ARTICLE https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00591-y OPEN Two conceptions of consciousness and why only the neo-Aristotelian one enables us to construct evolutionary explanations ✉ Harry Smit1 & Peter Hacker2 Descartes separated the physical from the mental realm and presupposed a causal relation between conscious experience and neural processes. He denominated conscious experiences 1234567890():,; ‘thoughts’ and held them to be indubitable. However, the question of how we can bridge the gap between subjective experience and neural activity remained unanswered, and attempts to integrate the Cartesian conception with evolutionary theory has not resulted in explana- tions and testable hypotheses. It is argued that the alternative neo-Aristotelian conception of the mind as the capacities of intellect and will resolves these problems. We discuss how the neo-Aristotelian conception, extended with the notion that organisms are open thermo- dynamic systems that have acquired heredity, can be integrated with evolutionary theory, and elaborate how we can explain four different forms of consciousness in evolutionary terms. 1 Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 6166200 MD Maastricht, ✉ The Netherlands. 2 St John’s College, Oxford OX1 3JP, UK. email:
[email protected] HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:93 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00591-y 1 ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00591-y Introduction his paper discusses essentials differences between two entity that has changed, is dirty, or has been turned. We then Tconceptions of mind, namely the Cartesian and neo- speak of a human being (not of a mind) of whom we say different Aristotelian conception.