Joint Force Quarterly

Home , 9th Bomb Squadron, John Shalikashvili, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USS Rainier (AE-5), William Owens (admiral)

JFQ13C1 12/9/96 9:04 AM Page 1 JFQJOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT Ten Years Later

21st Century Military NBC Proliferation Knowledge-Based Warfare Decisive Force Autumn96

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL 0213C2 12/9/96 9:19 AM Page C2

service forces assigned to a joint force provide an array of combat power from which the joint force commander chooses — Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

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AWord from the Chairman

Today, we often take the post-Cold War successes of our Armed Forces for granted. From Haiti to Bosnia, to the Taiwan Strait, to Liberia, to the skies over Iraq, they have achieved great success at minimal cost in nearly fifty operations since Desert Storm. Quality people, superior organization, unity of command, and considerable skill in joint and combined operations have been central to that achievement. All these factors owe a great debt to the Gold- water-Nichols DOD Reorgani- zation Act of 1986, whose 10th anniversary is celebrated in this issue of JFQ.

Indeed, the effects of Goldwater-Nichols have been so imbedded in the military that many members of the Armed Forces no longer remember the organizational problems that brought about this law. As recently as the early 1980s, while we had begun to rebuild capabilities DOD (Paul Caron) the effects of Goldwater-Nichols and overcome the Visiting Aviano have been so imbedded that Vietnam syndrome, Air Base, Italy. numerous events re- many no longer remember the minded us that mili- organizational problems that tary organization had changed little since brought about this law World War II. Despite the skill and dedica- tion of our men and women in uniform as well as a significant per- centage of national resources, we often came up short. As late as the early 1980s, notwithstanding the Reagan-era defense buildup, the Armed Forces

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■ CONTENTS

1 A Word from the Chairman ■ JFQ FOURM by John M. Shalikashvili 9 The Goldwater-Nichols Act: Ten Years Later ■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET 7 Letters to the Editor 10 Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols by James R. Locher III

18 Defense Organization Today by John P. White

23 Past Organizational Problems THE by David C. Jones GOLDWATER-NICHOLS 29 The Chairman as Principal Military Adviser: ACT An Interview with Colin L. Powell

Ten Years Later 37 Overseeing Cross-Service Trade Offs by William A. Owens and James R. Blaker

41 Next Steps in Joint Force Integration by John J. Sheehan

PHOTO CREDITS 48 Warfighting CINCs in a

The cover features soldiers of 325th Airborne New Era Battalion Combat Team on patrol outside Tuzla by Joseph W. Prueher Air Base (U.S. Army/Larry Lane). The front inside cover photos demonstrate (clockwise, from top left) KC–135 refueling 53 Emergence of the Joint F–16Ds (U.S. Air Force/Mike Reinhardt), USS La Moure County at Guantanamo Bay Officer (U.S. Navy/Lou Caporaletti, Jr.), marines with by Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider raft fast-dropping (U.S. Marine Corps), and 1st Armor Division heading for Srebenica (U.S. Army/Larry Lane). 58 Prospects for the Military The table of contents photos above show Departments (clockwise, from top left) landing craft off Rota, Spain (U.S. Navy/Stephen H. Kless), M–1 tank by Michael B. Donley (U.S. Marine Corps), naval battle group under- way (U.S. Navy), and F–16s at Luke Air Force 63 Base (U.S. Air Force/Val Gempis). The photo on Future Trends in Defense the opposite page catches Senator Nunn accompanied by Secretary Perry troop- Organization ing the line at a review in his honor on July 12, 1996 (DOD/Helene Stikkel). The back inside cover captures FA–18s aboard USS Independence off Thailand by Sam Nunn during Cobra Gold ’95 (U.S. Air Force/ Don Green). The back cover depicts (clockwise, from top) C–130 (U.S. Air Force/ ■ with sidebar comments by Archie D. Barrett, Val Gempis), UH–60 Blackhawk (U.S. Army/Penny Parker), Marine light armored vehicles (U.S. Navy/Jeffrey S. Viano), and dock landing ship USS Ashland Carl E. Mundy, Paul F. Gorman, and (U.S. Navy). Edward C. Meyer

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AUTUMN 96 / NUMBER 13

■ 90 It’s Not About Mousetraps— 67 A Strategic Assessment for Measuring the Value of the 21st Century Knowledge for Operators by Hans Binnendijk by Frank B. Strickland, Jr.

69 21st Century Armed Forces— 97 Leadership: Some Thoughts Joint Vision 2010 on the Military Circa 2025 by Charles D. Link by David E. Price

74 The Impact of NBC ■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN Proliferation on Doctrine 100 Dwight David Eisenhower and Operations by Robert G. Joseph ■ THE JOINT WORLD 101 Exercises and Doctrine

■ OFF THE SHELF 104 National Culture and Warfare— Whither Decisive Force: A Review Essay by David J. Andre

109 To Wage a War of Words: A Book Review 81 Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Security Strategy for the by Carnes Lord Next Century 111 Middle Eastern Military by Lawrence E. Casper, Irving L. Halter, Dynamics: A Book Review Earl W. Powers, Paul J. Selva, by Patrick L. Clawson Thomas W. Steffens, and T. LaMar Willis

Joint Force Quarterly Hans Binnendijk Robert A. Silano Patrick M. Cronin Director Editor Acting Director for Strategy and Policy Analysis Institute for National Strategic Studies Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor-in-Chief James R. Locher III Consulting Editor Contributing Editor (Issue 13) Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley Production Coordinator William A. Rawley Copy Editor Typography and Design Division U.S. Government Printing Office JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 112 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- Art Director for details). Please direct all editorial communications to: fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated Editor, Joint Force Quarterly employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- Fort Lesley J. McNair unified commands, and joint force development. rial is quoted from or based on its contents. Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- This publication has been approved by the Secretary of pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Defense. Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint FAX: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and E-Mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine ISSN 1070–0692 October 1996

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Joint Force Quarterly ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA (continued from page 1) Publisher were occasionally inefficient, even ineffective, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE conducting joint operations. In 1980, despite considerable heroism, we Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF ■ National Defense University Chairman failed to rescue the American hostages in Iran. We aborted a troubled mission primarily due to equip- BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman ment failures, but planning and organization were VADM Dennis C. Blair, USN ■ The Joint Staff also problematical. In 1983 a successful rescue operation in Grenada exposed weaknesses in organiz- MG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA ■ U.S. Army War College ing and conducting joint operations on short-no- A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College tice. We encountered severe organizational Col K.A. Conry, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College challenges at the staff level, difficulty delivering routine fire support, and problems communicating MG John S. Cowings, USA ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces among units of different services. While the assault BG Robert F. Dees, USA ■ The Joint Staff met with only limited resistance, it resulted in 18

Col Jerry M. Drennan, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College Americans killed and over a hundred wounded. The 1982 report of the Chairman of the Joint BG Joseph R. Inge, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Chiefs of Staff Study Group on The Organization Col Paul V. Kelly, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College and Functions of the JCS documented what had become painfully obvious to operators: “The military Brig Gen William R. Looney III, USAF ■ Armed Forces Staff College organizations given the responsibility for the plan- RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN ■ National War College ning and execution of joint activities...simply

Maj Gen D. Bruce Smith, USAF ■ Air War College [did] not have the authority, stature, trained personnel, or support needed to carry out their jobs ■ RADM James R. Stark, USN Naval War College effectively.” A number of observers added that these organizational problems seemed to be an in- EDITORIAL BOARD tegral part of how we had gone to war throughout

Hans Binnendijk ■ National Defense University our history. Compounding these traditional prob- Chairman lems was the fact that we were entering an era of short-warning operations requiring higher levels of Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University organizational agility than we had. COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College On planning and programmatic issues, the

Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University Joint Chiefs from 1945 to 1985 were organized by law as a committee of equals and oriented toward COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy consensus decisionmaking. While stronger on cri- Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University sis decisionmaking, the chiefs possessed much less credibility when it came to decisions about Col Robert J. Garner, USMC ■ Armed Forces Staff College force structure or budgets. Many Chairmen and Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces Secretaries of Defense bemoaned the fact that,

Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF ■ Naval War College when it counted the most, the chiefs were often unable to render decisive advice on the most dif- ■ Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College ficult programmatic decisions. Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation These organizational problems were difficult to fix. For nearly forty years, twenty major studies William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College or commissions—including one backed by Presi- CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN ■ National War College dent Eisenhower—recommended changes in de- John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago fense organization to foster better planning and operational effectiveness. In 1982, General David LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute C. Jones, nearing the end of his tour as Chairman, Lt Col Robert C. Owen, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College added his name to the list of critics and reform ad-

James H. Toner ■ Air War College vocates. He pushed for changes that would strengthen the Chairman’s role in providing ad- LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University vice to the President and Secretary, create a Vice COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA ■ Marine Corps War College Chairman, and enhance the quality of officers assigned to Joint duty. General Edward C. Meyer, COL Terry J. Young, USA ■ U.S. Army War College the Army chief of staff, also argued publicly in the middle of his tour for more radical changes in the way military advice was given to the National A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

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Shalikashvili

Air Force search and rescue helicopter lifting off USS George Washington. U.S. Navy (Gregg Snaza)

Command Authorities, as well as for increased much of the pressure for a consensus in decision- powers for joint commanders in the field. making and allowed for more flexibility and deci- Also in 1982, the House and Senate began siveness. In a related provision, the Joint Staff be- hearings which after five years of work resulted in came the Chairman’s staff, and not the staff of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The forces against the corporate JCS. change were strong. Not Second, the act created the position of Vice only were there open Chairman, who by law was made the second Goldwater-Nichols clarified and persuasive advo- ranking officer in the Armed Forces. Later, he was the authority of the Chairman cates of the status quo, also made a full member of the Joint Chiefs in his but the effects of some own right. Establishing this position provided over strategic planning, changes were hard to continuity in joint leadership and afforded the readiness management, and predict and entailed Chairman greater flexibility. Moreover, the addi- considerable risk. Even tion of the Vice Chairman has improved the work joint doctrine the Joint Chiefs resisted of the Joint Staff in many critical areas. The Joint many of its provisions. Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and its In the end, however, associated bodies have greatly enhanced the im- President Reagan supported the bill and on Octo- pact of the military on budgetary and program- ber 1, 1986 it became law. matic issues. Indeed, as Bill Owens and Jim Blaker From the vantage point of the mid-1990s, have noted in this issue, JROC “represents the the act has brought about a number of changes first major revision of the planning, program- which together have had a revolutionary impact ming, and budgeting system...since Secretary on defense organization. Robert McNamara put it in place more than three First, it made the Chairman—as opposed to decades ago.” the corporate body of chiefs—the principal mili- Third, Goldwater-Nichols clarified the au- tary adviser to the Secretary of Defense, National thority of the Chairman over strategic planning, Security Council, and President. While the chiefs readiness management, and joint doctrine. It remained valued advisers, this provision removed charged him to assist the President and the Secre- tary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. It also made him the

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■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

point of contact and spokesman for CINCs and Yet it is not sufficient merely to praise the established—with the permission of the Secre- Goldwater-Nichols Act. The legislation pointed us tary—his oversight of them. These provisions of toward jointness, and we must continue on that the law enabled the Chairman and Joint Staff to journey. Some tasks are clear. For example, as Gen- be the focal point for “jointness”—the search for eral Sheehan indicates in his article, joint training common solutions to problems shared by all the and joint force integration are top priorities. We services and unified commands. Jointness aims to still have some forty doctrinal pubs in the works, make all the efforts of the Armed Forces greater and unified commands are far from having per- than the sum of their parts. fected joint exercises. Improving the joint univer- Fourth, Goldwater-Nichols enhanced the sal lessons learned process is also essential. powers of unified commanders over their service Moreover, as I stated in the last issue of JFQ, components and advanced their role in bud- the most important next step toward jointness getary and programmatic processes. Thus, better will be the implementation of Joint Vision 2010, unity of effort in Washington complemented im- the conceptual template for how the Armed proved teamwork in the field. Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of Finally, the law inaugurated the joint spe- our people and leverage technological opportuni- cialty officer program and increased the value of ties to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint joint assignments. The quality of officers assigned warfighting. To increase efficiency and effective- to joint duty increased overnight. Today, the best ness in an environment of declining resources personnel from all the services seek joint assign- and a demanding operating tempo, the services ments, which has become a prerequisite for pro- and unified commands have decided to move for- motion to general or flag officer. In addition, ward together to develop new operational capa- Goldwater-Nichols emphasized joint professional bilities that will enable us to dominate any adver- military education. Along with subsequent legis- sary along the spectrum of military operations. lation, it sparked numerous improvements in Goldwater-Nichols helped us to accomplish that both intermediate and senior service colleges, as task today, and we must carry its spirit into the well as in the National Defense University. 21st century. In all, changes brought about by Goldwater- Nichols have improved advice to the National JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI Command Authorities on military matters and Chairman helped to rationalize defense decisionmaking and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic planning. The payoff came in Panama and Kuwait, as credited by General Colin Powell in the interview found in this issue. As a result of the law, we have pioneered numerous planning documents, including a new national military strategy and more robust programmatic assessments and recommendations. Our interoperability has improved. Joint doctrine has been a major success story, with more than sixty authoritative pubs available to guide joint operations. CINCs and their components have improved the quality of joint training and exercises. Today we have a functioning joint readiness system, allowing us to monitor and manage the force’s capabilities for joint warfighting. Most importantly, as mentioned above, the law caused changes in Washington and the field that enabled us to achieve unparalleled operational successes. As Senator Sam Nunn observes in his article, we have made more operational progress in the last ten years “than in the entire period since the need for jointness was recognized by the creation of the Army-Navy Board in 1903.” Thus, because of Goldwater-Nichols the Armed Forces can better protect our national interests at minimal cost in lives and resources. And that is the central reason why this landmark legislation is being lauded in these pages.

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET ■

inaccurate account by William Krieg—based almost that had never been previously attempted by a JTF, Letters... solely on the work of two Ecuadorians, Julio Tobar except for experience gained during a “warfighter” and Jorge Pérez—is reproduced in Weidner’s sum- exercise. Those next 12 hours were most likely the ON THE BORDER mary of the historical background. Official joint toughest for the JTF commander and staff, and it To the Editor—Your piece by Glenn Weidner Peruvian-Ecuadorian and U.S. records dating from would be exciting to read how they were able to entitled “Operation Safe Border: The Ecuador-Peru 1942 to 1949 (released this year by Peru’s foreign plan, coordinate, and execute a nearly flawless Crisis” (JFQ, Spring 96) presented a sound assess- ministry) clarify the historical account. They show operation in minimal time. ment of the role played by the Military Observer that the Border Commission duly marked the —LTC Mark Lopshire, USA (Ret.) Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP). The author’s in- boundary along a watershed in the Cordillera del Nampa, Idaho sightful analysis reflects his able performance as Cóndor and was fully aware of the region’s geogra- the first commander of the mission’s U.S. contin- phy, as well as the often mentioned Cenepa River. MEDICAL SUPPORT gent. But the article also includes inaccuracies that This evidence suggests that the Ecuadorian —Having read “Medical Dimen- have been repeated for forty-five years and muddy government decided to suspend the demarcation To the Editor sions of Joint Humanitarian Relief Operations” by an already complicated dispute. Moreover, it dis- process despite the fact that Peruvian and Randolph and Cogdell (JFQ, Spring 96), I would like torts the current talks being conducted by the two Ecuadorian experts agreed in September 1948 to to offer a few comments. I was chief of the cus- parties and four guarantors of the 1942 Rio Proto- define the small stretch of the Cordillera del Cóndor tomer support branch at U.S. Army Medical Ma- col. The article also risks undermining the crucial which remains to date without boundary markers. teriel Center, Europe (USAMMCE), during Restore role which the United States has been playing in Weidner’s account of MOMEP during initial Hope in Somalia. The article’s authors are correct in the peace efforts. implementation of the 1995 Itamaraty peace decla- their description of medical logistics elements of The first major misconception is accepting rations deserves careful study. But by repeating the mission (something planners routinely underes- the claim that Peru invaded Ecuador in 1941 and historical inaccuracies, he has unwittingly con- timate). With a large medical supply inventory in forced a settlement under the Rio Protocol. It was tributed to the misconceptions that have hindered Europe, straddling the major transport route was the lack of mutually-accepted boundaries which previous efforts to find a solution to a dispute which invaluable to theater medical support. International triggered that conflict. At the time, both countries requires objectivity from all the parties concerned. maritime satellite (INMARSAT) messages for spe- only recognized the military possession of the dis- —H.E. Ricardo V. Luna puted area in place since 1936. Skirmishes flared cific supplies could be handled in minutes. Ambassador of Peru to the Having dedicated space for medical supplies up as the two sides increasingly ignored the de United States facto border. The resulting treaty—the Rio on scheduled flights from Germany simplified transport greatly. Even with just a pallet location re- Protocol—was not imposed by one party but rather LODGEMENT was brokered by the United States, Brazil, served, we could adjust the contents of delivery Argentina, and Chile. Those mediators, who be- To the Editor—After finishing Anthony Tata’s packages to cover the greatest needs, and theater came the Protocol guarantors, had to convince detailed and insightful article entitled “A Fight for medical staff could be guaranteed delivery times. each country to relinquish its maximum territorial Lodgement: Future Joint Contingency Operations” The initial Army medical logistics battalion claims. Peru and Ecuador accepted a proposal by (JFQ, Spring 96), I breathed a sigh of relief that the that deployed to Somalia did not know how to oper- the mediators to find an equitable solution by es- plan for a forced entry into Haiti did materialize, ate the theater Army medical materiel information tablishing the boundary based on the pre-1936 thanks to pressure placed on the local regime. At system (TAMMIS), nor were they versed in the status of territorial possession. Logically, hard-liners the same time I’d find it enlightening if a future basics of forward deployed medical supply man- on both sides were opposed to the settlement, but contributor to JFQ could cover the 24 hours of the agement. Two staff members of USAMMCE were moderate and realistic viewpoints prevailed and operation when the JTF commander and staff had rushed to Somalia and spent the month of January Peru and Ecuador approved and ratified the treaty. to quickly transition from an airborne forced entry 1993 getting TAMMIS on-line, setting up the The second major misconception is the claim scenario to using air assault forces in what was still warehouse, and establishing the INMARSAT that in 1946 an unknown geographic feature, the a hostile environment. communication link. upper Cenepa River, was discovered near the bor- The intelligence picture for Uphold Democ- INMARSAT is not cheap, but its speed and der. According to this inaccurate version, the al- racy would most likely have remained the same convenience far outweigh its cost. Using it for leged “geographic discovery”—made thanks to a except that it would have taken place in daylight, official business should not be limited by any U.S. aerial survey of the border—led Ecuador to in- which would have negated our night fighting capa- consideration except operation security. terrupt boundary demarcations along the Cordillera bility and the element of surprise and also en- —LCDR Jim Walters, USN del Cóndor. But in reality the three-year mapping hanced the opportunity for hostile forces to see Acting Director for Logistics effort painstakingly carried out by the U.S. Army Air their targets. Moreover the fire support, operations, National Naval Medical Center Force allowed Peru and Ecuador to jointly resume communications, and logistics annexes of the plan demarcation along the mountain range in 1947. probably were heavily modified and had to be re- Moreover, binational field teams of the Peru- briefed to widely dispersed JTF elements. Another Ecuador Border Commission had made accurate matter of concern may have been the lack of re- welcomes your letters surveys of the upper Cenepa River as far as its hearsals for an operation such as this. JFQ th headwaters in 1943. Except for the excellent training that the 10 and comments Such misconceptions reflect long-standing Mountain Division received at Fort Drum and the FAX your correspondence to use of secondary sources. Weidner specifically ac- Joint Readiness Training Center, and a few “old (202) 685–4219/DSN 325–4219 timers” who deployed to Somalia, the operation knowledges a 1986 study, “Ecuadorian-Peruvian or send it on the Internet to would suddenly have been an entirely new mission Rivalry in the Upper Amazon,” as his source. That [email protected]

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■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

PKO IMPERATIVES reach political accommodations which preclude the In order to postulate what will work in post- use of force. This is in fact a change of political ob- Cold War PKOs one must understand that the focus To the Editor—Two articles that appeared in JFQ (Autumn 95)—“Lessons Unlearned: Somalia jectives by both sides. of such operations is preventing conflict escalation and Joint Doctrine” by Kenneth Allard and “Military Americans have not adjusted to peacekeep- and/or humanitarian relief. These operations are Education for the New Age” by Ervin Rokke —em- ing or peace enforcement and other nontraditional more difficult than traditional PKOs and require new phasized a critical flaw in current operational plan- uses of military power. They are still looking for bad criteria, including answers to the following: guys. This is reflected in efforts to legislate restric- ning. The missing element is consideration of the ■ Do conditions exist for reaching peace? What relationship between political and military require- tions on PKO participation and the isolationist jabs can be done to create them? Do all sides want them? Are ments, especially in the types of operations that which critics take at the United Nations. In discern- nations participating in the PKO willing to expend re- characterize the post-Cold War world. What is the ing the possible, politicians and soldiers alike sources to achieve them? ■ Is a PKO appropriate? Has fighting subsided to cause of this breakdown and how can it be avoided should remember that the public must often be educated on the complexities of operations. Popular a point where all parties believe that the operation and in Bosnia and similar operations? Regrettably, the forces are sufficient? Or must an end to the fighting be professional military education (PME) system may support is critical. Without it, belligerents will realize that the Nation is unlikely to stay committed and imposed through peace enforcement? be the perpetuating and even compounding factor. ■ What is the political, military, or humanitarian thus they can simply wait us out. This is also the In National Security and International mission? How much force is necessary? Is there support problem with definitive statements about with- Stability, Bernard Brodie noted, “We need people for the operation at least within the governmental elite? drawal dates, which is directly related to the fact who will challenge, investigate, and dissect the pre- ■ Can infrastructure work be done early? Can that too many issues currently are brought before vailing dogmas” of foreign policy and strategic speed be achieved politically and militarily? the United Nations. Some believe that the world or- studies. He cautioned that “the most basic issues of Once a PKO is approved, whether it is a ganization offers an economy of force approach to strategy often do not lend themselves to scientific quick fix or an effort to eliminate the root causes of crises which is cheaper and easier. Thus, PKOs are analysis...because they are laden with value a problem, a clear set of achievable political objec- evolving into multidimensional operations that are judgments and therefore tend to escape any kind of tives must be developed—namely, a mandate. This usually part of a larger social or humanitarian prob- disciplined thought.” Clausewitz, said Brodie, should reflect the governing consensus of those lem, increasingly related to internal conflicts, and a warned us “to stress the superior importance of the with the political will to carry out the mandate result of the “CNN factor.” political side of strategy to the simply technical and while being flexible, not overly detailed, and written The notion that “if it bleeds it leads” in TV technological side,” words that seemed well suited so that it will not result in ambiguous ROE. Force news coverage—the CNN factor—results in the to the age of nuclear deterrence. size is mission-dependent and should be clearly United Nations, NATO, and other international orga- Brodie therefore makes two critical points: stated. In essence, a mandate is the political mis- nizations becoming involved in operations for which analysis the military seeks to perform is potentially sion statement and tasking order for the military. they are neither designed nor equipped. Military flawed because issues of strategy do not mix well Mission creep occurs if a mandate is changed in planning does not take this into account as yet. The with “military/scientific analysis”; and, the political word or deed. Debate over a mandate should pre- CNN factor influences decisionmakers, not just the component of strategy ought never be forgotten. sent its full intent, especially the limits of the pos- public. This results in pressure to do something— One should thus analyze linkages between sible as defined by public support. Soldiers trained anything—and the military option has become political concepts and military objectives in detail. in the skills implied by Brodie should be thoroughly more attractive since it is both available and highly For example, in Somalia the military ignored politi- involved in drafting mandates. Linkages should be visible. Politicians thereby can argue that they are cal objectives and focused on military aims. The re- explicit, and the military must understand that doing something without addressing the sources of sult was a decoupling of the two. A similar thing progress depends on achieving political, not nec- the problem, which are usually social and political. could happen in Bosnia, suggesting that the Armed essarily military, objectives. In this context what works is what participat- Forces must relearn a key lesson of Vietnam, the PKOs have political, military, and humanitar- ing states will support at a given point in time. In relationship between political and military objec- ian components. Humanitarian actions may be at the hurry to do something, however, the conditions tives. The political situation will more often than not variance with political and military efforts and make necessary for a peace operation to succeed are define the realm of the possible for the military. In them harder. They must be impartial, while military regularly ignored, which usually causes PKOs to short, the military element of power is never a pure and political actions are not. There is a need to fail. Common violations include: policy option. Recognizing the synergism among consider which component takes priority. Moreover, political, economic, and military components of ■ insufficient resources available—funding is domestic political considerations may be para- strategy will result in a more pragmatic and achiev- tough when countries like the United States are a billion mount to those of the country in question. dollars in arrears able national effort—one where elements of power The Armed Forces bring many capabilities to are synchronized. This is the endstate planning ■ consent of the parties does not always exist— the countries involved in an operation are not neutral with PKOs but are reluctant to participate in them. These should seek to achieve. respect to the original belligerents; or impartiality is not operations are seen as detractions from readiness What must be done to make highly political observed—peacekeepers back one side or the other and departures from traditional missions. But that post-Cold War missions successful? We must never ■ self-defense is not perceived by peacekeepers attitude and others discussed above must be forget the primacy of the political. The use of force to include defense of their mandate changed if the military is to be a useful partner in is a political act for political objectives. Normally ■ the mandate is not clear and achievable peace operations, and that change means trans- each side in a conflict in which force is threatened ■ rules of engagement (ROE) are not usually the forming PME. problem—rather it is available resources and political will or used wants the opponent to change political ob- —COL Bruce B.G. Clarke, USA (Ret.) of the Security Council to sustain the operation. jectives to accommodate its own. But this may not Tabuk, Saudi Arabia apply in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) since one seeks to create conditions that allow each side to

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THEGOLDWATER- NICHOLSACT Ten Years Later

Page 9—no folio Locher/Forum 12/9/96 9:30 AM Page 10

■ Taking Stock of GOLDWATER- NICHOLS By JAMES R. LOCHER III

“One of the landmark laws of American history” is how Congressman and later Secretary of Defense Les Aspin described the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Re- organization Act. Speaking as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in 1986, Aspin added, “[This law] is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Con- gress created the Continental Army in 1775.” Because he was known for col- orful, dramatic assertions, many saw this claim as political overstatement. The Pentagon, which did not favor the legislation, not only dismissed Aspin’s characterizations but held an opposite view. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and service leaders had resisted reorganization legislation throughout a bitter, five-year battle with Congress.

Despite DOD attitudes, Aspin and opportunity to judge whether the re- The House’s leading specialist on de- his colleagues on the two Armed Ser- sults have matched expectations. Com- fense reorganization remarked: “The vices Committees had high expecta- paring the performance of the defense overwhelming influence of the four tions for Goldwater-Nichols. Senators establishment over the last decade services...is completely out of pro- Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, lead- against objectives for the Goldwater- portion to their legally assigned and ers of defense reform, recognized that Nichols Act provides a useful yardstick limited formal responsibilities.” 1 implementation of massive changes in for assessing the law’s contributions. With its desire to create a more the largest bureaucracy in the Free appropriate balance between joint and World would take time. They predicted Objectives service interests as a backdrop, Con- that meaningful implementation of Congress expressed its intent in gress declared eight purposes for the many changes, especially cultural the act’s policy section. The overarch- act, the last having two parts: ones, would require five to ten years. ing concern focused on the excessive ■ to reorganize DOD and strengthen The act’s tenth anniversary presents an power and influence of the four ser- civilian authority vices, which had precluded the inte- ■ to improve the military advice pro- gration of their vided to the President, National Security The Honorable James R. Locher III was a professional staffer separate capabili- Council, and Secretary of Defense with the Senate Committee on Armed Services and served ties for effective as assistant secretary of defense for special operations and joint warfighting. low intensity conflict.

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issue. The 1947 law preserved considerable independence for the civilian heads of the military departments. Al- though subsequent amendments strengthened the Secretary’s power and staff, the act did not prescribe his relationship to service secretaries. Not surprisingly, the civilian heads of services devoted considerable energy to advo- cating service positions, often at the expense of the Secretary’s broader agenda. Numerous Goldwater-Nichols prescriptions addressed these problems. Three stand out. First, desiring to leave no doubt as to the authority of the Sec- retary, Congress stated in the report’s language, “The Secretary has sole and

DOD (R.D. Ward) ultimate power within the Department of Defense on any matter on which the Secretary ■ to place clear responsibility on the Joint Chiefs provided the Secretary chooses to act.” Capitol the commanders of the unified and spec- Hill designed this provi- ified combatant commands for the ac- with watered down advice sion to end claims by de- complishment of missions assigned to those commands fense officials to jurisdic- ■ to ensure that the authority of com- advice.” The Joint Chiefs logrolled on tions that were independent of the manders of unified and specified combatant issues of concern to one or more ser- Secretary’s authority. commands is fully commensurate with the vices and provided the Secretary with Second, in designating the Chair- responsibility of those commanders for the watered down advice. This forced the man as the principal military adviser, accomplishment of missions assigned to Office of the Secretary of Defense to Congress envisioned him becoming an those commands carry the full burden of challenging ally of the Secretary with a common de- ■ to increase attention to strategy for- the services, individually and collec- partment-wide, nonparochial perspec- mulation and contingency planning tively, on policies and programs. De- tive. This change sought to provide the ■ to provide for the more efficient use Secretary with independent military of defense resources fense Organization assessed the negative ■ to improve joint officer manage- outcome: advice and also end the civil-military ment policies The natural consequence has been a nature of past Pentagon disputes. ■ otherwise to enhance the effective- heightening of civil-military disagreement, Third, the law specified the re- ness of military operations and improve an isolation of OSD, a loss of information sponsibilities of the service secretaries DOD management and administration. critical to effective decisionmaking, and, vis-à-vis the Secretary of Defense. In most importantly, a political weakening of prescribing relationships among the Civilian Authority the Secretary of Defense and his OSD staff. most senior civilian officials, Congress In its mid-1980s examination of The overall result of interservice logrolling filled a void that had existed for nearly defense organization, Congress found has been a highly undesirable lessening of forty years. numerous obstacles precluding exer- civilian control of the military.3 Civilian authority has been cise of effective civilian authority, par- strengthened. Goldwater-Nichols has Confusion concerning the roles of ticularly by the Secretary of Defense. empowered the Secretary to effectively the service secretaries ranked next on Many members of Congress agreed lead and manage DOD. Former Secre- the congressional list of problems with a former defense official’s summa- tary Dick Cheney found that the act hampering the authority of the Secre- tion of the Secretary’s position: “His “significantly improved the way the tary of Defense. In creating the posi- real authority is not as great as it place functions.” Of continuing service tion of Secretary of Defense, the Na- seems, and his vast responsibilities are arguments against the act, Cheney tional Security Act of 1947 never not in reality matched by commensu- commented in an interview which ap- specified the relationship of the new rate powers.” 2 peared in Proceedings in May 1996: office to the service secretaries. The bit- In a congressional report entitled ter postwar controversy over military I know each service wants to do its own Defense Organization published in 1985, unification precluded settling this thing, with its own authority. The fact is the Secretary’s efforts were seen as “se- that [DOD] is difficult enough to run riously hampered by the absence of a without going back to a system that, in source of truly independent military my mind, served to weaken the civilian

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authority of the Secretary and the Presi- former Chairman, Colin Powell, advice concluded that the act “has dent in terms of their ability to interact pointed out in his recent memoir, My made a significant and positive contri- with and use that organization. I think American Journey: bution in improving the quality of 6 Goldwater-Nichols helped pull it together Almost the only way the chiefs would military advice.” Cheney found that 4 in a coherent fashion. . . . agree on their advice was by scratching having the Chairman as principal mili- Some critics claim that the Chair- each other’s back. Consequently, the six- tary adviser “was a significant im- man’s more influential role undermines teen-hundred-member Joint Staff that provement” over the “lowest common civilian authority. Two groups have worked for the JCS spent thousands of denominator of whatever the chiefs made this argument: those who are man-hours pumping out ponderous, least- collectively could agree upon.” Higher genuinely concerned about the health common-denominator documents that civilian authority has not accepted lin- of civil-military relations and those every chief would accept but few Secre- gering criticism from the services that who would like to regain a greater de- taries of Defense or Presidents found their views are now under represented, gree of service influence. Both groups useful....In my judgment, this amor- especially in operational matters. are off the mark. Although Goldwater- phous setup explained in part why the Clear Responsibility Nichols increased the role of the Chair- Joint Chiefs had never spoken out with a man, it carefully ensured that the Sec- clear voice to prevent the deepening morass Congress found the operational retary could use his vast powers to in Vietnam. chains of command to be both con- control the Nation’s top officer. One fused and cumbersome. The roles of In answer to the problem of inad- the Secretary and Joint Chiefs in the analysis of this controversy concluded, equate military advice, Congress “No evidence exists to suggest that chain were uncertain. Despite the re- crafted some of the most far-reaching moval of the military departments civilian control of the military, prop- provisions of Goldwater-Nichols. The erly understood, has atrophied. The act made the Chairman the principal the act prescribed the chain President and Congress determine pol- military adviser, transferred duties to icy, from force structure and acquisi- him previously performed by the cor- of command as running tion to the use of military force.” 5 porate Joint Chiefs, and assigned new from the President to the Military Advice duties. To assist him, Congress created the position of Vice Chairman as the Secretary to the CINC In 1982 the Chairman, General second-ranking military officer. Last, David Jones, testified that, “the corpo- Congress gave the Chairman full au- from the chain of command in 1958, rate advice provided by the Joint thority over the Joint Staff. Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very the chiefs retained de facto influence The quality of military advice has over combatant commands, adding to useful, or very influential.” Recalling greatly improved according to its prin- the pre-Goldwater-Nichols era, another the confusion. cipal recipients. The most comprehen- To achieve its objective of placing sive assessment of post-1986 military clear responsibility on CINCs, Capitol Hill clarified the chain to each commander and emphasized that all were responsible to the President and Secre- Reviewing final plans tary for the performance of assigned for Haiti invasion, missions. The act prescribed the chain September 1994. of command as running from the Pres- ident to the Secretary to the CINC. The Joint Chiefs, including the Chairman, were explicitly removed. Opinion is universal that this objective of Goldwater-Nichols has been achieved. Senior officials and officers repeatedly cite the benefits of a clear, short operational chain of command. Reflecting on the Gulf War, General Norman Schwarzkopf said, “Goldwa- ter-Nichols established very, very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more effective fighting force.” As Secretary of Defense William Perry later said to the Senate Committee on the Armed DOD (R.D. Ward)

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Services, “All commentaries and after- action reports on [Desert Shield/Desert Empowering Eisenhower’s Concept Storm] attribute the success of the operation to the fundamental structural n 1982, a Marine witness warned the Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Armed Services changes in the chain of command Committee that acceptance of measures under consideration to reorganize the Joint Chiefs would be brought about by Goldwater-Nichols.” Itantamount to creating a “general staff system.” The most far-reaching proposal which was then being contemplated would have made the Chairman an adviser in his own right instead of merely a spokesman for the chiefs. The hearings and legislative proceedings that eventually led to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Commensurate Authority Act continued for four more years. During that time, Congress rejected all proposals to create a general staff. Congress found the combatant But with enactment of the law, it decisively rejected the existing DOD structure. What organizing concept did commands to be weak and unified in Congress embrace? name only. They were loose confedera- tions of powerful service components. De Jure Organization The services used Unified Action Armed While the answer was not explicitly stated in hearings, reports, or debate, Congress harked back to Forces to strictly limit the authority of the concept proposed under the Eisenhower administration in 1958 to guide reorganization. The National Se- CINCs and give significant autonomy curity Act of 1947 resulted in what President Eisenhower described as “little more than a weak confedera- to service component commanders. tion of sovereign military units.” The amendments of 1949, 1953, and 1958 sought to overcome unworkable arrangements. As part of the 1958 amendments, the President proposed and Congress approved the bifurca- This situation had prevailed through- tion of DOD into administrative and operational chains of command. A review of the act as amended in 1958 out the postwar period as evidenced by reveals that both the President and Congress shared a concept of just how they intended to organize the de- a Blue Ribbon Defense Board report in fense establishment. 1970 that found unification of “either Congress created DOD to replace the originally loose-knit National Defense Establishment. By 1958 command or the forces is more cos- the Secretary of Defense had metamorphosed in law from a weak general overseer to the most powerful of- metic than substantive.” ficial with “authority, direction, and control” over all DOD. Below him, the law created two chains of authority, To correct this violation of com- one to military departments and another to joint elements. Military departments were to prepare forces for mand principles, Congress specified the combat—organize, train, and equip—and provide logistic, administrative, and other support. They were thus command authority of CINCs. The charged with “maintaining” the Armed Forces. Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed the The law made the joint side responsible for employing the forces provided by the military departments. The Joint Chiefs, assisted by the Joint Staff, would provide advice to the President, Secretary, and Na- command functions of giving authori- tional Security Council as well as conduct military planning and related activities. tative direction, prescribing the chain of CINCs, who headed unified and specified commands consisting of combat forces provided by the ser- command, organizing commands and vices, were made responsible for military missions assigned by the President—winning the Nation’s wars forces, employing forces, assigning and coping with lesser contingencies. At those echelons below the CINCs were “employing” and “maintain- command functions to subordinate ing” chains of authority that split under the Secretary but were rejoined. commanders, coordinating and approv- ing aspects of administration and sup- De Facto Organization port, selecting and suspending subordi- This description of the post-1958 de jure organizational model shows that it is remarkably similar to nates, and convening courts-martial. that found in law today. If Congress was satisfied with the legislative model of DOD it established by 1958, In prescribing the authority of why was the Goldwater-Nichols Act needed? The answer is that what exists in law does not necessarily exist CINCs, Congress modeled the law on in fact. Prior to 1986—despite the de jure model—DOD was dominated by the services, which had been tra- the authority which the military had ditionally responsible for planning and warfighting as well as preparing our forces for war. The services were traditionally given to unit comman- unwilling to relinquish operational functions to a joint system. They continued to dominate both the main- ders. Initial service claims that the leg- taining and employing sides of DOD. The services exercised vetoes over JCS advice and controlled the weak islation would make combatant com- unified commands. As a consequence, joint institutions failed to become strong and effective. manders into warlords quickly vanished as the soundness of balanc- Making de Facto de Jure ing authority and responsibility at With Goldwater-Nichols, Congress again tried to realize the legislative model that emerged in 1958. CINC level—in line with military tradi- Though some titles of the act modified the military departments and defense agencies, the most fundamen- tion—became apparent. It is now tal provisions were designed to strengthen joint positions and organizations. The act designated the Chair- widely agreed that Goldwater-Nichols man as the principal military adviser, established a Vice Chairman, created a joint personnel system, and has achieved its objective of balancing empowered CINCs. It attempted to make de jure and de facto more nearly one and the same. Because Goldwater-Nichols emphasized joint institutions, one could regard jointness as the animating the authority and responsibility of the characteristic of defense organization. That would be a mistake. If jointness were the basic organizing prin- combatant commanders. The effective ciple, a general staff with a single chain of authority might be the concept for DOD. Congress focused on joint performance of these commands in institutions to achieve a counterpoise to the services suggested in the legislative model. The balance be- operations and peacetime activities tween maintaining and employing—input and output—serves as an organizing principle. Eisenhower con- provides convincing evidence in sup- ceptualized, and the law had anticipated, this balance in 1958. Twenty-eight years later, the Goldwater- port of this judgment. Nichols Act made it possible. A minority view urges increased authority for the combatant commanders —Archie D. Barrett Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the through a greater role in resource alloca- Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs tion. Not wanting to overly divert these

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commands from their principal warfight- timely, thoughtful strategic response to Despite that critical contribution, ing function, Congress intended that the the end of the Cold War. Chairmen have seldom provided defin- Chairman and Joint Staff would be ac- Progress on contingency planning itive resource advice to Secretaries of tivists on behalf of the commands’ re- was modest until recently. OSD has Defense. Recent developments could source needs. This approach still appears been inconsistent in performing its re- alter this. Admiral William Owens, preferable to any scheme that would responsibility to prepare contingency while serving as Vice Chairman, insti- quire greater involvement by the com- planning guidance. The continuing re- tuted a number of innovative changes batant commands. luctance of the Joint Staff to reveal to improve the support by the Joint contingency plans—both deliberate Requirements Oversight Council Strategy Making and Planning and crisis—to civilian officials has (JROC) to the Chairman’s formulation The two Armed Services Commit- blocked appropriate collaboration. Al- of resource advice. Creating joint tees determined that planning in DOD though DOD has surmounted these warfighting capability assessments rep- was underemphasized and ineffective. problems lately, the required interac- resents a dramatic advancement in an- Such planning was often fiscally un- tion between policy and operational alyzing service programs against mis- constrained, and strategy and resources planners is not yet assured. sion requirements. were weakly linked. Contingency plans Unfortunately, the JROC process had limited utility in crises, often be- Resource Use could be misused. If instead of inform- cause they were not based on valid po- Testimony before Congress re- ing the independent advice of the litical assumptions. vealed that vague and ambiguous DOD Chairman JROC were used to prenego- To increase attention to strategy objectives permitted service interests tiate issues in the old logrolling fash- making and contingency planning, rather than strategic needs to play the ion, the military would come full circle dominant role in to the wasteful, pre-Goldwater-Nichols to achieve more efficient use of defense shaping resource days. Such an approach also raises the decisions. The Sec- possibility of the services locking arms resources, Congress looked to the Chairman retary’s resource on significant resource issues to politi- management was cally overpower the Secretary and Con- Congress formulated four principal also weakened by the lack of an inde- gress. If the Chairman permits these ac- provisions. First, it required the Presi- pendent military assessment of service tivities and surrenders his independent dent to submit an annual report on programs and budgets. perspective, he will abandon the inten- the national security strategy. Second, To achieve its objective of provid- tions of Goldwater-Nichols. As use of it instructed the Chairman to prepare ing for more efficient use of defense re- JROC in improving resource advice ad- fiscally constrained strategic plans. sources, Congress looked to the Chair- vances, the Secretary must guard Turning to contingency planning, man for an independent military against such unfavorable practices. Goldwater-Nichols required the Secre- perspective that had been lacking. tary to give written policy guidance for Capitol Hill formulated six new re- Joint Officer Management the preparation and review of contin- source-related duties for him. Two of The 1985 report on Defense Orga- gency plans. This guidance would pro- the most important were advising the nization concluded that, “military offi- vide the political assumptions for plan- Secretary on priorities for combatant cers do not want to be assigned to ning. The fourth provision prescribed a command requirements and on how joint duty; are pressured or monitored role for the Under Secretary of Defense well the programs and budgets of the for loyalty by their services while serv- for Policy in assisting the Secretary in military departments and other DOD ing on joint assignments; are not pre- his work on contingency plans. Con- components conformed with strategic pared by either education or experi- gress intended this last prescription to plans and CINC priorities. The Chair- ence to perform their joint duties; and overcome the jealous guarding of con- man was also empowered to submit al- serve for only a relatively short period tingency planning by the Joint Chiefs ternative program and budget recom- once they have learned their jobs.” which had precluded sufficient staff mendations to the Secretary. Viewing the Joint Staff and headquar- support for meaningful review and di- Implementation has not achieved ters staffs of unified commands as the rection by the Secretary. the potential of the Goldwater-Nichols most important military staffs within The Goldwater-Nichols Act has in- reforms with the exception of General DOD, Capitol Hill found this situation creased attention to both strategy mak- Powell’s effective use of his resource to be intolerable. ing and contingency planning. The advisory role in formulating the Base Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols es- quality of strategy documents has var- Force. Reducing the Cold War force tablished procedures for selection, edu- ied, but in every case their value has structure by 25 percent represented the cation, assignment, and promotion of been superior to their pre-Goldwater- most significant and difficult resource joint duty officers. Congress and DOD Nichols predecessors. The new national issue faced by the Pentagon over the fought the last Goldwater-Nichols bat- military strategy, which envisioned last decade. tles over these provisions. The services fighting two major regional conflicts resisted a joint officer personnel system nearly simultaneously, provided a since they knew that loss of absolute

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control of officer promotions and assignments would weaken their domina- tion of the Pentagon. Congress was equally determined since it had concluded in Defense Organization, “The current system results in incentives to protect service interests rather than to think in joint terms. Joint thinkers are likely to be punished, and service pro- moters are likely to be rewarded.” The joint officer incentives, requirements, and standards prescribed by the act have notably improved the performance of those selected to serve in Advancing on Iraqi joint duty assignments. Secretary Che- position during Desert Storm. ney judged in his recent interview in

Proceedings that the requirement for U.S. Army (Joel M. Torres) joint duty “prior to moving into senior leadership positions turned out to be beneficial.” He also felt that as a result of Not surprisingly, Joint Staff imple- CINCs with sufficient authority to joint officer policies “the Joint Staff is an mentation of title IV was sympathetic both ensure unity of command during absolutely vital part of the operation.” to attitudes of the services for many operations and effectively prepare for General Schwarzkopf found the years. assigned missions. The act also as- same result in his command. Of his Congress had hoped that the designed the Chairman responsibility for subordinates during the Gulf War, he partment, after several years of imple- developing joint doctrine and joint told the Senate Committee on Armed menting title IV, would conceptualize a training policies. Services, “the quality of the people better approach to joint officer man- The overwhelming success of Just that were assigned to Central Com- agement. That has not occurred. The Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm mand at all levels changed dramati- Goldwater-Nichols objective of im- revealed the extent to which the act cally as a result of Goldwater-Nichols.” proving joint officer management has had unified the Armed Forces. Shortly These positive results were been achieved, but DOD still lacks a vi- after the Gulf War, an article in Forbes achieved despite indifferent implemen- sion of its needs for joint officers and noted, “The extraordinarily efficient, tation of the joint officer provisions by how to prepare and reward them. smooth way our military has functioned in the Gulf is a tribute to [Gold- OSD and the Joint Staff. The failure Operational Effectiveness over the last decade to develop a DOD water-Nichols], which shifted power directive to govern the joint officer For forty years after World War II, from individual military services to of- management program confirms a lack service separateness denied the defense ficials responsible for coordinating 9 of commitment on the part of top civil- establishment the unity to conduct them.” The Washington Monthly ian and military organizations. The ser- joint warfare. In 1983 Secretary James added, “Goldwater-Nichols helped en- vices were not indifferent. They made Schlesinger described the problem: sure that this war had less interservice vigorous efforts to minimize the impact In all of our military institutions, the infighting, less deadly bureaucracy, of the legislation on their interests. Se- time-honored principle of “unity of com- fewer needless casualties, and more nior joint officers—the beneficiaries of mand” is inculcated. Yet at the national military cohesion than any major op- 10 improved joint staffs—took little inter- level it is firmly resisted and flagrantly vi- eration in decades.” est in the issue. The Chairman when olated. Unity of command is endorsed if Commenting on the impact of Goldwater-Nichols was enacted, Admi- and only if it applies at the service level. Goldwater-Nichols over the past ten ral William Crowe, later wrote of his The inevitable consequence is both the du- years, Secretary Perry said in a speech unfavorable view of title IV: plication of effort and the ultimate ambi- last summer honoring Senator Sam guity of command.8 Nunn, “It dramatically changed the . . . the detailed legislation that mandated way that America’s forces operate by every aspect of the “joint corps” from the As was pointed out in Defense Or- streamlining the command process selection process and the number of billets ganization, “operational deficiencies and empowering [the Chairman] and to promotional requirements was, I be- evident during the Vietnam War, the the unified commanders. These lieve, a serious mistake that threatened a seizure of the Pueblo, the Iranian changes paid off in...Desert Storm, in horrendous case of congressional micro- hostage rescue mission, and the incur- Haiti, and today in Bosnia.” management. In this instance the chiefs sion into Grenada were the result of Joint doctrine and training have were unanimous in their opposition, and I the failure to adequately implement experienced more modest progress. Of agreed with them wholeheartedly.7 the concept of unified command.” Congress focused efforts on providing

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the first generation of joint doctrine, and flag officer positions, and cut NOTES the Commission on Roles and Missions some other staffs by 10 to 15 percent. of the Armed Forces critically declared Goldwater-Nichols remedies for 1 Archie D. Barrett, Reappraising Defense in its 1995 report, Directions for Defense, these management problems were Organization (Washington: National Defense “In many cases, it represents a com- largely ineffective. The defense bureau- University Press, 1983), p. xix. 2 John G. Kester, “The Office of the Secre- pendium of competing and sometimes cracy remains far too large. Duplication tary of Defense with a Strengthened Joint incompatible concepts (often developed of effort is still a problem. DOD also lacks Staff System,” in Toward A More Effective De- by one ‘lead’ service).” The designation a concept for the appropriate division of fense, edited by Barry M. Blechman and of U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) as work among its major components. William J. Lynn (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1985), joint force integrator, trainer, and pro- p. 187. vider has great potential for enhancing In the broad sweep of American 3 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on military operations. To date, parochial military history, the recent years have Armed Services, Defense Organization: The attitudes of the services and some geo- been remarkable for the frequency and Need for Change, committee print, Senate re- th st scope of significant achieve- port 99–86, 99 Cong., 1 sess., 1985, p. 620. 4 ments and successes by the “About Fighting and Winning Wars— parochial attitudes of the services An Interview with Dick Cheney,” U.S. Naval Department of Defense. Su- and some geographic CINCs have Institute Proceedings, vol. 122, no. 5 (May perb leadership played an im- 1996), p. 33. hamstrung ACOM performance portant role as did the devel- 5 Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Civilian opment of doctrine, training, Control: A National Crisis?” Joint Force Quar- education, and materiel that terly, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994–95), p. 83. graphic CINCs and weak support by the preceded the passage of the Goldwater- 6 Christopher Allan Yuknis, “The Gold- Joint Staff have hamstrung ACOM per- Nichols Act. Nevertheless, a significant water-Nichols Act of 1986—An Interim As- formance. body of evidence and numerous public sessment,” in Essays on Strategy X, edited by assertions by senior defense officials Mary A. Sommerville (Washington: National Management and and military officers argue that the act Defense University Press, 1993), p. 97. 7 William J. Crowe, Jr., The Line of Fire Administration enormously contributed to the positive (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 158. Many of the provisions of Gold- outcomes of recent years. 8 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on water-Nichols focused on improving During the last decade, Goldwater- Armed Services, Organization, Structure and DOD management and administra- Nichols attained most of the objectives Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department tion. But in adding this objective Con- established for it, helping to transform of Defense, hearings before the Committee gress had in mind specific structural and revitalize the military profession in on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 1st sess., problems that were hindering sound the process. The act validated former Sec- 1983–1984, part 5, p. 187. 9 management. These included excessive retary Schlesinger’s prediction that, Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., “Fact and Com- spans of control, unnecessary staff lay- “Sound structure will permit the release ment,” Forbes, vol. 147, no. 6 (March 18, 1991), pp. 23–24. ers and duplication of effort, contin- of energies and of imagination now un- 10 Katherine Boo, “How Congress Won the duly constrained by the existing arrange- ued growth in headquarters staffs, poor War in the Gulf,” The Washington Monthly, supervision of defense agencies, and ments.” In some areas, developments in- vol. 23, no. 10 (October 1991), p. 31. an uncertain division of work among spired by the act are still evolving and defense components. adding more luster to the law’s accom- The Secretary’s span of control es- plishments. In a few others, the accom- pecially concerned Congress. Forty-one plishments still leave much to be done. senior officials and officers, excluding Secretary Perry used an historic his deputy and staff, reported directly yardstick in praising the law: “. . . [Gold- to him. To reduce this span, the act re- water-Nichols] is perhaps the most im- quired the Secretary to delegate super- portant defense legislation since World vision of each defense agency and field War II.” And, while serving as Vice activity to an OSD official or the Chair- Chairman, Admiral Owens saw the leg- man. The Chairman’s role as overseer islation in even larger terms: “Goldwa- of the unified commands also helped ter-Nichols was the watershed event for to lessen the Secretary’s supervisory the military since [World War II].” burdens. Those assessments by Perry and Owens Other provisions consolidated cer- do not reach back as far as Congressman tain functions in service secretariats, Aspin’s; but it is clear that, in accord limited the number of both deputy with congressional expectations, the chiefs and assistant chiefs on the ser- Goldwater-Nichols Act has profoundly vice staffs, reduced by 15 percent the enhanced the joint warfighting capabil- size of the headquarters staffs of mili- ities of the Armed Forces. JFQ tary departments including general

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This may be the last piece of legislation that I will have the honor to offer for consideration by the Senate. If it is, I will have no regrets. I will have had the privilege of serving in the Senate on...the Barry M. Goldwater represented Arizona in the Senate for 30 years. A major general in the day that our soldiers, sailors, U.S. Air Force Reserve, he was the Republican airmen, and marines were given the Presidential candidate in 1964 and served as chairman of the Senate Armed organizational and command Services Committee during the arrangements that will enable them debates on defense reorganization. to effectively accomplish their vital missions.... —Barry M. Goldwater September 16, 1986

[This bill] fulfills the aims of President Eisenhower, who said almost three decades ago, “Separate ground, sea, and air Bill Nichols, a Democrat from Alabama’s 3rd district, died while warfare are gone forever.... serving his eleventh term in Strategic and tactical planning Congress. A combat veteran of World War II, he chaired the Investigations Subcommittee of must be completely unified, combat the House Armed Services Committee during its 1983–86 work on military reform. forces organized into unified commands. . . .” Congress rejected President Eisenhower’s appeals in the 1950s. Today, 36 years later, we can now report: mission accomplished. —Bill Nichols September 11, 1986

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■ Defense Organization TODAY By JOHN P. WHITE

The Secretary, President, and Chairman meeting at the Pentagon. ince the National Security Act of 1947 unified the defense establishment, Secretaries of De- S fense have struggled to assign roles, missions, and functions among major DOD components, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military services, and unified commands. Once responsibilities were actually assigned, securing performance of them—especially as various components exerted undue influence—proved an even greater challenge. Successive Secretaries found that they lacked authority to force compli- ance. Other senior leaders—such as the Chairman and CINCs—also lacked means to carry out their responsibilities. Weaknesses in central civilian as well as military authority together with ambiguities in the original law promoted in- DOD (R.D. Ward) terservice competition in both military operations and resource allocation. The Goldwater-Nichols Act ad- contributions of the services and uni- Secretary, assigned the Joint Staff to dressed these issues by more clearly fied commands. That distinction pro- him, and made clear that the chain of defining responsibilities and providing vided a sound basis for effective and command ran from the President authority to perform them. Empow- efficient operations by assigning the through the Secretary to the CINCs. ered by Goldwater-Nichols reforms, specific responsibilities for organizing, Before the act the services domi- DOD has made great strides in prepar- training, and equipping forces to the nated DOD activities. Continuing ser- ing for joint operations and managing services, while delegating the planning vice negotiations over their roles heav- defense resources. and execution of those operations to ily influenced planning and operational unified commands. The sharp division decisions as well as resource allocation. Operational Responsibilities of responsibilities among services, uni- The perspective of the Chairman and Among its major accomplish- fied commands, and other DOD com- the ideas, needs, and plans of the CINCs ments, the Goldwater-Nichols Act dis- ponents eliminated much of the previ- did not sufficiently inform major opera- tinguished between the operational ous ambiguity. tional and resource decisions. Additionally, Goldwater-Nichols Further, forceful exercise of insti- equipped the Chairman with a defini- tutional service roles—based on their The Honorable John P. White is Deputy tive role in relation to the service individual areas of responsibility, such Secretary of Defense and previously chiefs and CINCs, made him principal as unchallenged Navy leadership in chaired the Commission on Roles and military adviser to the President and Missions of the Armed Forces.

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Nichols, was thus to orient the services Self-propelled howitzer, toward those roles which grow out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. their institutional strengths, supporting joint operations today while assuring the availability of effective forces for the future. We have come far in this regard over the last ten years. Strengthening the authority of CINCs to conduct joint operations and clarifying service roles have led to an even greater use of service capabilities. In a recent speech to an Air Force doctrine seminar at Maxwell Air Force Base, General Ronald Fogleman summarized, “We want each service to organize, train, and equip forces that are dominant in their medium. We strive to make our forces interoperable so that the joint force

Signal Company (Glenn W. Suggs)Signal Company (Glenn W. commander can combine them...for th

55 maximum effect.” The specific contributions of the services exploit their expertise. For example, they have princi- maritime operations—diluted CINC The conventional view assumes pal responsibility for research, plans for theater-wide joint operations that the act tipped the scales in favor of development, test, and evaluation of which used their service components. jointness over service interests. Some weapon systems for their individual Consequently, truly joint operations believe that it somehow devalued ser- mediums, as well as for developing and seldom materialized. In addition, vice contributions to combat capability articulating innovative concepts for CINCs were unable to influence service and too severely restricted their roles. their employment. The services under- plans in the case of modernization or This argument persists in viewing DOD stand this responsibility, which in the force development—though they were functions through the prism of interser- case of the Air Force was characterized expected to fight and win with the vice and service-CINC competition. by General Fogleman as follows: “We forces provided by the services. In fact, however, the law defined owe it to the taxpayers to push the en- and enhanced the value of the velope of air and space employment to services by focusing them the conventional view assumes that seek warfighting advantages that save on core competencies which lives and resources. We are the Nation’s the act tipped the scales in favor involve delivering combat ca- premier advocates for extracting every of jointness over service interests pability to CINCs. Only the ounce of advantage from operating in services can execute such the mediums of air and space.” functions. By emphasizing The performance of all the ser- By ensuring that CINCs had the core competencies, Goldwater-Nichols vices in this area is undeniable. Tech- authority to prepare for and conduct strengthened the capability of each ser- nological advances have afforded us military operations, Goldwater-Nichols vice to support CINCs in their war- the best military systems. The services fundamentally changed the way in fighting role. engage in intramural competition in which DOD functioned. The law in- Service Responsibilities meeting this responsibility; but compe- creased the authority of CINCs over tition can be healthy in looking for al- planning, developing, training, and de- The services remain the bedrock ternative technological solutions. As ploying forces for operations. At the of military capabilities. Their unique the Commission on Roles and Mis- same time, the Chairman—supported competencies enable joint warfighting. sions of the Armed Forces (CORM) by the Joint Staff—assumed greater Differing perspectives—framed by ex- concluded in its report, “Service com- prominence as the channel of CINC in- pertise in certain technologies and petition has delivered innovative sys- fluence over these activities. With the ways of warfare—are essential to opera- tems and technologies. The key is to Chairman reporting to the Secretary tional success. The services organize, manage such competition to assure and directing an effective staff (en- train, and equip forces with special ca- that it is not wasteful.” hanced qualitatively by the Goldwater- pabilities and supply them to CINCs. More broadly, service pride, tradi- Nichols requirements for joint duty as a The challenge, answered by Goldwater- tion, competition, and cultures en- prerequisite for promotion), a major re- courage them to “push the envelope” allocation of responsibilities occurred. in their various roles. Further, the expertise, creativity, and professionalism

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Forces to leverage “technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.” It focuses on achieving dominance across a range of operations required in the current era and beyond. Joint Doctrine and Training The services base their doctrine on experience and expertise in their mediums of operation. Joint doctrine guides the integration and use of these systems and forces in joint operations. Goldwater-Nichols and CORM highlighted the need for the development and promulgation of joint doctrine. Assigning joint doctrine to the

II MEF Combat Camera (A. Olguin) Chairman has already enhanced its de- Marine tank retriever velopment (together with increased during CJTFEX ’96. funding for the Joint Warfighting Cen- ter). It has reduced the time needed to brought to the staffs of unified com- joint planning, doctrine, and support. develop doctrine from four years to mands by members of each service en- The intimate involvement of the two. Improvements are evident in key sure that CINCs employ service forces Chairman and Joint Staff in key re- areas, including doctrine for joint logis- effectively. But the services must also source decisions—for example, the tics, operations other than war, close planning and programming of air support, and theater air defense. military forces—gives CINCs a Closely related to doctrine is Goldwater-Nichols highlighted the strong voice in them. The role training, which is more than a set of need for the development and of the Vice Chairman as co- annual theater exercises. It focuses on chair of the Defense Acquisition integrating service-provided forces promulgation of joint doctrine Board increases the joint view in from their earliest training events. This acquisition decisions as well. effort is encouraged by a joint training integrate their efforts into CINC uti- Furthermore, the Chairman con- system which will be in place by FY98 lization plans. Resource decisions must trols joint doctrine, which is essential to identify the funding levels required reflect the needs of CINCs as well as to defining how joint operations will to fully resource CINC plans for joint the institutional orientations of the integrate service-provided forces, and training. The resource allocation proc- services, and service operations must how joint commanders will conduct ess is already resolving CINC training meld into joint operations. those operations. In other areas such concerns. as joint training, logistics, and com- DOD is working to prioritize joint Chairman and CINC Roles mand and control, the influence of the training requirements to guide the ser- To better support warfighting Chairman has grown commensurately. vices in allocating readiness funding. A needs, Goldwater-Nichols comple- Publication of Joint Vision 2010 major step is the evolving role of U.S. mented the responsibilities of the ser- represents the most significant recent Atlantic Command (ACOM) as joint vices with a stronger role for the Chair- development in this maturing process. force integrator and trainer. Through man in planning and resource In the past, the services relied almost initiatives such as the Joint Training allocation processes. This was not exclusively on their own visions of the Analysis and Simulation Center in Suf- merely a cosmetic change, but a funda- future to guide decisions about devel- folk, Virginia, ACOM is bringing a mental adjustment in the relationship oping forces. Force XXI, Forward... greater focus to the joint and com- among the Chairman, services, and From the Sea, and Global Reach, Global bined training of assigned forces. These CINCs. Today, CINCs have a direct Power are valuable documents in that efforts are already paying big dividends input to planning and programming they articulate service perspectives on by training commanders and staffs to which is consistent with their respon- use of their forces; but they are incom- plan and direct operations in the joint sibility for warfighting. plete without a joint warfighting vi- environment and by training forces to Adjusting the responsibility of the sion that ties them together and de- meet specific CINC requirements. Chairman from consensus-builder to fines the total requirement. JV 2010 Other initiatives include the joint sim- principal military adviser to the Presi- accomplishes this by serving as a con- ulation system—scheduled to be opera- dent and Secretary gave teeth to the ceptual template for channeling the vi- tional by FY99—which will distribute a Chairman’s sponsorship of CINC con- tality and innovation of the Armed cerns and provided more effective

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CINC Warfighting Needs Cautions on Goldwater-Nichols DOD has also implemented changes to assure that decisions on al- decade has passed since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This law sought to make two locating resources reflect the views of fundamental changes in the authority and functioning of the military side of the defense estab- CINCs. The planning, programming, A lishment. It strengthened both the advisory role of the Chairman and the command authority of and budgeting system (PPBS) remains unified commanders—combatant commanders as the legislation refers to them. As intended by Congress, the basis of DOD resource allocation, this strengthening implicitly diminished the influence and authority of service chiefs and service comman- though it has evolved in important ders in the field. Proponents of the act viewed these officers as obstructionists to smooth national military ways in recent years. The services can command advice and cohesive multiservice operational coordination in the field. “Jointness” became a by- no longer conduct planning, program- word of military cohesion, and “purple” became the color of choice. ming, R&D, and force development in- The law has proven effective in various ways. The services seem to understand each other better and dependent of the needs of CINCs. work together more efficiently. The development and upward flow of military advice are unquestionably smoother, and that advice is arguably as good or better than it was in the “bad old, good old days.” Interser- Today, several avenues, including sub- vice relationships are stronger. mission of CINC integrated priority On balance, Goldwater-Nichols was sound, and its impact on the Armed Forces has been good. As we lists, are used to assess their needs. The enter this law’s second decade, however, caution lights need to be observed as the generation of officers Chairman’s joint warfighting capabil- and the framers of the legislation—who lived on both sides of the reforms it wrought—depart with their vi- ity assessment (JWCA) process, which sion of what it did and did not seek to do. Caution light 1. Remember that effective jointness means blending the distinct colors EA–6B landing on board of the services into a rainbow of synergistic military effectiveness. It does not suggest USS George Washington. pouring them into a single jar and mixing them until they lose their individual properties and come out as a colorless paste. No army that has worn purple uniforms ever won a battle. Balanced military judgment and combat effectiveness depend upon service individuality, culture, training, and interpretation of the battlefield. The essence of jointness is the flexible blending of service individualities. Caution light 2. Consistent with their explicit roles in law and their derived functions, the service chiefs and service component commanders are responsible for building forces which bring unique capabilities to the table. Recruiting, training, organizing, equipping, fashioning programs, making decisions, and acquiring resources to provide service capabilities is the business of service secretaries and service chiefs and of Congress. The creep of the Joint Staff into areas of resource allocation and program evaluation and their imposition on unified commanders—with a resultant administrative expansion and shift in emphasis toward programmatics—threatens the national-level focus on strategic military planning U.S. Navy (Craig McClure) and advice and diffuses the operational focus at the combatant commander level. Caution light 3. The Joint Chiefs, a corporate body of the Nation’s senior military officers, were formed as a council to provide military advice to, and implement decisions of, the President and Secretary of De- functions through the Joint Require- fense. As Joint Chiefs, they bear dual identities. They are not simply service chiefs come to a meeting. The ments Oversight Council (JROC), Chairman is their spokesman, senior among them, and designated principal military adviser—but not a com- builds on these assessments and devel- mander. The member of the Joint Staff overheard during a disagreement among the chiefs as saying “This ops options for the Secretary that track isn’t a group grope—the Chairman is in charge,” missed the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It is a directly with service and defense “group grope” for effective military advice, and the Chairman can cast a deciding vote, but not a muzzling agency programs and budgets. JWCAs vote. Differentiate carefully between the roles of chiefs and those of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and ser- review capabilities for specified vice members who make up the council of military advisers to the Commander in Chief known as the Joint warfighting and support. Chiefs of Staff. The services remain the primary Caution light 4. Just as the Chairman is not a commander, the Joint Staff is not a general staff. Gold- water-Nichols is specific on that point. The Joint Staff is the hub around which service staffs are clustered to sources of new mission needs state- provide expertise, robustness, and depth. It is the blender of the rainbow of national military advice. Service ments that naturally reflect their pref- views and advice—provided to the Joint Staff on behalf of each member of the Joint Chiefs—are ignored at erences for warfighting—achieving the peril of balanced, joint military advice and cohesion within the joint system. dominance in their mediums. JROC re- These are my cautions. They flow not from the intent of Goldwater-Nichols or from the improvements views and validates such requirements it effected but from the need for the upcoming generation to understand its intent and to avoid the conse- in the joint context, with the goal of quences of misinterpretation. meeting the warfighting needs of CINCs as its primary objective. —General Carl E. Mundy, USMC (Ret.) Chaired by the Vice Chairman, JROC includes the vice chiefs of each service. JROC benefits from JWCA and consul- common virtual environment among Senior Readiness Oversight Council, tations with CINCs. services, CINCs, simulation centers, chaired by the Deputy Secretary, pro- The JROC and the Defense Acqui- and war colleges. vide the means to evaluate the readi- sition Board processes, led by the Likewise, the joint monthly readiness of CINC forces to include assess- Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisi- ness review, implemented by the ing joint training. tion and Technology, are mutually Chairman in 1994, and the quarterly

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supporting systems that provide inte- CINC needs and the DOD drive as giving the Chairman and CINCs grated and enduring decisions relating for efficiency provided the impetus for clear authority over assigned service directly to the warfighting needs of numerous ongoing acquisition and personnel and the ability to influence CINCs. Both processes support re- management improvements. On a their careers gave new value to joint ex- source allocation decisionmaking daily basis, DOD increases its reliance perience. Even more important were where the differing perspectives of the the requirements for joint edu- Chairman, services, CINCs, and DOD the real issue is whether we have cation at the intermediate and leadership converge. The Defense Ac- senior service colleges and in quisition Board and various program used the law to prepare for threats the joint capstone course for review processes, operated by the in the wake of the Cold War general and flag officers. Joint under secretary with representation education has broadened their from the Chairman and Joint Staff as experience and enriched their well as the services, ensure the viability on joint program management to use cultural development—enabling them of service development programs limited defense resources more effi- to make even greater contributions to within a joint context. In each case, ciently. CINC warfighting needs and joint warfighting. decisionmaking integrates these per- service programs both benefit from DOD has come a long way in exe- spectives of the service and CINCs. joint management in diverse programs cuting the intent of Goldwater- Ultimately, the Secretary of De- such as a primary training aircraft and Nichols. Arguments about changes in fense makes resource allocation deci- joint munitions. Likewise, support for the relative power or influence of institutions miss the point. The real issue is F–16 refueling over whether we have used the law to pre- Cherry Point, North pare for the security challenges, Carolina. threats, and missions which have arisen in the wake of the Cold War. In my view, the answer is yes. But this evolution is not yet complete—far from it. Our goal is total battlefield dominance. Assuring that calls for more changes. Next year, DOD will conduct a quadrennial defense review as CORM recommended to examine the major issues we will confront in the 21st century. It will assess future international environments and develop a strategy to meet emerging threats. A fresh articulation of defense strategy will provide a framework for analyses of resources needed to meet force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and readiness requirements.

U.S. Air Force (GudrunU.S. Air Force K. Cook) Moreover, the review must weigh the need for further changes in defense or- sions in the context of PPBS with help theater combat forces benefits from ganization ten years after the passage from the Defense Resources Board, in- the joint management of support in of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In my cluding representatives of the Chair- communications, logistics, and other view, we are on the correct path but man and services. Here, service views areas of common need. more must be done. JFQ on long-range capabilities are rational- ized with the necessarily short-term The real legacy of Goldwater- warfighting needs of CINCs. Nichols is that it changed the roles of Decisions that result from these ef- the major DOD actors. It enabled the forts are taken at each phase of PPBS. Ad- Joint Chiefs, services, and CINCs to justments recommended in the past year focus on core competencies and en- attest to their success. These alterations couraged them to work together. This include program changes to focus and landmark legislation also added a joint limit unmanned aerial vehicles pro- perspective to the outlooks of the ser- grams, procure additional C–17s, retire vices. Requiring joint duty as a prereq- the EF–111, expand the use of the EA– uisite for promotion to flag rank as well 6B, and adjust Marine munitions procurement to reflect joint capabilities.

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POrganizationalAST Problems By DAVID C. JONES

[Editor’s Note: In 1981, General Jones at- uring a late-afternoon meeting each service rests on imbuing its mem- tempted to initiate an internal reorganiza- at the White House a few bers with pride in its mission, its doc- tion of the joint system. After meeting D months ago, President Reagan, trine, and its customs and discipline— substantial resistance in the Pentagon, he who had just returned from horseback all of which are steeped in traditions. began to speak out publicly in early 1982. riding at Quantico, turned to me in jest While these deep-seated service dis- His call for reform resulted in a five-year but with a touch of nostalgia and tinctions are important in fostering a examination by Congress of the need for asked, “Isn’t there some way we can fighting spirit, cultivating them engen- defense reorganization that eventually led bring back the horse cavalry?” My reply ders tendencies to look inward and to to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. was: “Just wait, Mr. President. We are insulate the institutions against out- After retiring, Jones published an arti- starting by resurrecting battleships.” side challenges. cle in The New York Times Magazine Below the surface of this light- The history of our services in- that outlined problems in defense organiza- hearted exchange lie two pervasive cludes striking examples of ideas and tion. An edited, abridged version of that problems within DOD. First, we are too inventions whose time had come, but piece appears here. Reading it today con- comfortable with the past. Second, we which were resisted because they did veys a sense of how dysfunctional the joint not fit into existing service con- system was at the time and how far joint- each service rests on imbuing its cepts. The Navy kept building ness has progressed since the enactment of members with pride in its mission, sailing ships long after the ad- Goldwater-Nichols.] vent of steam power. Machine its doctrine, and its customs guns and tanks were developed in the United States, but the do not make a sufficiently rigorous ex- Army rejected them until long after amination of defense requirements they were accepted in Europe. The and alternatives. horse cavalry survived essentially un- By their very nature, large organi- changed right up until World War II zations have a built-in resistance to despite evidence that its utility was change. As the largest organization in greatly diminished decades earlier. the free world, our defense establish- Even Army Air Corps officers were re- ment has most of the problems of a quired to wear spurs until the late large corporation but lacks an easily 1930s. calculated “bottom line” to force But the Armed Forces are only part needed change. At the core are the of the problem. DOD has evolved into Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air a grouping of large, rigid bureaucra- Force: institutions that find it difficult cies—services, agencies, staffs, boards, to adapt to changing conditions be- and committees—which embrace the General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.), cause of understandable attachments past and adapt new technology to fit served as both Chairman of the Joint to the past. The very foundation of traditional missions and methods. Chiefs (1978–82) and chief of staff, There is no doubt that the cavalry lead- U.S. Air Force (1974–78). ers would have quickly adopted a horse

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which went farther and faster—a high- great deal more with its limited re- 1938 (later rescinded), prohibited any technology stallion. The result of this sources and forces. The North suffered Army Air Corps airplane from flying rigidity has been an ever-widening gap early defeats and encountered many more than 100 miles out to sea. between the need to adapt to changing leadership problems but finally won by The Army and Navy began World conditions and our ability to do so. virtue of overwhelming industrial out- War II with authority and responsibil- Over the last two to three years the put and military manpower. ity diffused. Each still had many semi- American public has become increas- We also had serious organizational autonomous agencies with little coor- ingly concerned over our deteriorating problems during the Cuban campaign dination below the chief of service position in military power and con- in the Spanish-American War. The in- level. Soon after Pearl Harbor, General vinced that we must devote more to terservice wrangling had been so great George C. Marshall, Army chief of our defenses than we did in the 1960s that the Army commander refused to staff, streamlined the Army by reduc- and 1970s. But after serving on the let the Navy be represented at the for- ing the number of officers with direct Joint Chiefs longer than anyone else in mal surrender. Unfortunately, this was access to him from 61 to 6. The Navy history and under more Presidents and not the last case of split responsibilities also made some adjustments. (The ser- Secretaries of Defense (four of each), and interservice conflicts obstructing vices have since slipped back into their and being a student of military history our conduct of a war. old patterns. The number of officers and organizations, I am convinced that In the aftermath of the 1898 war having direct access to service chiefs— fundamental defense deficiencies can- the services, particularly the Army, in- especially when the joint system is not be solved with dollars alone—no stituted some organizational reforms. considered—is again very high.) matter how much they are needed. Despite a great deal of opposition, a The Joint Chiefs were established We do not think through defense chief of staff of the Army was created early in 1942 as a counterpart to the problems adequately, and we are get- in 1903 and a chief of naval operations British Chiefs of Staff Committee. Al- ting less capability than we should was established in 1916. But the War though the wartime chiefs addressed from our increased defense budgets. Department (the precursor of the De- certain priority issues, to a great extent There is reason to believe that, faced partment of the Army and the Depart- World War II was fought along service with a contingency requiring a major ment of the Air Force) and the Navy lines. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in joint operation, our performance Department continued to be riddled his United States (as distinct from his would be below the level we should Allied) role, reported to Mar- expect or need. amendments to the National Security shall. In the Pacific, the dif- No one element of our defense es- ficulties of integrating the tablishment is singularly responsible for Act did little to alter the relative operations of the services re- our problems. Those I will identify have influence of the joint system sulted in the establishment existed too long to be the fault of any of two separate theaters: the particular administration or of particu- Southwest Pacific Area, with lar personalities in or out of uniform. with semi-autonomous, often in- General Douglas MacArthur reporting History books for the most part tractable fiefdoms, branches, corps, de- to Marshall, and the Pacific Ocean Area, glorify our military accomplishments, partments, bureaus, and so forth. with Admiral Chester W. Nimitz report- but a closer examination reveals a dis- World War I was the most tragic ing to Admiral Ernest J. King, chief of concerting pattern: example of trying to win a war through naval operations. Split authority and re- ■ unpreparedness at the onset of each mass and attrition. Thousands of young sponsibility in the Pacific was a contin- new crisis or war men gave their lives to advance a few uing problem and nearly caused a disas- ■ initial failures yards over enemy trenches, only to be ter during the battle of Leyte Gulf. ■ reorganizing while fighting thrown back the next day at an equal Today the Pacific has been joined into ■ building our defenses as we cranked cost to the enemy. one command and our combat com- up our industrial base The emergence of the airplane as manders now report directly to the Sec- ■ prevailing by wearing down the a major military asset during World retary of Defense rather than to their enemy—by being bigger, not smarter. War I should have alerted us to the service chiefs. But the Army, Navy, Ma- We could do things poorly at the need to adjust our doctrines and orga- rine, and Air Force components of our start of past wars and still recover be- nizations to changing realities. The combat commands report both to their cause time was on our side. continued development of airpower chiefs and combat commanders, and The North during the Civil War could not help but blur the traditional the service chiefs still have the greatest was a striking example of a bureaucra- distinction between land and naval influence over their actions. Further- tized military establishment. Initially, warfare, but the Nation reacted to this more, many fundamental problems of the South had better leadership, was phenomenon in a traditionally bureau- the World War II joint system still exist far more flexible, and was able to do a cratic manner: each service developed below the surface. its own airpower (today there are four airpower entities) and protected it with artificial barriers to obscure costly duplications. One barrier, established in

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Jones DOD (Frank Hall) Gen Jones (center) with the chiefs, 1979 (from left): GEN Edward C. Meyer, chief of staff, U.S. Army; ADM Thomas B. Hayward, chief of naval operations; Amendments to the National Se- across France, the battle of Midway, Gen Lew Allen, Jr., chief of staff of the Air Force; curity Act in 1949, 1953, and 1958 and the landing at Inchon were bril- and Gen Robert H. Barrow, commandant of the Marine Corps. strengthened the Secretary’s authority liant strategic conceptions, valiantly and expanded the size and purview of executed. But these peaks in martial his staff but did little to alter the rela- performance followed valleys in which We won World War II despite our tive influence of the joint military sys- the Nation found itself poorly pre- organizational handicaps, not because tem and services. pared, poorly organized, and imperiled we were smarter, but once again be- President Eisenhower had recom- by inadequacies in Washington. In the cause we and our allies were bigger. We mended a much stronger joint system past, we had time to overcome our had the time and geographic isolation in 1953 and 1958, and his wisdom was mistakes. Our allies often bore the ini- to mobilize American industry and a borne out by our conduct of the Viet- tial brunt, and we had the industrial superb code-breaking effort to aid our nam War—perhaps our worst example capacity for a quick buildup in the mil- intelligence gathering. of confused objectives and unclear re- itary capacity needed to turn the tide. As the war drew to a close, an ex- sponsibilities both in Washington and Today we can expect no such respite. haustive debate ensued on how to or- in the field. Each service, instead of in- Our allies could not delay the Soviet ganize the postwar military. The Army tegrating efforts with the others, con- Union while we prepared, and our in- favored a highly integrated system, but sidered Vietnam its own war and dustrial base has fallen into a state of the Navy and others were strongly op- sought to carve out a large mission for disrepair. Nuclear weapons have added posed, some fearing that the Army itself. For example, each fought its own new dimensions which make constant would dominate any integrated sys- air war, agreeing only to limited mea- readiness even more critical. If we are tem. The Air Force, then still a part of sures for a coordinated effort. “Body to deter another conflict, or to succeed the Army, supported integration but count” and “tons dropped” became the if one be thrust upon us, we must be was primarily interested in becoming a measures of merit. Lack of integration prepared to do things right on the bat- separate service. persisted right through the 1975 evacu- tlefield the first time. Those opposed to integration ation of Saigon—when responsibility A sound defense posture should were backed by stronger constituen- was split between two separate com- begin with sound long-term planning, cies, including powerful forces in Con- mands, one on land and one at sea. a means to measure progress, and au- gress, than were the advocates of unifi- Each of these set a different “H-hour,” thoritative direction and control to in- cation. Arguments that unification which caused confusion and delays. sure that all elements contribute to a threatened civilian control over the Our soldiers, sailors, marines, and well-defined objective. On the surface, military soon dominated the debate. airmen have acted bravely throughout our system appears to provide such an So after nearly two years of stud- our history. With few exceptions, our orderly approach. The process starts ies, debate, and political maneuver- forces have performed well at the unit with a Defense Guidance document pre- ings, the National Security Act of 1947 level. And there have been bright mo- pared by the Office of the Under Secre- emerged with a compromise military ments at the higher levels also. The tary of Defense for Policy, based on ad- establishment: a loose confederation of landing at Normandy, Patton’s charge ministration policy and fiscal guidance large, rigid service bureaucracies—now and on inputs from field commanders, four rather than three—with a Secre- services, Joint Chiefs, the OSD staff, tary powerless against them. and other relevant sources. The ser-

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money in the projected four of the five members of the Joint defense budgets to fulfill Chiefs of Staff are also service chiefs, a all stated requirements, negotiated amalgam of service views but the Defense Guidance almost invariably prevails when inputs does little to set mean- are finally proposed by the Joint Staff. ingful priorities or man- The Chairman is the only military date a search for new di- member of the Defense Resources rections to maintain our Board and can offer independent opin- security. This is not a ions, but he has only five people work- problem unique to this ing directly for him to sift through the administration. various issues. (The Joint Staff belongs Since requirements to the JCS corporate body, not the exceed resources, the Chairman.) Consequently, Chairmen services invariably allo- traditionally focus on a few critical cate resources among items. In my case, they were readiness, their traditional mis- command and control, and mobility. sions and seek ways to The result of this tedious process justify a greater share of is a defense budget derived primarily Joint Chiefs of Staff, the budget. But addi- from the disparate desires of the indi- February 1950. tional funds are likely to vidual services rather than from a well-

DOD come only from another integrated plan based on a serious ex- service’s share, so each amination of alternatives by the attempts to outgame the civilian and military leadership work- vices build their annual programs on others without sufficient regard for ing together. Inevitably, a Secretary of the basis of the Defense Guidance’s ob- cross-service programs. Defense either supports a total pro- jectives and budget targets and then The vast array of service programs gram that is roughly the sum of the submit them to the Secretary of De- is then submitted to the defense com- service inputs (limited by fiscal guid- fense. The Secretary convenes a committee. The name and composition of ance) or resorts to forcing changes, mittee to review the documents and the committee may vary from admin- knowing that advocates of disapproved recommend changes to bring the ser- istration to administration, but its programs will continue the opposition vice programs into conformance with function remains the same. Currently into the congressional hearings. the Nation’s priorities. After being sub- it is called the Defense Resources Board But resource allocation by the mitted to the President and Congress and is chaired by either the Secretary board is only the beginning of the for approval, the budgets are adminis- or Deputy Secretary and includes the problem. The optimism expressed in tered by the services and agencies as- service secretaries, Assistant Secretaries program proposals seldom comes true. signed to DOD. of Defense, and Chairman. The service The chairman of the Defense Science But this process starts to break chiefs attend as observers. Board, Norman Augustine, has written down at the very beginning because that over the last thirty years the military strategy contained in the chiefs are judged by their services our major weapons systems Defense Guidance always demands have met performance goals greater force capabilities than the bud- on their success in obtaining 70 percent of the time (not get constraints will allow. Some admin- funding and on protecting service bad) but have met schedules istrations have attempted to limit the only 15 percent of the time requirements by calling for the capa- interests and cost estimates only 10 bility to fight “one and a half” or “two percent of the time even and a half” wars, while others have Week after week, the board meets after accounting for inflation. proposed preparing for global war al- in an attempt to examine major issues, As costs increase, programs are most without limits. In any case, the but the focus is primarily on service stretched out. Weapons are usually or- guidance almost invariably leads to programs, which include many hun- dered in numbers well below efficient what the Joint Chiefs have long called dreds of items deemed essential by production rates, to the detriment of the “strategy-force mismatch” as re- their advocates. The board fusses over the “industrial base.” This only leads quirements outpace capabilities. marginal changes in programs, but it is to further cost increases, the cycle re- Current guidance is so demanding literally impossible for it to address peats itself, and we find ourselves that developing truly coherent pro- them in sufficient depth or to focus on trapped in a catch-22 situation. Tough grams to carry it out is impossible even the most critical cross-service issues. decisions are not made, so the finan- under the most optimistic budget as- The Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff cial “bow wave” that always spills sumptions. There is simply not enough are assigned a role in this process, but each service usually wants the Joint Staff merely to echo its views. Since

26 JFQ / Autumn 1996 Jones/Forum 12/9/96 10:07 AM Page 27

Jones

ahead is magnified. Attempts to im- ■ authority and responsibility are civilian analysts for such advice. These prove efficiency, such as the adminis- badly diffused consultants can provide a useful service, tration’s multiyear procurement con- ■ rigorous examination of require- but they cannot make up for the ab- tracts, are very helpful but do not get ments and alternatives is not made sence of alternative advice from experi- ■ to the fundamental problems of plan- discipline is lacking in the budget enced, serving military officers. That process ning and resources. the Joint Chiefs, a committee beholden ■ tough decisions are avoided The lack of discipline in the bud- ■ accountability for decisions or per- to the interests of the services, has not get system prevents making the very formance is woefully inadequate been able to provide such advice during tough choices of what to do and what ■ leadership, often inexperienced, is its existence is amply documented in not to do. Instead, strong constituen- forced to spend too much time on referee- scores of studies over many years. cies in the Pentagon, Congress, and in- ing an intramural scramble for resources Civilian accountability in DOD is dustry support individual programs, ■ a serious conflict of interest faces undermined further by the rapid while the need for overall defense ef- our senior military leaders turnover or inexperience in the senior fectiveness and efficiency is not ade- ■ the combat effectiveness of the leadership. In the 35 years since it was quately addressed. fighting force—the end product—does not founded, there have been 15 Secre- receive enough attention. Pentagon leadership finds it virtu- taries of Defense, and there have been ally impossible to find the time neces- Before too much criticism is 19 Deputy Secretaries in the 33 years sary to impose discipline on the budget heaped on the current administration, since the establishment of that posi- process. Cycles overlap and, as this year, let me point out that these problems tion. A recent study revealed that civil- we usually find Congress considering a have been with us for decades and ian policymakers in DOD stay on the last-minute multibillion-dollar supple- there are no easy solutions. job an average of only 28 months. mental appropriation at the end of one What all this adds up to is that it Little of what I have said is new. fiscal year and unable to agree on the is an uphill struggle for anyone—in- Reams of paper have been used since budget before the start of the next fiscal cluding a Secretary of Defense—to gain World War II to describe these defi- year. At the same time, the Pentagon is real control of our defense establish- ciencies. President Eisenhower, who struggling with the next five-year de- ment. One study on defense organiza- knew both sides of the civilian-military fense plan and the subsequent budget tion stated that everyone was responsi- equation well, tried to resolve the basic submission. This immerses the leader- ble for everything and no one was problem, but the effects of his efforts ship constantly in confusing external specifically responsible for anything. were limited. Others have also tried struggles for public and congressional The top leadership is too often at the but with even less success. Bureaucratic support and bewildering internal dis- mercy of long-entrenched bureaucra- resistance to change is enormous and putes over resources and turf. cies. It is ironic that the services have, is reinforced by many allies of the ser- The same pressures burden the with considerable help from outside vices—in Congress and elsewhere— service leaders as they attempt to cope constituencies, been able to defeat at- who are bent on keeping the past en- with managing procurement pro- tempts to bring order out of chaos by throned. Civilian defense leaders have grams, recruiting and training the arguing that a source of alternative been reluctant to push hard for forces, and maintaining discipline and military advice for the President and changes, either because they thought esprit. Chiefs are judged by their peers Secretary of Defense runs the risk of they could not succeed or because they and services on their success in obtain- undermining civilian control. did not want to expend the necessary ing funding for their own major sys- There has for some time been an political capital which they believed tems and on protecting service inter- imbalance in the degree of control that was better spent on gaining support ests in the three afternoons a week our civilian leadership exercises over for the defense budget. Many have they spend in meetings of the Joint operational and other defense matters. feared that raising basic organizational Chiefs. Furthermore, a service chief, In operational matters, it is pervasive. issues might distract attention from who is a service advocate in one hat An order cannot go out of Washington the budget and give ammunition to and supposedly an impartial judge of to move a ship or other combat unit or opponents, who would use admissions competing requirements in his other to take any other specific operational of organizational inefficiency to argue hat as a member of the Joint Chiefs, action without the specific approval for further budget cuts. Yet, since the has a fundamental conflict of interest. and initialing of the directive by the public already believes that all is not To sum up, our defense establish- Secretary of Defense. At times, Secre- right with DOD, bold reforms would ment suffers serious deficiencies, in- taries and their staffs have been in- not only increase our effectiveness but cluding the following: volved in the most minute details of strengthen public support as well. operations. ■ strategy is so all-encompassing as to That the balance of influence mean all things to all men In other areas, civilian influence is within the defense establishment is ori- ■ leaders are inevitably captives of the more often apparent than real. Secre- ented too much toward the individual urgent, and long-range planning is too taries of Defense are given very little services has been a constant theme of often neglected comprehensive advice on alternative strategies or systems. In an attempt to fill the void, they have often turned to

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many past studies of defense organiza- President Eisenhower intended provide a balance, the services must tion. A special study group of retired se- that the operational side would assist share some of their authority, but they nior officers just this April found it nec- the Secretary of Defense in developing have proved to be consistently unwill- essary to report that “a certain amount strategy, operational plans and ing to do so. A service chief has a con- of service independence is healthy and weapons, and force-level requirements stituency which, if convinced that he is desirable, but the balance now favors based on needs of “truly unified com- not fighting hard enough for what the the parochial interests of the services mands.” The Joint Chiefs and Joint service sees as its fair share of defense too much and the larger needs of the Staff were to be the Secretary’s military missions and resources, can destroy the Nation’s defenses too little.” staff in this effort. The services would chief’s effectiveness. It is commonly accepted that one remain the providers of the forces Only the Chairman is uncon- result of this imbalance is a constant needed by the combatant commands strained by a service constituency, but bickering among the services. This is but would not determine what to pro- he is in a particularly difficult position. not the case. On the contrary, interac- vide or how those forces would be em- His influence stems from his ability to tions among the services usually result ployed. But President Eisenhower did persuade all his colleagues on the Joint in “negotiated treaties” which mini- not achieve what he wanted. The Chiefs to agree on a course of action, mize controversy by avoiding chal- scales of influence are still tipped too and any disagreement requires a report lenges to service interests. Such a far in favor of the services and against to the Secretary by law. A Chairman “truce” has its good points, for it is the combat commanders. jeopardizes his effectiveness if, early in counterproductive for the services to Although the combat comman- his tour, he creates dissension within the attack each other. But the lack of ade- ders now brief the Defense Resources corporate body by trying to force the ser- quate questioning by military profes- Board and have every opportunity to vices to share some of their authority. sionals results in gaps and unwarranted communicate with the Secretary of De- Congressional action is needed on duplications in our defense capabilities. fense and chiefs, virtually their only these organizational issues—the most What is lacking is a counterbalancing power is that of persuasion. The ser- important defense problem facing the system involving officers not so be- vices control most of the money and Nation. Additional money is badly holden to their services who can objec- the personnel assignments and promo- needed for defense, but without major tions of their people wherever realignment we will neither achieve service chiefs almost always have assigned, including in the Of- the necessary capability nor spend the had duty on service staffs but fice of the Secretary of Defense, money as wisely as we should. The Joint Staff, and unified com- critical question is whether we will almost never on the Joint Staff mand staffs. Officers who per- show the wisdom to do as the British form duty outside their own did with their 1982 reorganization or tively examine strategy, roles, missions, services generally do less well than muddle along as we have in the past weapons systems, war planning, and those assigned to duty in their services, until some crisis or disaster awakens us other contentious issues to offset the especially when it comes to promotion to the need for change. JFQ influence of the individual services. to general or admiral. The service President Eisenhower tried to re- chiefs almost always have had duty on solve this problem in 1958 by remov- service staffs in Washington but almost The original version of this article, entitled ing the services from the operational never on the Joint Staff. Few incentives “What’s Wrong with Our Defence Establish- ment,” appeared in The New York Times chain of command. In essence, two exist for an officer assigned to joint Magazine on Sunday, November 7, 1982, separate lines of authority were created duty to do more than punch his ticket pp. 38–39, 41–42, 70, 73–74, 76, 78–83, and is under the Secretary of Defense: an op- and then get back into a service assign- reprinted with the permission of the author. erational line and an administrative ment. I cannot stress this point too line. The operational line runs from the strongly: He who controls dollars, pro- President, through the Secretary of De- motions, and assignments controls the fense, to the combat commands—those organization—and the services so con- theater or functional commands trol, especially with regard to person- headed by the Eisenhowers, the Nim- nel actions. itzes, the MacArthurs of the future. The Yet it is very difficult to break out Joint Chiefs are not directly in this line of the DOD organizational maze. Many of command but do, through the Joint have struggled vainly within the sys- Staff, provide the Secretary oversight of tem to improve the balance between the combat commands and pass his or- the operational and administrative ders to them. The administrative line lines. Solutions to some of the basic in- runs to the military departments re- terservice problems are heralded every sponsible for recruiting, training, pro- few years but to this date have not ad- curement, and a myriad of other tasks dressed the fundamental causes. To necessary to develop the forces assigned to the combat commands.

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An Interview with COLIN L. POWELL The White House The President, Secretary, and Chairman on THE CHAIRMAN February 11, 1991. as Principal Military Adviser

JFQ What is your appraisal of the over- the President, Secretary of Defense, and all impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act? other members of the National Security Council with good, clear, crisp, com- POWELL I believe the implementa- prehensive military advice and recom- tion of the Goldwater-Nichols Act has mendations. And they wanted to satisfied the intent of its author—Con- change a system whereby a commit- gress—which under article I, section 8 tee—the Joint Chiefs—tended, they of the Constitution has the power to felt, to offer the least common denomi- make regulations for the Armed Forces. nator advice. Congress achieved this by Congress wanted to make sure that making the Chairman the principal the Joint Chiefs of Staff were providing military adviser—charged to furnish direct military advice—but did not remove the responsibility of the other th General Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret.), served as 12 Chairman chiefs to provide it as well. During my of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was the founding publisher tenure as Chairman, I gave my civilian of Joint Force Quarterly.

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Moscow Summit, May 1988. The White House as national security adviser I watched

the Cold War starting to end between the Secretary and the chiefs, especially the Chairman. The Secretary is free to obtain advice from whomever he chooses, to include his own civilian policy staff. He is obliged to receive the leaders my own professional advice, Joint Staff has been improved so dra- advice of his military leaders; but he fully informed by the advice and coun- matically that it is now, in my judg- does not have to accept it if he finds he sel I received from my JCS colleagues. ment, the premier military staff in the can get better advice elsewhere or if he When one or more of the chiefs dis- world. You can see a similar effect in doesn’t find it responsive to his needs. agreed, I made sure the Secretary and the staffs of the combatant comman- My experience with Secretary Dick the President were aware of any differ- ders. Just as important, jointness, or Cheney for almost four years was that he ences. This is what Congress intended. teamwork as I prefer to call it, has fully understood his authority over the Goldwater-Nichols also clarified become imbedded in the culture of the entire Department of Defense. He used the lines of command and communi- Armed Forces. me and the chiefs skillfully to get the cation between the President and Sec- military advice he needed. He also skill- retary and the combatant comman- JFQ How has the Chairman’s more fully used his policy staff to get it from ders. CINCs are subordinate to the influential role affected the balance of another perspective. He was then able to Secretary—he is their boss, not the civilian and military authority? blend the two perspectives. I made sure Chairman or the Joint Chiefs. The act POWELL You have to remember that Secretary Cheney saw the Joint Staff authorized the Secretary to use the that Goldwater-Nichols was intended as his staff as well as mine. Chairman as his channel of communi- to strengthen civilian control over the The frequent claim that the Secre- cations to the combatant commanders. military by clarifying and reaffirming tary’s civilian authority and influence The act was also intended to the role of the Secretary and his rela- were reduced by Goldwater-Nichols is improve the professionalism of the tionship with the Joint Chiefs and simply nonsense. Mr. Cheney demon- officer corps in conducting joint opera- combatant commanders. strated on more than one occasion that tions. It has certainly done that. The But to answer the question fully, he was up to the task of controlling the you have to look beyond the legisla- military. Obviously, he found the advice tion. The key is the relationship we provided useful and relevant. To

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Powell

The White House Situation Room.

The White House

suggest that somehow the Secretary is JFQ Why has this new role of the critics. In my four years as Chairman, at the mercy of the Chairman and the Chairman drawn such fire from critics? I worked with five different sets of other chiefs is wrong. The suggestion POWELL Some critics suggest that chiefs. I believe they felt they were does a disservice not to the Chairman the Chairmen, especially me, did some- fully included in the formulation of or the other chiefs but to the Secretary. thing wrong in implementing the act advice. In fact the Chairman relieved The Secretary was very much in charge. in the manner intended by Congress. I them of a lot of housekeeping issues And because he usually found the mili- tried to take the act to its fullest limit. If and permitted them to spend more tary advice he received useful and acted I understand my obligation, I was sup- time and energy on organizing, equip- upon it, I believe the Joint Chiefs of posed to faithfully discharge the law. ping, and training their forces, which Staff became a more influential body Many critics didn’t like the law in is their principal role. than it had been. To improve, to the the first place. They fought it before it Congress and the American people Secretary’s satisfaction, the quality of was passed and are still fighting it. have had ample opportunity over the the military advice he received was These critics sometimes forget that past ten years to see how the Armed what Goldwater-Nichols was all about. Congress enacted Goldwater-Nichols Forces are working and they are The proof of the pudding is the because they were deeply dissatisfied pleased. Goldwater-Nichols has been a string of successful military operations with the system of old that the critics success notwithstanding its critics. we have seen in recent years, from long for. I am sure there was frustra- Panama through Desert Storm through tion among service staffs because the JFQ What is the nature of the relation- Bosnia. The problems encountered in Chairman could move forward on his ship between the Secretary of Defense and Grenada or Desert One, which gave own. The opportunities for logrolling Chairman under Goldwater-Nichols? such impetus to Congress to reform and frustrating progress for parochial POWELL The Chairman was given the process, have been largely over- interests were severely curtailed. We no no authority under the act. He was come. We are not perfect, but the per- longer had to “vote” on issues to deter- given a role—to serve as the principal formance of the Armed Forces in joint mine what advice the chiefs were military adviser. He commands noth- operations has improved significantly going to provide to the Secretary. ing. What the Chairman ultimately and Goldwater-Nichols deserves a great Interestingly, the chiefs seemed to possesses is influence, not authority, deal of the credit. have less of a problem with the role of the Chairman than their staffs and the

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and only that influence which the Sec- JFQ Why under your leadership did the I knew my approach was controversial retary gives him. It cannot be taken Joint Chiefs often meet informally? and kept waiting to see if I had to from the Secretary—he must give it to POWELL When former Chairman adjust it. But I never had a single chief the Chairman. The Secretary does that General Dave Jones and Army Chief of say, “We need to hold more formal when he believes the Chairman is Staff General Shy Meyer began the meetings.” someone who can get the best military debate that eventually led to Goldwa- I might add that the secure direct advice available out of the system, ter-Nichols, one of Shy Meyer’s ideas hotline telephone and intercom sys- someone in whom he has confidence was to have two groups of four stars— tems we installed among the chiefs and trust. That’s ultimately what the service chiefs and another council and with the combatant commanders makes the whole system work. It is a of four stars detached from their ser- permitted an even more informal system designed by Goldwater-Nichols vice responsibilities—to serve as the means of consulting. We were con- but one executed by human beings real Joint Chiefs. I didn’t think that stantly in touch and generally spoke who have confidence in each other. was the way to go. But the idea had with one voice once agreement was And at the top of that DOD pyra- merit because it is hard for any service reached on a given issue. mid is the Secretary of Defense. There’s chief who has to fight for his service’s no doubt in my mind—at least in the interest to put that interest aside easily JFQ What impact did the Goldwater- case of the two Secretaries I worked for, in discharging his role as a member of Nichols Act have on the conduct of mili- Dick Cheney and Les Aspin—that they the Joint Chiefs. This is particularly tary operations? were in charge. the case in well-attended formal meet- POWELL The invasion and libera- ings where the chiefs arrive with for- tion of Panama in December 1989 was JFQ How did your experiences in senior mal service-prepared positions to the first full test of Goldwater-Nichols positions in Washington help you as the defend and with their institutions in a combat situation, although there first officer to serve his entire tour as watching. was a partial test under Admiral Crowe Chairman under Goldwater-Nichols? So I used a combination of formal during operations against the Iranian POWELL I came to the job with a and informal meetings. We had lots of navy in the Persian Gulf in 1988. You rather unique background. I had been formal “tank” meetings as a group and might even say that Panama was some- national security adviser, deputy often with the Secretary of Defense in thing of a shakedown cruise for what national security adviser, and military attendance. But to use Shy Meyer’s we would be doing in Desert Shield assistant to three deputy secretaries idea, I had many, many more informal and Desert Storm a year later. and one Secretary of Defense, which meetings, just the six of us sitting General Max Thurman, CINC- gave me a window on the workings of around a table in my office without SOUTH, and one of the greatest sol- the entire Joint Staff and the Chair- aides, staff, or notetakers. This was not diers I’ve ever known, created a joint man’s relationship to the Secretary great for history, but it was a superb task force to design the contingency prior to the enactment of Goldwater- way of getting the unvarnished, plan. The plan was reviewed in Wash- Nichols. As national security adviser I gloves-off, no-holds-barred personal ington but not second-guessed by the also watched the Cold War starting to views of the chiefs. They never shrank Joint Staff and Joint Chiefs. It had end. I had also commanded all opera- from defending their service views, but been briefed to the Secretary. When tional Army forces in the United States it was easier for them to get beyond soldiers of the Panamanian Defense and knew what was happening in the those views when we were no longer a Force killed an American Marine offi- field. As CINC, Forces Command, I was spectator sport. It was also easier to cer, we were ready and able to move a force provider to the overseas com- protect the privacy of our delibera- quickly. I assembled the chiefs, we batant commands. That gave me great tions. We occasionally had a donny- reviewed the situation and plan, and insight into their regional warfighting brook but almost always came to provided our recommendation to plans and needs. agreement on the advice that I took intervene. Dick Cheney agreed and we That experience was also enhanced forward to the Secretary. On occasion, made that recommendation to the by the fact that I had both personal and the Secretary would join us at the little President after thoroughly briefing professional relationships with the round table in my office. I am sure the him on the plan. On the night of the senior members of President Bush’s service staffs were often unhappy operation and in the days that fol- national security team. I was national because they didn’t have their chiefs lowed, General Thurman was given security adviser when he was Vice Presi- loaded with positions and wouldn’t maximum flexibility to use the forces dent and I lived next door to him for always get a complete readout. we provided him. He reported directly two years in the Reagan White House. It was a technique I found useful. to the Secretary through me. Secretary During that same period Congressman Other Chairmen might choose to do it Cheney knew every aspect of the plan Dick Cheney was the minority whip differently. I wouldn’t be surprised if intimately but did not insert himself and Jim Baker was Secretary of Treasury. we met more times formally and infor- into every tactical decision. I dealt So these established relationships gave mally than any previous sets of chiefs. with Thurman, and the Secretary me the entree that I needed to fully watched and listened and kept the implement Goldwater-Nichols. President fully informed. When we

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Powell

jointness means nothing more than teamwork

Remnants of retreating

Iraqi forces. DOD

needed additional political guidance, Forces. The trick is always to put the an operation and it did it very well. We the Secretary rapidly got it from the right stars together on a team to accom- had to break a lot of bureaucratic bowls President. There were glitches, of plish the team mission without arguing to create ACOM. We knew that it would course. There always are. But the about who gets the game ball. have to evolve over time and that evo- model was set: we had clear political lution is still going on. guidance, there was a solid and well- JFQ How has the ACOM role as joint We used the old Atlantic Com- integrated plan, the CINC was in force integrator progressed in your view? mand as the base for ACOM because charge, and there was appropriate POWELL It took us three years of with the end of the need to defend the oversight from the Joint Chiefs and debate to create the ACOM concept. We sea lanes against the Soviet navy, National Command Authorities. It was recognized that with our drawdowns Atlantic Command was a headquarters the model we used, scaled-up, for around the world there would be a with the capacity to accept a new mis- Desert Shield and Desert Storm and it greater need to have jointly trained sion. Its location in Norfolk placed it is the model that is still in use and forces immediately available to deploy near TRADOC, Langley, the Armed working very well. overseas to be used by theater comman- Forces Staff College, the Pentagon, ders. Theater commanders trained their Quantico, and other installations that JFQ How would you assess the level of forces jointly, but we weren’t doing that have a role in training, doctrine, con- jointness during Desert Storm? well enough back in CONUS. Each ser- tingency planning, and education. At POWELL I would assess it as excel- vice trained its own forces, with only the time, we also left it with mission lent. It wasn’t perfect. We identified large, annual showcase exercises to responsibility for the Caribbean so it improvements we had to make such as train a joint force. We had to make would be a real warfighting headquar- enhancing the integration of the air joint training the rule and ACOM was ters and not just a think tank. It also assets available to a CINC. We worked created, in my mind, for that purpose. retained NATO responsibilities. very hard after Desert Storm to improve It was a force trainer and provider. In ACOM finally came into being the our joint doctrine. Jointness means Haiti, it also demonstrated it could run week I retired. It was my last act going nothing more than teamwork. We have out the door. Others will have to make lots of star players within our Armed

Autumn 1996 / JFQ 33 Powell/Forum3/3 12/9/96 10:49 AM Page 34

■ JFQ FORUM Courtesy of Special Collections, NDU Library In the field.

the definitive judgment of how well it no longer linked in the sense that they Both the strategy and the Base is doing now. were part of a worldwide Soviet threat, Force levels were severely criticized they could be looked at separately. We then and now. But they gave us some- JFQ How were a new national military needed sufficient forces to fight each of thing to plan on and to present to strategy and the Base Force concept devel- them. It was unlikely they would break Congress, the American people, our oped? out at the same time. But we didn’t want allies, our potential enemies, and our POWELL During the first year of our force structure to be so thin that if troops as a vision for the future during the Bush administration, it was clear we were executing one an adversary a time of historic transformation. It that the Cold War was coming to an could take advantage of our weakness served that purpose exceptionally well end. We were really going to lose our and start trouble in the other. The sim- and gave us the basis to downsize our “best enemy.” For four decades we had ple sizing formula was to be able to fight forces in an orderly way. We were a strategy, force structure, infrastruc- two major regional contingencies nearly determined not to be pulled apart for ture, research and development, and simultaneously. We wanted the second want of a rational strategy. investment policy that rested on the aggressor to know that we had enough Some critics now say that strategy need to be ready to fight World War force to deal with him even though it and force structure have outlived their III. If that was going away, then what could take a little time to get there. usefulness. I don’t think so. The strat- should we be ready for? The Base Force was designed to egy won’t last forty years as did the Obviously, we had vital interests in execute the new strategy. The term Cold War strategy of “containment.” the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. We “base” was used to denote that we felt But until North Korea follows the still needed our nuclear deterrent, and it was a floor below which we should Soviet Empire into political oblivion we still had force presence responsibili- not go given the world situation we and/or the Persian Gulf becomes a ties around the world. And there would saw when this was all being designed region of democracy and stability, we still be the need to fight the conflict that in 1990. There was quite a bureaucratic must still be able to respond to two no one predicted or planned for. The battle over what that base should be MRCs. The Base Force and its succes- two most demanding contingencies for each service, and it took some time sor, the somewhat smaller Bottom-Up were the Persian Gulf and Northeast to get everyone on board. Review force, have also ensured that Asia. We considered these major we had the forces needed to deal with regional contingencies. Since they were all the contingencies that have come

34 JFQ / Autumn 1996 Powell/Forum3/3 12/9/96 10:49 AM Page 35

With the fleet aboard USS Wisconsin. U.S. Navy (Scott Allen)

we have lots of star players within our Armed Forces

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along in recent years. Lots of alterna- were some disagreements. In particu- JFQ How were you able to recruit tal- tive ideas are floating around, but I lar, General Al Gray, Marine Corps ented senior officers to the Joint Staff? haven’t seen one yet that does the job commandant, argued strongly that the POWELL Goldwater-Nichols helped better. planned strength level for the Marine enormously. Since joint duty credit The roles and missions debate was Corps was set too low, even though was now needed for advancement, we seen as another way of rationalizing the Secretary of the Navy supported became a sought-after staff. The Joint and downsizing the force. I conducted that level. Secretary Cheney knew of Staff was seen as a prime assignment. I a roles and missions study as required the disagreement and made a decision. also believe that it became a more by Congress and pretty much validated But I was not constrained in providing exciting place to work. Panama, the the existing roles and missions for our my recommendation while I tried to Persian Gulf, new strategy, and the services. Some members of Congress achieve total consensus or put it to the Base Force all served to make the Joint didn’t like the results because they “yeas” or “nays.” And by the way, Sec- Staff more attractive as a cutting-edge weren’t revolutionary enough and retary Aspin subsequently raised the operation. The service chiefs were very forthcoming in nominating their most able officers. We also changed the rota- tional process for senior staff assignments. It was no longer the “Army’s turn” to get the J-3 position, etc. Or worse, to have to fill a position they didn’t want to fill! Now the best person gets the job. The law required me to maintain service balance and I was able to do that without a service rota- tion scheme. I was also able to get legislation from Congress that gave us billets for the three-star jobs on the Joint Staff. So now, when I asked the chiefs to nominate for one of those jobs, they didn’t also have to give up one of their three-star billets. This made the jobs even more attractive and spurred competition.

JFQ Finally, how well have the new

Courtesy of Special Collections, NDU Library Courtesy of Special Collections, NDU Library joint officer personnel policies worked? POWELL From my perspective as especially because they didn’t point planned strength level of the Marines Chairman, they worked very well. the way to even greater reductions and during the Bottom-Up Review. More officers than ever before are savings. Congress established a roles Much credit for the strategy and being trained in team warfare. More and missions commission which after force structure we came up with has to officers than ever have team warfare a year’s worth of work came basically go to the Secretary’s civilian policy experience. This is good for the Nation to the same conclusion I had, although staff. Under Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and good for the Armed Forces. they presented some recommenda- and his staff did their own analysis as I know that the policies have been tions for changes in process. they developed the Defense Guidance. very difficult for the services to man- Dick Cheney had a civilian policy age, but they have paid off. JFQ JFQ To what extent did Goldwater- check on what I, the chiefs, and the Nichols empower the development of this Joint Staff were proposing. We all got This interview was conducted on new strategy and the Base Force? along well. It was a healthy relationship June 24, 1996 in Alexandria, Virginia. POWELL It gave me more freedom which served the Secretary’s needs. and flexibility to come up with ideas We were also able to simplify the and move them through the system joint planning process. We cut through because I was able to speak in my own a lot of the paper encrustation which right and not wait for a vote of the had been the hallmark of the old JCS Joint Chiefs. As it worked out, all the system. chiefs agreed with the strategy and the overall force structure, although there

36 JFQ / Autumn 1996 Blaker/Forum 12/9/96 11:16 AM Page 37

Overseeing CROSS-SERVICE Trade Offs By WILLIAM A.OWENS and JAMES R.BLAKER

One of the most consequential aspects of the upon it to frame advice, the council could not only defer or prevent acquisi- Goldwater-Nichols Act directed the Chairman to tion but also exercise a central role in advise the Secretary of Defense on requirements, applying a joint perspective across the breadth of the entire defense program programs, and budgets. More than any other pro- and budget. vision of the act, this change constituted the legal Things initially moved in this direction, but JROC did not fully assume basis for the Chairman to become a key player in that role at once. The first Vice Chair- designing, sizing, and structuring the Armed man, General Bob Herres, established Forces. the authority of JROC chairmen to both set the agenda and validate potential requirements once the full Today the Joint Requirements with the chairmanship rotating among council had considered them. Oversight Council (JROC) has become the vice chiefs annually. Four months Admiral David Jeremiah, who suc- the chief mechanism through which before Goldwater-Nichols became law, ceeded Herres in 1990, maintained the the Chairman prepares his advice, and the Joint Chiefs redesignated the board authority carved out by his predecessor the process works well; so well, in fact, as the Joint Requirements Oversight while shifting the focus of JROC from that it represents the first major revi- Council. In April 1987, the Vice Chair- simply screening requests which had sion of the planning, programming, man—a post created by the act—be- originated elsewhere toward greater and budgeting system (PPBS) since Sec- came the JROC chairman. initiative in defining the military sys- retary Robert McNamara put it in place The council’s ten-year history is tems that the Nation ought to acquire. more than three decades ago. This new one of expanding authority. The origi- This more active role was largely dri- process has threatened old ways of nal body functioned essentially as an ven by the end of the Cold War which, doing business and thus has generated information clearing house, apprising however much the world benefitted, no little controversy. members of individual service interests left DOD without an underlying con- in large-scale acquisitions. After its sensus on its central role which had Early Growth name change and appointment of the kept the planning process together for In 1984, JCS created the predeces- Vice Chairman to head it, the JROC nearly four decades. Jeremiah did not sor to JROC—the Joint Requirements function shifted to validating the vari- have a detailed set of planning replace- and Management Board—to monitor ous proposals for major acquisition ments in mind when, in 1993, he ar- and advise the Joint Chiefs on the de- programs prior to the formal acquisi- gued that JROC should become a pro- velopment and acquisition of big-ticket tion decision process. This shift, based ponent of advanced technology items. The vice chiefs and director of on the Chairman’s enhanced authority systems. But by maintaining that it the Joint Staff were named members, as principal adviser to the Secretary on should do more than react to ideas requirements under placed before it for review, he laid the Goldwater-Nichols, foundation for a council that could Admiral William A. Owens, USN (Ret.), was the 3rd Vice made JROC much lead defense planning. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and James R. Blaker is more influential. If currently a visiting fellow in the Institute for National the Chairman relied Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

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A New Process A notable expansion of functions began as General John Shalikashvili encouraged JROC to build a better joint perspective and senior military consensus across a range of issues, seize greater initiative in defining joint requirements, and extend the council’s influence to defense planning and programming processes. In response, the number of JROC meetings quadrupled. Within a month council members were spending ten times more hours in discussions than before 1994. The USS Seawolf JROC process initiated an unprece- undergoing sea trails, July 1996. General Shalikashvili encouraged JROC to seize greater initiative in defining joint requirements

dented series of day-long offsite exchanges among the Joint Chiefs, CINCs, and the council. The Joint Staff established JROC liaison offices with

General Dynamics unified command staffs, and the council itself regularly visited the CINCs. Meanwhile, the Vice Chairman Loading MLRS on introduced a new analytical device board C–17. known as joint warfare capabilities assessments (JWCAs). The JROC Chair- man established JWCAs to serve as innovation engines. To help them meet this charge, their purview covered nine (later ten) cross-cutting warfare areas. Each JWCA—chaired by the head of a Joint Staff directorate (J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, or J-8) but with broad partic-

U.S. Air Force (KenU.S. Air Force Hackman) ipation from service and OSD staffs— was asked for new, analytically based insights designed to stimulate and inform discussions among the four-star JROC members as they, not their staffs,

U.S. Air Force moved toward specific recommendations on joint military requirements. JWCAs were not asked for consensus recommendations hammered out through normal staffing procedures. JROC suggestions and views, in turn, provided the basis for the specific program recommendations the JCS Chair- man used within the central process

General Dynamics that sets the size and structure of the Flight testing YF–22 U.S. military: the planning, program- prototype. ming, and budgeting system (PPBS).

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Owens and Blaker

The primary channels to PPBS in- signaled that the Chairman JROC Assessment Process volved emphasis on and a major revi- had thoroughly assumed sion of a document known as the the authority granted him Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) under the Goldwater- Program and the creation of the Chairman’s Pro- Nichols Act and was willing Development gram Recommendations (CPR). The to use it in a way that would Defense Planning Chairman, Admiral William Crowe, make a difference. The Guidance transmitted the initial CPA in 1987 to Chairman’s Program Assess- SSM SE EN S T comply with his responsibility under ment suddenly had teeth. Chairman’s A Chairman’s the Goldwater-Nichols Act to advise The Chairman’s Pro- Program Program Assessment the Secretary on the prioritization of gram Recommendations, or Recommendations JROC requirements. While CPAs were subse- CPR, is best understood as P SECDEF quently forwarded each year, most of a complement to CPAs. Defense R O C E S S Program C Review them simply acknowledged and en- Compiled before the Secre- Program Budget dorsed the individual programs sub- tary issues Defense Planning Development mitted by the services. Guidance, CPR communi- That kind of rubber-stamping cates recommendations ended in 1994. CPAs submitted by the from the Chairman to the present Chairman to the Secretary in Secretary on what should both 1994 and 1995, based largely on be included in the plan- JROC work, differed from—and in ning guidance to services some respects actually challenged—the and defense agencies. The Secretary members formally enjoyed equal rank, programs submitted by the services. may incorporate CPR into his guid- status, and decision power—each had These two CPAs, the first to emerge ance, or he can ignore any or all of it. an effective veto over what the body from the new JROC process, also took But because the services also receive could say collectively—and tended to on the programmatic wishes of defense CPR—as a courtesy, but not for coordi- deal with resource allocation additively. agencies and staffs in the Office of the nation—they know what the Chair- That is, as a committee of equals, their Secretary of Defense. They highlighted man will consider in assessing their answer to the difficult question of “how where the Chairman believed some programs later during the program- much is enough?” was usually decided programs championed by these advo- ming cycle. It provides an early indica- by summing each service chief’s postu- cates failed the needs test. tion of what will be raised as alterna- lated requirements. This meant very The CPA, forwarded to the Secre- tive program recommendations when large defense budgets, and the way the tary in October 1995 for example, given issues are not adequately ad- Joint Chiefs tried to cope with resource called for shifting significant sums dressed in service programs. constraints—first by funding what each among programs, recommended the The accompanying figure illus- service saw as its core competency and end of specific redundancies, and de- trates the relationship of CPA, CPR, and then by allocating remaining funds to tailed proposals for changing DOD the mainstream of PPBS. Seen in this functions or capabilities that were im- budget strategies dealing with recapi- context, the JROC system seems to be a portant to other services—had undesir- major revision of PPBS, able results. Among them, it led to gaps both PPBS and JROC sought to build which dates from the early in those capabilities which tied the ser- 1960s, and it is. Both PPBS vices together to achieve greater joint- a process that could adjust interests and the JROC system sprang ness. To McNamara, the marginal ad- of the services and DOD components from the same interests. Both justments needed for better joint sought to build a decision output depended ultimately on pres- and resource allocation sures from outside the military. He de- talization and the revolution in mili- process that could adjust the interests of signed PPBS for this purpose and armed tary affairs. The net impact of these the services and other DOD compo- his office with the authority, staffs, pro- recommendations, if implemented by nents to produce a better overall capa- cedural prerogatives, and analytic capa- the Secretary, would result in nearly a bility. Both were designed to make ratio- bility and support to allow the Secretary 12 percent adjustment in the projected nal cross-service resource allocations to bring external pressure to bear on the budget over the planning period with and to build overall capabilities that military departments. In the broadest no added funding. In short, the 1995 amounted to more than the sum of in- sense, PPBS initially shifted resource al- CPA represented an important bench- dividual service core competencies. Yet location authority to the Secretary. Mc- mark. It was a major juncture in the the original PPBS and new JROC process Namara’s guidance to the services set road leading to resolving resource com- are based on very different assumptions. priorities for programming, the pro- petition—which heretofore involved One reason McNamara devised gram review judged how well they were simply requesting more money—and PPBS arose from the structure and na- realized by the services and addressed ture of the interaction among the chiefs as it had evolved by the early 1960s. JCS

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alternatives prepared for the Secretary what really was required, in addition The second concern implies two by his staff, and the budget review con- to their natural roles as advocates for a questions. First, can the military itself firmed that his decisions were funded. single service. This was not easy. make better cross-service resource allo- PPBS and the staff assembled to help The new JROC is such a mecha- cations than nonmilitary groups? And the Secretary operate it enabled him to nism. But it is unlike other staff second, is there something wrong with execute formal responsibilities much arrangements that prevail inside the a system in which both JROC and the more fully and completely to assure the Pentagon. It assumes that the military Secretary’s civilian staffs recommend best allocation of defense resources. can shift funds from one service to an- such allocations? But PPBS did not automatically other within the context of a non-zero Optimal cross-service resource al- bring the civilian and military authorities sum game. But it acknowledges that locations are most likely to result from into a closely knit team, nor did it change this approach requires having the right various factors. Warfighting ought to the way the Joint Chiefs interacted. people address the right issues for the figure most prominently. But there are right period of time. For the military, other aspects of resource allocation— Long Gestation the right people are found at the four- such as political and social effects of Goldwater-Nichols sought to re- star level, and to enable them to coop- deciding who gets what—to be advise this process. By making the Chair- eratively discuss the right issues for the dressed, particularly when allocations man the principal adviser to the Secre- right amount of time often means that involve hundreds of billions of dollars. tary on military requirements, the law they must spend less time with their Even though the Secretary ought to staffs. And providing them turn to the Chairman, supported by to achieve cross-service trade offs with support needed to JROC, for recommendations on shap- achieve cross-service trade ing military capabilities, nonmilitary means developing ways to surmount offs means developing ways experts may be better qualified to ad- bureaucratic stovepipes to surmount the bureau- dress the other implications. cratic stovepipes that characterize most interservice staff The problem is maintaining the gave him new authority to initiate undertakings. Because of these differ- proper balance. This is particularly chal- force planning, assess programs, and— ences, the JROC system was not built lenging today when the old consensus via direct advice to the Secretary—pre- quickly and remains controversial. on the military threat has been replaced sent alternative programs, challenge The changes manifest in JROC by a seemingly more complicated set of unnecessary redundancies, adjust ser- have stirred two particular concerns. national security interests. It is not vice programs, and establish resource The first is whether the process under- made easier by different organizational allocations in the DOD budget. Yet, cut the statutory authority of the mili- trends that characterize the defense es- while authority to do these things ex- tary departments to raise, train, and tablishment. One can argue, for exam- isted after the act was signed into law, maintain forces. The second is whether ple, that while the military has moved it was nearly eight years before it was JROC and its active support of the toward greater integration—largely be- possible to exercise that authority in Chairman in the programming and cause of Goldwater-Nichols—the civil- significant ways. budgeting system duplicates functions ian side of the Pentagon has been mov- Why so long? While numerous assigned to DOD civilian offices. ing toward greater fragmentation and factors contributed to the delay, one of The first concern, sometimes factionalization, as the number of “spe- the most important is found in the stated in hyperbole about an ascen- cial interest” offices increases. A more original PPBS assumption about the dant general staff, is not warranted. coherent, integrated warfighting per- difficulty of getting individual service Service programs continue to reach the spective, partly prompted by JROC, can chiefs to regard resource allocations as Secretary who listens to them carefully. be a healthy development as defense re- something other than a zero-sum What is more, the Chairman is legally source allocation perspectives become game. The Secretary’s authority to set bound to offer an assessment of pro- more diverse. resource allocations is unambiguous; grams and recommendations on mili- Thus, the question is not whether however the line of authority between tary requirements. JROC affords a civilian or military officials make the the Chairman under Goldwater- mechanism for helping service leaders best decisions on allocating resources. Nichols and the military departments understand joint requirements and a Rather it is whether the JROC process under title 10 to identify requirements senior forum in which services can encourages the balance in civilian and is not clear. This outstanding ambigu- clarify their priorities. These contribu- military perspectives demanded under ity required a new mechanism to rections ought to alleviate any lingering our system. At this point, the answer oncile competing authorities, one built concern that JROC represents a move seems to be yes. This is likely to gratify to implement a very different assump- toward a general staff. the authors of the Goldwater-Nichols tion from that of the original PPBS. Act. They set out to improve the qual- That is, a way had to be devised for se- ity of military advice, and JROC has nior military leaders to function as a become an important mechanism in corporate body to find cross-service so- achieving that objective. JFQ lutions to the difficult question of

40 JFQ / Autumn 1996 Sheehan Pgs 12/9/96 11:20 AM Page 41

Next Steps in Joint Force Integration By JOHN J. SHEEHAN

Navy crewman guiding UH–60 Blackhawk.

U.S. Navy (Robert N. Scoggin)

The nature of modern warfare he battlefields of the next damage assessments conducted by demands that we fight as a century will little resemble joint force commanders (JFCs) but those of today. At the upper from anyone on or near the scene with joint team. This was important T end of the conflict spectrum, access to commercial satellite commu- yesterday, it is essential today, long-range and highly lethal precision- nication technology. Graphic reports and it will be even more guided munitions—launched from an and imagery from the battlefield by imperative tomorrow. assortment of ground, naval, and air journalists, relief workers, and other platforms and guided by a complex noncombatants will quickly sway pub- —John M. Shalikashvili web of command and surveillance as- lic opinion. Concern over casualties, sets—will continue to collateral damage, and fratricide will blur the lines separat- pressure political decisionmakers and General John J. Sheehan, USMC, is commander in chief, ing land, sea, and air military leaders to end kinetic conflicts U.S. Atlantic Command, and Supreme Allied Commander warfare. Feedback as rapidly and decisively as possible. Atlantic. Previously he was director for operations (J-3), will be immediate— Joint Staff. not just from battle

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Victory will depend on the ability Notwithstanding the great im- of JFCs to master the “system of sys- provement in joint operations over the Outside Arraijan, tems” composed of multiservice hard- last decade, challenges confronting the Panama during Just Cause. and soft-kill capabilities linked by ad- Department of Defense today require a vanced information technologies. A greater integration of service capabili- JFC orchestrating a battle must rapidly ties. An increasing number of techno- process and disseminate information logical and organizational challenges to his forces and deny an enemy sanc- to warfighting, together with shrinking tuaries of time and space. In sum, joint DOD resources, have forced a rethink- forces will have to be thoroughly inte- ing of national security and military grated to fully exploit the synergism of strategies. land, sea, and air combat capabilities. During the Cold War, the United States and its allies established large Evolution of Joint Warfare standing armies with redundant capa- Although joint warfare is as old as bilities to counter the Soviet threat. our Republic (witness the battle of Today forces built on mass alone are be- Yorktown), joint force integration (JFI) coming both less necessary and too ex- pensive to field and maintain. As since 1990 efforts have evolved a result, in an era in which precision weapons make massive from “specialized” to slightly less forces lucrative targets, the effec- than “synergistic” joint warfare tiveness of joint operations will

depend more on integrating ser- (DeanU.S. Air Force Wagner) vice maneuver and precision is a relatively new phenomenon. After strike capabilities than on marshalling a series of operational failures in the large service components. Bosnia, approach the level of synergis- 1970s and 1980s, Congress passed the Since 1990 the efforts of the tic joint operations. Synergistic joint Goldwater-Nichols Act to integrate in- Armed Forces have evolved from “spe- operations are mutually supporting in dividual service capabilities into a cialized” to slightly less than “synergis- that JFCs orchestrate separate service more efficient joint team. This law has tic” joint warfare. Operation Desert capabilities for common tactical objec- contributed to a number of joint oper- Storm represents specialized joint war- tives. Yet the lack of common joint ational successes, including Panama fare in that the coalition employed an doctrine has so far prevented the (1989), Kuwait and Iraq (1991), and impressive array of multinational, mul- Armed Forces from reaching the syner- Haiti (1994). tiservice, multidimensional, and multi- gistic joint level. functional forces with the common ob- To achieve Joint Vision 2010—the jective of ousting Iraq from Kuwait. The Chairman’s conceptual template for United States and its allies had the lux- how the military will channel re- ury of powerful, massed, sources and leverage technology for deeply redundant, separate greater joint effectiveness—we must be Evolution of Joint Operations services fighting in the same able to conduct coherent joint opera- battlespace. Service capabili- tions. JFCs must be able to integrate ties were deconflicted rather service capabilities to achieve common than integrated. tactical and operational objectives. Although specialized These integrated joint forces must ac- joint operations in the Per- commodate the natural battle rhythms sian Gulf clearly improved and cycles of land, sea, and air warfare. on multiservice operations At the current rate of progress, the prior to Goldwater-Nichols, U.S. military should achieve coherent the United States can no joint operations in five to seven years. longer afford the ineffi- By the early 21st century the Nation ciencies of a system that will have a joint integrated force that brings redundant forces to- can fully exploit the goals of JV 2010: gether for the first time on dominant maneuver, precision engage- the battlefield. ment, full-dimensional protection, and Joint operations since focused logistics. Desert Storm, such as Re- store Hope in Somalia, Up- hold Democracy in Haiti, and Joint Endeavor in

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Sheehan

th Soldiers and sailors 10 Mountain Division manning the rail of USS embarking during Dwight D. Eisenhower. Uphold Democracy. U.S. Navy (Robert N. Scoggin) U.S. Navy (Steve Enfield)

As principal advocate of JFI and The ACOM Role in JFI Joint Force Integration Process The time has come to merge these joint training, ACOM maximizes the unique capabilities of its service com- [CONUS-based forces] into a combatant Coherent Joint command whose principal purpose will be ponents (Forces Command, Atlantic Operations to ensure the joint training and joint Fleet, Marine Forces Atlantic, and Air readiness of our response forces. Combat Command) by melding their Develop combat elements into coherent joint Leaders —Colin L. Powell warfighting teams prior to deployment. Establish The need for U.S. Atlantic Com- Training mand (ACOM) surfaced in the Febru- Joint Force Integration Specify Materiel ary 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions, The process of ensuring interoper- Formulate and Functions of the Armed Forces of the ability and efficient use of the total force Organization United States prepared by the then takes place under the rubric of JFI. Four Develop Chairman, General Colin L. Powell. principles are used in achieving integra- Concept Faced with fewer forward-based forces tion and coherent joint operations: and recognizing the need to facilitate ■ future orientation—leveraging tech- JFI evolution, Powell recommended to nological advances the President and Secretary of Defense ■ full interoperability—enabling all and information technologies. Interop- that ACOM be established. ACOM as- joint and service systems to operate effec- erable technology will not assure suc- sumed its new responsibilities as joint tively together cess in itself. Our future joint forces ■ force integrator, trainer, and provider functionality across the conflict also need a sound conceptual frame- spectrum—providing a working capability of the majority of the Nation’s combat work, supported by common joint forces in the 1993 revision of the uni- to warfighters ■ enhanced competitive advantage— doctrine and logical procedures, to fied command plan. providing a significant edge over any adver- rapidly and efficiently acquire, dissem- As a natural extension of the con- sary. inate, and act on the critical sensor gressional intent to enhance jointness, and intelligence information that JFI also provides the intellectual the establishment of ACOM became passes through those systems. another milestone in DOD implemen- framework and vision to exploit com- tation of Goldwater-Nichols. petitive advantages in weapon, sensor,

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Amphibious assault vehicles, Agile Provider ’94.

Harrier hovering over USS Nassau. U.S. Navy (Robert N. Scoggin)

■ establish training—determine tasks, Training Analysis and Simulation Cen- conditions, and standards for using equip- ter (JTASC)—will possess the expertise ment and organization to support the con- to evaluate C4ISR tactical and opera- cept, and apply them during joint force tional concepts and identify technolo- training to personnel/units, both individu- gies which have the greatest potential ally and collectively, to accomplish the for warfighters. concept (includes establishing joint mission essential tasks and joint tactics, tech- ACOM is also working closely niques, and procedures) with the Joint Requirements Oversight ■ Council (JROC) and Joint Warfighting U.S. Marine Corps (Ronald Pixler) develop leaders—finally, educate leaders in the concept from purpose to the- Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams ory, organization to equipment, and train- on interoperability issues while striv- Conceptually, JFI may be viewed ing to application for continued success. ing to achieve information superiority as a five (but not necessarily sequen- and maintain it into the next century. 4 tial) step process. Joint Interoperability The Battlefield C I project has already completed one study and is pursuing ■ develop concept—formulate philoso- JFI requires the complete interoper- enhancements to the interoperability phy and/or doctrine, produce a plan of op- ability of weapons as well as command, 4 erations, determine overall costs and bene- control, communications, computers, of various C I systems available to fits, and select methods of employment intelligence, surveillance, and recon- joint commanders. ■ formulate organizational structure— naissance (C4ISR) systems. Due to lim- Moreover, ACOM is playing a design aspects of command and control, ited procurement funding and resiliency major role in ensuring that the quin- span of control (centralized versus decen- of legacy systems the lack of interoper- tessential joint operation, theater mis- tralized), layout, unit size and composition, ability remains a major obstacle to JFI. sile defense, fits into an overarching and tasks Many interoperability problems en- joint warfare construct. Another joint ■ specify material—identify require- countered during the Gulf War endure. initiative is the assessment of the limi- ments for equipment and/or weapons sup- tations and capabilities of offensive porting the concept and organizational As a key element, JFI seeks to minimize and defensive information warfare as structure (includes not only specific mater- problems caused by legacy systems ial, but numbers, force mix, interoperabil- while moving toward an efficient and re- seen from the perspective of theater ity, support systems, and C4I to sustain new sponsive battlefield C4ISR architecture CINCs on both the strategic and opera- or emerging technology) with “plug and fight” systems. tional levels. In the future, the Joint Battle Cen- ter—an activity of the Joint Staff which is collocated with the ACOM Joint

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Sheehan

frequency and size of the field exercises have been dramatically reduced and refocused. Tier 3 stresses training JTF commanders and staffs by combining tailored doctrinal instruction with operations order development. A realistic computer-aided command post exercise then tests the operations order. The Unified Endeavor (UE) series of exercises serves as the primary vehicle and provides truly “postgraduate level” JTF staff instruction without the cost of large field exercises. In each training program ACOM pursues an aggressive after-action reporting process to evaluate and provide rapid feedback on joint doctrine development and interoperability. Marines casting off The centerpiece for tier-3 JTF train- during Revised ing is JTASC, where advanced modeling Capabilities. and simulation technology, distributed U.S. Marine Corps (C.D. Clark) secure communications (including video teleconferencing), and other C4I capabilities allow commands from In support of joint interoperabil- process to effectively and efficiently around the world, including support- ity, ACOM is sponsoring a series of ad- meet these training needs while reducing and supported CINCs, to partic- vanced concept and technology ing OPTEMPO and costs. This process ipate in these challenging and realistic is built on a comprehen- exercises. the joint training and exercise process sive list of common joint Using complex scenarios based on must focus on the requirements of mission essential tasks real-world threat, environmental, and (JMETS), developed in con- terrain data bases, JTASC provides both supported CINCs cert with supported CINCs, JTF commanders and staffs with an en- with designated conditions vironment in which to work through a demonstrations (ACTDs) in collabora- and measurable standards. wide range of organizational, operation with the Advanced Research Pro- To focus on the requirements of tional, equipment, and doctrinal issues ject Agency. Such demonstrations need supported CINCs, ACOM identified ranging from strategic and theater-lift a joint advocate to rapidly field the types of training already being limitations to rules of engagement, promising technologies that comple- conducted and where jointness needed joint target selection, and the place- ment overarching joint warfighting to be emphasized—primarily at the ment and use of fire support coordina- concepts such as battlefield C4I inter- joint task force level. A three-tier tion lines (FSCL). UE exercises at JTASC operability. One example is the Preda- model was built onto the existing field afford an invaluable means of assessing tor unmanned aerial vehicle. and service-specific training. joint doctrine in a realistic environment The tier 1 foundation is where sol- short of actual combat. As General Hart- Joint Training and Exercises diers, sailors, marines, airmen, and zog, commander of U.S. Army Training To convert a plan from a forced entry op- coastguardsmen gain core competen- and Doctrine Command and formerly eration into one conducted in an atmos- cies by training on service mission es- the first ACOM deputy commander in phere of cooperation and coordination, sential tasks. In tier 2, joint interoper- chief, often points out: “Doctrine... within a period of about 10–12 hours, ability training is achieved through represents a consensus of how forces and to get the word down to the lowest field training exercises based on a list conduct operations today....[It] levels of those who had to execute, could of critical interoperability tasks from evolves as questions about concepts are only be done by a team that had trained supported CINCs. ACOM assigns train- answered or as concepts are validated together—not only in each of the services, ing objectives, coordinates component through analyses, experiments, exer- but trained in a joint environment. participation, provides joint trans- cises, or actual operations.” —Henry H. Shelton portation funding, assists with joint Another major benefit of JTF exercise control groups, and assesses training at JTASC is that we no longer The joint training and exercise joint doctrine and interoperability. The have to field an army to train a gen- process must focus on requirements of eral. In addition to cost savings, we supported CINCs. ACOM has devel- also reduce PERSTEMPO and family oped a joint requirements-based separation time on heavily tasked

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U.S. Atlantic Command

FORSCOM (Fort McPherson, GA) 95°W 100°E 6 Divisions 11 Separate Brigades/Regiments 199,700 AC Soldiers 628,000 RC Soldiers

LANTFLT (Norfolk, VA) 6 Battle Groups 5 Amphibious Groups 124,200 AC Sailors 112,500 RC Sailors IntegratorIntegrator Trainer

ACC (Langley Air Force Base, VA) 17 Fighter/Bomber/Composite Wings 91,100 AC Airmen 95,800 RC Airmen Provider

MARFORLANT (Camp Lejeune, NC) 1 Division 1 Wing 47,000 AC Marines 42,200 RC Marines 30°W17°E

troops. The focus is on JTF comman- Future joint operations are likely to must reduce duplication and become ders, staffs, and C4I systems instead of be combined as well and require exten- more efficient. We must do what cor- soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. sive interagency participation and coor- porations have done over the past Combat forces can then devote limited dination. Therefore the next step in en- decade—restructure for a changed training time and resources to improv- hancing joint force readiness will be to world, focus on core competencies, ing combat skills rather than serving as coordinate joint training and integra- and shed overhead that does not add exercise training aids for JTF staffs. tion with combined and interagency value. training and exercises. Our recent ef- To maximize the capabilities of a Beyond Joint forts in Haiti, along with the Implemen- smaller force, remaining forces must While perfecting JFI, we must un- tation Force experience in Bosnia, pro- share technological improvements derstand that forces will continue to vide us with the seasoning to fulfill that across the board. By leveraging tech- operate in complex environments. In important training mission. nology to reduce unnecessary and bur- addition to preparing active duty per- densome command layers, improving sonnel, a growing DOD dependence Joint Integration and Efficiency joint training and exercises, and en- on the Reserve components demands Congress enacted Goldwater- couraging much greater efficiency in that the training and readiness of Re- Nichols shortly after the high-water joint logistics, we can modernize and serve forces and National Guard units mark was reached in the defense still maintain a robust combat force parallel that of the active components. buildup during the Reagan administra- structure. Training and readiness oversight (TRO) tion. Over the last ten years, budget re- is a critical step in bringing Reserve ductions have reduced our combat The changed security environ- component forces into the total joint force structure by more than 36 per- ment, combined with rapid advances force structure. TRO presents CINCs cent. DOD procurement has sunk to its in communications and weapons tech- with both extraordinary challenges lowest level since before the Korean nology and mounting fiscal con- and opportunities. ACOM will work to War, while increased OPTEMPO is straints, are pushing the Armed Forces develop the highest level of joint inte- wearing out equipment at an acceler- toward greater integration. In future gration possible while also maintain- ated rate. conflicts, smaller forces will have to ar- ing the cost effectiveness of Reserve Clearly, resources are insufficient rive in-theater ready to fight as a joint forces. We will also strive to match Re- to allow each of the services to main- team. For that reason, we must con- serve readiness to active standards tain its current force structure, mod- tinue to work toward achieving coher- where possible. ernize, sustain combat readiness, and ent joint operations. perform all required missions. Thus we The unique position of ACOM as a geographic unified command with combatant control of the majority of

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Sheehan

C–5 unloading at Port-au-Prince. U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)U.S. Air Force

will allow us to pre- joint force integration is not only the The Changing Equation of Combat serve deployable most efficient way to fight but can combat force struc- help solve growing budget problems ture while reducing MASS unnecessary overhead that adds cost Fundamental changes in the key terms of the equation the Nation’s combat capability and the but little value. Preserving mission to train, integrate, and provide combat force structure is essen- joint forces to other forward CINCs, tial if we are to build a capable Persian puts it in the forefront of fulfilling Joint force for the future. Tomor- World Gulf Future Combat Operations War II Vision 2010. This blend of geographic row’s leaders—the young War and functional responsibilities gives a NCOs—can only learn their warfighting and joint orientation to the profession in combat com- Time is the critical, but ACOM staff. Lessons learned from ac- mands and not in the growing implicit parameter tual operations such as Haiti and the number of redundant staff po- Unified Endeavor exercises have im- sitions. PRECISION proved our effectiveness in training as This Nation deserves a well as in providing joint forces to more effective combat capabil- other warfighting CINCs. By working ity which is affordable in both to make the most effective and efficient dollars and casualties. Fortunately, use of combat capabilities, ACOM seeks Goldwater-Nichols provides us with to be a model for the future. the legislative framework to address Focusing on core competencies many of the structural challenges we and technology will reduce unneces- face today, and JFI provides us with the sary command layers, streamline the process if we intend to shape our decision cycle of JTF commanders, and forces for the challenges of the 21st generate coordinated maneuver and century. JFQ precision strike battle rhythms. Joint force integration is not only the most efficient way to fight but can help solve growing budget problems. JFI

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PACOM planning and actions. For PACOM, the demise of the Soviet threat over the last decade has not diminished Warfighting the fundamental significance of the Goldwater-Nichols Act as joint operators and relations with other service CINCs staffs evolve to the right level. Jointness in PACOM Earlier this year, the People’s Re- in a New Era public of China (PRC) conducted a series of large-scale military exercises By JOSEPH W. PRUEHER along their coastline opposite Taiwan. Although Washington did not believe that China intended to use military force directly, it assessed the exercises as provocative and publicly denounced them. The United States made it clear that it would oppose attempts by ei- Shortly after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols ther Beijing or Taipei to forcibly change the status quo. When PRC bal- Act in 1986, Admiral Ronald J. Hays, commander listic missile tests were announced in chief, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), called close to Taiwanese ports—30 kilometers north, 50 kilometers southwest— the law a “profound document.” In his view, it PACOM responded by sending the USS codified “relationships, procedures, and authority Independence carrier battle group to the vicinity. This force deployed in support that every unified commander ought to have had of the basic U.S. interest of maintain- even before the act was passed.” He praised the ing peace and stability in the region. On May 23, despite PRC exercises and legislation for clearly putting unified comman- missile tests, Taiwan conducted the ders in charge of designated areas of responsibil- first popular election of a Chinese leader in history. ity and making them accountable. This measured but firm action on Congress drafted the reorganiza- the part of PACOM, intended to en- tion legislation with a Cold War para- courage restraint from both parties, digm as the backdrop. It expected the was possible largely because of the act to strengthen the ability of the clear chain of command established by Pentagon to deter and defeat Soviet ag- the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Communi- gression. However, the cation channels efficiently supported CINCs confront regions payoff of Goldwater- the chain of command. Direct discus- Nichols came about in a sions between the Chairman and in which the range and different security envi- CINC ensured that theater assessments pace of operations have ronment. Today the geo- and recommendations were repre- graphic CINCs confront sented in the interagency process, and increased less stable, more dy- decisions by the National Command namic regions in which Authorities were passed along precisely the range and pace of military opera- as intended. tions have increased. Furthermore, the Within theater, the Joint Intelli- pace and importance of peacetime ac- gence Center Pacific (JICPAC)—the tivities have placed added burdens on PACOM multiservice intelligence fu- unified command staffs and forces. sion center—played a major role in as- Despite these myriad changes, the sessing the situation. Its products were Goldwater-Nichols prescriptions for among those forwarded to and used by unified commands defense and other officials in formulat- fit this new era as ing U.S. response options. JICPAC and Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN, is commander in chief, well as they did the counterpart organizations in other uni- U.S. Pacific Command, and formerly served as vice chief of old one. Jointness is fied commands exemplify increased naval operations. strongly rooted in

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Prueher U.S. Navy Responsibility-Authority Mismatch USS Rainier replenish- ing HMAS Sidney and hen I was commander in chief of U.S. Southern Command in the mid-1980s, President Rea- USCG Sherman. gan’s decisions to train Salvadoran forces in the United States as well as Honduras and deploy U.S. troops to Honduras sharply divided Congress. With all the services scheduled to partic- W Admiral Larson explained the ra- ipate, disagreements also arose at the Pentagon. This deployment was an “unprogrammed requirement” for the services, disrupting plans and diverting funds from other activities. Indecorous squabbling broke out tionale for this system: “During the among the Joint Staff and service staffs in Washington which demanded more time and effort from my staff Cold War, each service had a theater- in Panama than did coping with problems in Central America. wide commander in the operational My headquarters staff included fewer than 150 officers, with an average rank of captain or major. chain, interposing three headquarters There were two other assigned flag officers: an Air Force two-star and an Army one-star. The former was my between me and the troops in the air component commander and the latter headed my land component and the brigade which defended the field. We’ve developed a new organiza- canal. My maritime component commander was a Navy captain. tion to deal with the most likely threat Each component commander reported to a four-star service commander in the United States for of the future—regional contingencies.” funds, personnel matters, and guidance on priorities. Those service commanders established the length of He stated in his end of tour report temporary duty for servicemembers, constrained flying hours per month for aircraft in theater, set training that, “Nothing we’ve accomplished in objectives, and controlled allocations for base support and maintenance. Time and again their wishes took precedence over mine. Hence, I became a staunch advocate of reforms to assign genuine authority to each PACOM over the last three years has regional CINC commensurate with his responsibilities. contributed more to the jointness, readiness, and agility of my forces than —General Paul F. Gorman, USA (Ret.) the implementation of the two-tiered C2 structure.” Improving on the lessons learned emphasis on jointly produced, all- and responsibility to a subordinate from employing the two-tiered com- source intelligence for joint force com- commander.” To address the need for mand and control concept, PACOM manders. Joint intelligence centers, cre- responsive and efficient joint actions uses three interrelated measures to en- ated primarily from service component on the operational level—where strate- sure JTF success. First, potential JTF resources, are fully consistent with gic requirements are connected to tac- headquarters are preselected. Com- Goldwater-Nichols. tical activities—PACOM instituted a mands so designated include I and III two-tiered command and control (C2) Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), Two-Tiered Command concept in 1991 under Admiral Third and Seventh Fleets, I Corps, and Control Charles Larson. Put simply, a specific Alaska Command, and Special Opera- Joint Pub 3–0, Doctrine for Joint short-term mission is assigned to a tions Command, Pacific. Second, pre- Operations, enables combatant com- joint task force (JTF) commander who designated commanders and staffs par- manders to “directly control the con- reports directly to CINCPAC. ticipate in CINC-assisted seminars and duct of military operations,” as Gen- exercises to practice crisis action proce- eral Schwarzkopf did in the Persian dures as a JTF headquarters. Third, the Gulf War, or “delegate that authority CINCPAC staff, assisted by service

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CH–47s during CJTFEX ’96. II MEF Combat Camera (A. Olguin)

action planning and JTF organization RAAF personnel as well as specialized coverage of joint positioning cannon during Pitch Black ’96, intelligence, logistics, and personnel management. northern Australia. Gempis) (Val U.S. Air Force The augmentees who will round out JTF staffs during crises support component and supporting CINCs, The training program includes a much of this training. Repetitive sup- both staffs and trains a cadre of cycle of seminars, command post exer- port from trainers/mentors during sem- roughly 150 potential augmentees. A cises (CPXs), and field training exer- inars, CPXs, and FTXs not only makes tailored group of about 40 personnel, cises (FTXs) that help a single-service these augmentees proficient but pro- selected from this cadre, would aug- motes standardization across ment the JTF staff in a crisis. JTF training creates the trust needed PACOM. Finally, since these By predesignating JTF headquar- for full and rapid assimilation specially trained officers and ters, commanders and staffs of single- NCOs bring expertise and service commands can take a fore- skills to JTF commanders, not handed approach to preparing for joint staff to report directly to the unified as liaison officers but as integrated staff operations. These existing commanders command level and control joint oper- members, JTF training creates the trust and staffs know the area, people, and ations. Tailored for a designated com- needed for full and rapid assimilation. issues but are staffed, trained, and mand based on an assessment of its Feedback from commanders and equipped to function only as service joint mission essential task list external evaluators confirms the tactical and operational headquarters. (JMETL), training normally includes soundness of this “train the way you’ll Accordingly, they require personnel headquarters-wide topics such as crisis fight” concept and JTF preparation augmentation, JTF-specific training, measures. After a recent PACOM-spon- and some added equipment to func- sored CPX (Tempest Express 96–3) at tion as JTFs on short notice. Fort Lewis, Lieutenant General Glenn

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Prueher

with a tremendous number of joint Marines landing on warfighting tasks, they remain predom- Kauai, Hawaii, during inantly single-service manned. The RIMPAC ’96. next step should push joint personnel manning to JTF-level operators, concur- rent with a scrub of real joint billets. In PACOM exercise after-action reporting, JTF commanders highlighted a need for resident sister-service expertise to complement the infusion of joint personnel they receive during crisis augmentation. The PACOM solution is an interdepartmental exchange of officers at the major/lieutenant colonel and lieutenant commander/ commander levels. These officers would be assigned to key billets to provide potential JTF commanders daily access to experts in sister-service capabilities, limitations, and employment doctrine. U.S. Central Command re- U.S. Navy (Jeffrey S. Viano) cently implemented a similar exchange focused at the service component level. Marsh, the commanding general of I Fleets and other JTFs working in coali- Cross-service assignment pro- Corps, observed, “I am more con- tion scenarios. grams already exist, primarily in the vinced than ever that this type of joint While the theater staff benefits functional area of tactical fire support. training is some of the best and most from participation in JTF exercises, For example, the Air Force assigns air useful that we do, and it goes a long scheduling difficulties may preclude liaison officers and tactical control par- way toward building the personal and the unified command level from be- ties to Army units at various levels, professional relationships among our coming fully involved. A simulated or and the Army allots ground liaison of- staffs which are necessary for success.” “virtual staff” could readily substitute ficers to Air Force fighter and airlift Although PACOM has advanced for an engaged headquarters or even units. Other programs support cross- its thinking related to training needs facilitate multiple, simultaneous disservice attachment on a mission basis on both of these tiers, JTF training is tributed JTF exercises. such as Marine air-naval gunfire liai- clearly work in progress. Acting closely Theater staffs will normally cover son and naval fire support officers to with U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM), overhead issues such as scenario devel- Army units. the future JTF training picture will re- opment, exercise control, role playing, A workable concept would involve sult in a more efficient and effective and evaluation with in-house person- one to three officers per service on each program to capitalize on ACOM invest- nel. Drawing on the ACOM training potential JTF staff. The exchanges ments and capabilities for PACOM the- orientation, the theater CINC’s staff would be zero-sum actions. Staffs gain ater-specific JTF training and augmen- would be freed from some routine exer- the same number they provide. As- tation experience. cise overhead. Both tiers—unified com- signed full-time exchange officers For example, combining ACOM mand and JTF headquarters—could would work routine actions but spend core JTF train-up with theater-specific then fully engage in the exercise play. most of their time on joint matters. CPXs/FTXs would expose staffs to stan- This influx of service expertise will dardized instruction while focusing on Cross-Department Assignments make JTF staffs more responsive in ini- region-unique scenarios, environ- We must broaden the joint officer tial crisis action planning and more ef- ments, and plans. CPXs reaching back management system to complement fective in integrating joint capabilities electronically to the Joint Training the progress made in training to in- during mission execution. Analysis and Simulation Center in Suf- clude the second tier, JTFs. Although Such assignments would provide folk, Virginia, would not only be more unified command staffs benefitted joint experience and meet the intent of efficient in some aspects but allow a from Goldwater-Nichols improvements Goldwater-Nichols with respect to joint JTF commander and staff to conduct in joint personnel management, JTF duty. Accordingly, they should be fa- joint/combined operations using or- staffs did not. While we charge JTFs vorably considered as joint billets by ganic C4I systems from deployed loca- the joint duty assignment list (JDAL) re- tions. This is particularly critical for view board. Once the billets are added afloat staffs of the Third and Seventh to the list, the services can give joint service credit to officers who fill them.

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This concept meets the Goldwa- Recent JROC staff visits to CINCs, in- Beyond doubt, Goldwater-Nichols ter-Nichols goal of enhancing the ef- tended to solicit front-end and mid- has been, and continues to be, a posi- fectiveness of military operations with course recommendations, have in- tive influence on unified commands the current reality that they are and creased CINC participation in the and the resulting joint awareness and will continue to be conducted through studies well before they were called on culture. The act’s intent for a clear JTFs. Used in conjunction with a JTF to vote. chain of command has been evident in augmentation, cross-department staff- CINCs must engage appropriately the application of supporting policies ing of predesignated JTF headquarters in the resource allocation process to and doctrine, as the recent crisis in the would reduce the turbulence of ad hoc procure tomorrow’s forces while main- Taiwan Strait and every contingency attachment during the critical initial taining their respective fundamental over the past decade has underscored. phase of a contingency. command warfighting focus on em- Other intentions—such as improving ploying today’s forces. This involves the military advice the Chairman pro- Resource Allocation balancing current and future readiness, vides to civilian leaders, placing clear Two-tiered command and control which both fall within their purview. responsibility and authority for mission as well as cross-service assignments As warfighters, CINCs have to ask for accomplishment on the combatant represent advances in the joint agenda. what they need to accomplish their commander, using defense resources The defense resource allocation system missions, but not more. They must more efficiently, and improving the also continues to evolve and gain fame state their requirements precisely so joint officer personnel management because every American identifies with their instructions are not used to sup- system—have been equally successful. its bottom line—the dollar. port every conceivable program. Insa- There is, however, room for re- Today the resource allocation tiable appetites for more, new, and finement even where much has been process blends the intent of Goldwa- faster things do not help—and hedg- achieved. Preparing JTFs for contin- ter-Nichols by providing for more effi- ing on “more is better” is not the an- gency operations, improving the input cient use of defense resources and as- swer either. of the CINCs to the resource allocation signing clear responsibility and Two modifications in the resource process, and evolving to the correct commensurate authority to CINCs. allocation process would enable the balance for CINC responsibility and The Vice Chairman heads the Joint Re- unified commands to provide better accountability for both a long- and quirements Oversight Council (JROC), input. First, the Vice Chairman recom- near-term view of his AOR are three mended a standardized such areas. As Admiral Hays prophe- format for CINC inte- sied in 1988, “I believe that it will be CINCs have to ask for what they need to grated priority lists—an another five, perhaps even ten years accomplish their missions, but not more inventory of the com- before the full impact of Goldwater- batant commander’s Nichols sets in.” His call was about highest priority require- right. JFQ which helps the Chairman develop ments across service and functional programmatic advice for civilian lead- lines and defining shortfalls in key ers. The former as well as current Vice programs. This will allow JROC to Chairmen, Admiral Bill Owens and more clearly identify CINC consensus, General Joe Ralston, have made con- which would add potency to the certed efforts to incorporate CINC in- Chairman’s advice to the Secretary of puts to the Chairman’s advice. Defense on requirements, programs, As the JROC process evolves, and budgets. A format that provides a CINCs will have enhanced opportuni- rank ordering from one to twenty-five ties for “front-end” inputs while decid- with only one “system” per rank ing what to do. For example, CINCs re- would force the hard choices. After all, port readiness shortfalls to the resource allocation boils down to Chairman through the joint monthly tough decisions on offsets. readiness review (JMRR). Historically, This leads to the second recom- some 75 percent of JMRR issues require mendation. Future JWCA teams should programmatic rather than operational identify alternatives and present asso- solutions. The Chairman directed that ciated impacts—that is, cost savings such programmatic issues flow directly and resulting shortfalls—to allow into the resource allocation system. CINCs to make better informed The entry point will be the joint war- choices. Eventually, as analyses mature fare capabilities assessments (JWCA), and JWCAs begin cross-functional analytical efforts that support JROC. studies, such an approach will be necessary to assess macro offsets to support our mutual goals.

52 JFQ / Autumn 1996 Snider/Forum 12/9/96 11:43 AM Page 53 U.S. Navy (Jeffrey Viano) Emergence of the Joint Officer

By HOWARD D. GRAVES and DON M. SNIDER

Both the form and substance of professional military education (PME) have been subjected to basic and revolutionary reforms in recent years. The farsighted Goldwater-Nichols Act, though hotly debated and strongly resisted at the time of its passage, mandated and catalyzed this change. Initially the law had little appeal to the military departments. Today each service accepts, indeed embraces, these reforms because their contribution to the effectiveness of joint warfare outweighs the new burdens which they have admittedly placed on the services.1

PME reforms were the result of Recalling that the military is de- two profound and complementary fined, as well as delimited, by its exper- thrusts found in title IV of Goldwater- tise in military science and that this ex- Nichols that dealt with officer person- pertise is an intrinsic part of the nel policy. The first, which addressed self-concept of the officer corps and its form or process, created joint specialty relationship to the state, it is easy to see officers (JSOs) and imposed criteria for the prescient mutual significance of their selection, education, utilization, these two new thrusts in PME. To- Lieutenant General Howard D. Graves, and promotion. The second, one of gether, they have produced joint offi- USA (Ret.), served as superintendent substance, revamped the content of cers of a kind rarely before found in our of the U.S. Military Academy where military science as it applies to the ed- military institutions and culture. Some Don M. Snider is currently the Olin ucation of JSOs through its focus on professor of national security studies. emerging joint doctrine.

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may disagree with this characterization been neither joint educational programs Institutional Costs by pointing out that Goldwater- nor required standards The services have adapted to the ■ mandated promotion policy objec- Nichols only defined new duty posi- new realities of Goldwater-Nichols, but tives for officers in joint duty assignments, tions and educational requirements. not without costs. The requirement to But they misunderstand the revolution- objectives directing that as a group these officers should be promoted at a rate compa- assign promising officers to joint bil- ary nature of what has occurred in the rable to officers serving on service staffs in lets who otherwise would receive posi- joint arena over the last ten years—the the military departments tions which their service deemed im- clear emergence of a new culture ■ required newly promoted flag and portant to its own missions has among the leaders of the Armed Forces. general officers to attend the Capstone complicated personnel management. This new culture is truly joint. It is course, which is designed specifically to pre- The increased quality of officers serv- evidenced in the experiences of officers pare them to work with all the services ing in joint assignments resulted in a who have been educated and served in ■ designated a PME focal point in the corresponding decline in the overall vice director, Operational Plans and Inter- joint billets, many during operations in quality of service headquarters and op- Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, operability (J-7), Joint Staff, who is dual- hatted as the deputy director, Joint Staff, for erational staffs, a cost more quickly Haiti, and Bosnia.2 The reforms intro- military education and oversees the Military recognized by some services than oth- duced under Goldwater-Nichols are not Education Division (J-7). ers. Further complications have arisen the sole cause of this emerging joint over the time officers spend outside Moreover, a program for joint ed- culture, but they were vital in facilitat- their services for joint PME and in ucation has evolved into a PME frame- ing the learning experience through joint duty assignments, which in work which relates five educational which it is being nurtured. many cases now approaches 20 percent levels to career phases (namely, pre- Joint culture continues to emerge. of professional careers. commissioning, primary, intermediate, Its ultimate impact on the individual The third cost has been an unre- senior, and general/flag officer), each services is not yet fully known, nor is lenting increase in the number of joint with its own mandated learning areas the ethos it advocates. One outcome billets, more than 10 percent over the and objectives.3 appears certain: the next logical steps last six years alone, a period in which in the evolution of joint PME will pre- the services markedly reduced their sent serious challenges. As we face the next logical steps in the strength in officers. Lastly, inflexibility them, it is vital—especially for younger evolution of joint PME will in managing JSO assignments and in- officers—to recall that the Armed creased turbulence because of the re- Forces successfully adapted to new represent serious challenges quirement to attend phase II of the alities under title IV of the Goldwater- program for joint education (PJE) dur- Nichols Act. ing twelve weeks in residence at the These provisions, with others too Armed Forces Staff College constitute Influences on PME numerous to detail here, linked assign- ongoing costs to the services. ments, education, and promotion po- The principal changes brought Notwithstanding their expense, tential to joint duty. The law had re- about in joint PME under Goldwater- these reforms have been so fruitful markable effects on service policies Nichols include actions that: that on balance the result has been the relating to professional development. ■ established the Chairman as princi- emergence of a new joint culture. The services had to adjust traditions, pal adviser to the President and Secretary of America’s evolving approach to war- particularly the convention that officers Defense on all military issues including fare, which is increasingly joint in all did not serve outside their service nor PME (previously the domain of the corpo- respects, has been supported, even led their tight-knit career specialty lest they rate JCS) and facilitated, by officers profession- ■ defined “joint matters” for educa- fall behind their contemporaries who ally educated and employed under tional and other purposes as relating to the remained in the service’s mainstream. Goldwater-Nichols. integrated employment of land, sea, and air To effect change in the services, Ultimately, the benefit of PME re- forces in the areas of national military strat- Goldwater-Nichols needed to define forms must be measured against the egy, strategic and contingency planning, the nature of joint officer development performance of the Armed Forces in and command and control of combat oper- and create institutional incentives suf- ations under unified command, whereas be- defending and furthering national in- ficient to promote its ultimate legiti- fore they were not clearly defined and tradi- terests. In this case the record is clear: macy.4 As indicated, it did this initially tionally included only joint planning better officers, better prepared for joint by linking assignments, education, and ■ created a JSO career track to im- force employments, with markedly later promotion potential. In subse- prove the quality and performance of offi- better results in integrating service ca- cers assigned to joint duty; mandated that quent years, the effectiveness of joint pabilities on the battlefields and in re- critical positions identified in joint organi- combat operations has been even more gional conflicts. zations be filled only with JSOs contingent powerful in persuading officers that With so much successful adapta- upon their completion of joint PME joint duty is both personally fulfilling tion over the past decade, is joint PME ■ mandated maintaining “rigorous and career enhancing. standards” at joint PME institutions for ed- now established for the decades ahead? ucating JSOs, where previously there had

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If not, what issues should occupy those significance of those inter- responsible for preparing officers for ests. Thus these missions joint duty? Two broad sets of ongoing must be conducted swiftly changes in the security environment and efficiently, with even create challenges for designers of joint a higher premium on pre- PME. The first relates to future missions conflict integration of ser- of the Armed Forces—those purposes vice capabilities and joint for which the Nation will employ the training readiness. Fur- military in the next millennium. The thermore, they are likely second centers on the response of to have limited objectives Western democracies, including the and be of short duration, United States, to a new security envi- creating the aura of con- ronment and its implications for civil- stabulary missions.7 military relations. The tensions within these evolving missions al- Future Missions ready are, and will con- With respect to missions of the fu- tinue to be, quite real for ture, it would appear that within the officers. Will core compe- residual, state-centric international sys- tencies and self-concepts Medics carrying tem, conflicts among major powers will be focused on the role of Signal Company, Combat Camera (Brian Gavin)Signal Company, wounded Haitian. 5 th

be the exception. But nonstate actors the warrior or on that of 55 have increasingly created capabilities the constable and peace- which endanger U.S. and allied inter- keeper? Most OOTW mis- ests in widely separated regions. sions have also called for decentralized set of ongoing changes that will influ- Threats exist along two vastly different mission execution. This dispersion re- ence joint PME—the nature of the re- segments of the conflict spectrum: at quires greater political-military sophis- sponses by democratic governments, the low end with operations other than tication in younger officers, to include including the United States, to changes war (OOTW), and at the high end—be- direct contact with the media, non-gov- in security imperatives. yond conventional war as seen in re- ernmental organizations, and foreign gions like the Persian Gulf—through governments, as well as coping with A New Environment the proliferation of weapons of mass the inherent ambiguities and complexi- Democratic responses can be ag- destruction (WMD), some potentially ties of such international operations. gregated into four areas, each diverging to nonstate actors. Recent sharply from the patterns of the past OOTW missions which five decades, and with some quite im- have involved joint forces— will core competencies be focused on portant differences between America in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, the role of the warrior or on that of and its allies. First, the resources being Bosnia, Liberia—contrast allocated to national security have been sharply with the focus of the constable and peacekeeper sharply reduced and will remain so the Cold War era and the re- until a new threat to our vital interests gional conflict in the Gulf that immedi- Such missions also require officers of emerges for which elected governments ately followed it. But in fact they have exemplary character since the ambigui- can extract the necessary resources been the normal missions of the Armed ties and complexities of international from internally oriented publics.8 Cou- Forces save for the historical anomaly operations often have a moral-ethical pled with the requirement for political of the Cold War.6 character, and joint commanders must legitimacy in the use of military force, The need to be prepared for vastly work with foreign officers whose cul- as observed in the Gulf War and Bosnia, contrasting missions—from OOTW to ture and institutions reflect a different this means that Western democracies regional war with WMD or a return to value orientation. will fight future conflicts with political- major power competitions—poses sig- Since the Nation will always military coalitions.9 nificant challenges for joint PME. First, rightly expect that its Armed Forces be Secondly, unlike the Cold War era since OOTW missions do not usually prepared across the full spectrum of of long-standing coalitions, the future involve our vital interests (with the ex- potential conflict, the success of future norm will consist of ad hoc and condi- ception of international terrorism), the adaptations of joint PME may well de- tional commitments by democratic polity will expect them to be achieved pend on how this dilemma is resolved. governments, again as seen in the Gulf without casualties and other costs The challenge will consist of further War and recent OOTW missions. The which are not commensurate with the developing competencies for new, lim- implications for joint PME are clear. ited missions while enhancing joint For every joint concept, doctrine, or warfighting—a daunting task given the course, the United States must develop likelihood of continuing resource constraints. This brings us to the second

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missions for which they are relatively least suited, consuming even greater The Desirability of Joint Duty—1982 shares of declining resources. This is more true of the most critical asset for oint assignments are seldom sought by officers. A joint position removes them from the environment change: the focus of senior military for which they have been trained, in which they have established relationships and reputations, and in leaders.12 Thus, unless resourced and Jwhich they seek advancement. It places them instead in a wholly new environment involving unfamil- iar procedures and issues for which most of them have little or no formal training. Their fitness reports nurtured by them, PME may regress (which affect their careers and prospects for advancement) are often entrusted to officers of other services from the notable strides made under with little in common by way of professional background. Goldwater-Nichols.13 Adding to these concerns is the perception that much of the work on the Joint Staff is unproductive, and that too much effort is wasted on tedious negotiation of issues until they have been debased and re- Overarching Challenges duced to the “lowest common level of assent.” Regardless of which future un- The general perception among officers is that a joint assignment is one to be avoided. In fact, within folds, those responsible for PME will one service it is flatly believed to be the “kiss of death” as far as a continued military career is concerned. In face two transcending and thus key contrast, service assignments are widely perceived as offering much greater possibilities for concrete ac- challenges. The first is retaining the complishments and career enhancement. As a result, many fine officers opt for service assignments rather than risk a joint-duty assignment. Yet joint positions have the potential for making major contributions to the right balance between service and defense effort, and offer challenging work to the finest officers. joint/combined PME. The second and more important is maximizing the —Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Study Group, contribution of joint PME to the The Organization and Functions of the JCS (1982) moral-ethical development of officers. At the “point of the spear” in joint warfighting are service capabilities that enable the Armed Forces to conduct parallel combined capabilities in con- well as influencing officer attitudes and land, sea, and air operations in succes- cert with its allies. Those responsible perceptions toward fundamental shifts sive and successful battles. Developing for joint PME should urgently consider in military doctrine and organization.11 and educating officers in the integrated the profound implications of the rapid But the success of such investments in employment of these capabilities, joint internationalization of U.S. military in- human capital is problematic at best or combined, should not serve to di- stitutions and processes. given the political clout of congres- minish core service capabilities. PME The third response is the evolving sional-industrial interests that favor should not become too joint. If it does, specialization in U.S. military capabili- spending on defense hardware and soft- the profession of arms could be criti- ties vis-à-vis those of our allies. Basically, ware. Thus, only at senior levels where cized for “majoring in minors.” Calls Washington has indicated its intention the civilian and military leadership for substantial amounts of joint educa- to maintain a high-tech competitive ad- make these trade offs can the specific tion down to the precommissioning vantage—in pursuit of a revolution in challenge from a potential RMA to joint level, among other initiatives, could military affairs (RMA)—whereas other PME be met. rapidly lead to that point. By contrast, nations, with the possible exception of In the fourth area of response, our service culture and interservice compe- France and Japan, have eschewed such a allies have significantly reshaped their tition, especially on the tactical level, role. Unfortunately, any intention to force structures, in some cases even are constructive aspects of maintaining adapt and reshape the Armed Forces making changes in reserves and con- an effective defense establishment.14 through an RMA is unresourced as yet. scription, although America has done Of course such competition at Further, developments to date indicate little. The most notable examples are higher levels has occasionally gotten an asymmetric application of RMA ca- Britain and France, who have exten- out of bounds, such as when con- pabilities across the conflict spectrum, sively reduced and reorganized their strained resources inflame it, and per- with few benefits for OOTW, currently militaries. France even announced the haps could once again. On the other the most frequent grounds for employ- end of obligatory national service. hand, officer education is not the most ing joint capabilities. Collectively, the implications of effective method to deal with per- Since joint PME operates at the in- these responses for PME—at service, ceived excesses in interservice rivalry. tersection of intellectual development joint, and combined levels—are omi- Effective civilian leadership, which can and operational art, adapting to an RMA nous. Just as role specialization, a po- easily channel such competition to requires the formation of officers who tential RMA, and sharp declines in re- constructive adaptations and innova- are analytic, pragmatic, innovative, and sources are making adaptation, tions, is a more appropriate corrective. broadly educated.10 History teaches that innovation, and reshaping more criti- Civilian leadership cannot, how- effective PME—though insufficient by cal to military institutions—processes ever, effectively address the second itself—has proven to be necessary for historically facilitated by PME—the challenge. The moral-ethical dimen- military innovation, experimentation, Armed Forces are heavily engaged in sion of military service, vital in educat- and adaptation. This resulted primarily ing officers, is inherently part of the when PME provided the dual benefits of “contract” that the Armed Forces have training in new factual knowledge as maintained with the Nation. Were the

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military to abrogate that pledge, as re- An overriding need exists to 4 That such institutional change is pos- cent actions by a few officers have imbue joint PME with an ethos which sible, even predictable, is well documented. demonstrated, it would cease to be a is suited to the emerging culture. The For example, see Deborah Avant, Political In- profession. It would become unattrac- moral-ethical development of leaders, stitutions and Military Change: Lessons from tive to those who might wish to serve their education in character, occurs the Peripheral Wars (Ithaca: Cornell Univer- sity Press, 1994). and unsupported by those it is dedi- much more in the field and fleet than 5 Among many works on this subject, cated to protect. Furthermore, and in academic settings. But knowledge of see Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation aside from this contract, officers have ethics and values, which can be con- of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), always had to act with integrity and veyed through joint PME, is a necessary and Donald M. Snow, The Shape of the component of this Future, 2d edition (New York: M.E. Sharpe officer education is not the most effective development. PME Publishers, 1995). curricula are already 6 Samuel P. Huntington, “Nontradi- method to deal with perceived excesses overflowing with tional Roles for the Military,” in Noncombat- ant Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post Cold- in interservice rivalry good joint subject matter. That is exactly War Era (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1993), pp. 3–12. the point. For the 7 For early insights on such roles, see trustworthiness. Such attributes will re- moral-ethical development of joint of- Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier main a functional requisite to mission ficers, the military risks supplanting the (New York: The Free Press, 1960), particu- accomplishment in a profession that essential with the good. Desiring to re- larly chapter 20. unleashes violence as a team, with each main a profession, those responsible for 8 See Don M. Snider et al., “The Coming member subject to unlimited liability. the future of joint PME should not set- Defense Train-Wreck...and What to Do As noted, OOTW test such trust- tle for so little. About It,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, worthiness early in an officer’s career. no. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 87–127. 9 Therefore at a time when individual In 1986, Congress transformed See International Institute of Strategic character is becoming less central to the the officer corps over harsh opposition Studies, “The Problem of Combat Reluctance,” in Strategic Survey, 1995–1996 (London: Oxford society which professional officers from the Pentagon. Not discounting University Press, 1996), pp. 48–57. serve, it remains of unrelenting impor- the remarkable progress of the last 10 For amplification of this point, see tance to them regardless of grade or as- decade, new difficulties have emerged Steven H. Kenney, “Professional Military signment. To meet that need, all ser- for joint education. Senior military Education and the Emerging Revolution in vices are making serious efforts to leaders should not forget the lessons of Military Affairs,” an unpublished paper pre- develop and maintain leader character. the past. The challenge now is to resented at a symposium on the same subject But such efforts are not coordinated and shape PME—balancing the Nation’s in- convened at the National Defense Univer- appear to be implemented unevenly. vestment in its future military leaders sity on May 22–23, 1995. 11 Improvements in moral-ethical de- and their character against invest- See Military Innovation in the Interwar velopment are needed. Recent cases of ments in technology and forces—with- Period, edited by Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millett (New York: Cambridge Uni- untrustworthiness include adultery and out relying on Congress. JFQ versity Press, 1996). fraternization on the part of senior offi- 12 The critical role of military leaders in NOTES cers, failure to hold officers accountable peacetime innovation is well documented. for friendly fire incidents which cost 1 The authors are indebted to the deputy See Stephen P. Rosen, Preparing for the Next lives, personal use of government air- chiefs of staff for personnel of all the ser- War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, craft, and more intrusive “zero defect” vices for providing candid comments which 1991), particularly chapters 3 and 9. command climates which severely test assisted in the preparation of this article. 13 General Shalikashvili is attempting to principled performance at every level. 2 Here we subscribe to the definition of do this but has noted a lack of progress in Thus, if a joint culture is emerging, it is organizational culture advanced by Edgar critical areas: “. . . despite the importance equally clear that its ethos at the joint H. Schein, “Culture is what a group learns we have attached to simulations, nobody over a period of time as that group solves its has yet developed a single, fully-tested, reli- level is largely unarticulated and has problems of survival in an external environ- able, joint warfighting model.” See “A Word yet to be successfully inculcated. Unfor- ment and its problems of internal integra- from the Chairman,” Joint Force Quarterly, tunately, neither the new instruction tion.” See “Organizational Culture,” Ameri- no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994–95), p. 7. issued by the Chairman on PME (CJCSI can Psychologist, vol. 45, no. 2 (February 14 Don M. Snider, “The U.S. Military in 1800.1, March 1, 1996), nor Joint Vision 1990), pp. 109, 111. Transition to Jointness: Surmounting Old 2010 even broaches the question of 3 Not all the reforms summarized were Notions of Interservice Rivalry,” Airpower character development for future mili- mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Of Journal, vol. 10, no. 3 (Fall 1996). tary leaders. In addition, this ethos is particular importance was the legislation undergirded only through discrete, un- passed in 1989 as a result of the efforts of a coordinated, and less than effective ef- House panel chaired by Representative Ike Skelton. See U.S. Congress, House, Commit- forts by the services to strengthen indi- tee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on vidual character and commitment to Military Education, report. no. 4, 100th Cong., institutional values. 1st sess., 1989.

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■ PROSPECTS for the Military Departments DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) By MICHAEL B. DONLEY Secretary Perry visiting Task Force Eagle.

Through the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress redistributed authority within the Pentagon to meet the challenges of joint warfare, which demand a greater integration of service capabilities. The accumulation of power by joint organizations over the past ten years may have led the services to feel that their influence is in free fall without any stopping point in sight. With attention heavily focused on jointness today, the role of the services is too often regarded as a secondary issue.

Organizational Trends Act that increased the authority of the Two significant trends in defense Secretary of Defense, Chairman, and organization have emerged since 1947: combatant commanders reflect these the centralization of authority within trends. In general, these changes have The Honorable Michael B. Donley, vice OSD and the strengthening of struc- had a common goal of improving the president of Hicks and Associates, Inc., tures responsible for joint advice, plan- unity of effort within DOD and reduc- has served on the staff of the Senate ning, and operations. Successive ing the relative independence which Committee on Armed Services and as amendments to the National Security the military departments had enjoyed acting secretary of the Air Force. for 170 years.

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These trends have produced three civilian and military leaders in the ser- major centers of power which account vices, yet also bringing them closer to- USS Paul Hamilton undergoing sea trials. for nearly all DOD components: unified gether to protect the remnants of ser- authority, direction, and control from vice autonomy.2 the Secretary and his staff (OSD); joint Outside commissions and reports military advice, planning, and inte- provided conflicting opinions on the grated employment from the Chairman military departments. The Symington and joint structures; and organizing, Committee (1960) recommended the training, and equipping administered by strong centralization of management three military departments clustered under OSD and the elimination of ser- generally around land, sea, and aero- vice secretaries and their staffs. The space forces. Within this triangle, the in- Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (1970) ad- vised decentralization and the assignment of forces to combatant a reduction in the duplication of effort among commands also reduced the authority OSD, service secretariat, of service chiefs and service staffs. The Ig- natius Report (1978) sought a stronger role for fluence of OSD and the joint structures service secretaries, recommending clearly has been ascendant while that of their greater use in defense-wide tasks. the departments has been declining. It also promoted further reduction of Between 1947 and 1958, several the duplication in service headquarters fundamental changes in defense orga- and “common access” by the service nization affected the military depart- secretaries and chiefs to analytical and ments. These included creating a oversight functions. Bath Iron Works Bath Iron higher level National Military Estab- Though such recommendations lishment and Secretary over the ser- produced some minor adjustments in re- vices (1947); forming a stronger DOD, sponsibilities within the military depart- of agency” authorities, including bud- downgrading the status of services ments after 1958, the next major cross- geting and procurement responsibili- from executive (that is, Cabinet level) roads for statutory change came with ties, which made it unique among to military departments, and removing the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. combatant commands and akin to a the service secretaries from the Na- military department. Strengthening the Impact of Goldwater-Nichols tional Security Council (1949); and re- authority of the Secretary over all DOD moving service secretaries and chiefs The DOD reorganization of 1986 activities further emphasized that ser- from operational chains of command had direct and indirect effects on the vice secretaries function under his au- (1958). As one scholar noted in the military departments. The latter in- thority, direction, and control. early 1960s: “. . . the services are being cluded changes which did not directly In its direct effects, Goldwater- dismembered and disemboweled, their affect the services but increased the au- Nichols made several changes to mili- utility is decided continually in decre- thority and responsibilities of organi- tary departments that had mixed re- ments...the only relevant question zations above them. They reinforced sults. One of the more important was to being whether the process is too fast or broad trends, such as strengthening provide uniformity in the statute, pre- 1 too slow.” the roles of the Secretary, Chairman, scribing the responsibilities of service In general, these changes reduced and CINCs. secretaries to the Secretary of Defense the role of the service secretaries as in- The provisions which fortified and ensuring that secretaries and chiefs dependent civilian policymakers and these key players indirectly reduced the have the same basic responsibilities and created patterns of interaction whereby influence of service secretaries and reporting relationships within each ser- service staffs sometimes worked di- chiefs. With the Chairman clearly iden- vice. The act also attempted to reduce rectly with OSD, thus bypassing service tified as the principal military adviser duplication between service secretariats secretariats. At the same time, changes and in control of the Joint Staff, indi- and service staffs by separating civilian in the chain of command and the as- vidual chiefs would be less capable of and military functions and by assigning signment of forces to combatant com- wielding an informal service veto over certain “sole responsibilities” to the Sec- mands also reduced the authority of collective JCS positions. CINCs were retary. In this regard Goldwater-Nichols service chiefs, though their influence in given more peacetime authority over has only partially succeeded. The poten- joint matters remained strong. These component commands. A new unified tial integration of service secretariats losses of authority changed working re- command, U.S. Special Operations and staffs was the underlying issue and lationships within DOD in many ways, Command (SOCOM), was given “head a major sticking point. The House bill sometimes causing friction between favored integration while the Senate was opposed to it. Finally, the conferees

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Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisi- tion and Technology), with the advice of joint structures. Implementation of the Defense Management Review of 1989, creation of new defense agencies or expansion of existing ones, and introduction of new accounting practices—associated with the Defense Business Operations Fund—also pulled responsibilities for administration, support, and infrastructure away from the military departments and toward OSD. Some functions migrating from the services have also moved toward joint structures. Examples include establishing SOCOM and assigning the mission of joint force integration to U.S. At- M–1 tank on trail in lantic Command. Other changes, such Signal Company / Combat Camera (Nicholas J. Blair)

Bosnia. th

55 as assignment of peacetime resource management responsibilities to U.S. Transportation Command, are less visi- determined that service secretariats and Senate staff report were lost in the ble but no less important. staffs should be separately organized compromise. In attempting to rational- If this trend continues, it is possi- but expressed continuing concern over ize civilian and military functions in ble to envision parts of even more sup- this duplication which survived in the service headquarters, Goldwater- port responsibilities (such as medical, compromise language.3 Nichols probably raised as many ques- maintenance, and logistics) shifting to- Structural tensions in military de- tions as it answered. ward OSD and defense agencies, and partment headquarters remain and are some related to force development subject to even more scrutiny today Future Possibilities (such as certain types of planning, pro- with pressure to downsize staffs and re- Goldwater-Nichols clearly left un- gramming, and training) moving to duce duplication. The Commission on finished business in its treatment of joint structures. Such changes would Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces military departments, and the points impact on both major command activi- (CORM) found that having two staffs outlined above are good candidates for ties and the Washington headquarters in the same headquarters (three in the review. The basic role of service secre- of the military departments. If realized, case of the Department of the Navy) they would further diminish impedes integration of effort and the role of the military departments the control of service head- causes friction in the headquarters as depends upon how the Secretary of quarters over policies, person- well as at higher and lower echelons. nel, installations, and resource The commission concluded: “Military Defense exercises civilian control allocation, thus ultimately department secretaries and chiefs raising a fundamental ques- would be better served by a single staff taries is also a perennial issue, and mis- tion about the need for military depart- of experienced civilians and uniformed sions and functions across the military ments. officers” (with some accommodation to departments certainly need to be ad- the Navy’s special circumstances). No dressed. Here, the higher level issue of Limiting Erosion significant progress has been made on the role of military departments within How far might service responsibil- this highly contentious proposal. This the defense establishment is the focus. ities erode? Is it possible to describe issue is further burdened by the need Among the corners of the organi- clear organizational dividing lines? for statutory relief in certain areas be- zational triangle described earlier, Paradoxically, defining the future role fore closer integration and consolida- changes since Goldwater-Nichols have of OSD is key to answering these question can be attained. continued the erosion of service influ- tions. The role of the military depart- In sum, Goldwater-Nichols was ence. The equipping function, of ments, especially their headquarters, less concerned with reforming military course, has evolved in ways that leave basically depends upon how the Secre- departments than strengthening joint military departments largely as initia- tary of Defense perceives and exercises components. Further reforms envi- tors, managers, and administrators of civilian control, how and to what ex- sioned in the original House bill and procurement programs whose content he delegates authority to lesser tent—increasingly seen from a joint OSD officials, and how far he goes in perspective—is decided in greater de- creating defense-wide activities. The gree and detail by OSD (namely, by the

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Military Departments as Marines securing Integrators perimeter during CJTFEX ’96. Practical limits on the ability of OSD and joint structures to absorb all service functions may define an enduring place for military departments by default. Moreover, it is not clear that better ways to organize, train, and equip forces can be developed. Would it be preferable to recruit and organize forces around functional specialties or agencies? Probably not. Around geographic or functional combatant commands? Again, the answer is no. But is there a more positive rationale with which to affirm the role of military departments? The answer here is yes. From a detached perspective, II MEF Combat Camera (A. Olguin) the world of eleven assistant secretaries supervising sixteen defense agencies question is not how narrow service re- DOD headquarters as the Secretary sees (plus field activities), and the Chair- sponsibilities may become, but rather fit, further definition is necessary to ar- man’s oversight of nine combatant how broad the role of the OSD staff ticulate (among other things) responsi- commands, only accentuates the fact should be. And here there are probably bilities of civilian and military staffs that the military departments are practical limits. supporting the Secretary and how du- major integrating elements within the Unbounded growth in OSD could ties for the administration of DOD sup- DOD organizational structure. That is, eventually be recognized as detrimen- port and infrastructure activities should they internally balance and integrate tal for two reasons. First, the increasing be divided. Sorting out the future role combat and support and operations tendency to move from program over- of OSD is therefore central to various and investment perspectives. They sight to hands-on resource manage- pending management issues and cru- compose differences, make tradeoffs, ment highlights the limitations of cial for the military departments.5 and execute decisions within a strong headquarters staffs as operating agents. Absorbing major portions of mili- administrative chain of command. Responsibility for resource manage- tary departments into the joint system This argument, of course, potentially ment tends to turn advisers into advo- also has drawbacks. Responsibilities of leads to four separate service paths on cates. Second, the functional orienta- the Chairman and joint components any given issue and does not eliminate tion and growth of the OSD staff, focus on joint military advice, war- the need for defense-wide guidance reinforced by consolidation of defense fighting, and joint force development from OSD and the joint structures. It agencies, have the effect of stovepiping and integration. Because these tasks nevertheless shows that military de- or “balkanizing” management which are complicated enough, adding the partments, despite “narrow” service then makes it more difficult for the duties of organizing, training, equip- perspectives, still have a broad view Secretary to provide unified direction ping, maintaining, and supporting the when it comes to balancing effective- to DOD. Eventually, the deeply en- entire Armed Forces would overwhelm ness and efficiency across a range of trenched structure of decentralized the existing joint system and change defense activities. technical services and bureaus which its nature. The span of control is ar- It may be that particular functions plagued the War and Navy Depart- guably too broad. In addition, service are accomplished better or more effi- ments prior to World War II could training, education, infrastructure, and ciently if centralized in OSD or the reemerge, this time led by under and support systems—although overlap- joint system. Certainly this has been a assistant secretaries of defense.4 ping and in need of better coordina- leading rationale for the ongoing mi- The CORM report and FY96 DOD tion in some areas—are sufficiently gration of support responsibilities away Authorization Act (section 901) high- large and dissimilar to justify separate from the services. But this criterion is lighted the need to review the role of administration. So it is not obvious suboptimizing the overall structure of the OSD staff. Beyond acting as the im- that major efficiencies would result DOD. Each time a decision is made to mediate staff of the Secretary of De- from placing them under a single joint consolidate three support activities, the fense, its broader role is not addressed management umbrella. span of control for the Secretary or adequately by statute or in DOD Direc- Chairman increases (sixteen defense tive 5100.1 which outlines major orga- agencies and nine combatant com- nizational functions. While retaining mands and counting), the synergism the flexibility to organize and operate between combat and support activities

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Civilian and military leaders C–141s at Rhein-Main within each department must also do during Peace Shield ’95. their part to engage with OSD and joint structures in ways perceived to be constructive and oriented toward solving defense-wide problems. The line between acceptable and welcomed service advocacy and the “turnoff” of service parochialism can be fine. If the services fail to distinguish between the two, they may only encourage previous trends and further devalue their future role. However, with enlightened leadership, and if the role of military departments is not over or undersold, then the services may yet confirm their im- U.S. Air Force (GregU.S. Air Force Suhay) portant role in a well balanced defense organization whose constructive ten- is weakened, responsibilities are split, peacetime activities. DOD needs mili- sions will yield joint operational effec- and organizational roles and functions tary departments to fulfill basic mis- tiveness and efficiency. JFQ are blurred. This undervalues the over- sions. It needs the professional expertise all advantage to DOD of having three of individual services to provide build- NOTES military departments provide the ma- ing blocks for joint military capability; 1 Paul T. Hammond, Organizing for De- jority of management and administra- and it needs balanced management per- fense: The American Military Establishment in tion for defense resources. spectives (long and short-term, combat the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton To be clear, the issue is not the and support, et al.) to assist the Secre- University Press, 1961), p. 374. “power and influence” of military de- tary in efficient administration. 2 See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee partments versus other DOD compo- on Armed Services, Defense Organization: nents since all power resides with the Goldwater-Nichols was intended The Need for Change, committee print, staff Secretary of Defense unless Congress to build up joint structures too long report 99–86, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, prescribes otherwise. And it is certainly dominated by service interests, but it chapter 6; and George Watson, Jr., The Of- not an issue of “traditional title 10 re- was not meant to eliminate the role of fice of the Secretary of the Air Force, sponsibilities,” since most DOD compo- the military departments. It may be 1947–1965 (Washington: Center for Air nents have at least some of their respon- time for the pendulum to swing back Force History, 1993), chapter 7. 3 sibilities outlined in that title. Given the toward recognizing the importance of U.S. Congress, House, Conference Report, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Re- the departments—not to organization Act of 1986, House report 99– Goldwater-Nichols was intended to undo what has been ac- 824, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 1986, pp. 144–55. build up joint structures, not eliminate complished or diminish 4 See James E. Hewes, From Root to McNa- the ongoing commitment mara: Army Organization and Administration, the military departments to jointness, but rather to 1900–1963 (Washington: U.S. Army Center ensure that jointness is of Military History, 1975); also Hammond, tension and ambiguities of title 10 and grounded on a firm foundation of ser- Organizing for Defense, pp. 49–63. latitude afforded the Secretary to man- vice force providers. This argues for 5 Commission on Roles and Missions of age DOD, the issue is arriving at a clear revalidating and reinforcing the role of the Armed Forces, Directions for Defense: Re- understanding of the roles and func- the military departments as primary port of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Arlington, Va.: 1995), tions of all components in relation to line managers of defense resources and pp. 4–21. each other. a preference for strong, effective service The expertise and core competen- secretaries and chiefs. cies of military departments are in pro- Even within current budgetary and fessional knowledge of their respective operational climates focused on greater warfighting environments, integration efficiency and jointness, it remains im- of combat and support activities, bal- portant that the Secretary limits the re- anced resource allocation that includes sponsibilities assigned to OSD and the near- and long-term perspectives, and joint structures, reaffirms the essential the day-to-day management and ad- role of the military departments, and ministration of complex, large-scale takes advantage of the fact that they are likely to remain a large and enduring feature of defense organization.

62 JFQ / Autumn 1996 Nunn/Forum 12/10/96 9:11 AM Page 63 U.S. Army (Moore) The chiefs at Normandy, 1944: Arnold, King, and Marshall with Eisenhower. Future Senator Nunn and colleagues. Trends Courtesy of Special Collections, NDU Library in Defense Organization

By SAM NUNN

he Pentagon’s ability to pre- of JFQ that: “No other nation can and unified commands—where signifi- pare for and conduct joint match our ability to combine forces on cant organizational deficiencies had operations has improved the battlefield and fight jointly.” existed for more than four decades. Tmore in ten years—since By effectively implementing Gold- Some assessments reveal weaknesses passage of the Goldwater-Nichols water-Nichols, DOD has enormously on the administrative side of DOD Act—than in the entire period since improved both the conduct of military which have been magnified by post- the need for jointness was recognized operations and the management of de- Cold War security challenges. Exces- by the creation of the Joint Army-Navy fense resources. Today’s continuing sive bureaucracy, slow response to new Board in 1903. Over the same decade search for organizational improve- missions, ambiguous responsibilities the Armed Forces moved to a point ments in no way detracts from the su- among major defense components, where the Chairman could maintain perb performance of the last decade. In and management by policymakers in the Autumn-Winter 1994–95 issue fact, the 1986 legislation and recent need to be examined. One of these, ex- successes combine to create opportuni- cessive bureaucracy, also plagues the ties for further enhancements. unified command structure. Externally, The Honorable Sam Nunn has served The Goldwater-Nichols Act rightly organizational shortcomings in the in- four terms in the U.S. Senate and is a focused on joint military structures— teragency system undermine DOD in former chairman of the Committee on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, carrying out its missions. Armed Services.

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Excessive Bureaucracy DOD must reduce the overhead of concern, the operational and adminis- The defense bureaucracy is too numerous duplicative staffs in both its trative sides of DOD took several years large. The Pentagon has reduced force administrative and operational chains to formulate an organizational re- levels by approximately 25 percent and of command. Not only do these vast sponse to this priority mission. defense manpower by 31 percent since organizations consume talented per- The Pentagon’s and the intelli- the end of the Cold War. The bureau- sonnel and scarce funds, they drain gence community’s response to the ter- cracy, which was excessive during the the system of energy. This bureaucracy rorist threat, as evidenced by the two Cold War, has not been cut proportion- is insufficiently responsive to meet se- recent terrorist bombings in Saudi Ara- ately. The corporate DOD headquarters curity needs in a more turbulent era. A bia, were also inadequate. still employs 30,000, and staffs within reduction in the number and size of Ambiguous Responsibilities 25 miles of the Pentagon total 150,000. these headquarters will also free up The bureaucracy in the Washington personnel for combatant forces and The assignment of administrative metropolitan area has shrunk since help remedy the present unbalanced responsibilities among OSD, the Joint 1987, but only by 15 percent. tooth-to-tail ratio. Staff, and military department staffs is Excessive bureaucracy is not con- too ambiguous. Too many organiza- Response to New Missions fined to the Pentagon. A study by the tions duplicate the work of others. This Chairman’s office, The History of the DOD’s reaction to new missions is major problem has a long history. Unified Command Plan, 1946–93, ad- too slow. This lack of adaptability is Between creating the position of mits “The end of the Cold War trig- rooted in its organizational structure. Secretary of Defense under the Na- gered dramatic changes in the U.S. Each headquarters staff in the Penta- tional Security Act of 1947 and full military establishment but not in the gon—the Office of the Secretary of De- empowerment of that office by Gold- fense (OSD), Joint Staff, service secre- water-Nichols in 1986, Secretaries were DOD must reduce the over- tariats, and military staffs—is organized not able to get quality advice and assis- along traditional lines with manpower, tance from the JCS system nor to tame head in both its administra- intelligence, logistics, and other func- the parochial tendencies of the mili- tive and operational chains tional activities. The input nature of tary departments. They thus increas- defense budget categories reinforces ingly assigned tasks to a more respon- of command this functional orientation. Although sive OSD. In 1983, Secretary James this structure provided needed stability Schlesinger explained the result in this UCP....”In the early 1990s, the Joint during the Cold War, it does not adjust way: “The growth of [OSD] is a reflec- Staff under General Colin Powell con- well to new missions. Peter Drucker’s tion of the weaknesses of the military sidered boldly streamlining the com- assessment is highly relevant to the command system. The Office of the mand structure. Resistance to innova- Pentagon. Secretary has provided the analyses tive proposals preserved much of what The functional principle...has high sta- cutting across service lines, which the 2 existed. Two changes—creating the bility but little adaptability. It perpetuates Joint Chiefs cannot now provide.” U.S. Strategic Command and refocus- and develops technical and functional Since Goldwater-Nichols has cor- ing and redesignating the U.S. Atlantic skills, that is, middle managers, but it re- rected many traditional deficiencies— Command—were long overdue. The sists new ideas and inhibits top-manage- especially the lack of sound military latter’s role as joint force integrator, ment development and vision.1 advice—rationalizing responsibilities trainer, and provider was just an im- among OSD, the Joint Staff, and mili- A dynamic world requires a defense proved version of Strike Command tary departments is both possible and organization that can prepare quickly (1962–71) and Readiness Command desirable. Deciding how to divide the for a wide range of challenges. Joint Vi- (1972–87). Seven years after the fall of work will be complicated by the need sion 2010 makes the point that “We will the Berlin Wall, DOD remains bur- to consider the roles of defense agen- need organizations and processes that dened by a Cold War UCP. cies and functional unified commands are agile enough to exploit emerging The service component com- which will compete for responsibilities technologies and respond to diverse mands of unified commands also need within the Pentagon as well as with threats and enemy capabilities.” But to be reviewed. Several serve as compo- each other. current DOD organizations do not ex- nents of more than one unified com- hibit this characteristic. Management by Policymakers mand, which reduces the problem of The Pentagon’s delayed, fractured excessive bureaucracy somewhat. Nev- The involvement of defense poli- reaction to counterproliferation reveals ertheless, their continued existence cymaking staffs in management activi- this inadequacy. While the President needs to be reviewed to ascertain if ties is too extensive. Traditionally, OSD and Secretary repeatedly cited prolifer- there is not a better way to oversee lo- and the Joint Staff focused on policy- ation of weapons of mass destruction gistics and other support for opera- level activities. Defense economics and as the most serious national security tional forces and to provide a service the nature of warfare have led to the perspective to unified commanders. creation of numerous defense-wide or joint activities, such as defense agencies, DOD field activities, functional

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Nunn

Joining Southern Watch, September 1996. U.S. Air Force (SteveU.S. Air Force Thurow) F–16 taking off from Williamstown, Australia, during Iron Fist ’95.

security leaks, uninformed interference, and raids on defense resources. Such bureaucratic thinking can no longer be afforded. Even a major regional conflict such as Desert Storm required an extensive interagency effort. Lesser operations, where nonmilitary instruments U.S. Navy play even larger roles, will rely on effective contributions by civilian departments and agencies. The old days of unified commands, and joint boards policymaking receives less attention. the Pentagon doing the entire mission and centers. These require manage- Second, direct involvement in manag- are gone for good. ment oversight by an organization ing or overseeing an activity makes it Some elements of DOD recognize with defense-wide responsibilities. This difficult for policymakers to maintain this situation. In crises they have coop- has meant that OSD and the Joint Staff their objectivity in recommending erated more with their interagency part- have had to pick up these manage- policies to govern that activity. They ners. Restore Democracy in Haiti repre- ment duties. can become special pleaders for activi- sented the most forward leaning effort The emergence of nontraditional ties which they manage. What the Sec- to date. As one study observed, “Intera- missions has also added to OSD man- retary needs is objective advice from gency political-military planning oc- agement burdens. The administrative his immediate civilian and military curred at a higher and more integrated work of new, nontraditional missions staffs, not another assortment of level than in any earlier, similar opera- (such as counterterrorism, counter- parochial arguments. tion.” 3 Despite these improvements, Re- drug, and counterproliferation) does store Democracy illustrated that intera- Narrow Security Organization not fit into a single military depart- gency coordination in general is ment. As a result, Secretaries have as- Our organizational concept for rudimentary compared to the need. signed responsibility to OSD offices for national security is too narrow. Today’s Moreover, Pentagon efforts have not direct management of these activities. security challenges require integrating been institutionalized and are heavily the activities of many depart- dependent on personalities. today’s security challenges require ments and agencies, some not traditionally viewed as contrib- Working backwards through these integrating the activities of many utors to national security. But problems, the first requirement is for departments and agencies we still retain the formal struc- the Government to adapt its organiza- ture of the National Security tion to current national security reali- Council (NSC) designed for the ties. New members, especially the At- Diverting policymaking organiza- immediate post-World War II period torney General and the Secretaries of tions to management duties creates a with its focus on diplomatic, military, the Treasury and Commerce, may need twofold problem. First, management and intelligence functions. to be formally added to the National tasks—which tend to be more visible A second dimension of our intera- Security Council. Designating these and urgent—come to dominate organi- gency woes is that DOD, especially the Cabinet officers as members may serve zational activity and the more cerebral Joint Staff, has long held other agencies to catalyze necessary improvements in at arms’ length. This tradition had their departments’ national security many causes, including concerns over capabilities and work practices.

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department headquarters. The advantages would outweigh the disadvan- Now It’s Time for Goldwater-Nichols II tages. The unified command plan also needs review. en years ago, Congress mandated a giant change in the defense establishment by passing the The United States struggled for Goldwater-Nichols Act. In the ensuing years, significant progress has been made in defense forty-five years to create a defense es- T organization. The roles of the Chairman, service chiefs, Joint Staff, and CINCs have evolved into a much more decentralized organization. Greater authority and responsibility have been placed in the hands of tablishment that could effectively and the operational commanders. Jointness is now ingrained and not just lip service. efficiently prepare for and wage a con- Despite the changes in the defense arena, little change has occurred in the national security medium. flict such as World War II or a possible The current system is still very centralized and run from Washington. One could argue for a centralized sys- global clash with the Soviets. Hopefully tem while we still confronted the Soviet Union. Today, the world’s challenges have become more regional- the Pentagon will not take as long to ized. The U.S. officials who best understand regional challenges live and work in geographical areas as rep- reorganize for the security challenges of resentatives of their departments and agencies. the post-Cold War era, in which organi- It’s now time for Goldwater-Nichols II. Such a law would address the decentralization of national security zational adaptability and quickness are apparatus, placing more responsibility in the hands of “commanders” in the field such as ambassadors and de- major assets. The record of the last partment representatives. This would improve coordination across all segments of government in a given region because the people who best understand local problems could work together in proposing solutions. decade suggests that DOD will find and Goldwater-Nichols contributed materially to our success in Desert Storm. Further reform has the po- implement effective solutions to these tential of contributing to regional challenges today and those we will face tomorrow. problems. JFQ

—General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.) NOTES 1 Peter F. Drucker, “New Templates for Today’s Organizations,” in Harvard Business Review on Management (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 631. Many approaches taken for strengthen Pentagon performance in 2 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on granted by DOD—such as contingency the long run. Armed Services, Organization, Structure and planning, peacetime exercises, and DOD needs to put a priority on Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department overseas crisis augmentation teams— developing a new concept for dividing of Defense, hearings before the Committee are alien to some departments and work among OSD, defense agencies, on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 1st sess., agencies. The interagency process will the Joint Staff, military departments, 1983–1984, part 5, p. 188. continue to experience shortcomings and unified commands. Since its vari- 3 Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheat- until all contributors to national secu- ous components have operated am- ley, Interagency and Political-Military Dimen- rity are prepared to play their roles. biguously for decades absent such a sions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Turning to internal DOD reorgani- concept, the task of formulating an Studies, National Defense University, 1996), zation, the Secretary should consider overarching plan will be challenging. p. 49. assigning elsewhere those direct man- The Secretary of Defense should agement tasks currently performed by consider two ways of responding to OSD and the Joint Staff. Defense-wide new missions. First, he could establish a disinterested staff to the Secretary may need to create a new scan the horizon for the emergence of new entity to assume OSD management tasks missions and to prepare an organizational and joint activities will continue to approach to handle them. Second, grow in size and importance. The Pen- when a new mission does not fall tagon should act accordingly now and under a pre-existing organization, he create sound management approaches could ensure that entities which man- that can be sustained. In the case of age defense-wide activities are capable the Joint Staff, ACOM might assume of rapidly assuming administrative some of its management duties, in- management of it. cluding most tasks now performed by Although counterintuitive, DOD the Director for Operational Plans and can manage better with fewer people. Interoperability (J-7). The Secretary Rationalizing responsibilities among may need to create a new entity to as- the three major components will aid the sume OSD management tasks. A more search for headquarters staff reductions. rational approach of managing de- The time has also come to merge civil- fense-wide activities combined with re- ian and military staffs in the military focusing OSD on policymaking would

66 JFQ / Autumn 1996 Binnendijk 12/9/96 12:14 PM Page 67

A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FOR THE 21st Century By HANS BINNENDIJK

The international system is entering what During the first half of this decade, the major powers have pursued harmonious relations to a might be called the age of complexity. Sim- degree unparalleled in the 20th century. That ple bipolar or multipolar models cannot do happy state of affairs has enhanced U.S. national security, but it may not last into the next century. justice to events that unfold daily. This age China’s rapidly growing economic might under- is characterized by several simultaneous mines its communist ideology and the legitimacy of its one party system, and its leadership pursues global revolutions, including a geostrategic nationalism as a way to bridge the gap. Russia’s ef- restructuring, an exponential growth in in- fort to evolve into a market democracy suffers from transition pains that could still plunge that formation technology, and a relative de- major power into deeper chaos, with a return to cline in the span of control of national authoritarian rule a distinct possibility. Both coun- governments. One way to understand bet- tries consider themselves divided nations since significant numbers of their nationals live outside ter the consequences of this emerging and their existing political borders. Important U.S. in- complex international system for U.S. de- terests are involved in such places as Taiwan and the Baltic states. In addition, new tensions are defense and foreign policy is to analyze sev- veloping between China and Japan on the one eral crosscutting elements, such as the rela- hand, and Russia and Western Europe on the other. It is unlikely that either China or Russia will tionship among the major powers, emerge in the next 10–15 years as a global peer prospects of war with a regional rogue competitor, but both could become what might be regarded as theater peer competitors—nuclear state, likelihood that conflict in a troubled powers with the capability of challenging impor- state will require American intervention, tant U.S. interests in their respective regions. Our best prospect for avoiding a serious dete- and the new burdens associated with rioration in relations among the major powers is transnational threats. Such an analysis to continue to engage China and Russia diplo- leads to the conclusion that the Nation matically with the goal of bringing both more fully into the family of nations who live by in- must be prepared for a broad array of de- ternationally recognized norms. The United fense missions requiring a full spectrum of States must not make unnecessary enemies by pursuing narrowly-focused policies. We must also military capabilities. continue to preserve and modernize alliances with NATO and Japan. Our strategy ought to be a 21st century version of British policy in the l9th century, that is, to act as the stabilizer of relations Hans Binnendijk is director of the Institute for among the major powers. Our defense planners National Strategic Studies at the National Defense must consider more seriously the prospect that University and editor-in-chief of JFQ.

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the Nation may confront a theater peer early in issue. Dealing with large refugee flows has already the next century. Such a confrontation would involved the Armed Forces in northern Iraq, likely be limited and on the periphery of the Haiti, Cuba, Bosnia, and Rwanda. More of these other power, with America’s aim being to thwart situations should be expected. that power’s efforts to forcefully extend control This brief survey of the emerging interna- over its neighbors. tional security environment reveals that the Regional rogues such as Iraq and North Korea threats which we will face during the next decade still present a formidable challenge to U.S. inter- will probably be broad in scope. They may in- ests, but the prospect that we may need to fight clude high end threats from a theater peer com- two rogues almost simultaneously appears to be petitor as well as low end threats from troubled declining. North Korea is near collapse and its states and transnational crises. They will not be military readiness has suffered significantly as a limited to major regional conflicts. They will re- result of floods, famine, and resource constraints. quire a wide range of military options, including A suicidal attack on South Korea might still be ini- forward deployment to provide stability among tiated if Pyongyang saw external forces threaten- major powers, credible littoral warfare capabilities ing regime survival, a situation made less likely by to deal with a theater peer, power projection and the nuclear framework agreement. Iraq remains maneuverable land forces to defeat a rogue state, militarily much weaker than prior to Desert and forces specifically trained for peace and spe- Storm, a situation sustained by economic sanc- cial operations. Our continued dominance in tions and international inspectors. Saddam Hus- long-range lift, logistics, intelligence, and C4 will sein might be tempted to seize an opportunity to also remain crucial. Staying interoperable with al- recapture Kuwait if America were engaged in con- lies and potential coalition partners will be more flict elsewhere, but he must recognize that this challenging. time the United States would pursue the conflict The principal concept for dealing with this until he was eliminated from power. Other re- complexity is agility. The Armed Forces must be gional rogues such as Iran or Libya might provoke able to adjust to situations quickly using novel military action but such conflicts would probably solutions when necessary. That will also require a be limited. Planning our force structure based on high degree of organizational flexibility. But threats from Iraq and North Korea may be less agility does not mean that each element of the necessary in the future than it was in 1993. force should be designed to perform all missions. For the Armed Forces, troubled states and In fact, an even higher degree of specialization transnational threats will probably occupy an in- may be required in some cases to give our mili- creasing amount of their time in the future, fur- tary the necessary overall degree of agility. For ex- ther complicating existing OPTEMPO problems. ample, at the high end, some units will have to The ethnic, tribal, and religious extremism revived be reconfigured in order to implement more fully by the end of the Cold War gives no indication of some of the concepts inherent in the revolution abating. Even if U.S. interests are limited, humani- in military affairs. At the low end, some forces tarian motivations fueled by media and public at- will be required to provide a greater on-call capa- tention are likely to encourage our participation bility to perform peace operations. in some of these tragedies. Certain clashes, such as Finally, early in the 21st century the Armed a civil war in Macedonia, would profoundly affect Forces will benefit from the reforms in DOD orga- the interests of the NATO alliance. nization already in place. The broader array of If problems in troubled states seem apt to missions we can expect will rely on joint opera- continue at the current pace, transnational tions. Agility will require the kind of authority threats will also probably rise. They result from which is vested in the Chairmen by Goldwater- increasingly porous international borders and de- Nichols. And greater sensitivity to regional secu- creasing capability of governments to deal with rity issues has already been improved by strength- the resulting problems. Terrorism now threatens ening the role of warfighting CINCs. In short, Americans more directly than in the past, espe- with some modifications, the U.S. military will be cially members of the military. But dramatic solu- well positioned to meet the challenges of the tions may be difficult. Preemption, for instance, next century. The only real threat to America’s would probably be unilateral, based on sensitive ability to perform this range of missions is the intelligence difficult to publicize, and directed prospect of budgetary cuts that could diminish against another sovereign government. Interna- those crucial capabilities. JFQ tional crime still is primarily a police problem unless governments are taken over by criminal elements, as happened in Panama. Under those This analysis is based on Strategic Assessment 1997 to be published early next year by the Institute for National Strategic circumstances, it can quickly become a defense Studies, National Defense University.

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21st Century U.S. Air Force (MarvinU.S. Air Force Lynchard) Armed Forces— Joint Vision 2010 By CHARLES D. LINK U.S. Air Force (DebbieU.S. Air Force Hernandez)

Major General Charles D. Link, USAF, is assistant deputy chief of staff for plans and operations at Headquarters, Department of the Air Force.

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The report of the Commission on Roles and global security environment and fine-tuning our forces for the range of challenges we may face. Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) The lack of Cold War confrontation has increased which appeared in 1995 revealed a subtle sensitivity to costs, casualties, public opinion, and media scrutiny. More will be expected of the deficiency in the implementation of the Armed Forces than in the past. JV 2010 responds Goldwater-Nichols Act. Under what can be to these challenges with this concept: fight with every available advantage. viewed as a bicameral defense process, near- The vision of military excellence found in JV term visions developed by unified com- 2010 promises to play a key role in national security. If we supposed that the United States had a mands abut longer-term service concepts. fifteen-year lead in military development over CINC visions reflect diverse regional inter- any potential adversary, we might choose to in- ests and service visions indicate the particu- vest so that in fifteen years we can acquit ourselves well in a conflict with a peer competitor. lar mediums in which they specialize. Al- But instead, JV 2010 lays a foundation for invest- though this has enabled us to better ing in ways to keep the prospect of actually fighting a peer competitor fifteen years off. understand the core competencies of each service as well as the regional insights of the Unifying Constructs As the Chairman states in its preface, JV 2010 warfighting CINCs, it has also led to tension “provides an operationally based template for the and wasted effort. Sensing the need to inte- evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future.” It therefore builds on grate both types of vision, CORM recom- proven military concepts. But unlike earlier frame- mended that the Chairman articulate a uni- works, it explains ways in which joint forces inter- lock with, strengthen, and benefit each other. fying vision. The resulting document, Our bedrock strength as a fighting force is developed in close consultation with the core service competencies—reflecting distinctive Joint Chiefs and CINCs, is Joint Vision 2010. capabilities, cultures, and traditions—that offer a broad range of options to the National Command Authorities. As the services bring their unique The template in JV 2010 “provides a com- styles of warfighting and problem solving to bat- mon direction for our services in developing their tle, they are difficult to defend against in their di- unique capabilities.” The Air Force fully embraces versity and mighty in the aggregate. the document for three overarching reasons. First, Each service is responsible for developing as an integrating vehicle it releases tremendous competencies to prevail in its medium, training energy once dedicated to common standards, and presenting its role to the services are difficult to to competing visions the Nation. The joint force commander fits these defend against in their diversity with little return. Sec- assets into a cohesive warfighting team, fueled by ond, it frees the services professional pride, operating with joint doctrine, and mighty in the aggregate from legacy thinking and trained for a common purpose. JV 2010 pro- that, for example, con- vides a conceptual underpinning for assembling strained the airpower contribution to joint service core competencies to conduct fully joint warfighting. For decades the Air Force consumed military operations. a lot of energy perfecting auxiliary roles, fine-tuning capabilities which proved extremely useful in Operational Vision the Gulf War. At the same time that conflict em- On the level of joint force, JV 2010 delin- phasized the potential of airpower to more di- eates four operational tasks: dominant maneuver, rectly and effectively achieve joint objectives. The precision engagement, full-dimensional protec- advantages of the world’s leading aerospace nation, and focused logistics—enabled by information can be employed to their full capacity within tion superiority. the framework provided by JV 2010. Information superiority is the ability to collect, The third reason that airmen embraced this process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow document is because it leans toward the future. In of information while denying an enemy from the dynamic world that is unfolding in the wake doing the same. Air and space based platforms of the Cold War the only reality is uncertainty. such as the airborne warning and control system We cannot exactly predict future crises, but JV 2010 prepares us for them by describing the

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Link

C–17 Globemaster III. U.S. Air Force AWACS.

for a decisive advantage. Air- power creates leverage by controlling battlespace and threatening attacks on what an enemy values wherever it is located. Air and space assets can find hostile strengths and weaknesses over the entire the- U.S. Air Force (MikeU.S. Air Force Reinhardt) ater and, once specific vulnerabilities are identified, avoid strongpoints, apply power with (AWACS), joint surveillance and target attack surgical lethality, and take away enemy sanctuar- radar system (JSTARS), Rivet Joint, and advanced ies—the essence of dominant maneuver. Air supe- unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs) exploit riority is a prerequisite to making the full array of elevation to provide theater-wide surveillance, re- dominant maneuver possibilities available to the connaissance, and C3 advantages. Joint force joint force commander. With air dominance commanders gain edges in information by shield- every part of our force has greater value. In the ing and moving friendly information assets and Gulf War it protected all the components and applying combat power to destroy, neutralize, dis- made coalition forces impossible to defend able, or disrupt an enemy’s means of gaining in- against. formation and controlling forces. Information su- Precision engagement is the most militarily dis- periority can turn an adversary’s “fog of war” into tinctive capability each service brings to joint op- a wall of ignorance. erations. Joint force commanders strive to apply Dominant maneuver seeks to control the combat power in ways that maximize friendly depth, breadth, and height of battlespace and the force strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, and accom- tempo of operations by positioning capabilities plish the mission. Air forces, for example, use precision engagement throughout theater airspace

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and in an enemy nation against war sustaining ca- Dominant maneuver, precision engagement, pabilities, air forces, and surface forces. Precision and full-dimensional protection form a trinity of engagement and information superiority are en- combat power that will realize the ideal of full abling factors for dominant maneuver. In fact, pre- spectrum dominance presented in JV 2010 if en- cision engagement is its “kill mechanism.” abled by information superiority and focused lo- Full-dimensional protection. The aim of full-di- gistics. Individually, new warfighting concepts mensional protection is battlespace control so our provide the means to discriminately apply deter- forces are not just protected rent, coercive, or destructive power against dominating the air is pivotal but control the environment enemy centers of gravity. When integrated, the because it protects all forces and initiative in all opera- total result greatly exceeds the sum of the parts. tions. It guards our informa- Each element of JV 2010 is necessary, but our and enables all operations tion, maneuver, forces, and warfighting concept does not stand alone. It re- logistics. Air and space assets quires excellent component forces. It requires re- protect our airspace and forces from enemy en- sources. And its operational vision clearly relies gagement and maneuver capabilities, providing on friendly control of the air. Dominating the air not only freedom from attack but also freedom to is pivotal in modern warfare missions because it attack. Full-dimensional protection is key to domi- protects all forces and enables all operations. In nant maneuver and precision engagement. It is the Gulf War it shielded all of the components also essential to the information and logistics ad- and made it impossible to defend against coali- vantages upon which tomorrow’s joint force will tion forces. depend. Joint Vision 2010 JV 2010 provides 21st century forces guided by 21st century thinking. The payoff will be 21st century security. In an era of unparalleled change—with simultaneous exponential advances in many fields—this may seem a tremendous challenge. JV 2010 meets it by providing dynamic options for uncertain times, underpinning a revised “American way of war.” Modern airpower attuned to JV 2010 will be better suited than in the past to directly pursue political-military objectives. First, it can contribute to deterrence and, if that fails, it can reduce or eliminate an enemy’s ability to achieve its war aims, as the Gulf War displayed. It will also attack selected enemy capabilities and either reduce or eliminate the ability of an enemy to resist our policy objectives, as Deliberate Force in Bosnia illustrated. The speed, reach, perspective, and freedom of action of aerospace forces can cre-

U.S. Air Force (DixieU.S. Air Force Trawick) ate extraordinary advantages for surface elements F–16C taking off from even as they proceed to a crisis area. And once Aviano Air Base, Italy. they arrive, airpower can greatly magnify their Focused logistics will reduce reliance on stock- combat power. piles, prepositioning, redundant logistics infra- This is not to say that airpower can do every- structure, and cumbersome support systems. The thing, will be sufficient, or will always provide goal is to create an environment in which you the most appropriate force. Rather, it is proper to never run out of logistics. It is designed to elimi- study every military capability and limitation in nate the “iron mountain” associated with past the light of our unifying concept. It is important operations, thus reducing the tooth-to-tail ratio. for military professionals to clarify what they The Air Force has been developing practices that bring to a joint force commander’s table. Under- support focused logistics since 1994 through ad- standing each advantage our forces possess allows vances in lean logistics, total asset visibility, and us to leverage each one to win at the least hu- better use of commercial services and advanced man, fiscal, and political cost. airlifters like the C–17. Focused logistics puts the Sophisticated understanding helps avoid agility and responsiveness of our global mobility fighting at a disadvantage. The Armed Forces are forces to full use. superbly trained and equipped. We are disadvan- taged when fighting on equal terms. An enemy will

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Link

seize any asymmetry in its favor. We are wise to JV 2010 recognizes that all warfighting capa- continue investing in forces that are useful, capabilities brought to bear in joint operations are ble, and difficult or impossible to counter. Aero- crafted by the services. In fulfilling their responsi- space forces offer tremendous resistance to coun- bilities, each of the services seeks excellence in ters because, with global reach and unceasing what the vision identifies as six critical elements: speed, they inherently retain the advantages of the people, leadership, doctrine, materiel, organiza- initiative. They can also defeat highly concentrated tional structure, and education and training. The defenses by avoiding them, and if areas are uni- services prepare component forces for superior formly defended they incur no increased penalty mission performance in unified operations. when attacking the most important targets. This document provides a mechanism for fo- The capability of modern aerospace forces cusing the strengths of the individual services on that makes them resistant to defensive measures operational concepts to achieve full spectrum is stealth. Signature reduction diminishes the ef- dominance. Equally important, it iterates the fact fectiveness of acquisition, tracking, guidance, and that “we will always rely on...America’s men intercept systems all at the same time. Stealth fur- and women to ensure we are persuasive in peace, ther capitalizes on all the advantages inherent in decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of aerospace systems. Our aerospace industrial base conflict.” provides us with the means to counter a nation The six critical elements of JV 2010 are vital that concentrates its strength in either land or to service responsibilities—the areas in which we naval forces. Our aerospace forces in turn mag- strive for excellence. The five operational tasks nify the combat power and value of our land and offer a framework for tremendous warfighting ef- naval forces. fectiveness in a style befitting American values and interests. One could study the document to From the Past...the Future see if it confirms what has always been done and Our forebears in the profession of arms stop there. It will make a greater contribution as elected time and again to use technology to re- we use it to discover all we can do. duce risks to their forces. In search of attainable Regardless of background, military profes- advantages, they advanced metallurgy, chemistry, sionals will find JV 2010 appealing since it helps and physics to improve artillery. Before Henry them meet their responsibility to the Nation. Ford’s assembly line they pioneered mass produc- Today’s potential for asymmetric advantage pro- tion, standardization, and vides military leaders unprecedented capabilities JV 2010 is a watershed because interchangeable parts. A to secure victory with minimum cost. JV 2010 out- unique aspect of our her- lines how we can raise that standard higher still. it helps our thinking to catch itage is ingenuity. People Its timing is especially propitious for the Air Force, up with our capabilities in a land of freedom and which is conducting service-wide, long-range opportunity have initia- planning focused on 2025. Implementing JV 2010 tive and open markets yield incentives. Accord- will provide valuable direction and insights to en- ingly, American inventiveness has stunned the sure those efforts produce the best results. world for more than two centuries. One result is As Abraham Lincoln said, new conditions re- the great technical versatility found in our Armed quire us to “disenthrall ourselves.” The gift of Forces. Joint Vision 2010 is that it provides a contextual As complicated as technology has become, framework to harness the energies of the creative ideas on warfighting can be just as challenging. and diverse American military community to The leading military thinker of the 18th century, build a surer, better future. JFQ Frederick the Great, remarked that “the lifetime of one man is not enough to enable him to acquire perfect knowledge and experience in the art of war.” Of course military systems of the 21st century will be more complex than any envisioned by Frederick or Napoleon. JV 2010 is a watershed because it helps our thinking to catch up with our capabilities while simultaneously advancing them which will enable us to secure the future beyond the confines of outmoded concepts.

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Donning protective gear during Desert Storm. U.S. Army THE IMPACT OF NBC Proliferation on Doctrine and Operations By ROBERT G. JOSEPH

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Joseph

[Editor’s Note: From October 1994 to September Joint Staff in spring 1996. In addition, the geo- 1995, the Center for Counterproliferation Research at graphic CINCs have been charged with implement- the National Defense University held a series of working counterproliferation policy in their areas of re- shops to examine how service doctrine, operational sponsibility. They are in the process of developing concepts, and capabilities take into account the threat counterproliferation contingency plans to define from the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chem- how they intend to conduct counterproliferation ical weapons (NBC). The workshops represented the operations. The Joint Staff is also working with the first time that the majority of constituencies in the de- CINCs to assist them in identifying and developing fense establishment that are responsible for evaluating those capabilities which they will need to accom- and designing military responses to proliferation were plish their counterproliferation objectives. assembled. Collectively, the workshop series involved As a framework for military counterprolifera- more than four hundred participants drawn primarily tion operations takes shape, the Joint Staff and from the services but also included members of policy, services are focusing on the doctrine, operational intelligence, research and develop- concepts, and training to better prepare our forces on balance, our words on ment, and other organizations. Per- for operations in an NBC environment. Further- haps most unique, the workshops more, on the policy level, the recent establish- countering the NBC threat included broad participation from ment of the Counterproliferation Council chaired have been stronger than planners, operators, and trainers by the Deputy Secretary of Defense illustrates our deeds from all the services. Although the high level interest in the NBC threat and the workshop recommendations, de- commitment to respond to that threat. tailed in a number of reports, cov- The above responses begin to address many ered several broad areas—national military strategy, deficiencies identified in the workshop series. defense policy, and military capabilities—the central Overall, the findings suggest that the response to purpose of the series was to enlighten the operational the threat has been uneven. There are pockets of context. Presentations, discussions, and gaming fo- strength, such as procurement of passive defense cused on service capabilities for joint and coalition capabilities at the individual level. There are also warfare in NBC environments. This article presents more recent areas of progress, mostly program- those findings that are most germane to the further de- matic and focused on technology solutions, such velopment of joint and service NBC doctrine.] as developing light-weight suits and improving our detection capabilities. But on balance, our proliferation is recognized as words on countering the NBC threat have been a serious threat across the stronger than our deeds. NBC operational spectrum—from The workshops surfaced a number of weak- the deployment of forces to post-hostility activities. nesses in the areas of doctrine, force structure, References to NBC—frequently aggregated under training, and education. Identifying these weak- the rubric of weapons of mass destruction nesses and recommending improvements were (WMD)—appear often in policy and capstone state- the main focus of this work. In that context, it ments such as the national military strategy and should be noted that weaknesses do not mean Joint Vision 2010. that the joint community and services have failed At present NBC is also mentioned in service to address the challenge. No one should expect doctrine (for example, Army Field Manual 100–5 them to have resolved all of the difficult prob- and Air Force Manual 1–1) as well as in more tech- lems associated with this complex and growing nical manuals on detection, decontamination, in- threat. That said, solutions will be found only dividual protection, and biological warfare/chemi- when existing vulnerabilities are acknowledged cal warfare (BW/CW) shipboard defense. Aspects and the Armed Forces begin to think comprehen- of the NBC threat are also the focus of joint doc- sively about how to overcome them. trine publications, foremost among them Joint Pub 3–11, Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Doctrine Chemical (NBC) Defense, which provides a general For purposes of the workshop series, doctrine overview of NBC defense operations. was defined as how we think about the conduct of Furthermore, counterproliferation is being em- war and the principles for conducting operations. bedded in the planning process, as evidenced by The definition found in Joint Pub 1, fundamental the missions and functions study completed by the principles that guide the employment of forces in support of national objectives, is entirely consistent with this working definition. One deficiency common to service doctrine Robert G. Joseph is director of the Center for Counterproliferation is the failure to understand how an enemy may Research at the National Defense University and on the faculty of the employ NBC against us. Lacking such knowledge, National War College. doctrine is silent on this point; hence, concepts of

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Chemical attack exercise at Camp LeJuene. U.S. Marine Corps (C.D. Clark)

enemy NBC use are we miss an opportunity to take advantage of the absent from the rele- vulnerabilities in an enemy’s NBC posture. vant documents and Adversary employment concepts for conven- U.S. Air Force operational publica- tional conflict are recognized as essential for the Decontaminating F–15 tions mentioned ear- development of service and joint doctrine and during exercise. lier. In general, NBC concerns are confined either operating principles for conventional defensive as to very broad statements about the threat and well as offensive operations. Concepts of enemy need to plan against “weapons of mass destruc- conventional operations are fully embedded in tion” or to detailed technical data on how to put doctrine, force development, and training. Failure on mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) to develop and embed similar concepts relating gear and wash down contaminated ships. Between to NBC may expose forces in the field and fleet to these extremes—doctrine, tactics, techniques, and risks that could have been mitigated had likely procedures (TTP) for combat in various scenar- employment concepts been understood and cor- ios—there exists a relatively blank page on which rective action taken. we must focus our attention. Only by embedding enemy use concepts in Force Structure doctrine can the Armed Forces develop courses of A number of workshop participants empha- action above the individual and small unit level sized the need to remedy identified shortfalls in to counter the NBC threat to U.S. forces. More force structure, especially for forces that would be specifically, because doctrine does not take into called on for crisis response. Some questioned account enemy NBC employment concepts, we whether sufficient mobile detection vehicles were also lack TTP needed to overcome key vulnerabili- being acquired. Similar questions were raised ties identified by operators and planners. These about the biological integrated detection system vulnerabilities include protection of facilities (BIDS), and specifically its emerging employment such as ports and prepositioning depots, large concept which emphasizes forward deployment groups of personnel, and essential equipment and of scarce assets. Others questioned the planned supplies; decontamination capabilities for large level of on-hand stocks of MOPP gear in light of areas and sensitive materiel such as airfields and the requirement for possible suit changeouts aircraft; and handling contaminated casualties every other day for forces and critical civilians and cargoes. Moreover, without such concepts, needed to prosecute an operation abroad in a BW or CW environment.

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Chemical Biological International Reaction Force (CBIRF) washing down M–93 FOX. U.S. Marine Corps (C.D. Clark)

Participants also stressed the risks associated these units have been properly prepared for their with the current heavy reliance on Reserve NBC secondary NBC defense roles. defense units, again as with BIDS, particularly in In this context, one related point that came contingencies such as Desert Shield that do not up repeatedly was the assertion by Air Force rep- have the luxury of a buildup period. This would resentatives that the Army was responsible for de- be especially true if the adversary were to use contamination of large areas, such as air bases. NBC early to deter the United States from inter- Army participants consistently responded that vening by posing the prospect of high casualties. they had neither the mission nor the capability. Finally, some participants questioned the organizational designs of service NBC-related units. Training For instance, in the Army (which has the prepon- Perhaps the most critical requirement for de- derance of these units) the design of division terring NBC use, and for successful operations level chemical companies appears to be incom- should deterrence fail, are forces fully trained patible with current responsibilities (such as across the NBC threat spectrum. Training con- smoke generation and NBC decontamination) verts theory into practice by preparing forces to which may be required simultaneously under accomplish their mission in an operational envi- foreseeable operational circumstances. In high ronment. While recognizing a number of im- tempo combat, commanders may be forced to provements that have been made in establishing limit the use of smoke as a battlefield obscurant training standards and programs to enhance NBC to enhance force protection in favor of time-ur- readiness, such as training NBC defense experts gent decontamination. Because there are few of from all services at Fort McClellan, this is an area these specialized units in the force structure, com- of particular weakness. manders may be faced with an unacceptable Throughout the workshops the planners, op- dilemma. A similar circumstance may occur with erators, and even trainers themselves cited short- Air Force civil engineering units assigned both falls in their own individual and unit training ex- base maintenance and aircraft and base deconta- periences. Most of those cited have been mination missions. The question is not whether previously documented, such as in the DOD an- units need to be dual tasked but whether the cur- nual NBC warfare defense report to Congress and rent assignment of tasks, based on the Cold War model of conflict in Europe, is the most rational for regional NBC contingencies, and whether

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by the General Accounting Office. These defi- under current threat conditions. Training guid- ciencies deal with inadequacies in such basic but ance within the services and combatant com- central areas as the inability to handle CW and mands is inadequate for producing the proficiency BW casualties, improper wearing of masks, and needed to operate in regional NBC environments. the inability to operate detection equipment. Notably absent is useful staff training for develop- Such inadequacies—which reflect the current ing combat campaigns and courses of action for concentration of training on individual protec- operations involving an NBC-armed enemy. tion and specialized units—are the subject for All services need more realistic NBC events corrective action. incorporated into individual, unit, and staff training. Current simulations, which form the basis of much individual and unit training, do not realis- tically depict potential NBC use in likely combat and non-combat contingencies. There was consensus that existing models and simulations inad- equately portray the types of environments that could result from the NBC proliferation threat and, specifically, that its impact on land, sea, and air operations—as well as civilian populations—is routinely understated in wargames. One reason is that current models are not capable of providing essential information about CW and, especially, BW effects. In workshop games, red players saw NBC capabilities as important weapons to assail U.S. vulnerabilities and to reduce the significance of U.S. conventional technological superiority. The same players, when cast in the role of blue planners, consistently minimized the difficulties of operations in NBC environments. U.S. Marine Corps (C.D. Clark) Many participants also noted that there has Evacuating exercise been insufficient NBC play in joint and combined “victims”. exercises. While measures are being undertaken to However, participants identified other key enhance joint training, little progress has been training shortfalls. At present, primary service made in exercising with potential coalition part- guidance on NBC attempts to ensure that person- ners. Yet coalition operations will likely be the nel maintain their proficiency in taking individ- norm for regional conflict. It is clear that, despite ual protective measures like donning protective the deficiencies of U.S. forces in the NBC area, garb. Specialized NBC defense units have ade- they are relatively better equipped and trained to quate guidance to perform their unique technical operate in NBC environments than the forces of functions such as decontamination. However, many if not all allies and potential coalition mem- there is inadequate guid- bers. Therefore, combined exercises and training training guidance is inadequate ance within the services could provide a useful foundation for operations for producing the proficiency or from operational in the event of an actual conflict. It is essential to chains of command that work in advance with allies in the region to ensure needed to operate in regional defines tasks, conditions, cooperation when hostilities begin. NBC environments or standards for more On a more anecdotal basis, discussions in the complex NBC activities workshops pointed to the potentially harmful ef- such as operational planning to minimize the po- fects of current NBC training practices. For exam- tential effects of enemy NBC use. Even at highly ple, most Army participants affirmed that they instrumented Army combat training centers had trained for CW events. As the conversation (CTCs) there are not adequate models or tem- developed, however, it became clear that the CW plates to train soldiers against likely enemy NBC uses against which they trained were almost al- use in future conflicts. The commanders of units ways limited and discrete events in a broader exer- undergoing training essentially determine the cise. In almost every experience, U.S. forces were scope and nature of NBC play, if any, to be in- able to go around or through such use with little cluded in the scenarios by CTC controllers and effect on operational tempo. Two explanations opposing forces. were given for why the play was structured in this During the workshops service representatives candidly discussed difficulties encountered in training for operations in NBC environments

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fashion: first, the chemical event could not be al- NBC Challenges lowed to derail the larger exercise, and second, the Taken together, the workshop findings sug- commanders who believed they would be graded gested a clear bottom line from which obvious on the overall results of the exercise could not let challenges emerge. The first is to better know the the CW play affect the outcome. enemy. Here, we need to think differently about If these observations reflect widespread prac- intelligence requirements and tailor assets to the tice, one must ask whether such experiences do operational needs of the supporting services and more harm than good if they lead to a false sense combatant commands, placing more emphasis on of complacency that a clever enemy could exploit. enemy NBC operational concepts, employment doctrines, and capabilities. At the same time, it is Education essential to recognize that, although important, A consensus of workshop participants from better intelligence alone is not sufficient. all services indicated that professional military Another promising tool is the creation of education (PME) will be key to overcoming the dedicated NBC red teams with the authority to NBC challenge in the long run. Put simply, in a challenge conventional thinking—both in terms proliferated world in- of enemy use and U.S. responses. It is especially advanced courses on proliferation volving regional con- useful to have in place a disciplined process with flict, future leaders dedicated professionals for critically examining and counterproliferation reach must think differently alternative courses of action and capabilities. This only a small fraction of students about deterrence and tool can be applied by operators, planners, and defense. Senior ser- trainers across a broad spectrum of activities, vice colleges have from identifying critical intelligence and counter- made notable progress in designing advanced force capabilities for early deployment to plan- courses on proliferation and counterproliferation. ning for civil-military emergency response coop- They reach only a small fraction of students, eration in contingency theaters of operation. however. Most important, core curricula at these In the near term, interactive gaming can also institutions require added emphasis on the politi- be effective. Forcing U.S. planners and operators cal-military and operational implications of the to think like the adversary is invaluable. The NBC threat. At the intermediate and precommis- process can generate insights about issues that sioning levels, where student exposure to NBC is- military planners and operators could face when sues is cursory at best, even more must be done. confronting an NBC-armed opponent. To strengthen PME, the Counterproliferation Finally, we need to think about NBC differ- Center at the National Defense University has de- ently than we did in the East/West context. Today signed a counterproliferation awareness game—in the likelihood that NBC will be used against us is which players act as both red and blue team much greater. A number of factors explain this. In members on the operational level—that was used the bipolar Cold War context, regional states were for the first time in April 1996 by the National less free to pursue their own aggressive political, War College. Other senior service colleges have ideological, and in some cases religious objectives expressed interest in adopting the game. This tool through the use of force. The current lack of disci- will also help inform us about enemy use con- pline is compounded by the fact that proliferation cepts and, in turn, assist in developing doctrine.

Biological Weapons Effects: What We Know Chemical Weapons Effects: What We Know

TYPES “Real World” Exercise Experimental Studies, TYPES “Real World” Exercise Experimental Studies, Data Data Data Models, Data Data Data Models, LEVELS Simulations LEVELS Simulations

People People

Small Small Units Units

Divisions and Divisions and Above Above “Systems” (ports, “Systems” (ports, airfields, etc.) airfields, etc.)

Civilian Civilian Populations Populations

Little or no reliable information Incomplete or nonconclusive information Generally good information/accepted as reliable

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is occurring in regions of vital interest to the doctrine. A survey of existing data by the center United States, regions in which we have security indicates several major gaps in our knowledge commitments and forward-based forces. base, such as effects of BW and CW use on units In addition, within a regional context, the above the battalion level, on key nodes such as prospects for traditional deterrence succeeding— ports, and on civilian populations. The accompanying illustrations (shown on the previous page) provide an overview of some of those weaknesses. The green symbols indicate that we have generally good data on the effects of CW on individual soldiers. This applies particularly to physically fit males because relatively little information exists on women. The red symbols tell us where we have very little or no reliable information about the effects of BW and CW, for example, on large unit operations. The third challenge is to fully train and educate the force. Several suggestions have been covered earlier, from developing standards for larger units and complex tasks, to creating more realistic models for games and simulations, to the extensive use of red teams. The fourth and final challenge is to design and equip forces to meet the new realities of the NBC threat. Key to this effort is integrating ma- U.S. Marine Corps (C.D. Clark) teriel and non-materiel initiatives. Since 1994, the Treating “casualty” U.S. Government has issued a Counterproliferation under NBC exercise Review Committee report with details on the re- threat. that is deterrence based on retaliation and punish- quired technology initiatives, but non-materiel ini- ment alone—are problematic and in fact are more tiatives remain scattered. Not until a companion likely to fail for several reasons: the absence of volume on non-materiel initiatives is prepared, such conditions as mutual understandings and ef- and comprehensive doctrine developed, will there fective communications, the risk-prone strategic be essential guidance for defining the way we personalities of regional adversaries we are likely equip, train, and fight in an NBC conflict. JFQ to confront, and the asymmetric nature of deterrence in a regional contingency where U.S. survival is not at risk but the enemy likely sees his own at stake, or at least that of his regime. This could prompt him to use NBC with little concern about the consequences. Perhaps most significant is that the employment concepts of regional adversaries are also likely to be much different than those assumed about adversaries in the past. In this context, NBC capabilities are seen as weapons of the weak against the strong, as the only arms that can overcome the conventional superiority of the West. They are not seen as weapons of last resort, but rather weapons of choice to be threatened or used early in a conflict for political and psychological as well as military purposes. For this reason, understanding enemy concepts of use is central to the U.S. response to proliferation. The second challenge is to better know ourselves. We will not have fully met it until we understand the effects of BW/CW on operations involving U.S. and coalition forces and develop appropriate concepts of operations based on solid

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Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Security Strategy for the Next Century By LAWRENCE E. CASPER, IRVING L. HALTER,

EARL W. POWERS, PAUL J. SELVA,

THOMAS W. STEFFENS,andT. LAMAR WILLIS

upporting a National Security Strategy of En- near term while recapitalizing forces for the fu- gagement and Enlargement requires that we ture in an era of fixed or declining resources and Shave robust and versatile forces that can, rapidly changing technology. The situation is ex- in the words of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), acerbated by continuing commitments to opera- “credibly deter and, if required, decisively defeat tions other than war. In addition to consuming aggression...by projecting and sustaining U.S. recapitalization resources, such operations test a power in two nearly simultaneous major regional hedge strategy which is implicit in preparing for conflicts (MRCs).” 1 This presents the dilemma of major regional conflicts through a pattern of how to sustain the BUR-required capability in the force employment in other types of conflicts. Official and independent studies reveal a mismatch between the size of the BUR force and pro- Colonel Lawrence E. Casper, USA, Colonel Irving L. Halter, USAF, jected funding levels to recapitalize the Armed Colonel Earl W. Powers, USMC, Lieutenant Colonel Paul J. Selva, USAF, Forces for the next century. The $242.6 billion au- Rear Admiral Thomas W. Steffens, USN, and Captain T. LaMar Willis, USN, thorization for FY97 continues the ten-year trend comprised the first Secretary of Defense Strategic Studies Group.

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in reduced procurement, a 70 percent decline, and advantage of the emerging RMA to harness infor- an overall budget reduction of 45 percent.2 Gone is mation age technologies and processes to create a the Cold War strategy that so readily lent itself to force which is able to respond in an uncertain se- quantitative, comparative determinations of force curity environment within the DOD budget. requirements. However, we extended the threat Accomplishing this goal calls for a strategic based BUR approach to strategy despite a growing vision shared by industry and government, and suspicion that operations other than war—such as particularly among the services. This is essential dealing with regional instability, revolution, or for the services to develop a common warfighting ethnic strife; proliferation philosophy and doctrine and to guide the process KBW enables us to leverage of weapons of mass de- and organizational changes needed to create more struction; or future threats capable and efficient forces. It is also required as a battlespace to achieve effects from information tech- unifying concept to guide service investment in through precision employment nologies or non-govern- research, development, and acquisition. It would mental actors or organiza- provide a coherent basis for building a plan that of combat power tions—will be our most rationalizes defense spending, reducing stovepipe likely security challenges. development and duplicative acquisition among It is questionable whether anything as large as a the services. Knowledge-based warfare (KBW) is traditionally sized corps may indeed be deployed such a strategic vision. to meet them. At the same time advances in information The Strategic Vision age technology have inspired speculation on how KBW is a process that provides superior situa- these capabilities can be combined with process tion awareness of the battlespace, allowing us to and organizational change to create a fundamen- decide at a faster pace than an enemy. It enables us tal metamorphosis in the conduct of war, namely, to leverage our battlespace knowledge to achieve a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Informa- discrete effects through precision employment of tion technologies and processes, when synthe- combat power. What differentiates KBW from sized by operational art and new organizational other warfare is the synergism of combining ad- concepts, present an opportunity for discontinu- vanced sensors, information technology, and ana- ous change—a great leap in warfighting—from lytic tools to process the information. This allows the industrial to information age. The solution to commanders to view shared information in the the near-term security dilemma may be to take context of their battlespace, apply experience and judgment, and transform the information into battlespace knowledge. A capacity to collect data,

USS Shiloh, Operation Desert Strike. U.S. Navy

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Casper et al.

process it into useful information, and place it in a a dynamic, distributed planning and information battlespace context allows forces to achieve infor- network that supports the decisionmaker, plan- mation superiority. It has been an abiding goal of ner, and analyst as well as the commander and commanders and decisionmakers—to know better individual soldiers in the field. The conceptual in order to act faster and more shrewdly than an process of KBW involves the following: enemy and thus to be constantly ready. Now it ■ Data, the raw input of our knowledge building may be possible. Leveraging knowledge can allow process, is derived from space based, sea based, airborne, us to essentially operate in an adversary’s decision and unattended ground sensor systems, as well as elec- cycle. Commanders can achieve discrete effects— tronic intelligence, measurement and signature intelli- disrupting power grids or denying communica- gence, signals intelligence, human intelligence, and tions links—instead of inflicting widespread dam- open sources. This data is the basis for creating informa- age. This strategy leverages information superiority tion, adding to our knowledge base in the worldwide to sustain strategic advantage. database of systems, and ultimately battlefield decisions. ■ Taking advantage of our rapidly expanding In 15 to 20 years on the tactical and opera- computer processing power, analysts at combat infor- tional levels our forces will be able to focus less on mation analysis centers such as the Defense Nuclear destructive measures of attrition based, force on Agency (DNA) use dynamic modeling and simulation to force warfare and more on various effects that input data into context for the warrior, producing deci- clude, but are not limited to, physical destruction sionable information. These same tools enable warriors on the battlefield as part of a planned strategy. On to conduct systemic, effects based planning. the strategic level, this information superiority ■ Decisionable information, a key product of this could be used to orchestrate effects to achieve out- process, is information delivered to the right person at comes outlined in the commander’s intent or cam- the right time in a usable format. It allows leaders to paign plans. The proactive use of information su- choose actions or effects to achieve desired outcomes. ■ Forces, equipped with a variety of weapons and periority opens a new vista of indirect measures for constituted to respond to a given set of missions, can achieving political outcomes. Taking action early focus on executing operations with a clear understand- allows more options that are “nonlethal” and posing of how their actions will help achieve a battlefield sibly even transparent to the target audience. effect and support an associated strategic outcome. Process KBW depends on collection and analysis of information. An integrated command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system affords U.S. Navy

Tomahawk missile launch. U.S. Navy

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KBW is a departure from the attrition of enemy forces in a linear battlefield that empha- Secretary of Defense sizes physical destruction of targets to a nonlinear Strategic Studies Group focus on effects and outcomes both in and outside the battlespace. It envisions a process that n 1995 the Secretary of Defense formed the strategic studies group (SSG) to be com- determines, predicts, and measures cascading ef- prised of one or two officers from each service who are selected to focus on strategic fects across enemy systems of lethal and non- Imanagement issues for ten months. The officers assigned to this group must have lethal precision measures. demonstrated high flag or general officer potential; they receive senior service college and Decisionable information provided via a dis- joint PME credit for their participation. tributed network empowers individual warriors, The first group was tasked “to investigate the opportunities and requirements gener- blurring the distinction among the strategic, op- ated by a full adoption of a precision strike regime and to develop a strategy for implementing erational, and tactical levels. Lone soldiers, armed the transition to such a regime.” The results of that effort are found in the accompanying arti- with a knowledge of desired effects and outcomes cle on knowledge-based warfare which is derived from a report and briefing prepared by the six members of SSG I. Their findings were presented earlier this year to the Secretary, Chair- coupled with a superior battlespace awareness, man, and other senior civilian and military leaders. will be able to affect strategic outcomes. Decision- able information and the processes that produce it create an opportunity for faster, more informed decisions at the policy level, more rapid planning and execution by warriors, and more timely adap- ■ To assess the result of measures and ensure the validity of desired effects relative to strategic outcomes tation of security processes. Timely adaptation is in a dynamic environment, constant monitoring and a deliberate byproduct of real-time monitoring, feedback are required, relying on the sensors or collec- feedback, and analysis of measures which are tors that support a dynamic, adaptive process of con- taken by warriors in the battlespace. The result is ducting warfare. to speed up the whole security process, from pre- ■ What makes all this possible is a robust C4 sys- crisis monitoring through execution of chosen tem coupled with an accurate and high fidelity intelli- courses of action to crisis termination. 4 gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance system—C ISR. KBW stresses controlling the tempo of battle, allowing commanders to leverage superior knowl- What’s New? edge to engage at the time, place, and pace of If Sun Tzu were asked what is novel about their choice. Time thus becomes a measure of ef- KBW, he might knowingly say “not much,” but fectiveness for security processes. Parallel war is in fact there are differences. the ultimate expression of this procedure. Com- KBW not only can enhance KBW puts the development of bining dominant battlespace knowledge with the capabilities but increase an integrated command and ability to simultaneously attack all key targets control architecture first, fol- with precision measures across the spectrum of options for decisionmakers lowed by weapon systems de- an enemy’s systems in a relentless, high tempo, signed to operate within the C2 and very lethal assault yields the explicit capabil- framework. This reverses the trend of producing ity to bring a sophisticated industrialized society advanced weapons with no consideration for the to its knees in short order and an implicit capabil- C2 architecture to employ them. A case in point is ity to hold a massed force hostage. the initial deployment of the Tomahawk cruise KBW brings a new mind set to planning and missile to the fleet without provisions for the C2 information sharing. It embraces dynamic, inter- requirements of regional CINCs. active, collaborative planning with an emphasis Similarly, adopting KBW provides a con- on systemic, effects based targeting geared to de- struct for driving technological development and sired strategic outcomes. This is coupled with the focus for research and development investment. parallel distribution of information, from the de- This contrasts with the current process by which cisionmaker to soldier, with intelligent agents to industry brings technology to the services in sort decisionable information. It places greater search of an application. Technology today pro- emphasis on data analysis and creates more deci- pels the development of doctrine and operational sionable information and ultimately knowledge. concepts, frequently resulting in an appliqué of new technology on old processes and hardware. KBW Implications KBW initiates technology goals for industry Opportunities offered by KBW have signifi- through a coherent strategy and defined C2 archi- cant implications for national security strategy. It tecture into which future systems can be plugged. not only can enhance capabilities but increase options for decisionmakers, who utilize knowledge derived from a common base to apply political, diplomatic, and economic measures to avoid using force. This may solve our current dilemma

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military, and industrial infrastructure on all levels. It also does more with less. The overall force structure can be reduced since smaller units will be more capable than larger ones; some combat support functions such as intelligence will be sub- sumed by operations; and staff and support functions can be consolidated into fewer “centers of excellence” or combined career fields in support of multiple fielded forces by a robust network. In addition to a geometric reduction in logistics and acquisition costs, smaller forces translate into a diminished infrastructure for training and maintaining forces and fewer resources for recruiting, training, and sustaining personnel. The logistics anchor desk (LAD) which supported Joint Endeavor in Bosnia illustrates the po-

DOD tential reduction in logistics requirements with TLAM dispensing KBW. The Army has the lead in developing this submunitions. system, which provides access to authoritative by facilitating the transition to a more capable, data, contains responsive planning tools, and lets efficient force that can deter large scale conven- logistics staffs collaborate in planning. One of the tional conflict and offering policymakers tools to most used tools in LAD is the knowledge-based help shape the future security environment. logistics planning shell (KBLPS), which utilizes ar- The Gulf War Air Power Survey concluded that tificial intelligence tools to develop and analyze the precision guided munitions (PGMs) of Desert transportation and supply distribution. When the Storm fame were up to a hundred times more ef- Army was preparing to establish the intermediate fective than the dumb bombs that were used in staging base in Hungary, the standard for their fa- Vietnam.3 Army studies concluded that precision cilities was the ability to handle 10,000 soldiers. guided artillery rounds that sense and destroy KBLPS showed that the number would not exceed armor are up to 15 times more lethal than un- 6,000. Thus not only was the physical size of the guided rounds against the same target. Using staging base reduced, so were support require- these systems in the context of a shared picture of ments for meals, water, and beds. Just imagine the battlespace—a common reference system— the compounding effects if knowledge-based sys- can multiply their contribution to enhancing tems pervaded our operations. combat capability. By implication, combat units can be orga- Deterrence nized into smaller task-organized elements that The devastating capability of KBW is a con- are more mobile than units today. They will have ventional complement to our nuclear deterrent. equal or greater capability. They can operate An enemy who clearly realizes our superior capac- within an enemy’s decision cycle since they will ity to conduct high intensity, parallel warfare will leverage information to accelerate the pace of op- most likely be deterred from large scale conven- erations. Because these units are networked on an tional aggression, thus reducing the need for a information system, they can fulfill multiple task- large force structure. Events in Bosnia in autumn ings on a nonlinear battlefield and be mutually 1995 may provide insight into this potential fu- supporting. Forward staffs can be reduced and ture. Precision air strikes in conjunction with commanders can use the information network to diplomatic and other measures achieved the de- reach back to out-of-area staffs and exploit resi- sired effects: termination of the bombardment of dent expertise in analysis centers such as DNA, Sarajevo and convincing Serb troops to remove U.S. Strategic Command, and selected laboratories their weapons. Subsequently, 13 Tomahawk land such as Lincoln and Lawrence Livermore. Smaller attack missiles, part of a broader air campaign and sized units, increased lethality, and reduced for- coupled with diplomatic and economic measures, ward staffs can surge the reduction effect on logis- disrupted Serbian C2 systems. The point was clear: tics and acquisitions that will result in increased We had both superior knowledge of Serbian sys- agility and decreased vulnerability, in part due to tems and the ability and political will for precision a shrunken logistics footprint. This generates a attack. Serbian forces were vulnerable. Their grasp force that can conduct high intensity parallel war- of our capability and will, coupled with political fare, simultaneously hitting an enemy’s political, and diplomatic measures, helped achieve our desired outcome, cessation of hostilities.

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TLAM striking fixed facility. DOD

The deterrent potential of KBW is not limited competitive advantage in specific areas to sustain to large scale conventional conflict. With its adop- strategic advantage. What does it take to realize tion, we may be able to add to force structure sav- KBW? The answer is enabling technologies, proc- ings by exploiting knowledge-based systems to ess engineering, and organizational change. proactively shape our security environment. Abili- KBW is as much a thought process for con- ties that contribute to superior knowledge of the sidering warfighting in the future as an array of battlespace can also enable policymakers to act technologies. It thus becomes a construct to drive sooner to contain or even deter a crisis. technology to provide data collection, analysis, and information dissemination systems critical to Preventive Defense achieving the common picture of the battlespace KBW also extends the concept of preventive that is in turn essential to information superior- defense. It provides a potent tool to promote sta- ity. This contrasts with current acquisition proc- bility and thwart aggression in a chaotic world esses which rely upon industry to bring out new through the extension of a knowledge umbrella, technology for which the services develop opera- analogous to the nuclear umbrella proffered dur- tional applications, integrating it into existing ing the Cold War. notions of force structure and operations or ap- Superpower competition during the Cold plying it to existing systems to improve capabili- War produced a cult of secrecy where knowledge ties. KBW opens the door to explore not only held was power. Since then information has be- technologies, but processes and organizations come a commodity to exploit in achieving na- that will sustain our strategic advantage. tional objectives, much as military aid, training, The enabling technologies that help form a and foreign sales now bolster alliances. In the fu- common picture of the battlespace and provide ture our contribution of knowledge to an alliance decision tools for commanders in the field are or coalition may be more critical than past en- also vital to enabling a new warfighting capabil- dowments of forces and manpower and could be ity. First, it is critical that we develop a digital the basis for forming affiliations. Sharing knowl- world map, accurate to one meter in latitude, lon- edge can help optimize resources by enabling our gitude, height, and depth. This will provide a partners to act decisively without any direct in- common reference system which will serve as the volvement by our forces. It can also strengthen index for analyzing time-tagged sensor data and partnership arrangements and military to military as the basis for a shared picture of the battlespace. contacts through security dialogues based on an Common geographic references will accelerate awareness of our plans and intentions. In shifting correlating sensor data with ground truth, to an information age industrial base, our knowl- thereby allowing us to automatically fuse data edge-based system will encourage allies to adopt gathered by separate sensors, and streamline C2. systems that enable them to “plug and play” Operational planning and execution which uses a under our knowledge umbrella. As partners plug common reference system will also improve the into this umbrella, the opportunity increases to targeting and delivery of PGMs and precision em- access their unique data sources to build our ployment of “dumb” or imprecise systems. This knowledge base. digital map will be the foundation for a geo-spatial data base that will allow automatic fusion of Factors for Success data from various sources based on time and geo- Kenichi Ohmae suggests that sound strategic graphic location. Such reliable geo-location is the planning is based on determining what he has keystone to information systems designed to sup- called key factors for success.4 These are consider- port the KBW concept. ations that allow organizations to capitalize on

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There are many technical challenges to creat- the Navy cooperative engagement capability ing an accurate three dimensional map. It will (CEC) that fuses data from multiple radar sensors call for advances in information processing, preci- into a real-time target track. An ACR system com- sion navigation, and time control. The sheer size bining all these capabilities would be sophisti- of the database needed to maintain an accurate cated enough to detect physical changes like digital world map will require innovative ap- massing of forces or behavioral changes such as proaches to data handling and dissemination. Re- increased communications traffic on a particular search is in progress that could contribute to this line. We can use accurate time to correlate sensor objective. The Defense Mapping Agency is work- data to detect changes in either minutes or sec- ing with industry on a promising idea for data onds. This ability to recognize changes in physi- warehousing. A concept known as anchor desks cal or behavioral patterns could become the trip to disseminate information may also be helpful. wire for indications and warning systems and en- Advances in precision navigation technologies able automated collection and subsequent analy- like the wide area global positioning system (GPS) sis of base data for effects based modeling. Auto- enhancement and systems like the tightly cou- matic change recognition is essential to an pled GPS/INS (inertial navigation system) which adaptive process or knowledge-based system. is incorporated in the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) GPS guidance package will facili- Effects Based Planning tate exploitation of Third, battlespace awareness would help electro-optical sensors slated for geo-spatial data and forces determine the effects of actions in combat. deployment on UAVs can image may help update the This would require analytic tools and computer geo-spatial data base systems that provide commanders with a com- 11,000 square nautical miles a day through use of sen- mon picture of the battlefield. It would also call sors guided by these for tactical and operational level sensor systems navigation technologies. Finally, exploiting this that can respond to combat commanders in near- data will require time control in the form of a real-time. One advance in this direction is the very accurate time standard and advances in in- concept of operations used by the NATO Imple- formation processing to permit using time-tagged mentation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia which links geographic points as addresses in a geo-spatial Predator UAV sensors to the joint surveillance data base, essentially hanging time-tagged sensor and target attack radar system (JSTARS) to provide data on a digital world map. real-time video of the data depicted on moving Second, with advanced multispectral and hy- target indicator systems. perspectral sensors, a digital world map and associ- Fourth, effects based planning must be sup- ated precision navigation and time standards will ported by those automated decision tools that facilitate automated change recognition, or ACR, can model our forces as well as enemy systems using computer technology to help identify physi- within the context of a commander’s battlespace. cal and behavioral changes. This is vital because For effects based planning and analysis, comman- more data is collected today than can possibly be ders need detailed, interactive models of enemy examined and archived. For example, the electro- military, industrial, and political infrastructures. optical sensors slated for deployment on the Dark- Modeling this concept is a planning and analyti- Star and Global Hawk unmanned autonomous ve- cal tool that accurately depicts the intercourse hicles (UAVs) can image 11,000 square nautical among enemy economic, political, military, and miles a day. Moreover, a single UAV could produce social structures and predicts the impact of opera- enough 8x10 glossy prints in a 24-hour period to tions on many target sets in these categories. cover three football fields. ARPA studies indicate Modeling will allow us to select weapons or forces that automated change recognition systems could most commensurate with our objectives. reduce the imagery which an analyst must exam- System models are the basis for effects based ine by a factor of 1200:1.5 planning. One is Adversary software from the Na- Conducting change recognition at the pixel tional Security Agency which overlays an enemy’s level will reduce the amount of band-width that known communications infrastructure on a map is needed to disseminate imagery. If the dissemi- so that commanders can assess the impact of dis- nation system only sends the digital data required rupting particular nodes. Future models of enemy to show change on information already archived systems must predict the effects of a planned oper- at forward sites, the amount of data being moved ation and link them to broader strategic outcomes. across the communications infrastructure will The development of accurate systems models drop dramatically. poses analytic and technological issues. Because of An automated change recognition system their magnitude they will require advances in the should capitalize on the technology of time tagged data processing exploited to support it like

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symbiotic, chaos theory, fuzzy logic, and math- corporate restructuring reflects changing informa- ematical bases. For commanders to accurately tion processes. In the military this is further ag- evaluate courses of action, such models must reli- gravated by the fact that lives depend on the ac- ably represent effects and be interactive among curacy and timeliness of information. land, sea, and air components. Modeling systems Finally, the measure of effectiveness for this to a degree necessary to conduct effects based process engineering will be time—how fast accu- planning will require a worldwide database of sys- rate information is delivered to those who need tems to help commanders and decisionmakers it. Operating inside an enemy decision cycle is a clearly understand the impact of operations. Sys- key advantage of KBW. Leveraging decisionable tems models will be the tool to exploit our knowl- information will allow a commander to control edge of the battlespace in order to react at a pace the time and tempo of a conflict, forcing an and intensity that renders an adversary incapable enemy to react to the commander’s initiatives. of meaningful response. Organizational Change Process Engineering The technology and process changes dis- To help combat forces an integrated C4ISR cussed thus far will have an organizational im- system must produce decisionable information. pact. One of the most profound will be our per- This calls for a deliberate process engineering ef- ception of what constitutes combat. C4ISR is a fort to determine what information is needed by combat function in the information age. This is whom, when, and in what format. We now have not to imply that the infantryman, pilot, or sub- a communications, information, and intelligence mariner has a diminished combat role. Rather, infrastructure that purports to conduct some of C4ISR personnel, organizations, and processes— these functions. Process engineering in this con- traditionally regarded as combat support—must text will have to involve the users. They must be now be defined as integral to combat. This educated on the intelligent application of tech- change must occur across the board: conceptu- nology and how it can be ally, operationally, and institutionally in the ways C4ISR personnel, organizations, tailored to their needs. in which we organize, train, equip, and fight and processes must now be Too often operators have forces. This has significant implications for orga- defined preliminary needs nizations, careers, training, command, acquisi- defined as integral to combat and allowed technolo- tion, and where we invest defense dollars. gists, systems engineers, As a consequence of knowledge-based war- or analysts to define final information structures. fare, operations will absorb many functions we Users thus were not getting what they needed or associate with intelligence. Future operators must were being buried in unwanted data. interact with knowledge-based systems in order Process engineering will form the foundation to conduct effects based planning and execute for a cultural change in information sharing. To operations. By necessity, these operators will be support forces that must operate autonomously in- intimately familiar with the collection, analysis, side a sophisticated enemy’s decision cycle, we and dissemination of information needed to em- must construct an infrastructure that allows for the ploy advanced munitions. This also implies giv- parallel dissemination of information—its simulta- ing the development and deployment of C4ISR neous distribution to all the parties who require it systems a priority equal to that of new weapons for planning or execution. In this context, com- since the Armed Forces will leverage the informa- manders can have full confidence that all their tion from C4ISR to employ their weaponry. In the forces will have access to the same information at future battlespace, information dominance may the same time, and in a format that allows them to be key to victory, and a robust C4ISR system is the take action. Parallel dissemination will also enable key to information dominance. them to engage in collaborative planning and interact with a centralized battle management sys- Recommendations tem. It will also facilitate central command and co- Initial steps on the road to transition include ordination of forces with the distributed or the following: decentralized execution of operations. ■ Make an integrated C4ISR system the highest invest- Changing processes for information collec- ment priority of research, development, and procurement— tion, analysis, and dissemination is a daunting in- equal in status to deployment of improved weapons systems. tellectual challenge. An analogous process change We already have invested heavily in a capable inventory has been going on in the commercial sector since of precision and conventional weapons systems. We the microprocessor made desktop computers a re- must be able to achieve information superiority to as- ality in the early 1970s. Much of the turmoil in sure victory in the future battlespace. ■ As ultimate arbiters of change, it is essential that the services adopt KBW as a warfighting philosophy. Each

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large scale regional adventurism. Having a robust force structure in place also provides the luxury of a measured approach to incorporating costly or risky new systems. Technologies need not be incorporated until proven and there is reasonable assurance they will enhance existing capabilities. The irony of a conservative hedge strategy is that it poses the greatest security risk in the long term. Its intent is to maintain the military edge of the Cold War and Gulf War. This has been accomplished at the expense of recapitalization for the very forces that are key to a hedge strategy. The risk of this approach is block obsolescence of combat hardware, a hazard that grows with each year as recapitalization funds are used to main-

U.S. Air Force (CarolU.S. Air Force Floyd) tain current readiness. A possibly greater danger NORAD/SPACECOM is that an enemy may bypass industrial age forces command center, and leap straight into dramatically more effective Cheyenne Mountain. service has a vision of its place in future warfare. KBW is information age capabilities. Not hindered by a a unifying concept that all the services should adopt. A large investment in older systems, such an enemy shared vision is critical to guide service acquisition, doc- could develop a dominant new capacity reminis- trine development, and cultural change. Without it we cent of Blitzkrieg. risk dissipating an historic opportunity to exploit our asymmetric technological advantage to extend strategic A transition strategy focused on the informa- dominance in the information age. tion advantage would not only yield immediate ■ Immediately introduce the concept of KBW to sol- military improvements but benefit the growing diers, sailors, marines, and airmen at all levels of profes- “informational” base of our economy. The savings sional military education. The Chairman and service from not recapitalizing industrial age hardware, chiefs can be the flag-bearers, but broad support from and reductions in force consistent with the ab- within the services is crucial, especially in the education sence of a near term threat to the Nation, could be process. Change is occurring now, but the basic trans- used to accelerate the development of KBW. formation implied by KBW will come with the genera- Growth in capabilities from this type of warfare is tion that is entering the military today. In addition to key to retaining strategic dominance. Early devel- warfighting skills, we must teach them the impact of rapid advances in information technologies on warfare. opment and fielding of the substance of KBW may ■ We must encourage this new generation to debate the be an effective barrier to an enemy who cannot af- merits of KBW, explore the changes in organization and ford or is technically unable to develop a similar process that emerging technologies bring, and experiment with capability. At a minimum, it will allow us another those changes. We have a rare opportunity where there is decade or two of peace and stability. JFQ no clear and present threat to our national survival. This is the time for innovation and calculated risks. NOTES

The United States is in a unique position as 1 William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the sole “superpower” in a post-Cold War world. the Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, It is also blessed with a healthy economy, preemi- March 1996), p. 5. nent military, and information leadership. KBW 2 James Kitfield, “Fit to Fight?” National Journal, vol. represents a logical evolution from an industrial 28, no. 11 (March 16, 1996), p. 582. 3 age, threat based strategy to an information age, See Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot Cohen, Gulf War capabilities based strategy. This capitalizes on a Air Power Summary Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993). growing “informational” base, which now is sup- 4 Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist: The Art of planting our industrial base in economic signifi- Japanese Business (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982). cance, and an educated population that includes 5 “Battlefield Awareness, Program Overview,” SDSSG a new generation which is growing up with the briefing by Taylor W. Lawrence, Information Systems digital revolution. In our laboratories, field tests, Office, Advanced Research Projects Agency (February and exercises we must risk failing now to succeed 1996). on tomorrow’s battlefield. The strength of a hedge strategy—as implicit in BUR—is that it retains a force structure recognized as preeminent in the post-Cold War era. The fruits of a large scale investment in an industrial age force are a global recognition of un- matched U.S. capability which has helped deter

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■ It’s Not About Mousetraps— Measuring the Value of Knowledge for Operators By FRANK B. STRICKLAND, JR.

For decades to come...many of the best military operations. This is a danger similar to the criticism of earlier high definition TV which Nicholas minds will be assigned to the task of further Negroponte made in Being Digital. He asserted defining the components of knowledge warfare, that research was misdirected at higher resolution pictures instead of improvements in the “artistry identifying their complex inter-relationships, and of content.” Simply put, in pursuing creative uses building the “knowledge models” that yield of cutting-edge technology NRO must continue to sharpen its grasp of the nature of customer strategic options. tasks and the attributes of knowledge that enable —Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, them. This was the goal of a recent wargame, For- War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn ward Focus II, cosponsored by NRO and the Of- of the Twenty-first Century fice of Net Assessment within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Wargames provide a technique to determine the degree to which knowledge contributes to achieving operational objectives, the kinds of he National Reconnaissance Office knowledge required by operations, and knowledge (NRO) builds, launches, and operates strategies needed to cope with various enemy systems which collect information forces and activities. Games have been increasingly T from space. It responds to require- utilized by OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services to ments from the Joint Staff, CINCs, DOD agencies, explore relationships between information and Central Intelligence Agency, Na- tional Intelligence Council, operational and service intelligence ele- wargames help intelligence professionals gain ments, Department of State, and insight into the military genius to recognize other members of the intelligence community. strategic opportunities in the battlespace In this maelstrom of requirements, systems developers such as NRO can begin to believe that the end game has warfighting. For NRO and other intelligence agen- more to do with mousetraps (systems) than mous- cies, wargames also provide a venue to expand the ing (customer needs). This tendency is exacer- dialogue with operators about operations rather bated in a culture like NRO’s where some of the than focusing on specific information systems re- best and brightest engineers are attracted by ele- quirements and technologies. gant technical solutions that underpin all NRO Additionally, wargames help intelligence professionals gain insight into the operational art—the culminating point and rationale of all the knowledge requirements of an operator—or what might be described as the military genius to Frank B. Strickland, Jr., is deputy director, operational support office, recognize strategic opportunities in the battle- National Reconnaissance Office and formerly was the NRO space. However, according to the director of net representative to Air University.

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assessment, Andrew Marshall, past information- and the use of that dialect to define operational related games may have lacked the analytical measures of effectiveness. This challenged the spon- rigor to dissect and measure the complex interre- sors to identify a means to measure the value of in- lationships between knowledge and war. This ar- formation from an operator’s perspective which be- ticle will examine one attack on this problem: the came a key design goal of Forward Focus II. Forward Focus value model and its use in measur- The objectives of the second game were de- ing an operator’s needs for information. More- fined in 46 analysis questions. These and the For- over, it will highlight Forward Focus II discoveries ward Focus series generally are far more than an and their potential for future warfare. These find- academic exercise. Games are one analysis tech- ings are based on operator preferences and utility nique that contributes to major program deci- measures expressed in a wargame and captured sions on the characteristics of future intelligence through a multi-attribute utility analysis tech- architectures. The Forward Focus II objectives nique (value-focused thinking) for various opera- supported this aim. They were: tional objectives during the wargame. ■ further analyze the Forward Focus I data and discoveries Elicitation Technique ■ produce analytical data with sufficient quality The first wargame in the series, Forward and depth to support decisionmaking Focus I, was conducted at the National Defense ■ discover new techniques to analyze the needs of University in March 1996. Players defined generic operators information system attributes for a variety of op- ■ improve the working relationship between sup- erational tasks. While the game was fruitful, its plier (intelligence community) and consumer (warrior) methodology contained artifacts from the toys- To satisfy these objectives, NRO and Net As- to-task approach raised in deliberations on intelli- sessment required the appropriate analytical frame- gence support to operations. That is, operators work, one that informed present decisions with an were to tackle the problem by applying the capa- awareness of future value and utility. In 1992 NRO bilities of the intelligence system (toys) to opera- members participated in Spacecast 2020, a study tional tasks. A more natural sequence would mandated by the Air Force chief of staff and man- begin with the knowledge needed to accomplish aged by Air University. Its goals included identify- operational tasks, then reach to find characteris- ing high leverage technologies and applications for tics of intelligence systems that could satisfy space systems in the year 2020 or so. It was followed them. in 1995 by Air Force 2025, which broadened the in- Forward Focus I took a step away from the quiry to examine air, space, and information opera- future systems grab bag approach by having oper- tions in the far future. A distinguishing feature of ators score system attributes vice specific systems, both studies was the analytical model used to iden- and an excellent group of players produced data tify what’s-better-than-what from a combatant’s which yielded meaningful results considered perspective. Because Air University includes the Air within the boundaries of a regional war scenario. Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), the studies re- For example: lied upon AFIT faculty, especially the department of ■ Players identified timelines as a dominant infor- operations research. Based on analytical challenges, mation system attribute. potential models for identifying high leverage capa- ■ Longer periods of collection access were useful bilities and the technologies that could enable for increasing the responsiveness to operators. Continu- them thirty or more years in the future ranged from ous collection over a long time—the intelligence equiv- a most-to-least dear ranking to cost and effective- alent of a running commentary—seemed less useful. ness modeling. A simple qualitative ranking was ■ Players evidenced a willingness to trade the judged inadequate, and insufficient cost data on fu- quality of information for increased timeliness—detail ture systems (including the costs of bringing emerg- for speed. ing technologies to fruition by 2020–2025) made ■ Players indicated that on-line digital archives could often offset the need for real-time collection. precise cost modeling impossible. They would have to be developed primarily before the crisis. The presence of such an archive seems to facili- Value-Focused Thinking tate the quality-for-timeliness trade. A fortuitous compromise was found in value- focused thinking (or multi-attribute analysis), a In addition to substantive findings, lessons technique pioneered by Ralph Keeney which al- from the Forward Focus I methodology were critical lows preferences to be weighed by decomposing to shaping the Forward Focus II elicitation tech- them into attributes or qualities and defining util- nique. In the first game operators expressed con- ity curves that describe the utility of an attribute. cern with the vernacular of intelligence collection For example, if the people assigning preferences valued food to meet the overall goal of staying alive, the attributes of food might include smell,

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taste, texture, sodium content, caloric value, and The next major issue became how intelli- fat content. Such qualities become quantified in gence contributes to meeting operational objec- an elicitation process, essentially an extended tives. This required a better understanding of pair-wise comparison which involves assigning what intelligence did. From before the days of numerical values. Thus the qualities of food must Sun Tzu, knowing one’s own forces and those of total 1.00 and might be divided as: smell (0.06); an adversary has been a prerequisite for military taste (0.50); texture (0.04), sodium content (0.03); success. Martin van Creveld, John Boyd, and oth- caloric value (0.20); and fat content (0.17). This reers have discussed the role of knowledge in war- veals that for the evaluators the most important fare and competition. One’s knowledge of war quality of food is taste. To the extent that food rarely reaches certitude, and tradeoffs between means staying alive, taste certainty and knowledge adequate for effective is the dominant quality. action must be made continually. Friction and understanding the role of These values (or weights) chance are added to a smart adversary’s denial knowledge in the battlespace are quantified by utility and deception operations making knowing curves and distributions chancy. The battlespace, despite our best efforts proved a monumental chore that then allow qualities to control it, remains nearly chaotic. Understand- and preferences to being the role of knowledge in the battlespace and come quantities that can its contribution to operational activities proved a be compared. The relationship among food, shel- monumental chore. ter, warmth, and oxygen can then be understood for their contribution to staying alive, and taste Action Words can be compared as a value to a different attribute, Analysis showed that to combatants intelli- such as the value of “76 degrees F.” gence as a noun is knowledge about an adversary Value-focused thinking allows qualities and and the environment. As a verb, knowledge is quantities to be linked in a single model. This is a knowing. The question then became what are the technique that requires the elements it uses to be component parts of knowing, also expressed as both comprehensive when taken together and as verbs. Focusing on verbs is important for several mutually exclusive as possible when separate. reasons. First, they provide a basic understanding Consequently, food and taste cannot be on the of what must be done, and, second, they help same level since taste is a subordinate of food. avoid seeing the world as either products or prod- The highest and best value accrues when analysts uct divisions. The model pivots on understanding work with evaluators to construct a utility or pref- the component parts of knowing, not on nouns erence curve for each quality by eliciting this data like J-2, signals intelligence, imagery, satellites, or from evaluators. It is not enough to know that unmanned aerial vehicles. Finally, verbs allow taste is dominant. Taste must be analyzed to learn those who use the model to recognize that there the points at which how much or how good affect are potentially many ways to do what must be the quality called taste. done and an array of products that might fill that A model for the measurement of the intelli- need. The result was a model indicating that the gence component of operations awaited creation. components of know were the verbs detect, recog- The decomposition technique that is a prerequi- nize, and understand. These action words represent site for constructing a value model required NRO levels of cognition and occupy graded rungs on to think about military operations and intelli- the abstraction ladder: it is easier to detect than gence from a combatant’s position. The analytical understand. The Forward Focus II knowledge team concluded that intelligence, however de- model emerged. It included the component verbs fined, helped a combatant meet operational ob- for plan and execute, and an example of a utility jectives and thus should not be the model’s aim. curve for responsiveness appears in the accompa- By defining the model’s objective as “conduct an nying illustration (figure 1). operational task,” the team helped ensure the in- Application of the Forward Focus II model in telligence component was structured from an op- a game required an adversary and a group of play- erator’s view. ers. A wargame adversary is fully characterized With the object defined the next issue was through force capabilities, current disposition in what combatants do to meet an operational goal. the battlespace, and the geography on which it This elicited hundreds of action verbs which, operates. A history of the scenario, the conflict when grouped by affinity diagramming, revealed path—though sometimes emphasized in gaming that meeting operational objectives required design—is less important than the action-ori- combatants to do three things: know, plan, and ented problems blue combatants face. It is ulti- execute. mately of little value to debate the plausibility of a game scenario in the 2015 time frame. It is doubtful, for example, that the Falklands War was

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Forward Focus II players provided Figure 1. Military Operations Value Model a wealth of operational experience. Their intellects and creativ- Functions and Tasks ity gave purpose to an elicitation technique that otherwise would Conduct (operational objective) have been just another interest- ing model. Participants were chosen by name and invited based on Know Plan Execute warfighting experience, knowledge of the operational art, and combat arms specialty. The aim Detect Analyze Move was that the group represent expertise across the combat arms disciplines. The thirty soldiers, Recognize Sequence Shoot sailors, marines, and airmen— grouped into theater, land, sea, Understand Force Qualities Communicate • Area and air cells—came from Air • Points Combat Command, Carrier • Responsiveness Group Three, 101st Airborne Divi- • Update Frequency sion, 9th Bomb Squadron, 8th Spe- cial Operations Squadron, and the Special Purpose Marine Air- Ground Task Force (X). Operators gamed decades prior to that conflict. Similarly, it currently serving in program analysis and plan- may matter less who a future adversary actually is ning positions with Congress, OSD (Strategy and than that we foresee the possibility that very ca- Requirements), the Joint Staff (J-8), service staffs, pable adversaries might arise. A scenario nonethe- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and less does provide boundary conditions for the ex- National Imagery and Mapping Agency also took periment and the conditions which result. In the part. In addition, senior engineers from the aero- case of Forward Focus II, a different fight or prob- space industry participated so they could experi- lem under different conditions may have ence an operator’s perspective. The senior player changed the knowledge required for operations. and theater cell leader was a retired general and The Forward Focus II scenario had one prin- former member of the Joint Chiefs. cipal criterion: construct an initiative-oriented re- Over the course of three and a half days the gional competitor with robust long-range preci- Forward Focus II players scored the model for sion strike capabilities. NRO developers wanted to twenty operational objectives (military tasks). capture, as far as a wargame can, the dynamic of These objectives were adapted from the unified combat operations in which offense, defense, and joint task list and defense planning guidance sce- planning occur simultaneously. This was narios. They were selected to represent a range of achieved in large part by equipping the adversary land, sea, air, and special operations tasks that with substantial theater ballistic missile and long- would be high priority against the Forward Focus range fighter/bomber platforms with weapons of II adversary which included destroying the capa- mass destruction (WMD). To help players focus bility to deliver WMD, suppression of air de- on the adversary and not fight the scenario, ac- fenses, identifying/countering the main advance tual countries and other geopolitical issues were of ground forces, countering special operations avoided although real geography was used to attacks on friendly airfields, and conducting an avoid the investment in a synthetic geophysical amphibious landing. environment and in familiarizing players with it. Marshall’s injunction to the developers in- While the elicitation technique and scenario cluded overcoming the paucity of quantitative are essential to a good wargame, the knowledge of data traditionally produced by a game. The chal- the players is by far the most critical component. lenge was met. Players produced 20 weighted This was especially true given the complexity of models of specific attributes required of any this technique and effort required to complete the knowledge system with dozens of associated util- value model for any one operational objective. ity curves. This quantitative data illuminated other data as player comments and rationale were examined in the context of stated preferences and the utility curves that quantified the specific value they ascribed to an attribute. Among the

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findings were insights into how operators view the probable status of an entire unit. The pres- knowledge apart from platforms, sensors, and ence of mobility and countermobility equipment, technologies; how knowledge is generated and for example, may indicate the combat unit and battlespace analyzed to direct its gathering; levels location an adversary intends to use to com- of cognition required to know; the preference and mence a new offensive. Other signature objects utility for qualities in the time domain; and a the- such as armor can theoretically be anywhere in ory of how target objects and associated knowl- the battlespace. However, by overlaying the edge values may be grouped into three categories. METT–T template large mechanized units are Preferences for know, plan, and execute con- more likely to be found in some locations than firmed that knowledge is critical to combat opera- others. For instance, without the benefit of satel- tions. In fact, for problems posed during the game lites, the U–2, or other such collectors, the men the average value of know for operational tasks of the 1/21st were told they would be in the was nearly equal to that of plan and execute com- enemy’s path in early July 1950, as Max Hastings bined. Those who might rush to judgment aside indicated in The Korean War. This was based on from the boundary conditions previously cited organic knowledge—contact with North Korean should be cautioned. The fact that knowledge is a forces—and application of METT–T. In this case, decisive component of war is supported by thou- the routes to the south for a large mechanized sands of years of military history. However, the force were few and obvious. Forward Focus II model, being platform-and sen- An adversary with long-range missiles and sor-independent, helped emphasize the value of the ability to move rapidly is a larger challenge. an operator’s organic ability to sense and analyze For the game, threat radii from surface-to-surface the battlespace, or more crucially, a warrior’s intel- missiles and long-range fighter-bombers created a lectual process for gathering, sorting, deciding, battlespace in excess of two hundred thousand and acting on information. square nautical miles. Current surface-to-surface missile capabilities reflect a similar threat while fu- Analytical Frameworks ture systems would further expand the threat area All knowledge is not a product of non-or- (see Proliferation: Threat and Response published by ganic collection and analysis. In doctrine, opera- the Department of Defense in April 1996). While tors discern much about the battlespace for them- the scope of the game did not permit a precise de- selves by applying analytical frameworks such as limitation of the battlespace to likely threat loca- mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and tions, operators were clear in using METT–T to de- time available (METT–T). Player responses indicate limit searches for all signature objects. that much is gained by integrating METT–T into To the extent that long-range precision strike any definition of opera- forces are a future threat of interest to U.S. plan- tional information needs. ners, the battlespace must be defined by the radii knowledge gathering was Operators use METT–T to of threat systems—hundreds of thousands of develop knowledge, but square miles versus tens of thousands. Theater cell defined as many small areas the Forward Focus II play- players identified this as the top priority based on and points located in an ers indicated a further ap- the nature of the threat and ability to deliver plication—guiding the WMD. As one very senior officer in the theater cell extremely large threat ring collection of missing remarked, “Our number-one priority is to destroy knowledge. One can note red’s ability to continue the offensive...the another verity of warfare CINC’s job is to prevent his component comman- as timeless as METT–T: any need is weakness. ders from being surprised.” Thus, knowledge gath- Thus, the need for knowledge makes one vulnera- ering was defined as many small areas and points ble to age-old deception/denial measures as well located in an extremely large threat ring. as future information warfare techniques. Preferences in the component cells differed By applying METT–T during Forward Focus notably from those in the theater cell. While II, operators characterized a much different bat- knowing about objects and activities in large areas tlespace than the tens of thousands of contiguous had some value, there was a strong, consistent square nautical miles often reflected in post- preference for a combination of points, respon- Desert Storm discussions. Players approached op- siveness to the need for specific knowledge, and erational goals by identifying signature objects. frequent updating of that knowledge. Aside from These are frequently a subset of objects in a larger surface-to-surface missiles and airborne aircraft, unit that, when located and identified, indicate forces that traverse the earth’s surface do not move very far or fast under the best of circumstances. Likewise, even highly mobile aircraft present large signatures while located at an airfield. These characteristics allowed component cells to focus on

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specific points of interest that ultimately yield tar- This suggests that readiness should include a mea- gets. Recall that the theater cell had created the surement of whether a unit has sufficient prior un- obligation to prevent surprise by knowing what the derstanding of enemy capabilities and behavior pat- enemy was doing in larger areas. terns for the mission. In considering the observation of objects, The operational utility for attributes such as the terrain component of an operators’ analytical update frequency and responsiveness also pre- framework should not be viewed in isolation sented potential issues for knowledge collectors from mission, enemy, troops (friendly forces), and suppliers. Long-range precision strike forces and time. These other elements, along with ex- generally close to engagement quickly, sometimes tant terrain knowledge, are all relevant to devel- in minutes. This fact, and the emphasis put on opment of knowledge about an enemy. Even ter- these forces which red possessed in large num- rain with more or less homogenous surface bers, drove players to create unusually steep util- features, such as oceans or deserts, is still relevant ity curves for update frequency and responsive- to guiding knowledge collection. For example, an ness. That is, the value of knowing was often object can be much easier to discern from its sur- measured in minutes to several hours. After a few rounding environment in relatively flat terrain minutes, knowing where a mobile ballistic missile than in forests, mountains, or jungles. This dis- erector-launcher was had little value. A surprise tinction from the background would change the was that the operational utility of some kinds and sensor granularity required to detect the object, levels of knowledge about other offensive forces which in turn could have effects on the rate and was well inside traditional definitions of timeli- quantity of collection. ness. The preferences and stringent utility shown Required collection rates also could vary de- for time during this game suggest that all data pending on the platform and sensor if there was a providers reconsider what they should gather and need for increased granularity. However, for those how it should be delivered. Systems that collect objectives where area was valued most in this large quantities of data over longer periods may game, players placed a strong preference on the de- not be operationally effective against needs for tect level of cognition. This seemed driven largely more timely data. Again, Negroponte’s admonish- by the enemy’s initiative-oriented behavior and ment is applicable. Technological increases, such offensive capabilities. For certain objects, opera- as wider and cheaper bandwidth which permits tors seemed more interested in timely detection to the delivery of more and more bits, does not nec- support strikes than detailed discrimination be- essarily increase operational effectiveness. A more tween classes of objects. That is, when red was on complete measurement of timeliness issues would the move and the offensive, blue operators were consider the time required by operators to de- far less concerned with the type of red tank than velop knowledge from data and act on it. where those tanks were that needed to be de- Analysis of all models created for the game stroyed. These less agile and higher signature of- also yielded a theory on target characteristics and fensive forces caused operators to value knowledge the knowledge required by class of target. This about points on the earth’s surface. Points with theory drew on observed similarities in values small and agile signature objects caused players to and preferences for different objectives. These value higher levels of cognition. Signature ob- similarities—and a reference to the “timeless veri- jects—such as bridging equipment—could indi- ties” of warfare outlined by Trevor Dupuy—made cate the main axis of attack for red ground forces. it possible to postulate the characteristics of an These objects, sometimes located at very small ge- object independent of its physical manifestation ographical points, caused a preference for the rec- in the scenario. For example, there seemed to be ognize level of cognition. an object-to-value linkage and an object-to-level of abstraction linkage which remained more or Behavior Patterns less consistent in the game. Thus, the timeless Those objectives which required the highest characteristics of targets in war may be mobility, level of cognition often did not contain objects lethal range, and signature. Mobility is the ability calling for more granular sensing. For example, to to quickly close to engagement. Lethal range is understand the red C3I system mandated observa- that at which force has deadly effects. And signa- tions over time to identify equipment, capabilities, ture is the degree to which an object is discernible and patterns of behavior that taken together con- from the background environment. stitute an adversary’s C3I system or process. While Arrayed on an x-y-z axis, eight specific types behavior patterns can and must be observed in the of forces emerge, each defined by extremes (lows battlespace in war, identifying von Moltke’s strate- and highs) in lethal range, mobility, and signa- gic opportunities may be based in large part on the ture (figure 2). Historically, more threatening observation and characterization of potential enemies during long periods before hostile conflict.

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with high lethal range and low signature could be Figure 2. Combinations of Characteristics identified as agile attack forces. These forces are offensive by nature and may require detection of signature objects within an enormous area in very short timelines. Other forces, such as those

(High) with high mobility yet high signatures, allow

more focused knowledge gathering over slightly longer periods. A final category of force is found High Mobility High Lethal Range to have consistently low mobility or none at all,

Lethal Range Low Signature such as infrastructure objects. These may require

higher levels of cognition over a far longer time (Low) (High) Signature (Low) to reach the necessary level of understanding. Low Mobility Low Lethal Range Classifying objects and associated information High Signature (Low) needs in this way may be of value to analyzing alternative future threats and knowledge strategies Mobility necessary to combat them. (High) The United States is not the only nation study- ing these matters. Indian Brigadier General V.K. Nair noted strategies for frustrating and deceiving the knowledge com- Figure 3. General Target Characteristics and Information Needs ponent of the kinds of operations demonstrated by the United States with its coalition partners during Desert Storm in his volume on War in the Gulf: Lessons for the Third World. Boyd’s OODA loop—observe, orient, decide, and act—applies to periods between hostilities as well as war. Potential adversaries have observed our performance and are likely already reacting. Neither gaming nor other synthetic environments can fully replicate war. However, games are useful for collaborating with operators to determine and measure the knowledge component of warfare—a study of mousing, not mousetraps. As such, they are an integral component, along with re- forces are characterized by high mobility (able to quirements processes and technological research, rapidly move to effective engagement range), to improving the ways and means of joint high lethal range (able to outreach opponents warfighting inside an adversary’s strategic OODA and strike them quickly with lethal force), and a loop. Over time various games can provide both low signature (difficult to detect for various rea- data and insights that support a more precise un- sons). Such forces seem to have consistent values derstanding of knowledge in warfare and thus aid and drive preferences for specific kinds and levels the planning of future knowledge architectures. of knowledge. For instance, a force that can As Andrew Marshall noted, Forward Focus II rapidly close to engagement does not permit “shows real progress in developing a means of much time between detecting objects and react- evaluating the relationship of information to bat- ing. Objects in such a force have the highest util- tlefield operations.” Progress continues. JFQ ity for attack. Hence, the value and characteristics of knowing about these objects may remain as constant as their force qualities. Thus it may be that, regardless of the scenario, three classes of objects emerge with similar information needs as shown in figure 3. Objects

96 JFQ / Autumn 1996 Price Com 12/9/96 2:04 PM Page 97 commentary Combat Camera Imagery (C.H. Rudisill) SomeLEADERSHIP: Thoughts on the Military Circa 2025 By DAVID E. PRICE

aving the right leader in the Today, we face significant chal- share of our overall military mission. right place at the right time lenges—none more critical than devel- Fourth, new technology will go on dri- has always been critical to oping 21st century leadership. What is- ving rapid change. And finally, fiscal Hvictory. Yet for an institu- sues will confront future leaders? What constraints will continue to affect mili- tion such as the Armed Forces it is not qualities and skills will they need to tary decisions, especially those related leaders who bring success but to force structure and modernization. leadership. Is there a real differ- personal leadership skills will Traditional leadership. Personal ence between individual leaders leadership skills will remain essential and institutional leadership? remain essential for the officer of for the officer of the 21st century. Lead- History is replete with examples the 21st century ers must think strategically, impart or- of the importance of a leader’s ganizational goals, foster group cohe- personal character, courage, and sion, enforce discipline, and make skill to the outcome of an operation. meet the challenges? How should pragmatic decisions in stressful situa- But unlike battles, campaigns, or even young officers be prepared for leader- tions. There is no substitute for hands- protracted conflicts, military institu- ship roles? These are tough questions on guidance when training, motivat- tions are long-term organizations that leadership needs to consider ing, and directing people. Nevertheless, which have enduring political, cul- today. leadership will be different in 2025. tural, and social values. Their key to Leading integrated forces. Joint op- success is not a single outstanding Challenges erations point toward a future of inte- leader or even a succession of them. Numerous trends will shape mili- grated forces. For example, the Air Institutional achievement is founded tary leadership over the next thirty Force provides air and space operations on a system of ongoing collective lead- years. First, traditional hands-on lead- specialists for our Nation’s joint mili- ership that transcends individuals. ership will remain essential. Second, tary force. Most Air Force leaders come the current trend toward joint opera- from that kind of operational back- tions will evolve into thoroughly inte- ground. They understand global reach- grated forces. Third, peace operations global power and the capability it pro- Colonel David E. Price, USAF, holds the and other noncombat roles will con- Air Force chief of staff chair at the tinue to grow—becoming a major Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

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vides to our National Command Au- tion without sacrificing order or orga- than ever. Individual members of our thorities and theater commanders. nizational effectiveness. future military leadership team will However, by 2025 most Air Force lead- Leaders as businessmen. Our force need an unprecedented wealth of gen- ers will not only be familiar with the structure is a result of fiscally con- eralist skills and a broad base of widely roles and missions of their own service strained decisions made by past and applicable experience. in joint operations; they will com- present civilian and military leader- What if the services continue to mand integrated forces. This means ship. Conditions will be no different in train leaders who possess traditional that an effective Air Force leader must 2025. What will change, however, is skills and expertise? On the surface understand how to conduct carrier the focus of leaders. Today, they too this option appears satisfactory. We based flight operations as well as how often concentrate on getting “rubber have an abundance of effective tactical to plan a major peacekeeping opera- on the ramp” at the expense of good leaders, superb staff officers able to tion—not just its airlift or fighter sup- business practices. In the future, they manage complex support systems, and port. It also requires that the Air Force must be world class businessmen. experienced senior leaders with strate- be ready to accept commanders from Force planning will require considera- gic vision responsible for directing

commentary other services in traditional Air Force tion of all options including nonmili- large organizations. That sounds like leadership roles. Clearly, this trend will tary alternatives. Tradeoffs that must adequate leadership, so why not stick affect military commanders from all be made to optimize force structure to the status quo? force components—land, sea, and air. will be at least as challenging as those That approach will not suffice to- Ready for noncombat roles. The of today. Senior leaders will need an morrow. Effective military leadership Armed Forces have been tasked to understanding of the budget process must be responsive to both the socioe- carry out a variety of nontraditional and knowledge of cost and systems conomic and political environment in military missions since the Cold War. analysis. Those officers who have force which it finds itself. Any force that set- By 2025, operations other than war in- planning and budget expertise will be tles for good traditional leadership will cluding peace operations will be a rou- prepared to serve as senior decision- be hard pressed to match an enemy tine part of their job. However, it is un- makers while those without it will be who has adopted the same lessons of likely that the United States will relegated to lesser roles. leadership and moved on—challeng- undertake these missions unilaterally. The leadership environment of the ing, refocusing, and updating its lead- Thus small-scale multinational force 21st century will be extremely challeng- ership concept. ing. Our military leaders will The basic issue is that traditional be immersed in a “deep-pur- officer development models tend to be military leaders will be immersed in ple suit” environment in narrowly focused. Decisionmaking, a “deep-purple suit” environment 2025. They will plan and exe- communication skills, standards and cute nontraditional missions discipline, and organizational relation- and often lead non-U.S. ships tend to get significant attention. deployments will be relatively com- forces. They will implement rapid orga- Jointness also receives emphasis today. mon. Successful leaders will be able to nizational change driven by technol- However, even there the focus is too relate to diverse cultural elements ogy. And they will make major long- often on joint processes and organiza- within their commands as well as deal term force structure decisions based on tions rather than on overall force inte- directly with people in the region cost/benefit analyses. The cumulative gration and cross-service team build- whose language and culture differ impact will demand a new mix of leading. The human relations training that from our own. An open mind and lin- ership skills. most officers receive is inadequate to guistic skills will be vital for comman- develop a broad appreciation of cul- ders on all levels. Leadership Concept tural diversity; and language training is Champions of systematic change. Cadets and midshipmen today left to those destined for unique ca- The technological revolution is likely will form the leadership of 2025. As reers, such as defense attachés. Finally, to intensify. This will not only lead to previously noted, they will need joint information warfare and the budget new weapon systems, but information experience, cross-cultural and linguis- process are simply regarded as utilitar- warfare which will change the nature tic skills, an understanding of informa- ian specialties with no direct relevance of war. Today, effective leaders drive tion age warfare, and a business execu- outside a functional context. change to take advantage of emerging tive’s eye for cost and quality. The In 2025, we will probably need technology. By 2025, technology-dri- question we face is how to build an of- about the same mixture of tactical ven change will put constant pressure ficer corps for such an environment. leaders, staff officers, and senior deci- on military organizations to reinvent Perry M. Smith suggested in his sionmakers we have today. But with- themselves. Officers who follow a tra- book Taking Charge that those who out changing the way they are pre- ditional organizational paradigm by re- mentor and ultimately select individu- pared, there will be an increasing sponding to innovation will fail the als for leadership roles should “pick in- number of tactical level commanders leadership test. Successful leaders will dividuals who have the capacity to be proactive engineers of change—fa- grow and to become gifted general- cilitating rapid institutional innova- ists.” This advice is more sound today

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who are unable to take full advantage eign area specialists. The same is true career-broadening assignments at all of new warfighting technologies or for first-hand experience in informa- levels. This should be a reciprocal ex- cope with increasingly complex per- tion warfare and the budget process. change of operational as well as staff sonnel problems, staff officers who are Leaders with a background in these positions. Since it will not be easy to controlled by the bureaucracy rather matters will have the knowledge to re- achieve, the Chairman should cham- than controlling it, and senior level de- main proactive decisionmakers. The pion this initiative. Sixth, leadership cisionmakers who are captives of insti- rest will find institutional bureaucra- development should be on the agenda tutional decisionmaking processes. We cies identifying critical issues, deter- of all senior level planning sessions are already facing these problems to mining alternatives, and framing deci- held throughout the Armed Forces. some extent, and the trend is clearly sions for them. Without the active and ongoing direc- increasing. tion of today’s top leadership the de- The key to effective long-term Recommendations velopment of tomorrow’s leaders will leadership in this new environment is First, the Chairman and the Joint simply default to the status quo. a professional development process Chiefs should set specific long-term goals for developing future The world is rapidly changing. If commentary the Joint Chiefs should adopt a generations of leadership. the U.S. military is to remain the Second, the Chairman world’s most capable and respected comprehensive development concept should direct the senior and fighting force in the 21st century and to guide efforts to educate officers intermediate colleges to un- beyond, future leadership teams will dertake a joint study of require each member to bring an un- long-term leadership re- precedented range of both skills and that rewards officers who acquire the quirements. Third, the Joint Chiefs experience to the overall mission. The right generalist skills and experience. should adopt a comprehensive devel- leadership team of 2025 is being cre- Those who have been assigned outside opment concept to guide efforts to ed- ated now. It will mature over the next their services are better equipped to ucate and train officers. Fourth, appro- three decades. What we need is a clear plan, coordinate, and direct integrated priate service commands should development concept to guide its forces. A second language and ability publish leadership development guides progress toward 2025. JFQ to relate to diverse cultures are also as- focused on 21st century requirements— sets. Officers with these skills can di- not career specific, but a roadmap for rectly lead multinational units and becoming a “gifted generalist.” Fifth, build personal relationships that the Joint Staff should work with the would otherwise depend on junior for- services and other DOD components to increase the number of cross-service,

Supporting Deny Flight. Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

2d Marine Division (M.T. Huff) U.S. Air Force (Tana R. Hamilton) (Tana U.S. Air Force

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■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

General Dwight David Eisenhower (1890–1969) Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

VITA orn in Denison, Texas; graduated from Military Academy (1915); served in 19th Infantry (1915–17); 57th Infantry and instructor, Forts Oglethorpe and Leavenworth (1917–18); commander, tank corps, Camp Colt (1918–19); commander, heavy tank brigade; infantry tank school, Camp Meade (1919–21); commander, 301st tank battalion (1921–22); executive officer, 20th Infantry, Panama B(1922–24); Command and General Staff School (1926); Army War College (1928); office of the assistant secretary of war and Army Industrial College (1929–33); aide to MacArthur (1933–35); military adviser to Philippine government (1935–39); executive officer, 15th Infantry Divi- sion, Fort Ord; chief of staff, 3d Division, IX Corps, and Third Army (1940–42); chief, war plans division, and assistant chief of staff, operations division, War Department; commanding general, European Theater (1942); commander, U.S. Forces, North Africa landings; commander in chief of Allied operations in Italy, Sicily, and North Africa (1942–43); supreme commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Western Europe (1944–45); promoted to General of the Army (1944); military governor, American occupation zone, Germany (1945); chief of staff, U.S. Army (1945–48); president, Columbia University (1948–50); supreme allied commander, NATO (1950–52); President of the United States of America (1953–61); died in Washington.

. . . separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concerted effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be U.S. Army Center of Military History completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each Portrait by equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can Nicodemus Hufford. develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.

—President Dwight D. Eisenhower Message to Congress (April 3, 1958)

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■ THE JOINT WORLD

JTF headquarters such as those used to ■ Joint Pub 3–53, Doctrine for Joint Psy- Exercises manage theater operations in Haiti, chological Operations, treats planning and con- Bosnia, and elsewhere. The instruction duct of joint psychological operations to in- BALTIC CHALLENGE dealt with international and operational clude concepts, capabilities, objectives, and responsibilities (July 10, 1996). law, information management, peace Adazi military base, near the Latvian ■ Joint Pub 4–01.1, Joint Tactics, Tech- support operations, political-military capital of Riga, was the site of a U.S.- niques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Airlift Support to issues, multinational logistics, mission Baltic training exercise on July 11–18. Joint Operations, addresses airlift capabilities in- analysis, operational order development, The main objective of the exercise, Baltic cluding potential contributions of common- and special operations in both peace- Challenge ’96, was to improve interoper- user airlift, use of operational support airlift, keeping and peace enforcement. JFQ and airlift and airlift support operations such ability between U.S. and Baltic forces for as responsibilities at airfields, drop zones, as- peace operations. More than 700 troops sault zones, and landing zones (July 20, 1996). from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Doctrine ■ Joint Pub 3–10.1, Joint Tactics, Tech- United States assembled for the first land niques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense, exercise in the Baltics under the NATO furnishes guidance to JFCs and staffs on base Partnership for Peace program. JOINT PUBS UPDATE and base cluster defense in a joint rear area Forces included Estonian, Latvian, The following titles have been re- under all threat conditions outside the United and Lithuanian army troops as well as States (July 23, 1996). cently approved through the joint doc- ■ Latvian national guardsmen. Among the Joint Pub 4–06, Joint Tactics, Tech- trine development process: niques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Mortuary Affairs U.S. soldiers were members of the Army ■ Joint Pub 3–10, Doctrine for Joint Rear in Joint Operations, guides planning and execu- National Guard from Maryland, Michi- Area Operations, contains guidance on plan- tion of mortuary affairs in support of a joint gan, and Pennsylvania. Additional U.S. ning and executing joint rear area operations force (August 28, 1996). involvement included members of the in terms of major functions of infrastructure ■ Joint Pub 3–50.3, Joint Doctrine for Eva- Navy, Marines, and Air Force. Observers development, communications, intelligence, sion and Recovery, covers procedures and capa- came from nearby states such as Russia security, combat operations, sustainment, sur- bilities for assisting and recovering combat and Finland as well as Germany, Norway, vivability, movements, area management, and personnel isolated in hostile or denied terri- and Uzbekistan. host nation support (May 28, 1996). tory (September 6, 1996). ■ Training included convoy opera- ■ Joint Pub 3–58, Joint Doctrine for Mili- Joint Pub 6–02, Joint Doctrine for Opera- tary Deception, offers guidance and principles tional/Tactical Command, Control, and Commu- tions, land mine awareness, check point for planning and executing military deception nications Systems, focuses on joint doctrine for activities, counter-sniper exercises, operations including planning, coordinating, employing operational/tactical C3 systems in weapons demonstrations, and and supervising their execution by joint force support of a joint force (October 1, 1996). medical/CPR training. In order to build and component staffs (May 31, 1996). ■ Joint Pub 3–08, Interagency Coordina- trust and friendship, troops were housed ■ Joint Pub 4–01.3, Joint Tactics, Tech- tion during Joint Operations, describes the strate- together and shared dining facilities. Bar- niques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Movement Con- gic context of coordination between govern- racks, gutted by exiting Russian forces, trol, deals with planning, routing, scheduling, ment agencies including basic principles that a were repaired by Navy Seabees with the controlling, in-transit visibility, reception, and JFC may employ to gain interagency coopera- assistance of 45 Latvian soldiers. onward movement of personnel, units, equip- tion for accomplishing the mission (October 9, ment, and supplies over lines of communica- 1996). The significance of Baltic Challenge tion for joint operations (June 21, 1996). ■ Joint Pub 4–01.2, Joint Tactics, Tech- was noted by Latvian President Gunti ■ Joint Pub 4–01.5, Joint Tactics, Tech- niques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Sealift Support Ulmanis during a ceremony on July 11 niques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Water Terminal to Joint Operations, identifies, describes, and de- when he said that besides serving Latvian Operations, covers planning requirements, re- fines sealift forces including organizations for interests, the exercise promoted a united sponsibilities, and guidance for command and command and control, responsibilities of com- Europe and exhibited a response to the control of water terminal handling facilities to batant commands, procedures for generating post-Cold War world situation. JFQ support a joint force (June 21, 1996). assets and requirements, and doctrine for planning and employment (October 9, 1996). JFQ

COOPERATIVE GUARD Missing an Issue? U.S. Atlantic Command hosted Cooperative Guard 3—a Partnership for Peace (PFP) exercise—at the Joint Train- ing, Analysis, and Simulation Center in Copies of back numbers of JFQ are still Suffolk, Virginia, on September 23–30. available in limited quantities to individual The exercise was presented in cooperation with Allied Forces Central Europe. members of the Armed Forces and military Nearly 100 military personnel from 13 PFP nations including Austria, Bulgaria, organizations. Please send your request Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hun- to the Editor at the address or via the FAX gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden joined in number listed on the masthead. the exercise together with participants JFQ from the United States and other NATO countries. The primary focus of the exercise involved training to set up a combined

Autumn 1996 / JFQ 101 2113JtWd 12/9/96 2:07 PM Page 102

Just published...

Defensive Information Warfare

by David S. Alberts

The Directorate of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies (ACTIS) in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University publishes extensively on information warfare, dominant battlespace, coalition command and control for peace operations, et al.

For additional information, write: National Defense University, ATTN: NDU–NSS–ACTIS, 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319–5066.

102 JFQ / Autumn 1996 2113JtWd 12/9/96 2:08 PM Page 103

THE JOINT WORLD ■ Look for JFQ on the Joint Doctrine Web Site http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine

For more information about the Joint Doctrine Web Site, contact the Joint Doctrine Division, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), at (703) 614–6469 / DSN 224–6469.

Autumn 1996 / JFQ 103 2213OTS 12/9/96 2:13 PM Page 104

■ OFF THE SHELF

Hoffman reminds us that the Ameri- to overrun land and liberate [occupied] NATIONAL CULTURE can style of war reflects a strategic cul- towns....Seizing [enemy capitals], the Al- ture—its history, geography, economy, et lies believed, was sure to win the war. On the AND WARFARE— al.—that is, its collective learned sense of way to the Axis capitals, the Allies defeated WHITHER DECISIVE self. Not only does this culture determine the enemy. a society’s approach to warfare; it delim- This approach seems removed from FORCE its the range of alternative styles. For ex- Grant and Sherman, the wellsprings of ample, Americans have been chided for A Review Essay by Weigley’s annihilation model. not performing like the Wehrmacht or the As theorists tend to impugn the de- DAVID J. ANDRE Israeli Defense Force. Our Armed Forces struction of enemy military capability have not conducted themselves like through offensive action, a view well rep- other militaries simply because collec- resented in Decisive Force, Blumenson Decisive Force: The New tively we are not of German or Israeli or concludes from a combined analysis of American Way of War any other single background. One’s view the European and Pacific theaters: by F.G. Hoffman of what Hoffman, Weigley, and others Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996. say about national culture, style in war, Ultimately, the drive toward the enemy capi- 150 pp. $52.95 and use of force is strongly influenced by tals was empty....What decided the out- [ISBN 0–275–95344–0] an internalized sense of just what makes come of the conflict in each theater was the us unique. Hoffman’s synopsis of Ameri- destruction of the enemy forces. Had the ew subjects have more sharply divided can political culture, military culture, Allies...bent their energies to that end from Fmilitary officers from political elites and related desiderata provides some use- the beginning, chances are that they would who lack combat experience than cul- ful background. have gained the final victory in Europe tural influences on both our national before 1945. style of war and on the kind and the de- Annihilation As with the so-called maneuver and gree of force best suited to U.S. interests. The book’s major argument is attrition schools, annihilation and attri- Decisive Force: The New American Way of summed up in its first supposition: a new tion are not just overgeneralizations; War by F.G. Hoffman rekindles this de- American way of war has emerged that is they are often misrepresentations of a bate. If he is correct, the chasm separat- only subtly different from Weigley’s anni- complex reality which defies meaningful ing our civilian and military leaders may hilation conceptualization, said to have generalization. History teaches us that be widening. Hoffman’s aim is to “trace been operative from the Civil War through these constructs are not so much polar the development and evaluate the merits World War II. Hoffman cites Weigley’s opposites, but rather only two cases of a ‘New American Way of War’ embod- “concise taxonomy” of two strategies: an- among many. With enlightened leader- ied in the Decisive Force concept.” Three nihilation, based on destruction of an ship they have been executed simultane- suppositions drive the book. First, that enemy’s military capability; and attrition, ously and sequentially and tailored at there is a new way of war that is subtly exhaustion, or erosion. Our Armed Forces, each level to suit the situation, all in a different from the one expounded by we are told, have preferred the former as mutually reinforcing way. Russell Weigley in The American Way of have other militaries down through his- Clausewitz stated that “in war, War: A History of United States Military tory; thus its place as the traditional Amer- many roads lead to success.” Listing sev- Strategy and Policy. Second, that the ican way of war. Hoffman observes that eral, to include the destruction of enemy lessons of Vietnam and later were over- though this is “somewhat of an overgener- forces, he cautioned that “if we reject a simplified or erroneous. Third, that civil- alization...itisauseful one.” single one of them on theoretical military relations are in “subliminal cri- Weigley devised his either/or taxon- grounds, we may as well reject all of sis” because of a long-term deterioration omy a quarter-century ago. As a way to them and lose contact with the real of understanding between the govern- introduce such a broad subject to rank world.” ment and society at large. amateurs this stark dichotomy may have In considering Weigley’s austere Decisive Force surveys changes in our something to recommend it. But it is bipolar model in light of what Clause- approach over the last few decades and less helpful in framing the debate among witz, Blumenson, and others have dis- traces their consequences for civil-mili- defense policymakers and military cerned, therefore, the limits of reduction- tary relations through case studies of professionals. ism in the study of warfare are quickly Vietnam, Lebanon, Panama, and the Per- Martin Blumenson observed that reached. In the present case, for instance, sian Gulf. While the book’s conclusions World War II was the last time—and one it is concluded that exactly one of only are reasonable, they are remarkably anti- of only three in our history—when this two possible American ways of war, anni- climactic. It seems as if the author, on Nation consciously pursued a policy of hilation, has been superseded as the pre- reaching his final objective after a hard- total victory (the others being the Civil ferred way through something of a varia- fought campaign, has second thoughts War and Indian wars). Citing campaigns tion—and this from an author who on what he has done along the way. in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, expresses alarm at those who oversim- and elsewhere, Blumenson, writing in plify war by resorting to mere shibbo- Parameters (Summer 1993), reaches a con- leths such as setting “clear political ob- clusion that is hard to reconcile with jectives.” In all fairness, Weigley’s Weigley’s earlier conception. original taxonomy perhaps should have Surprisingly, the top Allied echelons only oc- been refined in view of contributions by Colonel David J. Andre, USA (Ret.), is a casionally attempted to knock out the enemy. others for use in serious comparative defense consultant and writer and formerly The basic Allied motive was instead geo- work such as Hoffman’s. chaired the department of military strategy graphical and territorial. The intention was at the National War College.

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the worst fears of critics of decisive force, this would be the place. But as inferred from its text, decisive force appears to imply that the Army and its constituent units are a decisive force. FM 100–7 does call for preventing long-term defensive operations by transitioning when practi- cable to offensive operations that overwhelm and paralyze an enemy by decisive simultaneous strikes throughout the depth of the battlespace. It reminds us that this approach resulted in minimal losses and a rapid strategic conclusion during Just Cause. But FM 100–7 hardly reflects a “pen- chant for total warfare” or insists on the “massive and unequivocal application of combat power”—certainly not in every operational outing—nor does it add to the crisis by encouraging Army leaders to dispute civilian authority over how much force is appropriate in a given situation. On the contrary. This field manual

U.S. Air Force explicitly addresses the reality of limited resources, the need to phase complex operations (to segment and sequence in Thus Weigley’s concise taxonomy Weinberger, saw decisive force as a time and space based on changes in the and annihilation model are at best of “checklist approach” and derided its “in- nature of the total effort), avoiding limited analytical value as referents for applicability to the challenges of main- enemy strengths by the indirect ap- this postulation of national style in war taining peace in the post-Cold War proach, even precluding actual combat at present. world.” Hoffman cites only one wargame (such as through a stand-alone informa- scenario which indicates that introduction war action). Every chapter and the Decisive Force ing forces quickly to establish an “over- appendix discuss military operations Hoffman opines that “the most dis- whelming force capability” can cause a other than war. tinctive element of [the new American crisis-management situation to “escalate In sum, accepting the often over- way of war] is the principle of Decisive faster and farther than intended.” Games wrought understanding by critics of deci- Force.” Weigley aside, this point logically may suggest many things, but American sive force requires a leap of logic and fails requires not only clearly defining decisive intervention in Haiti and Bosnia demon- to note what the military is telling itself force but demonstrating its newness and strate that major employments can also and actually does. Unless used with some identifying alternative principles. To his quickly stabilize a dangerous situation. precision within the context of particular credit, the author leads us partway down Notwithstanding the official inter- cases and then discussed alongside legiti- this challenging analytic path. He draws a pretation previously mentioned, decisive mate alternative styles of operation, the succinct description of decisive force from force is a much misused and maligned term has little of practical consequence. the National Military Strategy of the United term of art. General Powell believes it has States produced in 1992 by the Joint Staff been misinterpreted, pointing out that it Is It Really New? when Colin Powell was Chairman. neither mandates a fixed approach nor Decisive force is what makes the Once a decision in favor of military lays down prescriptive rules. new American way of war new, goes Hoff- action is made, half-measures and con- Aside from execution, the best indi- man’s line of reasoning. For the sake of fused objectives may lengthen a conflict, cator of the preferred military approach argument, let us take decisive force at which can waste lives and resources, di- to operations is published doctrine. Here face value in terms of its official defini- vide the Nation, and lead to defeat. Hoffman states unequivocally that, if the tion. Just how new an idea is this? Therefore, an essential element of our na- Armed Forces are adopting an all or Without rehearsing American mili- tional military strategy is the ability to nothing attitude with respect to the use tary history, and not promoting the idea rapidly assemble the forces needed to of force, it is not apparent in service or that the American military preferred win—a concept of applying decisive force joint doctrine promulgated since the strategies of annihilation up through to overwhelm adversaries and thereby Gulf War. Quite the contrary. World War II, there is little novel, per se, terminate conflicts swiftly with a mini- The May 1995 edition of Army Field about the way of war introduced in Deci- mum loss of life. Manual 100–7, Decisive Force: The Army in sive Force—certainly nothing to indicate To critics, the doctrine of decisive Theater Operations, has an evocative title. the kind of historical discontinuity one force insisted on “massive and unequivo- This is the Army doctrinal manual on op- normally identifies to support such a cal application of combat power.” The erational art focused at the operational claim. nay sayers included then Secretary of De- level. If the Army were going to counter Looking just at World War II, the at- fense Les Aspin who, by linking it with tack on Pearl Harbor fixated the country the six criteria for using combat forces ar- on mobilizing to win. Citing daily jour- ticulated by former Secretary Caspar nals, memoirs, and official histories,

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USS Franklin D. Crossing the Sava River, Roosevelt in the Gulf December 31, 1995. of Tonkin, 1966. U.S. Air Force (StaceyU.S. Air Force Wyzykowski) U.S. Navy

Blumenson and others have described as other conflicts, mainly the Soviet So the really new way of war based decisions on strategy and theater opera- Union and Israel. It pondered its very on RMA has yet to emerge, at least full tions, involving leaders from the Presi- being as a formerly revered institution re- blown. But it inexorably approaches. It dent to field commanders, that turned sponsible for national security. Then it still remains to be seen whether the largely on ending the war quickly yet applied what it learned, beginning with a United States will continue to take the conclusively, but without unnecessary vision of where it had to go to meet its lead in conceiving, shaping, and exploit- risk to Allied forces. This led the Allies to sworn obligation to the Nation. ing it. play it cautious and shy away from Can- Apparently, much of this pain was nae-type battles and otherwise miss op- for naught since, in the view of Hoffman Alternatives portunities to land decisive blows, a fact and others, our military committed origi- To argue that the military should often lamented by General George Pat- nal sin by not getting its major lessons abandon its current preferred style in war, ton. “Only . . . Patton understood the quite right. Whatever the critics say however it is characterized, requires pre- vital need to surround and destroy the about decisive force or other concerns, senting legitimate alternatives, meaning Germans at Argentan-Falaise, at the Seine the era between the fall of Saigon and they are: River, or at the Somme River,” Blumen- the Gulf War saw a sweeping institu- ■ demonstrably different son determined some years ago. tional transformation that served the ■ readily understandable, not just by There is historical precedent before United States and its global interests. theoreticians Vietnam, then, for the U.S. embrace of Moreover, technology is increas- ■ in keeping with American strategic decisive force doctrine, as briefly out- ingly lending a different meaning to culture lined in the 1992 National Military Strat- “reach out and touch someone.” But ■ reflective of the correct lessons of his- egy. But if Decisive Force does not define a whether this constitutes a new American tory, including the judgment that more force new way of war, is there anything in this way of war is a matter of interpretation. (not necessarily just numerically larger or even book that at least differs from past prac- It largely turns on whether Desert Storm physically applied) usually brings a quicker conclusion and that accomplishing missions tice? What has changed, Hoffman con- is viewed as the last war of the old regime without resort to hostilities (as the original firms, is the emergence of a different way or the first of the new. Even five years on heavy Implementation Force in Bosnia) leads of preparing for war well before the the weight of evidence, including official to fewer American losses consistent with the event. statements by those leading institutional outcome sought Vietnam carried the military, espe- change in the services and the joint ■ able to be taught and learned in pro- cially the Army, to the brink of institu- arena, suggests that the military is living fessional schools tional insolvency. After the war, this re- largely in the past. Albeit with some reas- ■ readily operationalized in a military viewer is reminded that the institutional suring exceptions, it still does business theater. Army—as contrasted with some of its more or less as usual. Any way of war that cannot satisfy constituents—did not, as Hoffman main- The rapid pace of technological these guidelines is unlikely to pass tains, push Vietnam “out of its con- change is manifest. But the kind of his- muster with the professional military or sciousness” to focus “therapeutically torical discontinuity that usually heralds public. on...the Soviet Union.” Rather, along a truly new way of war will require a At least as contained in Decisive with the other services, especially the more widespread unfolding and, perhaps Force and listed by Clausewitz, no author- Marine Corps, it did what the critics had more challenging, grass-roots acceptance ity known to this reviewer has advanced long castigated it for not doing, at least within the military of what has been a genuine alternative to the current pre- well. As recent works attest, it studied its termed an ongoing revolution in military ferred manner of operating militarily, own history, including Vietnam, as well affairs (RMA), including operational and much less a menu of choices. What has organizational concepts that more fully often been offered instead is philosophi- exploit new technology. cal hand wringing over terms like decisive force, opinions on how the military

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should not apply force or otherwise not to tell their superiors what they need to especially when a foreign state appears conduct itself in this or that contingency, hear, not what they want to tell them or deeply divided over its own national in- and ad hominem attacks against the what the civilian leader would like to terests. At the least, they expect an equi- Armed Forces. The court of professional hear.” He would have served his readers table sharing of the burden among those and public opinion thus awaits legiti- better by proposing practical guidelines with a stake in each case, especially major mate alternative styles. for mitigating the civil-military friction powers and relevant regional states. which he details. Hoffman acknowledges that the Other Issues There is a more serious related military, once committed, realizes it is On balance, Decisive Force attempts difficulty. As in Weigley’s annihilation/ they who will go in harm’s way and be too much. Discussing the book’s struc- attrition dichotomy, the civil/military hung out to dry if things go awry—even ture, Hoffman refers in his introduction dichotomy in Decisive Force often over- if an operation is ill-conceived from first not only to the three suppositions and simplifies reality, especially as it relates principles by their temporary political four-stage assessment of the case studies to major stakeholders in the recurring masters who, while legally sharing re- but to other dimensions: emphasis, debate over whether to commit forces to sponsibility, are seldom held account- focus, elements, evaluations, explo- trouble spots overseas. Hoffman seems to able. Not surprisingly, the military wants rations, goals, et al. The result is an un- recognize only two: the military and “the to be heard well before any final deci- even book in what it tries to accomplish, Nation” or “society.” sion. While perhaps new and disturbing much less integrate. The author’s goal In reality, there are at least three to some, this has little to do with a new was “to contribute to ensuring that the major parties to this most visceral issue of way of war. decision [to use force] is made wisely and state, all derivative of Clausewitz’s “re- When the issue of employing com- well.” But since he deliberately avoided markable trinity”: the people (not uncom- bat forces abroad is contentious, as seems discerning the correct military lessons monly mirrored by Congress when and if often the case of late, one seldom finds that should have been learned in Viet- it summons the courage to commit itself professional military officers aligned nam and afterward (versus accumulated institutionally), the Army, and the gov- against the other two elements of the myths), or even stating why the lessons ernment (political leaders and supportive Clausewitzian trinity. Rather, it is the ex- were so wrongheaded, one wonders how opinion elites). Clausewitz warns that “a ecutive branch and much of the rest of he hoped to succeed. theory that ignores any one of them or the establishment elite that commonly Hoffman appears to have tried to seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship be- finds itself isolated and seeking broader write two books in one. Looking again at tween them would conflict with reality to support. his three major suppositions, the first in- such an extent that for this reason alone it “The passions that are to be kindled volves a new way of war, the last a “sub- would be totally useless.” in war must already be inherent in the liminal crisis” in civil-military relations. Hoffman nods toward the trinity by people,” said Clausewitz. That this ob- The second—the poor quality of military referring to an apparently faulty lesson of tains so rarely today says less regarding institutional learning after Vietnam— the third leg (the people) as the military any division in public and military atti- generally is tied to the others. But the learned in Vietnam: “War is a shared re- tudes than about the Nation’s pragmatic first and third, and especially the sup- sponsibility between the people, the gov- grasp of the reordered post-Cold War porting rationale, do not dovetail well. ernment, and the military.” Rather than world and their perceptions of the judg- The author might better have deferred pursue this idea, however, he repeatedly ment and moral standing of those David the new way of war issue and dealt solely suggests that disagreements over com- Halberstam once called “the best and the with the connection between military in- mitting forces—and civil-military divi- brightest.” They become wary when stitutional learning and civil-military re- sions, more generally—involve the mili- elites discover vital favored projects that lations after Vietnam. tary on one side and the rest of society are at best secondary national interests, As it is, while replete with anecdotes on the other. He at least eschews the make fine distinctions regarding what featuring differing views between the thinly veiled contempt found in Interven- constitutes war or combat, and seem too government and the media, the book tion: The Use of American Military Force in ready to draw upon the national treasure, falls short of making a compelling case the Post-Cold War World by Richard Haas, including American lives. for a more general crisis, subliminal or who in noting “there is declining popu- This Nation has had an “all-volun- otherwise. Indeed, although recognizing lar and congressional support for military teer” military since 1973. But this term that a state of civil-military nirvana goes interventions” asserts that this support is conceals a reality seldom aired publicly unrealized, the reader is challenged to “desirable, but not necessary.” but of which our military leaders and cit- understand just what the problem is, Polling reflects wide differences be- izenry are keenly aware: America’s yawn- much less how to diffuse it. tween the general public and elites—in- ing and seemingly widening class divi- For example, Vietnam-era military cluding the current administration, the sion and the ways it is reflected in the leaders are vilified for not articulating extra-governmental foreign policy estab- Armed Forces as well as the bastions of their misgivings about strategy or achiev- lishment, and media—over international privilege and corridors of power. ing policy objectives at reasonable cost. affairs, especially the use of U.S. ground In the military today, the sons and At the same time, post-Vietnam leaders forces abroad. Clausewitz aside, Central daughters of the poor, the working class, are accused of fighting the problem if not America in the early 1980s, Lebanon in and people of color predominate. When of outright disloyalty when, after weigh- 1983–84, Somalia, and Bosnia today re- sent in harm’s way, they go at the behest ing the chances of success in relation to veal that ordinary citizens are not con- of a class increasingly made up and led costs and risks, they show little enthusi- vinced that military power should be by those who avoided the draft or service asm for particular overseas ventures— committed for purely political purposes, in Vietnam through legal or other means even before the President makes a final and by those who, absent a draft, have decision. The author then splits the dif- never worn a uniform. Moreover, they ference: “military leaders must be willing are rarely accompanied by scions of the

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sources that largely argue against decisive and its way of war, and is not a direct Soldiers loading onto force—the views of Colin Powell, Harry challenge to civil-military relations. helicopter, Just Cause. Summers, and other authorities to the Whether one agrees with the book’s debate are also well rehearsed. appraisal of the often dubious quality of Decisive Force has real value that goes professional military education since beyond informing a reader and provoking Vietnam, Hoffman aptly describes in few serious thought. The cases have merit, al- words something of what staff and war beit perhaps not for the reason intended. colleges assume they have learned. This They offer structured, issue-oriented, his- is important not only for the sake of the torical views of intervention: the nexus of subject at hand, but for the state of civil- strategic culture, institutional learning, military relations. The author himself and civil-military relations in the post- surmises that, while his focus was not to Vietnam and post-Cold War eras. Not sur- distill “correct” lessons from case studies, prisingly, many insights and judgments those lessons which the military believes differ, at times substantially, from con- it learned from these experiences are now ventional military wisdom. reflected in a new American way of war. Some aspects of these cases are “Ways of war”typologies aside, the likely to raise the brows, if not incite the military learns from its experience and, wrath, of readers who served at the as has been true for almost three decades, pointed end of the spear. In particular, might reasonably be expected to con- Vietnam veterans are forewarned to delve tinue to act based that experience. The warily into what Decisive Force says about author as well as this reviewer believe their war. The same goes for those who that prudent civilian leaders and others hold strong views about the results of our who work with the Armed Forces should

U.S. Army involvement in Lebanon in 1982–84. But at least try to understand this defining when consulted together with material body of lore. that offers other viewpoints, the cases socio-economically advantaged, educated will enrich learning in staff and war col- Decisive Force calls attention to con- at institutions whose alumni over the last leges as well as national security studies tentious issues and suggests that the best few decades have not often made sacri- programs within academe. one might expect is that the parties in- fices for the Nation—especially the ulti- Unfortunately the book was com- volved try to appreciate each other’s point mate sacrifice. pleted before the Somalia relief operation of view even if they only agree to dis- This, then, is another new and per- reached its tragic finale in October 1992, agree. Whatever the lessons of the past, haps defining component of the post- when 18 rangers died and 75 were the future is something that military and Vietnam strategic calculus, but one con- wounded while exercising something far civilian leaders can jointly begin to influ- spicuously absent from Decisive Force. short of decisive force. Subsequent criti- ence, shape, define, and bring about now. This factor as much as any other may cism hastened America’s withdrawal and We began by observing that issues most poignantly separate the military led to the fall of Secretary Aspin and a raised in Decisive Force commonly find and the rest of society from their govern- reappraisal of military support for peace political elites and the professional mili- ment and other elites in the debate over operations. One could usefully weigh the tary eyeing each other warily across a whether to involve the Armed Forces in key judgments in Decisive Force against widening chasm. One hopes that the crises abroad. that debacle in Mogadishu. The same message of this book is interjected into a Reducing our dependence on what holds for the more recent U.S.-led Imple- continuing dialog that leads to consensus is basically an economic draft—without mentation Force in Bosnia, where an which serves both the Nation and the reinstating the pre-1973 conscription American armored division, with hun- Armed Forces well. JFQ politicians were morally challenged to dreds of 70-ton tanks and fighting vehi- administer fairly—would help to produce cles and augmented by combat forces a truly new American way of war. This from other nations, appears to have suc- suggests a policy agenda worthy of atten- cessfully employed decisive force in a tion in coming years. dangerous, politically sensitive peace- making role. Parting Thoughts Hoffman brings closure by assessing Decisive Force is well researched, lit- how well the concept of decisive force erate, engaging, and often provocative. supports the major purposes of military Except for its citation of David Halber- power: deterrence, defense, decisive in- stam’s The Best and the Brightest and per- fluence, and diplomatic support. Cau- haps a few other ersatz sources, the bibli- tioning that one should differentiate be- ography is useful. The index is complete tween decisive force as applied to and mostly accurate, although some ref- warfighting or violent means and the erences to key topics in the introduction kind of involvement often associated are incorrect. Notes follow each chap- with low intensity conflict, he concludes ter—and though they allude to familiar that, though derived from somewhat political, scholarly, and journalistic faulty lessons, decisive force does support the purposes of military power, is consistent with the American strategic culture

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TO WAGE A WAR OF WORDS A Book Review by CARNES LORD

The Propaganda Warriors: America’s Crusade Against Nazi Germany by Clayton D. Laurie Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1996. 335 pp. $35.00 [ISBN 0–7006–0765–X]

nyone who doubts that the experi- A ence of this Nation in World War II remains relevant to contemporary issues should consult The Propaganda Warriors. The story of American propaganda during that conflict is on one level a sidebar to the domestic policy debates of the Mitchell) U.S. Navy (Terry New Deal and, as such, of interest pri- Tactical PSYOP in Somali marily to historians. On another level, marketplace. however, it is a remarkably instructive guide to the cultural eddies and bureau- Americans doubted that the United States was to promote American-style democ- cratic shoals that lie hidden in wait for should, or needed to, oppose the Nazis racy abroad. Still another approach was unwary psychological warriors even with their own weapons; yet no alterna- that of the Armed Forces, which had little today. Its lessons deserve to be pondered. tive concept of foreign propaganda had use for propaganda of any kind except in Americans engaged in international gained wide acceptance. Early attention the form of essentially tactical support for affairs in the late 1930s were struck by focused primarily on countering the combat operations. the extent and effectiveness of Nazi pro- much exaggerated threat of fifth column The story begins in earnest in mid- paganda and Western unpreparedness in activities on the homefront and shoring 1941 when FDR appointed Donovan as this sphere. Nazi indoctrination, of up domestic morale. At the same time, coordinator of information (COI), with a course, began at home where it played a memories of the notorious Creel Commit- broad if vague mandate to build an unique role in shaping and sustaining tee of World War I made such efforts polit- organization responsible not only for political identity. But equally impressive ically controversial, and the Roosevelt overseas propaganda but for strategic was its use as part of an integrated system administration was slow to act in an area intelligence and counterintelligence, sub- of political and psychological warfare de- which it feared might offend isolationist version, and special operations. Donovan signed to overthrow foreign regimes with and Republican sensibilities. recruited Sherwood, a presidential speech minimal force. The threat of “fifth In spite of undeniable successes, the writer, as head of his propaganda section, columns” fomented by external propa- American propaganda effort between the so-called Foreign Information Service ganda and supported by clandestine mili- 1941 and 1944 was gravely hampered by (FIS). That agency, which Sherwood tary and intelligence operations seemed conceptual confusion, bureaucratic in- staffed largely with broadcasting and ad- very real after the Nazi coup in Austria fighting, and indecision at the top. As vertising executives, journalists, and in- and the dismemberment of Czechoslova- Clayton Laurie demonstrates in a well-re- tellectuals, in short order created the kia. A few Americans, however, found searched narrative, the nub of the prob- Voice of America (VOA) as well as a vari- such actions to be more than a threat to lem was that no fewer than three compet- ety of other overt programs in other be countered. They perceived a model ing philosophies of propaganda struggled media (including films, magazines, pam- for offensive operations against the Axis for preeminence in a constantly changing phlets, posters)—all of which later found powers themselves. Foremost among organizational framework and with the an institutional home in the U.S. Infor- these was William J. (“Wild Bill”) virtual absence of workable doctrinal mation Agency (USIA). But the Donovan- Donovan who became wartime director guidance or presidential direction. The Sherwood partnership was intrinsically of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Donovan view of propaganda as a tool of unstable and did not long survive after and later spiritual father of the Central subversive psychological or unconven- Pearl Harbor. With America’s entry into Intelligence Agency. tional warfare competed with the posi- the war, Donovan understood that COI The climate of national opinion, tion most closely identified with Robert would be entirely a function of its rela- however, was far from sympathetic to Sherwood, a distinguished playwright tionship with the defense establishment such a view. Even interventionist-minded and ardent New Dealer who eventually and pushed for placing it under military headed the overseas propaganda arm of control. At the first meeting of the newly the Office of War Information (OWI). For him, propaganda was to be based upon Carnes Lord teaches in The Fletcher School “truth” alone, and its overriding purpose of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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constituted Joint Chiefs of Staff in Febru- postal system, among other unorthodox firestorm in the American press, with op- ary 1942, the American members, under and ingenious operations. ponents of the administration charging some pressure from their British col- In stark contrast to OWI and OSS, that U.S. propaganda had been hijacked leagues, recognized the importance of U.S. Army involvement was late, disorga- by New Deal ideologues and even com- psychological warfare and also the poten- nized, and motivated as much by rivalry munists. The President himself was tial of COI as its organizational instru- with these essentially civilian agencies as forced to reassure the Nation that Allied ment. At the same time, fearing such a by a conviction in the value of the mis- dealings with the Badoglio regime would shift, Sherwood and his allies began to sion. Once American forces landed in not call into question his unconditional agitate for the removal of FIS from North Africa in November 1942, a psy- surrender policy. All of this exacerbated Donovan’s purview. After months of in- chological warfare branch was estab- internal OWI disputes and led to a purge action, FDR split the difference by agree- lished within Allied headquarters; but it of Sherwood’s overseas OWI activities by ing to transfer COI to the military while was largely staffed by OWI and OSS civil- Davis in early 1944, which probably creating OWI, an entity that combined ians and quickly antagonized its military saved the agency. FIS with those existing agencies geared to sponsors by actively undercutting the de- By the last year of the war, much of domestic information and morale needs. cision to cooperate with the Vichy the dust from these quarrels had settled The journalist Elmer Davis assumed over- French under Admiral Jean Darlan. This as advocates of competing philosophies all control of OWI, although Sherwood incident helped accelerate Army efforts and agencies learned to accommodate and his like-minded associates continued to develop organic propaganda capabili- one another. Nevertheless, notable penal- to dominate what was now called the ties, initially in the form of mobile radio ties had been paid, and underlying ten- overseas branch. broadcast companies which came into sions and disagreement persisted. Indeed, But Donovan’s organization, recon- theater in spring 1943. But civilians it can hardly be doubted that they en- stituted as OSS, was not ready to aban- continued to play a prominent and semi- dure even today in successor agencies. don propaganda entirely. Within six autonomous role in military propaganda One may certainly question whether the months of its creation in June 1942, OSS while the respective spheres of responsi- U.S. Government needs black propa- had set up a morale operations (MO) bility of the Army, OSS, and OWI ganda capabilities in peacetime, but it is branch to realize Donovan’s original vi- remained largely undefined. also true that the OSS legacy in this sion of offensive psychological warfare to Reacting mainly to OWI objections realm has fostered an overly rigid con- the extent it could be done without to OSS black propaganda, a rare presiden- ceptualization of psychological warfare openly contesting the OWI mission. MO tial directive issued in March 1943 af- in nonintelligence organizations, espe- (according to recently declassified OSS firmed OWI primacy in overseas propa- cially in the Armed Forces. Particularly, records fully consulted by Laurie) con- ganda, while putting it firmly under given the new world opened up by conducted both “black” propaganda opera- military control in areas of actual or pro- temporary information technologies, in- tions and an array of related deceptive or jected combat operations. But as OSS ac- novative threats as well as opportunities subversive activities such as rumor cam- tivities continued unaffected, the net re- face the military, and it is becoming ever paigns and forgeries designed to “incite sult of this seeming bureaucratic OWI less tenable to understand psychological and spread dissension, confusion, and victory was actually a loss of authority. operations as an essentially tactical activ- disorder within enemy countries.” After The decline of OWI was greatly acceler- ity in support of conventional forces. At the D-Day landing it simulated German ated following an incident in summer the same time, the history of OWI con- anti-regime organizations through black 1943 when a VOA broadcast greeted tinues to limit the way we think about radio stations (such as Soldatensender Mussolini’s overthrow by describing strategic overseas information and its re- Calais) and papers (such as Das Neue Victor Emanuel as “a moronic little king” lation to other agencies and missions. Deutschland) and even introduced and the leader of the new regime, Mar- That strategic information activities must “poison-pen” material into the German shal Badoglio, as “Goering-like” and an be part of autonomous agencies and re- exemplary fascist. This created a flect an essentially journalistic understanding of “truth” very much remains the credo of VOA and its parent organi- UPCOMING SYMPOSIA zation, USIA. Such an approach, what- INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES ever its merits in peacetime, becomes NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY questionable in a crisis or war. In future conflicts, moreover, it is unlikely that the “European Security after the Summit” United States will enjoy the luxury of March 3–4, 1997 several years of experimentation with National Defense University, Washington, D.C. doctrinal and organizational fixes, as happened in World War II. Problems in “Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region: VOA coverage of the Gulf War, if nothing Cooperation and Conflict” else, point to the need for radical im- April 28–29, 1997 provement in interagency protocols for Hilton Hawaiian Village Conference Center, Honolulu, Hawaii managing strategic information in the ambiguous and rapidly evolving security For details on future symposia or registration material on the above events, please contact: National Defense University, environment that we face today. For any- ATTN: NDU–NSS–SY, 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-5066 one attempting to sort through these Telephone: (202) 685-3857/DSN 325-3857, Fax: (202) 685-3866/DSN 325-3866, Internet: [email protected] complicated issues, The Propaganda War- Further information on upcoming events, recent publications, et al. is available to Internet users via the National Defense Uni- riors holds much of interest. JFQ versity World Wide Web server. Access any Web Browser (for example, Mosaic or Netscape) by addressing http://www.ndu.edu. Symposia programs and registration material are normally posted on the server 90 days prior to events.

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F–15C at Azarq MIDDLE EASTERN Air Base, Jordan. MILITARY DYNAMICS A Book Review by PATRICK L. CLAWSON

The Powder Keg: An Intelligence Officer’s Guide to Military Forces in the Middle East, 1996–2000. by Edward B. Atkeson Falls Church, Virginia: NOVA Publications, 1996. (PaulU.S. Air Force R. Caron) 244 pp. $14.95 [ISBN 0–9638692–5–6] countries which appear periodically in Atkeson forecasts—our Armed Forces dward Atkeson, a retired Army major Jane’s Intelligence Review or the three first- may have sufficient equipment preposi- Egeneral and intelligence officer, has rate studies by Michael Eisenstadt of The tioned in the Gulf or afloat nearby to expanded and updated an earlier work Washington Institute for Near East Policy allow deployment of two to three divi- on the armed forces of the Middle East over the last four years on Syria, Iraq, and sions in days. Moreover, the United which surveyed the period 1991–96 in a Iran provide more profound assessments States maintains substantial Air Force new assessment which looks out to the of individual countries, but they are not supplies in the area, and it may well re- year 2000. Despite some problems, The designed as a survey of the entire region. main there indefinitely at the new facili- Powder Keg is a first-rate summary of the The Powder Keg contains detailed ties being constructed at Prince Sultan Middle East military landscape. material on Israel, Iran, and the Arab Air Base in Al-Kharg, Saudi Arabia, where Atkeson focuses on qualitative fac- states from Egypt to Iraq, including the 6,000 airmen were deployed. Then there tors and what will change over the years Arabian peninsula. It excludes the is the Fifth Fleet, which on many days to come. He provides tables on expected fringes—Turkey and the Caucasus on the has more ships than the Sixth Fleet. For equipment acquisitions by the major north; Sudan on the south; North Africa that matter, the Sixth Fleet is as close to Middle East powers to 2000 and analyzes including Libya on the west; and the Levant as it is to Central Europe and, trends that will affect their military po- Afghanistan and Pakistan on the east. so long as the United States has use of tential at the turn of the century. He also The book’s analysis also excludes non- the Suez Canal, it is within a few days presents the sort of data on major units state actors, such as the Kurdish groups sailing of the Arabian peninsula. In and equipment found in The Military Bal- which effectively control northern Iraq. short, the United States has become a ance published annually by the Interna- Because of the limits established for his major force in the region. tional Institute for Strategic Studies and analysis, Atkeson does not discuss ongo- Atkeson deplores our enhanced in the Middle East Military Balance issued ing conflicts in the area, such as the presence in the region, for “as U.S. forces by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Kurdish insurgencies in southeastern have diminished in size, the pool of at Tel Aviv University, which tends to fall Turkey and northern Iraq or intermittent troops available for extended commit- out of date quickly since it appears bian- fighting in southern Lebanon between ment has been greatly reduced.” In the nually. Equipment listings can be quite Hezbollah and Israel along with the final chapter on policy implications, he misleading for some Middle Eastern South Lebanese Army. goes on to argue, “U.S. forces should not states. Evaluating how much of the More seriously, Atkeson largely ig- be employed in locales where there is fielded equipment is operational is vital nores U.S. military presence in the Mid- recognizable risk that they may be to understanding the warfighting poten- dle East. That is particularly unfortunate caught up international hostilities.” This tial of the Iraqi and Iranian militaries, since this reviewer is unaware of any sys- is a peculiar statement: why does the Na- given that much of it has been worn tematic presentation of American deploy- tion maintain Armed Forces if they are down in combat or through lack of repair. ments in the region. Partly because of not be employed for international hostil- To be sure, Atkeson falls short of local sensitivities about this presence, ities? Furthermore, it puts the cart before providing the level of detail given by partly because some deployments are the horse by addressing the question of Antony Cordesman in his books, but classified as temporary (despite being six deployments without first asking what Cordesman does not offer the same sys- years old), and partly because of inertia interests in the region may necessitate tematic survey of future military poten- that hinders acceptance of a changed the use of force. In fact, he is exactly 180 tial, and his analysis sometimes is world situation, the Pentagon underplays degrees off. Because Persian Gulf oil is weighed down by distracting detail. Simi- this presence. For instance, there is the central to the world economy and the larly, the excellent articles on specific materiel afloat off Diego Garcia, which is United States would be gravely harmed if often omitted from analyses of equip- the vast income from that oil were mo- ment in the Middle East. The 20 ships nopolized by a power intensely hostile to stationed there contain stock for a heavy America, preventing aggression in the re- Patrick L. Clawson is a member of the Army brigade and a Marine expedi- gion is a truly vital interest. The best Institute for National Security Studies at tionary force forward as well as other the National Defense University. supplies. By 2000—the year for which

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■ OFF THE SHELF ■ A NOTE TO READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

means to accomplish that is by forward DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is distributed to the field and fleet through service channels. Military presence to demonstrate that this Nation personnel and organizations interested in receiving the journal on a regular basis should make has the ability and will to make aggres- their requirements known through command channels. Corrections in shipping instructions for sion unprofitable. If the United States service distribution should be directed to the appropriate activity listed below. had deployed such a presence in the Gulf in 1990, Operations Desert Shield/Desert ■ ARMY—Contact the installation publications control officer or write to the U.S. Army Storm might have been unnecessary be- Publications Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 cause Saddam would have understood (reference Misc. Publication 71–1). that he could not get away with conquer- ■ NAVY—Contact the Navy Inventory Control Point, Customer Service List Maintenance ing Kuwait. (Code 3343.09), 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19111–5098; requests may be Atkeson presents comparative analy- sent by FAX to (215) 697–5914 (include SNDL, UIC, and full address). ses of thirteen potential conflicts. He ■ MARINE CORPS—For one-time distribution write to Marine Corps Logistics Base (Code makes a number of important points 876), 814 Radford Boulevard, Albany, Georgia 31704–1178; request by FAX at (921) 439–5839 / about how such conflicts might unfold, DSN 567–5839. To be placed on standard distribution contact Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps such as the attractiveness to Israel, were it to want to hit Syria, of an attack up the (Code ARDE), Federal Building No. 2 (Room 1302), Navy Annex, Washington, D.C. 20380; request Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, which could put by FAX at (703) 614–2951 / DSN 224–1463. Israeli forces on the high ground overlook- ■ AIR FORCE—Submit AF Form 764A with short title “JFQN (with issue number)” to the base ing Damascus from the West. However, publications distribution office to establish unit requirement through the Air Force Distribution Atkeson is less clear on potential war ob- Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896. jectives. The recent history of the Middle ■ COAST GUARD—Contact U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, ATTN: Defense Operations East demonstrates well that war can be Division, 2100 2d Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20593–0001. used to further political goals rather than achieve battlefield victories. Egyptian In addition, bulk distribution is made to defense agencies, the Joint Staff, unified commands, forces may have been defeated by Israel in service colleges, and other activities. Changes in these shipments should be communicated to the 1973, but the Egyptian attack changed the Editor at the address below. political situation, broke the diplomatic logjam, and began a process that led to SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available by subscription from the Government Printing Office (see complete Israeli withdrawal from the the order blank in this issue). To order for one year, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) on the order Sinai. Syria may be tempted to use the and mail with a check for $16.00 ($20.00 foreign) or provide a VISA or MasterCard account same technique, with an attack on the number with expiration date to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Golan designed not to hold territory but Pennsylvania 15250–7954, or FAX the order to: (202) 512–2233. Individual copies may be to change the diplomatic situation. Atkeson’s analysis of conflicts in- purchased at GPO bookstores nationwide for $8.00 each. volving the Persian Gulf monarchies is not very useful. He does not discuss the CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes submissions from members of the Armed Forces as well as cases of greatest importance to the from defense analysts and academic specialists from both this country and abroad, including United States, such as an Iraqi invasion foreign military officers and civilians. There is no required length for articles, but contributions of of Kuwait or Iranian attacks on shipping 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters to the through the Straits of Hormuz (perhaps editor, items of commentary, and brief essays are invited. Reproductions of supporting material because, as seen in 1987–88, Iran feels (such as maps and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts; do not send originals. that its oil shipments are being impeded Manuscripts are reviewed by the Editorial Board, a process which takes two to three months. by an American boycott or some other To facilitate review, provide three copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. development). He ignores the issue of how effective U.S. intervention would be Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or and offers no analysis of the key ques- authors) in the body of the text. Follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but tions for the United States: how quickly endnotes rather than footnotes should be used. Bibliographies should not be included. Both the it could act compared to how much manuscript and endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins. warning time there would be and how JFQ reserves the right to edit contributions to meet space limitations and conform to the well our Gulf allies would fare until the journal’s style and format. Proofs of articles accepted for publication are not normally sent to arrival of substantial U.S. forces. authors for review. In short, Atkeson provides a useful Unless evidence of prior clearance is provided, all manuscripts selected for publication which analysis of what Middle East countries are contributed by members of the U.S. Armed Forces or employees of the Federal Government are will acquire up through the year 2000, forwarded to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to undergo security but he remains caught in the Cold War world in which our Armed Forces, occu- review. No honorarium or other form of payment is authorized for the publication of articles pied elsewhere, were not a major factor submitted by servicemembers or U.S. Government employees. in the regional military balance. JFQ If possible submit the manuscript on a disk together with the typescript version. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks in various formats can be processed, WordPerfect is preferred (disks will be returned if requested). Further information on the submission of contributions is available by calling (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220, FAX: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219, or writing to the Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ, 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319–5066. JFQ

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Autumn 1996 / JFQ Cover 3 01Cov1#13 12/9/96 2:17 PM Page 1

JOI JFQ coming next... an assessment of joint doctrine with contributions from the service chiefs and CINCs and others in the Winter 96–97 issue of JFQ JFQ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

THE GOLDWA Ten Years

21st Century NBC Prolife Knowledge Warfare JFQ 13 1996 / NUMBER AUTUMN JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Decisive Fo

Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Washington, D.C.

Cov 4 Score covers 1 & 4 no greater than 3/16” from the bi