"There Is Probably No God" a Quantitative Study of Anti-Religiosity in Western Europe
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FACULTEIT SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN "There is probably no God" A quantitative study of anti-religiosity in Western Europe Egbert RIBBERINK Proefschrift aangeboden tot het verkrijgen van de graad van Doctor in de Sociale Wetenschappen Promotor KU Leuven: Prof. Dr. Dick Houtman Copromotor KU Leuven: Prof. Dr. Rudi Laermans Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek Copromotor Universiteit Tilburg: Prof. Dr. Peter Achterberg Onderzoeksgroep: Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Sociology 2017 FACULTEIT SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN "There is probably no God" A quantitative study of anti- religiosity in Western Europe Egbert RIBBERINK Proefschrift aangeboden tot het verkrijgen van de graad van Doctor in de Sociale Wetenschappen Nr. 334 2017 Samenstelling van de examencommissie: Prof. Dr. Bart Kerremans (voorzitter, KU Leuven) Prof. Dr. Dick Houtman (promotor, KU Leuven) Prof. Dr. Peter Achterberg (copromotor, Universiteit Tilburg) Prof. Dr. Rudi Laermans (copromotor, KU Leuven) Dr. Loek Halman (Universiteit Tilburg) Prof. Dr. Joep de Hart (Protestantse Theologische Universiteit) Dr. Lois Lee (University College London) Prof. Dr. Marc Swyngedouw (KU Leuven) De verantwoordelijkheid voor de ingenomen standpunten berust alleen bij de auteur. Gepubliceerd door: KU Leuven, Faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen - Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologische Onderzoek [CeSO], Parkstraat 45 bus 3601- 3000 Leuven, België. 2017 by the author. Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de auteur / No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without the permission in writing from the author. D/2017/8978/22 Contents CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 NON-RELIGIOSITY AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY IN WESTERN EUROPE 1 1.2 BACKGROUND 2 1.2.1 NON-RELIGIOSITY IN WESTERN EUROPE 2 1.2.2 STUDYING NON-RELIGIOSITY AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY 4 1.2.3 DIFFERENTIATING NON-RELIGIOSITY AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY 5 1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 7 1.3.1 RELIGIOUS PRESENCE AND ANTI-RELIGIOUS REACTIONS 7 1.3.2 RELIGIOUS CULTURAL IDENTITIES AND ANTI-RELIGIOUS REACTIONS 9 1.4 RESEARCH OUTLINE 11 1.4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS 11 1.4.2 RESEARCH SCOPE AND LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 13 1.4.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 14 CHAPTER 2. DEPRIVATIZATION OF DISBELIEF? NON-RELIGIOSITY AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY IN 14 WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 18 2.1 INTRODUCTION 18 2.2 EXPLAINING ANTI-RELIGIOSITY: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 19 2.2.1 ANTI-RELIGIOSITY AS THE OUTCOME OF RATIONALIZATION 20 2.2.2 ANTI-RELIGIOSITY AS THE OUTCOME OF DEPRIVATIZATION OF DISBELIEF 21 2.2.3 HYPOTHESES 23 2.3 DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION 23 2.4 RESULTS 26 2.5 CONCLUSIONS 31 CHAPTER 3. ARE ALL SOCIALISTS ANTI-RELIGIOUS? ANTI-RELIGIOSITY AND THE SOCIALIST LEFT IN 21 WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 35 3.1 INTRODUCTION: SOCIALISM AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY 35 3.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 36 3.2.1 SOCIALISM AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY IN WESTERN EUROPE 36 3.2.2 THE RELIGIOUS PRESSURE THESIS ON ANTI-RELIGIOSITY AND SOCIALISM 37 3.2.3 HYPOTHESES 39 3.3 DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION 40 3.4 RESULTS 44 3.5 CONCLUSIONS 48 CHAPTER 4. SECULAR TOLERANCE? ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE 52 4.1 INTRODUCTION 52 4.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 53 4.2.1 SECULARIZATION AND ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT 53 4.2.2 RELIGIOUS COMPETITION 54 4.2.3 NON-RELIGIOUS PEOPLE AND ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT 55 4.3 DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION 57 4.4 RESULTS 62 4.5 CONCLUSIONS 68 CHAPTER 5. RELIGIOUS POLARIZATION: CONTESTING RELIGION IN SECULARIZED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 71 5.1 INTRODUCTION 71 5.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 71 5.2.1 WILKINS-LAFLAMME’S POLARIZATION THESIS 71 5.2.2 SECULARIZATION AND ANTI-RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES 74 5.2.3 PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC DISTINCTIONS IN ANTI-RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES 75 5.3 DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION 77 5.4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 80 5.5 DISCUSSION 84 CHAPTER 6. SYNTHESIS: WHO IS READING RICHARD DAWKINS? 87 6.1 SHEER CURIOSITY 87 6.2 MAIN FINDINGS 88 6.3 IMPLICATIONS 92 6.3.1 POST-SECULAR CRITIQUE ON PRIVATIZATION THEORY 92 6.3.2 PRIVATIZATION, RELIGIOUS INDIFFERENCE AND OTHER CULTURAL ATTITUDES 95 6.3.3 APPLYING AN AUGMENTED PRIVATIZATION THEORY 97 6.4 QUANTITATIVELY RESEARCHING NON-RELIGIOSITY AND ANTI-RELIGIOSITY 99 6.4.1 NON-RELIGIOSITY IN EUROPEAN SURVEYS 99 6.4.2 ANTI-RELIGIOSITY IN EUROPEAN SURVEYS 101 6.5 SO, WHO IS READING RICHARD DAWKINS? 103 APPENDIXES 105 SAMENVATTING 109 BIBLIOGRAPHY 113 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 131 CV 133 DOCTORATEN IN DE SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN EN DOCTORATEN IN DE SOCIALE EN CULTURELE ANTROPOLOGIE 134 Chapter 1. Introduction One common misattribution is to gloss the secularization paradigm as predicting that everyone becomes an atheist (Bruce 2002: 41) 1.1 Non-religiosity and anti-religiosity in Western Europe Beginning in January 2009, buses with the words “There’s probably no God. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life” drove around London and other British cities (Lee 2015a, 81). Later, atheists launched a similar campaign in other European countries, like Italy, Spain, Germany, Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, as well as in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Brazil. This campaign, initiated by British comedian Ariane Sherine and supported by the well-known author Richard Dawkins, professes atheism in an assertive, sometimes even provocative way. In January 2013, a social gathering in North London also attracted much attention, but not because it was some kind of protest. This initiative, called the Sunday Assembly1, was held in a church building, with a main speaker, moments of meditation and beautiful music. Only God was absent from the proceedings. It marked the start of a growing secular church movement, which now has over one hundred initiatives in many Western countries. This movement organizes contemplative services without belief in God, not anti- religious protests against belief in God. Now, this Sunday Assembly and the atheist bus campaign are just two examples of a wide variety of non-religious initiatives, movements, ideologies and group identities that have lately emerged across Western Europe (Amarasingam 2010, Beaman and Tomlins 2015, Lee 2014, Zuckerman 2009). The contrast between non-religious expressions that assertively and sometimes provocatively advocate non-belief, like the atheist bus campaign does, and those radiating a contemplative, tolerant, and inviting atmosphere as for example the Sunday Assembly does, is very remarkable. Whereas the former group opposes religions and religious influence on society, the latter group seem to be almost religious itself, notwithstanding its non-belief2. Another illustration of this remarkable contrast in non- religious attitudes is the manifestation of protest of the Pegida-movement, directed against the presence of Muslim immigrants in Germany, Norway, the Netherlands and other countries (Dostal 2015), which challenges and contrasts the tolerant and inclusive image secularized countries generally have (Mudde 2010). Similarly, in Western Europe there is a surprising diversity among people with socialist political ideals. For example, on the one hand, French socialism traditionally boasts and promotes disbelief and Introduction 1 secularism, aiming to remove all references to God from education and public administration (Knutsen 2004, Waller and Fennema 1988). On the other hand, in countries like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, socialists traditionally show an indifferent, or tolerant attitude towards religion, or they are themselves religiously motivated (Bas 1999, Brown 2001, Cort 1988, Waller and Fennema 1988). This dissertation consists of four empirical studies, which study these contrasting attitudes and their relation to the context in which they surface. Its central research question is: Where and why do some non-religious Western European people develop anti-religious attitudes, whereas others are benevolent and tolerant towards religion? Each of the four empirical studies approach this question from a different angle, based on theories from the secularization debate. This is a very broad and complex debate. Therefore, before turning to this theoretical framework, I will first present a background section, which among other things, discusses this debate’s surprising lack of attention for non-religiosity and anti-religiosity. Following this background section and the theoretical framework, the research outline and research methodology are presented. 1.2 Background 1.2.1 Non-religiosity in Western Europe The presence of anti-religious attitudes among non-religious Western Europeans is quite surprising considering the supposed secularization of this region (Bruce 2011). Why would people worry about religion if their society has become secular? This anti-religious attitude begs for explanation. Yet, before turning to possible explanations for this attitude, I will pinpoint some general historical processes that give a picture of the religious landscape in Western Europe. This entails a discussion of Western Europe’s current situation and in part, the process of secularization that has led to this situation. However, what I will not do, is go in depth to discuss explanations for secularization proper3. That has been done elsewhere extensively (Bruce 2002, Dobbelaere 2002, Martin 1978, 2005, Stark and Finke 1999, Wilson 1986), and as far as relevance prompts, it will be done in the theoretical framework section. For now, I will outline how the place of the non-religious in Western Europe has changed through the years. For centuries, the Christian religion dominated Western Europe. The scarce empirical data from 1800 show that almost 100% of the Western European population was religiously affiliated4. Of course, this does not imply that these affiliates were deeply religious, went to church twice every Sunday and obeyed the church’s rules and regulations in all aspects of their lives. Nonetheless, these data do indicate 2 Introduction how in those days, the church had a central place in the religious, cultural and political domain. There might have been non-believers among the Western Europeans, but they would have wanted to be ‘under the radar’. Being Christian was the norm, also because it tied in with national identities and ideas about being a good citizen (Martin 2014a).