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ORSAM REPORT 26 January 2021 INVESTMENTS AS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS: THE CASES OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE UAE AND QATAR Ismail Numan Telci I GÖKHAN ERELİ Copyright Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2021 Content of this publication is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM. The views expressed in this publication reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM. Publication Date: 24 January 2021 Center for Middle Eastern Studies Adress : Mustafa Kemal Mah. 2128 Sk. No: 3 Çankaya, ANKARA Phone : +90 850 888 15 20 Email : [email protected] Photos : Anadolu Ajansı (AA), Shutterstock According to the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Regulation on Banderole Application Procedures and Principles, the use of banderole for this publication is not compulsory. REPORT 26 January 2021 INVESTMENTS AS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS: THE CASES OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE UAE AND QATAR About Authors Assoc. Prof. Ismail Numan Telci Ismail Numan Telci completed his BA from Istanbul University, MA in European Studies at Hochschule Bremen, Germany and PhD in International Relations at Sakarya University, Turkey. As part of his PhD field research he spent 10 months at Cairo University from October 2012 to August 2013. Currently, he works as an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations and lecturer at the Middle East Institute (ORMER) at Sakarya University. He is also Vice President and Gulf Studies Coordinator of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) in Ankara. His research focuses on Turkey-Qatar relations, Gulf politics, Egyptian politics and Arab revolutions. He is editor of Middle Eastern Studies, a peer-reviewed journal published by ORSAM. Telci is the author of three books, Dictionary of Egyptian Revolution (2014), Egypt: Revolution and Counter-Revolution (2017), Egyptian Foreign Policy Since the Revolution: From Search for Change to Quest for Legitimacy (2019). Gökhan Ereli Gökhan Ereli was born in Ankara in 1992. He graduated from the Kırıkkale University, International Relations department with the highest cumulative GPA in his graduating class. Upon graduating, he enrolled in the Middle East Technical University (METU) International Relations Master’s with thesis program in 2015. He earned his master’s degree with the thesis “The Impact of American Exceptionalism on U.S. Foreign Policy”. Currently, he continues his studies in the Middle East Technical University (METU), International Relations Ph.D. program. Also, he is working as a research assistant within the body of ORSAM, Gulf Studies. While his main area of interest is the Gulf region and American foreign policy, his special area of interest is the foreign policies of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. He speaks advanced English and simple Arabic. 1 CONTENTS 03 INTRODUCTION 03 INVESTMENTS AS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS 07 SPORTS 12 CULTURE 15 AIRLINES 19 PORTS 22 MEDIA 23 EDUCATION 26 REAL ESTATE 28 ENERGY 32 CONCLUSION 2 INTRODUCTION he Gulf countries differ from other Dhabi, Dubai, and Doha in a race over the dis- Middle Eastern countries with their tribution of economic resources among them- T high economic incomes and relatively selves. It must be said that the royal families low population. Despite their high who rule these cities and emirates and indi- economic incomes, there is no rich diversity viduals who have close relations with the royal ahead of the Gulf countries in terms of eco- families also struggle to get a share from this nomic resource diversity. For this reason, the race. issue of diversifying the economic resources of the Gulf countries is of critical importance. INVESTMENTS AS FOREIGN POLICY The development of tourism, the establishment INSTRUMENTS of various cities in the countries as financial Increasingly, the Gulf countries are coming centers, and free trade zones summarize the to the fore in world politics with their interna- strategies of diversifying the economic re- sources of the Gulf countries. In addition to tional investments. These countries have in- Riyadh, cities such as Doha, Abu Dhabi, and ternational investments in sports, culture, air- Dubai are said to have emerged as financial, lines, ports, media, networks, education, real commercial, and tourism centers in the last estate, and energy. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and decades. Not only are these cities an object Qatar, the countries with the largest investment of economic development, but also the rulers and development funds in the Middle East, and residents of these cities have a role in di- use these funds as generously as possible in versifying economic resources. In this context, the field of international investment. Undoubt- Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), edly, there are other sub-categories where in- and Qatar are leading economies in the Gulf ternational investments are made. However, region in terms of regional and international there is also a political dimension to the inter- competitiveness. Not only are Riyadh, Abu national investments of the Gulf countries in 3 REPORT 26 Investments as Foreign Policy Instruments: The Cases of Saudi Arabia, The UAE and Qatar January 2021 the areas mentioned above. Providing details policy of this country. The first of these is to of technical investment that does not include shape the policies of the Gulf countries towards a political dimension is likely to not give an global actors such as the US, Britain, Germany, idea about the foreign policy objectives of the France, Russia, and China or to have a guiding countries. effect on this. To be more precise, the Gulf countries aim to buy the foreign policy of While for many years the Gulf states spent those countries with the investments they their revenues from natural resources on their make in these countries. In that sense, the internal development, they also transformed UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al the revenues into international investments. Nahyan presides over a real estate empire in While it has been observed that these initiatives London, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed have increased in recent years, the basic mo- bin Salman purchases cutting-edge technology tivation of these investments has become an equipment and top-of-the-line luxury real increasingly discussed topic. Although their estate in Western countries. main objectives are expressed as “economic diversification,” it can be seen that the motivation The second dimension is “Inter-GCC rivalry.” behind the investments made by the Gulf By making international investments, the Gulf states at a global level, especially Western states aim to gain an advantage in competition countries, is mostly “foreign policy” centered. with each other. In other words, Gulf states are entering an investment race by using their It can be argued that the Gulf states’ instru- financial resources to stand out in their com- mentalization of international investments as petition with others. In this way and with this a foreign policy tool has three main dimensions. policy, Gulf states aim to portray themselves The first dimension can be formulated as as being in a more effective position than “buying foreign policy,” which means by in- other states, to gain prestige or to make them- vesting in a given state, the Gulf Cooperation selves stronger in that area by preventing Council (GCC) actors aim to shape the foreign other states’ investments in these areas. The Gulf royal family members, like Mohammad bin Salman, are also interested in French châteaux. 4 İsmail Numan Telci I Gökhan Ereli race among the national airlines of Abu Dhabi, Investments made in the field of culture Dubai, and Doha is a race over who gets the include the modernization moves of the Gulf most influence among the GCC states. countries and efforts to create a national identity. As a strategy to support, strengthen, The third dimension can be formulated as, and embellish the cities and emirates that “regional competition over influence.” Another have been seen as financial centers, the cultural aspect of the Gulf countries’ instrumentalization investments include museums, various historical of global investments in the context of foreign artifacts, and various projects. Cultural invest- policy is to hinder the countries they are com- ments are also compatible with the idea of re- peting with at the regional level. In the simplest vealing the past to shape the present idea of form, this situation occurs when a Gulf country the Gulf countries. signs an agreement in the field of ports man- agement through the use of unofficial con- One of the areas where economic incomes nections with the government of that country are transformed into material advantages is to hinder a regional rival who has an investment the air transport race. The Gulf airline compa- plan in the field of port management in any nies, which have cutting-edge technology country, pushing the rival countries out of the equipment and fleets for a short time, became process. The Horn of Africa region is a clear the leading companies in the field. The race example of regional rivalry being played by of the countries, which have become the lead- the GCC states. Examples of this situation that ing companies of international air transport, can be found under the headings of the study also triggered international investments. In this such as energy, port management, airlines, sense, with the motivation to have large fleets think tanks, and real estate, and these will be and wide destination networks, airline com- discussed comprehensively. panies have signed various agreements. Just like investments in sports, Riyadh can be said In the sports section, partial and holistic in- to lag behind Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Doha in vestments in football teams and companies this sense.