht, April 2017
132 Ackowledgements
CV
Egbert Ribberink (Apeldoorn, 1981) is a sociologist of culture and religion at the Center for Sociological Research (CeSO), KU Leuven, Belgium. He studies the place of religion, non-religion and anti-religion in Europe. His publications cover topics like new atheism, secularization, socialism, anti-Muslim sentiment (or Islamophobia) as well as religious polarization and post-secularity. Next to his PhD-study, he has been working as a team leader and project manager at several non-profit organizations. He is married to Sieneke and father of three wonderful children.
CV 133
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen en doctoraten in de sociale en culturele antropologie
I. REEKS VAN DOCTORATEN IN DE SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN (1)
1. CLAEYS, U., De sociale mobiliteit van de universitair afgestudeerden te Leuven. Het universitair onderwijs als mobiliteitskanaal, 1971, 2 delen 398 blz.
2. VANHESTE, G., Literatuur en revolutie, 1971, 2 delen, 500 blz.
3. DELANGHE, L., Differentiële sterfte in België. Een sociaal-demografische analyse, 1971, 3 delen, 773 blz.
4. BEGHIN, P., Geleide verandering in een Afrikaanse samenleving. De Bushi in de koloniale periode, 1971, 316 blz.
5. BENOIT, A., Changing the education system. A Colombian case-study, 1972, 382 blz.
6. DEFEVER, M., De huisartssituatie in België, 1972, 374 blz.
7. LAUWERS, J., Kritische studie van de secularisatietheorieën in de sociologie, 1972, 364 blz.
8. GHOOS, A., Sociologisch onderzoek naar de gevolgen van industrialisering in een rekonversiegebied, 1972, 256 blz. + bijlagen.
9. SLEDSENS, G., Mariage et vie conjugale du moniteur rwandais. Enquête sociologique par interview dirigée parmi les moniteurs mariés rwandais, 1972, 2 delen, 549 blz.
10. TSAI, C., La chambre de commerce internationale. Un groupe de pression international. Son action et son rôle dans l'élaboration, la conclusion et l'application des conventions internationales établies au sein des organisations intergouvernementales à vocation mondiale (1945-1969), 1972, 442 blz.
11. DEPRE, R., De topambtenaren van de ministeries in België. Een bestuurssociologisch onderzoek, 1973, 2 delen, 423 blz. + bijlagen.
12. VAN DER BIESEN, W., De verkiezingspropaganda in de democratische maatschappij. Een literatuurkritische studie en een inhoudsanalyse van de verkiezingscampagne van 1958 in de katholieke pers en in de propagandapublikaties van de C.V.P., 1973, 434 blz.
13. BANGO, J., Changements dans les communautés villageoises de l'Europe de l'Est. Exemple : la Hongarie, 1973, 434 blz.
(1) EEN EERSTE SERIE DOCTORATEN VORMT DE REEKS VAN DE SCHOOL VOOR POLITIEKE EN SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN (NRS. 1 TOT EN MET 185). DE INTEGRALE LIJST KAN WORDEN GEVONDEN IN NADIEN GEPUBLICEERDE DOCTORATEN, ZOALS G. DOOGHE, "DE STRUCTUUR VAN HET GEZIN EN DE SOCIALE RELATIES VAN DE BEJAARDEN". ANTWERPEN, DE NEDERLANDSE BOEKHANDEL, 1970, 290 BLZ.
EEN TWEEDE SERIE DOCTORATEN IS VERMELD IN DE "NIEUWE REEKS VAN DE FACULTEIT DER ECONOMISCHE EN SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN". DE INTEGRALE LIJST KAN WORDEN GEVONDEN IN O.M. M. PEETERS, "GODSDIENST EN TOLERANTIE IN HET SOCIALISTISCH DENKEN". EEN HISTORISCH-DOCTRINAIRE STUDIE, 1970, 2 DELEN, 568 BLZ.
134 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
14. VAN PELT, H., De omroep in revisie. Structurering en ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden van het radio- en televisiebestel in Nederland en België. Een vergelijkende studie, Leuven, Acco, 1973, 398 blz.
15. MARTENS, A., 25 jaar wegwerparbeiders. Het Belgisch immigratiebeleid na 1945, 1973, 319 blz.
16. BILLET, M., Het verenigingsleven in Vlaanderen. Een sociologische typologieformulering en hypothesetoetsing, 1973, 695 blz. + bijlagen.
17. BRUYNOOGHE, R., De sociale structurering van de gezinsverplegingssituatie vanuit kostgezinnen en patiënten, 1973, 205 blz. + bijlagen.
18. BUNDERVOET, J., Het doorstromingsprobleem in de hedendaagse vakbeweging. Kritische literatuurstudie en verkennend onderzoek in de Belgische vakbonden, 1973, 420 blz. + bijlagen.
19. GEVERS, P., Ondernemingsraden, randverschijnselen in de Belgische industriële democratiseringsbeweging. Een sociologische studie, 1973, 314 blz.
20. MBELA, H., L'intégration de l'éducation permanente dans les objectifs socio-économiques de développement. Analyse de quelques politiques éducationnelles en vue du développement du milieu rural traditionnel en Afrique noire francophone, 1974, 250 blz.
21. CROLLEN, L., Small powers in international systems, 1974, 250 blz.
22. VAN HASSEL, H., Het ministrieel kabinet. Peilen naar een sociologische duiding, 1974, 460 blz. + bijlagen.
23. MARCK, P., Public relations voor de landbouw in de Europese Economische Gemeenschap, 1974, 384 blz.
24. LAMBRECHTS, E., Vrouwenarbeid in België. Een analyse van het tewerkstellingsbeleid inzake vrouwelijke arbeidskrachten sinds 1930, 1975, 260 blz.
25. LEMMEN, M.H.W., Rationaliteit bij Max Weber. Een godsdienstsociologische studie, 1975, 2 delen, 354 blz.
26. BOON, G., Ontstaan, ontwikkeling en werking van de radio-omroep in Zaïre tijdens het Belgisch Koloniale Bewind (1937-1960), 1975, 2 delen, 617 blz.
27. WUYTS, H., De participatie van de burgers in de besluitvorming op het gebied van de gemeentelijke plannen van aanleg. Analyse toegespitst op het Nederlandstalige deel van België, 1975, 200 blz. + bijlage.
28. VERRIEST, F., Joris Helleputte en het corporatisme, 1975, 2 delen, 404 blz.
29. DELMARTINO, F., Schaalvergroting en bestuurskracht. Een beleidsanalystische benadering van de herstrukturering van de lokale besturen, 1975, 3 delen, 433 blz. + bijlagen.
30. BILLIET, J., Secularisering en verzuiling in het Belgisch onderwijs, 1975, 3 delen, 433 blz. + bijlagen.
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 135
31. DEVISCH, R., L'institution rituelle Khita chez les Yaka au Kwaango du Nord. Une analyse séméiologique, 1976, 3 volumes.
32. LAMMERTYN, F., Arbeidsbemiddeling en werkloosheid. Een sociologische verkenning van het optreden van de diensten voor openbare arbeidsbemiddeling van de R.V.A., 1976, 406 blz.
33. GOVAERTS, F., Zwitserland en de E.E.G. Een case-study inzake Europese integratie, 1976, 337 blz.
34. JACOBS, T., Het uit de echt scheiden. Een typologiserend onderzoek, aan de hand van de analyse van rechtsplegingsdossiers in echtscheiding. 1976, 333 blz. + bijlage.
35. KIM DAI WON, Au delà de l'institutionalisation des rapports professionnels. Analyse du mouvement spontané ouvrier belge. 1977, 282 blz.
36. COLSON, F., Sociale indicatoren van enkele aspecten van bevolkingsgroei. 1977, 341 blz. + bijlagen.
37. BAECK, A., Het professionaliseringsproces van de Nederlandse huisarts. 1978, 721 blz. + bibliografie.
38. VLOEBERGHS, D., Feedback, communicatie en organisatie. Onderzoek naar de betekenis en de toepassing van het begrip "feedback" in de communicatiewetenschap en de organisatietheorieën. 1978, 326 blz.
39. DIERICKX, G., De ideologische factor in de Belgische politieke besluitvorming. 1978, 609 blz. + bijvoegsels.
40. VAN DE KERCKHOVE, J., Sociologie. Maatschappelijke relevantie en arbeidersemancipatie. 1978, 551 blz.
41. DE MEYER A., De populaire muziekindustrie. Een terreinverkennende studie. 1979, 578 blz.
42. UDDIN, M., Some Social Factors influencing Age at Death in the situation of Bangladesh. 1979, 316 blz. + bijlagen.
43. MEULEMANS, E., De ethische problematiek van het lijden aan het leven en aan het samen-leven in het oeuvre van Albert Camus. De mogelijke levensstijlen van luciditeit, menselijkheid en solidariteit. 1979, 413 blz.
44. HUYPENS, J., De plaatselijke nieuwsfabriek. Regionaal nieuws. Analyse van inhoud en structuur in de krant. 494 blz.
45. CEULEMANS, M.J., Women and Mass Media: a feminist perpective. A review of the research to date the image and status of women in American mass media. 1980, 541 blz. + bijlagen.
46. VANDEKERCKHOVE, L., Gemaakt van asse. Een sociologische studie van de westerse somatische kultuur. 1980, 383 blz.
47. MIN, J.K., Political Development in Korea, 1945-1972. 1980, 2 delen, 466 blz.
48. MASUI, M., Ongehuwd moeder. Sociologische analyse van een wordingsproces. 1980, 257 blz.
136 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
49. LEDOUX, M., Op zoek naar de rest ...; Genealogische lezing van het psychiatrisch discours. 1981, 511 blz.
50. VEYS, D., De generatie-sterftetafels in België. 1981, 3 delen, 326 blz. + bijlagen.
51. TACQ, J., Kausaliteit in sociologisch onderzoek. Een beoordeling van de zgn. 'causal modeling'- technieken in het licht van verschillende wijsgerige opvattingen over kausaliteit. 1981, 337 blz.
52. NKUNDABAGENZI, F., Le système politique et son environnement. Contribution à l'étude de leur interaction à partir du cas des pays est-africains : le Kenya et la Tanzanie. 1981, 348 blz.
53. GOOSSENS, L., Het sociaal huisvestingsbeleid in België. Een historisch-sociologische analyse van de maatschappelijke probleembehandeling op het gebied van het wonen. 1982, 3 delen.
54. SCHEPERS, R., De opkomst van het Belgisch medisch beroep. De evolutie van de wetgeving en de beroepsorganisatie in de 19de eeuw. 1983, 553 blz.
55. VANSTEENKISTE, J., Bejaardzijn als maatschappelijk gebeuren. 1983, 166 blz.
56. MATTHIJS, K., Zelfmoord en zelfmoordpoging. 1983, 3 delen, 464 blz.
57. CHUNG-WON, Choue, Peaceful Unification of Korea. Towards Korean Integration. 1984, 338 blz.
58. PEETERS, R., Ziekte en gezondheid bij Marokkaanse immigranten. 1983, 349 blz.
59. HESLING, W., Retorica en film. Een onderzoek naar de structuur en functie van klassieke overtuigingsstrategieën in fictionele, audiovisuele teksten. 1985, 515 blz.
60. WELLEN, J., Van probleem tot hulpverlening. Een exploratie van de betrekkingen tussen huisartsen en ambulante geestelijke gezondheidszorg in Vlaanderen. 1984, 476 blz.
61. LOOSVELDT, G., De effecten van een interviewtraining op de kwaliteit van gegevens bekomen via het survey-interview. 1985, 311 blz. + bijlagen.
62. FOETS, M., Ziekte en gezondheidsgedrag : de ontwikkeling van de sociologische theorievorming en van het sociologisch onderzoek. 1985, 339 blz.
63. BRANCKAERTS, J., Zelfhulporganisaties. Literatuuranalyse en explorerend onderzoek in Vlaanderen. 1985.
64. DE GROOFF, D., De elektronische krant. Een onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden van nieuwsverspreiding via elektronische tekstmedia en naar de mogelijke gevolgen daarvan voor de krant als bedrijf en als massamedium. 1986, 568 blz.
65. VERMEULEN, D., De maatschappelijke beheersingsprocessen inzake de sociaal-culturele sector in Vlaanderen. Een sociologische studie van de "verzuiling", de professionalisering en het overheidsbeleid. 1983, 447 blz.
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 137
66. OTSHOMANPITA, Aloki, Administration locale et développement au Zaïre. Critiques et perspectives de l'organisation politico-administrative à partir du cas de la zone de Lodja. 1988, 507 blz.
67. SERVAES, J., Communicatie en ontwikkeling. Een verkennende literatuurstudie naar de mogelijkheden van een communicatiebeleid voor ontwikkelingslanden. 1987, 364 blz.
68. HELLEMANS, G., Verzuiling. Een historische en vergelijkende analyse. 1989, 302 blz.
II. NIEUWE REEKS VAN DOCTORATEN IN DE SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN EN IN DE SOCIALE EN CULTURELE ANTROPOLOGIE
1. LIU BOLONG, Western Europe - China. A comparative analysis of the foreign policies of the European Community, Great Britain and Belgium towards China (1970-1986). Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, 1988, 335 blz.
2. EERDEKENS, J., Chronische ziekte en rolverandering. Een sociologisch onderzoek bij M.S.- patiënten. Leuven, Acco, 1989, 164 blz. + bijlagen.
3. HOUBEN, P., Formele beslissingsmodellen en speltheorie met toepassingen en onderzoek naar activiteiten en uitgaven van locale welzijnsinstellingen en coalities. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, 1988, 631 blz. (5 delen).
4. HOOGHE, L., Separatisme. Conflict tussen twee projecten voor natievorming. Een onderzoek op basis van drie succesvolle separatismen. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, 1989, 451 blz. + bijlagen.
5. SWYNGEDOUW, M., De keuze van de kiezer. Naar een verbetering van de schattingen van verschuivingen en partijvoorkeur bij opeenvolgende verkiezingen en peilingen. Leuven, Sociologisch Onderzoeksinstituut, 1989, 333 blz.
6. BOUCKAERT, G., Productiviteit in de overheid. Leuven, Vervolmakingscentrum voor Overheidsbeleid en Bestuur, 1990, 394 blz.
7. RUEBENS, M., Sociologie van het alledaagse leven. Leuven, Acco, 1990, 266 blz.
8. HONDEGHEM, A., De loopbaan van de ambtenaar. Tussen droom en werkelijkheid. Leuven, Vervolmakingscentrum voor Overheidsbeleid en Bestuur, 1990, 498 blz. + bijlage.
9. WINNUBST, M., Wetenschapspopularisering in Vlaanderen. Profiel, zelfbeeld en werkwijze van de Vlaamse wetenschapsjournalist. Leuven, Departement Communicatiewetenschap, 1990.
10. LAERMANS, R., In de greep van de "moderne tijd". Modernisering en verzuiling, individualisering en het naoorlogse publieke discours van de ACW-vormingsorganisaties : een proeve tot cultuursociologische duiding. Leuven, Garant, 1992.
138 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
11. LUYTEN, D., OCMW en Armenzorg. Een sociologische studie van de sociale grenzen van het recht op bijstand. Leuven, S.O.I. Departement Sociologie, 1993, 487 blz.
12. VAN DONINCK, B., De landbouwcoöperatie in Zimbabwe. Bouwsteen van een nieuwe samenleving ? Grimbergen, vzw Belgium-Zimbabwe Friendship Association, 1993. 331 blz.
13. OPDEBEECK, S., Afhankelijkheid en het beëindigen van partnergeweld. Leuven, Garant, 1993. 299 blz. + bijlagen.
14. DELHAYE, C., Mode geleefd en gedragen. Leuven, Acco, 1993, 228 blz.
15. MADDENS, B., Kiesgedrag en partijstrategie. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, Afdeling Politologie, K.U.Leuven, 1994, 453 blz.
16. DE WIT, H., Cijfers en hun achterliggende realiteit. De MTMM-kwaliteitsparameters op hun kwaliteit onderzocht. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 1994, 241 blz.
17. DEVELTERE, P., Co-operation and development with special reference to the experience of the Commonwealth Carribean. Leuven, Acco, 1994, 241 blz.
18. WALGRAVE, S., Tussen loyauteit en selectiviteit. Een sociologisch onderzoek naar de ambivalente verhouding tussen nieuwe sociale bewegingen en groene partij in Vlaanderen. Leuven, Garant, 1994, 361 blz.
19. CASIER, T., Over oude en nieuwe mythen. Ideologische achtergronden en repercussies van de politieke omwentelingen in Centraal- en Oost-Europa sinds 1985. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 1994, 365 blz.
20. DE RYNCK, F., Streekontwikkeling in Vlaanderen. Besturingsverhoudingen en beleidsnetwerken in bovenlokale ruimtes. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, Afdeling Bestuurswetenschap, K.U.Leuven, 1995, 432 blz.
21. DEVOS, G., De flexibilisering van het secundair onderwijs in Vlaanderen. Een organisatie- sociologische studie van macht en institutionalisering. Leuven, Acco, 1995, 447 blz.
22. VAN TRIER, W., Everyone A King? An investigation into the meaning and significance of the debate on basic incomes with special references to three episodes from the British inter-War experience. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 1995, vi+501 blz.
23. SELS, L., De overheid viert de teugels. De effecten op organisatie en personeelsbeleid in de autonome overheidsbedrijven. Leuven, Acco, 1995, 454 blz.
24. HONG, K.J., The C.S.C.E. Security Regime Formation: From Helsinky to Budapest. Leuven, Acco, 1996, 350 blz.
25. RAMEZANZADEH, A., Internal and international dynamics of ethnic conflict. The Case of Iran. Leuven, Acco, 1996, 273 blz.
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 139
26. HUYSMANS, J., Making/Unmaking European Disorder. Meta-Theoretical, Theoretical and Empirical Questions of Military Stability after the Cold War. Leuven, Acco, 1996, 250 blz.
27. VAN DEN BULCK J., Kijkbuiskennis. De rol van televisie in de sociale en cognitieve constructie van de realiteit. Leuven, Acco, 1996, 242 blz.
28. JEMADU Aleksius, Sustainable Forest Management in the Context of Multi-level and Multi-actor Policy Processes. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, Afdeling Bestuur en Overheidsmanagement, K.U.Leuven, 1996, 310 blz.
29. HENDRAWAN Sanerya, Reform and Modernization of State Enterprises. The Case of Indonesia. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, Afdeling Bestuur en Overheidsmanagement, K.U.Leuven, 1996, 372 blz.
30. MUIJS Roland Daniël, Self, School and Media: A Longitudinal Study of Media Use, Self-Concept, School Achievement and Peer Relations among Primary School Children. Leuven, Departement Communicatiewetenschap, K.U.Leuven, 1997, 316 blz.
31. WAEGE Hans, Vertogen over de relatie tussen individu en gemeenschap. Leuven, Acco, 1997, 382 blz.
32. FIERS Stefaan, Partijvoorzitters in België of ‘Le parti, c’est moi’? Leuven, Acco, 1998, 419 blz.
33. SAMOY Erik, Ongeschikt of ongewenst? Een halve eeuw arbeidsmarktbeleid voor gehandicapten. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 1998, 640 blz.
34. KEUKELEIRE Stephan, Het Gemeenschappelijk Buitenlands en Veiligheidsbeleid (GBVB): het buitenlands beleid van de Europese Unie op een dwaalspoor. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, Afdeling Internationale Betrekkingen, K.U.Leuven, 1998, 452 blz.
35. VERLINDEN Ann, Het ongewone alledaagse: over zwarte katten, horoscopen, miraculeuze genezingen en andere geloofselementen en praktijken. Een sociologie van het zogenaamde bijgeloof. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 1999, 387 blz. + bijlagen.
36. CARTON Ann, Een interviewernetwerk: uitwerking van een evaluatieprocedure voor interviewers. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, 1999, 379 blz. + bijlagen.
37. WANG Wan-Li, Undestanding Taiwan-EU Relations: An Analysis of the Years from 1958 to 1998. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, Afdeling Internationale Betrekkingen, K.U.Leuven, 1999, 326 blz. + bijlagen.
38. WALRAVE Michel, Direct Marketing en Privacy. De verhouding tussen direct marketingscommunicatie en de bescherming van de informationele en de relationele privacy van consumenten. Leuven, Departement Communicatiewetenschap, K.U.Leuven, 1999, 480 blz. + bijlagen.
140 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
39. KOCHUYT Thierry, Over een ondercultuur. Een cultuursociologische studie naar de relatieve deprivatie van arme gezinnen. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 1999, 386 blz. + bijlagen.
40. WETS Johan, Waarom onderweg? Een analyse van de oorzaken van grootschalige migratie- en vluchtelingenstromen. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, Afdeling Internationale Betrekkingen, K.U.Leuven, 1999, 321 blz. + bijlagen.
41. VAN HOOTEGEM Geert, De draaglijke traagheid van het management. Productie- en Personeelsbeleid in de industrie. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 1999, 471 blz. + bijlagen.
42. VANDEBOSCH Heidi, Een geboeid publiek? Het gebruik van massamedia door gedetineerden. Leuven, Departement Communicatiewetenschap, K.U.Leuven, 1999, 375 blz. + bijlagen.
43. VAN HOVE Hildegard, De weg naar binnen. Spiritualiteit en zelfontplooiing. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2000, 369 blz. + bijlagen.
44. HUYS Rik, Uit de band? De structuur van arbeidsverdeling in de Belgische autoassemblagebedrijven. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2000, 464 blz. + bijlagen.
45. VAN RUYSSEVELDT Joris, Het belang van overleg. Voorwaarden voor macroresponsieve CAO- onderhandelingen in de marktsector. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2000, 349 blz. + bijlagen.
46. DEPAUW Sam, Cohesie in de parlementsfracties van de regeringsmeerderheid. Een vergelijkend onderzoek in België, Frankrijk en het Verenigd Koninkrijk (1987-97). Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2000, 510 blz. + bijlagen.
47. BEYERS Jan, Het maatschappelijk draagvlak van het Europees beleid en het einde van de permissieve consensus. Een empirisch onderzoek over politiek handelen in een meerlagig politiek stelsel. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2000, 269 blz. + bijlagen.
48. VAN DEN BULCK Hilde, De rol van de publieke omroep in het project van de moderniteit. Een analyse van de bijdrage van de Vlaamse publieke televisie tot de creatie van een nationale cultuur en identiteit (1953-1973). Leuven, Departement Communicatiewetenschap, K.U.Leuven, 2000, 329 blz. + bijlagen.
49. STEEN Trui, Krachtlijnen voor een nieuw personeelsbeleid in de Vlaamse gemeenten. Een studie naar de sturing en implementatie van veranderingsprocessen bij de overheid. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2000, 340 blz. + bijlagen.
50. PICKERY Jan, Applications of Multilevel Analysis in Survey Data Quality Research. Random Coefficient Models for Respondent and Interviewer Effects. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2000, 200 blz. + bijlagen.
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 141
51. DECLERCQ Aniana (Anja), De complexe zoektocht tussen orde en chaos. Een sociologische studie naar de differentiatie in de institutionele zorgregimes voor dementerende ouderen. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2000, 260 blz. + bijlagen.
52. VERSCHRAEGEN Gert, De maatschappij zonder eigenschappen. Systeemtheorie, sociale differentiatie en moraal. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2000, 256 blz. + bijlagen.
53. DWIKARDANA Sapta, The Political Economy of Development and Industrial Relations in Indonesia under the New Order Government. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2001, 315 blz. + bijlagen.
54. SAUER Tom, Nuclear Inertia. US Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War (1990-2000). Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2001, 358 blz. + bijlagen.
55. HAJNAL Istvan, Classificatie in de sociale wetenschappen. Een evaluatie van de nauwkeurigheid van een aantal clusteranalysemethoden door middel van simulaties. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2001, 340 blz. + bijlagen.
56. VAN MEERBEECK Anne, Het doopsel: een familieritueel. Een sociologische analyse van de betekenissen van dopen in Vlaanderen. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2001, 338 blz. + bijlagen
57. DE PRINS Peggy, Zorgen om zorg(arbeid). Een vergelijkend onderzoek naar oorzaken van stress en maatzorg in Vlaamse rusthuizen. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2001, 363 blz. + bijlagen.
58. VAN BAVEL Jan, Demografische reproductie en sociale evolutie: geboortebeperking in Leuven 1840- 1910. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2001, 362 blz. + bijlagen.
59. PRINSLOO Riana, Subnationalism in a Cleavaged Society with Reference to the Flemish Movement since 1945. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2001, 265 blz. + bijlagen.
60. DE LA HAYE Jos, Missed Opportunities in Conflict Management. The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1987-1996). Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2001, 283 blz. + bijlagen.
61. ROMMEL Ward, Heeft de sociologie nood aan Darwin? Op zoek naar de verhouding tussen evolutiepsychologie en sociologie. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2002, 287 blz. + bijlagen.
62. VERVLIET Chris, Vergelijking tussen Duits en Belgisch federalisme, ter toetsing van een neofunctionalistisch verklaringsmodel voor bevoegdheidsverschuivingen tussen nationale en subnationale overheden: een analyse in het economisch beleidsdomein. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2002, 265 blz. + bijlagen.
63. DHOEST Alexander, De verbeelde gemeenschap: Vlaamse tv-fictie en de constructie van een nationale identiteit. Leuven, Departement Communicatiewetenschap, K.U.Leuven, 2002, 384 blz. + bijlagen.
142 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
64. VAN REETH Wouter, The Bearable Lightness of Budgeting. The Uneven Implementation of Performance Oriented Budget Reform Across Agencies. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2002, 380 blz. + bijlagen.
65. CAMBRé Bart, De relatie tussen religiositeit en etnocentrisme. Een contextuele benadering met cross-culturele data. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2002, 257 blz. + bijlagen.
66. SCHEERS Joris, Koffie en het aroma van de stad. Tropische (re-)productiestructuren in ruimtelijk perspectief. Casus centrale kustvlakte van Ecuador. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2002, 294 blz. + bijlagen.
67. VAN ROMPAEY Veerle, Media on / Family off? An integrated quantitative and qualitative investigation into the implications of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for family life. Leuven, Departement Communicatiewetenschap, K.U.Leuven, 2002, 232 blz. + bijlagen.
68. VERMEERSCH Peter, Roma and the Politics of Ethnicity in Central Europe. A Comparative Study of Ethnic Minority Mobilisation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia in the 1990s. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2002, 317 blz. + bijlagen.
69. GIELEN Pascal, Pleidooi voor een symmetrische kunstsociologie. Een sociologische analyse van artistieke selectieprocessen in de sectoren van de hedendaagse dans en de beeldende kunst in Vlaanderen. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2002, 355 blz. + bijlagen
70. VERHOEST Koen, Resultaatgericht verzelfstandigen. Een analyse vanuit een verruimd principaal- agent perspectief. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2002, 352 blz. + bijlagen.
71. LEFèVRE Pascal, Willy Vandersteens Suske en Wiske in de krant (1945-1971). Een theoretisch kader voor een vormelijke analyse van strips. Leuven, Departement Communicatiewetenschap, K.U.Leuven, 2003, 186 blz. (A3) + bijlagen.
72. WELKENHUYSEN-GYBELS Jerry, The Detection of Differential Item Functioning in Likert Score Items. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2003, 222 blz. + bijlagen.
73. VAN DE PUTTE Bart, Het belang van de toegeschreven positie in een moderniserende wereld. Partnerkeuze in 19de-eeuwse Vlaamse steden (Leuven, Aalst en Gent). Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2003, 425 blz. + bijlagen.
74. HUSTINX Lesley, Reflexive modernity and styles of volunteering: The case of the Flemish Red Cross volunteers. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2003, 363 blz. + bijlagen.
75. BEKE Wouter, De Christelijke Volkspartij tussen 1945 en 1968. Breuklijnen en pacificatiemechanismen in een catch-allpartij. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2004, 423 blz. + bijlagen.
76. WAYENBERG Ellen, Vernieuwingen in de Vlaamse centrale - lokale verhoudingen: op weg naar partnerschap? Een kwalitatieve studie van de totstandkoming en uitvoering van het sociale
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 143
impulsbeleid. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2004, 449 blz. + bijlagen.
77. MAESSCHALCK Jeroen, Towards a Public Administration Theory on Public Servants' Ethics. A Comparative Study. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2004, 374 blz. + bijlagen.
78. VAN HOYWEGHEN Ine, Making Risks. Travels in Life Insurance and Genetics. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2004, 248 blz. + bijlagen.
79. VAN DE WALLE Steven, Perceptions of Administrative Performance: The Key to Trust in Government? Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2004, 261 blz. + bijlagen.
80. WAUTERS Bram, Verkiezingen in organisaties. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2004, 707 blz. + bijlagen.
81. VANDERLEYDEN Lieve, Het Belgische/Vlaamse ouderenbeleid in de periode 1970-1999 gewikt en gewogen. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2004, 386 blz. + bijlagen.
82. HERMANS Koen, De actieve welvaartsstaat in werking. Een sociologische studie naar de implementatie van het activeringsbeleid op de werkvloer van de Vlaamse OCMW's. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven, 2005, 300 blz. + bijlagen.
83. BEVIGLIA ZAMPETTI Americo, The Notion of ‘Fairness’ in International Trade Relations: the US Perspective. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2005, 253 blz. + bijlagen.
84. ENGELEN Leen, De verbeelding van de Eerste Wereldoorlog in de Belgische speelfilm (1913-1939). Leuven, Departement Communicatiewetenschap, K.U.Leuven, 2005, 290 blz. + bijlagen.
85. VANDER WEYDEN Patrick, Effecten van kiessystemen op partijsystemen in nieuwe democratieën. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven/K.U.Brussel, 2005, 320 blz. + bijlagen.
86. VAN HECKE Steven, Christen-democraten en conservatieven in de Europese Volkspartij. Ideologische verschillen, nationale tegenstellingen en transnationale conflicten. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2005, 306 blz. + bijlagen.
87. VAN DEN VONDER Kurt, "The Front Page" in Hollywood. Een geïntegreerde historisch-poëticale analyse. Leuven, Departement Communicatiewetenschap, K.U.Leuven, 2005, 517 blz. + bijlagen.
88. VAN DEN TROOST Ann, Marriage in Motion. A Study on the Social Context and Processes of Marital Satisfaction. Leuven, Departement Sociologie, K.U.Leuven/R.U.Nijmegen, Nederland, 2005, 319 blz. + bijlagen.
89. ERTUGAL Ebru, Prospects for regional governance in Turkey on the road to EU membership: Comparison of three regions. Leuven, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, 2005, 384 blz. + bijlagen.
144 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
90. BENIJTS Tim, De keuze van beleidsinstrumenten. Een vergelijkend onderzoek naar duurzaam sparen en beleggen in België en Nederland. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2005, 501 blz. + bijlagen
91. MOLLICA Marcello, The Management of Death and the Dynamics of an Ethnic Conflict: The Case of the 1980-81 Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) Hunger Strikes in Northern Ireland. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2005, 168 blz. + bijlagen
92. HEERWEGH Dirk, Web surveys. Explaining and reducing unit nonresponse, item nonresponse and partial nonresponse. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologie [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2005, 350 blz. + bijlagen
93. GELDERS David (Dave), Communicatie over nog niet aanvaard beleid: een uitdaging voor de overheid? Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2005, (Boekdeel 1 en 2) 502 blz. + bijlagenboek
94. PUT Vital, Normen in performance audits van rekenkamers. Een casestudie bij de Algemene Rekenkamer en het National Audit Office. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2005, 209 blz. + bijlagen
95. MINNEBO Jurgen, Trauma recovery in victims of crime: the role of television use. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 187 blz. + bijlagen
96. VAN DOOREN Wouter, Performance Measurement in the Flemish Public Sector: A Supply and Demand Approach. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 245 blz. + bijlagen
97. GIJSELINCKX Caroline, Kritisch Realisme en Sociologisch Onderzoek. Een analyse aan de hand van studies naar socialisatie in multi-etnische samenlevingen. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologie [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 305 blz. + bijlagen
98. ACKAERT Johan, De burgemeestersfunctie in België. Analyse van haar legitimering en van de bestaande rolpatronen en conflicten. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 289 blz. + bijlagen
99. VLEMINCKX Koen, Towards a New Certainty: A Study into the Recalibration of the Northern-Tier Conservative Welfare States from an Active Citizens Perspective. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologie [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 381 blz. + bijlagen
100. VIZI Balázs, Hungarian Minority Policy and European Union Membership. An Interpretation of Minority Protection Conditionality in EU Enlargement. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Insituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 227 blz. + bijlagen
101. GEERARDYN Aagje, Het goede doel als thema in de externe communicatie. Bedrijfscommunicatie met een sociaal gezicht? Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 272 blz. + bijlagen
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 145
102. VANCOPPENOLLE Diederik, De ambtelijke beleidsvormingsrol verkend en getoetst in meervoudig vergelijkend perspectief. Een two-level analyse van de rol van Vlaamse ambtenaren in de Vlaamse beleidsvorming. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 331 blz. + bijlagenboe
103. DOM Leen, Ouders en scholen: partnerschap of (ongelijke) strijd? Een kwalitatief onderzoek naar de relatie tussen ouders en scholen in het lager onderwijs. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 372 blz. + bijlagen
104. NOPPE Jo, Van kiesprogramma tot regeerakkoord. De beleidsonderhandelingen tussen de politieke partijen bij de vorming van de Belgische federale regering in 1991-1992 en in 2003. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 364 blz. + bijlagen
105. YASUTOMI Atsushi, Alliance Enlargement: An Analysis of the NATO Experience. Leuven, Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 294 blz. + bijlagen
106. VENTURINI Gian Lorenzo, Poor Children in Europe. An Analytical Approach to the Study of Poverty in the European Union 1994-2000. Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, Università degli studi di Torino, Torino (Italië) / Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 192 blz. + bijlagen
107. EGGERMONT Steven, The impact of television viewing on adolescents' sexual socialization. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 244 blz. + bijlagen
108. STRUYVEN Ludovicus, Hervormingen tussen drang en dwang. Een sociologisch onderzoek naar de komst en de gevolgen van marktwerking op het terrein van arbeidsbemiddeling. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 323 blz. + bijlagen
109. BROOS Agnetha, De digitale kloof in de computergeneratie: ICT-exclusie bij adolescenten. School voor Massa-communicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 215 blz. + bijlagen
110. PASPALANOVA Mila, Undocumented and Legal Eastern European Immigrants in Brussels. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven/K.U.Brussel, 2006, 383 blz. + bijlagen
111. CHUN Kwang Ho, Democratic Peace Building in East Asia in Post-Cold War Era. A Comparative Study. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 297 blz. + bijlagen
112. VERSCHUERE Bram, Autonomy & Control in Arm's Length Public Agencies: Exploring the Determinants of Policy Autonomy. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2006, 363 blz. + bijlagenboek
113. VAN MIERLO Jan, De rol van televisie in de cultivatie van percepties en attitudes in verband met geneeskunde en gezondheid. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massa-communicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2007, 363 blz. + bijlagen
146 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
114. VENCATO Maria Francesca, The Development Policy of the CEECs: the EU Political Rationale between the Fight Against Poverty and the Near Abroad. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2007, 276 blz. + bijlagen
115. GUTSCHOVEN Klaas, Gezondheidsempowerment en de paradigmaverschuiving in de gezondheidszorg: de rol van het Internet. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massa- communicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2007, 330 blz. + bijlagen
116. OKEMWA James, Political Leadership and Democratization in the Horn of Africa (1990-2000) Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2007, 268 blz. + bijlagen
117. DE COCK Rozane, Trieste Vedetten? Assisenverslaggeving in Vlaamse kranten. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massa-communicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2007, 257 blz. + bijlagen
118. MALLIET Steven, The Challenge of Videogames to Media Effect Theory. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Mediacultuur en communicatietechnologie [CMC], K.U.Leuven, 2007, 187 blz. + bijlagen
119. VANDECASTEELE Leen, Dynamic Inequalities. The Impact of Social Stratification Determinants on Poverty Dynamics in Europe. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2007, 246 blz. + bijlagen
120. DONOSO Veronica, Adolescents and the Internet: Implications for Home, School and Social Life. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massa-communicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2007, 264 blz. + bijlagen
121. DOBRE Ana Maria, Europeanisation From A Neo-Institutionalist Perspective: Experiencing Territorial Politics in Spain and Romania. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2007, 455 blz. + bijlagen
122. DE WIT Kurt, Universiteiten in Europa in de 21e eeuw. Netwerken in een veranderende samenleving. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2007,362 blz. + bijlagen
123. CORTVRIENDT Dieter, The Becoming of a Global World: Technology / Networks / Power / Life. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 346 blz. + bijlagen
124. VANDER STICHELE Alexander, De culturele alleseter? Een kwantitatief en kwalitatief onderzoek naar 'culturele omnivoriteit' in Vlaanderen. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 414 blz. + bijlagen(boek)
125. LIU HUANG Li-chuan, A Biographical Study of Chinese Restaurant People in Belgium: Strategies for Localisation. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 365 blz. + bijlagen
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 147
126. DEVILLé Aleidis, Schuilen in de schaduw. Een sociologisch onderzoek naar de sociale constructie van verblijfsillegaliteit. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 469 blz. + bijlagen
127. FABRE Elodie, Party Organisation in a multi-level setting: Spain and the United Kingdom. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 282 blz. + bijlagen
128. PELGRIMS Christophe, Politieke actoren en bestuurlijke hervormingen. Een stakeholder benadering van Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid en Copernicus. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 374 blz. + bijlagen
129. DEBELS Annelies, Flexibility and Insecurity. The Impact of European Variants of Labour Market Flexibility on Employment, Income and Poverty Dynamics. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 366 blz. + bijlagen
130. VANDENABEELE Wouter, Towards a public administration theory of public service motivation. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 306 blz. + bijlagen
131. DELREUX Tom, The European union negotiates multilateral environmental agreements: an analysis of the internal decision-making process. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 306 blz. + bijlagen
132. HERTOG Katrien, Religious Peacebuilding: Resources and Obstacles in the Russian Orthodox Church for Sustainable Peacebuilding in Chechnya. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 515 blz. + bijlagen
133. PYPE Katrien, The Making of the Pentecostal Melodrama. Mimesis, Agency and Power in Kinshasa's Media World (DR Congo). Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Antropologie in Afrika [IARA], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 401 blz. + bijlagen + dvd
134. VERPOEST Lien, State Isomorphism in the Slavic Core of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A Comparative Study of Postcommunist Geopolitical Pluralism in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 412 blz. + bijlagen
135. VOETS Joris, Intergovernmental relations in multi-level arrangements: Collaborative public management in Flanders. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 260 blz. + bijlagen
136. LAENEN Ria, Russia's 'Near Abroad' Policy and Its Compatriots (1991-2001). A Former Empire In Search for a New Identity. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 293 blz. + bijlagen
137. PEDZIWIATR Konrad Tomasz, The New Muslim Elites in European Cities: Religion and Active Social Citizenship Amongst Young Organized Muslims in Brussels and London. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 483 blz. + bijlagen
148 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
138. DE WEERDT Yve, Jobkenmerken en collectieve deprivatie als verklaring voor de band tussen de sociale klasse en de economische attitudes van werknemers in Vlaanderen. Onderzoekseenheden: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO] en Onderzoeksgroep Arbeids-, Organisatie- en Personeelspsychologie, K.U.Leuven, 2008, 155 blz. + bijlagen
139. FADIL Nadia, Submitting to God, submitting to the Self. Secular and religious trajectories of second generation Maghrebi in Belgium. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 370 blz. + bijlagen
140. BEUSELINCK Eva, Shifting public sector coordination and the underlying drivers of change: a neo- institutional perspective. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 283 blz. + bijlagen
141. MARIS Ulrike, Newspaper Representations of Food Safety in Flanders, The Netherlands and The United Kingdom. Conceptualizations of and Within a 'Risk Society'. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massa-communicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 159 blz. + bijlagen
142. WEEKERS Karolien, Het systeem van partij- en campagnefinanciering in België: een analyse vanuit vergelijkend perspectief. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 248 blz. + bijlagen
143. DRIESKENS Edith, National or European Agents? An Exploration into the Representation Behaviour of the EU Member States at the UN Security Council. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2008, 221 blz. + bijlagen
144. DELARUE Anne, Teamwerk: de stress getemd? Een multilevelonderzoek naar het effect van organisatieontwerp en teamwerk op het welbevinden bij werknemers in de metaalindustrie. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 454 blz. + bijlagen
145. MROZOWICKI Adam, Coping with Social Change. Life strategies of workers in Poland after the end of state socialism. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 383 blz. + bijlagen
146. LIBBRECHT Liselotte, The profile of state-wide parties in regional elections. A study of party manifestos: the case of Spain. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 293 blz. + bijlagen
147. SOENEN Ruth, De connecties van korte contacten. Een etnografie en antropologische reflectie betreffende transacties, horizontale bewegingen, stedelijke relaties en kritische indicatoren. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 231 blz. + bijlagen
148. GEERTS David, Sociability Heuristics for Interactive TV. Supporting the Social Uses of Television. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Mediacultuur en Communicatietechnologie [CMC], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 201 blz. + bijlagen
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 149
149. NEEFS Hans, Between sin and disease. A historical-sociological study of the prevention of syphilis and AIDS in Belgium (1880-2000). Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 398 blz. + bijlagen
150. BROUCKER Bruno, Externe opleidingen in overheidsmanangement en de transfer van verworven kennis. Casestudie van de federale overheid. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 278 blz. + bijlagen
151. KASZA Artur, Policy Networks and the Regional Development Strategies in Poland. Comparative case studies from three regions. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 485 blz. + bijlagen
152. BEULLENS Kathleen, Stuurloos? Een onderzoek naar het verband tussen mediagebruik en risicogedrag in het verkeer bij jongeren. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 271 blz. + bijlagen
153. OPGENHAFFEN Michaël, Multimedia, Interactivity, and Hypertext in Online News: Effect on News Processing and Objective and Subjective Knowledge. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Mediacultuur en Communicatietechnologie [CMC], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 233 blz. + bijlagen
154. MEULEMAN Bart, The influence of macro-sociological factors on attitudes toward immigration in Europe. A cross-cultural and contextual approach. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 276 blz. + bijlagen
155. TRAPPERS Ann, Relations, Reputations, Regulations: An Anthropological Study of the Integration of Romanian Immigrants in Brussels, Lisbon and Stockholm. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 228 blz. + bijlagen
156. QUINTELIER Ellen, Political participation in late adolescence. Political socialization patterns in the Belgian Political Panel Survey. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 288 blz. + bijlagen
157. REESKENS Tim, Ethnic and Cultural Diversity, Integration Policies and Social Cohesion in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Relation between Cultural Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], K.U.Leuven, 2009, 298 blz. + bijlagen
158. DOSSCHE Dorien, How the research method affects cultivation outcomes. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 254 blz. + bijlagen
159. DEJAEGHERE Yves, The Political Socialization of Adolescents. An Exploration of Citizenship among Sixteen to Eighteen Year Old Belgians. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 240 blz. + bijlagen
160. GRYP Stijn, Flexibiliteit in bedrijf - Balanceren tussen contractuele en functionele flexibiliteit. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 377 blz. + bijlagen
150 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
161. SONCK Nathalie, Opinion formation: the measurement of opinions and the impact of the media. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 420 blz. + bijlagen
162. VISSERS Sara, Internet and Political Mobilization. The Effects of Internet on Political Participation and Political Equality. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 374 blz. + bijlagen
163. PLANCKE Carine, « J’irai avec toi » : désirs et dynamiques du maternel dans les chants et les danses punu (Congo-Brazzaville). Onderzoekseenheden: Instituut voor Antropologie in Afrika [IARA], K.U.Leuven / Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Sociale [LAS, Parijs], EHESS, 2010, 398 blz. + bijlagenboek + DVD + CD
164. CLAES Ellen, Schools and Citizenship Education. A Comparative Investigation of Socialization Effects of Citizenship Education on Adolescents. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 331 blz. + bijlagen
165. LEMAL Marijke, "It could happen to you." Television and health risk perception. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 316 blz. + bijlagen
166. LAMLE Nankap Elias, Laughter and conflicts. An anthropological exploration into the role of joking relationships in conflict mediation in Nigeria: A case study of Funyallang in Tarokland. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Antropologie in Afrika [IARA], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 250 blz. + bijlagen
167. DOGRUEL Fulya, Social Transition Across Multiple Boundaries: The Case of Antakya on The Turkish-Syrian Border. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 270 blz. + bijlagen
168. JANSOVA Eva, Minimum Income Schemes in Central and Eastern Europe. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 195 blz. + bijlagen
169. IYAKA Buntine (François-Xavier), Les Politiques des Réformes Administratives en République Démocratique du Congo (1990-2010). Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 269 blz. + bijlagen
170. MAENEN Seth, Organizations in the Offshore Movement. A Comparative Study on Cross-Border Software Development and Maintenance Projects. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 296 blz. + bijlagen
171. FERRARO Gianluca Domestic Implementation of International Regimes in Developing Countries. The Case of Marine Fisheries in P.R. China. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 252 blz. + bijlagen
172. van SCHAIK Louise, Is the Sum More than Its Parts? A Comparative Case Study on the Relationship between EU Unity and its Effectiveness in International Negotiations. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 219 blz. + bijlagen
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 151
173. SCHUNZ Simon, European Union foreign policy and its effects - a longitudinal study of the EU’s influence on the United Nations climate change regime (1991-2009). Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 415 blz. + bijlagen
174. KHEGAI Janna, Shaping the institutions of presidency in the post-Soviet states of Central Asia: a comparative study of three countries.. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 193 blz. + bijlagen
175. HARTUNG Anne, Structural Integration of Immigrants and the Second Generation in Europe: A Study of Unemployment Durations and Job Destinations in Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 285 blz. + bijlagen
176. STERLING Sara, Becoming Chinese: Ethnic Chinese-Venezuelan Education Migrants and the Construction of Chineseness. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], K.U.Leuven, 2010, 225 blz. + bijlagen
177. CUVELIER Jeroen, Men, mines and masculinities in Katanga: the lives and practices of artisanal miners in Lwambo (Katanga province, DR Congo). Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Antropologie in Afrika [IARA], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 302 blz. + bijlagen
178. DEWACHTER Sara, Civil Society Participation in the Honduran Poverty Reduction Strategy: Who takes a seat at the pro-poor table? Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 360 blz. + bijlagen
179. ZAMAN Bieke, Laddering method with preschoolers. Understanding preschoolers’ user experience with digital media. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Mediacultuur en Communicatietechnologie [CMC], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 222 blz. + bijlagen
180. SULLE Andrew, Agencification of Public Service Management in Tanzania: The Causes and Control of Executive Agencies. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 473 blz. + bijlagen
181. KOEMAN Joyce, Tussen commercie en cultuur: Reclamepercepties van autochtone en allochtone jongeren in Vlaanderen. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Mediacultuur en Communicatietechnologie [CMC], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 231 blz. + bijlagen
182. GONZALEZ GARIBAY Montserrat, Turtles and teamsters at the GATT/WTO. An analysis of the developing countries’ trade-labor and trade-environment policies during the 1990s. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 403 blz. + bijlagen
183. VANDEN ABEELE Veronika, Motives for Motion-based Play. Less flow, more fun. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Mediacultuur en Communicatietechnologie [CMC], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 227 blz. + bijlagen
152 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
184. MARIEN Sofie, Political Trust. An Empirical Investigation of the Causes and Consequences of Trust in Political Institutions in Europe. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 211 blz. + bijlagen
185. JANSSENS Kim, Living in a material world: The effect of advertising on materialism. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 197 blz. + bijlagen
186. DE SCHUTTER Bob, De betekenis van digitale spellen voor een ouder publiek. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Mediacultuur en Communicatietechnologie [CMC], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 339 blz. + bijlagen
187. MARX Axel, Global Governance and Certification. Assessing the Impact of Non-State Market Governance. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 140 blz. + bijlagen
188. HESTERS Delphine, Identity, culture talk & culture. Bridging cultural sociology and integration research - a study on second generation Moroccan and native Belgian residents of Brussels and Antwerp. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 440 blz. + bijlagen
189. AL-FATTAL Rouba, Transatlantic Trends of Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A Comparative Study of EU, US and Canada Electoral Assistance in the Palestinian Territories (1995- 2010). Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 369 blz. + bijlagen
190. MASUY Amandine, How does elderly family care evolve over time? An analysis of the care provided to the elderly by their spouse and children in the Panel Study of Belgian Households 1992-2002. Onderzoekseenheden: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], K.U.Leuven / Institute of Analysis of Change in Contemporary and Historical Societies [IACCHOS], Université Catholique de Louvain, 2011, 421 blz. + bijlagen
191. BOUTELIGIER Sofie, Global Cities and Networks for Global Environmental Governance. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 263 blz. + bijlagen
192. GÖKSEL Asuman, Domestic Change in Turkey: An Analysis of the Extent and Direction of Turkish Social Policy Adaptation to the Pressures of European Integration in the 2000s. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 429 blz. + bijlagen
193. HAPPAERTS Sander, Sustainable development between international and domestic forces. A comparative analysis of subnational policies. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 334 blz. + bijlagen
194. VANHOUTTE Bram, Social Capital and Well-Being in Belgium (Flanders). Identifying the Role of Networks and Context. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 165 blz. + bijlagen
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 153
195. VANHEE Dieter, Bevoegdheidsoverdrachten in België: een analyse van de vijfde staatshervorming van 2001. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], K.U.Leuven, 2011, 269 blz. + bijlagen
196. DE VUYSERE Wilfried, Neither War nor Peace. Civil-Military Cooperation in Complex Peace Operations. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], KU Leuven, 2012, 594 blz. + bijlagen
197. TOUQUET Heleen, Escaping ethnopolis: postethnic mobilization in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], KU Leuven, 2012, 301 blz. + bijlagen
198. ABTS Koenraad, Maatschappelijk onbehagen en etnopopulisme. Burgers, ressentiment, vreemdelingen, politiek en extreem rechts. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2012, 1066 blz. + bijlagen
199. VAN DEN BRANDE Karoline, Multi-Level Interactions for Sustainable Development. The Involvement of Flanders in Global and European Decision-Making. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], KU Leuven, 2012, 427 blz. + bijlagen
200. VANDELANOITTE Pascal, Het spectrum van het verleden. Een visie op de geschiedenis in vier Europese arthousefilms (1965-1975). Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Mediacultuur en Communicatietechnologie [CMC], KU Leuven, 2012, 341 blz. + bijlagen
201. JUSTAERT Arnout, The European Union in the Congolese Police Reform: Governance, Coordination and Alignment?. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], KU Leuven, 2012, 247 blz. + bijlagen
202. LECHKAR Iman, Striving and Stumbling in the Name of Allah. Neo-Sunnis and Neo-Shi‘ites in a Belgian Context. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2012, 233 blz. + bijlagen
203. CHOI Priscilla, How do Muslims convert to Evangelical Christianity? Case studies of Moroccans and Iranians in multicultural Brussels. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2012, 224 blz. + bijlagen
204. BIRCAN Tuba, Community Structure and Ethnocentrism. A Multilevel Approach: A case Study of Flanders (Belgium). Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2012, 221 blz. + bijlagen
205. DESSERS Ezra, Spatial Data Infrastructures at work. A comparative case study on the spatial enablement of public sector processes. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2012, 314 blz. + bijlagen
206. PLASQUY Eddy, La Romería del Rocío: van een lokale celebratie naar een celebratie van lokaliteit. Transformaties en betekenisverschuivingen van een lokale collectieve bedevaart in Andalusië. Onderzoekseenheid: Institute for Anthropological Research in Africa [IARA], KU Leuven, 2012, 305 blz. + bijlagen
154 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
207. BLECKMANN Laura E., Colonial Trajectories and Moving Memories: Performing Past and Identity in Southern Kaoko (Namibia). Onderzoekseenheid: Institute for Anthropological Research in Africa [IARA], KU Leuven, 2012, 394 blz. + bijlagen
208. VAN CRAEN Maarten, The impact of social-cultural integration on ethnic minority group members’ attitudes towards society. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2012, 248 blz. + bijlagen
209. CHANG Pei-Fei, The European Union in the Congolese Police Reform: Governance, Coordination and Alignment?. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], KU Leuven, 2012, 403 blz. + bijlagen
210. VAN DAMME Jan, Interactief beleid. Een analyse van organisatie en resultaten van interactieve planning in twee Vlaamse 'hot spots'. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2012, 256 blz. + bijlagen
211. KEUNEN Gert, Alternatieve mainstream: een cultuursociologisch onderzoek naar selectielogica's in het Vlaamse popmuziekcircuit. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2012, 292 blz. + bijlagen
212. FUNK DECKARD Julianne, 'Invisible' Believers for Peace: Religion and Peacebuilding in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], KU Leuven, 2012, 210 blz. + bijlagen
213. YILDIRIM Esma, The Triple Challenge: Becoming a Citizen and a Female Pious Muslim. Turkish Muslims and Faith Based Organizations at Work in Belgium.. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2012, 322 blz. + bijlagen
214. ROMMEL Jan, Organisation and Management of Regulation. Autonomy and Coordination in a Multi-Actor Setting. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2012, 235 blz. + bijlagen
215. TROUPIN Steve, Professionalizing Public Administration(s)? The Cases of Performance Audit in Canada and the Netherlands. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2012, 528 blz. + bijlagen
216. GEENEN Kristien, The pursuit of pleasure in a war-weary city, Butembo, North Kivu, DRC. Onderzoekseenheid: Institute for Anthropological Research in Africa [IARA], KU Leuven, 2012, 262 blz. + bijlagen
217. DEMUZERE Sara, Verklarende factoren van de implementatie van kwaliteitsmanagementtechnieken. Een studie binnen de Vlaamse overheid. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2012, 222 blz. + bijlagen
218. EL SGHIAR Hatim, Identificatie, mediagebruik en televisienieuws. Exploratief onderzoek bij gezinnen met Marokkaanse en Turkse voorouders in Vlaanderen. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU Leuven, 2012, 418 blz. + bijlagen
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 155
219. WEETS Katrien, Van decreet tot praktijk? Een onderzoek naar de invoering van elementen van prestatiebegroting in Vlaamse gemeenten. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2012, 343 blz. + bijlagenbundel
220. MAES Guido, Verborgen krachten in de organisatie: een politiek model van organisatieverandering. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2012, 304 blz. + bijlagen
221. VANDEN ABEELE Mariek (Maria), Me, Myself and my Mobile: Status, Identity and Belongingness in the Mobile Youth Culture. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], KU Leuven, 2012, 242 blz. + bijlagen
222. RAMIOUL Monique, The map is not the territory: the role of knowledge in spatial restructuring processes. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2012, 210 blz. + bijlagen
223. CUSTERS Kathleen, Television and the cultivation of fear of crime: Unravelling the black box. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], KU Leuven, 2012, 216 blz. + bijlagen
224. PEELS Rafael, Facing the paradigm of non-state actor involvement: the EU-Andean region negotiation process. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], KU Leuven, 2012, 239 blz. + bijlagen
225. DIRIKX Astrid, Good Cop - Bad Cop, Fair Cop - Dirty Cop. Het verband tussen mediagebruik en de houding van jongeren ten aanzien van de politie. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], KU Leuven, 2012, 408 blz. + bijlagen
226. VANLANGENAKKER Ine, Uitstroom in het regionale parlement en het leven na het mandaat. Een verkennend onderzoek in Catalonië, Saksen, Schotland, Vlaanderen en Wallonië. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2012, 255 blz. + bijlagen
227. ZHAO Li, New Co-operative Development in China: An Institutional Approach. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], KU Leuven, 2012, 256 blz. + bijlagen
228. LAMOTE Frederik, Small City, Global Scopes: An Ethnography of Urban Change in Techiman, Ghana. Onderzoekseenheid: Institute for Anthropological Research in Africa [IARA], KU Leuven, 2012, 261 blz. + bijlagen
229. SEYREK Demir Murat, Role of the NGOs in the Integration of Turkey to the European Union. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2012, 313 blz. + bijlagen
230. VANDEZANDE Mattijs, Born to die. Death clustering and the intergenerational transmission of infant mortality, the Antwerp district, 1846-1905. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2012, 179 blz. + bijlagen
156 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
231. KUHK Annette, Means for Change in Urban Policies - Application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to analyse Policy Change and Learning in the field of Urban Policies in Brussels and particularly in the subset of the European Quarter. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2013, 282 blz. + bijlagen
232. VERLEDEN Frederik, De 'vertegenwoordigers van de Natie' in partijdienst. De verhouding tussen de Belgische politieke partijen en hun parlementsleden (1918-1970). Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2013, 377 blz. + bijlagen
233. DELBEKE Karlien, Analyzing ‘Organizational justice’. An explorative study on the specification and differentiation of concepts in the social sciences. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2013, 274 blz. + bijlagen
234. PLATTEAU Eva, Generations in organizations. Ageing workforce and personnel policy as context for intergenerational conflict in local government. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2013, 322 blz. + bijlagen
235. DE JONG Sijbren, The EU’s External Natural Gas Policy – Caught Between National Priorities and Supranationalism. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], KU Leuven, 2013, 234 blz. + bijlagen
236. YANASMAYAN Zeynep, Turkey entangled with Europe? A qualitative exploration of mobility and citizenship accounts of highly educated migrants from Turkey. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], KU Leuven, 2013, 346 blz. + bijlagen
237. GOURDIN Gregory, De evolutie van de verhouding tussen ziekenhuisartsen en ziekenhuismanagement in België sinds de Besluitwet van 28 december 1944. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2013, 271 blz. + bijlagen
238. VANNIEUWENHUYZE Jorre, Mixed-mode Data Collection: Basic Concepts and Analysis of Mode Effects. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2013, 214 blz. + bijlagen
239. RENDERS Frank, Ruimte maken voor het andere: Auto-etnografische verhalen en zelfreflecties over het leven in een Vlaamse instelling voor personen met een verstandelijke handicap. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2013, 248 blz. + bijlagen
240. VANCAUWENBERGHE Glenn, Coördinatie binnen de Geografische Data Infrastructuur: Een analyse van de uitwisseling en het gebruik van geografische informatie in Vlaanderen.. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2013, 236 blz. + bijlagen
241. HENDRIKS Thomas, Work in the Rainforest: Labour, Race and Desire in a Congolese Logging Camp. Onderzoekseenheid: Institute for Anthropological Research in Africa [IARA], KU Leuven, 2013, 351 blz. + bijlagen
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 157
242. BERGHMAN Michaël, Context with a capital C. On the symbolic contextualization of artistic artefacts. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2013, 313 blz. + bijlagen
243. IKIZER Ihsan, Social Inclusion and Local Authorities. Analysing the Implementation of EU Social Inclusion Principles by Local Authorities in Europe. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2013, 301 blz. + bijlagen
244. GILLEIR Christien, Combineren in je eentje. Arbeid en gezin bij werkende alleenstaande ouders in Vlaanderen. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2013, 250 blz. + bijlagen
245. BEULLENS Koen, The use of paradata to assess survey representativity. Cracks in the nonresponse paradigm. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2013, 216 blz. + bijlagen
246. VANDENBOSCH Laura, Self-objectification and sexual effects of the media: an exploratory study in adolescence. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], KU Leuven, 2013, 238 blz. + bijlagen
247. RIBBENS Wannes, In search of the player. Perceived game realism and playing styles in digital game effects. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU Leuven, 2013, 346 blz. + bijlagen
248. ROOS Hannelore, Ruimte maken voor het andere: Auto-etnografische verhalen en zelfreflecties over het leven in een Vlaamse instelling voor personen met een verstandelijke handicap. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2013, 349 blz. + bijlagen
249. VANASSCHE Sofie, Stepfamily configurations and trajectories following parental divorce: A quantitative study on stepfamily situations, stepfamily relationships and the wellbeing of children. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2013, 274 blz. + bijlagen
250. SODERMANS An Katrien, Parenting apart together. Studies on joint physical custody arrangements in Flanders. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2013, 224 blz. + bijlagen
251. LAPPIN Richard, Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance: An Exploration of the Capabilities- Expectations Gap in Liberia, 1996-2001 & 2003-2008. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid [IIEB], KU Leuven, 2013, 348 blz. + bijlagen
252. VAN LOO Sofie, Artistieke verbeelding en inpassing in de kunstwereld in het begin van de 21e eeuw. Taboe, neutralisatie en realisatie. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2013, 399 blz. + bijlagen
158 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
253. GEERAERT Arnout, A Principal-Agent perspective on good governance in international sports. The European Union as ex-post control mechanism. Onderzoekseenheid: Leuven International and European Studies [LINES], KU Leuven, 2013, 190 blz. + bijlagen
254. VANDEKERKHOF Renaat, Van discours tot counterdiscours: een thematisch-stilistische analyse van vier Britse working-class films (1995-2000). Trainspotting (1996), Brassed Off (1996), The Full Monty (1997), Billy Elliot (2000). Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU Leuven, 2014, 353 blz. + bijlagen
255. MARIANO Esmeralda, Understanding experiences of reproductive inability in various medical systems in Southern Mozambique. Onderzoekseenheid: Institute for Anthropological Research in Africa [IARA], KU Leuven, 2014, 247 blz. + bijlagen
256. PATTYN Valérie, Policy evaluation (in)activity unravelled. A configurational analysis of the incidence, number, locus and quality of policy evaluations in the Flemish public sector. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2014, 320 blz. + bijlagen
257. WYNEN Jan, Comparing and explaining the effects of organizational autonomy in the public sector. Onderzoekseenheden: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven / Management & Bestuur, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2014, 272 blz. + bijlagen
258. COVRE SUSSAI SOARES Maira, Cohabitation in Latin America: a comparative perspective. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2014, 242 blz. + bijlagen
259. ADRIAENSEN Johan, Politics without Principals: National Trade Administrations and EU Trade Policy. Onderzoekseenheid: Leuven International and European Studies [LINES], KU Leuven, 2014, 185 blz. + bijlagen
260. BEKALU Mesfin A., Communication inequality, urbanity versus rurality and HIV/AIDS cognitive and affective outcomes: an exploratory study. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], KU Leuven, 2014, 134 blz. + bijlagen
261. DE SPIEGELAERE Stan, The Employment Relationship and Innovative Work Behaviour. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2014, 186 blz. + bijlagen
262. VERCRUYSSE TOM, The Dark Ages Imaginary in European Films. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU Leuven, 2014, 333 blz. + bijlagen
263. DOMECKA Markieta, Maneuvering between Opportunities and Constraints. Polish Business People in the Time of Transformation. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2014, 305 blz. + bijlagen
264. OFEK Yuval, The Missing Linkage: Building Effective Governance for Joint and Network Evaluation. Onderzoekseenheden: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2014, 463 blz. + bijlagen
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 159
265. HEYLEN Kristof, Housing affordability and the effect of housing subsidies. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2014, 138 blz. + bijlagen
266. VANDEWIELE Wim, Contemplatieve abdijgemeenschappen in de 21ste eeuw. Een etnografische studie naar het hedendaagse contemplatieve gemeenschapsleven. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2014, 219 blz. + bijlagen
267. BOTTERMAN Sarah, An empirical multilevel study of the relation between community level social cohesion indicators and individual social capital in Flanders, Belgium. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2015, 190 blz. + bijlagen
268. BELIS David, The Socialization Potential of the Clean Development Mechanism in EU-China and EU-Vietnam Climate Relations. Onderzoekseenheid: Leuven International and European Studies [LINES], KU Leuven,, 2015, 119 blz. + bijlagen
269. ROMMENS Thijs, Structuring opportunities for NGOs? The European Union’s promotion of democratic governance in Georgia. Onderzoekseenheid: Leuven International and European Studies [LINES], KU Leuven, 2015, 296 blz. + bijlagen
270. VAN DE PEER Aurélie, Geknipt voor het moderne: beoordelingscriteria, tijdspolitiek en materialiteit in geschreven modejournalistiek. Vakgroep Wijsbegeerte en Moraalwetenschap, Universiteit Gent / Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2015, 303 blz. + bijlagen
271. DAN Sorin, Governed or self-governed? The challenge of coordination in European public hospital systems. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2015, 243 blz. + bijlagen
272. PEUMANS Wim, Unlocking the closet - Same-sex desire among Muslim men and women in Belgium. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2015, 225 blz. + bijlagen
273. DASSONNEVILLE Ruth, Stability and Change in Voting Behaviour. Macro and Micro Determinants of Electoral Volatility. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2015, 307 blz. + bijlagen
274. VAN CAUWENBERGE Anna, The quest for young eyes. Aandacht voor nieuws bij jonge mensen in de Lage Landen. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU Leuven / Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, NL, 2015, 167 blz. + bijlagen
275. O’DUBHGHAILL Sean, How are the Irish European? An anthropological examination of belonging among the Irish in Belgium. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2015, 290 blz. + bijlagen
276. VERPOORTEN Rika, The packaging puzzle. An Investigation into the Income and Care Packages of the Belgian Eldery Population. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2015, 320 blz. + bijlagen
160 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
277. DEKOCKER Vickie, The sub-national level and the transfer of employment policies and practices in multinationals: Case study evidence from Belgium. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2015, 222 blz. + bijlagen
278. GARIBA Joshua Awienagua, Land Struggle, Power and The Challenges of Belonging. The Evolution and Dynamics of the Nkonya-Alavanyo Land Dispute in Ghana. Onderzoekseenheid: Institute for Anthropological Research in Africa [IARA], KU Leuven, 2015, 227 blz. + bijlagen
279. DE FRANCESCHI Fabio, The flexibility and security nexus in Multinational Companies in the context of Global Value Chains. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2015, 251 blz. + bijlagen
280. VERHAEGEN Soetkin, The development of European identity. A study of the individual-level development processes. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2015, 217 blz. + bijlagen
281. HAMUNGOLE Moses, Television and the cultivation of personal values among Catholics in Zambia. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], KU Leuven, 2015, 231 blz. + bijlagen
282. BEYENS Ine, Understanding young children's television exposure: An investigation into the role of structural family circumstances. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], KU Leuven, 2015, 204 blz. + bijlagen
283. ALANYA Ahu, Pervasive discrimination: Perspectives from the children of Muslim immigrants in Europe. A cross-national and cross-contextual analysis. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2015, 164 blz. + bijlagen
284. DINH THI Ngoc Bich, Public Private Partnership in Practice: Contributing to Social Conflict Resolution in Involuntary Resettlement in Vietnam. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2015, 325 blz. + bijlagen
285. PUT Gert-Jan, All politics is local: The geographical dimension of candidate selection. The case of Belgium (1987-2010). Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2015, 211 blz. + bijlagen
286. PUSCHMANN Paul, Social Inclusion and Exclusion of Urban In-Migrants in Northwestern European Port Cities; Antwerp, Rotterdam & Stockholm ca. 1850-1930. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2015, 282 blz. + bijlagen
287. COLOM BICKFORD Alejandra, Conversion to Conservation: Beliefs and practices of the conservation community in the Congo Basin (1960-present). Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Antropologie in Afrika [IARA], KU Leuven, 2016, 229 blz. + bijlagen
288. VAN CAUTER Lies, Government-to-government information system failure in Flanders: an in- depth study. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2016, 285 blz. + bijlagen
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 161
289. OOMSELS Peter, Administrational Trust: An empirical examination of interorganisational trust and distrust in the Flemish administration. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2016, 321 blz. + bijlagen
290. VANDONINCK Sofie, Dealing with online risks: how to develop adequate coping strategies and preventive measures with a focus on vulnerable children. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU , 2016, 201 blz. + bijlagen
291. SCHROOTEN Mieke, Crossing borders: The lived experiences of Brazilians on the move. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2016, 187 blz. + bijlagen
292. PEETERS Hans, The devil is in the detail. Delving into Belgian pension adequacy. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2015, 233 blz. + bijlagen
293. BUTTIENS Dorien, Talentmanagement in de Vlaamse overheid, Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2016, 433 blz. + bijlagen
294. DÖRFLINGER Nadja, Different worlds of work? A study on labour market regulatory institutions and contingent work in Belgium and Germany. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2016, 179 blz. + bijlagen
295. MOLENVELD Astrid, Organizational adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives. Onderzoekseenheden: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven / Management & Bestuur, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2016, 190 blz. + bijlagen
296. OP DE BEECK Sophie, HRM responsibilities in the public sector: The role of line managers. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2016, 406 blz. + bijlagen
297. BOONEN Joris, Political learning in adolescence: the development of party preferences in a multiparty setting. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2016, 240 blz. + bijlagen
298. SCHEEPERS Sarah, Een kritische discoursanalyse van de concepten gelijkheid en diversiteit in de Vlaamse overheid. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2016, 277 blz. + bijlagen
299. VAN AKEN Silvia, The labyrinth of the mind. Een narratieve-stilistische analyse van Jaco Van Dormaels ‘mindfilms’: Toto le héros (1991), Le huitième jour (1996), Mr. Nobody (2009). Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU Leuven, 2016, 254 blz. + bijlagen
300. KERSSCHOT Margaux, Lost in Aggregation: Domestic public and private economic actors in EU Trade Negotiations. Onderzoekseenheden: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven / Management & Bestuur, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2016, 154 blz. + bijlagen
162 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
301. TRIMARCHI Alessandra, Individual and couple level perspectives on male education and fertility in Europe at the start of the 21st century. Onderzoekseenheden: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven / Dipartimento di Scienze Statistiche, Università di Roma “La Sapienza” (IT), 2016, 205 blz. + bijlagen
302. FRISON Eline, How Facebook makes teens (un)happy: Understanding the relationships between Facebook use and adolescents’ well-being. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], KU Leuven, 2016, 211 blz. + bijlagen
303. NÚÑEZ-BORJA LUNA Carmen Alicia, Andean transnational migration in Belgium: decolonial attitudes at the heart of Europe. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2016, 274 blz. + bijlagen
304. BRAEYE Sarah, Family strategies for education: The Chinese in Flanders. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2016, 392 blz. + bijlagen
305. JORIS Willem, De Eurocrisis in het Nieuws. Een frameanalyse van de verslaggeving in Europese kranten en een effectenstudie van metaforische frames. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU Leuven, 2016, 260 blz. + bijlagen
306. TAN Evrim, Understanding the relationship between capacity and decentralisation in local governance: A case study on local administrations in Turkey. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2016, 265 blz. + bijlagen
307. NILSSON Jessika, ‘What is new about what has always been’: Communication technologies and the meaning-making of Maasai mobilities in Ngorongoro. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2016, 307 blz. + bijlagen
308. VAN PARYS Liesbeth, On the street-level implementation of ambiguous activation policy. How caseworkers reconcile responsibility and autonomy and affect their clients' motivation. Onderzoekseenheid: Arbeidsmarkt [HIVA] / Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2016, 366 blz. + bijlagen
309. BUMBA Guillaume Kamudiongo, Danser au rythme des jeunes en République Démocratique du Congo: les Bana Luna en tant qu'agents de transformation. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Antropologie in Afrika [IARA], KU Leuven, 2016, 299 blz. + bijlagen
310. VAN DEN BROECK Jan, Uncertainty and the future city: The impact of neoliberal urban planning on everyday life in the city of Nairobi. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Antropologie in Afrika [IARA], KU Leuven, 2016, 339 blz. + bijlagen
311. VANNOPPEN Geertrui, Fuelling the future with concrete, paper and discourse: competing claims in the making of an oil city, Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Antropologie in Afrika [IARA], KU Leuven, 2016, 276 blz. + bijlagen
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 163
312. KERN Anna, Causes and Consequences of Political Participation in Times of Rapid Social Change in Europe: A re-assessment of classical theories on political participation. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2016, 213 blz. + bijlagen
313. ABADI David R., Negotiating Group Identities in a Multicultural Society. Case: The Role of Mainstream Media, Discourse Relations and Political Alliances in Germany. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU Leuven, 2017, 336 blz. + bijlagen
314. BERBERS Anna, Outside in and inside out: Media portrayal, reception and identification of Moroccan minorities in the Low Countries. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU Leuven, 2017, 205 blz. + bijlagen
315. DICKMEIS Anne, Evaluating Some Hypothesized Cultural and Evolutionary Functions of Music: A Study of Young Children. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], KU Leuven, 2017, 159 blz. + bijlagen
316. MEEUSEN Cecil, The structure of (generalized) prejudice: The relation between contextual factors and different forms of prejudice. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2017, 253 blz. + bijlagen
317. ROZANSKA Julia, The Polish EU Officials in Brussels: Living on Europlanet? Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2017, 445 blz. + bijlagen
318. DERBOVEN Jan, Beyond Designers’ Intensions. A Semiotic Exploration of Technology Interpretation and Appropriation. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU Leuven, 2017, 257 blz. + bijlagen
319. BOESMAN Jan, Making news when it has already been broken: A production perspective on the framing practices of newspaper journalists in the Low Countries. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor Mediastudies [IMS], KU Leuven, 2017, 252 blz. + bijlagen
320. vAN dER LINDEN Meta, Context, intergroup threats and contact as determinants of prejudice toward immigrants. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2017, 229 blz. + bijlagen
321. NGALA NTUMBA Peter, Décentralisation congolaise et participation citoyenne: étude portant sur un dispositif participatif de la société civile à la gouvernance territoriale. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2017, 261 blz. + bijlagen
322. JACOBS Laura, The role of immigration news as a contextual-level factor for anti-immigrant attitudes: The effects of tone and threat frames. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Politicologie [CePO], KU Leuven, 2017, 242 blz. + bijlagen
323. REYKERS Yf, Delegation without control? Institutional choice and autonomy in UNSC-authorised military interventions. Onderzoekseenheid: Leuven International and European Studies [LINES], KU Leuven, 2017, 203 blz. + bijlagen
164 Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen
324. VANGEEL Jolien, Explaining adolescents' media use and differential susceptibility to the association between media use and risk behavior: a reinforcement sensitivity perspective. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMC], KU Leuven, 2017, 167 blz. + bijlagen
325. DE WITTE Jasper, Elektronische cliëntenregistratie in de jeugdhulp: tussen droom en werkelijkheid. Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek [CeSO], KU Leuven, 2017, 292 blz. + bijlagen
326. GROENINCK Mieke, ‘Reforming the Self, Unveiling the World. Islamic Religious Knowledge Transmission for Women in Brussels' Mosques and Institutes from a Moroccan Background. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2017, 263 blz. + bijlagen
327. KEULEERS Floor, European Union and Chinese Strategic Narratives towards Africa: A Mixed Methods Study of Reception by African Audiences. Onderzoekseenheid: Leuven International and European Studies [LINES], KU Leuven, 2017, 160 blz. + bijlagen
328. DE COSTER Jori, Dis/ability as an Emerging Global Identity: Im/material Entanglements of Congolese People in Kinshasa and the Diaspora. Onderzoekseenheid: Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre [IMMRC], KU Leuven, 2017, 301 blz. + bijlagen
329. COENEN Lennert, Questioning our Questions: A levels-of-analysis-perspective on meaning and measurement in cultivation research. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMCR], KU Leuven, 2017, 175 blz. + bijlagen
330. TIMMERMANS Elisabeth, Is Dating Dated in Times of Tinder? Exploring the Mediatization of Casual Sexual Intimacy. Onderzoekseenheid: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMCR], KU Leuven, 2017, 188 blz. + bijlagen
331. VAN ACKER Wouter, Sustainable Public Sector Innovations: How do feedback, accountability and learning matter? Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2017, 240 blz. + bijlagen
332. BELS Annebeth, Objecting to sex? Sexualisation, objectification and media in preteens' identity work. Onderzoeks-eenheden: School voor Massacommunicatieresearch [SMCR], KU Leuven / Departement Communicatiewetenschappen, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2017, 181 blz. + bijlagen
333. DEBELA Bacha Kedebe, Managing Performance in Ethiopian Municipalities: A Benchlearning Approach of Urban Water Services in Oromia National Regional State. Onderzoekseenheid: Instituut voor de Overheid [IO], KU Leuven, 2017, 253 blz. + bijlagen
ooOoo
Doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen 165