Tribalism, Ethnicity, and the State in Pakistani Baluchistan: the Economics and Politics of Detribalization in an Urban Setting

Home , Agha Nasir, Lehri tribe, Mir Chakar Rind

Tribalism, ethnicity, and the state in Pakistani Baluchistan: the economics and politics of detribalization in an urban setting

by Paul Brian Titus

,, \ ••

UNIVERSITYOF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE

Tribalism. Ethn,city, and the State in Pakistani Baluchistan: The Ecor,omics and Politics of Detribaiization in an Urban Setting

A Disi

Doctor of Philosophy

in •

Anthropology

Paul Brian Titus

December, 1991

Dissertation Committee: Professor Alan A. Beals, Co-Chairman Professor Michael Kearney, Co-Chairman Professor Martin Crans Professor Edna Bonacich Copyright by Paul Brian. Titus 1991 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertalion is truly a social product, one which has come from the efforts and thoughts of a number of people.

First I would like to express my thanks to and great admiration for my godfather,

Dr. fart Lyon, with whom I initially formulated plans to do fieldwork in Baluchistan. His "

:>bbef'Vationsand ccmm-,nL'l have kept me on my toes throughout the long process of research and writing.

For their insights and support I also owe intellectual debts to each of my commit tee members, Ors. Alan Beals, Edna Bonacich, MichaelKearney, and Martin Orans. My years at U.C. Riverside have been a challenge and a delight because of them and others.

The two years I spent in Pakistan studying Ordu and conducting fieldwork would not have been possible without the ~erous support of a number of people in the

United States and Pakistan. My doctoral researc:tlwas funded by a grant from the

American Institute of Pakistan Studies and I also greatly benefited from participation in the Berkeley Urdu Program in LahOre.

My experience in Pakistan was all that a scholar could hope for. I was given all the support l sought and the freedom to pursuemy research as l pleased. Therefore wh~e many will see their input in this dissertation, only l am responsible for its con

clusions.

l owe special thanks to my advisers at Baluchistan University, Professor Ghulam

Nabi Achakzai, Professor Abdur Rehman Brahui, and Professor Abdullah Jan Jemal

dini. Others who contributed immensely to-my understanding of Baluchistan are Aziz

iv Luni, Mir Agha Nasir Khan Ahmedzai, Tahir Muhammad Khan, Ayub Baluch, Janmah mad, and Professor Muhammad Khan Aaisini. Nawab Akbat Khan Bugti, Nawab

Abdul Qadir Shaw,and Nawab Aslam Raisini were hospitable and generous with their time and their thoughts.

I made many friends in Quetta who made my stay there enjoyable and produc tive. They include Suleiman Baluch, Hafiz Buzdar, Abdul Halim Muhammad Hasni,

Abdul Hamid Shiwani, Abdul Ghalfar, Javed Baluch, Abdul Basith, Abdul Karim, Rashid

Summalari, and Zinat and Senaullah Baluch.

A number of Pakistani academics befriended me and were the source of intellec tual stimulation and much needed support. They include Or. Akmal Hussain, Ors.

Adam and Doris Nayyar, and Dr. Akbar S. Ahmed who was CommissionerQuetta during part of my stay.

I am also fortunate that Ms. RehanaAsghar, a 1ecturar at Baluchistan University, has been doing doetoral research at U.C. Riverside in the years when I have been com pletingthis work. She has providad me numerous insights and helped in translating several documents and tapes.

Thanks also to Peter Dodd and the staff of the United States Education Founda tion in Pakistan for faclfrtating my research and for their hospitalitywhen my family and I were in ISlamabad. Thanks to the Quetta staff of MercyCorps lntematiOnal for video

nights and wonderful lunches, and to the relaxed hospitalityof George and Pat Mi: Cormick.

I owe my ability to speak and read (still rudimentary) Urdu to the staff of the

Berkeley Urdu Language Program in Lahore and to my .ull4l;l in Quetta, Mr. Rehimullah.

I wish I had more time to devote to learning that wonderful language.

V I owe a special debt of thanks to Fred Buell of Fredon Enterprises who put lnnum

berable hours into prc.ducing the maps and tables in this dissertation and giving it its final appearance. Mike Hogan also gave me assistance on several occasions with com puter matters.

Joye Sage, Dawn Schmechel, and the other office staff in U.C. Riverside's

Anthropology Department were very helpful, patient, and enjoyable throughout my

career.

A number of friends in Riverside, and especially in Canyon Crest Married Student

Housing provided friendship, child care, and a wonderful sense of community during

our years In Riverside. A word of thanks also to Leland Lubinsky fol the numerous

books he passed my way and Just because.

Finally this dissertation would not hava been possibl& without the love and unsel

fish support of my wife, Jan, and my parents, Lee and Ruth. I cannot begin to repay

them.

vi ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Tribalism, Ethnicity, and the State in Pakistani Baluchistan: The Economics and Politics of Detribalizatio:, ;n an Urban Setting

by Paul Brian Trtus

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Anthropology University of califomia, Riverside, December, 1991 Professors Michael Kearney and Alan R. Beals, Co-Chairmen

At issue in this dissertation is the salience of tribal institutions and identities and

that of ethnic or ethnic-nationalistones among 8aluchin Ouetta, · the capital of Pakis

tani Baluchistan. Some evidence indicates that tribes, the genealogically and territorial

ly defined subunits of 1he Baluch, retain legitimacy and practical r.etevancein

contemporary Baluchistanyet circumstancescan readily move beyond the confines of tribes to activate more ~e loyalties. The major propositionunderlying this disser tation is that economic and politicalchanges caused by Baluchistan's integration into

Pakistan are encouraging SUChbroader identities. It therefore seeks to assess the con

figuration and strength of tribalism and Otheridentities and levels of social organization

In Quetta, and to examine the economic and political contexts in which they take

shape. It suggests that broadet', more inclusive ethnie, national, and-religious identities

vU are replacing tribalism, and that while these identities may be conflicting, they are not necessarily exclusive. People can choose to act on the baSis of different principles in different social contexts. and indeed family, tribe, ethnic grc;>up,natiOnality, religion, etc. can all be viewed as identities that are partially. autonomous but also embedded wilhin one another.

To explore these issues this dissertation examines the internal workings of

Baluch society, and it examines Bal UChin their interaction with other ethnic groups and political powers. It begins by laying out the ethnographic and historical background of

Baluchistan including the relationship between the people of the area and those con trolling the state of Pakistan. it also loOks at the relationships between Baluch and the members of the other major ethnic group indigenous to northern Baluchistan, the Push tun. It concludes that efforts to socially construct and control space are particularly relevant to the relations between Baluch and others.

Data on the economic and polilical activities of Baluch in Quetta are the basis of this study. The economic data comes mainly from an examination of inter-city bus transportation. A portrait of this part of Baluchistan's economy which has seen both ethnic cooperation and c:onflictis drawn using data obtained through participant obser vation, interviews, and a survey. The politicaldata comas from two sources, a study of several of Quetta's self-defined social welfare organizations, and a study of the national and provincial elec:tionsof 1988 and the patties and personalities that tookpart in them.

viii Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION The Aims of the Dissertation ...... 2 TheData ...... 7 Chapter Outline ...... 9 ll WHO IS BALUCH?: 1£THNICITYANO TRIBAUSMIN BALUCHISTAN • . . • • • • • • • • • • • 11 Baluch Ethnicity ...... 14 Baluch Society ...... • ...... 15 Baluch Culture •...... 19 Language and Ethnicity ...... 21 Balucl'I Tribalism . . . . . • ...... 25 Ecology, Fraternity, Hierarchy ...... • ...... 26 Sections of Land, Sections of Blood ...... '" . . . 28 From Segmentation to Hierarchy ...... 31 Land, Blood,and Chiefsin Baluch TribaHsm ...... 34 Segmentation in Baluch Tribes ...... 35 Tribe and Territory in Baluchistan ...... 37 Hierarchy Within and Without ...... 38 Conclusion ...... • ...... 43 1 , NOTES ...... '...... • • 45 II\ BALUCHNAMA: . , THE COURSEOF BALUCHHISTORY •••••••••• ; • • • • • • • • • • 46 Baluch Genesis ...... : . . 50 SemiticOrigins ...... 51 Baluch Interpretations of Their Origins ...... 54 The Kalat Khanate and the Baluch Tribal Confederacy ...... 57 The Pre-history of the Kalat Khanate ...... • . . . . . 57 The Development of the Kalat Khanate ...... " . 59 The Nature of the Kalat Khanate ...... 62 Nationalist Historians View the Khanate ...... 64 British Colonialism in Baluchistan ...... 65 The Advent of the British ...... 66 The Emergence of Baluch Nationalism ...... 70 Baluch Interpretationsof the Impact of Colonialism ...... 73 Conclusion ...... 74 NOTES ...... 76 HD IN THE lAND OF THE PURE: BAL.UCHIN THE POST-COLONIAL STATE ••••••••••••••••• , 78 An lntru.siveBureaucracy ...... 80 Pakistan's First Decade ...... 81 A Military-bureaucraticOligarc:tlY ...... 85 Bhutto's Populism ...... 87 Zia's Marital Rule ...... 88 Ethnic Groups and Quotas ...... 90 Geography and Political Economy in Pakistan ...... 92 States and Territory ...... 92 Regional Disparities ...... 94 Regional Identities ...... 97 The Territory of Pakistan ...... 99 Baluchistan's·State of Underdevelopment ...... · . . 100 The Milltary's Role in Pakistan ...... 103 Pakistani and Baluch Nationalism ...... 109 Generalizing Nations ...... 109 Islam and Ethnic Nationalism In the Islamic Republic . . . ·. . . . 113 Baluc:tlEthnic-Natlonalisrn ...... 116 Conclusion ...... 119 NOTES ...... 121 M LITTLELONDON: · aomA AND ITS BALUCH POPULATION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 124 Historical Foundations ...... - ... 125 Fiom ShAIto Quetta .....•...... 125 The Demography of Post-colonial Quetta ...... 128 Census and Sensibilities ...... • ...... 128 The Settlers ...... 131 The Politics of Population ...... 133 Some Sense of Place . . . . . • ...... ; 133 Patterns of Residence ...... 135 Ethnic Boundaries ...... 136 Demographic Transitions and Their Impact ...... • . 138 Tribe and Territory ..•...... 139 Tha Brewery Land Dispute ...... 141 Quetta's Economy ...... 143 Trade In Historical Perspective . • ...... 143 Trade Today ...... 144

X Industry and Manufacturing . • ...... 146 The Civil Service ...... 148 The Valley's Agriculture ...... 149 Conclusion ...... 151 NOTES ...... 154 Vl ROUTES TO ETHNICITY: TftE ECONOMICS OF BUS TRANSPORTATION IN BALUCHISTAN • • • • • 156 The Routeing of Baluchistan ...... 158 Routes in Baluch Eyes ...... 160 The State of the Roads ...... 161 Roads of the State ...... 164 The Transport Industry ...... 1~ Informant categories ...... • . . 168 The Economic Data ...... • . . 171 Local and Intermediate Routes ...... 174 Quetta to Karachi ...... • · ...... 176 The SUNey's Conclusions ...... ·. 1n Family and Tribe in the Transport Game ...... 180 The Transport Riots ...... 183 October 29, 1986 . . . . • ...... 184 August 13, 1988 ...... •...... 1B6 The Implications of the Rioting ...... : . . : . . 188 Conclusion ...... 191 NOTES ...... •'·. . . 192 VI\ UNITY ANDWELFARE: · THE 'ITEHADS'OF QUETTA •• , •••• , ••••••••••••••••• 195 The Afghan ltehAd Bus Owners Association (AIBO) ...... • . . . . 1'JT The History of the Afghan ltehAd Bus Owners ...... 198 The Anjuman-e-ltehAd Zehrl (AIZ) ...... • ...... 201 Historic and Contemporary Tribal Conflicts ...... 203 The Scope of AIZ . . • ...... 204 ParaUels with Tribal Structures ...... 206 Baluch ltehAd ...... • . . . 208 Alms and Aspirations of Baluch ltehfld ...... 208 Defense of the Qaum ...... 212 The ltehAd and the Nawab ...... • . . . . • . . . . 216 The Persistence of T rlbes and Tribal Structures ...... 21 8 ·Pushtun ltehAd ...... •... 220

xi Pushtun ltehAd and Ethnicity ...... 222 Conclusion ...... • ...... 224 NOTES ...... 228 VII\ SARDARS MULLAHS, AND MUSLIM LEAGUERS: POUTICAL PAR'riES AND ELECTIONS IN BALUCHISTAN • • • • • • • • • • 230 Pakistani Elections ...... 232 Tribes In Elections ...... 233 The Parties and Their Programs ...... 235 The Jamiat ·u1erna-t-1s1am(JUI) . . .236 The History of the JUI ...... 237 The Conservative Radicalism of the JUI . . .. 240 The Nation~ Awami·Party (NAP) and its Descendants .. 243 The History of the NAP ...... 243 Contemporary Avatars of the NAP In Baluchistan .. 248 The Muslim League and Its Partners .. 252 The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) ...... 255 Independents .. 257 The Elaction Results ... 258 Conclusion ...... 262 NOTES ...... 265 VIII\ DISTURBING BOUNDARIES: CHANGING ETHNIC PROCESSES IN BALUCHISTAN • • • • • • • • • • • • 268

Baluch-Pushtun Relations in Historical Perspective . ·'• .268 The Colonial and Post-Colonial Eras . . . .271 Barth's Thesis on Baluch Territorial Advancement .273 Equality and Exclusion Among PushtuA . .274 Hierarchy and Inclusion Among Baluch .276 Equality vs Hierarchy ...... 2n Implications and Extensions of Barth's Thesis .279 Routes to Mobilizatlon ...... 280 The Pushtun on an Economic Route . .262 Baluch on a Political Route ... 285 Stereotypes and Mobilization ...... 287 Territoriality and Routes to MobilizatiOn ... 291 Space and Refugees ...... 293 Social Space ...... 295 Conclusion .296 NOTES ...... 298

xii SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION • • • • • • . • • . ••••••••••• 300 APPENDIX • • • • • . • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • . • . . • ••••• 306 BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • . . • • • • . • • • • • . • • . • . • • • • • . • • .308

UST OF TABLES Table 1: Local and Intermediate Routes ...... 175 Table 2: The Quetta to Karac:tliRoute ...... 178 Table 3 :The Location of Pakistan's Political Parties in Ideological Space ...... 236 Table 4 :The Results of Provincial Assembly Elections in Baluchistan, .. 258

UST OF MAPS Map 1: Linguistic Distribution in Baluchistan ...... 16 Map_2: Southwest Asia ...... 49 Map 3: Quetta...... 129 Map 4: The Distribution of Ethnic Groupsin Quetta...... 137

ABBREVIATIONS & TRANSLITERATIONS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••••• XIV ABBREVIATIONS

AIBO - Afghan ttehAd Bus Owners AfZ.- Anjuman ltehAd Zehri BOG - Baluchistan District Gazetteer BNA - Baluchistan National Alliance BNYM - Baluch National Youth Movement BSO - Baluch Students Organization CSP - Civil Service of Pakistan UI - lslami JAmhouri ttehid JUI - Jimiat 'Ulema-6-lslam JUH - Jimlat 'Ulema-6-Hind MPA - Member of the Provincial Assembly MAO - Movement for the Restoration of Democracy NAP - National Awami Party NOP -National Democratic Party NWFP - Northwest Frontier Province PNA - Pakistan National Alliance PNP - Pakistan National Party PPP - Pakistan Peoples Party RCD - Regional Cooperation for Development

Transllteratlons

Urdu words have been transliterated with a minimum of specificity. Only long vowels have been distin9ulshed from short ones by placing a hat over them. No effort was made to distinguashthe retroflex and the dental 't', 'd', or 'r'. The Arabic ghain is written u gh and the Arabic khAf is written u kh; they are therefore written the same u an aspirated 'g' and 'k' and must be distinguished by their context. Approximate equivalents of the long vowels are as follows: A is equivalent to the ·a· In salt i is equivalent to the 'ee' in bee 6 is equivalent to the ·ey•in they 6 is equivalent to the 'o' in so O is equivalent to the ·u· in tune.

Two words that are used extensivelythroughout the text, Baluch (pronounced Baluch) and sardar (pronounced sardir), are written without vowel markers.

l. I xiv I INTRODUCTION

Two Incidents from my fieldwork in Baluchistan illustrate the issues with which this dis sertatlon deals. The first took place In October 1987, a month after I arrived to do fieldwork, when I went to spend several dars at the house of a friend In Mastung, a town of approximately 20,000 located 20 miles south of Quella. My friend Is a member of the Baluch ShAwAnltribe and the day we arrlVedIn Mastung we went to a prear

ranged meeting with the sardar (or 'chief') of another Baluch tribe, the Muhammad

ShAhi. The sardar was not home and after waiting for half-an-hour my friend and I decided to return the next day. When we met him the next day the sardar apologized for missing our appointment and explained he had had to go to Ouetta to settle a dis

pute between one of the members of his tribe and a member of a Pushtun tribe. The

disputants both ran small bicycle repair stalls near each other in the city, and a quarrel

between them over a customer had led to violence In which the Baluch man was

seriously Injured. the matter wasr'esolved by both men contacting the leader of their

respective tribes ,Miomet and arrived at a settlement. The terms of the settlement were

that the Baluch man was to receive money from the Pushtun In compensation for his in juries but he also had to use some of the money he received to relocate his business.

The second Incident occurred some eight months later and also started with a

quarrel between a Baiuch and a Pushtun. But unlike the first case, the violence spread

and became a full-scale ethnic riot. This incident, described more fully In Chapter Five,

grew out of a dispute between a Pushtun bus owner/operator and a Baluch oil tanker

driver. A disagreement between them led to a series of confrontations and ultimately

the Baluch man, along with a cohort, ambushed the other's bus on the highway south

of Mastung. In the course of the ambush a bus driver was killed.· The next day, when ' the body was brought back to the bus station in Ouetta, crowds of Pushtun men attack

ed Baluch buses, and violence spread to other parts of the city. It continued until the

army was called In to reimpose order.

The Alms of the Dissertation At issue In these Incidents Is the salience of tribal Institutions and identities and that of

ethnic or ethnic-nationalist ones. The first incident reveals that tribes, the genealogical·

ly and territorially defined subunits of the Balucil and Pushtun. retain legitimacy and

practical relevance in contemporary Baluchistan. Yet the second incident suggests

that circumstances can quite readily move beyond the confines of tribn to activate , more inclusive loyalties. The major proposition underlying this dissertation is that economic and political changes caused by Baluchistan's integration Into Pakistan are

encouraging such broader identities. The dissertation therefore seeks to assess tha

strength or relevance of tribalism and other Identities and levels of social organization

in Quetta and to examine the economicand pofitlcal contexts in which they take shape.

The issues the dissertation addresses can be summarized in a single question:

To what extent Is detrlballzatlon taking place in Quetta, the largest (virtually the only)

urban center of Pakistani Baluchistan? By detrlbalizatlon I do not mean to imply a

trend toward atomization, social disintegration, or anomie. Rather I suggest that

broader, more Inclusive ethnic, national, and religious identities are replacing tribalism.

I also suggest, however, that even though these identities may be contradictory or con

flicting, they are not necessarily exclusive. People can choose to act on the basis of dif·

ferent principles In different social contexts, and Indeed family, tribe, ethnic group,

nationality, religion, etc. can all be viewed as ldentltles that are partially autonomous

but also embedded within one another. Thus, for example, as Baluch ethnic

nationalists strive to·distingulsh themselves trom other peoples of Pakistan they must

2 shape their identity in part from the distinct tribal structures and customs of the Baluch even though they also frame their movement as an attempt to overcome what they see as the backwardness and divisiveness tribalism has caused among Baluch.

The Issue of detribalization therefore raises a series of other questions and in· itiates a number of paths of discussion which wind through this dissertation. Clearly the question assumes that tribalism is an identifiable phenomenon that was prior to much of the efforts at mobilization currently taking place in Quella. This assumption re quires a description of Baluch tribes in other settings and earlier times. The eth· nographic material on the Baluch shows, In fact, that there is considerable diversity among the peoples who Identify themselves as Baluch. In some areas, notably In coas tal Makran and in Slndh, Saluch have been 'detribalized' and more-or-less feudal for considerable periods, while In most mountainous areas (including that where Quetta is located) the particular form of social organization that is Baluch tribalism has prevailed.

Baluch tdbes are organized around patrllineages that generally share (at least pur ported) descent from common ancestors; they are identified with particular agricultural ' ' and grazing lands; and their members owe allegiance to the group's sardar.

Because I am considering the alternatives to tribalism to be more comprehensive organizing principles or Identities, an explication of them Is also necessary. Those I will be primarily concerned with are ethnicity, nationalism, and Islam. While members of all

Baluch tribes are ethnically Baluch, that is they self-identify as Baluch and they share customs and often desqent with other Baluch, tribalism also implies that the tribal sub

units retain greater relevance and command greater loyalty than does the pan-tribal or super-tribal ethnic group. The difference is not so much that between passive and ac· live ethnicity but rather ethnicity that Is acted out or lived through tribal social forms ver

sus mobilization on a more inclusive basis. Though at some level the Baluch ethnic

3 group is the aggregate of its sub-groupings, other dynamics than those shaping those

, sub-groupings are at work in the case of ethnicity.

In Pakistan ethnicity, like tribalism, is constructed around shared descent and ter

ritory, but in addition ethnicity can be marked by such other factors as language,

religion, or economic status (see Brass 1974:8; Shackle 1986:32). All of these though

are flexible features which may or may not be pertinent In a given situation, and eth

nicity Is often a matter of political affiliation rather than cultural traits. Baluch ethnicity In

Pakistan is expressed relative to the country's other major ethno-linguistlc groups, the

Punjabis, Pushtun, and Sindhis and to a lesser degree relative to religious minority

groups, e.g., Hindus, Parsls, and Christians. It Is expressed as an assertion of Baluch

cultural or linguistic distinctness but also as demands tor a larger share of the

economic and political resources of the country or the state.

In regard to the last point, ethnicity can be said to be poUtlclzed as nationalism.

As I use the term, and as It Is used In Pakistan, nationalism equates the ethnic group

with a state or some Qdeally autonomous) territory. Nationalism can be distinct from

ethnicity in that It, or the state to which It refers can encompass many ethnic groups.

Often, though, the identity of a state ls conflated with that of the dominant ethnic group

within It, and, In fact, the national culture becomes a mechanl$m of control by which

others are measured and stratified (Williams 1989:434). Sub-national (aspiring nation

al) movements, like ethnic ones are also defined in relative terms, i.e., relative to those

who dominate the state and shape Its national culture or other sub-national move

ments. In my usage there Is an overlapping of the concepts of ethnicity and

nationalism. The core meaning of ethnicity Is the value given to culture or the identity

based upon It while nationalism Implies political mobUization and a higher degree of

autonomy and cohesion for the culturally or ethnically defined group.

4 My r8$earch focused primarily on urbanized and educated Baluch, most of whom

talk in terms of what I will call ethnic-nationalism. Ethnic-nationalism takes a number of

forms in Baluchistan. All ethnic-nationalists start with the premise that Baluch are a sub

ordinated minority that was Illegitimately and forcibly incorporated into Pakistan. I often

heard the ciaim from Baluch that despite living In its wealthiest province they are

Pakistan's poorest people because their resources are being used to enrich others.

There are a number of political parties and organizations with different strategies on

how to deal with the situation, and these range from proletarian revolution to pan

Baluchism Q.e.uniting all Baluch in a "Greater Baluchistan"} to accommodation with

Pakistan under terms which guarantee greater auton.omy. The latter is the most com

monly held position. While many non-Baluch dismiss Baluch ethnic-nationalism as an

effort by middle-class activists to gain better positions for themselves In the state

bureaucracy, I suspect most Baluch would agree that their status In Pakistan should be

1 enhanced to provide them greater political control over their lives and greater control

over the resources of their province.

Organizing principles or Identities other than ethnic-nationalism are available to

Baluch, the two most important of which are P~kistanl nationalism and mobilization

under the banner of Islam. Pakistani nationalism with its reverence for Muhammad Ali

Jinnah, its stance as a bulwark against Hindu domination of the Muslims of the subcon

tinent, and its generally pro-Western position In international affairs offers a sometimes

conservative and sometimes populist alternative with which some Baluch businessmen,

politicians, tribal leaders, and their supporters have aligned.

Most Baluch are Muslims of the Sunni tendency and Islam is a religious Ideology

that pennits a range of interpretations or political positions. It can for example be

equated with the state, or it can be a means through which opposition to the state or

5 some dominant ethnic group is organized. Islam often plays a unifying role in Muslim societies otherwise divided by lineage rivalry, factionalism, or ethnicity especially when they are confronting external threats (S. Pastner 1988:1 n}. Therefore Islam has had mobilizing potential when it resonates with Other interests or values. Among the B~luch and Pushtun of western Pakistan, it is not the Islam of the state, or that of the urban in telligentsia, but the Islam of the Jamiat 'Ulema-6-lslam, a political party with a tradition of opposition to central authority and a leadership that shares tribal links with the people of the region, that has developed an effective following (see Chapter Seven).

An assumption that underlies this dissertation is that all the forms of social or ganization I will examine take shape in relation to other groups, ysually under condi tions of opposition or competition but also cooperation. For this reason I will make an effort to place Baluch society in historical, geographical, and social context, I.e., I wtll il lustrate some of the external factors that Impinge upon and shape Baluch society. The structure of Baluch tribes appears, for example, to have been shaped by the fact that · they inhabit a marginal ecological zone that was peripheral to the important political dynasties that have dominated South and Southwest Asia. Another example of such external influences is that a conscious effort to elaborate a Baluch ethnic or national identity has grown with the incorporation of Baluchistan first into the British colonial em pire, and then into the Pakistani state.

An important aspect of the formation of these social groupings and identities and their relation to Other such groupings Is territoriality and the social construction of · space. In the following discussion I examine the efforts of the central government and the inhabitants of peripheral Baluchistan to define and utilize spece as well as some ways ethnic groups In and around Ouetta compete for the control of territory. In dis cussing ethnicity in terms of spatial relations I am aligned with a current of thought in

6 the social sciences that Is placing greater emphasis on spatiality as a determining and not derived factor lit social relations. Foucault, for example has said he had to over - come a bias in the social sciences toward time and history, and that in his own work spatial metaphors - e.g. domain, field, displacement - and a concern for institutional control of space allowed him to develop his project of examining systems of domina- lion and power (Foucault 1980:68-72).

The Data The data In this dissertation Is used to gauge the relative strength of tribal and alterna tive Identities in Baluchistan at this time, and to uncover ways that they are intercon

,nected, or, as I suggested above, embedded within one another. The dissertation is an exploration of the ways political incorporation and urbanization are influencing Baluch social organization and lc;lentity. Both economic and political data are use.d In that ex• ploration.

The economic data comes malnly from an examination of one sector of Ouetta's ' ' economy, bus transportation. Through participant observation, interviews, and an economic survey I obtained a portrait of the transporters and their business. This makes It possible to determine the significance of both tribal and ethnic affiliation In an

Important part of the city's economy. If tribalism Is significant in the economic activities of people In the cities then presumably tribal alliances or affiliations will be apparent In the transport industry. It should be noted that the choice to study bus transporters was somewhat opportunistically made since ten months prior to my arrival in Quella for fieldwork (and nearly two years before the riot I described above) a dispute over an inci dent at the city's bus stand led to an earlier round ethnic rioting between Baluch and

Pushtun.

7 The political data reveals the alternative Identities and or9anizations active In

Baluch society. Baluch ethnic-nationalist political parties and student groups have been in existence for decades, and elements of them waged an armed Insurrection against the government of Pakistan in the 19705 in order to achieve greater autonomy

If not Independence. It Is Important to detail the programs and Ideologies of some of these organtzations, and In particular their standing relative to and their connections with tribal Institutions. For example, the Baluch guerrilla movement of the 705 was reportedly weakened by trlbal rivalries (Harrison 1981 :71, 7 4-5).

The political data comes from two sources, a study of several of Quetta's self defined social welfare organizations, and a study of the national and provincial elections of 1988 and the perties that took part in them. The social welfare organizations I examined are voluntary associations organized to advance the interests of some group. I call them the 'llibAas' after the Urdu word for unity which many of them use as part of their names. The ttelllas are grass-roots organizations that express the at• titudes and aspirations of urban Baluch (and Pushturi) In relation to the wider society and to tribes. I did not attempt to conduct a systematic survey of the voluntary associa tions of Ouetta, rather I have selected ones for description that Illustrate the phenomena under discussion. One of those I chose to examine is a tribal lllJ:wl another Is a.union of buS owners, and the other two are etl'lnic (one Baluch and the other Pushtun). Because these groups are smaU and perhaps transitory, the data on them provides anecdotal evidence about the social and political forces at work in

Baluchistan. These studies depict some of the specific ways that tribes are being both transcended and perpetuated in Baluch society.

By contrast, elections are in effect an experiment In which major personalities and ideologies vie for public support on a large scale. The Pakistan elections of November

8 1988 were the first for nearly two decades In which au major social groups In the

country participated and which were not fatally tainted by charges of rigging. A wide

range of parties as well as Independent politicians contested the races In Baluchistan.

Because tribal and ethnic affiliation are factors affecting how people cast their votes, the election results give an Indication of their strength and that of various other political

and religious ideologies.

Chapter Outline The first three chapters.of the dissertation provide a background of Baluch society and

establish the context In which the research took place; the fourth chapter Is a detailed

description of the research setting; the following three are the main data chapters-in

which the hypothesis is tested; and the eighth and last ts a synthesis of the material

from preceding chapters that focuses on Baluch and Pushtun ethnic mobifization In

Quetta. It Is followed by a summary and concluding statement.

The first c:hapter Is an ethnographic survey of Pakistan's Baluch population. It

lays out the major features of Baluch tribalism and Baluch ethnic Identity and presents

details on some of the differing types of social organization Baluch utilize. The second

chapter serves two purposes. It places the events and structures of life in contem

poraryBaluc:hlstan In historical context, and It examines how Baluc:hself-perceptions

and aspirations (especially those of Baluch ethnic-nationalists) are reflected In the work

of Baluch historians. The third chapter examines the role of the Pakistani state In

Baluchistan, and its impact on the development of Baluc:hethnic-nationalism. Using

secondary sources and data from my field work the fourth chapter provides a descrip

tion of Quetta's history, its complex mix of peoples, and its econolTlywith special em·

phasis on the city's Baluch population.

9 The fifth chapter examines bus transportation in Baluchistan for what it can !ell

about Baluch tribal and ethnic mobilization. In it I show how competition over bus

routes is one element in the ethnic tensions that occasionally flare into conflict In Ouet

ta. The sixth chapter examines four voluntary associations active in Quella to see

whether or in what ways they attempt to transcend tribalism. I suggest that these or

ganizations are attempts to either expand the role of tribes to make them more relevant

to the lives of people in contemporary Baluchistan, or to transcend tribes and organize

and operate on an ethnic basis. In either case the activists in these organizations must

. deal with the fact of tribalism since it is often either their target for reform or their model

for social actio'n. The seventh chapter provides portraits of the major parties and pollti·

1::alfigures that contested the 1988 elections in Baluchistan, and It examines the results

of those elections with particular emphasis on the role of tribal leaders in them. I argue

that even in ethnic-nationalist parties tribal relations and tribal leaders remain pivotal In

the politics of the provlf!ce, In the last chapter I return to the problem of ethnic conflict

between Baluch and Pushtun In Quetta. In.it I show that differing tribal structures, ef

forts at economic and political mobilization, and competition over access to territory

are the major factors behind the conflicts that have occurred in recent years.

10 CHAPTER ONE

WHO IS BALUCH?: ETHNICITY AND TRIBALISM IN BALUCHISTAN

In some sense Baluch society is a cohesive whole only on the maps drawn by social scientists or Baluch activists trying to demarcate 'the Baluch' from other groups in

Southwest Asia. From another perspective, however, being Batuch means sharing an identity, or imagining oneseH to be part of a people who share Batuchness (however im precisely it can be defined). In the world where nations and states ideally coincide, though some aspire to it, there is no such Baluch entity. Baluch inhabit a vast area stretching from the Indus River in the east to Bandar Abbas and beyond in the west, and they are divided among a number of states, namely Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanis tan with small populations in the Soviet Union and Oman. Within Pakistan, where the majority of Baluch live, they are divided among a number of provinces, (Baluchistan,

Sindh, and Punjab), and provincially administered tribal areas. There is, in fact, no his torical record of all Baluch ever being part of a single polity. Even Nasir Khan the Great of Kalat, who came closest to unifying all Baluch, never absorbed the Baluch of Sindh and probably only incorporated Baluch groups in peripheral areas incompletely if at all.

There is no common language or social organization that all Baluch share, nor do all who consider themselves Baluch (and who are considered so by others) sha.re the memory of descent froin Baluch ancestors.

Yet many, if not all, Baluch share notions of shared heritage, loyalties, or life-ways which makes them Baluch. While not always as salient as sutHlthnic local or tribal identities, the perceived links with other Baluch, many of whom have quite different origins and cultural traits, provide the raw material and justification with which some are

tt attempting to construct Baluch nationhood. Efforts at unifying the Baluch as a nation have faced a number of dlfficultles Including the desert climate, mou!)tainous terrain, and corresponding sparse population of the region In which they live. it appears though that the harsh environment has encouraged the spread of basically identical cul tural patterns and has necessitated dispersed, flexible, and mobile populations of small· scale agriculturalists and nomadic pastoralists (Spooner 1983:104). Such factors also appear to have obviated the need for Baluch to establish indigenous states until pres sure from neighboring states precipitated higher levels of centralization. The conjunc tion, then; of various internal and external factors have brought about the phenomena with which this dissertation Is concerned, I.e., Baluch tribal and ethnic-nationalist social forms and identities.

This chapter serves two purposes. Firstly it sets some guidelines for navigating the complex mix of peoples and forms of social organization that make up Baluch society and the Baluch ethnic Identity. While there Is no set list Of qualities a person must have to be Judged Baluch, there ts a field of genealogical ties, linguistic com petence, territory, social structures, and values associated with honor, nomadic pas toralism, Islam, and natlonhOOdwithin which Baluch live and from which they contrast themselves with others. This chapter sketches an outline of that field of Baluch ethnic identity. Secondly this chapter examines the internal diversity within Baluch society in order to establish the foundation of this study, one of the aims of which Is to map the direction of change in Baluch society. This is to say that in this chapter I outline Baluch tribal social organization and political economy so that l can determine to· what degree and how urba.n Baluch maintain tribal identities and social forms. An ethnic or national

Identity is a contingent matter, one shaped by the ordering of groups relative to power and the means of production but it is also the mobilization and politicization of cultural

12 forms and Identities (see Comaroff 1987). This chapter examines the social struciures that give rise to Baluch cultural forms and asks what the content of those cultura: forms are.

As I have suggested, and as is illustrated further in later chapters, Baluch trit.al principles, social organization, and personalities continue to be important In the urban/national context. For this reason It Is necessary to avoid the temptation to use the terms 'traditional' and 'modern' to distinguish tribal and ethnic identities or the &O· cial relations that promote them. Indeed recent scholarship has begun to break d!:IW!l that dichotomy. Those writing on the "invention of tradition• have shown that symt>Ols or practices held to be ancient or natural frequently have their origins In the recen: past and in the need for modern states to display their links to the past (Hobsbawm 1963).

While the invention of tradition may be, as Hanson (1989:899) argues, common to all

discourses Including the anthropological one, the process more likely to occur is an

elaboration or revision of existing customs or ~ractices to meet new conditions and

new realities (WoH1982:387) .. such transforn;iations were especially prevalent in tne

colonial situation where Indigenous social structures and social processes were re-struc

tured to suit th&needs of empire for political control of territory and the channeling of

resources to the center.

It simply needs to be pointed out that such a restructuring does not establiSh

pristine Identities but transforms and preserves aspects of prior ones, and It is no! only

colonial regimes which promote such restructuring. Just as tradition and modemitY ln

terpenetrate and are to a degree responsible for one another, so too do the two 112·

nificant political forms of Southwest Asia and the Middle East, the tribe and the state.

The two have existed on a continuum of socio-political structures through which tt.e

people of the region have long organized themselves. Each has influenced the torm of

13 the other in their confrontation and accommodation. Many of the tribal groups of the region have developed hierarchies and political structures to withstand state pressure and likewise many of the indigenous states retain tribal ideologies and forms (rapper

1983:66-7; Lindholm 1979:50-4).

Baluch Ethnicity A lack of precision in defining the traits that members of an ethnic group share has long been noted (Narroll 1964; Moerman 1965; Barth 1969a), though it does not prevent people from developing a sense of shared identity. Moerman suggests that much is in a name, and the simple fact that people identify themselves as members of a group (and are so identified by others) means that the group exists and some distin guishable features delineate It from others. He also suggests that political co-affiliation may be what structures distinguishing traits. For that reason if affiliations change, iden tities or traits can change, and also different identities or traits become salient In dlf. ferent contexts given the level of contrast between the group and others (Moerman

1965:1219-1224; cf. Barth 1969a 15-16, 29-35).

This notion of ethnicity applies well to the Baluch ethnic identity which has vary ing diacritical features and relevance in varying contexts.Paklstani Baluch refer to

Baluch as a Qi1WD.an Arabic term that can be glossed as 'people' or 'nation'. and that implies that they are an integral whole that transcends state boUndaries (see Orywal

1985:49). The term QiWI1 though is not only used by Baluch to refer to the Baluch

people. In other contexts .Ql!Jlll can refer to the people of Paklstan, or conversely it could refer to the members of one of the tribal subgroups of the Baluch (and which are

also referred to as 1iifa.Q1bi1a. or zil). Though there Is an ethnic or cutturai unity of

Baluch, in practice sub-ethnic alignments often figure more prominently than does the

'national' coUective.

14 Though they are localized and autonomous economic and political units, in

recent centuries at least, Baluch tribes have been incorporated into alliances of varying

scope and strength. Even when a tendency toward centralization in a Baluch proto

state began to develop under the khans of Kalat, inter-tribal conflict and efforts by tribes or alliances of tribes to exert their independence from central control have

obstructed Baluch unity. A recent example occurred in 1948 when Kharan, Las Bela,

and Makran, sub-units or feudatories of Kalal, declared themselves independent and

opted for inclusion in Pakistan rather than remain as part of an independent Baluch

state.

At some basic level Baluch are people who identify themselves as Baluch. As

Spooner observes "a Baluch is one who calls himseH Baluch, and no one who is not

Baluch will so call himself' (Spooner 1983:94). He observes too that the term 'balw:tl'

Is also used to refer to those people In Baluch society who live as tent dwelling pas

toralists, 1 and he surmises that the term was originally used by Persian townspeople t~

refer to the various groups of nomadic pastoralists "Who roai'.nedthe uncultivated land

in their vicinity" (Spooner 1969:150). The term has always been "supra-tribar in his

opinion, and despite the status of Baluch as peripheral to the mafor power centers of

the region, groups of setUed agriculturalists, lineages from other pastoralist and tribal

societies, and even another entire ethno-linguistic group, the Brahul, have been encom•

passed within the Baluch ethnic Identity (see lbid.:144; Barth 1981 c; Harrison 1981 :183-

185).

Baluch Society As Moerman (1965:1219) has observed in the case of the Lue, Baluch ethnicity is large

ly generated out of political alliances (see also Anderson 1987). Such alliances give

rise to local tribal or .regional identities, though beyond particular local arrangements

15 tillOII r u n d --· ! 1

Q :!!: 1] i1u ~ :2 Ji D"l:I ~.s .§'o .!! ., ~i D. C .s~ c- _a,0N 3- &•.. i5-== .s ,!! D .!! E 6, D .5 C ...J 0 .;.:."tJ .fl

L there is a style or pattern of making such alignments that is typically Baluch. A number

of studies have examined the political structures and processes of Baluch society (e.g.,

Barth 1981c; S. Pastner 1988; Pehrson 1966; Salzman 1978a; Spooner 1969; Swidler

1969). Baluch tribes are unusual among the segmentary pastoralist tribes of South

west Asia, the Middle East, and North Afr~ in the degree of hierarchy within them and

the amount of authority vested in those who occupy the highest position in that hierar

chy. As I have noted, not all Baluch are organized into tribes though it appaars that in

coastal Makran this hierarchical relationship is preserved in the relationship between

patrons and clients (see S. Pastner 1988; Pastner and Pastner 1972). While the power

of the sardar differs in different tribes, Barth (1981a) has suggested this hierarchical

structure has allowed the Baluch to incorporate non-Baluch into their society relatively

easily. Acknowledgement of the sardar's authority is often sufficient to Initiate a

process through which,by intermarriage and sharing the joy and sorrow~

gbam) of its members, outsiders are incorporated into a tribe (SWidler 1969:150-1 ).

While this mechanism of Inclusion results In individ~als, families, or lineages

being incorporated into Baluch society, whole tribes and even tribal federations have

grown or become included within the wider Baluch identity. Spooner, for example,

describes the incorporation of Sindhi spaaking Jadgals who he estimates migrated to

and settled in Makran ten generations ago (Spooner 1969:144). Another Important seg- .

ment of Baluch society in Makran, the Gichkis, are said to be Rajputs whomigrated

there from India and eventually rose to prominence in the 18th century (Pastner and

Pastner 1972:128). To the north the core lineages of several Baluch tribes, including

the Raidnis and the SAtakzaihave their origins in Pushtun tribes· (BDG-5arawan:51,

61 ). While most of these subsumed groups have not retained their original languages,

that is not so in the case of the Brahui tribes. The presence of this large body of

17 people (most of whom are divided into tribes which are of the same ~ndamental 'Struc· ture as those of Baluchi speakers) who speak a language from an entirely different lan

guage family than Baluchi illustrates the inclusive nature of Baluch society. It also

underlines the fact that language plays an ambiguous role in Baluch ethnicity.

Along with these horizontal additions to Baluch society, some caste-like sub groupings are included within it at subordinate levels. These groups are most evident

in Makran where phenotypical differences (dark complexion and curly hair) distinguish

groups such as the Meds, DarzAdas, and Nakibs from other Baluch. Some of them are thought to be descendants of groups indigenous to the area, thus predating the

Baluch, others are said to be descendants of black slaves who were brought there

from east Africa by Arabs (Janmahmad 1982; Sultana 1990). Other subordinate groups

include the Lori, caste-like groupings of craftsmen and musicians who perform and

serve at weddings and other ceremonies, and who are found throughout Baluchistan

(BDG-Makran:79-80; BDG.Jhalawan:107). In Sibi and Kachhi Sindhi-speaking Jats, a

mixed group of non-Baluch and non-Pushtun peoples, work as tenants on Baluch

lands (BOG-Sibi:70-72; BDG-Kachhi:48). A similar sub-group, the Dehwar, lives in

Sarawan. Persian speakers who are said to be of Tajik origin, the Dehwars are settled

agriculturalists who, because many own good quality lands, are less subordinate than

Jats (BDG-5arawan:69-71). Baluch tribes are also ranked among themselves. In

Sarawan, tor example, the members of one Brahui-speaking tribe, the I.Angau, many of

whom work as tenants on lands owned by the Khan of Kalat, are said to be freed

slaves and prisoners, and are thus considered by some inferior to other Baluch (BDG

Sarawan:67).

Though all these groups are in some sense ethnically Baluch (perhaps less so in

the case of the Jats), their subordinate status i.Sindicated by the fact that many Baluch

18 will not intermarry with them. This is not necessarily the case with the l.Angau, though their situation may be similar to that ol the Jats whose women Baluch men will marry, but to whom many wiH not give their women.

Baluch CuHure I have suggested that while Baluch political units are to a degree exclusive and competitive, there is a cultural pattern that transcends and encompasses them (Spooner

1983:103). Baluch cultural identity is expressed in tribal custom (rillAior Batychjet),and

Islam. Similar to that of other tribal groups, especially the neighboring Pushtuns,

Baluch riJliiis a code of honor which entails strong sanctions to keep one's word, pro vide hospitality and protection to travelers and other guests, maintain the chastity of one's women, and avenge offenses against oneself or one's family (see Janmahmad

1982). Especially important among Baluch nomadsis the Institution of bi!. or the ex change of Information between people in ritualized tone$ and phrases when they meet.

Though the BaluchriJlii in some cases contradicts Islam (Baluch worr'8n, for examPje, do r;iot receive any inheritance which they are required to under Islam, and while Islam requires that an act of adultery be viewed by male witnesses to be substantiated, In many Baluch tribes the merest suspicion of impropriety Is sufficient for a man to Judge his wife guilty and enforce the punishment, death), Baluch generally conceive it to be consistent with Islam. Most Baluch are Sunni Muslims though In Makran a minority of the population are Zikris, followers of a Matidist Sufi sect. Though Baluch have a reputation for a relaxed approach to religion, there have been cases of intolerance and violence suchas a jibig_ led by the Khan of Kalat against the Zikris in the 18th century

(Pehrson 1966:106, Janmahmad 1982:152-3; see also Ahmed 1987).

These cullulal values and Baluch identity have their roots in pastoral nomadism.

As mentioned above 'Baluch' refers not only to the whole socio-cultural system but

19 also specifically to nomads (l2Alw;b).It is the nomads 'whose lives enshrine the values by which Baluch Identify themselves• (Spooner 1983:102·3). Although the core mean

Ing of Baluch Is nomad, cultivators (who may or may not have nomadic origins), city dwellers, and even those low-caste occupational groups who stand outside tribal genealogies, are to varying degrees Baluch by extension. They are fully Baluch in that they identify themselves as Baluch, are part of Baluch society, .and are accepted by others as Baluch, but they are In some sense derived. A similar attribute of core

Baluchness is held by those tribes or sections of tribes who have genealogical ties to such 'pure' Baluch tribes as the Rinds, while those with ancestry in other tribes are

Baluch as well but accretions. 2 The irony Is that to Baluch leading a nomadic pastoral lifestyle, their Identity as Baluch is probably less significant than is their Identity as mem bers of a particular tribe or sub-tribal lineage. A Baluch ethnic-national Identity Is to a significant degree most Important to the urbanized and the educated who find themsel• ves In contact and competition with members of other ethnic gro1;1ps.

One aspect of Baluch material culture that figures in their ~daptatlon to urban life is house construction. While Baluch nomads live In tents traditionally made of woven goats hair, in rural areas settled Baluch live in houses made of mud or sun-dried bricks covered with mud plaster. The only parts of such houses that must be purchased are the doors and the wood beams that support a flat roof of mats covered with mud and twigs. Villagers build their houses in mud-walled compounds for the seclusion of women according to the Islamic custom of 121,!W.Extended families consisting of a man and his married sons or brothers frequently share the same compound. This mode of house construction Is easily transferred to the city, and the outskirts of Quetta in many ways resembles large villages.

20 Language and Ethnicity Language has an ambiguous role in delineating ethnicity in South and Southwest Asia where people commonly speak two and often more languages. Despite its potential ambiguity, however, language Is an obvious and important marker of ethnicity In Pakis tan where ethnicity maps onto regions, and those ethno-regions roughly correspond with the country's four provinces.3 The Punjab is the most heavily populated province

In Pakistan and Punjabi speakers make up between 48 and 58 percent of the country's

population depending on whether Seraiki speakers are included. 4 The situation Is

more complex In Slndh because so many of the Mohajirs, or refugees from India, set tled there following partition. Sindhi speakers, about 12 percent of the national popula tion, predominate In rural areas, whereas Mohajirs, seven percent of the national

population, make up the majority in tile province's major urban centers, Karachi and

Hyderabad. Pushtu speakers constitute 13 percent of Pakistan's population. I wm refer

to Pushtu speakers as Pushtun but they are also known as Pukhtun, Pathan, or Af

ghan. Most of them live In the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) where they make

up around 80 percent of the population. They are the second largest ethnic group in

Baluchistan with around 25 percent of the population.

An important element of this dissertation is its examination of the relationship be

tween these ethno-llnguistic groups and Pakistan's Baluch population. Religion plays

little role in distinguishing these groups since all are predominantly Sunni Muslim.

Therefore language Is the most convenient way to distinguish them, though other cul

tural and social structural features are important as well. Pushtun cultural values and tribal structures are similar to those of Baluch, though they differ in some important

aspects. I will return to examine some of the differences between Baluch and Pushtun

that are relevant in the interaction of these two groups when I discuss ethnic mobiUza-

21 lion in Quetta in Chapter Eight Punjabis, Mohajirs, and Sindhis have complex class and ethnic dynamics of their own. Punjabi society is, for example, divided into caste or tribe-like descent groups or ~ (see Gilmartin 19~8:18-19, 83-95), and a Mohajir identity has formed in Pakistan out of aH the diverse peoples who left India for the Mus lim state. Both Punjabis and Mohajirs have a strong presence in Ouetta where together they constitute around 40 percent of the population. There they are known as •set• tlers•, "non-locals", or "domiciles•. I mostly refer to Punjabls and Mohajirs in the discus sion of the Institutions of the state which they dominate.

The ambiguity of language as an ethnic marker in Pakistan is especially evident in the case of the country's Baluch population. Having one of the two languages,

Baluchi and Brahui, which are exclusive to Baluch as one's mother tongue may be a

sufficient condition for being Baluch, but it is not a necessary condition. Baluch living in Sindh and Punjab generally speak the languages of those areas, Sindhi or Seraiki, though it is not clear whether or In what proportions those who have lived in those

areas for generations continue to use Baluchi or Brahui as the language of the home or

whether they no longer have any knowledge them (Harrison 1987:278). This is not an

insignificant fact since more,of Pakistan's Balu«:h population lives outside of the

province of Baluchistan than in it. Together Baluchi and Brahui speakers constitute

around four percent of Pakistan's population, and around 57 percent of Baluchistan's. 5

In addition to the Baluch population of approximately two-and-a-half million in Baluchis

tan, around four million live in Sindh and two million live in Punjab. The Baluch popula

tion in Sindh is divided into the two million relatively recent arrivals who live in Karachi

(and who are mos,tly Baluchi speakers), and the rest who live in rural areas and are in

tegrated into Sindhi society Obid,; see also Ahmad 19758:8; Pakistan. 1988:56; Kaul

1912:348).

22 Though Brahui and Baluchi share a lexicon, at core the two languages are radical ly different and this raises a number of questions about the historical relationship be tween the two groups of linguistically-defined tribes. Baluchi, like Pushtu, is a member of the Iranian branch of lndo-lranlan languages; Brahui is Dravidian. (Sindhi and

Seraiki are members of the northwest group of the lndic branch of the lndo-lranian lan guages). The Brahul-speaklng tribes are concentrated in Sarawan and Jhalawan, regions mountains and plateaus to the west of the Indus pl~ns (see Map 1). To some linguists the evidence suggests the original Brahui entered the area from south India around a thousand years ago (Spooner 1988:624). The Baluchi-speaking tribes are thought to have entered the areas they now occupy a century or two after that by a series of eastward migrations to and later beyond Makran from central Iran (ibid:609).

Another version of events is contained In the Baluch legend that the Brahui tribes are the descendants of Mir Saad, the leader of a faction of Baluch tribes that settled in Seis tan and later advanced southeastward through Chaghai and Kharan to the lands they now occupy (Baluch 1975:56; Harrison 1981 :184). Having entered the region before the later Incursions of Baluch tribes through Makran, they adopted the language of the prior inhabitants of the area according to this account .

I have suggested that Baluch ethnicity Is contextually established and that In most contexts Brahui are considered Baluch by themselves and others. The process through which the Brahui-speaking tribes were encompassed by the Baluch Identity is not clear and seems in large part to extend from the need for the numerically small

Brahui to associate with a larger ethnic grouping. There are numerous similarities be tween the two groups. I have mentioned that Brahui tribes are structurally the same as

Baluch ones; members Baluchi and Brahui tribes all share the fundamental values and codes of ho.nor which are identified as Baluch; and most Brahui speakers also speak

23 Baluchl. In some settings Brahui and Baluch identity can be contrastedand In addition to language, there are other more subtle differencesbetween them. Strict versions of Islam, for example, have attracted more support from members of Brahui tribes than from Baluchi-speaklngones. Also the sardars of Brahui-speakingtribes, though power ful, do not have the degreeof authority of such Baluch sardars as those of the Marri and Bugti tribes. As a casual observer I could discern no phenotypicaldifferences be tween Brahui and Baluch,though natives might be able to make distinctions I could not.

The Brahui have been encompassed by the Baluch not as subordinates but as equals and even as leaders,for It was the tribal confederation centeredin Kalal with a nucleus of Brahul tribes that eventually grew and encompassed most Baluch tribes of what is now Iran and Pakistan. There is some evidence that in the era of the Kalal

Khanate the Brahui tribes held a privileged position within the state. The Imperial Gazet teer of India of 1880 Includesthe following statement:

The country Is inhabitedby two distinct races, the Brahul and Baluch. They are each divided Into numerousclasses; and although Baluchistan derives tts name from the latter, the Brahuis are considered the domin~nt people, and from amongst them the rulers of the C9untryare always selected. So marked is the distinction between these · races that when the Khanassembles his tribes for warlike purposes,the Brahui portion · demand [sic} as a right wheaton flour for their rations, while the Baluchcan only claim a much coarser grain called js2a[. [Hunter:343; see also H~ison 1981:183) Differences in the status of the two subgroups may still be present. For example in

1987 the sardar {hereditaryleader) of a pro_minentBrahui-speaklng tribe, the Raisn, was ambushed and killed by members of the Baluchi Rind tribe. The ambush was revenge for an earlier incident In which the sardar's son had killed a number of Rind tribesmen after a dispute over election resuhs. In the attempts at negotiating a settle ment to the election murders,the RalsAnisardar had refused the aggrievedparty's demand for marriageablewomen (an acceptable demand according to tribal custom) because, according to anothertribal leader, he felt the Rind wereof lower status.•

24 Wrth no compensation payment the Rind felt honor demanded blood revenge. Some

people talked of strains between Balucti and Brahui as a result of this and other inci

dents though at present there ar!! much stronger centripetal forces from the Baluch eth

nic-nationalist movement for Brahui and Baluch unity.

I will use the term 'Baluch' to refer to both Baluchi- and Brahui-speaking tribes un

less for some reason further specificity is required. Most Baluch in Quetta are in fact

Brahui-speaking since the city is located at the northern portion of Sarawan, one of the

Brahui core areas. I use the more general term 'Baluchistani' to refer to residents of the

province of Baluchistan. Generally ! use it to refer to a member of the area's two major

ethnic groups, Baluch and Pushtun, as opposed to settlers. · 1nspecified cases though

it can refer to anyone who resides there.

BaluchTribalism · Baluch tribes are configurations of the genealogical, territorial, political, and cultural

relations linking their members. They can be classified as segmentary lineage systems

In that they are decentralized, lack many of the trappings of government such as ad

ministrative machinery, and their political life is organized around unilineal descent

groups (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:5-7). Baluch tribes have long been part of

tribal confederations of varying cohesi.on, however, and they are better described as

"differentiated" or "stratified segmentary systems• because, though the tribe is a collec

tion of lineages, a chiefly segment or lineage stands above the others (Khazanov

1984:146). As mentioned above, Baluch tribes are led or represented by chiefs or sar

dars (also called hakOlmor~. and, as described below, the power of sardars

differs among tribes. Some can extract tribute from their tribesmen, some can make

binding decisions to settle disputes (others can only mediate), and they all appear to

25 play an important role in relations with outsiders and formerly in the organization of military force (e.g., Salzman 1983:271).

After a review of the literature on tribal societies, and particularly the Muslim pas toral tribes of the greater Middle East, this section will examine the relations between people that constitute Baluch tribalism. Particularly important are such factors as economi_c adaptations to desert environments, kinship, territoriality, hierarchy, and ~o tions of honor. Following this general discussion of Middle Eastern tribalism, the eth nographic material on Baluch tribes is examined. For purposes of discussion,

Baluchistan is divided Into four ecological and cultural zones and the patterns of tribalism in each are discussed.

Ecology, Fraternity, Hierarchy The classic formulation of a segmentary society is Evans-Pritchard's ethnography of the Nuer. Evans-Pritchard starts his study with an analysis of Nuer pastoral production or what he terms 'oecology', and then moves to a discussion of the political and genealogical structures which simultaneously extend from and make possible that . production (Karp and Maynard 1983:500). The Nuer, he says, evaluate their territorial relationships politically and conceive of them as a system of segments or units which fuse together or come into opposition relative to other such segments depending upon social circumstances

Each segment is Itself segmented and there is opposition between its parts. The members of any segment unite for war against adjacent segments of the same order and unite with these adjacent segments against larger sections. [Evans-Pritchard 1970:142, see also 149, 190] Membership In this system of relations is not conceived of merely in terms of residence,

however. Rather, for Nuer those rights and obligations are a function of real or imputed

descent from male ancestors, and parallel to the territorially based, nested system of

tribes, communities, and tribal sections is a similar though not identical hierarchy of

26 clans and lineages. Despite the fact that Nuer "think generally in terms of local divisions and the relations between them• (ibid.:203), the 'conceptual skeleton' on which they construct those relations and the idiom in which they express them is kinship (ibid.:212).

The concept of a segmentary lineage structure is often applicable to the social or ganization of pastoral nomads and unites the three major dimensions or planes of their society, the economic or productive, the politico-spatial, and the genealogical, in a model which reaches from the environment to the way people think (Karp and Maynard

1963:482-3; Khazanov 1984:121 ). It is clear though that the model can not account for

much of what takes place in tribal society, mainly because there is a disjunction be tween territoriality and descent, and because social relationships other than these can affect tribal alignments (Eickelman 1981 :93).

An Important critique of the segmentary lineage model Is Peters' account of feud among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica. Peters concludes that, though the model presents f tribal Ideology, a common-sense understanding of social relations which might be ade quate as a folk model, what It must account for as exceptions or deviations are too fun

damental for it to be used as anthropological analysis. Among the Bedouin, like the

Nuer, tribal segments map onto territorial divisions. Peters shows, however, that seg

mentation theory Is a poor predictor of what actually takes place on the ground since

groups that are theoretically equivalent are not necessarily balanced in terms of poHti cal power and/or resources;.. and other relationships, most notably those established matrilaterally or through marriage, modify how the complementary opposition of

lineages works out (Peters 1967:27 4).7 The model predicts certain relationships which

are not manifested due to competition for pasture and water, and fails to predict others

which result from the same process (Salzman 1978b). Emmanuel Marx, like Peters, as-

27 serts that in practice needs for pasture, water and self-defense take precedence over genealogical closeness and, even more than Peters, he emphasizes the Importance of non-agnatic personal relationships in tribal structure (Marx 1977:358, see also Marx

1979).

In a similar critique, Dresch argues that the massing effect that segmentary lineage theory posits, i.e., that related lineages ally to oppose structural equivalents, is not consistent or predictable. He says that events can be shown to follow from the prin ciple of segmentation, (balanced opposition or mobilization relative to others) though it will not necessarily activate lineages (Dresch 1986:313-4; see also Salzman 1979:123).

In Yemen, he says, segmentation is manifested when individuals and groups act on the basis of honor which entails the protection of spatial and social boundaries. "The seg mentary, tribal structure is of honor, not of cohesive groups• (Dresch 1986:315). Mass ing will take place on the basis of honor but no predetermined groups will emerge as opponents, and those that do will not necessarily be defined solely on the basis of genealogy. Indeed political factors such as disputes over boundaries or extended feud ing may not only override genealogical ties, thus causing lineages to leave one tribe for another, they can also override the material interests those who argue from the position of ecological determinism emphasize (Dresh 1989:337-9).

Sections of Land, Sectionsof Blood Central to this conception of tribes, then are the notions of segmentation, territoriality, and descent. That other kin, patrons, partners, and friends can complicate the unilineal picture is generally recognized. It is also the case that the two main elements of the segmentary lineage model, territorial segments and genealogical ones often do not cor respond as they are supposed to.

28 Ecological conditions are one of the reasons for the variable strength of tribal ties. Different 'choices' on the ecological-productive plane will bring about different dynamics along the other dimensions. A pastoral group's 'mode of exploitation', mean

Ing primarily the types of animals it utilizes, depends partly on the environment and part ly on its cultural traditions (Spooner 1973:8). The mode of exploitation will affect other aspects of social organization since a human population must adjust to the particular biological and social characteristics of its. animals (ibid.:23). Though the environment sets broad limits, and certain generalizations can be drawn about the type of adapta tion that will be employed in different ecological zones. it can not be seen as the deter mining factor of social organization. Internal contradictions, between wealthy and poor nomads, for example, and relations with external groups can also shape how the other dimensions take shape (Khazanov 1984: 198).

Though the genealogical and the politico-spatial dimensions, are often conflated by tribesman and by some anthropologists (e.g., Sahlins 1968.:16), they are best treated as detachable or "Independently variable" (Fortes 1953:36). One definition of territory holds It to be the "relationship established between a community of politically organized people and their space" (Gottman 1973: 123). But political organization is not prior to territoriality, It emerges as people organize themselves In space. Dresch's depiction of honor, for example, is that the practices of tribal peoples like the Baluch on and in relation to their territory give rise to the principle and ideology of honor, and It in tum mediates mobilization relative to others (Dresch 1966:315). Similarly, while ter ritorialgroups relate to each other through the principle of segmentation, those ter

ritorial units are simultaneously people with relations of kinship and descent.

Kinship is, among other things, the symbolic use of blood and marriage ties to es tablish access to the labor and resources a group controls (Wolf 1962:91-2). Middle

29 Eastern pastoral societies give major importance to the relations established through male ancestors. The lineages established from that relationship follow a segmentary logic jµst as territorial units do (Evans-Pritchard 1970:197; Dresch 1986:320).

Genealogies do not only determine action or membership, however, they also reflect the shifting relations that emerge from actual practice (Eickelman 1981 :97). Individuals or groups can be adopted or absorbed into descent lines as fictive younger brothers, for example. Because senior lineages often have prestige and authority, genealogies manifest not only segmentation, the implied equality and structural similarity of lineages, but also hierarchy (Dresch 1988:59; Ahmed 1980:138-9).

In tribal societies kinship Is the primary relationship between people which gives access to land, and conversely access to tribal territory usually equates to real, ob· tained, or virtual kinship. It is not necessary to move to either extreme as Kroeber did at one point by positing the logical or temporal primacy of territorial groups over derived gen,alogical ones, or as Fortes has done by arguing the opposite (Kroeber

1938:306; Fortes 1953:36). Both are manifested in tribal social structure and ideology since people must simultaneously relate to others and to land. People's relationship to their means of production, the major element of which is land in the tribal case, shapes their social (genealogical) forms, just as those social forms establish how people can relate to their productive forces. ·

The structure of organized space is not a separate structure with its ownautonomous laws of construction and transformation ....lt represents, instead a dialecticatty defined component of the general relations of production, relations which are simultaneously social and spatiaj.(Soja 1989:78). In any given case territorial identities and genealogical identities may coincide or one may predominate In determining social action. Territorial relationships may take

precedence over genealogical ones in determining people's actions as Peters and others observe, or genealogical ones may continue to operate in the absence of direct

30 contact with territory. Such for example Is the case when tribesmen go to the city and retain their tribal identity.

An important factor in shaping the relationship between territoriality and geneal ogy In nomadic pastoral societies is that Individuals own and manage livestock while the tribe collectively possesses and protects its pasture (Gellner 1983:441; Khazanov

1984:140; Lef6bure 1979:6; Bonte 1981:27-8). Khazanov suggests that in local settings

(or "lower levels of segmentation") day-to-day necessities of economic production under variable conditions compel fluid, flexible relations which is why other kinship rela tions, marriage, and contractual relations can override lineal descent principles. At the more Inclusive, tribal level however, descent and the corporate Interest in the group's territory broadly define the space in which Individuals can move, and also serve as the

Ideological and social mechanism fOr mobilizing people for its defense (Khazanov

1984:140; see also Marx 19n:356-7). The tribe may thus appear more corporate to outsiders than to Insiders.

From Segmentationto Hierarchy Individual ownership of animalshas another important consequence: different rates of success In the herding of animals can lead to economic inequalities among tribesmen despite leveling mechanisms which might prevent this. Some have suggested that such tendencies can lead to the emergence of class divisions in segmentary societies

(Bonte 1981 :42; Lefebure 1979:7-10).

While these authors base their argument on the internal dynamics of nomadic tribal societies, others place much greater emphasis for the development of such hierar chical tribal structures as chlefships, dominant lineages, and tribal confederacies on relations with external groups. In the case of pastoral tribes this follows from the fact that pastoralism in not an autonomous or autarkic economic form, but one that is an

31 outgrowth of agriculture and partly dependent on it (Spooner 1973:6; Khazanov

1984:198; HeHgott 19n:45). These authors generally argue in ecological terms: pastoral nomads are able to exploit marginal environments where agriculture is not viable

(Spooner 1971:205; Khazanov 1984:69). Others argue that nomadism is a politico military adaptation by weaker groups who have been marginalized or sought to avoid domination by more powertul settled groups (Irons 1971 :647, 654; Bates 1971 :116;

Fried 1975).

The main dynamic in the relationship between pastoralists and agriculturalists is that nomadic groups often rely on the products of agriculturalists or towns. Helfgott ar gues on this basis that pastoral production serves two functions, use and exchange, and that different social institutions develop to deal with the production that cor responds to each {Helfgott 19n:41). While kinship mediates use, exchange, hear gues (without providing any ethnographic examples, however), gives rise to chiefs or other power figures, because of the control certain individuals are able to exert over

economic relations with outsiders (ibld.:48). It is also important to note that If pas-

,' I • toralists co~ld not trade for the goods they needed they obtained them by force, and that this was a source of their military strength and their penchant for raiding.

The relationship between pastoralists and farmers is strongly Influenced by

ecological factors which Include, along with the environment, the relative sizes and

adaptive mechanisms of each group (Bates 1971 :111 ). Pastoralism and agriculture

may simply be different economic strategies utilized by the same population under vary

ing conditions, but in some cases different economic niches can coincide with different

ecological ones and distinct ethnic groups may fill each. This is the case, Barth shows,

in Swat where Pushtu-speakers occupy the best lands, those on which two crops a

year can be grown, while Kohistanis, who the Pushtun had previously displaced by

32 force, occupy the marginal mountainous regions where they must supplement their agriculture with herding (Barth 1961b).

Bates argues, however, that to understand the relationship between pastoralists and settled farmers It Is Insufficient to examine only their ecological relations. It Is also necessary to determine how both groups are linked to the larger political structures In which they are sit\,lated.

The existence of most niches In the rural scene of the Near East Is as much a creation by forces exterior to the immediate areas, as the niches themselves are inherent in the landscape, or even in the techniques of the peoples themselves. Whether specific economies are In competition or cooperation In using a shared area, depends as much upon how they relate to the outside world, as upon how much they would be able to supplement each other's diet. [Bates 1971 :130] Encapsulation or even proximity to states increases the hierarchical tendencies within

tribes. Irons goes so far as to hypothesize that

among pastoral nomadic societies, hierarchical political institutions are generated only by external political relations with state societies, and never develop purely as a result of the Internal dynamics of such societies. (Irons 1979:362, see also Fried 1975] The history, degree, and kind of state intervention In the tribal sphere will strongly In-

fluence the nature Of tribal political structures and the degree of hierarchy within them

(Tapper 1983:50).

Leaders like Baluch sardars seem to emerge as part of the structures through

which longer lasting and more cohesive alliances than are possible in purely segmen

tary structures are formed in the context of resistance to more powerful political

groups. The chiefs' role frequently centers around conflict with external groups and dis

pute resolution within the tribe. If the tribe becomes encapsulated within a state or sub

mits to Its Indirect authority then the chief becomes the Intermediary between tribe and

state. Ruling or chlelfy lineages are strengthened by their relationship with external ad

ministration because their status as Intermediaries establishes them as conduits for

resources and Information flowing in both directions (Salzman 1974 & 1983).

33 Land, Blood, and Chiefs In Baluch Trlballsm I will examine the ethnographic material on Baluch living in four zones, 1) Makran, the southern, coastal regions of Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan; 2) the highland Sarhad region of northern Iranian Baluchistan; 3) the Brahul core area on the Kalal plateau which is divided Into the northern Sarawan .and southern Jhalawan regions; and 4) the northeastern highland area of Pakistani Baluchistan I will call the Marrl-Bugtl area.

These are the only areas in which contemporary ethnographers have studied and writ ten about the Baluch, and many important areas, e.g., Kharan, Las Bela, and the Kach hi and Indus Plains, are unfortunately not represented. These four zones do, however, provide a fairly good cross section of Baluch social forms, though by neglecting the

Baluch on the eastern plains it is not possible to consider the more purely feudal arran gements which have developed in the context of large land ownership and canal irriga tion. Ouetta is located within zone three, though the city's Baluch population also includes people from zones one and four.

The first zone, Makran, ls the only one of the four with a climate hot enough to aDow date cultivation and the corresponding development of oasis centers that can support •quite large populations· (C.Pastner 1978:265). As In the other three regions, in Makran nomads herd sheep, goats, and camels on the outskirts of the agricultural centers and In the mountain ranges. Due to its higher elevation, In the second zone,

Iranian Sarhad, water is too inaccessible to tap for irrigation and the climate too cold for date palms. The inhabitants of this area engage In a 'multi-resource nomadism' which combines pastoralism with grain cultivation on small dispersed plots, annual. migration to areas where dates can be grown and labor sold, and, at least until the im position of Iranian state rule, raiding (Salzman 1972).

34 The Kalat plateau, the third zone, is similar to Sarhad due to its elevation though there are some rich alluvial valleys (such as that in which Quetta is located) where irriga tion makes agriculture very productive. The Kach hi plains to the east have been politi cally associated with the highlands since the rise of the tribal confederacy centered in

Kalat. Until recently much of the population followed a transhumant cycle, moving to the Kach hi lowlands with their herds in the winter months, and returning to their high land pastures and agricultural plots in the warmer months. The fourth zone, the Marri

Bugti area, is also a highland one where the inhabitants mix herding with rain-fed

agriculture. Uke the Baluch of Sarhad, the Marri and Bugti were strategically placed for

raiding agricultural settlements and trade routes before the colonial era.

Segmentation In Baluch Tribes In all of these zones except Makran the prevailing unit of social organization Is the

stratified segmentary tribe. Salzman, depicts the Yarahmedzai of zone two as having a tribe with three sections, and around sixty lineages (which constitute the basis for herd

ing camps) related to one another through common ancestors (Salzman 1971 :435).

The tribe operates through a process in which "sub-units are contingently activated,

deactivated, and reactivated in response to conflicts over life, injury and property"

(Salzman 1983:269, see also 197Bb:64-5). These segments do not own or control

specified divisions of the tribe's highland pasturage, though they do have date groves

in the lowlands. Since people pursue their economic ends as individuals, lineages

have few corporate economic or social activities. They are mainly visible when they mo

bUizeto defend themselves, their honor, or their property.

Pehrson portrays Marri tribesmen of zone four as reciting the classic refrain of

segmentary societies.

I fight with my [agnatic] cousin but when another Muliani comes to fight me or him we are one. When a Londawani comes to fight a Muliani, then we are one ....ln a war with

35 the Bijaranis then all Ghazeni ...become one. In a war with Pathans all Marris become one. (Pehrson 1966:27]. The Marris, he says, use genealogical principles to identify themselves In a series of nested sections, subsections, and lineages. Patrilineality ls the path through which property is inherited and the genealogical principle is matched by a territorial one since male members of a section receive a share of the group's agricultural lands (ibid.:1 S..9).

The tribe periodically redistributes these lands following segmentary principles and sharing in the 'landed estate' is a confirmation of trib,al membership.

Similarly Swidler describes the Brahui tribes near Quetta as organizing themsel ves on the basis of patrilineally defined segmentary sections (1aklsa[),generally en dogamous subsections~. and lineages (ilZiz)(Swldler 1969:132). She goes further ttian most in positing the corporate nature of some of these segments. Mem bers of a abllwi1:for example constitute a group for "mutual aid and support"

(lbld.:135) wt1ogive contributions of money or animals to co-members at important events such as marriages or engagements (bijJac)or the deaths of family members

(12l.[a). She does not identify a direct correspondence between genealogical segments and land holding units as Pehrson does but the lineage's territorial nature Is apparent.

Nomadic herding camps, for example, she describes as lineage fragments, formed around a core group of brothers and patrilineal cousins (ibid.:70) and In a village near

Ouetta she observed that the distribution of agricultural land and housing roughly fol lows lineage principles, though Individual decisions to transfer cultivation rights have obscured their boundaries (ibid.:103).

Unlike in the other areas, in Makran the contingencies of small-scale irrigation agriculture lead to fluid patron-client relations which tend to weaken the "corporate func tions of kinship" (Pastner and Pastner 1972:132-3). The situation in Makran ap proaches feudalism, and there the tribal elite have become sedentary landlords with

36 tenants. While segmentary tribes are present they do not feature prominently in deter mining social action or identity. People instead identify themselves territorially (by vii· lage or, in the case of nomads, by a grazing area) or allegiance to a patron (S.Pastner

1978:250). Nomadic groups in Makran form bilaterally as opposed to patrilineally as they do where tribes are strong. They have a core grazing area they think of as their homeland, and they maintain access to an additional, con.siderably larger area through bilateral kin and marriage ties (ibid.:176, 180; C. Pastner 1978:266). In the settled ir rigated areas fluid arrangements regarding land tenure and political allegiance result from the individualistic pursuit of advantage. In this context land holdings are not tribal· ly base but diffused and fregmented (Pastner and Pastner:133-4).

Tribe and Territory In Baluchtatan The relationship to land in different regions of Baluchistan varies according to ecologi· cal exigencies and socio-political structures. At one extreme is the situation found in

Makran where there appears to be a fairly marked distinction between cullivatorS and nomads with tribes spacializing in one or the other activity (see Spooner 1969:140).

Nomads attempt to avoid having to enter sedentary life even in cases of drought

(Pastner 1971 :178).' At the other end of the spectrum is the Brahui case In which there is little difference between nomads and cultivators since people with the same tribal af filiations combine various economic options (Swidler 1973:299). Sardats, acting under the Khan of Kalat, initially distributed grazing and in some cases cultivation rights on newly acquired lands through sections and lineages of their tribes (W. Swicller

1972:72). From that point two types of land rights developed. ~ is a proprietary

land right based on this process of redistribution, and bazgbi[i is a tenancy right ob tained through improving land and making it cultivable (Swidler 1973:302). H a lineage

or family settles on land where they have grazing rights they will hold both .bl:l1lciand

37 bazgllari rights, bul often those with proprietary rights grant tenancy rights to people from other tribes. Tribesmen in this region, utilizing access to the lowland Kachhi

Plains, generally combined transhumant pastoralism with cultl\/ation on plots for which they had established .bazgtwl. Swldler concludes that in Sarawan these tenancy arran gements prevented the creation of a class of landless tribesmen on the one hand, and, because .b.Q1A[irights are collective, powerful landlord families on the other (Swldler

1973:303). She also correctly points out, however, that having had control of land redistribution and the right to impose certain taxes, the sardars of Sarawan themselves frequently control the best lands (Swidler 1969:153).

Speaking generally grazing lands in Baluch society are collectively held, bul people can buy or sell agricultural land or the rights to cultivate it (even to non-Baluch).

There certainly seems to be room for individual economic Initiative with the advent of tubewell technology. Some individuals In the Sarawan area have invested In It and are

profitrng from the seffing the fruit and v~getable crops It makes possible. As men tioned, sardars own some of the best lands as well as the technology to make it

productive, but they are not the only ones who have thus prospered.

Hierarchy Within and Without Pursuing Barth's insight (Barth 1981 c), Spooner observes that Baluch society takes a

distinctly hierarchical form as a result of the economic and political relations between

pastoralists and farmers (Spooner 1983:104). As is common in regions where the set

tled population is militarily weak due to its dispersal to isolated pockets and no state

has developed which can unite or protect them, Baluchistan's pastoral nomads have

held a dominant position In those relations (Khazanov 1984:223). This relationship is

not unusual in Southwest Asia where various conditions have encouraged close con

tact between nomadic pastoralists and settled populations (ibid.:184). Spooner con-

38 eludes that Baluch cultivators and nomads •a,e in fact not thought of as two interdepen· dent populations, but rather as parts of a social whole that is stratified into four classes•

(Spooner 1983:102).

In Makran those four classes are the chiefly families and lineages; the .b.all&b.or pastoral nomads; a distinct group of peasants; and the lowest stratum of former slaves, menials and despised castes (Spooner 1969:140). This four part hierarchy is found in modified forms in most Baluch areas. It generally takes the form of a small tribal elite, a broad middle stratum of nomads and peasants, and a small underclass which is genealogically, if not culturally and linguistically, non-Baluch. These classes are rein· forced by patrilineal genealogies and endogamy.

In Makran powerful sardars who have attained the ability to extract tribute from settled agriculturalists are known as ~- The bilsOmmaintain a dominant position because they are able to play the nomadic and the settled populations off against each other (Spooner 1969:147-8; s~e also Salzn'l&fl 1978a). Spooner surmises the hlmOm· originated as the leading families of invading pastoral tribes among whom they lacked coercive power but had status as mediators and the ability to manipulate external rela tions (see also ~alzman 1979:442). Through their tribal links they had access to military force which they utilized to obtain land, labor, and taxes from the agricul· turalists, and the weahh they gained from their strategic hold on agriculture in turn rein· forced their predominant position among the nomads.

Where it is not possible to develop irrigation the social order differs from this. In zone two, for example,conditions do not allow for peasant-based agricultural produc· lion and so bilsOmare not present. Rather the tribes in this area are lead by sardars who are paramount trlbal chiefs whose main source of economic and political support lie with pastoral nomads whose identity, and to an extent, lifestyle they share (Salzman

39 1971 :440-2). Salzman observes that despite ecological {widespread pasture, erratic rainfall, and dispersed population) and social factors (readily available weapons and the option to join other tribes) that militate against centralization in this area, the office of the sardar persists (Salzman 1983:275-6). The sardar, he says, has very little control over the internal workings of the tribe or its resources (there are no sub-tribal offices through which he can enforce decisions or collect revenues, for example ) though he does mediate disputes. It is mainly in external relations that the sardar in zone two has an important role. "Negotiations with outsiders over such weighty matters as war and peace, control of disputed resources and political alliances and affiliation, are con ducted through the Sardar" (ibid.:271). Though even in these matters he does not dic tate but leads and represents.

Salzman explains the phenomenon of a stratified segmentary tribal structure by reference to the historical events confronting the Yarahmedzai in the last century and more specifically·their relations to another ethnic group's expanding •quasi-feudal proto state• (ibid.:2n). To resist becoming subordinate to that more centralized power the

Yarahmedzai established sardars as military leaders and negotiators through which they organized themselves on a more sustained basis than they otherwise could. Limit ing the analysis to specific evenls in the last century begs the question of how virtually all Baluch tribes have achieved this level of hierarchy in much the same form, and how some have further degrees of stratification and hierarchy. If the degree of hierarchy rep resented by sardars is primarily the product of external relations then confrontations with states probably have a long history, and one Which proved the military effective ness of centralized leadership.

The quasi-feudalism of Makran and the simply stratified segmentary structure of tribes in the Sarhad are poles on a continuum along_which tribes in zones three and

40 four are intermediate. That the tribes In these areas are more hierarchical than the

Yarahmedzal Is reflected In the greater economic and political power of their sardars, and the presence of Inherited and achieved offices at lower levels In the tribal structure.

In these tribes recognizing the authority of the sardar is in fact considered an· essential element of tribal membership and a route through which outsiders can become clients and eventually members of the tribe (Swidler 1969:150-1).

The Marrl tribe and Its sections must be understood as a structure of groups and leaders, and the crucial feature of membership in a group is the relationship of subordination to its leader ...The sardar is the central and unifying leader, who by his existence creates the Marrl tribe and who for formal purposes is regarded as the font of all legitimate power in the tribe (Pehrson 1966:20]. Their wealth (from personally owned lands and the taxes they levy on their tribesmen and clients), their ability to determine who holds office at sub-tribal levels, and formal connections with external political structures give these sardars considerable power to settle disputes and determine events within the tribe. In language reminiscent of that used to describe organized crime, Swidler describes the relationship between sardars and their tribesmen as one in which tribesmen •exchange allegiance, obedience and, on occasion, money or goods for protection• (Swidler 1969:152).

The senior line of the tribe's senior section holds the office of sardar, and the senior line in each of the other segments provides a hereditary section head (Swidler

1973:305). The section head has the same relation to his section as the sardar does to the entire tribe. They settle disputes within the section or its component segments and act as the sardar's advisers and agents (Pehrson 1966:21). As members of the tribal council which operates under the authority of the Pakistan government, section heads are also linked into external power structures.

In addition to these hereditary officials, in both the Brahui-speaking tribes of zone four and the Baluchi-speaking ones of zone three, other men, known as motebarswho

41 are skilled at managing people and resources can gain a personal following and a de gree of political influence. The surest way for motebars to gain prestige Is through close relations with the sardar. H he chooses, the sardar can circumvent the hereditary structure and promote motebars as his representatives at the local level (Swidler

1969:119-23, 144). By holding the power to advance or retard the careers of hereditary and self-made political figures at the sub-tribal or local level, the sardar can undercut the authority of the hereditary section heads and prevent the formation of alternative power centers.

The degree of hierarchy in the tribes of zones three and four is in large part a function of their Inclusion in the Kalal Khanate (which only loosely incorporated the tribes of the Marri-Bugti area) and British colonial structures. During the flowering of the Kalal Khanate the tribes which made up the confederacy were ranked with each holding corresponding rights and duties, and hierarchy within tribes extended from the sardars' association with the court of the Khan (see Swidler 1969). With Kalat's submis sion to British India the power of sardars increased. Through the colonial government's encouragement and subsidies they developed their own police forces, jails, and often reputations for severity and despotism (see Pehrson 1966:27). In regards to the con temporary setting it must be noted that the ethnographic work upon which this analysis is based is around thirty years old.8 Since that time Increased integration into the

Pakistani nation state has brought economic, political and administrative alternatives to the members of tribes. Sardars no longer have absolute authority or even the official policing duties they did during the colonial era, but they too have been able to utilize new conditions to advance their economic and political positions as I discuss in later chapters (see for example Duncan 1989:145-147).

42 An Important element of Salzman's analysis of the stratified segmentary lineage structure Is the presence of a tension between tendencies toward centralization and decentralization within the tribe. Whtte segmentary lineages maintain the egalitarian and decentralized relations which allow adjustment to the ecological environment, at the same time the chiefship enables the tribe's members to unite to cope with the politi cal environment (Salzman 1983:279). However the relationship between hierarchy and segmentation is not unproblematic or one which results in functional equilibrium within the tribe. There is rather a tension between them. The segmentary nature of the tribe,

Salzman says, weakens It as a political unit (ibid.:270). He theorizes that they are •or• ganizational alternatives• the group can apply to deal with the circumstances it con fronts (ibld.:280). In some conditions one will prevail and in others its counterpart will.8

In the era of incorporation into the Iranian state it is hierarchy (i.e., chiefs or sardars) that has come to have increasing importance, _dueas suggested above, to the sardar's role as middle man between tribe and state. Such conflicting tendencies toward hierar

chy and decentralization are visible not only in tribal settings but also in Ouetta where volunt8f)' associations have developed that both seek to supplant the authority of tribal

sardars and associate with them In order to increase their popular standing.

Conclusion Baluch tribal Identity is based on genealogical ties to male ancestors, rights to tribal ter-

ritory, and acknowledgement of the authority of the tribal sardar. Some genealogies

lack depth but have a tendency to increase their breadth by absorbing individuals or

sections from other tribes or even other ethnic groups. Territoriality is broadly outlined

in tribal terms, but much of that land, or the right to cultivate it, is in the hands of in

dividuals who can transfer or sen it. Tribal sardars are powerful figures within the bibes

and have the prestige and authority to settle disputes and command allegiance.

43 In Pakistan Baluch tribal identity Is weakest in Makran, where along with the ecological and economic factors that prevent the development of strong tribal struc• tures, high rates of migration to the Gulf s~ates of Arabia as well as Karachi have brought non-tribal alternatives in social organization and ideology (see Ahmed 1987).

In the other areas personal identity is grounded in tribal identity and most people use the name of their tribe as part of their personal name. In those areas sardars continue to have great influence within.their tribes, and as I show in subsequent chapters, politi cal activity in non-tribal spheres often centers around sardars.

44 NOTES 1) A similar co-usage of terms is used to refer to nomadic pastoraiists among the Kurds (lwI.d) and Arabs (lWUl) (ibid.).

2) Brahui tribes also have a powerful claim to indigenous authenticity since It is general ly presumed that, whether they were themselves formerly Baluchi speakers or they are the descendants of Dravidian-speaking groups, they were in place on the Kalal Plateau when the eastward migrations of the Baiuch took place. See next chapter.

3) Clem calls these regions •ethno-territories• (Clem 1986:141). I will use that term to refer to smaller, local settings and the term ethno-region to refer to the provincial scale I am discussing at this point.

4) Seraiki is a mixture of Punjabi and Sindhi spoken in southwestern Punjab. Some consider It a dialect of Punjabi and others consider it a distinct language (see Harrison 1987:270). In recent years a Seraiki cultural movement has gained momentum, and some have even raised the call for the creation of a Seraiki speaking province (see Shackle 1978 & 1985).

5) These figures are based on the 1981 census of Pakistan. In Baluchistan the only census category that reflects ethnicity is language spoken in the household (Pakistan. Population Census Organization 1984:107). My figures for the number and percentage of Baluchi and Brahui speakers is based on that measurement and assumes that all eth nic groups In Baluchistan have families of the same average size.

6) This version of events may not be correct since the Baluchistan District Gazetteer for the Kachhl district written at the turn of the century says that the sardarkhel(the Uneage which provides the sardar of the tribe) of the Rind tribe has marriage ties with that of the Raisanl tribe (BOG Kacchi:36). If status differences were behind the Raisani sardar's refusal to give women as wergeld payment it was probably the relative status of the families of the deceased vs that of his own. According to tribal genealogies, the Rind are the descendants of one ol the most important of Baluch figures. Rind was one of the four sons of Mir Jalal, the leader of 44 Baluch tribes which ballads and epic poetry say migrated to Makran from Kirman in the 12th century. The ability to trace genealogical ties to Baluch ancestors is .a source of prestige among Baluch tribes since most tribes have incorporated lineages of non-Baluch. The Rind then can claim descent to one of the most prestigious branches of the Baluch and one that ha·s produced such legendary figures as Mir Chikar Rind (see Chapter Two).

7) Peters observed, for example, that on-going marriage ties with spatially and genealogically more distant sections, maintained out of the need to keep open options due to the possibility of localized drought, can aggravate or reinforce the tense relation ships between segments who are most proximate in blood and space, and who the model says should unite against outsiders (Peters 1967).

8) Pehrson did his work among the Marri in 1954 and 1955, and Swidler did her fieldwork in Sarawan in 1963, 1964, and 1965.

9) Two other anthropological studies that uncover countervailing tendencies toward hierarchy and decentralization are Leach {1965) and Comaroff (1982).

45 '.

CHAPTER TWO

BALUCHNAMA: THE COURSE OF BALUCH HISTORY

When talking about themselves or their ethnic group many of my informants framed or initiated their dialogue with reference to history. One student leader, for example, giving a presentation at a conference at the University of Baluchistan on the. ethnic question in Pakistan: thought it sufficient to describe Baluch history in chronological detail with special emphasis on the oppressive acts perpetrated by the government of

Pakistan. This is not surprising since, as the adage goes, the ability to define the past extends from the power exercised In the present. Handler though has cautioned those writing on issues of nationalism and ethnicity against stepping into this native dis

course or even initiating an analysis with history because such approaches encourage the objectification and reification of diverse individuals and subgroups into "bounded

cultural objects• (Handler 1985:178-80). It is true that this type of dialogue can lead to

the use of such reified or overly general terms as 'the Baluch', 'the Baluch people' or

even 'the Baluch race', indeed ethnic or racial histories can be the source of or con

tribute to demagogy and obscurantism as Tambiah has graphically shown (Tamblah

1980). I am, however, disregarding Handler's advice because it seems to me that a

historical perspective reveals much about the situation in Baluchistan today, and also

because an accurate historical portrait should reveal some of the social divisions and

subgroupings of the Baluch. In fact, considering folk notions of race or ethnicity may

reveal how a group's ethnic identity provides its members with a sort of 'cultural capital'

with which they can promote their Interests.

46 History can be a vortex which sucks one ever deeper into its depths of details, but it is not the purpose of this chapter to reach any definitive historical account of the

Baluch. Its goals are instead 1) to see, however roughly, certain events and structures of life In Baluchistan In historical context, and 2) to examine how Baluch intellectuals see and understand these aspects of their history. As regards the first point, a number of recent anthropological studies have used historical approaches to show the relation between social structures and the events or practices which both constitute and emanate from them (see Comaroff 1985; Sahlins 1981; Rosaldo 1980). Events can transform structures In ways those participating in them do not anticipate or intend.

The dynamics of social structure as well as its transformation are most apparent at times of culture contact (Sahfins 1981 :68; see also Cohn 1987;73). By obseiving move

ment and culture contact through time and place (with the constant provision that much in Baluch history, as in history in general, is tentative and speculative) a better un

derstanding of contemporary Baluch society is possible.

In examining how Baluch present their own history it is useful to consider Cohn's

contention that, though it deals with time and place, anthropological history need not

focus on a place, a category of people (such as a tribe), or even a sequence of events,

but instead can consider the "construction of cultural categories" (Cohn 1987:47). The

aim of this chapter then, is not just to examine the history of the Baluch people, but

also the history of the particular ethnic or national identity with which they defme them

selves. As stated above, this Baluch identity is both cultural and political, and it sub

sumes Brahui identity. As the statements' of Baluch intellectuals, Baluch history is both historical account and Ideological s~tement deseiving critical evaluation. Other than legends or

baUads which present details of particular individuals or events, there are few pre-

;~~- I ,I- 47 "' 1rr· l',;O \ I ,, 1 C'1- ,.. ; t "T] ' \ ·;;., J \.i)d\:1, -- ·.-~ 15~'60 colonial written accounts of Baluch history. The practice of writing of Baluch history as the history of a distinct race 01 nation arose with the development of a salaried and business class in Baluchistan during the early twentieth century. The writings of Baluch historians are then, indirectly and unintentionally, historical accounts of the develop ment of that class as well as its products or seH-assertlons. The history of the people sett-identified as Baluch, like all history, is a contested domain; it informs and is part of a dialogue among those who share Baluch ethnic identity and one with those who do . not. This chapter will dissect several examples of that dialogue.

Through an examination of three topics, Baluch origins, the formation of the

Baluch tribal confederacy centered in Kalal, and the colonial period, this chapter treats

Baluch history both as cause, and as evidence. In it I will look at the work of contem porary and colonial western historians, and at two generations of Baluch historians, the first with Its birth in the colonial era, and the second in that of Pakistan. for each of the three topics I will examine the work of these authors for what It reveals about the past of the Baluch and especially how that past relates or gives rise 'to contemporary Baluch society. Then I will deal with the work of the Baluch intellectuals as evidence, texts which reveal how Baluch define themselves in the post-colonial world.

Although there are a number of historical works written by Baluch and Pakistani intellectuals in Urdu, including several volumes by the Baluch activist-Intellectual Gui

Khan Nasir, for this discussion I have had to rely almost entirely on English language texts. Any confirmation of my analysis in the Urdu texts is another and larger task, and so is anything to be got from a thorough review of Baluch legends and ballads. This is also true of an analysis of the ideological content of western intellectuals' analyses of

Baluch society and history. The present chapter is a beginning.

48 -•.. .c• C :i ii 0 i5c VI :I a: i,i 0 cc C • Q. l!i 0 ::Ii:

49 Baluch Genesis Linguistic evidence indicates that the Baluch are an lndo-European people. Baluchi is a member of the lranlan branch of the lndo-European languages though there is some confusion over its precise classification. Elfenbein, generally recognized as the leading authority of the language, once characterized it as belonging to the eastern branch of those languages (Elfenbein 1959:1006), but more recenUy classified it as a

"northwestern• Iranian language (Elfenbein 1988:635). It is, he says, related to modem

Kurdish, Middle Persian, and Parthlan, and may be a descendent of Median (ibid.).

The archaeology of the lndo-lranians is Inconclusive but they are first In evidence in

Eastern Iran having moved into the area from the north around 1000 B.C. In the mid· ninth century B.C. "Assyrian texts record the existence of the Medes (836 B.C.) In the vicinity of modern Isfahan and the Persians (Parsua) northwest of Kermanshah" (Mal· lory 1989:49).

The scant historical references to people identified as Baluch indicate they were a stateless, tribal people on the margin of Persian states, at times in conflict with them due to their proclivity for raiding and banditry (see Frye 1960:197; Savory_1980:125,

241; Bosworth 1976:14). Spooner observes that the term 'Baluch' •appears to have been a name used by the settled (and especially the urban) population for a number of outiaw tribal groups over a very large area• (Spooner 1988:609). The earliest reference use of the term "Baluch" ls in a Pahlavi1 text of the 8th century which r~fers to the

Baluch·as one of seven autonomous mountain communities Qbid.:606). Arab his torians writing about the Muslim conquest of Persia (circa 650 A.O.) centuries after the event describe the Baluch as inhabiting the mountains of Klrman (south-central Iran) and Seistan (Dames 1904:29; Frye 1954:1005; Brunner 1983:n6). References to the

Ghaznavids centered in what is now eastern Afghanistan, and the Buyyids centered in

50 Shiraz (Fars) Indicate that by 1000 AO. the Baluch were independent of both empires, and the target of their ire (see Busse 1975; Bosworth 1976:15).

At this point In history it appears that the migrations of Turkic nomads from central Asia forced Baluchi-speaking tribes to move to the east. The Seljuq Turks moved from the northern steppes into Khorasan (northeast Iran) where they estab lished an empire in the 11th century. They pressed into Kirman where they pacified

"Baluchl brigands" and established settlements, even in the outlying districts that had been Baluch strongholds (Bosworth 1986:58-9). The prevailing conception of Baluch

history Is that under Seljuq pressure the Baluch moved into Makran which they oc

cupied at the expe,nse of the Indian, perhaps Dravidian-speaking, peoples who were In

habiting the area (Bosworth 1976:10; Frye 1954:1006; 1961:47). On the evidence of

one Arab geographer of the time, al-Muqaddasl, some contend that at the time of the

Seljuq Invasion Baluch already inhabited lands as far east as Panjgur in present:<1ay

Pakistani Baluchistan (Hansmen 1973:568). In either case, the violent and disruptive

Mongol invasion of the 13th century, and/or Increasing competition over grazing lands

with other ethno-lingulstlc groups forced some of them to migrate east and northward

to occupy areas In the Indus valley and the mountains to its west (Gankovsky

1973:146; Baloch 1987:95).

Semitic Origins Other explanations of Baluch origins hold that they were originally a people speaking a

Semitic tongue. The notion that seems to have held sway among Baluch in the

precolonial period, as evident from the oral tradition, was that the Baluch have Arabian

origins. Alternatively some held that the Baluch consist of peoples from a number of dif.

ferent ethnic groups, the "puresr of which have Arabian ancestry. A number of British

colonial scholars, many of whose scholarship was secondary to their bureaucratic or

51 military duties, pursued the idea of the Arabic origins of Baluch tribes .. There are also some more fanciful claims about Baluch origins.

Baluch ballads and legends make frequent reference to a Baluch homeland near

Aleppo, Syria and to their descent from Hamza, the uncle of the holy prophet Muham

mad (in some versions as a product of his union with a fairy since Hamza historically died without male issue) (see Burton 1973:237, Bray 1978:40, Baluch 1984:3). One bal· lad states that the Batuch are the offspring of Hamza and followers of the Holy

Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, Ali. After the martyrdom in 680 A.O. of Ali's son, Hus sein, the Baluch, it says, were persecuted and forced to move from Aleppo to Kirman and Seistan. The ballad traces the movement of the Baluclttribes in later centuries into

Makran (coastal Baluchistan) and, from there, east into the areas of present day Pakis tan which they now inhabit.2

Another more plausible version of Arab origins some Baluch adhere to is that the

Baluch (and Brahui) are of mixed origins, and that some tribes are descended from . . Arabs. Arabs entered areas inhabited by Baluch In the early stages ofthe expansion following Muhammad's death. They extended their presence Into kl;manin 644 A.O.,

Makran in 664 A.O., and Sindh around fifty years later. The areas remained under Arab

control until the Ghaznavid expansion over two-hundred years later (see BOG

Sarawan:24). Some tribes claim to be the descendants of these or later generations of

Arab colonists. For example the former Khan of Kalal, Ahmed Var Khan, claimed that

his tribe, the Ahmectzai, has Arabic origins as a consequence of a migration to Makran from Oman (Baluch 1975:262; see also Baloch 1987:42).

Colonial scholarship on the Baluch was a mixture of unrestrained conjecture and serious scholarship, and some of scholars advanced various versions of the Arabian

52 roots of the Baluch. Bray has captured the flavor of this sometimes wild speculation with his summary of theories about the origins of the Brahui speaking tribes.

They have been classed as Semites because of their display of the tokens of their virginity; Syrian because of their name; Turco-Iranian because of their head-measure ments; Mongolian because of the coloring of their infant buttocks; Scythian because of some of their tribal names; Sumerian because of ancient pottery found in their countiy. (Bray 1978:40} Those scholars who supported the notion of Arabian ancestry for the Baluch drew their conclusions from Baluch traditions and their own observations. Tate, a British civil servant writing at the end of the 19th century, suggested that some subgroupings of the

Baluch and Brahuis, such as the Buledis and Mirwaris, arrived with the Arab conquests

(Tate 1896:8). Other tribes, most notably the Rinds, a major branch of present-day

Baluchi speaking tribes, Tate identified as the descendants of the followers of Ali, who would presumably have arrived In Makran centuries later having followed the course the ballads describe. Mockler, a British civil servant who studied the Baluch and their language, concluded, based on tribal names, that some Baluch tribes were indigenous to the area before the Muslim conquest, but that the Rinds, who claim to have the purest Baluch genealogy are all Arabs from Oman (Mockler 1895:33-9)

In 1862 the British historian George Rawlinson proposed another influential theory that assigns the Baluch Semitic, though not Arabian, origins. He surmised that the source Of name of the Baluch Is either the Babylonian god Bel or their "hero founder", King Befus (Rawlinson n.d.:50). The Babylonian kingdom fell in 538 B.C. to the Persian Cyrus (Sykes 1930:150), and, according to Rawlinson's thesis, the

Babylonians, speakers of a Semitic tongue, were dispersed. Some of them, the

Baluch, were captured and transported or simply migrated to the north where they adapted an fndo-European tongue, but maintained their distinct identity (Baluch

1984:26). Other than this proposed etymology of the name 'Baluch' there appears to

53 be no real historical Of archaeological evidence that would ~upport the thesis. Never theless a number of Baluch historians and political leaders, mostly In the first genera tion of modern Baluch-nationalists, have adopted it.

Baluch Interpretations of Their Origins Several points raised In these versions of Baluch origins are worthy of examination and

Integration into a discussion of Baluch sett-representation. Initially I will discuss the question of Arabian ancestry and then that of why the first Baluch who set out to write

Baluch history were attracted to Rawlinson's thesis. Finally I will discuss current at titudes among Baluch historians and Intellectuals about their origins.

Baluch claims to Arabian origins should, of course, be approached with skep ticism. It is not unusual for people to attempt to Identify with the powerful or the pres tigious and a number of authors have noted the tendency for Muslim groups to fabricate Arabian ancestry (Janmahmad 1982:6; Tate 1896:9). Therefore an effort to

do ~o by powerful tribes or Baluch poets would not be unusual. As history, though, the

oral tradition must account for how or why these presumably Arabic spealdng tribes adopted an In do-European language, or why they converted from being Shl'a, the

branch of Islam which recognizes the descendants of Ali as the true heir to the Holy

Prophet's legacy, to being Sunni which virtually. all contemporary Muslim Baluch are.

While both language and religion are exchangeable, the cost of doing so Is probably

greater than changing a distant genealogy, a more common practice.

The claim to have been followers of Ali would not seem to be an effort at seH-ag

grandizement, since more often than not the Shi'as have been a dissenting minority

and out of power in the Islamic world, though in recent centuries Shi'aism has, of

course, been the sect identified with the Iranian state. The tradition of a Shi'ite past

54 could be seenas a purely pragmatic nod to Iranian authority while upholding the religion which prevailed among the Indian empires to the east.

A less cynical Interpretation is that the ballad reflects a dimension of tribal thought. An Important aspect of Baluch self-definition is ~. the tribal code of honor. This tribal Ideology entails a sense of exclusiveness, an extension of descent from a common ancestor. A similar sense of exclusiveness, a notion of being an elect, has been noted among Shl'as (A. Ahmed 1988:57) due to their loyalty to Ali and Hus sein whom they see as acting on the basis of principle rather than political or economic expediency (Jafrl n.d.:59, 203). Whether or not Shi'a Islam prevailed among some

Baluch tribes is perhaps less important than the values this claim represents, i.e., a stress upon upholding certain principles that are buttressed by select blood ties, in one case from the lmlma to the Prophet Muhammad, and in the other from tribesmen to tribal ancestors.

Another question to be asked Is why the hypothesis of Babylonian (Chaldean) origins of the Baluch was (and continues to be) so attractive to Baluch intellectuals.

This theory of Baluch origins gained currency among what I am calling the first genera tion of Baluch nationalist Intellectuals, men who were involved not only In estabfishing the Baluch nationalist movement, but in establishing the notion of the Baluch as a na tion (see Baluch 1947). This promotion of what amounts to an "invented tradition" ls more than a discovery of an obscure past. It is an attempt to use the past to promote the conception of the Baluch not only as a people, but as a nation deserving Its own state. Hobsbawm notes the invention of tradition is a frequently used construct in modem nation states attempting to legitimize themselves by claiming to be •rooted In the remotest antiquity" and "so natural as to require no definition ottier than self-asser tion• (Hobsbawm 1983:14). The myth of Chaldean origins must be seen as part of

55 such a nationalist project. As lnayataullah Baluch, a historian of the second generation has observed, the belief that the Baluch have Semitic roots and are therefore neither In· dlan nor Iranian, encourages a feeling of separateness and justifies to themselves their status as a distinct nation (I. Baloch 1987:41). Origins in Babylon mean links to an an cient state which buttress Baluch demands for their own state.

Baluch historians of the second generation, those who came of age in Pakistan, tend to discount the notion of Babylonian origins. They identify the Baluch as lndo

European (Janmahmad 1962; Bugti 1984), or as a people of unknown and mixed origins speaking an lndo-European language (Baloch 1987:91-2). I can suggest a num ber of explanations for this shift.

One is that among Western scholars the debates about Baluch origins seem to have been resolved in favor of lndo-European origins. No Western academics are trying to score points by positing alternatives to the linguistic evidence. Those Baluch scholars writing In English probably reflect the greater certainty that conclusion now holds. Another factor is that many Baluch nationalists resisted the lslamizatlon of Pakis tan by the government ol Zia-ul-Haq and some, like the historian Janmahmad, reas

serted secular values by emphasizing the non-Muslim (i.e., Persian and Zoroastrian)

customs of the Baluch. A distancing from Semitic people would coincide with such a tendency. A third factor is the persistence of the state of Pakistan. With the retreat of the Soviets from Afghanistan in the mid-1980s, lingering hopes for an Independent

Baluchistan subsided under the realization that lack of external support for any guerrilla

movement implied Pakistan's continuing dominance In the region. With that realization

perhaps the notion of Baluch genealogical finks to the other lndo-European peoples of

the region became more acceptable. The recognition of those links has not necessari

ly stifled Baluch nationalist aspirations, but it has put them on a different footing. For

56 example the Western-educated historian lnayataullah Baluch has argued that to move beyond racial deflnitlons of the Baluch does not reduce the legitimacy of the claims of

Baluch nationalists, but it makes the basis for their claims more purely political.

The Kalat Khanate and the Baluch Tribal Confederacy The question of the development of a confederacy of Baluch tribes centered in Kalal

(called the Brahui Confederacy by the British), even more than that of Baluch origins, raises issues which concern the historic and current character of Baluch nationalism.

Implied in a discussion of the Kalal Khanate is the relation between the Brahui-speak lng tribes, i.e., those whose territories are located in the core of the confederacy, and the more peripheral Baluchi-speaking ones. Also central to the discourse on Baluch nationalism is the nature of indigenous political structures, particularly the Khanate in relatlon to the tribes, before the British entered the scene. As in the question of Baluch origins, the pi:,ocess of establishing and legitimizing a Baluch natlonalist identlty and political movement has entailed some Baluch intellectuals asserting both the cultural unity of the Baluch and Brahui tribes, and the prior cohesiveness, inclusive scope, and sophistication of the Kalal Khanate. In the discussion of these issues an initial sketch j, I of the eastward and northeastward migrations of the Baluch and the development of the Kalal Khanate will be followed by an analysis of the thinking of some Baluch scholars regarding these events and their significance.

The Pre-history of the Kalat Khanate Several authors have observed that Baluchistan's marginality has been an impor

tant feature its history (Swldler 1969:38; Harrison 1981 :19-20; lspahani 1989:37): The

desert climate and mountainous terrain made long-term occupation by external powers

costly and Impractical just as they made It difficult for the Baluch to overcome tribal

divlslveness.3 Though marginal to the great historical events of the subcontinent,

57 Baluchistan certainly was not entirely isolated from them (Swldler 1969:44). As described, Arabs expanded into the area in the 7th and 8th centuries at the expense of

Hindu dynasties (the Sewas and the Rais). In the beginning of the_11th century they were in tum displaced by the Ghaznavids, the first ofa series of central Asian tribally based empires (that included the Mongols, the Timurids, 4 and the Mughals) that were to exert varying levels of control over the region.

Little is known of the history or -social structure of the Baluchi- or Brahui-speaking tribes during most of this period. They were probably organized into lineages and tribes that could unite in loose alliances for defensive or offensive military operations and that were the prototypes for the tribal federations which began to evolve toward statehood, According to Gankovsky

the formation of the Baluchi feudal nationality began in the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, when tribal unions came and went, some of them settling on the lands they seized from the local population, as the Baluchis dispersed over the territory of the country [sic] bearing their name to this day. [Gankovsky:147-8] Some evidence of such tribal struetures is available from the oral tradition but it seems

Inconclusive. Acc_ording to one legend, 44 tribes emigrated from Kirman to Makran under the leadership of M!r Jalal Khan whose four sons Rind, Lashar, Koral, and Hoat and daughter Jato Bibi became the primogenitors of the major tribal groupings of the eastern Baluch. Baluch historians themselves differ on the dates and significance of

Mir Jalal's existence, however. Some, such as lnayataullah Baloch (Baloch 1987:95) and Muhl!fflmad Sardar Khan Baluch (Baluch 1984:34), assert he lived In the 12th cen tury while another, Khudda Buxsh Baloch, place him in the 14th (Baloch 1985:124).

The former authors place great importance on Mir Jalal Khan, claiming he was the founder of a tribal confederacy centered in Makran that formed the base from which tater Baluch expansions took place.

58 Furl.her eastward migrations into Sindh {13th and 14th centuries) and Punjab

(15th century) took place, and during that time Baluchi-speaking tribes apparently chal lenged Brahul !!peaking tribes for control of the highlands above the Indus and Kach hi plains (see Spooner 1988:609; Khan 1977:63). The Baluchi speakers who pushed their way into these areas are often depicted as under the leadership of Mir Chakar Rind, a historical figure who has acquired mythical dimensions. 5 Oral histories and ballads describe Baluchi- and Brahui-speaking tribes fighting over possession of the highlands and Kachhi with the Baluch initially taking the town of Kalal (circa 1530) and then moving onto the plains. The Baluchi speakers were later expelled from Kalat, and though some Baluch tribes settled in lower Kachhi and others amalgamated with

Srahui tribes, tradition holds that a long and bitter feud in Kachhi between the Baluchi speaking Rind and Lashari tribes led eventually to a dispersal of Baluch tribes into the

Sulaiman Mountains and the Punjab (N. Swidler 1972; Baluch 1984:227; Baloch

1987:97).

The Development of the Kalat Khanate

The history of the Khanate is Intertwined not only with minor Baluch and Afghan tributary prlnclpalltles centered In Qandahar, Sibi, Sindh, and southern Punjab, but also with two major empires, the Persian Safavids and their successor Nadir Shah to the west, and the Mughals of Northern India to the east. The continuity of authority In Kalat under khans from the Ahmedzal section of the Brahui-speaking Qambarani tribe began with the accession of Amir Ahmad in 1666 (Spooner 1988:610). By allying with one or the other of the imperial powers and, later, by taking advantage of the political space created by their declining authority, the Brahul tribes, loosely united under Ahmedzai khans, slowly began to extend their influence into larger and larger areas (Raverty

1976:607).

59 The Mughal and Safavid empires both had their beginnings in the first decades of the 16th century, a period which overlapped with ongoing Baluch migrations into Kach hi and Punjab. Starting from a base in Afghanistan, Sabar, the founder of the Mughal dynasty, captured Delhi in 1526. Babar's grandson, Akbar, enlarged the Mughal domains through conquest and annexation to include the northern two thirds of the In dian subcontinent as well as Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Saluch tribal leaders of the

Punjab acknowledged Akbar's authority at his court in 1586, and he annexed Baluchis tan in 1595 (Roy 1974:151; Saluch 1984:246). The Safavid dynasty was being con solidated at approximately the same time. With his defeat of a Turkish army near Tabriz in 1501, Ismail, the leader of a Sufi movement called the Safavids, took control of Azer baijan, crowned himself Shah, and began to extend his control over the rest of Iran through military means (Savory 1980:24-25). While the Safavid dynasty focused mainly on western Iran, it attempted to exert control over its eastern border too.

Qandahar, the administrative center to which Kalal was generally attached, has

been described as an Alsace region between the Mughals and Safavids (Roy

1974:153). The Safavids seized the area in 1558 and held it until Akbar established his jurisdiction over the region in 1595. In 1650 the Persians again took control of Qan

dahar (Tate 1896:11), though subsequently the Safavids went into decline and the

power of the Mughals under the emperor Aurangzeb {1658-1707) expanded. The

dominance of the Persians sawa brief resurgence with the advent of Nadir Shah (1736-

47) after which Oandahar under the Durrani Afghans, and eventually Kalal under the Ah

medzais established their autonomy from external authority.

In the latter stages of the Mughal dynasty and then during the Persian resur

gence, the Kalat Khanate began to increase its dominion, though historians disagree

about the details and nature of this expansion. By maintaining good relations with the

60 emperor Aurangzeb, Amir Ahmad (1666-95) had the necessary support to expand at the expense of other local dynasties, the Barozai Afghans of Sibi, and the Kalhoras of

Sindh (Baloch 1987:102-3). In the years of the Mughal and Safavid decadence the

holdings of the Khanate Increased under Khan Abdullah Khan (1716-31) to Include

lands outside Its base in Sarawan and Jhalawan. Through raiding AbduUah Khan was

able to unite Baluch tribes and draw into Kalat's sphere of influence Baluch areas as far west as Bandar Abbas, though Raverty characterizes these moves as no more than the stirrings of rebellious Persian subjects (Spooner 1988:611; Baloch 1987:103; Savory

1980:125, 241; Raverty 1976:612). Until this time the Brahui-led tribes failed to occupy the Kacchl plains which the Kalhoras of Sindh controlled (Tate 1898:25). This point Is important because, as Swidler observes, until it could be thoroughly controllad and the transhumant pattern of subsistence practiced by the inhabitants of the Kalat highlands

guaranteed, the consolidation of the Khanate was problematic (N. Swidler 1972: 117).

With the brief revival of Persian power under Nadir Shah (1736-1747), and then the rise

of a Durrani Pushtun empire centered In Qandahar, the Brahui Khans once again had

suzerains with whom allegiance lead to territorial gain. Nadir Shah granted the Kalal

khans rights to Kachhi, and Ahmad Shah, the first of the Durrani kings (1747-73), trans ferrad the right to extract revenues from the'valley of Shal (Ouetta) to them (Tate

1896:27, Caroe 1986:373).

In 1749 Nasir Khan assumed the title of Khan of Kalal. Known as Nasir the Great,

he was responsible for expanding the influence of Kalal to its greatest limits. During the five decades of his rule he extended Kalat's control south over the principality of

Las Bela and the port of Karachi, and east into Kachhi and the southern Punjab. He seems to have held power largely independent of but with the acquiescence of Ahmad

Shah Durrani to whom he had given a cousin in marriage (Dupree 1980:338). With the

61 death of Nasir Khan decay set into the confederacy. Afghans and Sikhs occupied parts of it, and other parts became independent (Gankovsky 1973:151; Baloch

1987:124). It was around this time that the British became interested in the region.

First with spies and later with troops they began to mark out strategic positions in the area.

The Nature of the Kalat Khanate Much of the anthropological work on tribes and tribal states has been done from ecological and evolutionary perspectives. For those approaches, as mentioned,

Baluchistan's marginal environment and its location between major empires are deter mining. The Kalat Khanate fits a pattern Sahlins has observed among nomadic tribal federations which Is that they •are not entirely sui generis but crystallized by external pressures• (Sahlins 1966:45). To say that the Kalat Khanate emerged as a defensive as

Well as an opportunistic reaction to neighboring empires and feudal kingdoms Is not to negate the political and administrative sophistication and military strength required to ' organize and unite the tribes.

Some of the subtle developments which lead to the rise of the Ahmedzal dynasty, though not well documented, can be surmised, and Swidler has done a good job in teasing out some plausible ones. Among them was the importance of maintaining ac cess to, and eventually obtaining control of and extracting tribute from the Kachhl lowlands. A control of multiple ecological zones is often given as one of the conditions for movjng from a decentralized to a centralized political system (Service 1971 :135).

Related to this was the control of a large fighting force as the tribes pledged military support to the Khan. This was not a standing army with which the Khan could exercise extensive control, but one he-could mobilize when needed. The economic dimension of military service ~as also Important, since it provided not only plunder, but land, the

62 key element in a hierarchy of obligation in which "land rights moved down the scale of

superordinance while fighting contingents moved up• (Swidler 1969:47). The Khan's

own wealth was Important too, and along with controlling the most productive lands

(Swldler 1969:169), the Khans initially established an exclusive relationship with the per

manent settled agriculturists of the highlands, the Persian-speaking Oehwars (Swidler

1969:165, BOG Saiawan:69-70). These two factors gave the Khan greater wealth than

the sardars who headed the tribal units that composed the confederacy. Another sig

nificant economic dimension to the Khanate was a regional economic network of trade

and finance generated by caravans and local Hindu merchants (Swldler 1969:179).

The internal structure of the Khanate presented obstacles to its moving toward

greater centralization. Kalal did achieve a degree of economic stratification and the

Khan exerted some control over the economic sphere through a monopoly of the use

of force (Haas 1962:172; Service 1971 :163). Vet the integration of the confederacy was

done largely on a ceremonial and personal level (Swldler 1969:168). Instead of being

institutionalized, the ability to collect revenues or realize the obligation of the sardars to

. provide military forces depended on the Khan's personal standing (Oliver 19n:21). 8

The tribes and their sardars retained a high degree of economic, military, and Judicial in

dependence from the Khan. According to one historian, even during the period of

Nasir Khan the amounts of tribute the Khan could extract from the tribes was low,

reflecting hislack<>f authority (Gankovsky 1971:151f; cl. Baluch 1987). Traders never

became powerful enough to challenge the landed military/political elite represented by

the Khan and his sardars. To have done so might have necessitated greater control

and use of coercive force on the part of the tribal elite in order to maintain 1heir

privileged position, a scenario recently proposed for the transition of chiefdoms to

states (Kipp and Shortmann 1989:375-9).

63 Nationalist Historians View the Khanate Baluch nationalists tend to view the Kalal Khanate as a centralized state and one which was the expression of Baluch nationalism since under Khan Nasir Khan It encom-

passed all Baluch but those of Sindh. They point to Its political and Judicial centraliza tion, the high levels of revenue extraction, and the size of uie mUitary under Nasir Khan.

lnayataullah Baluch characterized Nasir Khan's Kalal as "feudal and federar (Baloch

1987: 115), and he writes that Nasir even systematized the internal workings of the

tribes, giving them the hierarchical structure they now have (ibid.:122; see also Baluch

1984:85). He also puts great emphasis on the degree of autonomy Nasir Khan exer

cised in his relationship with Durrani Afghans (Baloch 1987:105-6).7

Other Baluch downplay the power of the Khanate even under Nasir Khan. Akbar

Bugti, sardar of the Baluchi-speaklng Bugti tribe, Insists that the Brahul khans exerted

little control over the northern tribes, and he has listed over twenty major tribes he says were never part of the confederacy (Bugtl 1984:5). Like descent, from Babylon, the no- lion of a formerly centralized and powerful Kalat provides legitimacy and a natural foun-

dation to the aspirations of autonomy Baluch nationalists hold. Conversely Bugti's

historical analysis fits weU with his own bids for political leadership in Pakistani Baluchis

tan which Is discussed in later chapters.

An element in this debate among Baluch over the nature of the Khanate Is the ten

sion between Brahui- and Baluchi-speaking tribes. A topic that reveals this tension is

the early development of the Khanate and Chakar Khan's capture of Kalal. Historians

from Baluchi-speaking tribes, especially those of the first generation of Baluch

nationalists, have viewed the Baluch occupation in Kalat as being of considerable dura

tion and the role of the Brahui speakers in the region as Insignificant until the late 17th

or early 18th century. Sardar Khan Baluch and Justice Marri Baloch contend the Rind

64 occupation of Kalal lasted decades, and the latter even credits Chakar with estab lishing the foundation of the Kalal Khanate (Baloch 1985:181 ). Justice Marri contends that the Baluch initially took Kalal from Jamotes (Sindhi speakers) not Brahuis, and that it was only in the 18th century that Brahuis speakers under the Ahmedzai tribe achieved prominence there (ibid.:226-30).

On the other hand, Brahui historians assert a longer standing presence of the

Brahui in Kalal. Agha Nasir Khan Ahmedzai, a member of the Khan's family, contends that the Brahui Khanate was formed in 141O by the Mirwari tribe, though he agreed in a personal interview that when Chakar and the Rinds seized Kalal they did so by defeat ing Jamotes who had temporarily displaced the Mirwaris. That there are sharp differen ces between Baluchl and Brahui intellectuals regarding this history is evident by the conclusions each group draws from it. For example, Sardar Khan calls the Brahui op ponents to Baluch rule in Kalal "demons of rebellion• and their period of rule one of "dis aster and disgrace• (Baluch 1984:76, 124), while the Brahui historian Gui Khan Nasir labels Mir Chakar a "dacoit" and claims the Baluch held Kalat for only two years

(quoted In Baloch 1985:228).

British Colonialism In Baluchistan As it had With the Mughals, Baluchistan's marginality defined the relationship between the area and British India. The colonial government's Interests In the region -re strategic, and secondarily economic. As a political officer of the day observed:

But though the general aspect of Baluchistan Is uninviting, the population scanty, and the products few, its situation on our western frontier with command of the principal highways between India, Qandahar, and Persia, and the strong military position of Querta,gives it Immense Importance from political, commercial, and strategic points of view. A strong and friendly Baluchistan is almost as essential to British Indian interests as a strong and friendly Afghanistan. (Thornton 1979:112] Because they proved too difficult to pacify and administer, the British strove to monitor and influence the buffer states of Afghanistan and Persia in order to check the southern

65 advance of the Russian empire into the area (see lspahanl 1989:40). Baluchistan fit

Into the category of territories known as Frontiers of Separation, •unadmlnlstered bor der areas• where "tribal chieftains continued customary forms of government" under the indirect control of the Government of India (Embree 1979:27). These were established as transitional zones between the heart of the empire on the plains and nominally inde pendent Afghanistan and Persia to the west. Although the active presence of the colonial government was to increase in Baluchistan toward the end of the 19th century, their reasons for being there never changed.

The Advent of the British When the British initially became involved in the region, the Khan of Kalal controlled the highlands and the Talpur Batuch ruled Sindh while a number of tribes in the Suleiman

Mountains such as the Marris and Bugtis were in effect Independent For Kalal the first large scale encounter with the British came .in 1839 when the Imperial army moved troops through the Bolan Pass to Qandahar and Kabul in the occupation of Afghanis tan that was to lead to the First Afghan War. The event Illustrates both the Internal

divisions which afflicted the Khanate and the attitude the British were to adopt toward

the Baluch.

The aim of the British in their Afghan campaign was to install Shah Shuja, a con

tender to the Afghan throne, and from the Khan of Kalal they sought two things, accep

tance of vassal status to Shah Shuja as King of Afghanistan and free passage for the

British Indian army. The Khan initially refused, though after the British annexed the

areas along the route to Qandahar (Kachhl, Mastung, and Shal) to Afghanistan, he

agreed in exchange for a large subsidy (Baloch 1987:129-30). As the British army

moved through the Bolan Pass Baluch raiders harassed them, and others attacked and

robbed their envoy to Kalal. The British intercepted letters to various tribes purponedly

66 signed by the Khan Inciting them to rise up against the foreigners.• Once they had secured passage of the major part of their army to Kabul, the British sent a column to

Kalal to punish the Khan for the aggressions against them. He was killed in the action and the colonial government attempted to replace his heir with a distant cousin who ac knowledged their authority. When that move met with continuing opposition they aban doned their protege, recognized the dead Khan's son, returned the districts which had been ceded to Afghanistan, and established treaties under which the Khanate held the status of an independent though subordinate ally.

Shortly after this, in 1843, the British defeated armies of the Talpur dynasty In

Sindh, and assumed direct control over that region. They now had an immediate bor der with Baluchistan and began to exert pressure on the independent tribes to stop raiding settlements and caravans (Swidler 1969:49). With the succession of Khudadad

Khan to the throne In 1858 conditions in Kalal began to deteriorate however. His at tempts at Increasing his authority with British backing at the expense of his sardars caused rebelUon, civil war and •anarchy" (Baloch 1985:224, Baloch 1987:135, Thornton

1979:62).

Unlike Southern Africa where three important social groups, the bureaucracy, set tlers, and missionaries, competed In the colonial process (Comaroff 1989), the colonial subjugation of Baluchistan was carried out almost exclusively by the first of these (see

Smith 1983:78). Within the bureaucracy however there was a long-running debate about the appropriate borders and frontiers of the empire (see Yapp 1980:478, 492-3).

The debat& reflected different conceptions of the structure of Baluch society, different approaches on how to deal with the Russian empire (which by 1866 had begun to move southward and absorb the khanates of Central Asia), and at times competition be tween administrative units over turf and spheres of influence. The two positions in the debate were known as the Close Borders System and the Forward Policy. The former advocated holding a defensive position along the im mediate boundaries of the empire i.e., the Indus River (ibid.:481; Awan 1985:95). This approach catted for restraint in military penetration of tribal territories beyond those bor ders, and therefore implied bolstering the Khan of Kalat so he could police his subjects and prevent the raiding of Sindh (ibid.:151, Embree 1979:39). The Forward Policy called for extending the British presence further west to secure more advanced defen sive positions. Versions of the Forward Policy at various stages in the grow1h of the empire advocated the Amu Darya (Oxus River), the Hindu Kush Mountains or eastern

Afghanistan as the most suitable line of defense. Along with penetrating and con centrating forces in the tribal areas the Forward Policy called for autonomy and self government for the tribes, though under British patronage of tribal leaders (Caroe

1986:376).

In the face of continuing unrest in the region throughout the 1860s and '70s, sharp exchanges took place between administrators In Sindh and Punjab over the status of Baluchistan. The senior administrators from Bombay and Sindh who had been responsible for dealing with the region since the early years of contact with Kalal advocated a position in line with the Close Border System. Conversely Captain Robert

Sande man, a deputy commissioner In the Punjab frontier responsible for dealing with

Baluch tribes, saw the Khan not as a "despotic Prince• but as a "constitutional one, having with his position Inherited certain responsibilities towards his sardars• (Khelat Af fairs 19n:178). Along with advocating direct dealings and subsidies for the sardars while maintaining the preeminence of the Khan, Sandeman and others urged stationing troops above the Bolan Pass {Thornton 1979:53-9).

68 Ultimately Sandeman prevailed in the bureaucratic arena and was given the op portunity to mediate between the Khan and his sardars to end the state of civil war.

Sandeman also received authority to negotiate a new treaty between the colonial government on the one hand and the Khan and his sardars on the other. The treaty, signed in 1876, reaffirmed the status of the Khan as a leader of an independent and subordinate allied state, allowed the British to station troops in Baluchistan, and gave them final say In disputes between the Khan and his sardars. As a result of the new relationship, new administrative procedures developed which increased the authority of the sardars. They received annual subsides contingent upon their "loyalty and coopera tion with the Khan• (Swldler 1969:52). A portion of that money was to be used for the maintenance of armed levies under the orders of the sardars and local colonial political officers with which the sardars were expected to police their territories. In addition the colonial administration established JJrgasor tribal councils. Appointed by the British authorities and headed by the sardar, the JJrgassettled local disputes subject to ap proval by the colonial officers (Swidler 1969:52-4; Baloch 1967:140-1).

A further effect of empire's intrusion was to legally specify the partition of

Baluchistan into a number of poHtical and administrative units. As part of the new treaty arrangements, the British leased the district of Quella and certain other territories from Kalal. Under the terms of the 1679 Treaty of Gandamak which terminated the second Anglo-Afghan war, the government of Afghanistan ceded several districts to

British India. They were located to the north and east of Ouetta and inhabited mainly by Pushtuns. The leased and ceded districts were consolidated, along with the Marri

Bugti tribal areas, into a single administrative unit known as British Baluchistan (Holdich

1909:48-9). The British ruled this area directly while the Khan's government held sway in the remainder, known as the Kalat States Union.9 Although nominally independent

69 the States Union came increasingly under British control. The colonial government

paid subsidies to the sardars within the States Union, maintained a polilical agent in

Kalat, and in 1892 engineered the replacement of the Khan with his son who was more

pliable and amenable to British influence (Baloch 1985:310). The Baluch of Sindh con

tinued to be part of the Bombay division and those settled along the Indus further north

were part of the Punjab. In 1871 the Goldsmid Mission surveyed the exlstlng boundary

with Iran, thus officially creating a major division of ethnically Baluch territory. In 1895

another division was formalized when the Ourrand Line, which still demarcates Al·

ghanistan and Pakistan, was established.

The Emergence of Baluch Nationalism As suggested at the beginning of the chapter a salariat/middle class, Baluch

nationalism, and a Baluch historiography all developed under British indirect rule of

Baluchistan and were a function of the limited development which took place in the

region during that time. The colonial government's economic interests in the region

were restricted to monitoring trade with Iran and Afghanistan, and the extraction of

some minerals, namely coal and chromite. They constructed roads and railways main

ly for strategic purposes and developed agriculture to supply the cantonment at Ouetta

(see lspahani:47-8). The effects of the British presence were primarilyfelt in the north~

em and eastern parts of Baluchistan which were linked to the heart of India on the one

hand and the Afghan frontier on the other. There were few Baluch merchants or

entrepreneurs present to benefit from these construction projects or the trade which

supplied the garrison. Hindus, mainly from Sindh or Punjab had long controlled the trade of the region, and most of the civil servants working in Baluchistan were also from

other parts of India (Ahmad 1975a:25). Because much of the development in Baluchis-

70 tan took place In Pushtun areas they were better positioned to take part in the ac

tMtles, such as transport, that spun off the British presence.

Gradually, In the first decades of the 20th century, with the development of a few

schools in Quella and more opportunities to engage in business or find employment in

the bureaucracies of the region, a salariat and business class self-identified as Baluch

began to develop. Some of the politically active individuals associated with this class

participatad In the Soviet sponsored Congress of the Peoples of the East held in Baku

In 1920. Others, lead by such men as Abdul Aziz Kurd, son of a civil servant of Kalal

. State, and Yosuf Ali Magassl, son of the sardar of the Magassi tribe, formed the

Anjuman-e-ltehAd Baluchistan (The Society for the Unity of Baluchistan) which pursued

a reformist path to constitutional change and an independent Baluchistan. In a 1932

conference the Anjuman passed resolutions requesting the Baluch of all areas of India

be unHed In a single province, customary tribal law tie modernized and lslamicized, and

that steps be taken to raise the level of education among the Baluch (Baloch 1987:149-

54). While their demands were restricted to the confines of the colonial empire their '

vision encompassed all Baluch. They saw the failure of the Baluch as lying in the dis

unHy of their ancestors and their salvation in the unification of all Baluch In a "Greater

Baluchistan• (see Baluch 1947:165, 181).

In the mid 1930s a section of the Anjuman formed the Kalal State National Party.

The party and Hssupporters consisted "primarily of employees of the state" (Baloch

1980:14). Because the National Party's vision of a united Baluch nation implied a

strong central government they tended to support the Khan, as opposed to the sardars

whose auton~y they parcelved as diffusive. The Khan in tum supported the National

Party and this relationship continued until their attack on the privileges of the sardars

provoked a counterattack. The sardars appealed to the Khan to restrict the activities of

71 the National Party. Caught between two means of legitimizing his authority, the Khan

choose the tribal over the national, and in 1939 declared the National Party illegal in

Kalal State. The leadership was exiled though they re-estabtished themselves in Quet ta and continued to organize (Baloch 1987:156).

With the dismantling of Britain's Indian empire the various administrative units with _Baluchinhabitants held several options for their political future. The demand of the All India Muslim League for a creation of a separate Muslim state did not meet

strong support among most Baluch. An observer at the time wrote that little had even

been heard of it outside of Quetta, Baluchistan's only urban center, and its primary sup

porters in the region were Pushtuns (Baluch 1947:142, 145; see also Baloch 1987:159).

On August 15, 1947, the day after the partition of India, the Khan of Kalal declared the

Kalal States Union an independent state. Under the terms of its constitution the new

state established a legislature consisting of an upper house of tribal chiefs and a lower

house of elected members. In the elections for the lower house of Parliament the Na tional Party won 39 of 51 seats. Both houses opposed Joining Pakistan and the upper ,

house unanimously passed a resolution which stated "This ho1,1seis notwilling to ac- .'

cept merger with Pakistan which will endanger the separate existence of the Baluch na

tion• (Baloch 1980:21 ).

An independent Baluchistan did not prove viable. The Khan attempted to

negotiate a treaty with the government of Pakistan which would have guaranteed

Baluchistan a degree of autonomy within the new state but the government negotiators

demanded unconditional accession. The government of Pakistan upped the pressure

on Kalat by entering into separate negotiations with the feudatorles and. provinces that

made up the union. Pakistan recognized Las Bela, Kharan, and Makran as inde

pendent states, and the rulers of these states then acceded to Pakistan. When Pakis-

n tanl officials began approaching the sardars of Sarawan with similar offers, the Khan capitulated and joined Jinnah's Pakistan.

Baluch Interpretations of the Impact of Colonialism A point which constantly arises In Baluch historiography is the degree to which loose in corporation in the colonial empire altered Baluch tribal structures. Most Baluch intellectuals assert that the colonial authorities weakened the Khan at the expense of the sardars, and increased the authority of the sardars over their tribesmen (Baloch l 1985:299; Baluch 1980:58-60; Baloch 1987:141; AM Bugti 1976a:30, 1976b:9). They contend that whereas previously the Khan, as well as the sardars, attained office through "election• according to tribal custom, under the British these positions became

"feudal" and hereditary (see Baluch 1980). In addition they claim that through subsidies and the ultimate power of dismissal the colonial government turned the sardars into their "allied mercenaries• (Ahmad 1975a:23). The sardars, with the blessing of the colonial government, began to exert personal control over previously communal lands and to Impose new types of taxes. In addition armed levies and jails under the control of the sardars gave them a physical presence they did not have prior to _thecolonial period.

Most of the Intellectuals represented above could be classified as members of the salarlat and ideologically as Baluch nationalists. These statements are part of a political discourse associated with versions of Baluch nationalism that call for the aboli tion of the •sardari" or tribal system. Raised initially by Baluch nationalists, this demand was picked up as a political tool by non-Baluch In the political battles of the 1970s (see

Awan 1985:292). The historical understanding which grounded this discourse and these demands is In part •an attempt to read the present in terms of the past by writing the past in terms of the present" (Hanson 1989:890). The notion that underlies this

73 demand is that during the colonial era the sardars evolved into a retrogressive feudal force opposed to social or economic development for the Baluch people because such development would threaten their expanded authority.

In the colonial period ..the ~ who was popular and respected within the tribe but who had incurred displeasure from the govemment [sic] could be removed from office by the latter. On the other hand, the oppressive and cruel ones bacame flatterers and time-servers for the government officials. Today, all the~ with the exception of two or three, are watchdogs for the exclusive interests of the Punjabi government. These are the servants of the enemies of the Baluch people, working to undermine the nation from the inside. That is why the abolition of the Sacdadsystem has long been a prime objective of the Baluch national programme. [Baluch 1980:61] This Is not the only conception of sardars current among Baluch. Sardars have their own voice and their own supporters. In fact much of the political drama and dialogue in Baluch society takes place under the sponsorship of sardars who adopt various political positions, Including opposition to the "sardart• system. A case in point Is the

National Awaml Party government of 1.972-3(see below, Chapter Seven), the leaders of which were or had close connections to sardars. That government attempted to end such aspects of the .uu!a[i system as government subsidies and the gs (Ahmad

1973a:38, 1973b:54).

Conclusion

In the modern period the subject as well as the setting· of history is the (actual or en visioned) nation-state. For the Baluch to conceive of themselves as a nation Involved what Guha has termed In the context of peasant uprisings In colonial India a negative consciousness (Guha 1983). By this he means that rather than having an Internally or organically constructed conception of themselves as a class, or in this case, a nation, they initially defined themselves relative to those who dominated them. Some Baluch may have held the conception of themselves as a nation before the colonial era,

74 though that notion was still undeveloped, and ultimately weaker than local and tribal in terests.

This negative nationalism denied the legitimacy of colonial domination but at the same time accepted and attempted to appropriate for itself the categories and Institu tions which estabfished that relationship. A:$ anti-colonial nationalists strove to create their own state, they looked to their cultural heritage for inspiration or models which would differentiate them from the colonial powers and be more just and more ap propriate for local conditions. Yet, even though nationalism entails a •myth of historical renovation•, I.e., a rediscovering of the communal past for the purpose of creating the future, It also entails a negation of that past, for something must have gone wrong to lead the people to their present situation or leave them in it (Smith 1983:22, 66-7). So for nationalists in the colonial context there Is a simultaneous negation and appropria tion of two inescapable others • the colonizer and the past.

By attempting to become participants In the world of nation-states, anti-colonial political leaders and intellectuals accepted the premises and institutions upon which na tions and their states are built (Chatterjee 1986:48-51 ). They could challenge the colonial discourse on nationalism, as it affected them, in terms of Its truth, consistency, or morafity, but they could not transcend that discourse and remain nationalists them selves. They were also in part stuck with the definitions and categorizations of their society which had been formed In the period of colonial control and social transforma tion. Along with such categories as "tribe", "chier, and "custom" Baluch history came to

Baluch intellectuals via colonialism (Dirks 1989).10 As I have shown Baluch intellectuals hav8 challenged some those Ideas and adapted others to their own agendas.

75 NOTES

1) Pahlavi is a dead Iranian language.

2) This ballad was first recorded by the British civil servant and Baluchi scholar, M.L Dames (Dames 1989:1-3), and has been identified by Justice Khudda Buxsh Baloch as one which "up to the 19th century was universally learnt by heart by Baluchi speaking tribes without much textual variation" (Baloch 1985:53).

3) In this respect the Baluch are reminiscent of Gibbon's observation concerning the Romans and the Scots. "The native Caledonians preserved, in the northern extremity of the island, their wild independence, for which they were not less indebted to their poverty than to their valour" (Gibbon 1946:4).

4) The Timurids were the ruling house that descended from Tamerlane, himself sup· posedly the descendent of Chengiz Khan. ·

5) Raverty, a colonial authority on the region, contends, however, that Baluch had been In the Punjab one-hundred years before "'the mighty Chakar Rind' was heard of" (Raver ty 1978:561, see also 583f).

6) lnayataullah Baloch asserts that Nasir Khan had a "peacetime army" of around 12,500 (Baloch 1987: 119) though the colonial officer Robert Sandeman observed thiat other than •a few armed retainers• his successors did not have "any troops worthy of the name• (Khelat Affairs 19n:178).

7) Baloch suggest that there is an ideological content to British historians' assessment of the relationship be.tween Kalal and the Durranls. He says that though the earliest British observers on the scene (Pottinger was in Baluchistan less than 20 years after the death of Nasir Khan) depicted the Baluch as independent, later when the British entered into treaty relations with the Afghan kings, historians tended to characterize the Baluch as vassals to the Durrani (Baloch 1987:110).) The Khan at this time was Mehrab Khan, Nasir the Great's grandson.

B)These letters later turned out to be forgeries made by a Machiavellian minister in the Khan's government.

9) The core of the States Union was Sarawan and Jhalawan with the coastal Makran area considered a province of Jhalawan. It also included Kharan and Las Bela which had been largely independent prior to the expansion of Kalal in the mid-18th century and which again became so with the weakening of Kalat's power during the unrest of the 19th century (see BOG Kharan:33-35, BOG Las Bela:26). Their status in Kalal was debated with the British considering them feudatories of Kalal, and the Khan consider· ing them provinces of Sarawan and Jhalawan respectively.

10) This is evident from the fact that, as the Baluch historian lnayataullah BalUch says, very little was written on Baluch history before the colonial era (Baloch 1987:114).

76 It was a particular historiography and the colonial interpretation of Baluch history, not history itself which Baluch nationalists inherited. As I have shown, pre-colonial ac counts of their history were found mostly in the ballads and poetry which continue to be an important in Baluch cultural life.

n CHAPTER THREE

IN THE LAND OF THE PURE: BALUCH IN THE POST-COLONIAL STATE

In an article on anthropological approaches to macro and micro levels of analysis Ben nett observes that while the "transition from medieval to modern• in Europe entailed the submission of feudal nobilities to states, in Africa and Asia that process involved "the conquest of tribal and vi!'a;ie solidarity and autonomy by the militarized post-colonial state•, He goes on to observe that this can be a difficult process since tribes and com munities "remain more persuasive frames of identity than shifting, and often untrustwor thy national governments• (Bennett 1985:38), He does not mention that while it is true that in some cases people resist Incorporation into these post-colonial states, the alter native identities and programs they call upon are not likely to be tribal or community based In an unchanged way, They may, for example, display elements of tribalism, but they may also take the form of pan-tribal or even anti-tribal movements which attempt to unify people on some more inclusive basis.

In other words, a state's attempts to consolidate itself by controlling its con stituent peoples and reducing their autonomy may shape Its own opposition. It is, how ever, also the case that resistance on the part of those a state seeks to absorb may in turn affect the policies and even the structure of that state (Smith 1985:94), In order to fully understand how such a dialectical relationship might work it would be necessary to view the process of state formation and consolidation from a number of levels all of which are the setting for competition between various interest groups and classes,

Local, provincial, and national dynamics all effect the shape a state will take, as will

78 such Inclusive relationships as regional and global political alliances and economic sys tems. This seems obvious and is frequently pointed out by Baluchistanis.

One of the Issues about which those who theorize about states differ is the extent

to which the state Institutions are essentially Instruments of the dominant classes in a

society and the extent to which they are autonomous entities with their own interests

and agendas. Those who argue strongly from the former position contend the state

creates through its administrative, Ideological, and repressive apparatuses the condi

tions necessary for perpetuating existing relations of production (Carnoy 1984:110-1,

213). Those arguing the state Is largely autonomous point out th11tthough the state

must suslllln the accumulation process, its Interests do not directly coincide with those

of any clus and it may at times act against the capitalist clus (e.g., through

nationalization of ln9ustry) or some fractions of it (Carnoy 1984:133-4; Rueschemeyer

and Ewns 1985:44). For the purposes of this chapter, I will emphuize the id&lls of

those who treat the slllte as relatively autonomous. 1

Advocates of this position frequently take MllX Weber's work on the state as their

slllrtlng point, and they advocate dealing with specific contemporary and historical

cases rather than dealing abstractly with the state, capitalism, or cluses. In her review

of current research Skocpol discusses two strategies for analyzing the state. One is to

look at sllltes as actors and to concentrate on the specific ways they, as collectlvities of

officials in a partlcular social context, mobilize resources to establish and oblllin their

aims. The second Is to view sllltes •more macroscopically as configurations of or

ganizations and action that Influence the meanings and methods of politics for all

groups and classes In society" (Skocpol 1985:28). In regards to this latter approach

Corrigan and Sayer go beyond the political sphere to look at the institutions and ac-

79 tivities of states as cultural forms which regulate their citizens' social identities and "sub· jectivities· (Corrigan and Sayer 1965:2).

In thiS chapter I will look at Pakistan briefly in both of these ways. Because

Weber's definition of the state highlights the features of the state·I wish to examine I will

use it as a starting point for a discussion of the specific institutions and groups that con

stitute the Pakistani stair: Then I will discuss how, in its drive toward consolidation,

Pakistan has attempted to estab.lish a national culture and identity. 2 The economic,

political, and cultural Impact of Pakistan on Baluch social structure and ideology is the

major theme of this w'Jrk, and while I will sketch out some of them in this chapter, I wl11

provide more detailed illustrations in subsequent ones.

The three essential characteristics of the state according to WebeJ are 1) that it

possesses an administrative and legal apparatus with Its own staff; 2) these institutions

of administration are territorially defined i.e., they have jurisdiction over all that takes

place within cert.sin borders; and 3) It reserves for Itself a monopoly over the legitimate

use of force within society (Weber 1947:156). I will apply each of these criteria to Pakis

tan in .order to examine how the state has developed there. Firstly I provide a brief his

tory of Pakistan with special emphasis on the role the administrative institutions have

played in the consolidation (or lack of consolidation) of the state. Secondly I examine

Pakistan• a territorial entity with emphasis on the peripheral status of Baluchistan.

Thirdly I provide a description of Pakistan's military particularly as it has eff~ed

Baluchistanis. Finally I examine the development of Pakistani and Baluch nationalism.

An Intrusive Bureaucracy As Bennett and many others have observed, the processes and end-products of state

formation In the former colonies of the European powers have been different than

those which led to the European nation-states (see for example Giddens 1985:267-276;

80 B. Anderson 1983:Ch. 7; Migdal 1966). Despite existing in a complex of nation-states as legitimate, sovereign entities, the post-colonial states have largely failed to attain the major achievements of the Western European states which have for the most part and until recently been their model.3 That is, as a result of indigenous, colonial, and post· colonial factors, they have failed to achieve economic development, liberal democracy, and, in many cases, internal political legitimacy and national integration.

Pakistan's First Decade While administrative institutions and exclusive control cf the legitimate apparatuses of coercion developed organically (though not without struggle) in the European states, in the post-colonial states they were the imposed instruments of colonial rule. They developed as an aspect of the practices through which colonial powers first subdued, then ruled and strove to deny independence to their subject peoples. This meant that in many cases, Including that of Pakistan, once Independence was achieved the civil bureaucracy and the military were the most developed and powerful features In the· society, but also that they tended to be externally oriented (Alavi 1983:42).4 Kennedy concisely sums i.lP the implications of this fact for Pakistan.

Pakistan inherited a politlcal system from Britain which was crafted to suit the needs of a colonial power, i.e., its overriding concern was to rule a subject people. As a consequence, a primary tool to effect this control, the administrative system inherited by the new state, demonstrated highly complex patterns of organization, well-estab lished fomls of socialization of its members, and a remarkable degree of institutional autonomy. Countervailing Institutions, particularly those responsible for ensuring governmental responsiveness to the demands of the public • legislatures, interest groups, local governments • existed in only an attenuated form. This developmental gap has persisted since Partition [Kennedy 1987:185]. While both the bureaucracy and the military of Pakistan were severely weakened at ln· dependence in 1947, they were quickly able to regenerate themselves given the need establish order-in the chaotic aftermath of Partition, and the perceived need to stand tough against India, especially in the dispute over Kashmir (Jalal 1990:44-63).

81 As other observers note, however, the power and extent of these institutions of the state have been counteracted by the legacy of another colonial practice, namely in direct rule through local power figures (Noman 1988:200). Uke filling the lower ranks of the imperial bureaucracy with Indians, the colonial practice of strengthening, and in some cases creating, local power figures (such as landlords, tribal chiefs, or even the heads of •states; to act as functionaries and intermediaries extended from the prag matics of running a large and diverse empire, and from the British policy of making

Colonial subjects as much as possible pay for their colonization. In Pakistan, as in other post-colonial states, the colonial practice of creating rural and urban 'strongmen' resulted in a social structure which, while not threatening the existence of the succes sor state, has prevented its effective or thorough national consolidation (Migdal

1988:227).

The role of the ,bureaucracy in national consolidation has been tied to two central issues in Pakistan: its relationship to the political institutions of the country, and its ac cessibility to the ethnic and regional subgroups which make up its citizenry. In regards to the first point, as noted, especially in the country's first two decades the administra tive bureaucracy was the most powerful actor on the national scene. Understaffed and faced with the large-scale problems of establishing a state the civil service reorganized itself as a national cadre as opposed to a collection of provincial ones as it was in the colonial era (Ali 1967:357). It retained however the essential eiements of the colonial bureaucratic structure by reserving all key bureaucratic posts at the center and In the provincial governments for a selected elite, members of the CivilService of Pakistan

(CSP) (Alavi 1983:73). While In theory the bureaucracy operated on a ministerial sys tem in which politically appointed ministers were superior to the secretaries heading each section of the administration, the lines of authority in fact ran in the opposite direc-

82 tion The structure amounted to a perpetuation of the "vice regal" colonial system in which the bureaucracy held legislative, executive, and judicial power Independent of political control (Kennedy 1987:12,47; Alavi 1983:75; LaPorte 1975:45).

One of the reasons for the dominant standing ol the bureaucracy was the polltl· cal vacuum in the new state. Jinnah, the Quaid-e-Azam who had directed the struggle for a separate Muslim state, opted for the powerful post of Governor-General which stood above politics in Patdstan. He was in any case extremely ill by that time and died a year after Independence. Technically political power in the new state was in the hands of a Constituent Assembly established before Partition which had the dual responsibility of legislating for the new state and establishing its constitution (Wolpert

1984:337).5 The Muslim League, the vehicle for the creation of Pakistan, was the largest party In~ constituent Assembly. It was, however, split both along regional lines and into factions supporting the various landlords who sought to control it

(Sayeed 1980:33-6; All 1967:367). As a result a series of weak and temporary govem- ments rose and fell In Pakistan's first decade.

Internal divisions were one cause of the weakness of the poUtical process in

Paldstan but equally importan\ was the development of a powerful, centralized bureaucracy. WhRe increasing its ·ability to deal with the economy and law enforce· ment, the central administration also undermined and eventually discredited the Muslim

League, the only party with the potential to link the center with all levels of society (Jalal

1990:101).

Far from enabling [the] government to keep a better grip on the affairs of state, the decision to stretch administrative capacities In order to intervene more decisively at all levels of society assumed a momentum which soon led to the erosion of political authority. (Jalal 1990:67)

83 Besides empowering a class of bureaucrats, administrative centralization without politi cal direction worked to the benefit of the military and a group of powerful landed, mer chant, and industrial families in Punjab and Karachi.

Administrative centralization was attained by taking over much of the authority provincial governments held in the colonial framework, and the question of provincial rights became intertwined with the issue of political representation. The impulse toward centralization clashed with the reality of Pakistan in which provinces are ethno, regions accustomed to considerable autonomy. The difficulty lay in the historical and demographic factors that created a situation in which Punjabis and to a lesser degree immigrants from India (Mohajirs) overwhelmingly stalled the upper levels of Pakistan's bureaucracy and military while the majority of its population was In ethnically distinct

Bengal. Relatively developed under the British, Punjab was an important source for

manning the colonial bureaucracy, just as it was a favorite recruiting ground of the

colonial army. On the other hand, in Bengal Hindus, not Muslims, had predominated in the colonial civil service and therefore few members of the newly established CSP were

Bengali. While efforts were early made to aajust this balance, the process was at best

designed to be a gradual one (Ali 1967:363).

The question of the division of power between the center and the provinces was

one Of the sticking points Which prevented the Constituent Assembly from completing

Pakistan's first constitution until 1956 (Hussain 1979:115-117; Noman 1988:9-11). A

constitution which insured political democracy would potentially have had the dual ef

fect of subordinating the bureaucracy to elected representatives and of diverting politi

cal control away from the Punjab to the Bengali east. When a constitution was finally

produced it provided for a powerful center that controlled much of the revenue of the

provinces, had the authority to direct how provincial governments administered them-

84 seives, and could call upon sweeping powers to suspend all political processes in the

provinces indefinitely in times of emergency (Jalal 1990: 218-21).

To counter-act what they perceived as Punjabi-Mohajir domination Bengali

politicians repeatedly attempted to align with the non-Punjabi ethnic groups in west

Pakistan, and in order to contravene the possibility of such an alliance the Governor

General (himself a member of the CSP) implemented, with the eventual compliance of

the Constituent Assembly, the 'One Unit Plan' in 1955 (Alavi 1983:81). Incorporated

into the constitution the following year, One Unit merged all the provinces of west Pakis

tan, and established representative parity between It and the Bengali east (LaPorte

1975:50). The consolidation in the west reduced the autonomy of the smaller provin

ces there and as a consequence their political opposition to One Unit and to the center

grew.

An outgrowth of opposition to One Unit was the creation of the National Awami

Party (NAP). The NAP was a coalition of leftist and regional parties which included Us

taman GAi, a Baluch nationalist party led by Prince Karim, the brother of the Khan of

Kalal, as well as parties from Sindh, NWFP, and East Pakistan. The NAP would be

come the vehicle of the Baluch ethnic-nationalist movement in the 1950s, 'SOS,and '70S

(see Chapter Seven).

A MIiitary-bureaucratic Oligarchy In late 1958, six months before the scheQuled elections that the riewconstitution re-

quired, and apparently because they felt such elections would lead to the political as

cendancy of Bengali ethnic-nationalists in alliance with other classes and regional

elites, the leadership of the civil service asked the milltary to take ovet the government

(Jahan 1972:53; see also Sayeed 1980:45-6; Noman 1988:15).8 After some Jockeying

for position, General Ayub Khan, the Chief of Staff of the military assumed control of the

85 country as President under martial law. The government banned all political parties

and seized their financial assets. It especially targeted the NAP, arresting all its nation

al and provincial leaders and charging them with "subversive and anti-state activities•

{Afsal 1987:11 ). Outright marital law was replaced In 1962 with a new constitution, an extremely limited form of democracy, and the unbanning of political parties, though

Sayeed has labeled the whole of Ayub's rule {he resigned from the presidency in 1969)

a "military-bureaucratic oligarchy" {Sayeed 1980:28).

The Ayub government's policy of promoting economic growth through functional

inequality caused class and regional disparities to increase in the 1960s {Sayeed

1980:76; Noman 1988:35). The concentration of wealth in the hands of a small group

of industrial families, high inflation, and war with India led to widespread demonstra tions in Pakistan's cities by students and workers, and ultimately to Ayub's resignation

{Jalal 1990:30?·8). The new President, General Yahya Khan, succumbed to popular

pressure for the abolition of One Unit and the holding of elections. The elections took

place in 1970 and are generally recognized as the first elections in the country's history

untainted by restriction or manipulation. Yahya balked at acting on their results; how

ever, since they showed a sharp split between East and West Pakistan. The Awami

Party took all but two seats in East Pakistan and held an outright majority in the Nation

al Assembly; the Pakistan People's Party {PPP) swept Punjab and Sindh; and the NAP was in a strong position in NWFP and Baluchistan. Seating the Awami League would

not only have given political authority to Bengali politicians, it would in all fikelihood

have led to a restructuring of Pakistan since the League's election manifesto called for

a confederation of the provinces 1,mdera weaker central government.

86 Bhutto's Populism Failur.e to act on the results of the election led, of course; to the dismemberment of

Pakistan, and, In 1972, the advent of the PPP government under Zulfikar Bhutto. Bhut· to and his People's Party were the first manifestation of representative political authority

In Pakistan. With slogans calling for "rOjj kapra aur makAn·(bread, clothing, and homes) and Islamic socialism, and with the military discredited by its years of political interference .and its loss of the Eastern half of the country, Bhutto assumed power with considerable popular support and a mandate to restructure Pakistan which he proceeded to do. Along with implementing moderate land reforms, the nationalization of some Industries and banks, and the drafting of a new constitution, Bhutto attempted to curtail the power of the elite leadership of the civil bureaucracy. Under his orders the government dismissed over one thousand individuals from Its ranks on charges of af filiation with prior regimes or corruption; it dissolved the CSP and disbursed its mem bers to various departments; and It opened the bureaucracy to lateral entry by people from other fields (Noman 1988:61; Kennedy 1987:105-6).

As many observers have noted however, Bhutto's program was designed less to fundamentally alter the structure of the state than to Increase his personal lnffuence

(Sayeed 1980:97; see also Ahmad 1983:116; Hussain 1988:378). H.e maintained a

strong central government and the basic design of the bureaucracy remained as It had

(Kennedy 1987:106). Indeed, despite his efforts at exerting personal and political con trol over It, Bhutto's program of nationalizations in fact increased the power and extent of the bureaucracy.

Regarding relations between the central government and Baluchistan, the most

Important development In the period of the PPP government was the appointment of a

NAP-led government in the province and its subsequent dismissal. In the 1970 elec-

87 tions the NAP took three of the four national assembly seats in Baluchistan and eight of

20 provincial assembly seats. In the Pushtun areas of the province, the Jamiat-ul

Ulema-e-lslam (JUI), a religious political party (see Chapter Seven), won two provincial

assembly seats (Awan 1985:254). A NAP-JUI coalition led by the nationalists took con trol of Baluchistan's provincial government, and a coalition of the same parties was

also seated in the NWFP.

The NAP-led governments were short lived however, and as a result many Baluch

nationalists turned from electoral to armed political opposition to the central govern ment. Despite a new constitution which guaranteed some provincial autonomy, Bhutto

dismissed Baluchistan's NAP government in 1973 on charges that it permitted and en

couraged lawlessness, and the NAP government in the NWFP resigned in protest.

Eventually the government arrested the leadership of the NAP, an action that prompted

an armed insurgency against the government. 7 The army deployed as many as 80,000

soldiers against the poorly-armed rebels (Harrison 1987:274) and used standard

counter-insurgency techniques including the oppression and resettlement of the civilian

population upon which they depended (Shad 1987:2n; Ali 1983:119-21). The fighting

continued sporadically throughout Bhutto's term of office, and only ended when Zia's

marital law regime freed the NAP leadership at the end of 19n.

Zia's Marital Rule The military under Chief-of-Staff General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq seized control of the

government following months of demonstrations protesting the rigging of the 19n na

tional elections which the PPP won by a wide margin. Opposition to the PPP came

from religious parties, ethnic and regional groups, and disgruntled industrialists, mer

chants and sectors of the middle class (Sayeed 1980:158-61; Shad 1987:287). Few of

the opponents of Bhutto, however, would go on to support the martial law regime

88 which became the longest and most severe In Paklstan·s history. Without a popular mandate but with self-assumed and incontestable authority, the martial law regime, like

Bhutto before it set out to restructure society. It did so along Islamic lines, establishing the Council of Islamic Ideology to advise the government on creating an Islamic legal, polltlcal and economic system (Esposito 1987:343-4). Political parties were banned on the grounds they were not an Islamic institution, and political activity was punishable by seven years imprisonment and 20 lashes (Noman 1966:122). The government im

posed Islamic taxes and created the ll!.ldlld.ordinances which stipulated Islamic punish

ments for certain crimes (Shad 1967:335).

In regards to the status of the civil service under the marital law government, as in the previous martial law period the bureaucracy continued to be central to the opera tion of the government, but under Zia the military assumed a more active and visible

role. Zia ·condemned the previous government's attempts to exert political control over the bureaucracy but followed a simUar if not more extensive use of such policies. He

did not resurrect the abolished CSP, but instead introduced wide-scale recruitment of.

serving and retired military officers Into the cMI service (Kennedy 1987:14). While the

administrations of both Ayub and Bhutto had recruited members of the civil service

from the military, that practice greatly increased under Zia. His administration placed

mllitary officers at higher levels within the bureaucracy, and that practice was lnstltutlon

alized with 1O percent of the highest entry level positions reserved for them Qbid.:122-

3). Slmulteneously accusations of corruption on the part of these military appointees

and questions about the effect of their appointments on the fighting capacity of the

military also increased (Alavi 1983:90).

The military government entered a new phase in 1964 by holding municipal elec- ·

tlons In which polltlcal parties were not allowed to participate and similar ones on a na-

89 tional level the following year. The political parties, united in the Movement for the Res toration of Democracy (MAD) boycotted those elections, and most of the successful candidates at the national level were traditional power figures, i.e., landlords and tribal leaders, with businessmen also constituting a sizable block (Noman 1988:127; Jalal

1990:324). Political parties in fact re-entered Pakistan's political life through the back door as the Pakistan Muslim League was reactivated to organize the majority of the elected Assembly members supporting the government (Ziring 1988:799). However Zia as President continued to hold ultimate political power since he, not the Assembly, ap pointed the Prime Minister and he could dismiss the government without consultation.

That he did so ultimately led to party-based elections in 1988, though they would not have been held in that mode (or perhaps at all) if Zia had not been assassinated in

August of that year.

Ethnic Groups an~ Quotas This brief historical discussion illustrat!s that its bureaucratic institutions have played a leading role in the establishment and attempted integration of the Pakistani nation state, though throughout that process they have been in a struggle for power with th_e country's political parties. For all but th1;1~ve years of PPP rule those institutions have relegated the political parties to the political background, and, in partnership with the military, have been the de facto political power in Pakistan. As Kennedy has observed the bureaucracy has performed many of the duties usually performed by elected offi cials such as revenue coUection and distribution, adjudication, and policy formulation.

It is for this reason that issues of ethnic and regional representation in the civil service are such a crucial issue, for as he says: "denial of civilian bureaucratic office in Pakistan is functionally equivalent to the denial of political representation• (Kennedy 1987:186).

90 Since its inception Pakistan's bureaucracy and civil service have been perceived

In ethnic terms, that Is as the more or less exclusive domain of certain ethnic groups, notably Punjabls and Immigrants from India, and thus their instrument of polltlcal

domination. For just as long quotas have been in place to redress these Imbalances in representation. 8 Kennedy concludes that the quotas have to a certain extent fulfilled their promise. He demonstrates that though urban Sindh and to a lesser extent the

Punjab are over-represented relative to their assigned portion and such areas as

Baluchistan and rural Sindh are under-represented especially in the higher ranks of tbe

bureaucracy, the discrepancy is significantly lower than it would be if 111eritalone were

the criteria for selection, and, he says, the level of inequality has been reduced since

1973 (Kennedy 1987:193-6).

The quota system's success is qualified in two important ways, however. First.

since residence alone and not ethnic affiliation Is the criterion for selection, the figures

mask ethnic Inequalities. For example, many of the places ~igned to Baluchistanis

are filled by Punjabi and Mohajir residents of the province. Secondly, within most

provinces one or two districts (including Quetta in Baluchistan) provide over three times the mean district representation for the provlnce. In Baluchistan this fact probab

ly amounts to high representation of non-Baluch since they make up a very large per

centage of Ouetta's population, and in general it means recruitment favors the relatively

wealthy and/or well-educated from the cities. Elsewhere Kennedy observes that be

sides the cost to Pakistan of decreased efficiency as a result of superseding selection

based on merit, quotas have actually enhanced ethnic competition and perceptions of

inequality (Kennedy 1986:87). It can be argued, however, that in both regards making

no efforts to adjust the imbalances and draw peripheral groups into the power structure

would have had even greater negative consequences.

91 Geography and Political Economy In Pakistan Central to the concept of the state is the role of its institutions in defining, occupying, and regulatrng a territory, a socially delineated space. Theorists from a number of schools are paying increasing attention to spatiality as they attempt to account for so· cial life. As they draw space into the central dynamics of social tile in their theories they argue that space must be considered more than simply the objective form of matter or the area within which social life takes place (Soja 1989:79; Gottdiener 1985:197). While it does have natural constituents, they emphasize the importance of its social construe· lion. Those concerned with these issues use such concepts as "the social production of space•, "the socio-spatial dialectic", and •spatio-temporal structuration of social life" to argue not only that social and productive relations organize and structure space, but that spatiality is an Integral aspect of all social relations (Soja 1985). Like social struc ture, space is both a medium through which social action takes place, and the product or outcome of social practices and relations (Soja 1985:94, Giddens 1981 :27).

Humans modify space socially and that socially constructed space then Influences their

Mure social relations. The social produc;tion of space .takes place at a number of levels, from personal body space, to the work place, to urban centers, and ultimately at the level of regions, nation-states and beyond.

States and Territory In tribal society the primary social relationship to interact with territoriality/spatiality to shape social structure is kinship, while in capitalist society productive relations assume that role. Capitalist production entails particular technological and social uses of space. Productive forces are centralized in factories with their associated concentra tions of laborers. They are further concentrated in or near urban centers which are also major sites for the collective consumption of the commodities produced. Changes in

92 the technology of transportation and communication have transformed accessibility to space, creating new possibilities for investment, production and social life (Harvey

1985:146). Sources of raw materials, changing production processes, labor and capi tal markets, class conflict, competition among fractions of capital, real-estate specula tion, and accumulation cycles all effect the spatial positioning of productive facilities in capitalist societies (Gottdiener 1985:77-8). Another consequence of capitalist produc ti~m is the creation of relatively developed and underdeveloped regions both subnation ally and Internationally.

As It asserts bureaucratic control over territory economically, politically, and cul turally the state too plays an Important role in the social structuring of space. Uke production, which has enormous influence over where and in what conditions people must (choose to) live and In tum how they relate to and conceive .of one another and themselves, the state Intrudes Into both physical and social space. States exist within a system of states In which their borders, though mulable and at times contested, are recognized as the limits of political sovereignty. Whlle capital cities are the quintessen tial manifestation of states, borders, though stricUy delimited are where states become ambiguous (Taylor 1989:144; Kearney 1991:58, 62). Within Its borders the state's space is at once homogeneous, the land of all citizens, and differentiated Into ad ministrative, political, and economically developed and underdeveloped zones. To paraphrase Soja, through bureaucratically controlled conective consumption, the crea tion of centers and peripheries, and the penetration of state power into everyday life, space is fragmented and hierarchically structured (Soja 1989:92).

Critical among the ends of the state is to condition an environment for profitable economic production. For most sectors in most states production is carried out in a sphere largely distinct from the state. However state institutions do penetrate that

93 sphere as they attempt to perpetuate the relations of production and the conditions necessary for profitable accumulation (Hadjimichalis 1967:94). Though capitalist states less commonly intervene directly in the production process, they do act indirectly through the legal and regulatory agencies (which, for example, set standards for the relations between employers and employees, provide credit, and determine where and what type of production can take place), and through investment in police and the military, infrastructure, social services, and research and development, projects that are not profitable for individual capitalists to support (Hadjimichalis 1967: 101 ; Gottdiener

1965:203). As it shapes a labor force of a certain type and provides logistical support for production the state socially organizes Its space/territory.

Regional Disparities One of the most important territorial outcomes of capitalist production within nation· states is the creation of relatively developed and underdeveloped regions. Holding to the conception of spatiality used here, regions are defined not only in terms of their physical features, but also in terms of the specific social relations and cultural practices shaping them (Cooke 1965:222; Soja 1989:117). In economic terms regional dis· parities occur when, as a consequence of favorable location, natural resource endow ment, or political decisions, some region begins todevelop before others.

Once underway this spatiaUy concentrated growth is sustained by multiplier effects and agglomeration, economics of scale, market size, favorable inter-regional terms of trade, migration of labor and entrepreneurs to nodes of development and expanding economic opportunities, the flow of capital to areas which offer the greatest return on investment, industry mix, and discriminatory freight rates (Clem 1966:140]. Regions differ in terms of labor productivity, wage rates, costs of materials, capital-labor relations, and profit rates. Such differences are maintained not only through such lac· tors as differential rates of investment and development of infrastructure but also in the forms of articulation of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production (Soja

94 1989:107). The role of state Institutions in the midst of these regional differences is con tradictory since they both promote the relationships which prcduce inequalities and at the same time are committed, at the rhetorical level at least, to overcoming such ine qualities.

The long-term consequences of regional disparities are debated. Some contend that market forces will overcome regional inequalities, others that such inequalities are inherent to capitalist production. Some argue that in the 'postmodern' era of transna tional corporations and labor forces, varied and flexible conditions are found among regions. In some cases of restructuring long-standing inequalities are further ag gravated, In some cases developed regions are becoming underdeveloped and vice versa, while in others there is an Intermixing of both conditions within the same region

(Soja 1989:172, Kearney 1991:59-61)

Under neoclassical assumptions trade between regions will ensue if their in habitants either produce commodities for which they have an advantage in abundant and cheap inputs or, if through efficient scales of production or the development of labor skills, they establish a specialization for producing commodities which provide relative price advantage (i.e., at a comparative advantage) over other regions (Holland

1976:13; Blaug 1982:162). Theoretically such trade and factor movements (the flow of labor and capital) between regions will lead to the disappearance of regional disparities as prices for factors and commodities are equalized. Also, the 'spread effects' from

~elopment in one region are such that they wt11draw other regions into the process .

·as the demand for agricultural. products and raw materials grow (Myrdal 1957:31 ). The corollary which follows from such assumptions under modernization theory is that, through this process, underdeveloped ethnoterritories are integrated with more ad-

95 vanced ones in the national setting, with the result that economic an.d cultural differences between them will disappear (Hechter 1975:24, 29).

Opposing views hold that unchecked market forces will tend to aggravate dis parities between regions (Myrdal 1957:24; Holland 1976:51). Some authors contend that the main tendency in factor flows is for labor to migrate and capital to flow from un derdeveloped regions to developed ones, rather than for capital to take advantages of lower labor costs in the less developed areas (Holland 1976:83; Myrdal 1957: 16). Less developed regions may thus be starved of the inputs necessacy for development. Une qual exchange theory holds that the articulation, through trade, of areas where petty commodity production predominates with industrialized regions creates conditions of unequal exchange which prevent capital accumulation from occurring naturally at the periphery (Upietz 1980:65). In short, the forces listed above which contribu1e to the Ini tial disparities betwe~n regions may cause them to persist.

Since the supply of cheap labor is an important ingredient for capitalist produc

tion, there can actually be incentives for maintaining depressed regions (Carney

1980:32).11 Some theorists go further and assert that regional inequalities are neces

sary to the survival of capitalist production and that the establishment of nested cores

and peripheries is as fundamental to capitalism as is the creation of classes of

capitalists and laborers. Indeed because regional inequalities contribute to the crea

tion of such classes c~pitalism presupposes and requires such inequalities (Soja

1989:111).

The accumulation of capital itself produces development and underdevelopment as mu1ually determining moments of the uneven and combined movements of capital. The lack of homogeneity in the capitalist economy is a necessary ou1come of the unfolding laws of motion of capital itself (Mandel quoted In Soja 1989: 107]

96 The various economic, political, and cultural forces at play, including efforts of the state to overcome or preserve such inequalities, determine how such inequaJiUeswill appear on the ground.

Regional Identities In this regard Harvey makes the observation that class aUiances,loosely bounded within a territory and frequently organized by a state, can be the basis for regional development. While not denying their ultimately conflicting interests, he suggests cer· tain fractions of capital (those with an interest in the fixed capital or land of the place) and labor (the indigenous or otherwise relatively privileged) will share an interest in the development of a region. States too share such an interest and he suggests that the process of state formation or dissolution under capitalism is a function of factors promoting and discouraging such class alliances (Harvey 1985:151·2). The ideological expression of those class alliances he observes emphasize shared identities. "The struggle for community, regional or national solidarity as the ideology behind the al·

Hance,may support, reconstitu1e or In some cases actively create local and regional cul· lures and traditions• (Harvey 1985:152). Though he reduces complex cultural and political Issues to economics, Harvey's analysis captures some of the dynamics of the regional movem~nts that result from uneven deve(opment.

While such alliances can occur between states they can also occur within them, and when ethnicity and regions overlap, as they do in Pakistan, regional inequalities will be perceived in ethnic terms. When economic inequalities are perceived as part of the collective oppression of a peripheral cultural group, ~anethnic movement is a likely response (Hechter 1975:44). As different levels of technology are employed in different regions, a cultural division of labor may develop that may lead to ethnic stereotypes.

The culture of relatively developed areas is associated with urban centers and high

, 97 status occupations, whil.e the maintenance or elaboration of their culture by peripheral groups is a form of resistance to integration into the state (Or other dominant core) on what are perceived as unjust terms. Economic expansion or modernization may initial ly aggravate ethnic conflicts in such a situation because the core group is in a better position to take advantage of new inputs or conditions. In later stages peripheral groups may narrow the gap between themselves and the core either through economic competition or political challenge. Inhabitants of the developed region may in turn feel relatively deprived by their loss of dominance and react against the periphery along eth nic or nationalist lines (Rothschild 1981: 120-1).

The nation-state is both the primary arena for such ethnoregional conflicts and the medium through which they are fought out. Despite its relative autonomy from ac tual prodµction, the state Is viewed as the body responsible for the economic IHe of its constituent regions and peoples. Its autonomy and its ability to intervene politically do give it some means to alleviate inequalities if its leaders wish. Its restructuring strategies Include national and regional planning, improving infrastructure in the less developed regions, regulating banking, supplying weHare and credit, extending tax in centives so that businesses wUIlocate in backward regions (Myrdal 1957:44). Since their demands are formed by class alliances, the state may be more wilting to redress regional or ethnoreglonal imbalances than to address the question of class. Classes are larger, amorphous bodies whose demands will tend to have greater structural im plications than ones based on ethnicity (Rothschild 1981 :222). It may not be the state's intention or within its ability to overcome those inequalities, however, and Hit does, the development that results may be at the expense of other such regions or groups within its territorial space or In others.

98 The Territory of Pakistan Space has had noteworthy, even grotesque importance in the creation and subsequent history of Pakistan. With the Partition of India and Pakistan millions of people aban doned their homes amidst incredible slaughter to cross the invisible boundary delineat· ing the new states. Aft~r the violent convulsions of its birth Pakistan consisted of two areas separated by a thousand miles of potentially hostile Indian territory. Saleri cap tures some of the disorientation and restriction felt by the inhabitants of the Islamic

Republic.

It was simply too deranging, for none of us really liked to contemplate the fact of our own numbers, in themse1ves quite sizable, and how we clung with precarious novelty to our designated swoop of the globe ... [l]ndependence - a big word - actually signified a slivering up of space. When In 1947 Mountbatten's scissors clipped at the map of India and handed over what Jinnah fastidiously called a moth-eaten Pakistan ~e had been unrealistically hungry for the whole of the north and Delhi too, l think) the more energetic Muslims of the subcontinent winced to see that they could push and push at their cuticles, only to discover meager half-moons. fSuleri 19B9:74] It was not possible to overcome the physical and cultural distances between the two wings of the country, and the creation of Bangladesh, again with considerable bloodshed, brought a further constricting of Pakistan's territory. With Its dramatic and harsh extremes of climate and topography, and such political features as disputes over borders (most notably that with India in Kashmir) and small but disruptive Inde pendence movements In the smaHer provinces, Pakistan's geography remains problematic.

Colonialism considerably transformed the social geography of the region. Migdal suggests that policies regarding tenure, taxation, and transportation were the key ones with which European countries transformed their colonial territories (Migdal 19B8:56).

By requiring that taxes be paid in cash, increasing indMdual rights to private property, and Investing in massive Irrigation projects that opened large tracts to cultivation the

British changed the social geography of the Punjab (Fox 1965:38, 53). Though consid-

99 erably less development took place in more peripheral districts, roads, railways, telegraphs, military garrisons, and boundary commissions all altered spatial relations in the lands that were to make up Pakistan. Specifically in Baluchistan the British system of empowering sardars "had the effect of dividing the Baluch into numerous personal fiefdoms· whereas previously more egalitarian relations prevailed within the tribe and the Khan of Kalal had greater power at the center (Spooner 1989:615).

In Baluchistan, as in other parts of Pakistan, change has continued in the post· colonial era, and has accelerated in the last twenty years. At Independence Pakistan's industrial sector was small and located entirely in Karachi, Lahore, and Lyallpur (Fais labad). Most development In the country·s first decade took place in .these areas. The development that did take place in other regions was mostly due to the ready availabiUty of raw materials In them (Kardar 1988:19). Later It became politically neces sary, to develop peripheral areas and some development has subsequently taken place in Baluchistan. 10 In the last decade electricity has arrived to many but not all the major towns in the province, and after years of complaints and demands the govern ment has supplied natural gas for home use in Quetta. The number of schools and dis pensaries in the province has risen since Independence though their quality is seldom very good.

Baluchistan'sState of Underdevelopment Despite the development that has taken place Baluchistan remains underdeveloped both absolutely and relative to the rest of Pakistan by most measures. Baluch nationalists assert that this lack of development is due to a lack of concern by the

Pakistani state, and they contend that the development that has taken place has not been for the benefit of Baluchistanis, but for the benefit of external powers. One of the examples Baluch nationalists consistently use to make this point is the production of

100 natural gas at Sui in the Bugti tribal area. In 1986 the Sui gas field met 80 percent of

Pakistan's needs for natural gas which provided a savings of around Rs 9 billion a year to the country (Kardar 1988:15). The province received royalties of Rs1 billion which is low by international standards Qbid.; Harrison 1981: 162). In addition, Kardar observes, the agricultural and industl1al products produced in other parts of Pakistan with

Baluchistan's natural gas as a cfirect or indirect input are sold in Baluchistan at prices higher than the world market making for a further transfer of wealth out of the province

(Kardar 1988:16).

A number of economic and quality of life measures can be used to show the un derdeveloped state of Baluchistan. In terms of per capita income differentials by province, Baluchistan's average Income is the lowest in Pakistan and around 20 per cent lower than that In 1heSlndh which has the highest (Rs845 per month versus

Rs1,059 per month) (De Kruljk 1986:689).11 However urban areas of Baluchistan

(which essentially means Quetta) have a monthly per capita income rate of nearly double that of rural areas (Rs1357 versus As762). Five studies cited by Hussain rank

46 of Pakistan's administrative districts in terms of either infrastructural development or production per caplta. 12 The ten districts of Baluchistan rank consistently among the very lowest In the country. Again the exception to this rule is Quetta which ranks among the country's highest in terms of infrastructure though quite low in production rates (Hussain 1988:39). In terms of literacy too Baluchistan ranks lowest of Pakistan's four provinces. Approximately 22 percent of the country's total population is literate, with the figure for urban areas (42 percent) considerably higher than for rural ones (15 percent). In Baluchistan Just1 O percent of the population Is literate, though similarly nearly one-third (32 percent) of the urban population is and only six percent of the rural population is (Pakistan. Fed. Bureau of Statistics 1988:55). Life expectancy in rural

101 Baluchistan was only 42 years in 1977 as against a national average of 60 (Harrison 1981:161).

One of the first studies conducted on regional inequalities in Pakistan estimated value added in the administrative districts within each province and concluded that there has been a tendency for relatively developed regions to grow faster than relatively

less developed ones (Hussain 1988:17). The conclusions of this study, conducted in the early 1970S, seem to be less valid in recent decades duril)g which there have been

more efforts to overcome regional differences. For example while the_levels of value

added in large-scale manufacturing continues to be greater in the major urban centers

of Karachi and central Punjab, the percentage of .the national total contributed by those

centers declined from 66.5 percent in 1959-60 to 54.5 percent in 1976-n. The dif ference entai1ed a shift prlmarUy to "local core areas• (Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Mul

tan) and "Inner peripheries• (mostly small cities In the Punjab and some In Sindh)

(Hussain 1988:40-2). This moderate decentralization has benefited Baluchistan Uttle,

the exception being the industries that have moved to the tax-free zone at Hub Chowl

Immediately across the provincial border from Sindh and just 25 miles from Karachi.

In agriculture the benefits of the government's subsidies for 'green-revolution'

technology have gone to the Punjab, though other prOvinces have benefited as weU.

For example, in 1973-74 84.5 percent of Punjab's agricultural land was under irrigation

and by 1982-83 that figure was 95 percent. Similarly the increase in Sindh was from 87

percent to 95 percent, while in the NWFP it went from 39 percent to 40 percent and in

Baluchistan from 33 percent to 39 percent (Kardar 1988:22). Though the Punjab and

Sindh have much more water available for Irrigation than do the NVVFPor Baluchistan,

lands in these two provinces can be irrigated with tubewells. Only 5 percent of the

government funded tubewells were Installed in Baluchistan and the NWFP in the years

102 between 1971-72 and 1983-84 and 70 percent of them were installed In the Punjab

(ibid.:23). It should be noted, however, that the wisdom of large-scale pumping of ground water in Baluchistan is questionable given the limited supplies of such water and the difficulty In replacing it. Though agricultural land in Punjab constitutes 56 per cent of the country's total it has received 64 percent of the government's agricultural credit and has a significantly higher credit-availability-per-acre rating than other provin ces (ibld.:24). 13

This Is not to say that Baluchistan has been entirely neglected by the government of Pakistan. Indeed Baluchistan received special attention throughout the 1980s be cause of Its sensitive strategic location near Afghanistan, not only from the government of Pakistan, but from International aid agencies as well. US AID set aside $250 million for Baluchistan from its $1.~billlon budget for Pakistan in the years 1983-88 Qbld.:16).

Indeed, according to its own statistics, the government of Pakistan's development_ex pendlture per capita In Baluchistan was double that for the other provinces In the years

1978"85. It Is Important to note however that the low population density of Baluchistan, and the fact that other areas are starting from a baseline of higher levels of previous development, distort these figures (ibid.:37·6).

The Mllltary's Role In Pakistan As implied above, Pakistan's military has played a central role in shaping and atafflng the post-colonial state. It claimed and received special consideration and considerable resources In the new state. Outright martial rule has been Imposed three times In

Pakistan's history (1958-62, 1969-71, and 19n-S5), and for much of the remaining time the military has ruled behind a civilian facade. The mllltary's incursl~n into government blocked the development of representative politics, and its recruitment policy has

resulted In a largely Punjabi rather than a national military.

103 Many· expected the state of Pakistan to collapse under the weight of the immense burdens with which it was saddled at independence, and to prevent that the state's early leadership thought it necessary to strengthen its military and centralize the bureaucracy.

Nothing stood in the way of the reincorporation of the Pakistan areas Into the Indian union except the notion of a central government whose structures of authority lacked both muscle and the necessary bottom. So in Pakistan's case defense against India was in part a defense against internal threats to central authority. This is why a preoccupation with afforcing the defense establishment - not unusual for a newly created state - assumed obsessive dimensions in the first few years of Pakistan's existence. [Jalal 1990:49] The military received fully 70 percent of the total revenues of the central government in

Pakistan's first budget, and over its first decade 60 percent of Pakistan's budget went to the military (lbid.:70; Rizvi 1986:44).

In the 1950s the stress placed on procuring arms and building a counter to India affected both the internal structure of the Pakistani state and its International relations.

The military leadership and high level bureaucrats were able to pressure or even dis miss the government when they felt military needs were Inadequately met (see Jalal

1990:179). Former and serving generals entered the government as cabinet ministers, and one, lskander Mirza, took the powerful post of governor general. As the United

State's interests and involvement in the Middle East expanded and the cold war inten sified, Pakistan sold itself as a willing ally. American aid brought a degree of American leverage over the administrative operations of the Pakistani state and Americanization of the military and its equipment (ibid.:239-43; Cohen 1984:64). In subsequent decades the interests of the two states have merged and diverged. During the

Reagan/Zia years their Interests coincided due to the Afghan civil war, but have once again begun to diverge with the changed circumstances in the Middle East, the Soviet

Union, and Afghanistan.

104 It Is frequentty argued that the military's intervention in Pakistan's political sphere occurred because of the chaos undisciplined and self-serving politicians have created

(Hussain 1979:134; Choudhury 1988:28; Rizvi 1986:255-6). Others argue that by com· mending such large shares of the new state's resources and undermining the repre sentative process, the military, in partnership with the central administrative bureaucracy, insured that a viable political leadership could not emerge (Jalal

1990:140, 251-2). Some Baluch ethnic-nationalists take this argument further and argue that such military Intervention is designed to insure Punjabi domination of the rest of Pakistan (Cohen 1984:113-6).

The ethnic composition of the army contributes to the sense of many Baluch that

Pakistan is an Imposed and colonlzing force In Baluchistan. In his study of the Pakis tan military Cohen says that at partition n percent Of.the army's recruits from the areas that became west Pakistan were from Punjab, 20 percent were from the NWFP, two per· cent were from Sindh, and virtually none were from Baluchistan. He clalins, without giving figures, that the percentages have not changed "dramatically" since then (Cohen

1984:44). Indeed the military is even more unrepresentative than these figures indicate because an overwhelming percentage of the recruits come from a handful of districts within the Punjab and the NWFP around the Potwar piateau. 14 This pattern is In part an extension of the practices of the British who preferred to recruit among those they per ceived as 'martial races' and avoided conscripting those they considered not sufficient ly warlike (Sind_his)or unreliable (Batuch).

Because the mltltary is a major consumer of Pakistan's resources and is a means of access to a range of enterprises, exclusion (whether voluntary or involuntary) from It means foregoing Important opportunities. Like the United States, Iraq, and China,

Pakistan ls classified as spending between five and ten percent of its GNP on its

105 military (Cohen 1984:19). Spending per soldier rose In the late 1970S and early '80S,

and some of that increase "went into satisfying the material wants of personnel' (Jones

1985:73-4). In addition, at any given time almost five percent of Pakistan's soldiers are

employed In Arab gulf states where they are paid far higher than In Pakistan. There are

a number of other perquisites associated with military service in Pakistan including allot-

. menis of agricultural land and house plots, medical care, and the possibility of employ

ment for retired soldiers or family members in such military enterprises as the Faujl

5 Foundation, which operates a number of industrial plants, farms, and hospltals, 1 and

the National Logistics Cell, a military-run trucking operation (Duncan 1989:280-1;

Cohen 1984:121n; Jones 1985:76).11 Jones estimates that ten percent of the

households In Pakistan (a figure which, again, largely excludes Baluch and Sindhis) are

Involved In the military economy (ibid.).

Though the ethnic composition of the military has not significantly altered since

Pakistan's inception, the class composition of Its leadership has. Whereas previously

the commissioned .officers In the Pakistan military came from the major laticfed families

of Punjab and the NWFP and the small urban upper-middle class, these classes now

spurn mUltary careers, and recruits for officer training are generally from the middle and

lower-middle classes of towns and small cities (Jones 1985:71 ; Cohen 1984:97). Less

educated, and more conservative and parochial than previous generations, these of

ficers are more amenable to the lslamlzatlon that has always been an aspect of the

Pakistan military's ideology but which Zia aggressively pushed forward.

Because Indian Muslims were able to mobilize along religious lines to force the

creation of Pakistan, many make the leap to conclude that Pakistan is an Islamic

'ideological state' (see Hussain 1979). The military frequently assumes the roles of

protector and most pure representative of Pakistan's ideology, which, as argued below,

106 negates the legitimacy of the country's sub-national groups. Though now somewhat dormant or defensive, a central tenet of Islam is libid., or •permanent war1are• carried out by heart, tongue, hands, and/or sword to establish Muslim sovereignty (Khaddurl

1979:55-65). A special status Is therefore awarded to the military in Islam.

Islam's attitude towards political and military power is not one of negation, disassocia tion or suspicion, but of complete affirmation. A religious value is attached to power, success and victory as such. Islam endows the army with the prestige and authority of an institution meriting divine blessing and its heritage paves the way for military intervention which is to be regarded as most fitting and proper In the eyes of God and man. [Beeri quoted In Hussain 1960:127] Many polltlclans, lawyers, and people of all classes In Pakistan reject such a notion, but it carries enough weight to provide the army with an Ideological Justification and a body of supporters, which allows its Involvement In politics to be tolerated If not unopposed.

The army's presence has become more pervasive In Pakistan's economyand ad· ministration, but ironically its policies have contributed to Increasing the level of violence In Pakistan society. As a result of the theft and blackmarketeerlng of supplies

Intended for Afghan rebels, Pakistan has been saturated with powerful weapons in the last decade. Not only did several varieties of Kalishnlkov machine guns become readi ly available In Quetta with ammunition for them available almost at cost.17 I was told that one could even buy missile launchers and ground-to-ground missiles on the black market. The trade In he_rolngrew apace with the spread of weapons and both con tributed to Increasing levels of violence In Pakistan, especially In the cities of Sindh. As the traditional power of the landlords In Sindh eroded and the police proved incom petent to control the situation the army assumed an Increasing presence there. Yet despite its more activist stance, ethnic violence between Sindhis and Mohajirs con tinues to grow, banditry and kidnapping have become widespread, and the wealthy employ gangs of armed men to protect themselves and, In some cases, to extract pay ments from Clients since the legal system has ceased to function effectively (Duncan

107 1989:300-2). Though the military undoubtedly controls the ultimate physical force in

Pakistan, the decade of its most intense involvement in running the country has brought a deterioration in the day-to-day security of Pakistanis.

Finally ii is not appropriate to discuss the military in Pakistan and Baluchistan without referring to its role in bringing force to bear against Baluch ethnic-nationalists and tribal leaders. Though the most sustained and bloody confrontation between

Pakistan's military and Baluch ethnic-nationalists took place between 1973 and 19n, the army had been deployed in Baluchistan a number of times before that. At the time of Baluchistan's inclusion in Pakistan (1948) the Khan of Kalat's brother together with

700 supporters crossed the border to Afghanistan from where he sought to oppose the new government. He was eventually captured by the army and imprlsoned. 16 The day before its leaders declared martial in 1958, the army entered Kalal and arrested the

Khan and a number of his supporters for 'anti-state activities' (Awan 1985:224; Baluch

1975:181-4; Harrison 1981:27-8). This and other grievances sparked a small uprising

In Jhalawan led by the sardar of the Zehri tribe, Nauroz Khan. After turning himself in

(as a result of government treachery Baluch charge) Nauroz Khan died In prison, and six of his supporters, including his son, were hung. Ongoing tensions between major sardars, and the government lead to more sustained guerrilla activity throughout the

1960s which the army tried to suppress. Awan, a director of Pakistan's Intelligence and home affairs departments during this time says that these guerrilla movements were directed by the Marri and Bugti sardars whose demands included that all minerals in

Baluch tribal areas be the property of the sardars and other concessions that would have increased their authority (Awan 1985:231 ). Harrison depicts the leaders of these movements as having broader, nationalist aims (Harrison 1981 :29-33). This period of

108 confrontation ended In 1969 with the termination of 'One Unit' but it had set the polltlcal and military stage for the more intense fighting which took place four years later.

Pakistani and Baluch Nationalism In his introduction to a collection of articles on the production of national cultures Fox classifies racial Identities, ethnicity, nationalism, and subnationalism as nationalist

Ideologies or "cultural productions of public identity' (Fox 1990:4). He suggests that these identities and the cultures they throw off as they are •put into action• are mutable responses to material conditions and structural factors that are also contingent upon the accidents of history, political conflict, and human emotion (Ibid. 6-10). Yet by equat ing all such Ideologies he Is also guilty of that which he accuses Barth of, namely he treats the contents of these ideologies as less important than the processes which cre

ate the space In which they develop. While It Is true that the boundaries between rac.t,

ethnicity and nation are, as he says, fuzzy, and the source of that fuzziness is not just

scholars but ~octal life, at core the content of these Ideologies differ.

Generallzlng Nations For this reason It Is useful to begin an examination of natlonaffsm in Pakistan and

Baluchistan with a more traditional definition of the term. A useful one is Gellner's ob

servation that nationalism is the doctrine that Says "the political and the national unit

should be congruent' (Gellner 1983: 1, see also Hobsbawm 1990:9). lhe product of

that doctrine, the nation-state, differs from previous states in that Its administrative

bureaucracy Is more centralized and pervasive, and Its borders are more precisely

defined and Ideally delimit an ethnic or cultural-linguistic unit (see B. Anderson 1983;

Gellner 1983). A chicken-and-egg argument develops as to whether nations, I.e., cul

turally andterritorially unified people, preceded and generated states and nationalism,

or vice versa (Corrigan and Sayer 1985:200; cf. Hobsbawm 1990:10). It likely that the

109 two developed together and what Is really at issue is how those states of Europe that did correspond with linguistically defined groups became the setting or the medium in which the industrial revolution grew. Through the creation of the conditions necessary for Industrial society - mass literacy, administrative efficiency, and the naturalization and intemalizatlon of certain types of inequalities - states, nations, and nationalism proliferated. The Industrial-based European empires spread the conditions in which the nation-state became not only desirable but the necessary form of socio-polltlcal life

(see Chatterjee 1986).

While the world now talks the language of nation-states, each unit entalls a dH ferent reality than that standard usage assumes. 19 As a number of people have

pointed out, nationalist ideologies generally emphasize the nation's antiquity, con

tinuity, purity, and uniformity when the situation is more likely the obverse. As Gellner

has observed

Nationalism is not what it seems, and above all not what it seems to itseH, The cultures It claims to defend and revive are often Its own inventions or are modified out of ail recognition .... [lt) has Its own amnesias and selections which ..••can be profoundly distorting and deceptive. {Gellner 1983:56-7; see also Hobsbawm andsRanger 1983) Or as another author has observed, national cultures and even national histories are

blends of "fact,fiction, and folklore".(Taylor 1989:177).

Gellner himself is less attentive to the ways in which this Inventing and obscuring,

Indeed nation-states themselves, are the product of inequalities between classes and

ethnic groups. This is so because the relations of production that prevail in industrial

society displace or capture prior ones, and so too do their accompanying ideologies.

Nationalism largely succeeds in blocking off or absorbing other means of expressing or

interpreting experience or political interests. Within the framework of nationalism, Gld-

dens observes "dominant classes have much less difficulty representing their own

policies as in 'the national interest' than do oppositional groups, since they have much

110 more influence over the style and form of what can be discursively articulated" (Gid dens 1985:221: see also Kapferer 1988:19; Fox 1990:12).

As nations create states or vice versa the elaboration of nationanst ideologies takes place using some of the same idioms which tribal peoples use to perceive and describe themselves, i.e., land and blood. As mentioned, territory is precisely specified in 1heworld of nation-states. The international community uses such concepts as sovereignty and self-determination to recognize and regulate borders, if not always guarantee them. In the ideology of nationalism the land and the people correspond.

Oftenthe connection with a particular territory supplies a nation with is sense of antiq uity and naturalness. The landscape (and especially mountains, rivers and lakes, and ancient monuments) becomes the source of feelings of tangible and mystic identity

(Smith 1986:183-90): In his study of ethnic-nationalism in Quebec Handler observed that the attachment to or identity with the land is not only seen to be the outcome of having lilied and labored there, some Qubecols argued that simply being bom in

Quebec naturally disposes one to being Qubecois (Handler 1988:34).

As In segmentary societies, In the nation-state the metaphor and rhetoric of blood express both equality and hierarchy. Williams argues that In nation-states race, class, and cutture lnterpenetrate, and "in the conjunction of race-making as nation building and the Invention of purity which it entails, blood becomes synecdoche (sic) for all things cultural" (Williams 1989:431 ). Dominant ethnic groups within the state and the culture they embody are equated with the nation and are perceived In terms of race or blood.20 Nations take on the attributes of human species In which indMdual members display those traits which distinguish the group (Handler 1988:44-6). Though she per haps overestimates the fixity of this alignment, Williams observes that other ethnic groups confronted with this "race/class/nation conflation• must compete with one

111 another for a place In the national political economy and for unique ways to contribute to the nation or its culture (Williams 1989:434-6).

Many of the traits of nation-states and nationalism laid out above are most ap parent in the states that replaced colonial empires because in them political consolida tion and tendencies toward cultural homogenization are problematic, and were largely contrived by or in reaction to external powers. In the colonial setting Eurppean cultural forms and values had the greatest status, and they became the lens through which in digenous nationalists perceived and measured themselves as they sought to create al ternatives to colonialism. Traditional or folk cultures were rediscovered, reinterpreted, and given greater currency, and, with decolonialization, realignments of groups around them created new hierarchies. It has frequently been the case, however, that domina tion by local rivals is less tolerable than domlnat.ion by 'neutral' external ones, and while the new states have proclaimed their cultural or soclo-politlcal unity, strains along eth nic-nationalist lines have frequently emerged.

Though his contention seems somewhat dubious In light of recent events in the

Soviet Union, Hobsbawm claims that most subnational movements do not strive for ter ritorial Independence, but rather for competitive coexistence. As is the case when migrants enter established nation-states these movements are attempts by subgroups to adapt, attain their share of available resources, and defend ·themse.lves against dis crimination, usually by mobilizing for positions in government Institutions (Hobsbawm

1990:155-8). While decentralization and autonomy are the usual demands of such movements, it Is probably best not to underestimate the power of the appeal for inde pendence as an ideal that activates people, that can be used as an extreme position in order to extract more moderate concessions, or that Is an option which might become more realistic if the stability or even viability of the state in question deteriorates.

112 Islam and Ethnic Nationalism In the Islamic Republic Unlike post-colonial states that simply inherited the territorial boundaries of the colonial administrative units that preceded them, Pakistan came into being as an explicit at tempt to define the Muslims of India as a distinct nation. Jinnah and the All India Mus lim League were ultimately able to mobilize support around the notions that aU Musil ms of the subcontinent shared a common history and culture, and that, despite the close contact and the customs they shared with Hindus, the two peoples would never con verge nor could they be peacefully joined in a single state (Gilmartin 1988:183; Moore

1983:544-5). The extension of the "two nation theory" was that as a nation equal in status with the Hindu •nation", the Muslims of India had a right to an independent state

(or states) in the areas where they constitute a majority of the population.

Pakistan (the name itself, an acronym made from the names of the areas that were to constitute the new state, means literally 'the land of the pure') came into being on this basis, though throughout the struggle to establish the new state its future institu tions and organlzlng principles remained vague (Jalal 1990:20). It was In part this am

biguity which allowed Musllms of all classes to imagine the Pakistan they wanted and to support It on their own terms. Much of Pakistan's popular support came because people imagined It would fulfill Islam's promise of equality and social justlce. 21 Others, citing Jinnah's own British education and secular outlook saw it as a homeland for In dian Muslims, not as.an Islamic state (Alavi 1988:66-7; Esposito 1987:335; Haque

1983:374-5). As described, control of the new state lay in the hands of politicians, land owners, businessmen and the military/bureaucratic elite, most of whom shared the lat ter rather than the former view, though it ls not possible to ignore the importance of

Islam in the consolidation of Pakistan. In this sense Islam played the role It often does

113 in Islamic societies, that of uniting otherwise divided groups In times of crisis or external threat (S. Pastner 1988:1 n). 22

The universal legitimacy of Islam made it an obvious, and perhaps necessary Im· plement in the drive to centralize the new state, though to the provinces the center's ap proach appeared authoritarian and insensitive, and they were soon alienated. The extent to which the new state would be 'Islamic' was an early controversy which was lar gely avoided by the decade long delay in creating Pakistan's first constitution. The ruling elite wanted the state to be the guarantor of an Islamic social order though they

In no way wanted a theocracy in which, as some wished, they would be under the au1horlty of Islamic scholars (Jalal 1990:284). With each succeeding crisis of legitimacy the government of Pakistan has faced, however, it has further lslamicized the country.

In the first decades Islam served largely as a focus of national unity; later Bhutto used his own brand of 'Islamic socialism' to legitimize his populist programs; and most recently Zla-ul-Haq sought support from conservative forces by implementing a number of Islamic laws and taxes, yet he too kept power in the hands of secular bureaucrats and soldiers (Metcalf 1987:132-4).

Though its constitutions have labeled Pakistan an Islamic republic, most em phasis has been placed on Urdu and the aristocratic culture of the Mughals as the es sence of Pakistan's Islamic heritage. The result has been an ongoing tension In the effort to define a national culture since an emphasis on Urdu and the heritage of the ex ogenous conquerors of India runs counter to local traditions, and has elevated the status of the Mohajirs with whom those traits are Identified (Jalal 1990:289-90; Kurln

1988:245). Bengalis, who are proud of their own literary tradition, were especially sensi tive to the Imposition of Urdu as the national language, but all of the sub-regions have deep rooted cultural traditions. Despite the interpenetration of the peoples and cul-

114 lures of these sub-regions, core areas (and core cultural traits) have remained

autonomous even in the periods when dynastic powers were able to extract tribute from them all simultaneously. Their inhabitants~ attitude toward the political, economic,

and cultural centralization Pakistan has pursued is well summed up in Wali Khan's

reply when he was asked in 1975 whether he is first a Muslim, a Pakistani, or a Push

tun. He replied that he has been a Pushtun for six-thousand years, a Muslim for a

thousand years and a Pakistani for 27 years (Harrison 1987:285).

This tension is also present between the groups dominating Pakistani state and

society, thus challenging the universality of what Williams Identifies as the race/class/na

tion conflation. It Is Ironic that untll shortly before Independence support for partition

was strongest in the provinces where Muslims were in the minority, and equivocal In

those areas that were to constiMe the new state. This, along with the state's

patronage of their culture has led Mohajlrs to consider themselves quintessential Pal

tanis. Kurln captures the attitude of many Mohajlrs when he writes that

this community saw In ltseH the image of what Pakistan was to be and what It was to represent. To this community, they, the muhAjirin, were Pakistan, for Pakistan was, essentially, the apotheosis of a Muslim consciousness that they had originally lntro dwced, nurtured during the period of Muslim imperial rule, preserved In the face of . British colonialism, and revitalized when faced with Hindu ascendancy and domination. Pakistan, literally meaning "land of the pure•, was simply their "land", and they, by implication, were the •pure•. [Kurin 1988:241) Relatively wealthy, skilled, and educated, members of the Mohajir community have

been prominent In Pakistan. though as argued above, Punjabi bureaucrats and mlDtary

men have been the most dominant group in the institutions of the state and increasing

ly in the political economy as well (F. Ahmed 1988:29-30). The fact that the Mohajirs

feel dispossessed as quotas and 'Punjabi and Pushtun expansion into the Mohajir stron

ghold of Karachi have encroached on their share of the economy and state institutions

is indicated by the political strength of the Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz (MOM), a politicized

115 ethnic movement which seeks among other things to define the Mohajir as one of

Pakistan's sub-nationalities.

While upper-class residents of Lahore, the Punjab's largest and most influential urban center and an important Mughal city, undoubtedly hold some of the same values and real or putative origins as do Mohajirs, Punjabi culture differs from that associated with Urdu. Punjabis, especially in rural areas, see themselves as organic to their land, and most do not trace themselves genealogically to foreign conquerors but to local

(Hindu) populations who converted to Islam. ~. or lineages, are still important in

Punjabi life which Is focused on the worldly values of zar zan aurzemjn (wealth, women and land} the essentials of life, rather than on cultivating the more abstract spiritual and poetic qualities ideally valued by Mohajir/Urdu culture {Kurin 1988:239-44;

Duncan 1989:27). A split therefore appears between the national culture of Pakistan focusing on Urdu and an idealized version of Islam the Mohajirs best represent, and the actual control of the political bureaucratic and military Institutions o_fthe state which

Punjabls control (and in doing so, act out what Kurin identifies as their central cultural value).

Baluch Ethnlc-Natlonallsm Because of this division between the national culture of Pakistan and the dominant

position of Punjabls In the state, Baluch exert their cultural identity relative to both of these. Though they have made strides to exert greater control over the province, In

Baluchistan the government of Pakistan to a large extent continued the policy of in

direct rule used by the British. The Frontier Crimes Regulations (a body of laws

developed by the British that allows for tribal customs), not Pakistani civil law, still

prevails in nearly all of Baluchistan. This status gives Baluch in tribal areas consider

able autonomy. Despite urbanization and a slowly transforming economy, throughout

116 the province tribal ties are important, sardars have remained powerful figures, and

Baluchi and Brahui prevail as the languages of everyday speech. It is from this cultural base that Baluch tribal leaders, political activists, and intellectuals assert their distinct

'national' Identity. There Is though a tension within this movement since many hold as virtues nomadism, tribal institutions, and the historic autonomy of the Baluch from exter nal dynasties and states (see Janmahmad 1989:119), while others emphasize the need for Baluch to gain the benefits and acquire the values of industrial society.

Baluch, in fact, share some of the cultural values held by Punjabls, though they generally emphasize their uniqueness and use it to legitimize their potitical and economic demands. For example I was told numerous times of the crucial Importance

Of 'zar zan andzemjn' in Baluch.life, especially in causing the disputes that activate the Baluch tribal code of honor and revenge, an essential element of Baluch cultural identity, In comparing Baluch and Punjabls one Baluch sardar characterized the strong tribal instiMions of the Baluch as a virtue saying that the ~ of the Punjabls ere simply tribes that have become debased and corrupted by feudalism and colonialism.

As suggested in Chapter One, however, in Sindh and Punjab Baluch have largely as similated by adopting local languages and feudal land ownership patterns, though they also retain a Baluch identity. Baluch In Baluchistan and Karachi more consciously strive to differentiate themselves from Punjabis who many describe as colonialists seek ing to replace the British in dominating the Baluch (see Cohen 1984:114). "Should we give up being Baluch and wear ghOli and chew R4o[like the Punjabis}?" one informant asked sarcastically when discussing the persistence of Baluch customs among the ur banized.

As Baluch ethnic nationalists have consciously sought to project and elaborate

Baluch culture they have largely done so relative to the culture and institutions of Pakis-

117 tan. See for example Janmahmad's claims that along with education in Urdu comes no tions of the cultural superiority of Mohajirs, some of whose important historic per sonalities (e.g., Mahmud of Ghazni) were enemies of the Baluch. He also contends that some of the institutions (e.g., homosexuality and courtesans) that are important in

Urdu traditions are abhorred by Saluch (Jan mah mad 1989:243-4, 251-2).

Ethnic nationalists have cultivated Baluch culture in a numbers of ways. The

Baluchl (and to a lesser extent Brahui) language has been p'romoted through small

Baluchi newspapers and literary magazines, and through the Baluchl Academy which produces books in Baluchi, Urdu, and English. These efforts are hampered though by divisions O\/E!rwhich dialect and script (Roman or Arabic) should be standard. Much of the work of contemporary Baluch poets focuses on the conditions facing the Baluch as a people. They mourn the poverty, the loss of independence, and disunity confronting them and mix references to Baluch traditions of honor and revenge with appeals to sacrifice for freedom and the 'motherland'. 23 Such poetry Is recited at marriage

ceremonies, and at readings held In private homes or sponsored by community or

ganizations (Slimbach 1990:16). Those who have died in the independence movement

or other poHtical struggles ,are remembered as martyrs. The anniversaries of the

deaths of important martyrs are marked and their portraits displayed at political events,

notably of the Baluch Students Organization, and on such items as key chains. Ethnic

nationalist groups organize study circles and tutorials to help students prepare for

exams and to educate them on such topics as Baluch hh~tory, and nationalist move

ments like those of the Kurds and Palestinians with whom Baluch sympathize and Iden- tify (ibid.:15).

The extent to whlch·the project of elaborating Saluch culture alms ultimately at

separation from Pakistan Is best not exaggerated. An autonomous Baluch state is

118 ptobably an ideal many or most Baluch hold deep in their hearts, much as Muslims long to recreate the times of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four caliphs. It is an ideal which the realities of life keep well out of reach and most Baluch see their Mure 24 as part of Pakistan, though preferably as part of a decentralized, federal Pakistan. It is around a program of greater autonomy and demands for more resources from the center that visible Baluch political activity is organized. The leaders and intellectuals of the Baluch nationalist movement are frequently government employees or candidates for elected office at all levels of government. Another indication that the movement is at present restricting its scope to Pakistan is that Urdu, not Baluchi, is the language

Baluch nationalist parties use at their public political rallies in Quetta and In their litera ture.

Concluslon Fanon wrote that "A national culture is the whole body of efforts made by people in the sphere of thought to describe, justify and praise the action through which that people has created itself and keeps itself In existence• (Fanon 1963:166). He was not perhaps envisioning a situation In which peoples freed from colonialism would face national and ethnic dMsions among themselves. The situation facing Pakistan's Baluch Is one that follows from the political economy and social geography of the state In which they find themselves. As its western periphery, distant, culturally distinct, sparsely populated, and poor, Baluchistan has appeared a poor Investment to those who control the Pakis tani state, not-withstanding Its strategic location, its natural gas supplies, and its poten tial mineral wealth. It appears much as it has to previous powers with an interest in the area, best controlled, but impossible to fully occupy. Yet the nation-state is a different creature than the tributary states that preceded its colonial pupal stage. Efforts to cre ate and promulgate the culture and institutions of industrial society have brought

119 greater economic, political, and cultural penetration as well as some development of the periphery in Pakistan. As a result, now more than ever before, Baluch face sus tained contact with peoples attempting to absorb them into their polity.

At this stage the obvious point must be made that what is peripheral to Pakistan is core to Baluchistanis. As their homeland and the social space in which they produce and reproduce, their land is a constituting element of Baluch identity. Yet they cannot see it or themselves purely in absolute terms, I.e., solely as the trajectory of their own history. For the Baluch and their land exist only relative to others and In that relation ship Baluch find themselves marginalized and perlpheralized. Williams observes that often the cultural or ethnic non-elite in the nation-state "form key elements of the histori cal bloc that comes to represent and 'protect' the tribal past" (Williams 1989:439). In

some sense Baluch accept this role wilHngly, a case of the virtue of necessity and the

comfort of the known and practiced. In other ways they rebel, demanding and/or work

Ing to obtain equal status and opportunities. All Baluch enact or embody a particular

blend of these two tendencies. While they confront their marginalization in Pakistan by

becoming as Pakistani as the social space allotted them (and which they agitate to ex

pand) permits, by establishing cultural alternatives (which is part of that agitation) they

keep an eye on the future, a future which may or may not unleash their ideal ·of Baluch

nationalism.

120 NOTES 1} The main loss In forgoing an emphasis on the other, Marxist approach Is the neglect of classes as the central dynamic In the forming and functioning of states. I refer to classes more Implicitly than expliclUy in the following discussion since the focus is the institu11onsof the state. and generally not the complex economic and political factors which generate them.

2) This approach Is similar to Verdery's:

[W]e might analytically separate •nation-state formation• into two components: the building of organizational and institutional structures and arenas, related to gover nance within fixed borders and to interactions across them • state building • and the production of a community Imagined as a single soclal body (Ideally contained within actual or possible state borders) - nation-building [sic] [Verdery 1990:62).

3) I say for the most part because there have been some largely unsuccessful attempts to transcend the nation-state model, e.g. the efforts to establish a pan-Arabic union. Some post-colonial states have also adapted aspects of the centrally-planned, socialist states as well. I say until recenUy because the formerly colonizing nations states of Europe are now themselves moving toward transcending the nation-state model by unit ing their economies.

4) For another interpretation of the bureaucracy In Pakistan, see Lindholm who argues that the British handed on the legacy of powerful bureaucratic institutions after attach Ing some "western trappings• to them. The Mughals, not they, were Its creators he ar gues (Lindholm 1979:54).

5) The Constituent Assembly consisted of 69 members elected in 1946 by provincial as semblies rather than by a direct popular vote (Jalal 1990:62).

6} Jahan terms the Bengali ethnic-nationalists the 'Vernacular political elite"; and he dis· tinguishes them from the national elite. The latter, mostly landlords or members of the urban upper~class he says were bilingual (English-BengaliFand were politically dominant at the time of independence. Subsequently however •new social forces gave rise to a Bengali counter-elite which was 'vernacular' and regional" (Jahan 1972:38). This group was made up of members of the lower-middle class he says, and it had an ethnic-nationalist political program.

7) Following the assassination of a PPP leader in the NWFP in 1975 the government ar rested other NAP leaders, including many Pushtun, and banned the party.

8) The quota system assigns seats in the upper levels of the bureaucracy to individuals on the basis of their civil service exam scores and their place of residence. Since 1973 its allocation procedure has remained unchanged with the exception that an additional number of positions reserved for the military have been added to it. Ten percent of the openings are chosen strictly on the basis of merit, i.e. test scores, 50 percent of the seats are reserved for applicants from the Punjab, 7.6 percent for urban Slndh, 11.4 per cent for rural Slndh, 11 .5 percent for NWFP, 3.5 percent for Baluchistan, and the remain ing 6 percent are distributed among the remaining groups in the country. The distinction between urban and rural Sindh is an important one since Sindh's cities

121 (most especially Karachi) are inhabited predominantly by Mohajirs and immigrants from other parts of Pakistan while indigenous Sindhi speakers live predominantly in rural areas.

9) This notion is central to the argument of those who assert that capitalism operates through and requires articulation with non-capitalist modes of production. See for ex ample Taylor (1979).

10) See below, Chapter Five, for a discussion of how the development of what lspahani terms •routes of access• have altered economic, political, and social relations in Baluchistan.

11 ) It should be noted that the economist who made these calculations emphasized that interprovincial income rates are an almost negligible factor in determining the in come level in any given household. Much greater differences exist within each province and income levels are much more strongly affected by such factors as residence in an urban versus rural area, the number of income earners per household, and access to income from land, other property, or interest (De Kruijk:691 ).

12) Districts in the northern mountainous districts (Hindu Kush, Karrakorum, Kashmir) are not included in the study.

13) Credit availability in Punjab is Rs43, in Sindh it is Rs36, in NWFP it is Rs15, and in Baluchistan Rs11.

14) Quoting Cohen again: •75 percent of all recruits come from only three districts in the Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and Campbellpur) and two adjacent districts in the NWFP (Kohat and Mardan) hence the army as a whole is stHI unrepresentative• (ibid.). It should also be mentioned that 10-12 percent of the officers in the Pakistan army at in dependence were Mohajirs from India. This percentage has decreased since then, but some important officers including the current commander-in-chief, Aslam Beg, are Mohajir.

15) Duncan says the Fauji Foundation is "probably the biggest industrial empire in the country" (Duncan 1989:301).

16) The National Logistics Cell was inltially $81 up to transport grain from Karachi to the interior, and was expanded to supply Afghan rebels and refugees. It now competes with private truckers and several of the respondents in the survey of bus transporters who also own trucks complained that it is taking business away from them.

17) Weaver quotes a leading tribal figure of Makran as saying that there a bullet costs one rupee (around five cents) and an egg costs two rupees (Y'o/eaver1990:96).

18) See Harrison 1981 :26 for the Pakistani and Baluch versions of these events.

19) Apropos nationalism elaborated as a system whose units exist relative to one another Williams' definition is pertinent. She defines nationalism as •a set of ideological precepts partially focused on ordering, evaluating, and homogenizing Internal heterogeneity, and partially on situating a politically defined territory (the state), its

122 people (the nation) and its culture (the nation-state) in an international arena (an order of nation-states)" (Williams 1990:128).

20) "In ethnic competition, where eyes always look beyond immediate interest to posterity, inheritance of the right amount of the right blood becomes a euphemism for inheritance of the state, and of the control over a set of criteria on the basis· of which rights In the state will be distributed to marginalized citizens• (Williams 1989:432).

21) As Durrani wrote in 1944:

The idea of Pakistan has set the Muslim imagination afire. They see strange, un dreamed of, limitless possibilities in it. ...They imagine Pakistan to be a state in which men shall be free from oppression, injustice and exploitation, and free from selfish greeds {sic], covetousness and fear of poverty [quoted in Haque 1983:376]

22) For the people of Pakistan Islam is a central unifying ideal, a source of identity, and an idiom of morality, though it takes a number of forms and olten can not transcend the ethnic or cultural differences that predate it (Ahmed 1988:31; Kurin 1987:127}- As Jalal observes

Inter and Intra-regional diversities in Pakistan seem to imply that Islam either falls short of providing a complete world view for the mass of the people or, equally palpable that its fusion with local cultures is so complete as to confound the task of bringing about a national Integration or the basis of religion alone [Jalal 1990:287].

Pakistani Musnms can be distinguished by such doctrinal and sectarian differences as those between Sunni (the school of the majority of Pakistanis though itself divided into a number of tendencies) and Shi'a, or between them and such less orthodox groups as the Zikrl and Ahmediyya. Villagers In rural areas of Punjab and Sindh have retained folk (often Hindu) practices, while among Baluch and Pushtun tribal values and cus toms are thought indistinguishable from Islam.

23) For a review of some of this literature see Janmahmad 1989:118-156_

24) The guerrilla movement Of the 19608 and 70s and the presence of guerriDacamps in Afghanistan today are palpable reminders of this ideal, and they Imply that the ideal is attalnable"perhaps in some distant time. Just as Muslims can go much of the way toward the Islamic Ideal In the way they live their own lives, so too the ideal of Baluch nationalism suggests that Baluch should strive to attain that ideal.

123 CHAPTER FOUR

LITTLE LONDON: QUETTA AND ITS BALUCH POPULATION

It Is to be expected that detrlbalization and the e~ergence of new practices, ideologies and identities will be more advanced in urban settings, and therefore the persistence of tribal structures and customs more significant, than in rural ones. It Is in urban situa tions that new and varied economic opportunities are available, educational levels higher, and political organiZations can find the support and resources with which to develop their programs. Ouetta and Karachi are the two Pakistani urban centers with significant Baluch populations. As describ~ in Chapter Two, it was the educated elite, trained in Quetta and other Indian cities, who were the first to develop Baluch · nationalist aspirations and ideologies. Though their ultimate strength depends on the extent to which they gain acceptance in rural areas, it is from these urban centers that contemporary movements In Baluch politics, from the National Awaml Party to the

Baluch Students Organization and Baluch ltehad, have emerged.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research setting and the context in which these social transformations were studied. The chapter is divided Into.three sec tions. The first presents a brief history of Ouetta and its development as a mmtary

urban center. The second describes the demography and settlement patterns of contemporary Ouetta with its large numbers of Afghan refugees and settlers from other

parts of Pakistan and India, in addition to its Baluch and Pushtun populations. The third describes the economics of the city, with speciat"emphasis on the economic ac

tivities and status of its Baluch population.

124 Hlstorlcal Foundations Quetta has been an urban center for just over 100 years. The British developed the city as an administrative center and adjunct to the army garrison they established there In the late 18705. In nearly all of the censuses conducted before 1947 military personnel

constituted one third to one quarter of Ouetta's population (Kureishy 1959:22). Hence

an Important feature of Ouetta's development was, and has continued to be, the large

percentage of its inhabitants with origins in other regions of the subcontinent.

From Shil to Ouetta Ouetta is located in the southern end of a network of narrow alluvial valleys lying be-

tween the Bolan Pass leading southeast onto the Indus Plains, and the Kuchlak Pass

leading northwest to Qandahar and southern Afghanistan. At an elevation 1,850

meters It owes Its existence as a city to this strategic location along one of the major ap

proaches to India. Quetta valley has been inhabited for thousands of years and has

had fluctuating population densities. When the British colonial government began to

develop a major military garrison there, its center was a vlllage of 4,000 Inhabitant& i clustered around a large mound topped by a mud-walled fort (BOG Quetta-Pishin:332).

The name Ouetta is derived from the Pushtu word mttA meaning fort or wailed city

(Raverty 1976:611 ; BOG Ouetta-Pishin:1 ), though historically the area was better

known as Sh61.

Before· it came under control of the expanding Brahui confederacy in the mid-18th

century Quetta fell within the administrative sphere of Oandahar and was inhabited

mainly by Pushtun. On the periphery of both empires, ultimate control of the area

shifted between the Mughals and Persians throughout the 16th and 17th centuries

With the rise of an autonomous Afghan state in Qandahar it was exclusively under

Pushtun control. It Is generally agreed that the Afghan King Ahmad Shah Abdalll

125 granted tributary rights for Quetta to Khan Nasir Khan of Kalal as a reward for military service against the Persians in the Battle of Meshad in 1759 (BOG Quetta-Pishin:35;

Baluch 1984:85).'

In recent centuries the population has been predominantly Pushtun, most notably of the Kasi tribe, but when Kalal assumed suzerainty Brahui also began to settle its southern part. KAsi tradition holds they entered the area seven centuries ago (BOG

Quetta-Pishin:75; see also Masson 1974a:332). A numerically small tribe, the KAsi were subject to more powerful neighbors. For example under Khan Nasir Khan they paid an annual tribute In grain and cash to Kalal (BOG Quetta-Pishln:74; see also Mas son 1974b:106; Elphinstone 1969:449). While the KAsi continued to hold the central and most fertile part of~e valley, they also sold lands to the areas north and east of it

(e.g., Hanna) to members of other Pushtun tribes, notably KAkar and DurrAni (BOG

Ouetta-Plshin:245). Masson, an early (1827) British traveler through the area, reported

ShiwAni Inhabiting the southern part of the vaDey (Masson 1974a:330).2

The Treaty of 1876 between the Government of India and the Khan of Kalat and his sardars set the terms through which the British.extended their presence Into

Baluchistan and established a str~ng presence 111Ouetta. The terms of the Treaty granted the British the right to station troops on the Khan's territory and also allowed the construction of railways and telegraph lines to link them to India. Just two years

after the establishment of the garrison in Ouetta, Its international importance was under

scored as troops and logistical support from it played a central role in the second war

between the British and Afghans. In 18n the Government of India demarcated a new

administrative unit, the Baluchistan Agency whose headquarters were in Quetta .. Much If ii of the new agency's lands were leased from the Khan of Kalat, though the Government

of India eventually purchased the 3,750 acres of land on which they developed the gar-

126 rison and the civil town. Of that land the military cantonment, encompassing the old fort and separated from the civil town by a watercourse (the Habib N!la), occupied

3.500 acres though mueh of it was stony waste lands (BOG Ouetta-Pishln:335).

With the establishment of the garrison the population of the valley increased rapidly. The need to staff and service the garrison and civil service drew over 20,000 people to Ouetta in the 25 years between the signing of the treaty and the 1901 cen sus. Most of the influx came from other parts of India, much of it from the neighboring provinces of Punjab and Sindh, and there were nearly as many Hindu and Sikh in habitants (10,300) as there were Muslims (10,400). These immigrants from other parts of India, rather than local inhabitants of the region played the leading role in the development of Quetta's urban character. This is indicated by the Baluchistan District

Gazetteer's observation that "Punjabls and Sindls, with a few Europeans and Parsis, monopolize almost aUthe trade and the educated professions, and fill most of the ap pointments in the local Government offices• (BOG Ouetta-Pishin:333).

As It developed under the British, Ouetta consisted of three physically and social ly distinct parts laid out roughly on a grid pattern. To the north was the military-canton ment area, which along with barracks and headquarters for infantry, artillery and engineer corps, came to have an airforce base and a staff college. With around 12,000 troops, by 1935 the garrison had become the largest in British India (Jackson 1960:16-

17). To the south of the cantonment lay the more densely populated civilian area which was itself divided into European and native quarters. The dividing line between them was Bruce Road (now Jinnah Road) with the Indian bazaarand residential area to the south and east of it and the European area to the north and west. The latter, known as the CMI Lines, was the location of administrative buildings, the post office and the railway, as well as European civilian residences and the Quetta Club. In May,

127 1935 an earthquake razed virtually all of Quetta's civilian areas and killed between

20,000 and 30,000 (Jackson 1960:241). The city was rebuilt on approximately the same layout as previously though it differed from its predecessor since some landmarks

(e.g., the Sandeman Jirga Hall), were not rebuilt; the government enforced strict new building codes; and inhabitants of the Indian quarter had to give up property in order to widen the •narrow and congested streets• during the rebuilding (Pinhey 1938:41 ).

The core of the city has retained these patterns in the Pakistan era (see Map 3).

The cantonment remains sparsely populated and highly ordered, as does the former

Civil Lines area. Now, however, many former villages OWi)on the outskirts of the city are virtually incorporated within it.

The Demography of Post-cotonlal Quetta Quetta's demography is a picture of dazzling complexity. Its population increases in the summer and shrinks ln the winter and a large percentage of it are people from

India, Afghanistan, and other parts.of Pakistan. No single ethnic group constitutes a majority of its Inhabitants unless perhaps Pushtun refugees from Afghanistan and local

Pushtun are considered a single category. Patterns of residence ln Quetta are also

~mplex with some of Its urban neighborhoods ethnically distinct and others mixed. In the rural parts of the Ouetta basin a general observation can be made that Baluch in

habit the areas to the south of the city and Pushtun inhabit those north of it. With the in flux of Afghan refugees in recent years this dichotomy, probably never absOlute, has been breaking down, especially in Baluch areas .

Census and Sensibilities Ouetta grew steadily through the 20th century, and, though most of the non-Muslims left at the time of British withdrawal and Partition, the city's ethnic makeup is markedly

different from the rest of Baluchistan's with a continuing pattern of dominance by non-

128 Map 3: Ouetta. Based on Ouetta Gulde Map, UonArt Press, Lahore.

129 locals. According to the government's census figures, by 1941 the population of the city was 65,000, by 1961 it reached 107,000, and by 1981 it was officially 286,000. 3

Since 1951, the government of Pakistan has collected no census data on ethnic group affiliation directly. The only category in the 1981 census that gives an idea of the numeric strength of ethnic groups is that of the primary language spoken in the household. Because household size can differ between ethnic groups, or between urban.and rural settings, this figure gives at best an approximate notion of the demographic status of ethnic populations (Addleton 1986:56).

According to those figures, in 1981 the population of the whole of Baluchistan province was 4,332,000 of which 57 percent of the households were Baluchi- or Brahui speaking, 25 percent were Pushtu-speaking, and the combined proportion of Urdu and Punjabi-speaking households was around four percent. 4 By contrast Quetta

Municipal Corporation and the Cantonment together had a population of 286,000 of which only 16 percent of the households were Brahui- or Baluchl-speaklng, 36 percent were Pushtu-speaking, and nearly 40 percent were Punjabi- and Urdu-speaklng. 5 It should be noted that Ouetta's census figures do not include the population of the sub urban Pushtun and Baluch villages that are outside the Municipal Corporation boun daries. These villages do Influence Ouetta's ethnic complexion since they are practically, If not administratively, part of the city. Therefore the percentage of non* cals in the city's actual population ls somewhat less than the census indicates, but sig nificantly more than that of the rest of the province.

Though it gives a general idea of the ethnic makeup of both the province and the city, the census figures mask a complex, rapidly changing and often disputed reality. It does not, for example, account for the city's large refugee population which is itseH eth nically diverse, Though the majority of the refugees are Pushtun, there are also large

130 numbers of Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Tajiks among them. In religious terms Quetta's population, like that of the rest of Pakistan, is overwhelmingly Muslim. While most

Pakistanis practice Sunni Islam, a significant proportion are Shi'a. Such is also the case in Quetta where the Shi'a population is represented primarily by Hazaras, a Per sian speaking people of Mongolian descent most of whom occupy the mountainous regions of central Afghanistan. Ouetta's Hazara community dates from the tum of the century when large numbers fled civil war and persecution in their homeland to settle there under British protection (Poladi 1989:267). The British formed a battalion of

Hazara soldiers in Quetta in 1904 and Hazaras have continued to be an important ele ment of the military in Pakistan!' There are a number of other religious minorities in the city. Despite persecution during Partition a sman number of Hindus (670 according to the 1981 census) have remained, some of whom have businesses on Jinnah Road, the city's main thoroughfare. A larger number of Pakistani Christians (8,700), both catholic and Protestant. also live In Quetta, many of whom constltut!l a sort of sweepercaste.

There is also a small colony of well-to-do Parsi Zoroastrians; the Chief Secretary of

Baluchistan as well as Pakistan's ambassador to the United States during the period of my research were from Quetta's Parsi community.

The Settlers7 In Sl,ltVeying the census data I have combined Punjabl-·and Urdu-speaking households into a single category, a category inhabitants of Quetta also make use of and which they often refer to as 'Settlers'. This is useful in so far as members of these two ethnic groups have prevailed in the economic, bureaucratic, and educational institutions of

Pakistan In its first decades. It Is also true, however, that the economic and social dynamics of the two groups are distinct. Those who speak Urdu as their first language are for the most part immigrants from India who came to Pakistan at partition or sub-

131 sequent to It. They are known collectively as MohAjirs, a term that can be glossed as refugees, and was used for the early Muslims who followed the Prophet Muhammad in his flight from Mecca to Medina.8 Despite_the wide diversity in the ethnic and. social background of the MohAjirs, In general their strong support of Pakistan and their rela tively high levels of education, training, etc. led them to play a prominent role in the new state. MohAjirs came to Quella primarily for positions In the government's bureaucracies, state enterprises such as railways and banks, and the military (Pakistan

1954:25), though some were also given lands in the city which had been abandoned by Hindus. They constituted a significant proportion of the city's population Immedi ately after independence, 22 percent in the 1951 census (Kureishy 1959:16). With con tinuing migration by other groups their percentage of Quetta's population had dropped to 14.5 percent In 1980.

Though Punjabis settling in Quella after partition have sought similar economic niches to those Mohliirs have sought, they have utilized .other options as well. Even more than Mohijir~, Punjabls have a strong presence In the security forces and both the army and the police at all levels are staffed overwhelmingly by Punjabls. In Quella

Punjabis have also. gone Into business and some of the space created by the depar ture of Hindus and Sikhs at independence, was filled by Punjabi merchants. Many of the wholesale merchants (e.g., those selling flour, sugar, oll etc.) In Quella today are

Punjabi, though several Informants said that some of them had left the city when hos tility against them grew during the political disturbances of the late 1960s and the

1970S. Prominent Punjabi businessmen control some of Baluchistan's largest economic enterprises such as mines and companies which distribute the coal mined in the province.

132 The Politics of Population The census In Baluchistan Is never far from controversy and many question its ac curacy. Doubts about the census stem in part from the difficulties faced by under funded agencies In compiffng statistics on an insular and dispersed rural and nomadic population. Other concerns are political since the census Is the basis for the division of

many of the government's economic and political resources. Baluch repeatedly told

me, for example, that their population is underestimated In the Ouetta Municipal Cor poration where a Pushtun majority is reflected in their majority on the c:ity council, while

Pushtun often dispute the Baluch provincial majority claiming that, though smaller In area, Baluchistan's Pushtun districts are more densely populated than the Baluch.1

One of the officers In the Pakistan government's statistical division responsible for

Baluchistan's 1981 census described in an interview his bureau's hierarchy of field workers and supervising officers and the standard procedures they used for gathering the census data. His description may have been more normative than real, however, for In another Interview a government official who had been a District Commissioner In

a rural area of Baluchistan during that census (and thus an officer responsible for super vising census data collection) claimed that in his division they had simply added ten percent onto the figures of the previous census to arrive at their figures. 10 If this prac tice was widespread It would, of course, explain why current figures correspond neatly to earlier ones, which they do (see Note Four of this chapter).

Some Senseof Place A description of the city and its ambience can be made only by emphasizing the division between its military and civilian sectors. Since the army consists for the most

part of men from the Punjab and the Northwest Frontier Province, Its presence Is a

major reason for Quetta's distinct ethnic profile. The Quella cantonment Is one of

133 Pakistan's largest and most important. Its staff college is the only one in Pakistan, and it has international status with military officers from the United States, and European,

African, and Asian countries attending it (in exchange for Pakistani officers training In those countries). Along with the army there is a major airforce base on Quetta's out skirts. Despite the presence !)f this large military force, a strange dichotomy between the two parts of the city make it almost invisible in the civman areas. While Pakistani civilians (but not foreigners) live in the cantonment which, as in other Pakistani cities, has some of its most pleasant neighborhoods, the military is for the most part absent from the civilian areas. Though officers sometimes eppear In Quetta's major stores or

banks, and caravans of army vehicles occasionally pass on the main roads which skirt the city center, there are no groups of uniformed or non-uniformed soldiers visible on

city streets. The only exception to this t witnessed was during ethnic riots in August of

1988 when the army was called upon to stop the violence and maintain a curfew in

parts of the city for several week$.

Formerly Ouetta's cosmopolitan lltmosphere earned it the sobriquet 'Utile

London'. Though some of its glamour is fading as it comes to resemble most Other

south Asian cities, the diversity of Its population, Its closeness to the international bor

der, and its status as a seat of government combine to give Quetta an atmosphere

simultaneously sophisticated and provincial. A merchant with a shop on Jinnah Road

nostalgically described how clean the streets were in the 19505 and 1960s when only a

few wealthy people and sardars had cars and everyone wore European style suits

rather than the shA!wAr-kamjzof today. 11 Several Informants described the distinct at

titude that natives and longtime residents of the city share. A newspaper reporter who

grew up In the city claimed in an interview that the longtime residents of Quetta do not

make ethnic distinctions. They speak each others' languages, socialize with each other

134 even when they do not share the same political affiliations, and intermarry. He claimed that extreme politics and ethnic tensions are the. result of new-<:omers who do not

share that altitude.

Patterns of Residence Given the tack of government data on the subJect and the tendency for Muslims to

shield their family life from public view, it is difficult to arrive at a valid description of eth

nic residence patterns within Quetta. The magnitude of the task would have been well

beyond what a one-man anthropological demographic survey could have ac

compllshed. However the Baluchistan District Gazetteer's demography and history of

the Quetta district provide a good starting point for developing some notion of residen

tial patterns In the are11,to which can be added the data J obtained through interviews

and personal observation.

In the 19th century Kisi Pushtuns were the main landowners In the area that was

to become Ouetta proper, as well as In the lands immediately to the south of the city.

Further south members of the Brahui speaking ShAwAni tribe held most of the land. Al>

cording to a prominent Quetta lawyer, _whodealt with some of the disputes which

resulted from the government appropriating t

Town (the city's first suburb), SariAb Road, which runs north and south along the mid

dle of the valley can be used as an approximate dividing line in the area Just south of

the city. The Kisl he said owned the land to the east of Sar!Ab Road and their tenants

on that land had been members of the Brahui Jatak and RaisAni tribes, while the

ShAwAni held the lands to the west of the road and their tenants had mostly been Ban

gulzai and Lehri. All four of the tribes whose members were tenants are currently

among the most populous and prominent Brahui tribes in Quetta as are the ShAwAni.

t35 Although members of the KAsi tribe are still Important landowners in Ouetta, they have sold most of what they once owned. KAsl m4llls.a(large landowners often with an office or personal importance within the tribe) still have major land holdings In such areas of Ouetta as Hudda, Samangli Road, Kili Shaikan and even further away from the city in Bul&li a.nd KuchlAk (see Map 4). Despite this it is commonly observed that the

KAsi squandered their large landholdings. The lawyer mentioned above joked with a

KAsi man we were visiting that the KAsi had sold their land for glL[ and .b!ir.a(raw sugar and millet), the staples of the poor, and a young KAsl professor at Baluchistan Univer- ' sity once joked that-the KAsi had spent all the money they gained from selling their lands on women and alcohol. But the KAsi are in fact still quite prominent as a group in

Ouetta, and many have obtained education and entered professions.

Ethnic Boundaries Numerous maps depict Quetta as part of a boundary zone between Pushtun and

Baluch territories. for an example see the map reproduced here from the 1921 Census of India (Map 1), and for other examples see Figure 1 In Harrison (1981) and also Map

8 In_lspahani (1989). It Is, in fact, accurate to say an approximate dividing line between the two groups can be drawn running steeply northwest to southeast through the city.

To the north of It the population is predominantly Pushtun, to the south of it Baluch.

While such a boundary Is flexible, porous, and has moved through time, It can be thought of as a boundary between similar cultural groups. Though Leach (1967) ar gues against the notion of boundaries between groups and he describes populations

in highland Burma with the potential to revert from one social form to another, the situa tion in northern Baluchistan can be thought of as one In which a boundary exists be tween groups that are distinguishable by their principles of social organization. Such a

boundary is certainly only approximate since individuals or small groups from each eth-

136 Ethnic M.,.-ities

~. Balueh . ~ Push tun Settlers m- Hazara Keehr se· ·.::: : : : :: : : :: : :: : :: : : : : : : : : :: : : : . Map 4: The Distribution of Ethnic Groups In Ouetta. Based on a map produced for their own use by the Election Commraalon of Ouetta, November 1988.

137 nlc group live In each other's territory. While the situation may differ In other districts

(e.g., Loralai), In and around Quetta (and even further south) Pushtuns reside In Baluch

areas more often than vice versa.

The picture is more complicated within the urban core than outside It, and certain_

parts of Quetta proper, mostly neighborhoods on the periphery of the city center, are

areas of ethnic concentration, while others are ethnically mixed. For example Hazaras

almost exclusively Inhabit the area east of the city center known as Marriabad; 12

Brewery Road and Hudda are areas of Baluch concentration; and PushtunabAd, as the

name implies, is a Pushtun area (see Map 4). Though reconstructed after the

earthquake of 1935, the central bazaars and the residential.areas Immediately surround

ing them _arethe oldest parts of the city and still bear reminders of their pre-Pakistan

past such as street names like Gordat Singh Road and M6ti RAm Road. An unofficial

map Quetta's election commission prepared for their own reference in the 1988 elec

tions, and which I have reproduced here (Map 4), depicts this as a settler (I.e., Punjabi

and Mohajir) majority area, though there are certainly members of local ethnic groups,

, especially those with long-standing ties to the city, residing in the area. Nawab Bugti,

with a house in the downtown area, and the l

compound called Kila l

Demographic Transitions and Their Impact

The demography of the city is dramatically changing due to the influx of Afghan

refugees and continuing rural-to-urban migration, with most of the additional population

being added to its outskirts. While the central and older parts of the city are really

urban in character with (albeit In some cases poorly) paved roads and brick and ce

ment buildings, areas on the outskirts of the city begin to resemble villages. In the

areas along Sariab Road known as Burma Hotel and Gharib Abad mud walls (which do

138 in fact often hide brick houses but also ones of mud) and dirt roads, frequently too nar row to drive through, become common in residential areas. Some viUages in this area were once agricultural but are now being absorbed into the urban miHeu.13 Though most have electricity, some only have water at public wells and are without gas or telephone services. In several areas, e.g., in the areas south and east of PushtunabAd, as well as areas north of Brewery Road, Afghan refugees are establishing settlements, often by simply occupying land.

Another factor which is contributing to changing the residential pattem of the city

Is the ethnic tensions that have developed over the past decade. A member of a prominent Brahul tribe who lives with his adult sons in the mainly Baluch Brewery Road area said that previously he lived In an ethnically mixed neighborhood but had built his current home after the ethnic violence Of 1986 because he felt he would have been vul nerable there If relations between the ethnic groups deteriorated further. A Baluch university student who on several occasions helped me with fieldwork told a similar tale. He lives with his family in Kili Alamo, the area furthest north In Ouetta with a

Baluch majority. Worried by the large influx of Pushtuns (many of whom are refugees) into the area, they have purchased land south Of the city though he said they had not yet constructed a house on it and did not have immediate plans to do so.

Tribe and Territory

The residence patterns of the Baluch living In more truly urban areas differ from those of Baluch living in the villages and agricultural areas just south of the city. There are a few discernible tribal concentrations within Quetta's city limits. The Lehri tribe, for ex ample, Is concentrated in certain parts of Brewery Road. as well as in the area between the University and the bus stand known as Kill GhounsabAd. The urban Batuch popula tion is generally of mixed tribal background, however. People migrate to the city as In-

139 dividuals or as part of (often extended) families. While households may be In com pounds within which several related nuclear families reside, there do not seem to be broader patterns above that level in Quetta. A systematic survey might reveal other wise.

This is less the case in the areas south of the city where there is an agricultural basis to the settlement patterns. There the patterns of land-holding that follow from the tenancy relations discussed above have created areas of tribal concentration. The

ShAwani tribe for example holds much of the land in Kachi Blig; members of the

Kambarlni tribe hold most of the land in Kili KambarAni; and ,there is a strong presence of the Jatak tribe in the area east of Gharib Abad and south of Satellite Town. Even in these areas the tendency to sell or lease lands makes the settlement patterns very com plex al1dthere are households or compounds of various Baluch and even Pushtun tribes. Given figures on urbanization, it Is probable that significant numbers of people in the peripheral areas of the city are new arrivals. Many of those leasing shops In the

Baluch majority area along SariAb Road are Afghan refugees for example. But the presence of a tribally (if not ethnically) mixed population with high percentages of cer tain tribes Is probably of long standing given that Individuals have been coming to Quet ta to work and settle for nearly a century.

The recent growth in the Pushtun population of the city, largely but not exclusive ly Afghan refugees, has led to tensions and disputes over land. Newcomers have set tled throughout the city but predominanUy on its periphery. Several informants charged that the refugees have Illegally settled on lands they have no title to, and some confrontations have taken place as a result. Some idea of the attitudes this process is generating can be gauged by an informant's account of the spread of squatter settle ments. The informant, a Brahul-speaking professor at Baluchistan University, claimed

140 that it was the strong presence of members of the Brahui Jatak tribe which prevented the advance of Pushtun squatter settlements into Baluch areas south of Satellite Town.

He said that illegal occupations of lands along tile base of the mountains to the east of the city had spread from PushtunabAd, through KAkar Colony to areas south of there.

While other informants criticized the Jatak as troublemakers, he praised them for their strength and resolve, asserting that the Pushtun expansion ceased when it reached the lands of the Jatak who were prepared to respond with arms if necessary to halt it.

While I did not attempt to determine the truth of this account, other informants con firmed that there had been illegal occupations of land in the area, though in some in stances it was not a case of people simply seizing land but of others Hlegally selling It to them.

The Brewery Land Dispute Toe latter appears to be the situation In a land dispute along Brewery Road, an impor tant case study because it illustrates many of the Issues and relationships which lie beneath the social and ethnic dynamics of the city. In this case the fight over owner ship of land led to the shooting death of one Baluch man and injuries to several Push tun. The provincial government convened a ll.cgaof Baluch and Pushtun sardars to settle the dispute. In Its report the ll.cgatraced the history of the disputed land which the government had allotted to Mohljirs after its Hindu owners abandoned it In 1947.

They In turn sold it to local residents. Though the report's account of the ownership of the land is somewhat tangled, it appears that a member of the Brahul Zehrl tribe pur chased it and when he died his inheritors sold it to a member of the Lehri tribe. In 1984

Pushtun occupied and built houses on 41 of the 57 acres of the disputed parcel, claim ing they had purchased it from a relative of the Lehri man who was the owner of record.

Their ownership was later chaUenged and when violence erupted over the issue a Lehrl

141 man was shot and killed. The Jirga concluded that, although the land belonged to

Baluch, to be forced to abandon it would be a hardship on those who had built their

homes there. The Jirgatherefore ordered the Pushtun to pay the Baluch a reasonable

price for the land (which the Jirga determined) and It also Imposed a fine of Rs50,000

(U.S. $2,300) to be paid as compensation to the family of the victim of the shooting.

In addition to what It reveals about the property relations and settlement patterns

in Quella, as a case study, the Brewery land dispute also illustrates some of the ways

tribal structures and traditions continue to operate in the urban context. It is significant that the provincial government.opted to form a Jirga in this case rather than attempt to

settle the dispute through the standard Pakistani legal system under which the urban

areas of Baluchistan are generally governed. Though some Baluch challenge the

moral and political legitimacy of the sardars, In issues perceived as tribal, their authority

and prestige persist. An effort to resolve the conflict that had the support of the sar

dars was more likely to be seen as legitimate and thus prevent further violence than

would an initiative coming solely from the police or the government. A Jirga bases its

decisions on tribal tili!l, or the code of honor and conduct. Because it seeks to COl!l·

promise and to compensate those who suffered loss rather than simply to punish, a ji[ga's decision generally allows each side to gain something In the settlement and

preserve their honor. The result is that renewed violence is less likely 1Qoccur. Be·

cause the Pakistani legal system Is viewed as corrupt, and because cases tried within it

may drag on for years, even in the city Baluch frequently solve their disputes outside it,

often by calling on sardars to mediate. It is rare though that the government actually

calls upon a Jlcgato settle a dispute.

142 14 Quetta's Economy Quetta's economy Is based primarily on trade and agriculture. There is also a significant economic dimension to its status as the administrative center of the province since the various government agencies employ people at all levels. Though it is Itself a sizable market, much of the reason for Quetta's role as a trade center is Its location on the routes between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. It follows from Its importance as a trade center and its economically Important location (which is at the same time peripheral to the major industrial and port facilities of Pakistan). that road and rail transportation are also Important aspects of the city's economy. Although Baluch are

pcesent and active In each of these sectors of the economy, members of other ethnic

groups, notably Pushtuns and Punjabis, control most economic activity In the city.

Trade In Historical Perspective Though located on a historic trade route, the patterns of Ouetta's current economy were largely established during the British era. Considerable trade developed between

British India and Iran and Afghanistan through Quetta, most of It in the hands of Hindu

and Sikh merohants. Iran and Afghanistan were industrially undeveloped; so the

products manufactured in British India or Imported into it were in demand In both

places, and were obtained In exchange for dried fruits, almond-and pistachio nuts, car

pets, wool, silk, hashish, and raw animal hides (see Raverty 1976:499). Goods were transported by rail and on cam_elcaravans, operated by Baluch on the route to Iran and

Pushtun on that to Afghanistan.

The trade with Afghanistan was probably the more important of the two and in ad·

dition to dried fruit, fresh fruit was an important Item of trade. Some of the trade In

dried goods and more expensive items was carried out by Pushtun nomads (called

p(lhwinda,)who moved with their herds and merchandise on a transhumant pattern

143 along number of routes from the highlands onto the Indian plains in the winter and back again when the hot weather arrived. Though most pOhwinda bypassed Quetta, rail and roadways linked the city to border town of Chaman which was in turn con nected by road to Qandahar. Qandahar is well known for its orchards and gardens, and along with the trade In dried fruits and nuts there was and continues to be a market in Quetta for such fresh fruits grown there as aml1llmelons, peaches, apricots, and pomegranates.

Trade Today These two types of the trade with Afghanistan fit into different sectors of Quetta's economy and continue to retain Importance In it. Different sets of merchants handle the fresh fruit and vegetable trade, and the dried fruits trade. The latter is included in the wholesale business which supplies such bulk items as flour, rice, sugar, tobacco,

pulse, spices and ·cooking oil. These merchants also deal in the dried fruits and nuts which are produced in both the northern Pushtun (apricots, almonds) and southern

Baluch (dates) parts of Baluchistan. The fresh fruit and vegetable merchants supply

Quetta with both locally grown produce and those products imported from other regions, but more importantly they export large quantities of fresh fruits to other parts

of Pakistan. Northern Baluchistan's high altitude creates the temperate conditions In which flourish such crops as grapes, stone fruit and apples that can not be grown on

Pakistan's sub-tropical plains. Baluchistan in fact produces about 50 percent of

Pakistan's total fruit crop (Spooner and Jones 1982:16).

After independence.the major change which took place in Quetta was that Pun jabi and Pushtun merchants replaced the Hindu and Sikh ones who had abandoned the city following riots aimed at them. With their business and family connections in the

parts of the country those goods come from, Punjabi merchants are well situated to

144 succeed In the dry goods sector. Most of the fresh produce merchants are Pushtun though a significant proportion are Baluch. While I did not Investigate Its dynamics, the informant who described the fresh fruit and vegetable trade to me asserted that It Is be coming Increasingly polarized along ethnic lines with Baluch growers selling to Baluch merchants and Pushtun growers to Pushtun merchants.

Another change that has taken place In recent decades is that, though the Items which were previously Important In the trade with Iran and Afghanistan continue to be

Imported, other Items have assumed greater significance. More Important now Is the trade in durable consumer Items, much of which Is carried out Illegally (see Rlaz 1990).

Because of high tariffs In Pakistan and low ones In Afghanistan goods produced In

Europe, Japan, and the United States are more profitably smuggled from Afghanistan than Imported directly Into Pakistan from the producers. From Iran come Items which are produced In factories there and which people consider of batter quality than those produced In Pakistan. The free flow of money and materials for the civil warIn Afghanis tan has also encouraged the smuggling of Illegal goods, notably weapons and drugs,

Into Baluchistan.

Another Important factor in the city's economy is the trade In coal mined In the province. Although other minerals are mined in smaller quantities in Baluchistan (the most notable being chromite and barite), coal Is the most significant In Quetta's economy. 15 Coal mining was developed during the colonial era though Baluchistan's output never accounted for more than one percent of the total mined In India (India.

Oep't of Commercial Intelligence 1935:850-1; India. Office of the Economic Adviser

1949:394). It has been a more significant percentage of that mined In Pakistan, and In

1986 over haH of the 2 milHon tons of coal mined in the country came from Baluchistan

(Pakistan. Fed. Bureau of Statistics 1988:202). It is, however of low quality (Spooner

145 and Jones 1982:15), and according to one Informant, primarily shipped to the Punjab where it is used in brick kilns. Similar to other enterprises Punjabi businessmen moved to control the industry once the Hindus and Sikhs who had been running it left in 1947.

One of Quetta's most prominent and influential families, the Parachas, are included in this group of coal merchants. In recent years some Baluch and Pushtun entrepreneurs have entered this business. These merchants are agents who buy coal from the mine owners, frequently loaning them money to tide them over the periods when the coal can not be mined because the weather Is too hot or wet, and sell it to distributors or users In other parts of Pakistan. In the words of my informant "There are 50 to 60 coal merchants in Ouetta and they are ail milliona,res".

Industry and Manufacturing Industry and manufacturing is minimal in Quetta. The best known and most successful industry in the city is Marker Alkaloids, a pharmaceuticals manufacturing plant owned by a member of the local Parsi commu!'lity, Other important industries are fruit preser vation, the production of gbi (cooking oil), and the Bolan Textile Mills at Bul&UOust north of the city) (Pakistan. Population Census Org. 1983:2). In addition the Baluchis tan Development Authority is searching for investors to fund a number of other projects in Quetta, including apple and grape juice extracting plants, a slaughterhouse and meat packing plant, a cement pipe factory, foundries, and a cold storage (see Baluchis tan Development Authority 1986). However the lack of development In the city and in the Province as a whole continues to be an issue which angers Baluchistanis.

At the southern end of the valley off SariAb Road sits an idle textile mill which 11· lustrates many of the tensions and clashing attitudes over development in Ouetta.

Originally developed as a joint venture between the governments of Pakistan and Iran in the era of the Shah and Zulfikar Bhutto, it operated at a loss until it was shut down in

146 the early 1980s. The government continues to pay a percentage of their salary to the miR's staff, and there are constant suggestions of reopening it. For many Baluch the mill is a symbol of the government's lack of concern for the development of the province. They hold that while the Iranian government upheld Its part of the contract, the Pakistan government never fully complied with its terms, and, In fact, corruption and mismanagement by Pakistani managers caused the enterprise to fail. A Punjabi policeman who had lived in Ouetta for over twenty years echoed the sentiments of other Settlers In Quetta when he countered by saying that the reason the factory was not successful was that the local people do not want to work. He said that they want to get paid without working and that while the mill was open its workers were constantly calling strikes which hindered it from operating efficiently. This falls to explain, of course, why several private industries in the city continue to function profitably with local work forces.

In addition to larger scale industries there are numerous small-scale manufactur ing enterprises in the city, most of which appear to be operated by Settlers. They In clude bakeries and sweets shops, furniture makers, printers and bookbinders, jewelers, and tailors. Baluch do predominate in one of these, the manufacture of sturdy leather sandals which are pattemed on the Indigenous footwear in the tribal areas. An economic activity in which both Baluch men and women participate Is embroidery.

Using sewing machines male Baluch tailors embroider the designs on the everyday clothing wom by Baluch women while Baluch women do the more intricate and deli cate hand-stitching and mirror work that Is found on more expensive clothing and cushions. Several Informants complained however that these women generally work on a contract basis for boutiques who pay small amounts for the work which they then sell at high prices.

147 . As elaborated in Chapter Five, survey data show that a significant portion of

Baluchistan's transport is owned and operated by Baluch. This Is especlally true of the buses that operate between the villages and cities In Baluch majority areas. Most transporters own one or two buses which they operate themselves or with family, but there are some major transport companies several of which are owned by Baluch businessmen. Compared to Pushtun bus owners Baruch transporters are less well rep resented on some of the inter-province routes, most notably on the Quetta to Karachi route which ls economically the most important In the province. Pushtun transporters also appear to dominate in the trucking industry, but no survey data was conducted to test this observation. Perhaps more significant than the presence of Baluch In transpor tation Is the tendency for them to be losing some of their share of that business to

Pushtun transporters, a trend which is discussed further In Chapters Five and Eight

The Clvll Service

The various departments of the national and provincial governments alongwith the in ternational aid and development agencies which operate In Baluchistan provide the big gest source of employment In Quetta's economy. They hire people with a range of educational backgrounds, skills and experience, from drivers, chaukidArs (watchmen), gardeners, and '2mD1 (delivery boys) to high level bureaucrats, engineers, and doc tors. The largest employer in the province is the Government of Baluchistan, which, ac cording to a 1987 survey the Provincial Assembly conducted, employs 73,579 people.

Governmental hiring is a constant point of controversy and Baluch and Pushtun com plain that their share of the positions In the bureaucracy, especially in the upper grades is Inadequate given their population. Urdu- and Punjabi-speaking Settlers, who general ly out perform locals on the tests which determine eligibility for those positions, counter that merit, not quotas should be the criterion for ~lacement.

148 tt the criterion for judgment Is only representation relative to a group's percentage of the population, the 1987 survey shows that there is validity to Baluchistanis' claims that they are under-represented at the upper levels of the bureaucracy. It found that ap proximately 50 percent (36,838) of all the Provincial Government's employees were

Baluch (eHher Baluchl- or Brahui-speaking), 27 percent (20,461) were Pushtun and 13 percent (10,271) were Settlers. 16 These employees are divided into 21 different grades which reflect the ranking and corresponding salaries of ail the positions for which people are hired. This ranked structure of grades is intended to reflect the level of skill and/or seniority required to hold such a position. 17 86 percent (63,987) of all the posi tions In this structure are in the lowest 1O grades. Baiuch fill 50 percent (33,425) of them, Pushtun 27 percent (17,845) and Settlers 11.5 percent (7,396). For the highest five grades Onwhich there was a total of 3,083 employees), the percentages are slg· nllicantly different, however, with the Baluch 111HngJust 30 percent (942) of them, Push tun 26 percent (793) and Settlers 38 percent (11,724).

The Valley'sAgriculture Though pastoralism is the predominant agricultural actiVityin Baluchistan, u In other settings where an adequate supply of water can be assured, farming Is more Im portant In the Quetta basin. Water (and to a lesser extent soil) is the Hmiting factor In ' the development of Quetta's agriculture. Spooner and Jones report that due to water scarcity, Inefficient practices, and negligible use of fertilizers agricultural output Is low In

Baluchistan relative to the average in Pakistan though the situation may be somewhat better In Quetta due to its accessible markets and the Agricultural Research Station on the city's outskirts (Spooner and Jones 1982:15-7). Most cultivated land in Baluchistan is devoted to grain crops, wheat being the most common followed by sorghum and

149 rice but where perennial irrigation is possible it is generally applied to orchards or other cash crops, especially tobacco. Such is the case in Quetta.

Viewed in cross-section the valley of Quetta has three distinct zones measured in terms of slope and soil type. The land along the base of the mountains on both sides is the steepest (5-1 O) and the stoniest. Toward the valley center the next zone has a more gradual slope (2·5) and soil with pebbles, clay, and sandy loam. The center the valley is flattest and the soil there is a fine sandy loam. Land use follows the landscape. In the center of the valley farmers grow fruits and vegetables (onions, tomatoes, turnips, potatoes, spinach, cauliflower, carrots and peas); in the Intermediate zone they grow grain and fodder crops; and the peripheral zone is suitable only for pas· turage (Scholz 1978:92-5). It Is along this third zone that Pushtun transhumant nomads camp and skirt the city with their herds In their annual migrations.

Traditionally lsllrJzirrigation made possible Intensive agriculture In the valley cen ter. A ls.ai!zis a series of vertical shafts connected at the bottom by lateral tunnels to form an underground channel from a water source (usually at the base of mountains) to its point of use. Mechenized pumping for Irrigation and city use have caused the water table to drop, and as a result all but one of the lsiU!zin the Quetta basin {that at

Kachi 86g) have dried up. In Interviews, farmers at KiliKambarani told me that most of them could not afford the cost of the drilling and pumps necessary to extract water so they must buy it from those who can or from those who have access to lsilclzwater.

In addition to irrigated agriculture some rain fed agriculture is practiced in the val· ley but it is unreliable. In this case fields are prepared within low embankments. H suffi· cient rainfall occurs the runoff Is channeled onto the field In which will subsequently be planted grain crops or, in some cases, melons.

150 As stated above, the area to the south of Quella city is ethnically Baluch though the pattern of agricultural land ownership is mixed in tribal terms. Regarding Baluch set tlement of this part of the valley much of the land was initially, and to a large extent still is, In the hands of members of the ShAwani tribe who received it from the Khan of Kalal.

However they have sold considerable amounts of that land to former (Baluch) tenants and others, including in some cases, Pushtun. Land is not owned predominantly by sardars or their families, though, on the other hand, large landowners are in many cases important figures either in tribal structures or government tribunals which deal with tribal affairs. An economics professor at Baluchistan University estimated that among the Baluch population in the Quella basin only 10 percent actually own land.

Most of them, he said, work their land, themselves, though some use tenant share-crop pers. The significance of agriculture in Quetta's economy would thus seem to be less than It is In the province as a whole since it is estimated that 65 percent of

Baluchistan's labor force and 56 percent of its gross domestic product is tied to agricul ture (Spooner and Jones 1982:16).

Conclusion Though It is the capitol of Baluchistan, it is not possible to call Quetta a Baluch city.

The Brl.tlsh acquired the land for their garrison from the Khan of Kalat but most of the in

habitants in the area were Pushtun and the city soon became one dominated by for

eigners and non-local natives. That pattern has continued in the era of Pakistan, but In the 1980s large numbers of Afghan refugees began to alter the culture of the city.

Some Pakistani Pushtun nationalists claim that the Pushlun parts of Baluchistan should be affiliated with the NWFP to establish an ethnically Pushtun province. Such a step

would raise the question of Quetta's status since most Baluch consider the city part of

151 the territory of Kalat, and many Pushtun claim it would have to be in their province be cause most of the valley's inhabitants were and are Pushtun.

As an ethnic group Quetta's Baluch are backward in economic terms, though, like all ethnic groups in the city, they are divided into a range of economic classes, and there are Baluch businessmen, landowners, and government employees who occupy the upper levels of the economic scale. In the urban area Baluch tend to be engaged in various types of unskilled labor. These include manual labor in construction; work in offices at the lower grades; employment with private parties as chaukjdArsdrivers, porters, and gardeners; or self-employment as street vendors. In Baluch neighbor· hoods such as Hudda the businesses which service the daily needs of people (e.g., small grocery stores, butcher shops, tailors, barbers, tea stalls, video rentals) tend to be run by Baluch but the presence of Baluch in these activities in other parts of the city is significandy less. With increasing levels of education among Baluch this pattern may change, but not In the short run.

This is not to say that Quetta is an unimportant city for Baluch, or that the Baluch are an unimportant element in Quetta. Politically, economically and culturally the

Baluch have an important, though in some cases secondary, status there. Ouetta's mayor is Baluch; most important Baluch sardars reside at least some of the time in

Quetta; Baluch at all levels of society continue to migrate there for economic reasons; and important cultural institutions such as the Baluchi and Brahui Academies are lo cated there. Baluch ril{jjcontinues to figure as a guiding principle In the lives of

Baluch, at the rhetorical level at least, and some tribal economic institutions, such as bil4ror the sharing of marriage expenses, persist in the urban context. Sardars con tinue to have importance in the urban context and are at least on some occasions called upon by tribesmen or the government to mediate disputes. Finally Quetta is also

152 a setting for the creation of organizations and movements that attempt to express the concerns and changing attitudes of Baluch and to advance their interests.

153 NOTES 1) It is also frequently said that it was given to the Brahui Khan when he gave e cousin in marriage to Ahmed Shah (Dupree 1~:338). Such an exchange could well have ac companied a pact of allegiance or cooperation.

2) The Baluch historian Akhund Muhammad Sidiq reports that the Persian King Nadir Shah actually granted Quettato the sardar of the Shawani tribe @ 1740 (Tate 1896:27).

3) Census data is taken from the Pakistan Statistical Yearbook for 1988 (Pakistan. Fed. Bureau of Statistics 1988), and the 1981 census reports for Cuetta District and for Baluchistan Province (Pakistan. Population Census OrganiZation 1983 and 1984).

4) In 1988 the ratio of Baluchistan's Baluch and Brahui speaking population to its Push tun speaking population was2.3 to one. This figure corresponds closely to the popula tion estimates obtained in the 1951 census in which data was collected for ethnic affiliation and-the ratio of Baluch and Brahui to Pushtun was 2.4 to one (563,172 to 243,882) (Pakistan 1954:83).

5) The government also collected data in the categories of families speaking Sindhi, Seraiki (spoken in southwestern Punjab, northern Sindh, and the parts of Baluchistan that are adjacent to those areas), Hink6, as well as "Other". It is likely that a s~nificant percentage of those families residing in Baluchistan who speak Sindhi or Seraiki would identify themselves as ethnically Baluch. The combined proportion of Sindhi and Seraiki speaking families at the provincial level was 11 percent, while for Ouetta's population they represented only one percent of the total. On the other hand the per centage of households in Quetta that fit into the "Other" category wasnearly 12 percent while the percentage in this category was only three percent for the Provinceas a whole. My guess is that few of the people in the "Other" category are likely to be Baluch, for example many are probably Persian speakers originally from Afghanistan. It is probable then that the difference between the percentage of the population that was eth nicallly Baluch for the Province versus that percentage for Quetta was even greater than the figures I have cited.

6) The governor of Baluchistan during the period of my field work wasa retired general, Muhammad Musa, a mernt>erof Ouetta's Hazara community whom General Zia had appointed to the governorship.

7) Settler$ in this case means people whose origins are In other parts of India or Pakis tan but who, at least theoretically, were either born in Baluchistan or who have lived there long enough to have acquired residence.

8) In this sense the term bears the meaning that the refugees to which it refers have left their homes for the sake o~ Islam. It is also used to refer to the refugees from the N ghan w8l.

9) While it is impossible to judge such claims, I tend to doubt them since, as stated above (Footnote 4). the relative population figures do correspond to those obtained in earlier censuses.

10) This particular officer had Pushtun leanings and he charged that the census retained a Baluch bias because the previOus (1972) census had been compiled when 154 there was a Baluch governor (Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti) who had seen to it that the figures for the Baluch population were exaggerated.

11) This last comment seems very unlikely since photographs taken just after the 1935 earthquake show native inhabitants dressed in shatwar-kamjz(see Pinhey 1938).

12) Because Marriabad is a bounded area in an old section of the city and thus provides no room to expand, Hazaras are now purchasing lands in an area along Brewery Road as well.

13) In addition to urban encroachment, some of these villages have become less oriented toward agriculture due to the drying up of .kar§Z irrigation systems. The IW:k have died because population growth and the increasing use of electric pumps have caused water levels in the valley to drop. Ari interim minister for agriculture in the provincial government told me the water level is dropping as much as ten feet a year in parts of the valley.

14) This section of the chapter is based primarily on interviews with Professor Bahadur Khan of Baluchistan University and Advocate Tahir Muhammad Khan, though the con clusions it draws are my own.

15) The most valuable product extracted from Baluchistan is natural gas which comes from wells at Sui In the Bugti tribal area. Most of it is shipped in pipelines directly out of Baluchistan, though for the last decade an additional pipeline has supplled gas to Quet ta.

16) People who have been transferred through bureaucratic channels from other parts of Pakistan are not-includl!d in the Settler category. Together the transfers and the Hazaras of Baluchistan constitute the remaining 1O percent of the Provincial Government's 73,579 employees.

17) For example Gracie 18 lnclu

15S CHAPTER FIVE

ROUTES TO ETHNICITY: THE ECONOMICS OF BUS TRANSPORTATION IN BALUCHISTAN

Having discussed in a general way the demography and economics of Quetta, I will

now examine in detail bus transportation, an important element of the local economy

and one which is controlled by Baluchistanis. A setting for competition and even con flict, the transportation industry provides a good opportunity to examine the interplay of

economics, ethnicity, and territory In Baluchistan. In this one part of the area's

economy the various levels of political and social organization in Baluchistan are

visible. The national and provincial governments, ethnic groups, tribes, families, and in

dividuals all pursue their Interests along Baluchistan's roads. A fairly new phenomenon

in Baluchistan, those roads have given people access to information and opportunities

which tend tO promote broader ethnic and nationalist rather than local, tribal identities

and they have contributed to a situation In which tensions between local groups have

increased.

I suggest Baluch ethnicity takes shape in relations of opposition to other ethnic

groups and to the state itself, and both dynamics are apparent In my study of bus

transporters. Outsiders have constructed most of the roads and rallways of Baluchls-

tan, and they have done so with an eye first toward their own strategic concerns and

secondarily to the needs of indigenous populations. Yet transport provides some of

the limited legal opportunities for small-scale capital investment in Quetta and Baluchis

tan, and local conditions and social structures shape the ways Baluch and Pushtun

entrepreneurs utilize and compete for bus routes. For example the pattern ol ethno-ter

ritories in Baluchistan has important implications for transport and trade in the region,

156 and to an extent lineage and tribal affirtation figure in the ownership and operation of vehicles and transport companies.

This chapter focuses the discussion of transportation in Quella and Baluchistan on three topics: routes of access, I.e., the roads themselves, the economics of the transportation Industry, and the appearance of ethnicity within it. The first section Is an extension of Chapter Three in that it describes the Pakistani state's efforts to control and structlJTespace in Baluchistan through the roads that link the province to other parts of Pakistan and to other nation-states in the region. The construction of a net work of roads has consistently been the Pakistan government's leading priority for the development of Baluchistan, but Baluch tribal and political leaders have often resisted road construction on grounds that It creates access on terms favorable not to Baluch but to outsiders. In the eyes of many Baluch the underdeveloped and oVf!r-pollced state of Baluchistan's roads reflects the general condition of the province. Using Meh naz lspahani's recent study of the political-economy and strategic Implications of transportation In Pakistan's border regions (lspahani 1989), interviews, and the case study Of a transporters' strike I will examine roads In Baluchistan and Baluch attitudes toward them.

The chapter's second section deals with the economics of transportation in Ouet ta by focusing on the owners and operators of inter-city buses. A competitive enterprise that requires a not insignificant amount of capital, bus lines are a risky but potentially rewarding business. In addition to income from passengers, transporters are also well-positioned to act as smugglers, and some have participated in local politics. Based on participant observation, interviews, and a survey questionnaire of 58 bus owners, this section lays out the economics of bus transportation and reveals

157 some of the tribal and ethnic ties through which transporters sometimes conduct their business.

The final section explores ethnic tensions between Pushtuns and Baluch within the transport industry. The ethno-territories of both groups provide each with certain advantages in competing for transport business. As new circumstances give changed significance to tribal and ethnic identities, economic competition reacts with political competition and evolving attitudes to form potentially explosive ethnic tensions.

Through two case studies, ethnic disturbances at the bus stand in Satellite Town in

1986 and 1988, I will examine the formation of ethnic identities in this setting.

The Routeing of Baluchistan The development of routes of access in Baluchistan began in the colonial period when the British built railroads linking Quetta to India, Afghanistan, and Iran and several im portant roads. In the first decades of its existence one of the few development projects the government of Pakistan undertook in Baluchistan was the construction of the RCD highway which runs from the town of Tuftan on the Iran-Pakistan border to Quetta, and from there south through Kalat to Karachi. The RCO highway was a project of the

Regional Cooperation for Development, •an on-again, off-again venture• of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan completed in 1964 (lspahani 1989:240f). Though it is called a highway, it is for the most part an unpaved, one-lane road which degenerates here and there into a track. Smaller roads were also cut into the Marri and Bugti areas, whose oil and mineral resources helo economic potential and whose inhabitants were politically troublesome (ibid.:51).

With the Baluch insurgency in the 1970S and the Afghan war in the 19805, it be came strategically and politicaHy necessary to develop the province rurther, and as before the emphasis has been on road construction. The lack of infrastructural

158 development during the 1950s and 60s hindered the government's war against the In surgents and so It undertook new construction projects (ibid.:63). In a white peper pub lished during the conflict the government explicitly stated the strategic dimension of their development program.

Indeed the military presence in Baluchistan in aid of civil power has a dual purpose: preservation of law and order and economic development .... The building of a road, the opening of a police post, the establishment of a school, a dispensary or a community centre constitutes developmental activity. Yet they are administrative acts designed to bring a measure of organized, peaceful life to the area .... The dual role of the Army can be viewed most clearly in the communication sector. The Army has assigned the highest priority to road construction because without roads the rugged mountains of Baluchistan will never yield to the economic planners [Government of Pakistan 1974:29]. lspahani calls this approach •security propelled development" (lspahani 1989:53) and though It has accomplished some of its economic and polltical functions, It has persist·

ently created opponents to it who emphasize its security over its developmental features.

The Soviet presence .in Afghanistan led to a convergence in Baluchistan of the In·

' ' terests of westem governments, especlally the United States, with those of Pakistan.

The perpetual bugbear of the Russians' quest for a warm-water port gained renewed

currency with their deployment of troops in support of the Afghan government In 1979.

Baluchistan became the setting for a new game of "enhancement and denial of access"

(lbld.:69). Seeking to accommodate nearly a million refugees, prevent the war from

spreading across the border, and abort renewed conflict with Baluch natlonalls1s Pakis

tan proposed ambitious development projects for the province for which It sought sup

port from willing international financial and aid organizations. Security concerns and

road construction featured prominently in those plans.

Though most road construction projects were rejected, the United States agreed

to fund a major one In Makran. The American strategic analyst Francis Fukuyama

159 wrote that -ni•• •pent on •uch project• are •politically l••• provocative becauH altbeu9h they have direct military utility tbay could be di9qUi•ad .. econ ... ic ~id"

(.IJ:>id.,111. The con•truction project in the ll&kran directad by u.s.A.1.11. conabu u

thb •ta9a of linkin9 a.ia to Turbat with • pa

inland from the coa•t and there werereport• \:ba\: a •econd •tage of conttructioa will

creat. a road alon9 the coa•t itealf. ·iJowever one obNtter· recentlJ reported that., d- to

local oppo•ition and inefficient contractor•, ·60 i,l8rcent of the tum allotted for the roact coutructiOD project hH pa•Nd and .only .. ix per cent Of the ~rk baa beerl accomplul,md ilakin9 a •acond •ta98 - unlilcalJ especiallJ .in U9~t of the so...i.• pull-out f tlf9banutan {Wea••r 1990:94). ·

llollte• in Baluch Eye•

....S con•truction project• in. 8al11Cbiatmi baft genarat..t •llui,ly contra11ti119 attitlldn. Qooe:wwwnt official•, -•t --Bal1acll,and -ir 8aloch - the flMld9 u a way of -=min9 the backvardneH and po,,erty of tlle region ud of fraeinfJ tra.- fr.a tlle

-t&'Ol of their •arclu•. load coutrootion iaa• ..._ • blportant upect of efforu to couolictata the Paki•tani · atmta, ud_ 8alach naUonaliata oppoud to IObat they percebe a• tlle govarnMnt'• effort• to daalna~ and _9Ubordinate tba havealeo Oppoud rolld

~ction. 't'bey arvu ~llat. tlle _rollda Nnll only CJO••IWl!.t· iat:wt•.· am of tbma, ·11aw1> ltllair Boa911 Karri, haa a..... quoted aa Ny1Dg ·"IID8t. of 1:IMtzOAda 1:Nl.lt 1a lalaciu.tan an not for our benefit but to ... it._1- for the td.litary to ~l oa and for tbe

tonjabb to rob .... (Barri- 1981147).

S... tribu have attempt8d to block mad coaatructioa in their armu u did the

aati-,overwwwnt guerrlll••· A rK1red bripdiar. in ti. Paldatan U11J dnc:ribed to - lib -,.rience of protactinfJ coaatruct1- =-- daring tlle bul.lding of ti. ICD higlD,aJ iJ1 aalawan which· at ti.mu nquind tile ·- of pi.clmta _an tbe pub abaft tlle rolld to pre,,eat

~ attacks. During the guerrUla war rolldll ~ -tad tera.iA. Cuerrlllaa

per1odical17 disrupted roacl and rail traffic to other i--incea and uillaat.d gooezwat

forceto al0119 -jor route•. Inaorpnta in t:N IIU"ri ane prevented th9 con•truct1aa of

EOllda for oil uploration throllvhaat ti. coaree of th9 war fBarr1- 1911:37, 167). EconOllllcally and politlc•lly road& hava lead to t.lle ...... ,.a.nt of the people of

.. lucblatan wlthin ll.m~ta but they contlnua to ba cont-.ted terrain. Saluchi•tanl• percal•• tbelr r....s. partly in polltlcal taraa; &thnlc natlon•llata lnterpret Pakiatan·a

and the auperpowera' concern wlth the provlnca u due to ita mlneral -•1th and atrateqic

location. That the Unlted State• waa buUdln9 t.ba Nakru road prlmarlly for ita own

ailltaq reaaona le widely held. A pollticl.an in ·the Paklatan llatlonal Party' ••id in an

1.ntervlAw that the road would all- tba U.S. to aec:ure tba Nakran coaatllne and ita

atral:89ic vantage owar the entrance to tba Perai1111 Gulf in caae of• deterloratlon in the

1.ntern!U atabillty of Pakiatan or. lta ln•uion bf India_ &N!/or Afghanlatan and the v.s.s.a. Nhy elae would the u.s. IJOYe~ apen,S eo -.:II to pa- a road whlch bu leH

~i,c importance than auch other• u the RCD highway which la -also in very poor

c:oadition I waa ••Iced-r•l U-• •1

Ill a aurvay I ubd bu•~· about the difficaltiea they face in tbelr bueineaa and tba

- fnqueat re-i,onae wu tbe poor ttate of the ICOllda. flle 11:0d ve both dugeroua and create additional af.ntenuce apenaea. No paaaanger on one of llal.acbiatan'a buHa euily forveta the experimlce of careening~ another bwt on a

- 1- road, and -rortnv at tbe laat ainuta' oato the llllolaldltrto a"°ld colliaion. s.-a1 -:1or accident• bappelllld on tbll soad8 of 11alucb~ in tba period of my field -rk u4 - of my primary 1nfozauita on tranepartatial -ttera, ..,._d Buh• .

1 ) See Chapter seven for • description of the political parties in Balucbistan.

2 _ ) Tbis notion was not held by Balucb alone. A British engineer working on irrigation projects in Baluchistan told ae that he had seen the

blueprinta for the Bela-Turbat road and that it had the capacity to handle heavy •ilitary equipment. ,,. Jemaldini, an OfficiaJin the Tuftan Transporters' Union, died when the bus he was riding on top of overturned while returning to Quetta from Tuttan. Beyond the danger in volved, the condition. of the roads causes parts and tires to wear out rapidly. One respondent in the survey claimed that because of the ragged roads, tires that should last a year wear out in three months. Another claimed that tires needed to be replaced every month. The stated and unstated Implication of these claims is that the condition of the roads Is the government's responsibility, and their poor condition reflects Its laek of concern for Baluchistan's development.

Another common complaint the survey elicited was the role of the security forces in policing the roads. Several branches of the security apparatus have (or have as sumed) responsibility for monitoring the transport that passes along Baluchistan's

roads. Extending across two borders and leading to Pakistan's largest city and major port, Baluchistan's roads certainly do have economic and strategic Importance. The economic policies of the government that place tariffs on many consumer items create

incentives for importing them illegally from both Iran, where many such items (e.g., cloth, machine-made carpets, gas heaters, and tableware) are manufactured, .and Af· ghanistan, where less restrictive Import policies make foreign goods much cheaper than in Pakistan. In addition to these relatively Innocuous products the civil war in Af· ghanlstan has created conditions In which the smuggling of arms and drugs thrives.

The security forces have the authority and responsibility for controlling smuggling and one of the ways they attempt to do so is by monitoring passenger transportation.

Transporters claim, however, that those agencies are ineffective in stopping major

smugglers and instead harass them and their passengers. Several told me they must

pay bribes at customs checkpoints or else they are detained for long periods. I accom-

162 panied one crew on their trip from Quetta to Karachi during which the bus owner, who also does some of the driving, had to pay bribes at three separate checkpoints. 3

In January of 1988 frustrations over !II-treatment by the security forces along the

Quetta-Tuftan route led to a transporters' strike. Transporters parked their vehicles on the road outside the town of Noshki and effectively closed the highway for two days.

Leaders of the strike claimed that, while large-scale smugglers were operating un hindered off the main roads, officials detained their buses for hours and searched the personal belongings of passengers. Security forces, they charged, often took buses two or three miles from the main road for searching, during which they harassed and beat passengers and confiscated their property even when it was obviously for per sonal use or made In.Pakistan. They had even killed one man, Sadiq Baluch, when they fired on him thinking that a rock thrown··by the tires of his pick-up truck Into their vehicle's windshield was a bullet. The transporters wrote in a letter to the Chief Minister of the province

The duties of the Chaghal Mifltia and Kharan Rifles are the defense of the nation, protection of cltlzens's life, property and hOnor, and prevention of terrorism and destruction. in fact the situation Is the opposite .... On one hand they spread terror and, on the other, every month they steal crores of rupees. The strike continued for several days and Involved at least one major confrontation be tween the police and the strikers. According to newspaper accounts the police used tear gas, fired In the air, and li1hl(baton) charged the strikers to move them off the

road when they were attempting to transfer some prisoners from Noshkl to Quetta. The

strikers responded by blocking railway tracks and preventing a train from leaving. They

held a protest rally and the shops in the Noshki bazaar.closed in solidarity with the

strikers. The transporters cafled off their strike when a delegation of their leaders met

with Chief Minister Jam Ghulam Qadir, who promised that the Frontier Corps would not

163 take buses from the main road for searches and would only search them at two

specified checRpoints.

Roads of the State The issues involved in the transporters' strike say much about the nature of state power and politics in Baluchistan. The condition of the roads reveals the extent of state power in Baluchistan, the state has the economic and political capability to con struct roads and regulate their traffic. That the roads are in poor condition and must be patrolled by the military indicates that capability is limited. Roads, like boundaries, are central elements in a state's sett-determination. In an exchange Foucault and an Inter viewer reach a point of understanding that boundaries confine or make inmates of their citizens, •national man" (Foucault 1980:73). Foucault's project Is to examine how micro

relations constitute and result from larger, national or capitalist power relations. Bor ders are pan of that process. They are ambiguous, Jiminal zones where the state attempts to assert legitimacy and authority by controlling the status or Identities of those who enter, its space (Kearney 1991:63). Along the roads of Baluchistan, as In the case of the U.S.-Mexico border, at one level these acts of regulatlon create a degree of actual control, yet total control is well beyond their scope or their Intention. They operate too 8$ myth, reminders of surveillance thet discipline tho11 who traverse their domain Qbid.:61).

Pakistan's western border has always been problematic; nomadic pastoralists and others Ignore the border or utlllze it to their advantage. Being land locked, Al· ghanlstan has HtabUshed Transit Trade AgrHments with Pakistan which permit it to convey Its Imports and exports along Pakistan's routes and utilize port facilitlea at

Karachi. The trade In foreign goods (e.g., tobacco, electronics, motorcycles, food stuffs) then smuggled back from Afghanistan to Pakistan has proved profitable to both

164 the Afghan government and border tribes. Though causing an apparent loss of revenues, such trade has been tolerated by the Pakistani government partly because it would be difficult to control, and because ii placates the historically Independent and often irascible Pushtun tribes along the border and integrates them into Pakistan's economy (lspahanl 1989:111-113). Though two-thirds of Afghanistan's Imported goods travel from Karachi up the Indus Valley to Peshawar and then to Kabul, the trade up the

RCD Highway to Chaman and then Qandahar accounts for the remainder. With a logic

peculiar to the circumstances, some of those goods are then smuggled back across the border to Pakistan and sold openly in the bazaars of Ouetta where transporters and others purchase them to smuggle to Karachi for resale. Since the RCD Highway cros

ses the border through Pushtun territory, most of the International smuggllng Is In their

hands. All the major routes that enter Pakistan from the border region traverse Bafuch territory, however.

Following Kearney's observation that the experience of illegal Immigrants cross-

Ing a border resembles a rite of passage (Kearney 1991), viewed as ritual,-the harass-

. ment and surveillance of buses and their passengers both Incorporates and expresses the Incorporation of citizens Into relations which constitute the state in Pakistan. Many

mundane events of daily life can be treated as ritual In that they are largely expressive

acts (Goffman 1967:57). A stop at a checkpoint becomes an expressive act because

Its official or declared purpose Is to prevent smuggling, but the fact that searches are

avoided by paying a bribe negates that purpose. Its actual purpose appears to be for

the state to exert authority and customs officials to extract bribes. A stop at a check

point, especially for passengers, Is e more concentrated event than those Goffman la

concerned with. It approaches that of a formal ritual with its stages of limlnality and In

corporation (Van Gennep 1960: 11). 4 During the liminal stage, that of the actual or

165 potential search which often takes place In the middle of the night, the passengers and the crew of the bus submit to the authority-of the community and face anxiety or humiliation. After it they resume their Journey as approved members of society. Points of liminality present an opportunity to scrutinize central values or axioms of society

{Turner 1969:167). In societies characterized by Inequality rituals Incorporate ln cflViduals Into social life but In doing so reinforce the "discrimination, alienation and in authenticity" which accompany it (Deegan 1989:20).

An overtly economic and political act, Inspecting buses and extracting bribes from their drivers, expresses both the strength and weakness of the Pakistani state. H expresses strength because the government has the authority and the resources to as sign the task and have It carried out like no other entity can. H expresses weakness be cause H must do so. The government can not or will not discipline Hs upper classes of large landowners, Industrialists or merchants to pay adequate (virtually any) taxes. H Is then forced to utilize tariffs to obtain revenues which sets up the conditions for smug gling to be profitable. 5 This simultaneous strength and weakness of the state is visible in the exaggerat~d presence and corruption of the security agencies. Corruption equals state strength because its officials can make such demands of the population with impunity, weakness because the government can neither discipline them nor pay them adequate wages which might make bribery less attractive. Both the Inspectors and the inspected knew smuggling proceeded unhindered by their efforts. Thecrew of the bus I travelled with to Karachi smuggled 150 cartons of cigarettes on that one trip.

All transporters have the reputation of being petty smugglers, and some buses are rumored to be fitted with hidden compartments for smuggling more lucrative com• modities such as heroln.11 The working agreement appears to be that as long tis the ap-

166 propriate bribes are paid smuggling will proceed unhindered. The inspectors are not, however, only an operating expense but a real nuisance as the strike indicates

As the nation-state asserts its power in daily life through agencies of regulation,

and sanctioned and imposed practices, people develop their identity as citizens

(Foucault 1980:73-4; Corrigan and Sayer 1985:199-203). For most Baluch a major ele

ment of that Identity extends from their status as an ethnic minority. They interpret the

state of the roads and harassment at the hands of security forces at least In part, in eth-

nic terms, that is as the acts of a state not responsive to their needs. This is Illustrated

by the fact that the strikers had the support of the Baluch National ·vouth Movement

(BNYM), Baluch ltehad, and other ethnic-nationalist organizations. Representatives

from these groups add_ressedthe strikers' rally in Noshki, and the representative of one

of them {the BNVM) was himself a transporter. Although the transporters were striking

for their commercial interests, many saw the issues as ethnic also and especially politi·

cal.

The Transport Industry The people of Baluchistan do not establish or enact their ethnic identities only in rela-

tion to an external power center or its local representatives, but also in the process of

dally interaction with each other. Simaarly the roads of Baluchistan are not only

products of the state. Their nature is determined in use as the object, as well as the set

ting, of both competition and cooperation between members of local ethnic groups.

Local people make use of roads as passengers, consumers, and business men so In

this sense, of the various dimensions of routes discussed above, the economic has the

most influence on Baluch-Pushtun relations. Economics, though, are always em

bedded in political processes, and while this section deals in a descriptive way with tne

economics of operating buses on Baluchistan's dusty roads, the next will deal with how

167 the use of and access to them are influenced by contemporary politics and the ter ritorial nature of ethnicity in the region.

In examining the economics of ethnicity in Quella, I could have chosen several sectors of the economy in which significant numbers of both Pushtuns and Baluch par ticipate. These include, for example, the wholesale and/or retail meat, fruit, or vegetable trade, or the provincial and local bureaucracies. The decisive factor in my selection of the transport industry was the ethnic rioting that took place in the bus stand in October, 1986, between the time when I formulated a research project.on eth nicity in Quella and the start of my fieldwork in September, 1987. I assumed that at least some of the sources of the conflict lie in the transport industry itself, and so I spent many hours in the offices of Quetta's bus companies drinking sweet tea and talk ing, I took several bus trips, and I conducted a survey questionnaire with 58 bus owners In order to create a social and economic portrait of the industry and those who participate in it.7

InformantCategories Though the survey sought information from a uniform group, passenger bus owners, the sample population can be subdivided using a number of criteria: the types of their vehicles, the types of routes on which ·they drive them, and their ethnicity. The survey includes data from men owning three sorts of vehicles: 1) standard buses, 2) mini-vans,

!ind 3) air conditioned buses. The standard buses range from small ones which hold

around twenty passengers to larger ones which hold fifty. These are the cheapest

buses to ride in and they are also designed to carry freight on their roofs. There is

more range in the cost of these buses than among those in the other two categories

since many are bought second-hand, but the average cost of purchasing a standard

bus is $33,000 (Rs6 lakh).8 Mini-vans are less expensive than standard buses, the

168 average price being $20,000 (Rs3.66 lakh), but cost passengers more to ride in be· cause of Increased speed and comfort. Like air conditioned buses they are only designed to carry passengers and not freight. Air-conditioned buses are recent arrivals on the scene having just been in operation since 1985. They primarily ply the Quella to

Karachi route and it is nearly twice as expensive to make the journey on one of them as on a standard bus (Rs150 compared to Rs80). Along with different levels of initial in· vestment each of the categories of buses have different running costs. The average monthly maintenance cost of running standard buses, $385, and mini-vans, $325, are comparable. The average cost of running an air conditioned bus is more than double this at $900 (Rs16,200) per month.9

An initial distinction in the types routes can be made betwe11nlocal village routes and longer ones to larger towns and cities. Transporters on most local village routes make a round trip daily. They leave for Quella in the morning and return to the village in the afternoon. On longer routes only one leg of the journey is made each day, and on the longest ones (from Quella to Karachi or Tuftan), the bus and Its crew take at least a day layover at each end. A transporter can legally operate a bus only if he holds a permit Issued by the provincial government which specifies a route 'and time of departure.

Standard buses operating on local village routes act as much as freiQht carriers as passenger carriers. The Pushtun crew I accompanied on one such route, to Gulls tan and back to Quella the next day, filled the roof bay of their bus with freight in Quet ta, and most of the passengers rode to Gulistan with their feet on hundred-pound sacks of flour stuffed between seats and In the aisle. The passenger trade alone Is suf· ficient to support a number of mini-vans on such village routes as those between Quet ta and Mastung, Pishln, and Sibi. The longer routes can be divided into intermediate

169 routes, those between Quella and such towns as Sukkur, Loralai, Zhob, and Kharan, and the Tuftan and Karachi routes which are longer and have greater potential for trade and smuggling. On the Karachi route buses make eight and on the Tuftan route four round trips per month, while those on the intermediate routes generally make fifteen.

In terms of the ethnic identity of the transporters, the survey sample is quite _ uniform. All 58 respondents were Pushtun or Baluch (though one was a Pushto-speak lng Sayyed) 10 and only one of them does not have his origins in Baluchistan. That in dividual is Pushtun and from Afghanistan, though he said he had moved to Quella well before the influx of refugees from the civil war. It is perhaps significant that he was at the center of the ethnic violence which erupted during my field work. In any case, bus transportation in Baluchistan is In the hands of members of indigenous ethnic groups.

Nol only are members of other ethnic groups who have resided in Quetta for genera tions {Hazaras, Punjabis) not involved, neither are Afghan refugees who have made big inroads into ttie transport industry in Peshawar and the Northwest Frontier. 11

The pattern of ethnicity among the owners can be further specified in that, for all route~ except Quetta to Karachi, the bus owner is usually a member of the ethnic group which predominates along the route and at the terminus. The exceptions are sig· niflcant in shaping perceptions of the ethnicity of transportation because virtually no

Baluch operate buses in Pushtun areas 12 though Pushtuns do operate along "Baluch routes". Though Baluch-owned buses do predominate on most Baluch routes, I met or heard of Pushtuns driving buses from Quetta to Tuftan, Sukkur, and even Turbat in the heart of Makran, while on the Karachi route it appears that over half of the bu11esare owned by Pushtuns.

170 The Economic Data One of the primary goals of the survey was to provide a detailed portrait of transporters' incomes and in this respect it did not fully succeed. The survey ad dressed the question in two ways - directly by asking transporters to estimate their monthly incomes, and indirectly by requesting the various components of monthly operating costs and gross incomes in order to calculate the difference. Data on Incom es is notoriously difficult to gather since people may not want others to have access to it, the form in which the question Is asked may not be the ones in which informants make their own calculations, or incomes niay vary either seasonably (which several of the respondents complained of) or due to other factors. In any case the data on incom es IS too incomplete and inconsistent to allow a good statistical analysis. However, along with statements gathered in the process of conducting the interview, It does pro vide enough insights to draw some tentative conclusions about the industry. My Im pression is that operating buses, especially on the major routes Is a highly competitive enterprise, but also one which seems to generate an above average level of income.

According to many of the transporters, one of the causes of their difficulties is a shortage of passengers or an excess of buses. The purpose of route permits is to maintain a favorable balance between the two by limiting transporters' access to the routes. For the busiest routes the number of permits is supposed to be fixed and the government does not issue new ones. The cost of purchasing a route permit from the government is not large, around $800.13 However on routes in which they are in limited supply the permits are illegally bought and sold between individuals, often in conjunc tion with the sale of a bus. The survey data show that those transporters who did not buy their route permits from the government paid on average nearly $6,000 more for their them than they did for the buses themselves, $40,600 (Rs7.31 lakh) vs $34,800

171 (Rs6.26 lakh). Despite these arrangements several bus owners complained of declining numbers of passengers. In the words of one respondent who works the Quetta to

Karachi route "we used to have 50 passengers, now we have 15". Not all respondents complained of the problem; ten of the 52 informants who responded to the question about difficulties they face as transporters mentioned it in contrast to 40 who mentioned the poor quality of the roads and 16 who mentioned harassment by security for ces. Those who complained of lack of passengers operate buses on busy major routes, Quella to Karachi, Sibi, Zhob or Mastung, where there is more competition with mini-vans.

One of the reasons more did not mention It may have been that the problem is felt more by some than others; certain time slots in the daily schedules are more profitable than others. Buses on the Quella to Karachi route for example make the 12- hour Journey through the night, and the timetable schedules buses to leave from mid day until early evening. Those with permits for the latest departure times (4:00-6:00 r p.m.) fared much better than those with earlier ones. The receipt books of Public

Transport, which only has buses going to Karachi, show that In a 17 day period in Sep tember, 1988 the average ticket earnings for the buses leaving Quetta between 1 :00 and 3:00 was $47 (Rs850) while for the buses leaving in the later time slots the figure was $136 (Rs2450). One informant with an early departure time said he was able to make up some of his shortfall by picking up and dropping off passengers along the route (income that did not appear in the receipt books), but the difference is still sig nificant.

Several of the respondents who complained of the problem also stated that the reason there are so few passengers is that the government allows too many buses, some specifically mentioned air conditioned ones, to operate without permits. The ac.

172 buses and mini-vans must also have permits but they are a different type than those re quired for standard buses. The former only need have ·contract carriage permits" which the government provides at the cost mentioned above ($600). As the owner of a number' of air conditioned buses explained it to me, contact carriage permits allow the holder to run as a chartered bus and to leave whenever they decide they have enough passengers, though In practice they do leave at set times. Beyond this however some owners operate their buses without permits. According to an official in the provincial

. government responsible for issuing permits, as much as one half of the buses on the roads do not have permits. It is apparently worth the expense of paying bribes to the police not to buy a route permit.

Despite the fact that the data on bus owners' incomes are not adequate to analyze statistically there Is enough information to provide an Idea of the economics of the industry. I have suggested three ways to sort the data, by type of vehicle, length of route, and ethnicity of owner. Because (If air conditioned buses are excluded from con sideration) the cost of operating a bus is primarily a factor of distance, I will use that criterion to approach the data. The survey's informants operate buses on 16 different routes. 21 of them have at least one bus on a local route, 12 have them on Inter mediate routes, and 26 have a bus or buses driving on the two longest routes, those to

Karachi or Tuftan. I will examine four groups of figures, those for the buses which travel on two local routes, an intermediate route, and the Quella to Karachi route. The four routes I will examine are those with the largest number of responses. In each

body of data I compare the figures for the informants' estimates of their monthly net in come with those I calculated by aggregating monthly operating costs and subtracting that total from my estimates of their monthly gross income. 14 Because the costs and in-

173 comes generated by running the air conditioned buses are so much greater than stand ard buses or mini-vans, in the Quella to Karachi data they have been excluded.

Local and Intermediate Routes The most consistent data the sur11eyproduced were from buses on local village routes.

This is especially true for buses driving the route to Gulistan, a village around 100 kilometers northwest of Ouetta. As the figures in Table 1 show, the estimates of the transporters' own incomes are all very similar though there is more variation in the cal culated incomes with the lowest figure being around a tenth of the highest.

The second local route is Ouetta to Sibi. Located on the Kachhi Plain, Sibi is less a village than a large town whose population is a mix of Baluchi, Pushtu and Sindhi speakers. Since the road to it goes through Baluch territory and the respondents operating buses on it are all Baluch, it represents a Baluch counterpart to the Gulistan case though there are differences between the two routes. For example Sibi is 50 kilometers further from Quella than Gulistan is, four of the five Sibi informants operate mini-vans rather than standard. buses, and their round trip begins and ends in Quella, not Sibi. The data from Sibi shows less consistency than the Gulistan data does. As

Table 1 shows the informants' estimates of their own Incomes show a fair level of agree ment with each other and with those of the Gulistan owners. It is in my calculations of their incomes that the difficulties in the data begin to appear. Two of the calculation show net monthly losses while two are making sizable profits.

Because my calculations for other transporters showed them operating at a loss, these two figures are worth examining in some detail. It should be noted that both of the respondents for whom negative figures resulted also stated that they had monthly incomes of Rs2500 from each of their vehicles and there are a number of possible ex planations for the discrepancies. As stated above these include intentional or uninten-

174 GULISTAN • QUETTA II Ill IV V VI 1 Rs4,000 Rs1,200 Rs550,000 Rs320,000 5 2 Rs4,500 Rs4,500 Rs380,000 RsO.O 15 Rs3,300 Rs7,550 Rs450,000 RsO.O 18 Rs11,450 Rs220,000 Rs550,000 2 Rs4,000 Rs600,000 Rs650,000 0.5 Mean Rs3,950 Rs6,175 Rs440,000 Rs300,000 8

QUETTA • SIBI II Ill IV V VI 3 Rs2,500 Rs1,633 Rs403,000 ·RsO.O 9 3 Rs2,500 Rs367 Rs4n,ooo RsO.O 8 2 Rs3,000 Rs5,500 Rs430,000 RsO.O 9- 3 Rs6,000 Rs5,433 Rs430,000 Rs400,000 15 2 Rs2,000 Rs400,000 RsO.O 50 Mean Rs3,200 Rs2,233 Rs428,000 Rs80,000 18

OUETTA-SUKKUR/LARKANA II Ill IV V VI 1 RsS,000 Rs10,ooo Rs950,000 Rs600,000 5 2 Rs15,000 Rs18,500 Rs700,000 Rs700,000 3 3 Rs2,567 Rs907,000 Rs900,000 6 4 Rs3,250 Rs260,000 Rs50,000 5 Mean Rs10,000 Rs8;580 Rs704,000 Rs563,000 4 Column I • Number of buses informant owns. Column II • Informant's estimate of his monthly income per bus. Column Ill • My calculation of his monthly Income per bus. Column N - Average cost of informant's buses. Column V - Average cost of informant's route permits. Column VI • Length of time in years informant has owned at least one bus. TABLE 1: LOCAL AND INTERMEDIATE BUS ROUTES

tional miscalculations, and fluctuations in the number of passengers or maintenance

costs in any given month. Also hidden income from smuggling would not show up in

my calculations though smuggling probably. would not be significant on the local

175 routes. Another possibility is that, though both respondents who showed losses stated they made monthly payments of Rs5000 toward the purchase of their buses, if they con sumed what they needed and paid less than Rs5000, the eventual purchasing price would be greater because of interest, but in the meantime they would be maintaining the Income they reported, a good one by Pakistani standards (see below).

A different pattern of ownership appears on the Sibi route since all of the respon dents reported owning more than one bus. There is little difference in the average cost of buses on the two routes, the smaller standard buses used on the local routes generally cost as much as new mini-vans. The Sibi transporters operate more vehicles because they pay virtually nothing for permits for mini-vans. Two of the owners of

Gulistan buses had obtained their permits from the government and so they too had paid little or nothing for them, the remainder had, however, paid on average $28,000

(As5 lakh) for theirs. 15

Only 12 respondents operated buses on routes classified as Intermediate, and they are divided among seven different routes. By'comblnlng two routes, Quetta-to

Larkana and Quetta-to-Sukkur, a single category pf four cases can be created.

Larkana and Sukkur are medium sized cities located close together along the Indus

River. The data from the combined category is fairly consistent. Though only two In· formants made estimates of their Incomes, my calculations of their Income roughly paralleled them. While averages of such a small number of cases are almost meaning less, they do in this case correspond.

Quetta to Karachi Linking Ouetta to Pakistan's largest city, the route to Karachi is the only one on which approximately equal numbers of Pushtun and Baluch operate buses. This route was also the scene of the violent incidents which led to rioting during my field work. For

176 both reasons it is important to come to terms with the economics of this route, unfor tunately the data from it is problematic. Of the 21 respondents who operate buses on the Karachi route, only 14 provided income estimates and/or responses to all categories included in my calculation of profit rates (see Table 2). As on the other ' routes the transporters' estimates of their own incomes are similar, but considerable variation is present when I calculated them. While these figures are low compared to those for the intermediate route, they are comparable to the self-assessed and calcu lated amounts on the local routes. It is important to repeat that, especially for the

Karachi buses, the Incomes I calculated might appear low because of hidden Income from smuggling or other sources which I did not enquire about. The revenue generated by smuggling could be enough to offset the small negative profit levels which emerged from the data. For example the owner/driver of the bus I joined on a trip to Karachi made $.65 (Rs11) for each of the 150 cartons of cigarettes he smuggled giving him an additional income of $92 (Rs1650) per trip. It should also be noted how ever, that this amount was offset by the bribes (RstOOO)he had to pay along the way, and the commissions (Rs700), he had to pay the offices In Ouetta and Karachi that sold tickets to his passengers. All of these are amounts I did not attempt to factor into the calculation of the monthly incomes. In addition to smuggling, owning or working on a bus with regular access to the city can provide other sources of Income. For example one of the drivers on the bus I accompanied to Karachi bought a large number of shoes from a wholesale market which he intended to resell at a small shop in his village.

The Survey's Conclusions If the estimates the transporters made of their incomes are averaged, there is a fairly high degree of consistency among the different routes. The meaning of these Income figures can be seen by comparing them to other income levels in Pakistan. The lnterna- QUETTA • KARACHI II Ill IV V VI -Rs7,600 Rs1QQ,OOO Rs650,000 9 1 Rs7,500 Rs5,190 Rs700,000 Rs425,000 3 1 ·Rs400 Rs725,000 Rs250,000 6 Rs5,500 Rs100 Rs700,000 RsS00,000 8 Rs2,000 Rs750,000 Rs600,000 4 Rs3,500 Rs7,500 RsB00,000 Rs600,000 3 2 Rs7,250 Rs650,000 Rs425,000 4 RsB00,000 Rs700,000 13. ·Rs500 Rs850,000 Rs1,000,000 3 RsS,000 Rs900,000 Rs1 ,300,000 5 Rs3,000 Rs600,000 0.0 6 1 Rs300,000 Rs300,000 1 2 Rs3,900 Rs900,000 Rs950,000 2 3 Rs14,733 Rs733,000 Rs733,000 13 1 Rs100,ooo Rs900,000 1 3 Rs2,567 Rs907,000 Rs750,000 6 3 Rs500,000 Rs150,000 2 1 Rs400,000 Rs400,000 8 3 -As3200 Rs833,000 Rs900,000 4 2 Rs9do,ooo Rs 1,100,000 10 2 Rs900,000 Rs975,000 1 Mean Rs4,417 Rs2685 Rs726,095 Rs667,048 5 Column I • Number of buses informant owns. Column II • Informant's estimate of his monthly income per bus. Column Ill • My calculation of informant's monthly Income per bus. Column N · Average cost of Informant's buses. Column V • Average cost of informant's route permits. Column VI • Length of time in years informant has owned at least one bus. TABLE 2: THE QUETTA TO KARACHI ROUTE

tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimates the yearly per capita in·

come tor Pakistan to be $380 (Rs6840) which works out to a monthly figure of $32

(Rs570), just 14 percent of the average for all bus owners' stated monthly incomes,

$229 (Rs4, 122). It is also high when compared to the salaries earned by government

178 employees. For example six of the respondents had a family member working in a government office, a position that requires a degree of literacy. Their average income was $65 (Rs1,150) per month. A lecturer from Baluchistan University doing research here In the United States tells me that the pay for a beginning lecturer there was $195

(Rs3,500) at the time of the survey; Similarly the mean salary the respondents paid their drivers was $140 (Rs2,500) per month ..

If the data is looked at in terms of the ethnicity of the owners it also shows consid erable consistency. The average monthly incomes I calculated from the data for all

Baluch transporters was Rs4,076, while for ail Pushtun transporters the figure was

Rs4,305. These closely approximate the average monthly incomes the informants In both groups provided, Rs4,096 for Baluch and Rs4,238 for Pushtuns. Regarding the cost of their vehicles, the Baluch transporters paid on average nearly $3,000 (Rs.5 lakh) more than did Pushtun transporters (Rs6.2 lakh vs Rs5.7 lakh), though on the other hand Baluch bus owners paid considerably less for their route permits (Rs3.4 lakh) than did the Pushtun respondents (Rs4.7 lakh). The difference in amounts paid for route permits is in part a function of a significant difference in the length of time transporters of each group have operated buses. For Baluch respondents the average length of ownership is 13.6 years while for the Pushtuns the figure is only 5.2 years.

This difference in length of ownership may be an indication that Pushtun entrepreneurs are moving into an economic niche that Baluch have filled. This fact is underlined by figures which show that the Baluch transporters on the Quella to Karachi route have been in business for 9.7 years and Pushtuns have been operating on the route for an average of just 4 years.

Finally It must be noted that considerable variation is hidden in dealing with the data In terms of averages, and while some transporters are prospering others appear

179 to be struggling. Many respondents complained that everything they earn goes Into repairs or time payments for their buses. As a Pushtun bus owners representative stated

YahA p6_6k transporter h6, gharlb h6, bus nehi 16 sakta h6. Kuch Jama kerta he. 6k IAkh, dO IAkh pyr emir, surmayadAr k6 pAs 16jlt6. VO tin IAkh kA nayA bus 1616tA h6 us kA ch6 IAkh k6 d6 d6t!I. Pyr vO gharib jab kam Ata h6 mahna ys kO pyr mAlik kO d6t6 h6. Salon k6 bAd us kA qars khatam hi!. Oars khatam h6 bus bhi khatam hOjle. Syrf sarmayadAr k6 lie kam Ana hua .... Abhi humar!I bus mAlikAn jO h6, vO Am tOr par busOn k6 sAth Ate jAte, khud jAtA, khud driving kert6 hi!, khud p6sa ikat6 kert6.

Here is a transporter. He is poor, he can't buy a bus. He gets some money together, one lakh, two lakh then he goes to a capitalist. The capitalist buys a bus for three lakh. and sells it to him for six lakh. Then when that poor man makes anything he gives it to the capitalist. Years later his debt is settled. When his debt is finished his bus is finished. Only the capitalist earned anything .... Now most of our bus owners ride with their buses, they themselves do the driving or collect fees. Those who can afford to pay cash for their buses avoid monthly payments (which average around Rs10,000 per bus), and pay from $10,000 to $17,000 less to buy them.

While some transporters work intensively on a single bus, others have hundreds of tho"Usands of dollars invested In transport, and some of these men finance purchases by small independents. The survey Is slanted toward the independents both because I could not interview several of the largest transporters and because data on air conditioned buses is excluded for most calculations. Mos1 transport though is accounted for

by individual or small scale owners.

Family and Tribe In the Transport Game While I have depicted the bus industry as made up of small-scale entrepreneurs, In

most cases buses are not In fact owned by individuals but by groups of kin, often ex tended families. One of the survey's questions asked whether the informant owned his

bus alone, with relatives, or with partners to which 28 responded that they own the bus with relatives, 25 by themselves and seven with partners. In another question six of

those who said they are individual owners also stated that other members of their fami-

180 ly with whom they live (usually brothers and occasionally other agnates) work on their

bus or buses. This either means that they interpreted the response "alone• (in Urdu

~ to mean owned by the immediate family or else the owners hired their Immediate

family to work for them.

Certainly the extended family is the predominant type of household among both

Baluch and Pushtun. Only three of the 54 men who answered the question about fami

ly structure said they live In a nuclear family. According to the survey the mean number

· of people in the bus owners' homes is 23 which seems unusually high, especially when

compared with the 1960.census figures which show the average household size for

Baluchistan is 7.3 persons, and for Quetta 7.7 (Pakistan 1984:8-9). The higher figures

my Informants gave may reflect living arrangements in which a number of agnates

(brothers, father and sons, brothers and their adult children) live In separate

households in a single compound. 16 Though the buses are In the majority of cases

family owned, they are not necessarily fully family operated. Most respondents hire

staff and pay them wages, which is to say few operate with unpaid family labor. Only

15 informants said they hire relatives to man their bus or buses, another 14 said they

hire members of their tribe {theoretically distant relatives), and seven said they hired

people who Hve In their vHlage. The rest said they hire whoever works well. Extended

families generally have more than one Income earner in the household though that ls

not always the case. Data from the 38 informants who responded show that the mean

number of employed adults per household is three. 17 Of these Informants, 13 stated

that all Income earners work on the family's bus or buses, and the others said family

members work in such other areas as agriculture (eight), government offices (six), fami

ly shops {five), driving other vehicles (four), laboring (three) and such other occupa

tions as mechanlcs,teaching, the military, and the railways.

181 While bus owners confront the economic world more as families than as In·

dividuals, it is another question as to whether they also approach it as members of

tribes or ethnic groups. The structure and ethnic composition of the major transport

companies reveals that in some cases tribal membership is an important element in the

pattern of bus ownership. This is especially true of one Baluch company, Sada BahAr, whose buses operate on routes between Quella and a number of cities including

Karachi, Larkana, Jacobabad, Bannu and Peshawar. Such bus companies do not only

operate their own buses, for a fee they sell tickets for others who operate their buses

through them. The man who owns Sada Bahtir and many of Its buses Is from the Lehri tribe as are the owners of many of the buses which affiliate with It. Of the seven survey

respondents who are affiliated with the company four are Lehri while two others are

from different Baluch tribes and one Is Achakzai Pushtun. Though ,not a particularly

large tribe, the Lehrls are prominent in local business and political circles. Lehris own a

number of butcher shops and uji (Baluch style roasted lamb) re~taurants in the, city.

The responses of two informants indicate that It was an early entry into the supplying of

live animals to Quella and later butcher shops that provided the capital with which

some Lehris became prominent in Quella and bought their buses. Another economic

asset members of the Lehri tribe hold is lands and houses in an area known as Kili

Ghounsabad which is located along one of two major approaches to the bus stand.

Around it are shops and repair facilities for buses, and a large hotel was aiso under

construction there.

Similar patterns are apparent in other companies and on other routes. Baluchis

tan Transport, the oldest of Quetta's bus companies, operates buses on the Quetta

Karachi route and is also owned by members of the Lehri tribe. At least two of the

other transporters affiliated with it are also Lehr!, but most of them are from other

182 Baluch tribes and some are Pushtun. Public Transport is the other major company with standard buses plying the Karachi route. Formed after the first ethnic disturbances In

1966, Its buses are entirely Pushtun-ownj)d. It is run as a cooperative and its members come from a mix of Pushtun tribes though the majority of respondents (six of nine) are from one, the Achakzais. 18 From the evidence it can be said that tribal affiliation Is an active element in shaping the ownership of buses In Quella. It Is not a determining fac tor but does appear to provide openings, i.e., access to knowledge, opportunities, and the capital or route permits necessary for entering the industry.

The Transport Riots It can be argued that ethnicity as a form of sub-nationalism is always the product of competition or inequalities of access to resources or power. Certainly real or perceived

Inequalities give rise to stronger ethnic Identities or the active mobilization of people on the basis of their ethnicity. If members of a group understand themselves to be dominated by others or even believe the possibility exists, they will have a strong Incen tive to mobilize. Conversely, If those in a group feel their position of dominance Is threatened by the demands or mobilization of other ethnic groups they too are likely to moblllze along ethnic lines, though their mobilization may take the form of nationalism or a religious Identity under which their position of superiority Is unchallenged.

In other words, ethnicity or the mobilization of people on an ethnic basis Is largely a reactive, oppositional form of social identity. People keep a close eye on the status of others and react to counter their perceived or potential advantages. The reactive na ture of ethnicity is well illustrated by the violent incidents which have taken place .In

Quetta's transport Industry, and by events that have followed them. The incidents at the bus stand also support the contention that ethnicity is figured by the political economic context In which It Is manifested. In these cases, the surfounding circumstan-

183 ces as well as the attitude and actions of local government officials toward the violence affected the way people Interpreted events and the meaning of ethnicity.

October 29, 1986 The October 1966 riots in Ouetta, which began as a quarrel between transporters and then spread, sowed the seeds for increasing ethnic polarization in the city. Details of the October 1966 violence and the events leading up to it come from interviews with a' number of people, including some of those involved in them, and from press reports.

The violence began with a fight between two bus drivers, one Pushtun and the other

Baluch. It escalated into rock throwing and bus burning. Some members of both par ties were armed, and at some point the Baluch owner of a major bus company opened

fire Into a crowd that was threatening his property, kHling nine and wounding others.

Violence then spread to other parts of the city. In the city center Pushtun crowds killed

a Baluch bus driver and burnt down several Bafuch shops and a uji restaurant. In

response local authorities declared a curfew which the army enforced.

These events were linked to an incident that had taken place days before at the

offices of the provincial government. The Baluch chief minister had di$missed a P!Jsh

tun minister in his cabinet after the man slapped a stenotypist in another official's office

(see Shahid 1966a:65). As head of a mainly Pushtun transporters' union, the dis

missed minister's son attempted to organize a strike to protest his father's dismissal.

When the Baluch leaders of another transporters' union, a group that included the man

that later anegedly fired on the crowd, refused to support the strike, tensions rose creat

ing the climate in which the riots occurred.

Interviews with two of the central figures in the dispute shed little light on the inci

dent. The Baluch transporter accused of the killings refused to discuss the inc:ident

other than to say it occurred because he would not join a strike over a personal matter.

184 He also claimed that a jeep-load of armed Pushtun came to the bus stand to pressure

him to strike just before the Incident. In an initial interview the dismissed minister's son

denied having attempted to organize a strike. He claimed his father's, business affairs

are entirely separate from his own and furthermore, he said, on the day of the incident

he was staying in his village outside of Quella. In a subsequent interview six months

later, he admitted having called a strike, but said that it was in an initial stage in which

the government Is given warning of the intention to strike ii certain demands are not · met.

Tensions underlying the Incident relate to the history of transportation in the city

and political competition between members of the two ethnic groups. Tension be

tween the dismissed Pushtun minister (himseH a transporter) and Baluch transporters

had been present since the late 1970s when they clashed over the site of new bus

stand for Quetta.19 Further tension had been added according to one Pakistani

journalist's account, six months prior to the riots when the government granted the

Baluch transporter at the center of the riots a route permit to drive from Quella to Oera

Ghazi Khan20 on a route that initially traverses Pushtun areas. Pushtun transporters ob

jected and forcibly stopped his buses from· operating on that route so he subsequently

began operating on one that does not cross Pushtun lands (Shahid 1986b:51 ). Not

only were this man and the dismissed minister's son heads of different transporters'

unions, both were competing for political patronage lrom the Muslim League and the

government (ibid.).

Following the rioting both of these men were arrested and imprisoned for around

a month, but beyond this neither was punished nor was any trial held. Instead the

provincial government appointed a iicgA(council) of Pushtun and Baluch tribal leaders

to investigate the incident. The iicgAgave generous compensation to those who had

185 lost property in the riots with the largest award, several transporters told me, going to the Baluch who had fired on the crowd. Several high-level provincial officials dis cussed the incident with me and said the jlrga had been poorly handled since it awarded compensations soon after the deliberations started which removed the incen tive for people to participate in it. The guilty were not punished, and, the officials said, the government's actions even gave the appearance of condoning the violence. For ex ample the Baluch chief minister of the Province reportedly decla.red the transporter ac cused of the firing to be a gb.6zl(one who sacrifices for Islam) at a public event soon after his release from prison.

The effect of the violence on both the transport industry and the politics of the city was polarization long ethnic lines. The polarization was not extreme or Irrevocable but it certainly was visible. As I discuss in the next chapter, after the rioting the dis missed minister's son estabiished a new transporters' union, Afghan ltehAd Bus

Owners, exclusively for Pushtun, and a group of Pushtun who had been running their buses with Baluch companies left and formed Public Trans.port, an entirely Pushtun company. Ironically some of them were in the process of purchasing their buses and/or route permits from the Baluch transporter at the center of the controversy, and indeed several informants said he.obtained route permits as part of his compensation for his loses in the riots. In politics. too ethnicity began to have greater mobilizing poten tial after the riots, a trend I discuss in the next chapter.

August 13, 1988 The second transport riot reflects many of the issues this chapter has raised as well as that of the persistent influence of tribal custom and ideology in the relations between

Baluch and Pushtuns. For Pakistan as well as for me personally, the violence of

August 13, 1988 coincided with a point of transition. It erupted the day after I returned

186 from Karachi after seeing off my wife who was returning home to give birth to our second daughter, and It was in the days immediately after the violence, when much of

Quella was still under curfew, that General Zia's plane crashed, ending his decade-long domination of Pakistan's politics.

The events leading to the violence began on August 12th when armed men stopped a Pushtun-owned bus on the RCD.Highway outside the village of Manguchar, near Mastung. According to some versions of events they robbed the passengers, but in any case they shot the driver of the bus. The driver's body remained at the scene of the ambush untD late that night when the head of the Afghan lteh4d Bus Owners retrieved it and brought It to the bus stand in Quella. The next morning the presence of the corpse, and perhaps also provocative speeches, inflamed a Pushtun crowd which attacked Baluchbuses and shops. When I came upon the scene at 10 a.m. thick black smoke wasrising from the bus stand, snipers were firing from surrounding buildings, and young men were heaving brickbats at Baluch buses trying to flee the scene and burning those they succeeded In stopping. In other parts of the city (namely along

Sariab Road) gangs of young Baiuch attacked and looted Pushtun businesses. Again the violence continued until the. army imposed order and a curfew.

The ambush of the bus was the culmination of a series of events that began with a minor accident between a Baluch-run oil tanker and a Pushtun-run bus on the RCO highway outside of Karachi. The Pushtun got the better of a confrontation that fol lowed, and to revenge himself the Baluch tanker driver assembled a group to stop his foe's bus on Its return trip to Quella. Having learned of their plan the Pushtun as sembled his own supporters who arrived at the scene of the ambush well-armed and defeated the Baluch party, injuring some of them severely. In addition, a relative of one

of those involved in the affair told me, the Pushtun filed charges against the Baluch and

187 the police arrested some of them. The Baluch party felt dishonored by the whole affair and Baluch informants said Baluch spokesmen urged the Pushtun party to do the tribal custom of~ a formal apology and request for forgiveness (see Janmahmad

1982:68). The Pushtun transporter did not do so, and in an Interview with me said no

Baluch had suggested that he make such an apology. He claimed they had said only

'this is our road and you should not be on it'. The fact that he is originally from Af ghanistan may have affected the situation. He may not have been aware of Baluch sen sibilities, or they may have perceived him to be more of an outsider. In any case, it was following an amount of time appropriate for allowing ~. that a party of Baluch sought revenge. Armed with guns this time they attacked his bus (though he himself was not present) and killed his driver.

Viewed from the perspective of tribal custom it could be argued that this was ac ceptable behavior. Revenge (tw!a!) Is a core element of both Baluch and Pushtun tribal codes of behavior (riltill (Janmahmad 1982:66; Dupree 1980:126), and the par ties could perceive themselves as acting according to those codes, For example after the riots I asked the Pushtun transporter if he would.seek revenge for the attack on his bus, and he said he would or else he would not be Pushtun.

The Implications 01 the Rioting Despite the tribal identities of Its participants the initial dispute did not remain a tribal one; instead of Involving only the sections or perhaps the tribes of the two parties, in the context of the economic and social condi.tions I have described, i.e., economic com petition in the transport sector and the increasing strength of ethnic rather than tribal identities, the dispute was interpreted as and escalated to a Baluch-Pushtun confronta tion. In a sense the larger ethnic group had become a tribe. Though not unexpected under the theory of segmentary opposition, it is not given that a dispute between a

188 Baluch and a Pushtun will escalate to the level of ethnic violence. The case study presented in the introduction provides an example of how tribes can contain the violence that occurs between their members. The tribe is a set of inherited and at tained relations and positions of power, and so too is the larger ethnic group. Different options, aims, and individuals operate in each (despite the fact that hereditary tribal leaders are prominent in both), and the extent to which each is relevant or becomes ac tivated depends on the particular circumstances and the broader social context.

The politic.al climate in which the two riots took place shaped how their effect was felt. The first riots occurred In the period immediately after martial law had ended and elections conducted without political parties had produced a government widely viewed as unrepresentative. The second incident was overshadowed by the death of

President Zia and a High Court decision that parties could participate In the elections to replace the government. In dealing with the second transporters' dispute the interim administration took a different approach than had their predecessor. They too ap, pointed a jirga. but the new chief minister, himself Baluch, threatened that there would be no· compensation to those who lost property and even accused transporters. of destroying their own buses In order to obtain excessive compensation. Though the composition of the lir.SIIwas imbalanced since its Pushtun members were atl 1rlbal figures and·lts Baluch members transporters, 21 it did conduct a thorough enquiry. In an Interview held after the lir.SIIreached its decision, one of its members said that the government had compensated claimants only half the value of destroyed property and

had called for the arrests of the men who had allegedly carried out the ambush. Its

balanced approach, coming at a time of a more open political climate in the country, at least did not contribute to further ethni.c polarization, though it was still ad hoc and did

not plumb the deeper causes of ethnic tension in the city.

189 Baluch and Pushtun ethnic nationalists charged the government with at best negligence and al worst complicity in the ethnic violence. Those who charged negligence included the head of the Pushtun transporters' union. He claimed that no officials responded to the incident on the highway between six in the evening when the ambush took place and three in the morning when he retrieved the body from the site of the ambush, and the same was true once he had taken ii to the bus stand.

I.Ash m6 uthaya, m6r6 s6 koi nehi mila. Din k6 gyAra baj6 tak koi D.C., mici, Commissioner, koi bhi nehi AyA. Deputy Commissioner ko ham n6 b61A. Koi bhi nehi Ayi\. MA n6 jirg6 k6 s1\mn6 y6 bayi\n di k6 si\ra ztmdari tumhar6 uper h6. Tum kyOn nehi aya udher?

I took away the corpse but nobody met with me. Until 11 o'clock in the morning not a O.C .• a Commissioner, nor any officer came. We called the Deputy Commissioner but nobody came. I made a statement to the jirga that [the violence] was your [the government's] responsibility. Why didn't you come out there? A Baluch employee of one of the transport companies said that they too called the authorities when Pushtun transporters began blockadlng the bus stand with their

buses but no one arrived.

Many of my informants claimed that the government held greater responsibirity

for the ethnic violence than mere negligence. Various versions of a view I heard from

students, workers, and political figures of both ethnic groups held that the government

either passively benefits from or actively encourages the violence between Pushtun

and Baluch. Tensions between the two groups, they contend, prevents them from

working together to advance their interests, and thus protects the position of the

government and the strategic concerns of the imperialist powers with which it is as

sociated. The notion that the government was operating behind the scenes was more

prevalent after the first incident when the government's unseemly compensations were

interpreted as rewarding those involved with the violence. Nevertheless the view that

190 the government and foreign powers manipulate events is widespread, and an element some of my key informants told me I should not overlook in my work.

Conclusion The state has created roads which provide a setting as well as a medium through which Baluchistanis advance their economic interests. Baluch and Pushtun individually gain access to economic capital, make investments, and run buses, but in doing so they also draw on their cultural capital, an element of which is ethnicity. Through it they receive direct and indirect links to an ethno-territory, shared economic skills and knowledge (see Kronenfeld 1985:29), and political Influence. No single element is suffi cient for economic success and when individuals compete over limited opportunities or sp_aceth41Y will draw on as many options as they can or must, thus at some point bring

Ing ethnicity into the process. Ethnic identities have sharpened around the transport sector in Baluchistan and, as discussed further in Chapter Eight, the reason is, in part, the relative economic success of the Pushtun and the increasing access to Baluch so

cial space they are thus obtainlf'!g.

This chapter has shown that the state establishes some of the conditions under which individuals Interact and define themselves in ethnic terms relative to others who

are similarly subject to the state. Influences from a number of levels shape those condi· tions. These include world economic systems and global politics, the degree of politl·

cal participation and provincial autonomy the national governments allows, and the

policies and attitudes of provincial officials who may or may not be members of the eth

nic groups concerned.

191 NOTES 1) See Chapter Seven for a description of the political parties in Baluchistan.

2) This notion was not held by Baluch alone. A British engineer working on irrigation projects in Baluchistan told me that he had seen the blueprints for the Bela-Turbat road and that it had the capacity to handle heavy military equipment.

3) This trip took place towards the end of Aamzan, the Islamic month of daily fasting. Ramzan culminateswith several days of Eid that are celebrated with feasting and gift giving, and the bus owner said that the customs officials were demanding more than the usual amounts because they needed to buy Eid gifts. The total amount paid in bribes on the trip was Rs1000 a quite significant portion of the gross revenues generated by the trip. I calculated that amount to be Rs7,234 for passengers and freight, a figure which includes the profit from smuggling 150 cartons of cigarettes.

4) Indeed van Gennep sees the rite of passage very much in spatial terms or as a spa tial metaphor (van Gennep 1960:25) and he discusses a number of ceremonies as sociated with territorial passage (ibid.:15-24).

5) This fact is underlined by a statement the newly elected mayor of Quella made in an interview with me in 1988. He said that octroi on goods coming from other parts of Pakistan is the sole source of revenue for the Quella Municipal Corporation.

6) Rumors also circulated about the participation of some government officials in the smuggling of drugs or other items.

7) A narrowing and refining of the survey project took place as it progressed. I aban doned attempts to interview owners or operators of any forms of transportation (trucks, pickup trucks, rickshaws, car taxis, camel and donkey carts) other than passenger buses and did not gather separate survey data from the employees (drivers, conduc-· tors and cleaners) of the bus owners as I initially intended. The questionnaire itself evolved through three stages. To the basic questions about the economics of owning and operating buses in my test survey I added several about family structure and in come. Then, after the violence in August, 1988, I added four questions which referred to it.

8) At the time of the survey the exchange rate between U.S. dollars and Pakistani ·rupees was $1=Rs18. A lakh equals one-hundred thousand (100,000).

9) This difference is only partially a factor of the type of vehicle since the calculated costs for mini-vans and standard buses include many vehicles running much shorter distances than the a.c. buses confront on the Quella to Karachi route. The cost of maintaining standard buses on that route, $575, is still significantly lower than what the a.c. buses require, though fuel costs are the same. In short it takes considerably more capital to purchase and operate air conditioned vehicles though the returns also ap pear greater.

10) Sayyeds are descendents of the Prophet Muhammad and thus stand outside the Pushtun tribal genealogy.

192 11) Afghan refugees are allowed to operate some buses between Quetta and major refugee camps, but not in the regular traffic between Baluchistan's cities or to other provinces. Many refugees operate illegally in pick-up trucks and other small vehicles, however.

12) The one exception I came across was a Baluch man who was a partner with a Push tun in operating a mini-van to Loralai.

13) Officially· a permit from the government costs around $50 (As1000), though one in formant told me that including bribes to the appropriate officials it costs around $800.

14) Four variables compose operating costs, maintenance, fuel, wages, and time pay ments. Income equafs passenger fees (number of passengers X cost of a ticket X num ber of trips per month) plus freight. Toward the end of the survey I found that most transporters have in mind a ready estimate of their average income per trip (not per month) which I used in place of the separate categories.

15) Another cause of the different ownership patterns could be the length of time the In formants had been operating the buses on their routes. The average length of owner ship on the Slbi route was quite high, and only partly because one of the respondents had inherited his bus. Owning buses for a longer period may have allowed them to build up their business and purchase more buses.

16) In his analysis of the households of Mohmand Pushtuns who live along the Kabul Aiv1n in NWFP, Akbar Ahmed has shown that several types of households are present in both tribal and settled areas. These Include nuclear family households, Joint family households composed of brothers and their wives, and compound family households in which a polygynist lives with his wives and perhaps married sons. If what Ahmed terms the "settlement" IS taken as the unit of analysis his population figures ap proximate those my informants provided (Ahmed 1980:222).

17) This aspect of the survey's results contradicts Ahmed's findings. My informants in dicated that Joint family household tend to share incomes and expenses, and he found that In joint family households "the primary and effective social end economic unity Is the nuclear family" (Ahmed 1980:241). However he found this not to be the case in compound families in which a patriarch oversees a unitary budget for the household (Ahmed 1980:230).

18) Two of the other three respondents from Public Transport are from the same major tribal division as the Achakzais and so tribal affiliation may be an underlying factor. The tribal Identity of more of the 22 owners affiliated with Public would have to be deter mined to be certain.

19) I discuss these events and the transporters' unions in the next chapter.

20) Dera Ghazi Khan is a city in the Punjab originally founded by a Baluch and where many Baluch live. ·

21) The leader of a Pushtun nationalist party In Quetta told me that he and several of his party-members were among those Pushtun transporters requested to sit on the

193 jirg.ll. He said the local administration dismissed them after the Jirga's first meeting be cause of their political opposition to the government and replaced them with tribal figures. The representatives requested by the Baluch transporters remained on the jirg.ll.

194 CHAPTER SIX

UNITYAND WELFARE: THE 'II£HAD.S' OF QUETTA

In his study of social changes resulting from technological change and urbanization in

Western Africa, Little focuses on what he calls "voluntary associations•. These are simp ly organizations or groups people must join even when, as in clan or tribe-based ones, eligibility is from birth. Voluntary associations, he observes, serve two functions, they provide support networks and they are often instruments "the 'progressive' young men use to obtain social change• (Little 1965:26-33). A number of such organizations with a range of aims are active in Quella. Those I describe in this chapter illustrate how

Baluch are drawn to transform and transcend tribalism in order to deal with the contingencies of contemporary urban life.

I will be considering a much smaller variety of groups than Little did in his study. • r His task was to consider social change in general and therefore the types of groups he includes within the term "voluntary organization" include all those which emerged as a result of contact with European culture or are founded on principles other than kin ship. They range from purely social dining clubs and athletic teams to anti-colonial political parties (Little 1965:146-6). The four organizations I will examine stand in the middle of that spectrum. They have been organized to advance the welfare of their members or of some broader portion of society, but they are not out to seize political power in order to do so. Each of the groups I examine also uses ethnicity as one of its criteria for membership.

One element in my discussion of these groups is the notion of 'unity'. Like similar organizations everywhere, those I describe put unity forward as both a goal and a

195 medium for attaining other goals. The pivotal word in the names of the four of them is

~ an Arabic word used in Persian, Urdu and the other languages of the region, that means unity, union, alliance or close friendship. The groups I examine here are 1) the Afghan ltehld Bus Owners (AIBO), self-defined as a union (but more accurately labelled a guild) that represents Baluchistan's Pushtun bus owners; 2) Anjuman lteMd

Zehri (AIZ), or the Society for Zehri Unity, the Zehris being a Brahui-speaking tribe; 3)

Baluch ltehAd whose name means United Baluch or Baluch Unity; and 4) Pushtun ltehAd (often called ltehld-e-Pushtun) whose stated aim, like its Baluch counterpart, is ethnic unity.

I chose to, examine these particular groups in detail for a variety of reasons in part because these were groups I happened upon as I explored the issues of tribalism and ethnicity in Quetta. Though they were not particularly powerful, Baluch ltehld and

Pushtun ltehld were visible and active players in the ethnic politics of Quetta during my . stay. Afghan ltehld Bus Owners Is representative of a number of transporters guffds In

Quetta, and similarly Anjuman ltehld Zehri Is representative of a number of neo-tribal or ganizations In the city. Though there are other types of voluntary organizations In Ouet ta that I did not examine, I suspect their aims and methods are in general similar to these. 1

Though organized for different.purposes these ·~s· all share certain traits.

Members of all of them, and non-members as well, emphasized that they are not In their words "politicar organizations but should instead be considered ·social welfare• or ganizations. Though that distinction becomes somewhat blurry with Baluch ltehld and

Pushtun ltehld which verge on being ethnic political parties, it means that they see themselves primarily as organizations set up to deal with the day-to-day issues facing their members and constituencies. They may deal with the state and its bureaucracy in

196 the course of their efforts, but they do so as interest groups, not as parties organized to attain office or power. They are too small-scale for that.

These itelllQs are the creations and voices of certain individuals and groups within the growing middle-class of businessmen, salary earners, and students in urban settings. Th6ugh they may seek ties with both, their members include neither the tradi tional tribal elite nor the new elite of high-level bureaucrats or the very wealthy. Crea tions of people who live largely outside tribal economics and politics, the itelllQs are new types of organlzations whose scope extends beyond the confines of tribes. Yet the structures and relationships of tribal society confronts each of them, and they are In fact products of tribalism as they attempt to escape, reform, or replace it.

The Afghan Hehid Bus Owners Association (AIBO). Of the four itelllQs.the Afghan lteh!d Bus Owners has the most clearly defined purpose and the least to do with tribes or tribalism. It was organized to advance the Interests of its members, Pushtun bus owners. In It ethnic and economic interests coincide. There ' are other transporters' unions in Quella, and other ethnic organizations, but only the

AIBO is explicitly both. As such It is the product of the changing economics of Baluchls- tan and increasing ethnic polarization.

In addition to outlining its structure and operating procedures, the AIBO's con stitution (dastyral amal)lists Its aims and goals. Some of the general observations about the ~ made above are explicitly stated in the constitution. For example, members are not allowed to be active in political parties. It also stresses the benefits of

unity (llm)!d): "The association will promote positive and fraternal relations among its

members so It can successfully accomplish its goals". As an extension of the theme of unity, the constitution also emphasizes the organization's role In settling disputes among its members and, in cooperation with other groups, between its members and

197 theirs. Specifically relating to transport it reiers to the need to overcome obstacles to traffic and to develop paved roads in the area. To achieve these goals, it states, the

AIBO will remain on good terms with the government but will also pressure it to serve transporters' Interests.

An example of the AlBO's approach and the issues it concerns itself with can be

seen in its statement printed In the Quella edition of the Urdu newspaper aog on

January 28, 1988 regarding one of its meetings. The statement is entitled "Afghan

lteh&d Bus Owners Meets and Decides that It Will Take Extreme Steps if Its Demands

Are Not Mei by February 15th".2 The groups demands included that the civil administra

tion in Zhob (a district in Northern Baluchistan) follow the provincial government's

policies for settling transport disputes In the area; that the bus stand In Quella be

cleaned and more adequately supplied with water and electricity; that customs agents

· stop their corrupt practices; and that the Quella Municipal Authority construct the

transport office for which the Provincial Government allotted them land, regulate illegal

pick-up trucks, and set time tables for all buses and mini buses. Other demands raised

in the meeting were that bus stands be built in Loralal, Zhob, and Chaman (all towns in

the Pushtun portion of Baluchistan), and that the AIBO participate in the distribution of

route permits for buses travelling to those areas.

The History of the Afghan ltehid Bus Owners The history of the AIBO reflects both its economic and ethnic dimensions, and in addi·

tion highlights another feature of the ~s. i.e., that they tend to be the vehicle, or at

least remain in the control of the individuals who founded them. The AIBO had its

genesis in disputes between an earlier generation of transporters' unions. Those older

unions were the now defunct Pakistan Motor Transport Federation, run by the father of

the current president of the AIBO (the man whose dismissal from ministerial office

198 precipitated the transport riots described in the previous chapter), and the still function ing All Baluchistan Transporters' Association whose leaders were and continue to be mostly Baluch. Though the membership of both these organizations were ethnically mixed, the former was predominantly Pushtun, and the latter predominantly Baluch.

Rivalry between the two was apparently long-standing and it sharpened in the late

1970s with the local government's decisions to move Quetta's central bus stand from the city center to a larger area near Satellite Town, a new suburb to the south. The

Pakistan Motor Transport Federation opposed the shift since Pushtun towns are lo cated to the north of Quella and Pushtun transporters did not want the bus stand relo

cated to a place that would require them to drive across the city .3

According to the president of the AIBO, transporters were fed up with the squab

bles between the two unions, and so he established the Baluchistan Bus Owners As· soclatlon. Like his father's organization it seems to have been predominantly Pushtun with a contingent of Baluch members. In fact, the son's organizatiqn replaced the father's which ceased to function. Following the 1986 Baluch-Pushtun riots In Quetta a polarization between the ethnic groups took place In the midst of which the Baluch transporters abandoned the Baluchistan Bus Owners Association, and the members who remained changed its name to Afghan ltehad Bus Owners to emphasize their larger ethnic identity. An exchange in my interview with the president of the AIBO 0-

lustrates this:

P • Baluchistan Bus Owners Association mil koi Baluch maujud thli ya ... A • HA thli, thli. HumAra general secretary jo tha Yusuf ShAwAni thA. S6 mer6 s!th thli Baluch. P - L6kin masla kli bad vo chala gya? A • HA v6 chala gya, bas. P • Lagta hli kli ys incident kli bad qaum me kuch yxtilAfat... A· Kuch nehi, zyAda yxtilalAt Aya the, zyAda dur ho gye. Y6 nehi kli syrf transport m6 dur hli. Nehi, siasi parti6n, avam, businessmen, all the Pushtun and all the Baluch ys masla s6 bahut dur ho gye.

P • Were there any Baluch present in the Baluchistan Bus Owners Association or ...

199 A - Yes there were, there were. Our general secretary was Yusuf Shawani. One hundred Baruch were with me. P - But they left after the [riots)? A - Yes they left, that's it. P - It seems that after this incident some differences in the nation ... A - Not some, large differences developed, a great distance developed. This distance was not just in transport. No, from this problem distance developed in political parties, among the public, businessmen, between all the Baluch and all the Pushtun.

This polarization did not occur in all sectors of the transport industry. For example the

Mashtarka Local Bus Union an organization of the owners of buses operating with

Quetta and the villages on its outskirts continued to have both Pushtun and Baluch of ficers. 4

When I made the above interview in April of 19BB, the distance between Baluch and Pushtun the AIBO president speaks of had begun to narrow. He said he had

recently gone to Sindh with the Baluch leaders of the All Baluchistan Motor Federation and a tru'ck owners' association in order to deal with some problems affecting transporters from Baluchistan, and he talked about his efforts to establlsh a committee

of bus and truck unions to deal with transport issues. Following another round of riot- ' Ing later in 19BB, however, he abandoned that effort.

Little observed that "in the economic field the influence of voluntary associations

makes for intertribal co-operation• (Little 1965:144-5). In Quetta this seems true within

each ethnic group and to an extent also applies to inter-ethnic relations. The primary

organizing principle for the AIBO is shared economic interests and, as far as I could

determine, within the broader Pushtun ethnicity tribal affiliations did not determine who

became a member. Further investigations might reveal otherwise, however, because

survey data show that not an Pushtun bus owners are members of AIBO. The presiden

cy of the unions representing Pushtun transporters virtually passed from father to son,

and has remained with him through several elections. The tribal identity of these men,

200 and the relations of cooperation and rivalry between Pushtun tribes, may affect mem bership in their organization, though no one mentioned It as important

Between Pushtun and Baluch transporters countervailing forces of economic and ethnic attraction and repulsion are at play. In purely economic terms transporters are better off cooperating to create a united front to press their demands. However, as

Pushtun and Baluch, transporters are not immune to ethnic competition. Indeed, as I argued above (Chapter Five), rivalry between transporters for access to certain routes is one source of ethnic tension. The prior successes of each group block the Mure op portunities of the other.

The AnJuman-e-ltehad Zehr! (AIZ) Unlike the other ~s the AIZ is explicitly tribal in its emphasis. It is representative of a number of welfare associations tribesmen have organized to promote their unity and development. Though starting with the traditional genealogical/territorial Identity of the tribe these organizations are attempts to unify dispersed tribesmen amidst changed economic and politlcal circumstances. The organizers of these i11.bll1sare not the hereditary tribal elite, sardars and takrl.but middle-class activists who say their aim Is to make tribes more relevant to current circumstances.

I first contacted the members of AIZ when I noticed a ,sign bearing their organization's name over a small office in the Hudda area of Quetta. I held several for mal and informal interviews with leaders and rank-and-file members between November

1987 and January 1988, and attended a dinner they held following the selection of new officers in February, 1988. According to the leaders and members I interviewed, the purpose of the AIZ Is to unite the various branches ~ of the tribe In order to promote their social welfare and to settle their disputes.

Z - Our primary goal it to finish all m!Q in the Zehr! tribe. P -Why?

201 · Z - To stop internal fighting and killing. We will become so strong we can make dispensaries, schools, and women's activity centers. If a fight develops we will make a settlement outside of the government's system. If there are poor people in our Zehri tribe we will give them irru!M(support). If someone needs medical care we will see they get what they need - treatment, blood, money.

They claimed to support poor students financially and to hold tutoring sessions for stu dents and uneducated adults though I did not witness any such sessions. As dis cussed below, at least some of these aims have their origin in the particular history and current status of the Zehris, however the vision of these urban Zehri extend to all

Baluch.

Z - Our other goal is that if we can unite, then we will unite all the Baluch. We will disband Zehri, Mengals, and unite on one platform as Baluch.

Unlike the mutual aid societies of Africa, the AIZ is not designed to benefit Its

members through rotating credit; payments to meet medical, marriage, or funeral ex penses; or other forms of assistance that members give exclusively to other members

(Utile 1965:51-4; Lukhero 1962:51-52; Meillasoux 1966:62, 79). Members of Baluch tribe! ~s perceive tribal and ethnic unity as a force which will strengthen the bonds between people and help them solve the various problems they face. This is articu

lated not only in economic and political terms but in terms of honor and dishonor. Un derdevelopment and the lack of latitude it causes are at some level dishonorable not

only to individuals but to collectivities - to one's tribe, to all Baluch. This is well il

lustrated by the statement of a man who was attempting to organize a similar welfare society for his branch of the Jemaldinl tribe.

Duniya badt gae magar ham nehi badle. Vaqt tezi se guzAr rehA he aur ham vaqt ke sath dene s6 qAsir he. Zindagi ke har shobe me ham mehrumi se do chAr hen. Harne nazm-6-zabt, aur discipline ke jizbAt ke fuqdln. HamAr6 mAb6n dosti, braderi, aur khersagaH mlnd par gae jis k6 behes ham ek dusr6 se dur h6te jA rehe hen. Dusre ki khushi aur gham se IAtAluq h6te jA rehe he. Harne 6k zemAna thA jab ham ne Jemaldinl qabite ke sardar aur taslim kie jAt6 th6. Ham6n bepana qadar-o-manzalat hAsal ki h6 aur ham6 issat-o-takrim ki nigA se dekha jata thA. Magar Aj jab ham apne gird-o-p6sh kA Jaeza lete t6 gheron k6 maqabl6 me apne Ap ko buri terah khwAr-o-

202 zabOn dAkhtll hll. Mashre me hamare vaqar, izzat, nafs bar barqarar ne rekhtll hlln. Ousrll is sOrat-e-hal ka barpOr faida hota reha he.

The world has changed but we have not. Time is passing quickly and we won't be able to keep up with it. In all areas of life we confront a sense of deprivation. We are losing our feeling of discipline. The sense of friendship, brotherhood, and prosperity among us has faded because of which we are becoming distant from one another. We are becoming disconnected from the joy and sorrow of others. There was a time when we paid great respect to the Jemaldini sardar. We had great honor and we were viewed with admiration and respect. But now when we look around we see ourselves wretched and unfortunate compared to others. We can not maintain our dignity and honor in society. Others are benefiting from this situatio.n. Like the members of the AIZ, this man too aspired to unite his tribe, improve their situa-

tion, and to unite aH Baluch.

Historic and Contemporary Tribal Conflicts For the Zehr! the need for unity extends not only from contemporary conditions but

from the history and structure of the tribe. The Zehri tribe is one of the leading tribes of

Jhalawan, and the area in which they are concentrated is called Zehr!. According to

the colonial Gazetteer of Baluchistan for Jhalawan, the major tribes of Jhalawan were

,historically divided into two major "political or ethnic unit[s) known as giwa", the Zehrl

dam and the Mengal dam (BOG Jhalawan:73). The two were rivals and each was

divided into a number of separate clans or groupings which were largely autonomous.

These divisions were especially marked in the Zehri dam.

The Zahri tribe consists of a number of heterogeneous eiements ....Four of these clans, viz., the KhidrAni, Jattak, MOsiani, and Sasoli, though sharing in the gocid and Ill of the Zahris, may be regarded as now forming practically independent units [BOG Jhalawan:74}. These divisions remain and over-coming them is the primary aim of the AIZ. Its mem-

bers named 16 m6Qof the Zehri they said they were attempting to unite. They said, for

example, that members of all these m6Qshould quit using the name of the m6Qas

part of their personal name and use only Zehri.

203 Enmity between the Mengal and Zehri tribes has existed for generations accord ing to the Gazetteer. One cause was the historic rivalry over who should provide the chief of Jhalawan, a privilege the Zehri now hold. The Mengals are the largest tribe in

Jhalawan, and among the largest of all Baluch tribes. They are more cohesive than are the Zehri and the current Mengal sardar, Ataullah Mengal, is a leading Baluch nationalist politician. By contrast the Zehri are not only structurally fragmented, the

Zarakzai, their sardarkh61(the~ with the hereditary right to provide the sardar) has been riven by a blood feud.

That feud began with the death of a former sardar, the hunchback Doda Khan, in the early 1980s. Doda Khan had nine sons by various wives, the oldest of which was

Rasul Baxsh who assumed the sardarship upon his father's death. He had been feud

Ing with several of his half brothers who arranged a dinner for him, ostensibly to resolve their differences. Instead, during the course of the gathering, they murdered hlm.5 At the time of my Interviews with the AIZ the brothers were fugitives from the government, the Zarakzai were split into factions, and dozens of people had been killed in the fight between them. The sardar at that time was the father-in-law of the late Rasul Baxsh.

He was acting as the caretaker for the heir to the .slllilari,Rasul Baxsh's son and his grandson, who' was too young to assume office.

The Scope 01 AIZ The importance of the AIZ lies more in the vision it represents, the state of Its members'

"imagining• to use Benedict Anderson's term, than what it can accomplish. When I asked them to tell me their most significant accomplishment, the AIZ members said it was that in the two years of the .aojiunan's existence it had opened over 20 offices in towns and cities throughout Baluchista~. Sindh and even in a number of Arab Gulf states. The members of the AIZ aspired to more than to unify the Zehri in traditional

204 tribal terms. They sought to unite tribesmen now dispersed by changing economic pat terns on the basis of their tribal affiliation, but also to make the tribe more than it cur rently Is, I.e., to make it effective In providing for Zehri in the various situations they find themselves in.

The small amounts in dues t.he AIZ collected from its members, which I was told was its only source of funds, did not seem ample enough to permit its intended social welfare activities, however. For example, a pr:mary concern of the members of AIZ was drug, especially heroin, abuse by young Baluch. Despite their concern they did not seem to have any program to deal with the problem although one member told me that the AIZ financially supported the Baluch Trust, a local heroin treatment center. The

Trust's staff said, however, that they were not aware of any assistance from the AIZ.

have little evidence to gage the effectiveness of the AIZ's social welfare activities, but It was probably most useful to Its members rather than to the wider Zehrl community If

such a community could even be said to exist in Ouetta. Its office served as a meeting

place for an informal network of people who could give each other limited mutual sup

port, and its "host of minor offices and titles" provides a range of people the opportunity to have some responsibility and importance (Little 1973:415). It may have also serve as

a mechanism for new arrivals from Zehri to beco'!1e familiar with the city.

A Baluch protessor at the University of Baluchistan told me in a conversation

which touched on tribal welfare societies that they are largely ineffective, and usually

exist only if they receive the endorsement of the sardar. His observations seem to be

accurate in the case of the AIZ. Regarding the relation between it and the Zehr! sardar,

those members I interviewed told me that the sardar supported the organization but

was not involved in running it. In fact his standing relative to the AIZ resembles that

which the sardar has in the tribe. Two months after I had begun visiting the AIZ's office,

205 annual elections to select its national chairman were scheduled. I arrived at the office on the day the election was to take place only to be told that the sardar had already decided who among the three candidates would be the next chairman. All the can didates had agreed with his decision, and I was told that if they had not, the election would have been held as scheduled. In other words the issue was settled very much like any other dispute within the tribe upon which the sardar passes judgment. The sardar's decision provided an easy way to make a decision in a loose and widely dis persed network, a decision that was legitimate In the context of the tribe.

What I would call a lack of depth to the organization and its dependence on in dividuals rather than structure was apparent shortly after this. The new chairman seemed to have little enthusiasm for AIZ activities. On repeated trips to Hudda I was never able to find anyone in the AIZ office. Eventually wind toppled th.e sign above it.

The sign was never replaced and I never saw any further activity there. I never pursued my contacts with the AIZ members once my point of contact with them, the office, was abandoned so it is possible that thv AIZ pursued its program elsewhere. Towards the end of my fieldwork greater Zehri unity had been achieved at one level, however. Due to the Khan of Kalat's intervention and arbitration the feud among the Zarakzai was set-· tied. In fact in the elections of. November, 1988 one of the fugitive brothers, Sena'ullah, was elected to the Provincial Assembly from Zehr!.

Parallels with Tribal Structures These two points, the ineffectualness of the tribal ~s and their relations to sardars, deserve further scrutiny. Because Baluch tribes are primarily genealogical and ter ritorial entities they set limits to the level of organization tribal ~s are able to achieve. On the one hand the i1ellk\s are able to get people to unite on the concept of tribal unity, i.e., shared identity and mutual support, because ideologically this Is a tradi-

206 tional aspect of being a tribesman. On the other hano the structural limits of tribes are also difficult for them to overcome as they try to implement more encompassing or ac tive notions of unity. Tribes are not economic units in the sense that members work col lectively or for the commonweal. Tribes consist of economically independent individuals, or more accurately, families, linked by other principles, though certainly

members of Saluch tribes cooperate, share, and even have formalized joint labor (Jan

mahmad 1982:64)6 As in the tribal homeland, in the urban setting tribes do not have· an ultimate responsibility for the welfare of their individual members. Nor do they pro vide the institutions or social structure which ~s or others have found to be easily

modified to fulfill such functions.

As the embodiment of all that is positive about tribes as-they-are (cooperative so

cial ties, protection, anothe ability to settle disputes) as well as all that is negative Qner tia, hereditary privilege, and maldistribution of wealth and land), sardars generate

considerable ambivalence. The activists working to form ~s are caught by the ten sion between tribal traditions and modern conditions as they attempt to incorporate,

subsume, or bypass the sardars with their organizations. The tension between tradi

tion and modernity is apparent in the paradoxical attitudes of the Jemaldini Informant

quoted above. On the one hand he said the sardars of three tribes • Marr], Bugti, Men

gal • are still powerful within their tribes. According to him their tribes do not need to

form i.umAas because they have unity •naturally" (Qudratj t6r pac). When I asked what

the difference is between these tribes and others he said that in the other tribes people

have become educated.

VO bhi tribal he lekin in me aur shun'.JpedA hua he, talim peda hua he. Educated hen. Apne sardarl nlzAm kO mastarad hO gyA.

They are also tribal but In them something else has been born, education has been born. They are educated. They have rejected their saroari system.

207 As he perceives the situation, the least developed and most traditional tribes have purity and cohesiveness as evidenced by the prestige and authority of their sardars.

Those who have gained education have lost that unity by rejecting the authority of the sardars and are now trying to recreate and extend it through the ~s. 7

Most tribesmen have not rejected the authority of the sardars, however, and by expressing or mobilizing for solidarity on a tribal basis the activists enter into the realms in which the sardar and "tradition• have considerable legitimacy. The middle class ac· tivists are able to imagine their tribesmen united, but they as yet do not have the con tact with people, the resources, or any viable alternative strategies which would allow them to supplant the sardars.

Baluch ltehad Many of the social forces and sentiments which have given rise to the tribal JlibMs ( also underlie Baluch ltehad. There is a significant difference between the two since

Baluch ltehad members identified tribalism as one cause of the difficulties affecting

Baluch, while the tribal ~s attempt to work in the medium of tribes. The difference, though, is one of emphasis and timing. Both claim to want to overcome the disunity of

Baluch in a way that ultimately transcends traditional tribal relations. While the tribal

~s see Baluch unity as a more distant goal, one to succeed tribal unity and development, the activists in Baluch ltehad·see ethnic rather than tribal issues as primary at present. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive as was illustrated by the fact that the AIZ members expressed their support for Baluch ltehad.

Alms and Aspirations of Baluch ltehad The purpose of Baluch ltehad according to its leaders is to promote unity among

Baluch in order to solve their problems. My interviews and conversations with Baluch ltehad members, as with most Baluch, invariably touched on the underdeveloped state

208 of the Baluch and the Injustice inherent in their economic and political relations with the government of Pakistan. This is typified by my first interview with the founder and pres!·

dent of the organization.

Ham 16g6n ne Baluch ltehad is tera banaya: yaha par Pakistan me, khAsusan Baluchistan me Baluch6n ke siasi haquq jo he, hamare moashi sama~ haquq v6 t6 40 sal se ghazab he. Hamare sube se Pakistan k6 kafi daulat milte he Jabke hamar6 nehi yaha koi gas he ne koi bijli he, ne nalke he. Us mehrumion ko us Baluch6n ki darbadri ko Baluch6n ke Juda juda hamare ander ek qabailism, tribal system. Jis se hamar6 Baluch6n ka quat mantashir he. Jab ham mantashir hO, t6 na ham apn6 siasi haquq le sakeng6, na apne iqtisadiat haquq le sakenge, na siasi faida le sakeng6 hukumat• e-Pakistan s6.

We formed Baluch ltehad for this reason: for 40 years in Pakistan, and especlally In Baluchistan, the political, economic and social rights of the Baluch have been denied. Pakistan gets abundant wealth from our province at the same time we are without [natural] gas, electricity, or plumbing. This deprivation, the displacement of Baluch [is due to] our internal divisions, tribalism, the tribal system. Because of It our strength' is divided. When we are divided we can not gain our political rights, our economic rights, or any political benefits from the government of Pakistan. In a later Interview he said the three priorities of Saluch ltehAd, in order of their impor•

lance, are 1) the defense of Baluch territory.(serzemin); 2) solving internal differences

and overcoming tribal divisions; and 3) developing institutions such as schools, hospl•

tals, and orphanages to Improve the quality of Baluch life.

As was the case with the other i!eb&is, members and non-members alike em

phasized that Baluch ltehAd Is not a political but a social welfare organization, I.e., one

that sees Its primary role as solving the day-to-day problems of Baluch. Several local

observers characterized Baluch itehAd, and the Pushtun ltehAd as well, as middle-class

reactions against Pakistan's political parties, including the left/ethnic ones, which for

decades have focused their attention and energy on the long-term aim of establishing

democracy in the country (in addition to squabbling with one another over principles

and personalities) Instead of addressing the more Immediate needs of people. Part of

another interview with Batuch ltehAd president confirms this assessment.

209 Pakistan mil kOi politics nehi hil. Sarli fraud hfl, sflrll jut hil. Sirf aur sirf dh6kA d!it6 hil aur iqtidllr hllsal kernll kll lill. Avllm kil koi nehi hfl. Khas kar hamllr!i BaluchOn k!i lifl kOi political party nehi hil j6 un kfl mis Ail face kAr saktll.

There are no politics in Pakistan, there are no political parties. They are all frauds, they are all lies. They only spread deception in order to gain more power. None of them are for the people. It is especially the case for Baluch. no political party can face our problems. Statements ~) of Baluch ltehlld printed in J.aog reveal what they see as im-

portant issues affecting Baiuch. They repeatedly focus on such issues as the high rate

of unemployment among Baiuch; the difficulties the refugees from Afghanistan have

caused and the need to restrict them to camps; and the need to end tribal differences

(see JllJlg 1/14/88; 1/26/88; 2/3/88; 6/1/88). 8 One statement describes an incident in. which Baluch itehtid blocked traffic on Sariab Road to protest the death of a Baluch

youth, Abdul Rahim, while in police custody (J.ang4/16/88). Another argues that as

part of Pakistan's efforts to work for the interests of the United States it is trying to

weaken the Baiuch by moving non-Baluch into the fertile and well-irrigated Pat Feeder

district in Kachhi (J.ang3/6/88). Several of these statements-originated not from the

central Baiuch ltehid office in Ouetta, but from branch offices in such towns as Noshki,

l(haran, and Sibi Indicating that the group has had some success in establishing a

presence outside of Ouetta.

Baluch ltehlld is willing to intercede with the government on behalf of individuals.

Its members said they had negotiated with the government to block the transfer of

members of the civil service to other parts of the province when it was a hardship on

their families. In another case they said they intervened with the civil administration in

Kalal because Baluch there had to meet more rigorous requirements for promotion

than did non-Baluch. Soon alter the ethnic riots between Baluch and Pushtun in

August 1988, I was interviewing Baluch ltehtid members at their central office in Quetta.

During the interview a Baruch man asking for the Baluch ltehad office arrived on tne

210 scene. He sat and told his story, saying in the previous year he had purchased or chard land in Hanna-Urak, a Pushtun area just northeast of Ouetta that has some of the valley's most productive agricultural land. During the recent riots his neighbors had at tacked him, he said, and he had fled through the hills to the city. He was afraid to return, and complained that this year's crop had been stolen and his were trees dying because he could not Irrigate them. He had made written requests (darkhwAst) to the

Provincial Chief Minister, the Home Secretary, and the Commissioner to deal with his situation. No one was willing to take up his problem and he was hoping Baluch ltehAd would act on his behaH.

The most visible and large-scale actions of Baluch ltehad were several street mar ches and rallies they sponsored. Two were held In Quetta, the first on June 26, 1987; the second and lari;iest on July 10, 1987; and·a third was held in Slbl on February 12,

1988. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the sardar of the Bugti tribe and a major Baluch politician gave speeches at the latter two. I attended the Slbi event which consisted of a caravan of cars, buses, and motorcycles from Quetta and several major towns to Sibl, a distance of 150 kilometers, and then a rally at which, in addition to the Nawab, a num ber of representatives of Baluch ltehad gave speeches. I estimated the rally had an at tendance of around ten thousand, though Baluch ltehAd organizers insisted it was much higher. Following it Baluch ltehAd leaders talked of organizing another rally at which all the Important leaders of the Baluch, including those in exile, would be brought together on one platform of Baluch unity.

The leaders of Baluch ltehAd claimed to have had some success in settling dis putes among Baluch. Mediation is a central concern in the tribes because once violence has broken out "there is only an indefinite range of possible violence• until someone with the appropriate standing offers his authority and honor to arbitrate the

211 matter (Dresch 1969:99). Despite the fact that arbitrating disputes can bring prestige,

Swidler observed that among Baluch tribal leaders mediation is regarded as "a burden some and potentially divisive undertaking" since one party will usually be dissatisfied with the results (Swidler 1969:136). Baluch ltehiid members I interviewed were critical of the lack of interest shown by sardars is settling disputes, and also of the fact that they charge the parties in the dispute a fee for their services. They claimed that Baluch ltehiid never charges fees for mediation, and attempts to reach settlements that do not rely on cash payments. It was better they said to establish marriages between the dis

puting parties because that way respect develops and the settlement will be more per

manent.

Baluch ltehad's president gave as an example a case he had settled in Noshki in which a family dispute in the Jemaldlni tribe had led to the death of four people. He said that he and other members of his organization had made several trips to Noshki and had, according to Baluch custom, concluded a compromise between the factions.

He said he was currently working to settle another long-standing dispute, also in the

Jemaldini tribe, in which eight people had died. In another interview and in newspaper

statements members stressed the need to establish a committee of reconciliation

(masAihatjcommittee) within Baluch ltehad that would deal with such disputes. That

they had settled some disputes indicates that Baluch ltehad leaders had built up some

legitimacy. It did not appear to me that the organization had solved a large number of

such cases, however, and when I left Ouetta, nearly a year after our initial interviews, it

had not yet established its reconciliation committee.

Defense of the .Qa.um it is useful at this point to have a closer look at the three priorities of Baluch ltehad men-

tioned above. The first one, the defense of Baluch lands, is not only made in relation to

212 the Pakistani state, but more particularly to Pushtun. The sequence of events leading to Baluch ltehAd's emergence and the statements of its members and leaders show that it defines Itself relative to other ethnic groups, most especially the Pushtun. I have suggested that ethnicity ls largely a reactive phenomenon in which a certain identity or label Is contrasted with equivalent "others• (Moerman 1968:161). Such categories both emerge from and are given content in relations of opposition and/or Inequality (Com aroff 1987:307-311). Members of ethnic groups judge themselves and their deprivation or privilege not in absolute terms but relative to otl')ers, and their actions will be largely determined by perceived changes in their or the •other's" state.

The reactive nature of ethnicity is well illustrated by Baluch ltehAd's history.

Baluch ltehAd emerged as a significant force with its July, 1987 demonstration which Its organizers said attracted 80,000 participants and was the largest in Baluchistan's his tory. This was not Its first effort at organizing, however. The founder/president said he first had the idea for the organization in 1981 when he wrote a small pamphlet as a mes sage to the Baluch people. He made 20,000 copies of it which he distributed himself, first around Quetta and then in other parts of Baluchistan. At some point he traveled to

Karachi where he met with the leaders of an organization called Baluch ltehAd (Rlbta

Committee). He said he offered to open up a branch of that organization In Ouetta to which its leaders agreed. When he failed to receive any support from them he kept the

name but made It an Independent organization. (The leader of Baluch ltehAd (Rlbta

Committee) confirmed In an Interview that the man who established Baluch ttehAd In

Quetta had met with him and members of his organization, but in his version of events

he said they never heard from him after he returned to Quetta). Even after this the,

Baluch ltehAd's president's time in the wilderness was not over. For years, he said,

213 Baluch ignored him and the police harassed him. In February, 1966 he attempted to hold a public rally which only drew 21 people.

Things began to change after this, however. On December 30, 1965 President

Zia announced the end of martial law in Pakistan. National elections were held, and eventually restrictions on political partilis were lifted. Benazir Bhutto returned from exile in April, 1966 to be greeted by immense crowds in Lahore and Karachi (Van Hollen

1967:144-146). Much as in the Soviet Union, though to a more modest degree, the new openness encouraged public expression of ethnic and regional differences which had been exacerbated by martial law (ibid.:146). Toward the end of that year bloody ethnic riots erupted In Karachi as they did In Quella.

It was in this new climate of openness and ethnic tension that Baluch ltehad began to develop a following. In June 1967, around six months after the Quella riots, it held Its first major rally. The rally took place soon after Pushtunkwa Milli Awami lteh&d

(PMAI), a Pushtun nationalist political party, held a large march and rally In Quella during which demonstrators fired guns and raised slogans calling for the creation of a province made up of the NWFP and the Pushtun areas of Baluchistan. Following their first rally eno\Jgh people joined Baluch ltehad to form a cabinet which less than a month later mobilized the second and much larger demonstration.

The Baluch ltehad president himself identified tensions with Pushtun as a reason of the growing strength of his organization.

Pushtun hamare khilaf nafrat kar rehe hen. Baluch ltehad jitne masbut h6 rehe he us kl vaja ye he ke hamllre khilaf opposite. Action-reaction. Pushtun ne hamare khilaf sazish ki, hamare khilaf avaz baland ki, hamare khilaf nara lag8.ya roadOn pe "Baluchis tan murdabad", 'Chitral se Bolan tak". Basic bat unhOne ham8.re serzemin ke khilaf ghalat avaz lagay8..

The Pushtun hate us. Baluch ltehad has become as strong as it is bec11u,e of the opposition to us. Action-reaction. Pushtun have conspired against us, they have raised their voice against us, they gave raised slogans on the roads against us "Death

214 to Baluchistan•, "[A Pushtun province] from Chitral to Bolan·. The basic point Is that they have spoken against our lands. He and others emphasized that they are not opposed to the Pushtun people but to the small group (101a)that wants to break up Baluchistan.9 He also linked the problem with

Pushtun to the presence of the Afghan refugees. Another Baluch ltehAd officer saw more elaborate connections between the refugees and the superpowers, especially the

United States, that are trying to divide and weaken the Baluch in order to gain access to their lands.

Many people, Baluch and non-Baluch, characterized Baluch ltehAd as a chauvinistic organization. They charged that It existed only to promote Baluch interests against those of Pushtun. A typical remark was that If they sincerely cared for gaining

Baluch rights they would Join one of the political parties that have been struggling against the government for years. No member of Baluch ltehAd I interviewed used an explicitly racist analysis though some framed derogatory stereotypes. In most cases they did not blame Baluch hardShlps on other peoples, but on select groups, the government, or certain officials. A common remark by Baluch ltehAd members was to the effect that we are for Baluch and not against any other people (gaum). For ex ample a month after the ethnic riots of August, 1988 I met some Junior Baluch ltehAd of ficers in their central office. They blamed the riots on certain Pushtun hooligan elements (ghu[)dAinAsar), and especially a handful Of Pushtun bureaucrats, who they said had allowed the situation to get out of hand in order to create differences between the two ethnic groups.

It is valid to ask whether an unspoken anti-Pushtun sentiment Is a mainstay of

Baluch ltehAd. Certainly it is an organization with many dimensions and many con cerns, but to what degree must an emergent ethnic movement assert Itself against another ethnic group to define or justify itself? At what point does 'defense of the

215 QJW[D.' become an attack on the other? The attack on Pushtun buses at Manguchar which led to the August, 1988 riots between Baluch and Pushtun in Ouetta took place in the evening of the day on which Baluch ltehad had held a rally in Mach, a town In the

Bolan Pass. The president of the AIBO, who brought the body of the slain bus driver back to Quetta, said that witnesses had identified Baluch ltehad members among those who made the attack. Baluch ltehad leaders denied that the organization was in any way involved in the incident, but they said that it was possible that its members had par ticipated as individuals. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that ethnic chauvinism is present to different degrees In different individuals and in the setting of ethnic mobilization it may find occasion to be manifested.

The ltehid and the Nawab Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti was an important draw for the large crowds attending Baluch ttehad rallies. The presence of a major tribal and political leader gave added depth and legitimacy to the fledgling group, and he in turn gained Increased visibility through their events. Historically, as an ally of the National Awami Party (NAP), Nawab Bugti had ad vocated some form of Baiuch nationalism, i.e., greater autonomy from the central government, though he later fell out. with his NAP colleagues {and, many Baluch feel, betrayed them) and joined with Bhutto. In 1988 most of his old rivals for leadership of the Baluch were either dead or in exile and the Nawab was In a good. position to as sume a leadership role at a time when politics were coming Into the open for the first time in a decade. His relationship with Baluch ltehAd must be seen in this context.

in· an interview Nawab Bugti said Baluch ltehad had the potential to develop as had the Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM),10 the organization of Indian immigrants that began as a largely student-run social welfare organization, but became a political force

In the cities of Sindh during the local body elections of December, 1987. A significant

216 difference between them is that the MOM was the first group to attempt to organize

Mohajirs on an ethnic basis while those efforts have been in progress among the

Baluch tor decades. There is little empty space on the spectrum of Baluch politics for

Baluch ltehad to fill.

The rise of Baluch ltehad coincident with the Nawab's presence at their rallies led many people in Quella to see the organization as his creation. They claimed he some how stood behind it and manipulated it. Both he and Baluch ltehad leadership denied this, but I was chided by some for accepting their statements. Evidence such as the corroborated story of the visit to Karachi and contact with Baluch ltehad (Rabta Commit· tee); and, later, differences in their reaction to the riots of August, 1988 and a sub sequent transporters strike (pehjya jam) by Baluch transporters on September 5, which the Nawab opposed and Baluch ltehad tacitly supported, confirm their autonomy from one another.

In addition to the committed, political rallies in Pakistan, especially those ad

dressed by major personalities, attract the curious and the bored (see Duncan'

1989:127), and do not always reflect the political strength of the hosts. Soon after

Baluch ltehAd's February, 1988 rally in Slbi the political landscape again began to

change quickly with President Zia's dismissal of the Junejo government, his death

three months later, and the government's decision to hold elections with the participa

tion of political parties. Because it lacked both tribal connections and the deep and

widespread grass roots organizing power of the Baluch Students Organization (BSO),

the value of association with a nascent movement like Baluch ltehad decreased. The

Na-b consequently drew closer to the mainstream of the Baluch nationalist move

ment represented by the BSO and the Baluch National Youth Movement, and eventual-

217 ly entered into an electoral alliance with them and a number of sardars. Baluch ltehad stayed neutral during the elections.

The Persistence of Tribes and Tribal Structures The relationship between the Nawab and Baluch itehAd raises the issues of detribalization and the importance of sardars in Baluch life. The most important politi· cal leaders of the Baluch are themselves sardars (with the exception of the late Ghous

Bukhsh Bizenjo who was the brother of a sardar). The political success of sardars is

due to several factors. Many sardars have much better educational backgrounds than

do almost all Baluch, and they usually also have more experience in dealing with the

government and the non-tribal world. Also, thOugh the sardars are not without their

detractors, the persistence of tribal values and structures in Baluch society reinforces

their prestige and legitimacy.

The relationship between a political leader such as Nawab Bugti and a grass

roots, organization like Baluch ltehad has strong parallels with that between sardars

and mid-level tribal leaders, ~ and wa. Baluch ltehad fills a role similar to that

of~ wtio achieve status through their wealth and connections within the village

or village section, and through their personal ties to the sardar (1.mlikethe Wei whose

position is structurally similar but also hereditary). ~ can settle disputes, reach

· decisions based on group consensus, and transmit the sardar's requests or orders

(N.Swidler 1969:138, 142-44). In the urban contex1 Baluch itehad (along with some

other organizations and student groups) fulfills these functions by mobilizing people at

the grass-roots level and in turn gains greater status by ties to prominent tribal/political

figures. As in tribes. the sardars are concerned with relations between Baluch and the

outside world and the complicated equations of alliances and conspiracies which are

the stuff of Pakistani politics, while Baluch itehad gears Its activities and contacts

218 toward the immediate concerns of their constituents. As urban •neo-tribalism", 11 eth

nicity evokes the same principles as tribal"ism: genealogical ties and territory, though

certainly more vaguely than does the original (Horowitz 1985:53).

The tension between segmentation and hierarchy within the tribe is also re

created in the relationship between Baluch lteMd and the sardars. In Chapter One, I

specified following Salzman, the mechanisms of decentralization and egalitarianism ver

sus those of centralization and hierarchy that are present within Baluch tribes.

Whereas centralization within the tribe, represented by the office of the sardar, was

greatly strengthened by colonial encapsulation and patronage, centralization at the eth

nic or neo-tribal level has never been strong in Pakistan.12 This is due to tribal andper

sonality differences among the sardars, and to the central government's efforts

(encouraged by the United States or the CIA many Baluch would say) to prevent a

cohesive opposition. Salzman·(1983:268) suggests that even when the centralizing

principle prevails

[IJower-level units maintain substantial political rights, duties and responsibilities. The most important of these are protection of life and property, manifested in self-help and collective responsibility, ... [and cJontrol of certain resources. He terms these •contingent groups• because they arise, disappear, and reform relative

to e~ents. In the tribal setting contingent groupings are mostly formed within lineages

while in the urban setting voluntary associations are more likely.

Because a centralized, cohesive Baluch leadership has not emerged, there is con

siderable space for a number of groups to develop to deal with the contingencies of

Baluch life. The iigbig_s are one example, the Baluch Students Organization is another,

elected officials at the local level are another, and so are the major and minor tribal

figures who continue to be influential (not to mention non-ethnic organizations such as

labor unions or sports clubs). The tendency toward decentralization was particularly

219 strong after the harshest period of marital law finished in the early 1980s and before political parties could regain their prominence. This was the period during which

Baluch ltehad appeared and burned its brightest. With the return to representative politics (i.e., greater centralization) its role as mobilizer of large numbers of Baluch along -ethnic lines will probably cease. Political parties will fill that role. Baluch ltehad

may continue to be a spokesman for the more immediate concerns of Baluch, especial

ly when difficulties are perceived to be caused by the failure of the government to act

or by ethnic competition. It may also choose to more overtly emphasize ethnicity (to

the point of chauvinism), a step the political parties will likely not take, both for ideologi

cal reasons and because of the need to make inter-ethnic alliances to hold power in

Baluchistan.

PLishtunltehid Pushtun ltehad offers some valuable comparisons with Baluchltehid. That the mem-

bers of both groups share similar aims and aspirations indicates that the social forces

at work are not specific to either ethnic group. Differences between the two ethnic

.il.ilbjgs also reveal some of the cultural differences between Baluch and Pushtun. I col-

lected considerably less data on Pushtun ltehad and the material on them comes

primarily from a single 3-hour interview with its founder/president.

Uke Baluch ltehad, Pushtun ltehad calls for unity and an end to tribal differences

in order to "obtain Pushtun rights" in Baluchistan. As its president said in an interview

We did not make Pushtun ltehad against anybody, we made it so that all Pushtun are one. We should become Pushtun to solve our problems, to take our rights from other tribes or nations. The only solution to our problems in not to be Kakar, Achakzai or Ghilzai, Bareach or Nurzai, only to be Pushtun ...The day we finish this Zli and .ls!:!il.13 become united Pushtun, and take our rights in Pakistan, that day Pushlunistan Is made. Pushtun ltehad members too likened themselves to social workers and they contrasted

their organization with the ethnic political parties. The parties, their president said, do

220 not work for people but maintain themselves in a "fantasy• (presumably that they would ever gain political power in Pakistan).

The members of Pushtun ltehAd have similar backgrounds to those of the mem bers of Baluch ltehAd (civil servants, students, small businessmen), and presumably have similar motives and aspirations. Many of Pushtun ltehAd's concerns are the same as those of Baluch ltehlld. For example they too stressed economic concerns

(though the president also emphasized the relative wealth of Pushtun) such as the need to increase Pushtun representation in the bureaucracy. As the president said

If there is a job for chaprAssl.in an office that Is a right. We fight for It the same as we would fight for the governorship. The l2mllland the governorship are both Important to us. The problem is that there are not enough jobs. The group's leadership also stressed their role in settling the disputes traditional tribal leaders n9Qiect.

Men go to their chief, but they don't want to solve their problems. It Is a nuisance for them. The sardars and elders have proudness, they won't go to the house of the other. If needed In some mud house we would go there or if it was the Sheraton Hotel we would go there. We want to solve the problems, that ·is the big success of our party.

In other cases the Issues that concerned Pushtun,ltehlld seem very different than those of Baluch ttehlld. The president described an action his organization had taken against movie theaters In Quetta which show Pushtu films. They disapproved of the films, which one Pakistani journalist characterized as •orgies of sex and violence•

(Yusufzai 1990:127), because, the Pushtun ltehlld president said, they •only have danc ing and corruption• and show nothing of Pushtun history or culture. Pushtun ltehAd complained to the government about the films, but the government took no action so

Pushtun ltehAd sent 50 men to a theater to interrupt the screening of a film. They claimed they then won a concession from the government that they would remove •any bad parts• of the films in the future. The Pushtun ltehld described a similar Incident In

221 which a local newspaper refused to give positive coverage to his organization, so after numerous complaints anc;Ia quarrel with the editor, carloads of armed members went to the paper's offices, confiscated that day's papers, and burned them in the street.

Other differences between Pushtun and Baluch emerge from the ways the mem bers of the ltehAds depict themselves. For example Baluch ltehAd members claim their flag was modeled on one which was once flown by the Khan of Kalal. Pushtun ltehAd members emphasized their historic past as well, but also put heavy emphasis on Islam.

"The white in our flag means that we are pure and believe in Islam and nothing is above

Islam•. While Baluch lteh!d aspired to unite all Baluch under the leadership of the recognized nationalist tribal/political leaders Pushtun ltehAd had no such aims.

Despite the importance they attached to Islam, they did not support any Islamic politi cal party and they also condemned the Pushtun left/ethnic political parties as com munist.

Pushtun ltehlid and Ethnicity The formation of Pushtun ltehAd Is further evidence of the reactive nature of ethnicity. It was established in Quetta in September, 1967, just two months after the large Baluch ltehAd rally there. The timing is significant because it shows further how each ethnic group mobilizes to match the position of the other. The Pushtun ltehAd president ar ticulated his organization's purpose relative to Baluch as well as Punjabls, the latter vir· tually synonymous with the state of Pakistan. Like many Pushtun, he complained that

Pushtun are under-represented in the census and therefore in the political assemblies and the bureaucracy. "In the 1960s the ratio of government servants was Pushtun 70 percent and Baluch 30 percent, in the 70S It became 50/50. Now in the 19B0SPushtun are only 40 percent and the rest are Baluch". In our Interview the Pushtun ltehAd presi-

222 dent directed little rhetoric against Baluch and he blamed the situation facing the Push tun on Punjabls and the central government.

In the late 60s the Baluch and Pushtun started a revolution against the Punjab and started fighting for their rights. But alter a little while the Punjabis felt unsafe and they started to make trouble between Pushtun and Baluch. We are working to finish differences between Pushtun and Baluch and to make them fight for their rights. Despite his statements an important question remains as to whether, or to what de· gree, an underlying anti-Baluch sentiment is important in the bearing of Pushtun lteh!d.

It is difficult to comment on the parallels between Pushtun tribal structures and personalities, end Pushtun ltehAd since little ethnographic work has been done on the

Pushtun tribes of Baluchistan. Pushtun tribes are generally characterized as less hierar chical and more "democratic", than Baluch ones (see BDG Zhob:67; Barth 1981c:95-

98; Ahmed 1980:94-96). This may be less true In the parts of northern Baluchistan where contact with Baluch tribes and more thorough encapsulation and patronage by the colonial administration may have created more powerful tribal leaders and greater hierarchy. For example, Richard Bruce, a colonial officer on the scene argued that Sir

Robert Sandeman's Forward Policy was equally effective with both Pushtun and Baluch tribes and that the •constitution• of their tribes are quite similar (see Bruce 19n: 19,

140-142). While perhaps not as powerful within their tribe as many Baluch sardars are within theirs, some Pushtun tribal elite have had considerable prestige and have been

Important In the history and politics of the region. They have not, however, dominated the Pushtun nationalist movement or popufar politics as have Baluch sardars.

Despite the tendency for Pushtun in Ouetta to characterize themselves as more educated and less traditional or "tribal" than Baluch. the founder and president of Push tun ltehAd Is the uncle of Nawab Jogezai, the head of the Kakar tribe, one of the largest

Pushtun tribes in Baluchistan (BDG Zhob:34, 66-70). The president used the title nawabzada,which emphasizes his blood tie to the Nawab (and thus a potential claim

223 to the office). A young man in his early thirties, the Nawabzada had spent several years in the United States where he attended a junior college. He said people en couraged him to form Pushtun ltehAd because he had done so much work as an In dividual for the Pushtun people in the years since he had returned to Pakistan.

Pushtun ltehad therefore illustrates better than any other 'ilitllali' how such a group can be the vehicle or career of its leader. It is not unusual for family members close to the seat of tribal power, and thus well-educated, experienced, and ambitious, but with limited opportunity in the tribal context, to strike out on an independent politi cal career. Ghous Bukhsh Bizenjo is the most obvious example, and others include

Ahmed Nawaz Bugti who joined a party opposing his brother's alliance in the elections of 1988. Though ttie Nawabzada characterized Pushtun ltehAd as a non-political or• ganization, In the 1988 electlons he ran as a Independent candidate for a seat in the provincial assembly. The election results support the contention that, as "social-wel fare• organizations, the ethnic ilmlids represent embryonic and still weak politicalor ganizations. Out of the approximately 25,300 votes cast In that race the Nawabzada received just 1,357, or around five percent of the total.

Conclusion The l1itlld.s of Ouetta confirm the assessment Meillasoux made of voluntary associations in Mali. He observed that in many ways they are institutions marginal to aHthat is happening in society and even in their members' lives. Many are short-lived and repre sent little challenge to the ultimate authority of famliy or emerging classes (Meillasoux

1968:146).

Voluntary associations seem like bubbles rising and disappearing on the surface of boiling water. It is from deeper sources that the people who stir them find their motivation, and it is at more significant levels that we must try to explain a society in which associations are no more than indicators of social problems; reflections, to be interpreted, of some aspects of the society, but epiphenomena! too, because they furnish the points of convergence of many social forces [Meillasoux 1968:147}.

224 The forces at work under the surface of Quetta's ~s are those which have been referred to throughout this work: Baluchistan's integration into Pakistan, increasing ur banization, unequal distribution of wealth and persisting economic underdevelopment, the presence of large numbers of Afghan refugees, ethnic tensions, and detribalization.

The era of General/President Zia's rule saw what has been called a •crisis of cMI society" in Pakistan (Hussain 1986:393-4). The army and religion became highly

politicized while institutions of popular expression and the courts were suppressed. As

a result of the war in Afghanistan the country was flooded with powerful weapons and

drugs. Corruption Increased within the government, and services in some cities, most

particularly Karachi but even in Quella, deteriorated. In this context people developed

a deep cynicism and began to rely on themselves, their families, and their ethnic groups for protection and weHare (ibid.; Duncan 1969:302).

The imtl!sts should be. seen in this light as well. They are attempts to articulate and address the needs of Quetta's middle and working classes. In the tribal setting family- or lineage-based institutions deal with people's needs for support, protection, or the resolution of conflict. Those needs may go unmet in the city where the institutions of the state are often Inefficient, mistrusted, or are themselves the source of difficulties,

and traditional Institutions are unavailable or inappropriate. Voluntary associations

have arisen as part of the effort to deal with these contingencies.

Similar to the afignments which develop within tribes, the llwlw:fsare contingent

upon conditions at a point in Quetta's history. Drawing upon the standard notion of

segmentation which sees mid-level groups developing only in the context of opposl·

tion, Salzman points out that in the Baluch tribal setting sub-units only emerge to deal

with particular situations (Salzman 1963:269). lacking economic autonomy or the rein

forcement of social structure the ~s may also be temporary. This may be less true

225 of the Afghan ltehAd Bus Owners since It has a narrower constituency with a set

economic base, but its history shows that it too is subject to political developments

within the transport industry and the wider society. Similarly the other ~s dis

cussed here are affected by developments in tribal, ethnic, and national arenas. Their

following and importance will vary with conditions in the wider society and the

availability of adequate representation through political and administrative channels.

With the right connections access to power through the administrative bureaucracy is

often available in Pakistan, an approach some of the ~s have utilized. H

democracy persists other channels to authority or opportunity may become institutional

ized. On the other hand, the ·~· or grass-roots organizations like them, will con

tinue to play some role in the lives of people if the deterioration in civil society

continues despite democratization.

The question of detribalization can also be viewed in the context of the currents

gMng rise to the iteblds. Tribal institutions, even ones transformed by colonialism, are

inadequate to deal fully with the stresses confronting Baiuch. Capitalist economic,

political, and social relations have entered most of Baluchistan, and they have trans

formed, though not systematically replaced prior ones. The situation is one which has

been described as a state of "radical opposition• in which dramatic social change

brings conflict between prevailing and nascent social structures. In such a situation

people may not recognize the tendencies at work and so may temporarily support two

-incompatible or contradictory structures (Wilson and Wilson 1945:127-8). Thus the sin

gular image from my fieldwork of an informant, who earlier described his efforts to over

come tribalism with his work in a tribal 'itebld', taking the hand of Nawab Bugti and

kissing it, a traditional sign of respect and subservience.

226 Such seemingly inconsistent acts may not be just the outcome of misrecognltlon since people can Only mold the socio-cultural clay at hand (the same from which they themselves were fashioned). Fox suggests that culture is not just something which' shapes and socializes us but something we create and recreate in each generation and in the practices of daily life (Fox 1985). Tribal identities and tribal leaders may be

undermined by the practices new circumstances generate, but they are also an Impor

tant repository of past practices, practices which continue to have potential utility in

daily life, and are a readily available means to mobilize resistance to the state or others

defined In cultural (i.e., ethnic) terms. Tribal elites continue to adopt new practices

themselves, and without the development of conditions which would impel those with

non-tribal, even revolutionary outlooks to supplant Of exert control over the repre

sentatives of tradition, 14 they continue to be the most powerful figures in Baluch

society.

227 NOTES 1) Besides those I discuss here a number of other organizations In Quetta and Baluchis tan use the word ~ in their title. They include a political party In formation, the Al· ghan Milli Avlmi ltehid, and several youth organizations such as the Anjuman ltehil.d NOjOvAn (The Society of United Youth).

2) The title of the article In Urdu is Afghanltehad Bus Ownerskl'! jjlas me pandra Februarytak matalabatoa blinft ki suratme ;nt;haiiqdam ka tesla. 3) Ironically though Baluch transporters benefit from the southern location because their routes lie to the south of the city, they perceive the bus stand to be Pushtun dominated because Pushtun received leases to many of the shops there to compen sate them for its Inconvenient location.

4) See JAog·Ouetta 10/24/87.

5) According to some Informants, Rasul Baxsh had himself murdered another of his brothers, Yusuf. Yusuf was the son of a different mother than either Rasul Baxsh or the other brothers, and It does not appear that YOsuf's murder was the source of the feud.

6) Various types of Joint labor among both Pushtun and Baluch are known as bu.hi!' (see Buzdar 1988).

7) it is difficult to gage the accuracy of his claim that the Marr~ Mengal, and Bugtl tribes are more underdeveloped than other Baluch tribes and that this Is therefore a source of their unity. The territories of all of them are far from urban centers but no further than many others. The presence of the Sui gas fields in the Bugtl tribal territory has brought development, at least in terms of Infrastructure and a monetized economy (though per haps not in higher levels of education than In other tribal areas) (see Duncan 1989: 146). In the case of the Mengal tribe it seems unlikely that they are less developed economlcally or more poorly educated than their neighbors and rivals, the Zehri. The informant has taken the prestige and authority of these three sardars, Which come as much from their standing as political leaders In Baluch society as from their standing within their own tribes, as evidence of greater tribal unity and purity when the dynamics within tribes may vary little.

8) All references to~ are from the Quetta edition ol that newspaper.

9) This is certainly not the only position Baluch hold on the question of the status of the Pushtun areas of Baluchistan. Some, including the late Ghous Bukhsh Bizenjo, advo cate allowing the Pushtun of Baluchistan to separate and form an independent province or amalgamate with the NWFP. The boundaries such a division would take and the status of Quetta with its Baluch and Pushtun populations are sensitive ques- . tions which most said would be decided at a later point. One Informant, a long-time Baluch nationalist, said the Pushtun could have Quetta. Its too vulnerable to attack, he reasoned. "We'll build our capitol in Khuzdar".

10) The National Mohajir Front

11) This term is coined by Duncan in reference to the MOM (Duncan 1989:186).

228 12) The period of the strongest and most cohesive centralized Baluch leadership was that of the zenith of the NAP in the late 1960s and the early 19705. Even at that time a number of major tribal figures, including the Khan of Karat, stood not with the NAP but the government. 13) Zai and Immare the suffJXesto which are attached the personal names of the an cestor who gives his identity to a tribe or lineage.

14) See Lan 1985 for an example of tradition (or perceived tradition) being harnessed to a contemporary political movement.

229 CHAPTER SEVEN

SARDARS, MULLAHS, AND MUSLIM LEAGUERS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN BALUCHISTAN

The grassroots organizations described in the last chapter all took pains to distinguish themselves from political parties. Political parties, though, are important vehicles through which Baluch articulate and mobilize to pursue their interests. This chapter ex amines the ideologies and personalities of the parties that have significant political sup port in Quella and the province of Baluchistan, and it evaluates their relative strength as expressed in the national and provincial election of November, 1988. It examines how parties and candidates attempt to represent and make use of tribalism, ethnic and

Pakistani nationalism, and Islam, and it shows some of the ways In which the tribal structures of Baluch society are intertwined .with contemporary politics.

The elections of 1988 were the first national elections since 1970 (and only the second in Pakistan's history) generally accepted by observers and participants as fair, both because political parties were free to take part, which was not the case in the

1985 elections, and because they were mostly untainted by charges of rigging as was the case in 19n. Elections in general are a fairly blunt instrument for determining what

people are thinking, even more so in these particular ones given the low voter turnout

(in the country as a whole only 42 percent of the electorate voted, and in Baluchistan

the figure was just 24 percent), and the fact that Pakistan's elections are vulnerable to

manipulation by those in power. Yet voting patterns tell us much about the strength of

social groups arid ideologies among Baluch. An informant expressed a similar senti

ment when he joked "We expect that we will have marital law before long, but it is good to have elections once in a while so we can see where everyone stands'.

230 The context of the 1966 elections was established in the restricted elections of

1965. In those elections, held under martial law, parties were not allowed to par ticipate, nor could candidates hold processions or use loudspeakers. Opposition politi cal parties boycotted the elections leaving the field open to local traditional power figures and to polltlcians who sympathized_with the military government.

With the political parties out of the race, the results became predictable. The absence of national issues encouraged emphasis on [local) level problems in what eventually turned out to be the most expensive and the.most superficial elections In the nation's history. The complexion of the assemblies elected as a result was feudal, patrician and thoroughly conservative (Amir 1966:34). Yet within those assemblies politlcat parties (most notably the Muslim League) re- emerged, and grew Increasingly confident and Independent of President Zla. When he dismissed the national and provlnclal assemblies in May 1966 most observers thought this, riot the dubious charges of corruption and lack of Islamic zeal was the reason (sea

Amir 1988). Many doubted whether Zia would adhere to the constitutional requirement to hold new elections, and It was only his death which led to the participation of parties

In those that eventually were held.

Five major parties won seats in either the national or provincial assemblies from

districts in the Baluch majority areas of Baluchistan. They were the Jamlat 'Ulema-6-

Islam (JUI), the Baluchistan National Alliance (SNA), the Pakistan National Party (PNP),

the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and what I wm call the Muslim League which was the

major party in an electoral alliance of religious and conservative parties called the Is·

larnic Jarnhuri ltehAd (IJl).1 Two of these parties, the PPP and the Muslim League, were

truly national in the sense that they could attract significant support In all parts of Pakis

tan; one, the BNA, directed Its appeal only to Baluch; and the other two 'aspired to a

broader country-wide constituency but were in fact largely limited to either Baluch

areas (the PNP), or Baluch and Pushtun ones (the JUI).

231 Pakistani Elections The elections of 1988 brought a sense of new beginnings to Pakistan. The fact that political parties were participating in them and the military remained uninvolved led to the feeling that legitimate popular representatives could come to power. There was hope that a democratically elected government could alleviate the country's ethnic ten sions, settle the war in Afghanistan, and even stimulate greater economic development.

The elections were colorful and dynamic not only because of the public displays of posters, banners, and rallies, but also because of the fast-paced deal making and coalition building that accompanied them. Because so many voters In Pakistan are H literate the parties select election symbols by which their supporters can Identify.the candidates when they vote. These symbols (prominent ones in Baluch areas Included the saw, the arrow, the axe, the bicycle, and the book) are then painted on walls and bamers, or brandished by candidates and their supporters. The elections of 1988 saw the collapse of old coalitions,2 and the creation of new ones. At one point the Musfim ' ' League was split With each faction belonging to different newly-formed electoral alliances. Then negotiations brought a reunification of the party arid its abandonment of one alliance for a dominant place In the other. The most important such development in Baluchistan was the creation shortly before the elections of the Baluchistan National

Alliance (BNA), a coalition of left-wing ethnic nationalists and several major sardars.

Candidates In Pakistan use techniques that are standard to all electoral cam paigns, and some that spring from Pakistan's particular social and political structure.

The leader of the Ouetta branch of one of the major parties described some of these to me. They include such common electioneering practices as distributing leaflets and posters, holding meetings at which candidates speak, and door-to-door canvassing.

Another technique is to contact figures such as minor tribal leaders who have their own

232 followers. •tf you can get their support you can get the support of 100 men because they will mobiUze people on the day of the voting• he said. The last technique that he described was to pay people for their ballots. Cooperating voters bring the ballots out of the polling station to the candidate's supporters who gather them and then cast them appropriately. More opportunities for manipulating the voting is available to the party in power. For example, in local body {town and district council) elections In

December, 1967 nearly two-thirds of the candidates in Baluchistan, most of whom belonged to the party In power, the Muslim League, were elected unopposed. In most cases because government officials disqualified those who attempted to oppose them

{Shahid 1966:43).

Elections, like other social events take place in a context shaped by the historyof events and Institutions, and the structure and culture of society. Psychological,

'ideological, and social fa~ors all contribµte to how voters choose to support can didates .. Structural factors In Pakistan such as which parties control the administrative apparatus can influence not only what is presented as the results of the election, but ' also how people cast their votes. This Is because there Is a tendency for politicians and their constituents to align with parties not only {and in some cases, not at all) for ideological reasons, but because they appear most likely to be successful.

Tribes In Elections In the context of elections tribalism is manifested by people voting for a person (most often their sardar) primarily because he is a member of one's tribe. This Is obviously dif ferent from voting for a nationalist candidate because one agrees with his notion that

Baluch should unite themselves or join with other ethnic groups to accomplish some

political program. This is not to saythat there might not be overlap between tribalism

and ethnic-nationalism. Several Baluch sardars either ran as candidates of an ethnic-

233 nationalist party or aligned With one once they were elected as independents. In these cases, however, I presume that sardars make the decision to align with the nationalist movement often based on calculated political maneuverings, and only partly because of pressure from their constituents to take a nationalist position.

Layne has provided references to several anthropological studies of elections in

Middle Eastern and other patrilineal societies and a review of them shows that lineage or tribal ties can be compelling in determining how people vote, but they are not bind ing. In his study of a municipal election in Morocco, Rosen found kinship ties unimpor tant In intruenclng how men cast their votes. Highly Individual "dyadic and coiltractural bonds" people established with patrons determined voting patterns (Rosen 1972).

Layne herself found two discourses, that of party politics and another of meritocratic in dividualism, opponents of tribalism elaborated in Jordan. Even in the parts of that country where tribes are the active core of social organization, complex cross-cutting in fluences of nationalism, personal ties, and the changing status of tribal leaders also in fluenced how people cast their votes (Layne 1987b). Herzfeld's look at elections in

Crete showed that what he calls segmentary or agnatic allegiances were important in determining how people voted, but that other factors such as nat.ional (Greek) politics, relations with other villages, and personal ties also influenced how the residents of one village voted (Herzfeld 1985:111-22).

On the other hand, because tribes are a kin-based form of political organization they can be an effective, even party-like instrument for contesting elections (Gavrielides

1987:168). Participating in elections by supporting a member of one's tribe allows tribesmen to relate to the state through its modern apparatuses, but at the same time, through tribal ideology and symbols (ibid.:170). In Baluchistan tribal ties are most im

portant in those areas where one or two large, powerful tribes predominate, and, not

234 surprisingly, the sardars who have led the Baluch nationalist movement come from such areas. As the results of the election will show, in other areas such as Makran where tribalism has largely dissolved, Sarawan where many smaller tribes live Inter- · spersed with one another, or urban Quella, other factors become important. While tribalism is in part an ideology of kinship, it is also the aggregate of the material and political ties tribesmen have with one another. When tribalism ls-replaced with or modified by other allegiances It Is because new ties have been established and new

Ideologies developed that transcend kinship and/or local economics.

The Parties and Their Programs While it is impossible to understand the political process in Pakistan without understanding the relations of kinship and patronage which underlie society, and which politl cal parties too make use of, the parties must also be examined for the programs, ideologies and candidates they promote. If only the contemporary manifestation of tribal and feudal relations were significant, Pakistanis would not be so concerned to have parties participate In elections, and It is the case that no election held In Pakistan without them has been considered legitimate. Some parties make explicit use of the traditional elite and their political agendas simply call for slight adjustments of the status quo. Others, both progressive and Islamic, still attempt to make use of them, though they background kiri, tribe, or patron-client relations and foreground their politl cal agenda and ideology (see Herzfeld 1985:97).

In the realm of ideology each party attempts to define the interests of the Baluch and equate them with Itself, and each thereby occupies a distinct "semantic space•

(Kronenfeld 1988:54). Each creates a persona on the basis of its poUtical program and the personalities It can recruit to stand with It. Table 3 shows where each party stands along the axes of three important dichotomies: left-wing/right-wing; Islamic/secular; and

235 PNPBNA PPP IJI JUI Secular Islamic PNP BNA PPP JUI IJI Left Wing RightWing BNAPNP JUI PPP IJI DecentrallzITTg~-,..""*"~~~..-~~~~~~--1.,.._"'"*~ Centrallzlng

Table 3 :The Location 01 Pakistan's Polltlcal Parties In Ideological Space centralizing/decentralizing (i.e., their attitude toward the appropriate distribution of power between the provinces and the center). The last trait is close but not identical to the degree they emphasize ethnic-nationalism since the ethnic-nationalist parties are the strongest advocates of devolving power to the provinces. The history and Ideology of each of the parties that won Baluch seats is examined below.

The ~amlat 'Ulema-6-lslam (JUI) The name 'Jamiat 'Ulema-e-lslam' reveals much about this party's background and the social identities of its leadership. The term '.lJlimaIs the plural of the Arabic~ meaning a man trained in Islamic legal and religious studies. These ~ (also referred to as mullahs and addressed as mauMor~ often operate mosques, some of which have madrassas, ihe schools at which '..uliroaare trained. The top- and mid-level ranks of the JUI are manned mainly by '.1.!liroatrained in ii single school of Is lamic thought (Waseem 1987:148).

There are a number of tendencies within Islam in Pakistan, often distinguished as orthodox, fundamentalist, and modernist or rationalist (ibid.:189; Alavi 1988:79; Binder

1961:10-110). The first is an extension of pre-colonial traditions and legal schools; the second calls for radical breaks with the Islamic traditions and legal scholarship of the last several centuries and seeks to return to original texts in order to realize a more pure Islam; and the third aims to reconcile Islam with Western science and rationalism.

236 All three are efforts to make Islam relevant and workable in the contemporary indUS1rlal lzed and bureaucratized world, though, except in the case of the modernists, MetcaH argues they should not be seen as efforts to become modern or Western. Rather they are movements within Islam which seek renewal (~. and the glory and purity Of the past (Metcalf 1982:359-60).

TIie History of the JUI Wrth Its roots In the reformist movement whose tieart was the madrassa In Oeoband, a town 90 miles northeast of Delhi, the JUI is part of the orthodox tendency within Islam.

The madrassa at Deoband was established In 1867 and emulated colonlal bureaucratic

Institutions rather than traditional madrassas. Unlike them, the madrassa at Deoband was not tied to a mosque nor was instruction through personal, devotee-master relationships. The school had a professional staff, and a fixed course of study and ex aminations. The .'.UllmAwho w_eretrained there themselves established schools finked

In an informal network to Deoband (lbid.:93-4). Its founder ~ad ties to the Chistl move ment of Sufis, a scripturalist Sunni tendency which empha~ized adherence to Islamic law and opposed Shi'aism and the popular Sufism of saints and shrines (ibid.:6, 27).

While some of the llJiroa at Deoband had ties to India's upper classes, some were In fluenced by Western socialism and emphasized Islam's opposition to privileged

authority and economic Inequality (Ahmad 1967:201-3).

The Deoband movement was initially purely religious, but at the beginning of the

20th century it Joined in the movement for an independent India. In 1919 llliroa formed the J~miat 'Ulema-6-Hind (JUH) whose stated aims were to protect the rights of Mus lims, guide their activities according to Islam, and fight for the freedom of India (Afzal

1976:33-4). The political alignments of JUH changed with changing circumstances, but·

it eventually took a pro-Congress position, calling for an independent India with a weak

237 federation of autonomous provinces and special provisions to protect the rights of Mus lims. In 1945 the~ who supported the Muslim League's call for an independent

Muslim state split from the JUH and formed the Jamiat 'Ulem1Hi-1slam (ibid.:36; see also Alavi 1988:84-7).

The mix of Islamic conservatism and progressive politics which still characterizes the JUI was evident in its stance in the first decades of Pakistan. In the new state the

JUI, along with other religious parties, pressed for an Islamic constitution (Afzal

1976:153-61; Jalal 1990:281). Like other parties, religious ones were repressed

(though to a lesser degree) by the military when it took over the government in 1958

(Afzal 1987:17). The JUI was one of the first to reconstitute Itself once the ban on par ties was lifted l('I 1962. Its stated alms at that time were to establish an Islamic order in

Pakistan by making it an Islamic Republic with a system of social justice based on the

Coran and Sunnah. It also called for an end to regional disparities In the country, na tional elections, and the withdrawal of all the emergency laws of the Ayub government

(ibid.:86-9). In alliance with such other parties as the Pakistan Peoples Party, It took part In .the agitations which eventually ied to the fall of that government.

The JUi's strength in the Pushtun areas of southern NWFP and northern Baluchis tan led to election victories once Ayub's government fell and elections were held in

1970. The JUi's affinity with the PPP seems to have ended with the elections, and some JUI candidates won by portraying the socialism of the PPP as JsO!w:(ungodly)

(Sayeed 1980:126). In elections for the national assembly the JUI won more votes than any other party (though not the largest number of seats) in the mainly Pushtun

Northwest Frontier Province. It took six of the NWFP's 24 seats while the Muslim

League won seven and the National Awami Party (NAP) won three. In Baluchistan the

JUI won one of four national assembly seats, and 20 percent of the vote, mainly in

238 Pushtun areas. In the crucial provincial assembly races the JUI won four of the 40 seats and the NAP won 13 in the NWFP, and in Baluchistan the JUI won two of the 20 total seats and the NAP won eight. On the basis of these results the NAP and the JUI formed the short-lived coalition government that y,,as in power from April 1972 until

February 1973 when Bhutto manipulated its removal (Awan 1985:254; Rizvi 1986:176-7).

The JUI later joined the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a coalition of religious and secular parties that formed to challenge the PPP in the 1977 elections and then agitated against what they claimed were the fraudulent results of those elections (Rizvi

1986:218-21 ). The PNA's fight with Bhutto culminated In the imposition of martlal law whlch, as Chlef Martial Law Administrator, General Zia attempted to legitimize In terms of Islam and the need to transform society according to its principles. The religious par ties were the driving force of the PNA, and the JUI was initially supportive of the martial law regime (Esposito 1987:340-4). Later, after the military and the bureaucracy had squeezed the polltlcal figures out of policy making, then canceled scheduled elections and banned political parties, the JUI broke its ties witti the government (Ibid.; Rizvi

1986:236-7).

In 1981 an alliance of political parties formed around demands for withdrawal of martial law and free elections. Called ttie Movemen1for the Restoration of Democracy

(MRO), It Included among others, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), several parties which succeeded the old National Awami Party (NAP), and the mainstream of the JUI which had split over the question of whe.ther or not to join it. Though composed of dis parate groups the MRD was able to maintain some cohesion and refused to participate in the 1985 elections. With the decision to hold the elections of 1988 on a,party basis the MRD dissolved though many of its members wanted to maintain it as an election al

Hance.3 The biggest surprise of those elections in Baluchistan was the victory of the

239 JUI, not only in the Pushtun areas where it had been strong previously, but also in

Baluch areas.

The Conservative Radicalism of the JUI The political program of the JUI centers on its demands to lslamicize Pakistan In a way that is compatible with orthodox Islam. I gathered material on the JUI in conversations with JUI members and rival politicians, and from formal interviews with the deputy secretary general of the party as well as with the~ who run two mosques affiliated with it. The deputy secretary general at the time of the elections was a member of the

Achakzais, a large and powerful Pushtun tribe Inhabiting the area around Chaman. He participated in Pushtun nationalist politics in the 1950s, held political office during the

1960s, and joined the JUI in 1970. One :alimI interviewed ran a mosque located near

Baluchistan University, and the other ran the mosque on Brewery Road where I Inter viewed the deputy secretary general. The former, a member of the Baluch Lehri tribe, said he came to Quetta to build his mosque because "the city was full of communists and Shi'as•.

Haque suggests that Islam is generally interpreted or acted upon either as a set of principles and a code of action aimed at achieving social equality, or as a set of

(primarily feudal) institutions and religious rituals which tend to reinforce prevailing economic structures (Haque 1983:368-7). Leaving aside the possibility of other for• mulations of Islam, in this dichotomy the Islam of the JUI is closest to the conservative type of Islam, though it too has strains of utopianism. This is evident from the deputy secretary general's criticisms of the lslamization policies of the Zia government for not having gone far enough toward implementing an Islamic system of government in

Pakistan. He said, for example, that Instead of stopping the country's banks from

240 paying interest, the government simply keeps a percentage of that interest and calls It

Zilkl1(the alms tax, payment of which is one of the pillars of lsllilm).4

In our Interview he stressed that the JUI would implement an Islamic legal system based upon what he said are the four main hudud-e-sharjah or religious restrictions: zlllA(or adultery), punishable by 100 lashes; theft, punishable by the loss of a hand H the thief was not forced by poverty to steal; consumption of alcohol, punishable by 80 lashes; and murder, punishable by death though It is more virtuous to forgive the mur derer. The other two principle planks of the JUI election platform were a guaranteed In come of Rs2,000 ($110) a month per family,5 and greater provincial autonomy with the central government retaining control of only defense, communications, currency, and foreign policy. 8 Both he and the :uJemiI interviewed expressed strong support for the

Afghan rebels and they claimed that the only opposition to the rebels comes from

Pakistani leftists supporting the Afghan government. On one occasion I met men In a

JUI office who, I was told, had fought with the rebels, and others who said they were training to.

The nature of the relationship between the JUI and Baluchistan's mosques and madrassas Is an important one. Training centers for those who will run mosques, teach religion, or become Qizjs (Islamic jurists),7 the madrassas provide the JUI effec tive recruiting grounds and centers from which to do political organizing. A large JUI flag flies from the roof of the mosque near Baluchistan University and its .'.lllilnsaid and his madrassa there has 400 students, most of whom are Baluch. Many of them live In the mosque's small compound where they receive free room (consisting of sleeping mats and blankets on cement floors in a room full of students) and board. All those as sociated with the JUI said that the madrassas are independent and voluntarily as sociate with the JUI and that they are not sponsored or funded by them. They also

241 said that the madrassas do not receive money from the government but that they do receive zaki1money, the Implication being that people donated money directly to the mosques. The JUi's political opponents charge that the JUI not only receives money from the government, but from foreign (namely Arab) countries as well. 8

The JUi's strength, which may well grow in future, comes from the support it gains through the mosques and madrassas and its Islamic critique of traditional elites.

As an official in the Quella branch of the Pakistan Peoples Party observed during the election campaign

The mullahs have shown that they don't associate with the vested classes of Baluchis tan. People think we, the educated professionals, are hypocrites. NAP was soeialist but all the representatives were nawabs and sardars ....Tne madrassas serve poor people who have no chance to use the public schools, those fed up with tribalism, sardars, and maJllsl[large land owners]. Every 30 miles there is a madrassa with 200 to 300 students, generally poor boys. It Is not possible for their parents to educate them. The government high schools only provide a teacher, no food, no clothing, no lodging. The schools do not have [free] hostels while the mullahs provide shelter and food. As in other countries of the Middle East, Islam provides a radical alternative to the status quo in Baluchistan, and leaders of the JUI claimed after the ~lection that they

would have won more seats if sardars had not prevented them from campaigning on their turf r,Jeaver 1990:99).

Not surpfisingly the JUI took advantage of their affiliations with religious institu tions In the elections. The election symbol they chose was the book, and they clearly

made the coMection between their symbol and the Qoran. The leader of Pushtun

nationalist party told me after the election that the JUI candidates, nearly all of whom

were mullahs, handed out Qorans during their electioneering, and like many others, he

charged that they had told people that voting against the JUI meant voting against

Islam. Others charged that the JUI used Afghan refugees as election workers, and in

some cases arranged for refugees to vote iltegally.9 The JUI was however tapping into

242 a genuine sentiment of support for Islam. While the government of Zia-ul-Haq was never able to fully legitimize itself through its lslamization policies, there seems to be considerable support for lslamization in Pakistan. Some indication of this Is provided by a suivey the monthly English-language news magazine ~ conducted a month before the 1988 election. in a survey of 101 people in Quella, 14 percent of the respon dents thought the government's lslamization policies had been sufficient, 78 percent said they were insufficient, and only five percent said they were excessive.10

The National Awaml Party {NAP) and Its Descendants Because two Baluch nationalist parties (as well as two Pushtun ones) contesting the 1988 elections had their roots In the National Awaml Party it will be necessary to

trace Its history, and that of several Baluch sardars' Involvement In It. The NAP was the

vehicle for those politicians demanding greater provincial autonomy and more equi

table distribution of resources in Pakistan during the 19505, '605 and 705. Though It

was later banned, It has remained the touchstone for ethnic-national poHtics,In Pakistan.

The History of the NAP The National Awaml Party, formed at a national conference In Dacca In 1957, was an al

liance of 1) the left-wing of the Awami League, 2) the Pakistan National Party (not to be

confused with the party by the same name that participated in the 1988 elections), and

3) several smaller groups (Afzal 1976:216·9: Gankovsky and Gordon-Polonskaya

n.d.:268, 292). The Awami League 11 was composed of dissident groups of the Musnm

League and had a strong base In East Pakistan. Its left-wing was disaffected by the

compromises the party's leadership had made when it entered a coalition with the

Republican Party12 to take over the central government (Afzal 1976:207-15; Rashiduz

zaman 1970:578-9). The Pakistan National Party had formed less than a year before

the NAP, and was itself a coalition of ethnic-nationalist and left-leaning parties from

243 West Pakistan. It included the Ustaman Gal, the party the Khan of Kalat's brother,

Prince Abdul Karim, formed once he ended his prison term for his role in the brief armed resistance to Pakistan's annexation of Ka1at. The Ustaman Gal's general secretary was Ghous Buxsh Bizenjo who would play a leading role in Baluch nationalist politics in the coming decades (Harrison 1981 :27).

Since it was a national alliance of parties, the program of the NAP was broad and addressed both national and international issues. Of special importance to West Palds· tanis in the NAP was dissolution of One Unit and its replacement with four ethnically defined provinces. Of special concern to East Pakistanis in the NAP was unequal development in the two wings of the country. The NAP called for land reforms, elec i' i tions, and end to Pakistan's participation in such military pacts and CENTO and

SEATO.

During the 1960s the NAP was in opposition to the government of General Ayub

Khan. The military imprisoned many of the NAP leaders when it declared martial law in

1958 (Afzal 1987:11 ). In 1964 the NAP reconstituted itself under its former leader,

Maulana Bashani, with a manifesto calling for direct eiections, 13 dissOlution of One Unit, full regional autonomy with only defense, foreign affairs, and currency in the hands of the center, and a nonaligned foreign policy (ibid.:110). In 1967 the NAP split into pro

Soviet and pro-Chinese camps, the former led by Wail Khanof the NWFP, and the latter by Bashani (Ali 1970:143-4, 193). The NAP of Baluchistan aligned with the pro-Moscow faction which de-emphasized socialism and stressed democracy and regional autonomy.

As outlined above, when widespread popular pressure in the late 1960s (at least in part organized by a broad coalition of groups which included the NAP)14 forced the government to declare martial law and then abolish One Unit and hold direct elections,

244 the NAP wona plurality of provincial assembly seats in the NWFP and Baluchistan.

The·martial law government never acted on the results of those elections bec:aUsethe

Awami League, who won a sweeping victory in East Pakistan demanded it form the · government under a six-point formula that would have greatly decentralized authority and established virtually separate economies for the eastern and western wings of the country (Rizvi 1986: 180-1). When no compromise could be reached demands for Inde pendence increased in East Pakistan, and India's intervention in the civil warthat en sued led to the creation of Bangladesh.

Under the terms of an interim constitution Bhutto, the truncated country's presi: dent, appointed NAP governors in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan after his initial appointment of PPP men to those posts met with popularprotest.

Ghous Buxsh Bizenjo, the NAPgovernor in Baluchistan, was a Baluch nationalist of long-standing who had led the opposition to Kalat's incorporation in Pakistan In the

1940&. The Baluchistan Assembly appointed NAP assemblyman Atauliah Mengal, sar dar of the Mengal tribe, chief minister of the province. In Sindh and Punjab Bhutto's

PPP formed the provincial governments. A spirit of accommodation and compromise

characterized the Initial relations between the central government and the NAP-JUI governments, and together In 1973 they established a new constitution which estab lished a degree of provincial autonomy in a federal system (ibld.:213}. Cooperation soon broke down however and Bhutto dismissed Baluchistan's NAP-led government amidst increaslng disorder in the province.

Each party in the conflict blames the other for this outcome. In 1974 the govern ment of Pakistan published its account of events in Baluchistan. It charged that the

NAP.JUI government obstructed the work of Pakistan's Coast Guard In Baluchistan 80 that its supporters could smuggle food and arms; that it organized its ownpolice force

245 and allowed or encouraged .lawlessness by its supporters, notably the Baluch Students

Organization and Marri tribesmen, the latter of whom attacked Punjabi settlers in Kach hi District; and that Chief Minister Mengal organized and armed tribal forces to attack rivai tribes in Jhalawan and Las Bela (Pakistan 1974:13-21). Underlying these specific charges was the more general charge that in connivance with foreign governments the

NAP supported Baluch and Pushtun separatist movements (ibid.:41-3; see aiso Wil liams 1975:85-108).15

On the other hand NAP supporters, as well as many Pakistani and Western scholars argue that Bhutto destabilized the government of Baluchistan because it limited his personal authority, and because of external pressure, particularly from the

Shah of Iran (see Wirsing 1987:11; Harrison 1981:34-5; Burki 1980:96; Awan 1985:267,

274; Sayeed 1980:115-7; Rizvi1986:213). NAP supporters I Interviewed claimed for ex ample that it was necessary for the NAP provincial government to give its supporters policing powers because nearly the entire police force of Baluchistan came from the

Punjab, and that province's PPP governor recalled them. Theyalso claimed that the

Jam of Las Bela and Sardar Doda Khan Zarakzai, supporters of the PPP, instigated dis turbances in their areas which the army refused to put down thus necessitating the rais ing of tribal forces to do so. Awan, a former government official, seems largely to

concur with this latter claim (see Awan 1985:268, 272-5).111

The NAP may have been guilty of over-enthusiasm, inexperience, and of over-es timating their strength given their narrow election victory, but they were probably not

guilty of the most serious charges made against them. This is not to deny however

that there were elements within the Baluch nationalist movement who were advocating

and preparing for an armed confrontation with the government of Pakistan (see Har

rison 1981:35-6). As the Kurds have to rival states In their region, the Baluch and Push-

246 tun presented governments wanting to keep Pakistan off-balance an excellent oppor

tunity. and Afghanistan in particular had at times applied pressure with its support for

an independent Pushtunistan. With the recent toss of half of the count,y the central·

government must have been particularly sensitive to the possibility of separatism and

so exaggerated the danger as a way to eliminate political opponents.

The government banned the NAP and arrested Its leaders In 1975, though the

party's leadership soon sponsored a replacement. the National Democratic Party

· (NOP). In the aftermath of the unsuccessful guerrilla war and shorUy after the NAP

leaders were released from jail in 1978 the NOP split along ethnic.tines. The Baluch

leadership left to form the Pakistan National Party (PNP) in 1979 and later they themsel

ves split into factions with Ghous Buxsh Bizenjo remaining in control of the PNP, and

Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Nawab Khair Buxsh Marri (formerly the provincial president

of the NAP)going into exile (Janmahmad 1989:293-4). Mengal wentto London where

he first moved toward adVocatlng an Independent Baluchistan but later joined with

other Pakistani ethnic-nationalists to form the Sindhi.Pushtun-Balueh Front which advo

cates turning Pakistan into a confederation of states (S. Ahmed 1988:199-203). Marr!,

the most militant of the Baluch nationalist leaders went, from London to Kabul where he

remains alOng with some armed supporters keeping open the possibility of a separatist

movement

In the context of the NAPand their brief period of rule it is also necessa,y to men

tion another major Baluch tribal figure who would play an important role in the 1988

elections, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. Although not a member of the NAP and forbidden

from running for election _because of a murder charge against him, Nawab Bugtl com

mitted time, energy, and resources· to their election campaign in 1970. According to

several informants, he expected to be rewarded for his support with the governorship

247 of the province, and when he was passed over in favor of Bizenjo he turned on his

former associates and aligned himself with Bhutto and the PPP. Indeed much of the

fuel for the Bhutto's allegations of NAP's separatist activities came from Bugti who

charged that he had personally participated with NAP leaders in schemes to create an

independent Baluchistan (Awan 1985:270-1; Janmahmad 1989:301·2). After he dis

missed the NAP-JUI government Bhutto appointed Bugti governor of Baluchistan. He

was, in fact, governor when the guerrilla war began, though less than a year later he

resigned, and the center replaced him with Ahmed Var Khan, the Khan of Kalat.

Contemporary Avatars of the NAP In Baluchistan Bizenjo's Pakistan National Party (PNP) and the Baluchistan National Alliance (BNA) were the two parties with their roots in the National Awami Party that participated in the

elections of 1988. The PNP, a direct organizational descendent of the NAP, par ticipated in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy throughout the 1980s, while the BNA was an electoral alliance that tOok shape just days before the deadline for filing nomination papers for the 1988 elections. Its organizers intended it to unite all

Baluch nationalists on a common platform, but it failed to attract Bizenjo's participation, and thus the nationalist vote was split (see Abbas 1988:93).

One of the reasons it refused to join the Baluchistan National Alliance was that the PNP portrayed itself as more than a Baluch party. With the issues it addressed and the candidates it recruited, the PNP hoped to win seats in Karachi and other districts of

Sindh, parts of the Punjab, and both the Baluch and Pushtun areas of Baluchistan.

Months before el.ections were scheduled I had approached the provincial leadership of the P NP in Quetta to discuss their party. After intelViewing the provincial chairr'nan of the party, a member of the Brahui-speaking Lehri tribe, I held interviews with two other members of the party's cenlfal committee, one a Hazara, and the other a Pushtun.

Both were later (unsuccessful) candidates in the November elections.

These two men stressed the PNP's progressive policies and Its opposition to what they calle.d •narrow nationalism". According to the Hazara member

If there is any political action that is for the betterment of Baluchistan then we (Hazaras) will join with our Pushtun and Baluch brothers to move it forward. Until all Baluchistan is in one strong political party, such a movement will not be successful. PNP is the best forum for that movement because here tribal, national, or religious differences do not matter. Shi'a, Sunni, 'Christian. Hindus, and Ahmedis are all present. The PNP recognizes all nationalities and is leading the others in struggling for their legal rights. On the other side there is either the religious parties or the narrow nationalist parties. The PNP is the best for all the nationalities because It is a secular party and struggles for national rights. The Pushtun member went beyond this and argued thl;lt Pushtun and Baluch "narrow

nationalists• (many of whom he characterized as ex-Maoists) were playing the game of the government and "the Imperialist powers• by stirring up ethnic hatred. He too said that the PNP Is the only party trying to unify all nationalities on !l progressive platfonn.

The PNP openly supported the Afghan government In Its civil war, like other nationalist

parties It called for maxiq,um provincial autonomy in a loose federation, and It criticized tribalism and the sardara. This public attitude toward tribalism did not stop the PNP

from attempting to ally ltseH with sardars during the elections. I attended a meeting be

tween G.B. Bizenjo and Nawab Aslam RaisAni, the leader of a small Independent block

of sarctars running for office, in which the former unsuccessfully solicited the latter to

join his party. Two years after the elections NawabRaisAni did in fact join the PNP.

In the 1988 elections the PNP under Bizenjo's leadership seemed to have gained

litue by de-i!mphasizing Baluch nationalism. Regarding autonomy, Bizenjo had been

the most moderate of the Baluch leaders in the NAP. Once Zia released them from

prison Bizenjo criticized the armed insurrection as mistaken and aiguecl for reconcllia

tion with Pakistan, though he continued to press for revising the country's constitution

249 to allow for greater provincial autonomy including the right to secede if the central government over-stepped its limits (Harrison 1981 :54-9; Janmahmad 1989:341Hi, 418-

9}. This position drew the PNP into an unpopular middle ground. Baluch nationalists charged that it had thereby abandoned the nationalist cause and sold out to the central government, while non-Baluch considered it a Baluch nationalist party and its non-

Baluch officers mere tokens.

In the contest for the Baluch nationalist vote the Baluchistan National Alliance

(BNA} out-maneuvered the PNP by s~ng out political ground to its left and right. The old NAP's strength among Baluch lay in the fact that it combined the forces of a group of strong tribal leaders with students and a large portion of the middle-class. The BNA was an alliance of the left-wing of the old NAP coalition represented by student groups, and several important sardars, including both Mengal and Bugti. With Mengal's ab sence from Pakistan at the time of the elections (he was represented by his son who

returned from England to run for the provineial assembly seat in the Mengal tribal area)

Bugti \assumed the l~adership of the alliance. Because Bugtl Is a political moderate he

attracted the support of several other sardars and the alliance did not appear threaten

ing to non-Baluch or Islamabad. At the same time the student groups claimed that in

creating the alliance with him they had drawn him into a nationalist position. On the

one hand, therefore, Bizenjo was without tribal support, while on the other the

nationalist element of the BNA17 attacked him for his political moderation on the issues

of Baluch autonomy from Pakistan.

The fight between the BNA and the PNP was partially a fight for the disembodied

souls of Mengal and Marri,the two symbols of the nationalist movement and the suug

gle of the 1970s. Both parties displayed their portraits at election rallies to evoke the

image of themselvM as the true heir to the nationalist legacy. With engal's son and

250 Marri's nephew present in their ranks, the BNA was able to make a more credible claim to that status. With its largely middle-class leadership the PNP lacked the aura of pres tige and legitimacy in Baluch terms which the sardars gave the BNA.

One factor which weakened the BNA's claim to lead the national cause was the presence of Bugti since he still evokes images of betrayal of the NAP. His apparent reconciliation with Mengal who was one of the major grievants In that Incident seems to have alleviated the misgivings of most Baluch nationalists however. I sensed an at titude among Baluch that sardars (and even the leaders of such organizations as the

Baluch Students Organization) conduct themselves on a higher plane where they deal with issues of honor and reconciliation about which others have little knowledge or say.

This impression matches Pastner's observations in Makran:

Traditional political and economic organization is oriented around the maneuvering for power among members of the elite stratum who contract patron-client ties with members of the lower strata [C. Pastner 1988:250] I would suggest that this traditional pattern is present in contemporary, non-tribal organizations as well. The style of Baluch leadership is explored further in the next chapter.

Not all Baluch accepted Bugti's move for power, of course. One informant who di.d claimed that Marr! had left the field of practical politics by adopting the position that only armed resistance could gain anything for the Baluch, and Bizenjo had gone in another direction and capitulated to Pakistan, Only Mengal and Bugti, he said, had stayed with the original principles of the NAP and so had naturally allied with one another. One of Bugti's opponents countered that Mengal's long exile had caused him to be marginalized in Baluchistan, and, from this position of weakness, he had aligned with Bugti in order to regain popular support.

251 Though the BNA made an explicitly Baluch nationalist appeal, it did not do so chauvinistically. In the past, the student groups, Mengal, and Bugti had all publicly op

posed ethnic violence and promoted cooperation among Pakistan's sub-nationalities to obtain greater autonomy from the center. 18 The BNA framed its politic& appeal in terms of the rights of all the people of Baluchistan and parity amo~g the provinces of

Pakista,n. It maintained that the people of Baluchistan should exert more control over the natural resources of their province and that they should be used to bring the stand

ard of living of Baluchistan up to that of the rest of Pakistan.

Thece is little remarkable or even controversial about the BNA's demands for

economic development or even greater autonomy for Baluchistan. Most candidates

had to support some version of them to be credible. Stokes calls campaigns based on

such issues "vatenbe campaigns• in that successful candidates are those who can

depict themselves as most able to achieve the goals everybody wants (i.e., they are

best able to create bonds or valences in the public's mind between themselves and

those goals) (Stokes 1985:23-5; Layne 1987:118). While other partieS could appeal to

other factors (e.g., the JUI to Islam, the PPP to the memory of Bhutto, and the Muslim

League to potentially profitable ties to the central government) the BNA and the PNP

challenged each other on the legitimacy of their claims to hold the legacy of the NAP

and to best be able to advance the nationalist cause.

The Muslim League and Its Partners The Muslim League has gone through a number of transformations, splinterlngs, and_

resurrections in Pakistan's brief history. In the 1950s the Muslim League was riven with

factions caused mainly by the maneuverings of the large landowners that dominated it,

and both the Republiean Party and the Awami League were established as the results

of splits within it. Burki describes the Muslim League in the 1950s as a party of

252 patronage which used rural notables and their supporters "to run up majorities In con stituencies that were little more than bailwicks controlled by the squirearchy" (Burki

1980:54). Despite its association with the creation of Pakistan and the landed elite,

Ayub Khan's martial law regime banned the Muslim League along with the other politi cal parties in 1958.

With the regeneration of political parties in 1962the Muslim League again divided with one factiOn,the Convention Muslim League, becoming the vehicle of Ayub Khan and the government's supporters, and the other, \he Council Muslim League, opposing the government and calling for electiOns(Rizvi 1987:54). By the time elections were held in 1970 a third grouping, the Qayyum Muslim League, had also emerged. By then, however, events and the rise of Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party had eclipsed the Mus lim League. In those elections all three Muslim Leaguestogether drew only 14 percent of the votes and by taking just 18 of 300 national assembly seats.

Toe leader of the pro-government Convention Muslim League during the 1970 elections was the Pir Pagara who played an important role in the Muslim League In the late 1970s and 19805.111 Toe Pir Pagara is the heir to the sanctity and vast landhold ings of a Sufi lbllkb. (saint) that developed a large and dedicated following in Sindh.

Toe Pagara family has not confined itself to religion, however; it led a number of uprta ings against colonial rule.20 Pir Pagara's Muslim League survived in some form the many defection of its members to the Peoples Party during the 1970s, and in 19n joined the Pakistan National Alliance in opposing Bhutto's re-election. With other con servative parties his Muslim League stayed on to join Zia's martial law government. though it too was later banned when Zia abolished political parties on the grounds that they are unlslamic.

253 Ironically, the non-party elections of February, 1985 brought the Pagara Muslim

League to prominence. Unlike the parties in the Movement for the Restoration of

Democracy, the Muslim League did not boycott those elections (though its candidates did not, of course, run as members of the party). For prime minister of the newly elected parliament Zia, as Pakistan's president, selected a Pagara loyalist, Muhammad

Khan Juneja. While political parties were not at first legalized, two party-like groupings, the Official Parliamentary Group and the oppositional Independent Parliamentary

Group took shape in the parliament (Richter 1986:210). Later political parties were revived and the Muslim League became the party in power, attracting the allegiance of independents and others who sought the rewards of affinity with the government. In

Baluchistan the chief minister and nearly all the members of the provincialassembly, most of whom were sardars or the relatives of sardars, became Muslm Leaguers.

With Zia's May, 1988 dismissal of the Junejo government and the provincial as semblies, the Muslim League again faced crisis and division. The party split into two fac tions one led by men Zia chose as the interim chief ministers of the fOl,lfprovinces, and the other by Pir Pagara and Junejo. As mentioned above, each joined separate elec

.toral alliances. Wheri they reunited, it was with tha conservative lslami Jamhurl ltehad

(IJI), an alliance that advocated increased lslamizatlon and emphasized its ties to

General Zia and the military. A number of the dismissed assemblymen in Baluchistan, many of them with ties to the tribal elite, ran on Muslim League tickets in Baluchistan.

Although the military and the bureaucracy remained neutral in the elections, the

Muslim League's ties to the institutions of power were obvious and 1his was an impor tant part of their electoral persona. Being in power for three yeaq had allowed the Mus lim League to establish patronage relations and a reputation of being a moderate and democratic change from military rule. Along with Zia, the Muslim Leaguehad benefited

254 from the favorable political and economic climate created by Zia's policy on Afghanis

tan which drew considerable international attention and assistance to Pakistan. The

Muslim League had also gained a positive image for Junejo's support, as Pakistan's ·

prime minister, of the United Nations diplomatic efforts to settle the Afghan civil war, ef

forts that led to the Soviets' withdrawal.2 1 To create a popular base of support for his

continuing rule Zia gave the Muslim League considerable leeway. In Baluchistan, for

example, the Muslim League's attraction to members of the provincial assembly (MPA)

grew with the chief minister's practice of distributing a district's development money

through its MPA if he had joined the Muslim League and through standard bureaucratic

channels if he had not (see Ali and Hussein 1986:66).

The PakistanPeoples Party (PPP) ZuHikar Ali Bhutto, a Western-educated Sindhi landlord and former foreign minister in

Ayub Khan's government, established the Pakistan Peoples Party in 1967 as an Is

lamic, socialist and democratic alternative to Ayub. Bhutto's bold and persistent at- . . tacks on Ayub, and his appeals to workers, students, and the peasantry, won his party

a popular following in Punjab and Sindh. In the 1970 elections the PPP won 81 of the

135 national assembly seats in West Pakistan (18 of Zl in Sindh, 62 of 82 in Punjab,

and one of 25 in the NWFP) and majorities in the Sindh and Punjab provincial as

semblies.

Details of the PPP government have been given in Chapter Three, but more can

be said about its actions in Baluchistan. Sayeed summarizes the PPP's rule this way:

Bhutto was primarily motivated by animus dominandi, that is, through the aggrandize ment of his own .power, he wanted to control every major class or interest [sic] by weakening its power base and by making it subservient to his will and policies (Sayeed 1980:91].

255 While his motives were probably more complex than this, personal authority was cer tainly a major consideration during his rule, and tension between him and the NAP-JUI

administrations must be seen in that light (Ziring 19n:583).

Bhutto used the full force of the military against the Baluch insurgents and that of

the government against his political opponents, while at the same time he also con

ducted a positive political offensive to establish a base of support in Baluchistan.

Some of Baluchistan's political and tribal leaders aligned with Bhutto for strategic or

ideological reasons, and through a combination of coercion and enticement he

recruited others. 22 He attacked his opposition by arresting 50 of the top leadership of

the NAP and charging them with high treason. On the other hand he tried to appeal to

popular sentiment by taking a pege out of the NAP book and officially abolishing the

"tyrannical" and "cruel" sardar system. 23 This amounted to ending the privy purses and

subsidies of the sardars, replacin9 tribal courts and jir9as with judicial committees, and

ending ~ a tax on a9ricultural production some sardars (notably in Jhalawan)

levied on their tribesmen (Sayeed 1980:120-1; Awan 1987:285-93).

In the 1988 elections the PPP softened its socialist and anti-Western stance and

many commentators observed that little differentiated the PPP and the Muslim League

on such major issues as the economy and the warin Afghanistan. The PPP could

probably be Characterized as more populist than the M~im League (e.g., It rhetorically

·supported spendin9 on social services and development, and opposed the implemen

tation of Islamic laws which curtailed the rights of women), but It ultimately felt itself too

constrained by structural and geo-political Circumstances to act extensively on such in

tentions. As with 1he Muslim League, many of the PPP 's candidates in Sindh -re

large land owners (some of whom had joined the martial law 90Vemment), and It based

256 its appeal largely on the memo,y of its former •martyred" chairman and the charisma of its present one, his daughter.

The PPP's status in Baluchistan remains ambiguous. Many ethnic-nationalists" are hostile to it as a result of the events of the 1970S. On the other hand there is a por tion of the Saluch middle class that opposes the tribal elite and the left-wing

nationalists, and sees the PPP as the party which could best bring about development

In Baluchistan. Also, because the PPP began to play standard Pakistani patronage

politics after the 1970 elections by putting forward candidates whose strength comes from landed or tribal power bases, it has been able to attract one or two sardars. The

PPP also has a body of supporters in the non-local population of Quetta.

Independents Some candidates elected to run for office without affiliating with any political party. In

Quetta a number of businessmen, professionals, and tribal figures did so, and so did

many sardars in rural areas. Pakistan's constitution 'prohibits membenl of the as

semblies from switching party affiliation, though members elected as Independents are

free to align with whichever party or alliance forms the government Such a strategy Is

attractive to sardara since their support derives less from an ideology or the major per

sonalities present in a political party.than from the authority and prestige they hold In

the tribal sphere. The strategy of running as an independent is best suited to areas

where the boundaries of a tribe and a voting district largely overlap, or else one tribe

predominates in a mixed population. In Baluchistan the Marri-Sugti area, parts of Kach·

hi, and parts of Jhalawan are the regions where such conditions exist. Nawab Sugti,

leader of the SNA ran on its state, but kept open the possibility of having an influence

in a government which did not include his party by having his two son-in-laws, both

257 tribal figures, run as independents in districts where they were sure to win on the basis

of their tribal support. 24

The Election Results Voting in Pakistan's 1988 elections took place on two days. As in the rest of the

I Party II FeaturM Ill MU81lm IV Baluc:h V Number Seats Seata of Sardara

JUI Islam 10 3 PNP Progressive Politics 2 2 Ethnic Nationalism BNA Ethnic Nationalism 6 6 2 Tribal Ties Progressive Politics

IJI Pakistani Nationalism 9 6 3 Islam

PPP Pakistani Nationalism 4 2 lnde- Tribal Ties 7 7, 7 pendents

PMAI* Ethnic Nationalism 1

TOTAL 39 26 12

.. *Pushtunkwa M1m.. Awam, ltehad. a Pushtun nationaliStparty Table 4 :The Results of Provincial Assembly Elections In Baluchistan, country, on November 16th Baluchistan's voters elected representatives from the

province's 11 national assembly districts and on November 20th they chose members

for the provincial assembly. Baluchistan's provincial assembly has 45 seats. Of these,

40 are Muslim seats, three are for the representatives of religious minorities (who are

elected on a province-wide basis, one each for Christians, Hindus, and "othersj, and

two are women selected by the other 43 members of the assembly. 25 I will focus my at

tention primarily on the results of the Muslim provincial assembly races because they

provide the most detailed breakdown of public opinion in Baluchistan.

258 The government declared one of the provincial races null and void which left a total of 39 Muslim assemblymen elected from districts throughout the province. As column Ill of Table 4 shOW&,the JUI won the largest portion of those, the Muslim

League's alliance, the UI, won the second largest portion, followed by the ind&· pendents and the BNA. The JUI won most of its seats in Pushtun majority areas, and the relative strength of the parties changes if only the 26 seats I have identified as having a Baluc:h majority are considered. See Appendix One for a list of those seats, one of which can be considered urban and the rest rural. In the case of the Baluc:h majority seats independent candidates were most successful, followed by the BNA and the UI (see Table 4, Column IV). These proportions change again when the alignment of the independents is taken into consideration. Three of them (all linked to Nawab

Bugti through blood or marriage) stood with the BNA in the subsequent efforts to form a government, and the other four stood with a coalition led by the UI that opposed the

BNA211

Column V of Table 4 shows the party affiliations of the sardars who were elected to the provincial assembly and it reveals that sardars made good use of the strategy of running as independents. All of the seven independents are sardars or very close rela tives of sardars. Though, as suggested, this strate;w was most successful In areas where a large concentration of one tribe is present, the RaisAni sardar wonfrom a tribal ly mixed seat in Sarawan in which his tribe is not the majority. He wasable to do this for a number of reasons. One is that despite being the heads of a small tribe, In the

Kalat Khanate the RaisAni sardars were the 'chiefs' of the tribes of Sarawan, and they have retained a degree of prestige from that status. Nawab RaisAni also drew active support from at least one other tribal leader in the area, the sardar of the Muhammad

Shihi tribe. Perhaps most important was that, as a large landowner and a minister in

259 the interim government in power during the election, Nawab RaisAni had the ability to distribute considerable patronage. Finally, several people (including one of his defeated opponents) told me the Raisani sardar had rigged the election. Such charges against the winners were not uncommon in the aftermath of the elections and so should be viewed with some skepticism but one man who made the charge observed that in Pakistan the ability to successfully rig an election is also an expression of politi cal strength.

Sardars won 12 of the 25 races in rural Baluch areas, and where they did not the outcomes followed two main patterns. In Makran candidates appeared to have wonbe cause of their party affiliations. The BNA wonthree seats, anl:I the PNP and PPP one each in the five provincial assembly races there, all with middl.class candidates. As suggested in Chapter One, ties to Karachi, Immigration to the Gulf, and different_land use patterns cause weak tribal structures in Makran. The second trend is represented by the :.utwnafrom the JUI who.won two seats.in Sarawan. Though some clalmed that the JUI candidates were able to take those seats because the Baluch nationalist vote was split, 27 in neither case would the combined vote of the BNA and the PNP have defeated the JUI. The reasons for the support for Islamic candidates in Brahui areas is not entirely clear to me. I have noted that .Islamseems to have a greater appeal to the

Brahui tribes than to Baluch ones. This may be because the previous Khan of Kalat,

Ahmed Var Khan, who was personally religious and wanted to increase the strength of

Islamic law in Kalat state. may have subsidized madrassain the area One informant claimed that Arab sheikhs who have hunting lodges in Sarawan and Kharan havealso subsidized madrassasthere. See Appendix One for the distribution of votes In the two

Brahui seats won by the JUI.

260 A number of factors are probably at work in the other seats won by non-tribal can

didates In the remaining areas. Two of those successful candidates belonged to the

IJI, at least one of whom {the representative from Chaghai) was a member of the former

assembly. This man, who had the reputation of being a heroin smuggler, was very

wealthy, and he used his wealth and ties to the government to win re-election. I am not

certain of the background of the other IJI candidate, Muhammad Saleh, who won In PB·

35, Las Bela. Because the elections in Las Bela are dominated by members of the Jam

... of Las Bela's family, I would not be surprised if he too is a member of It. If so 13 of the

26 successful candidates would be from the tribal ellte. In one seat (Tambo) the PPP

won the election, reflecting the fact that the party's Sindhi leadership (the Bhuttos)

makes It attractive to the large non-Baluch (Abro and Samat) populations there.

In Quetta the situation Is complex due to the population mix as well as the

strength of political Ideologies among urbanites. Quetta is divided into four districts

which to varying degrees also include rural areas. No figures are available on the eth

nic make-up of the districts, but extrapolating from the geography of the districts and

the strength of the ethnic-nationalist and tribal candidates in each of them, it appears

Quetta I has a Pushtun majority, Quetta II and Ouetta Ill (which includes the canton•

ment) have settler majorities, and Ouetta IV has a slight Baluch majority. The JUI won

two of the Quetta seats (I and IV),and Pakistani nationalist parties (the PPP and the U~

won the other two. In none of the cases does it appear that the combined Baluch

nationalist vote (PNP plus BNA) would have been sufficient to have defeated the win

ning candidate. See Appendix One for a break down of the voting in the three Ouetta

provincial assembly districts with sizable Baluch nationalist votes.

As described above, In the contest between the two Baruch nationalist parties,

the BNA and the PNP, the former out-flanked the latter both by attracting sardars willing

261 to line up with an ethnic-nationalist program and by challenging its opponents' commit ment to ethnic-nationalism. The situation was made obvious by the results In the two national assembly seats the PNP president, Mir Ghous Buxsh Bizenjo, contested. In

NA-205, the seat for Khuzdar (Jhalawan), the BNA candidate who was the sardar of the

Muhammad Hasni tribe defeated him, and in NA-207, the seat which encompasses most of Makran, another BNA candidate, a middle-class ethnic-nationalist, defeated him. Although each contest was fought in a local setting with its own dynamics,

Bizenjo's efforts to create a progressive but still Baluch persona for the PNP were not sufficient in most cases for It to displace the one the BNA was able to create by appeal· ing to both tribal and nationalist versions of Baluc:hness.

It would not be fair to complete this discussion of the elections without mention ing what some of the defeated parties perceived as Interference in them by outside for ces, namely the United States. Spokesmen for the PNP and two Pushtun ethnic-nationalist parties, all of which had fared poorly In the elections identified the support given their opponents as the major cause for their defeat in interviews with me.

Similar to the attitude many held about the riots between Pushtun and Baluch, a PNP leader told me that the government, backed or directed by the United States, had sup ported •narrow nationalists• (namely Nawab Bugti) in order to divide the people of

Baluchistan. The Pushtun nationalists emphasized how the same forces had sup ported the Islamic fundamentalists of the JUI in order to continue their war in Afghanis tan.

Conclusion The elections are an instance of short-term, sensitive event history but they also illustrate some of the structural features of Baluch society I have discussed. The out come of the elections were influenced by the immediate history preceding it. For

262 example it is possible that the strong showing by sardars and religious parties was In

part a consequence of the previous ten years of martial rule and lslamization during

which opposition parties had not been allowed to organize openly. Subsequent events

however reveal the pivotal role of sardars in Baluch politics. In the two years following

elections several reafignments took place within the Baluch political groupings I have

discussed In this chapter, and the result was a three-way split of the Baluch

nationalists, each having an affiliation with certain sardars and some version of ethnic

nationalism as their political program.

One development was that two major sardars, Nawab Raislni and the Zehr! Sar

dar (the 'chiefs' of Sarawan and Jhalawan respectively), Joined the Pakistan National

Party. The other was that there was a split between the middle-class ethnic-nationalists

and Nawab Bugtl's tribal faction of the BNA. The BNA's student/middle-etass elements

regrouped under the title of the Baluchistan National Movement and Identified with Sar

dar Ataullah Mengal. Fresh from a series of clashes with the central government over

the distribution of resources and authority when he was chief minister of Baluchistan,

Bugti formed his own party with which a number of sardars,affilia.ted.

In other words tribalism and tribal personalities remain central to political life in

Baluchistan and all but the most extreme political positions are advanced through

them. Tribalism can be thought of as the way people use the most salient features of

life (ties of kinship, patronage, and the ideology of honor), to deal with the world. A&

suggested in Chapter One, Baluch sardars occupy the strategic point of contact be

tween tribes kept corporate by ecological, economic, and political factors, and the •ex•

ternal" world. Sardars have considerable autonomy and their understanding of and

approach to external factors is in large part unaffected by their constituents. In fact the

political stance the sardar takes will often influence that of his tribesmen who Identify

263 with him, though his Influence will also be affected by such factors as his personality, standing in the tribe, and the particular positions he takes.

Tribes are both the composite of tribesmen's lives and social ties, and an entity which shapes them, and so tribes are never fully corporate or sardars all-powerful. The state (and its international Imperatives), market forces, and the spread of education bring new influences to the lives of tribesmen. It is likely that they will also bring op tions and Ideologies that will weaken tribal ties and authority figures, but that Is not yet obviously the case, nor is it certain to be. Sardars have retained influence in most parts of Baluchistan, even where they were not elected to the provincial assembly, and their continuing social, political, and in some cases economic power will be an lmpor· tant factor in determining how external forces reach Baluch. As nationality has persist ently retained more salience than the ideology of class in shaping the actions of the proletariat. so too tribalism, tied to ethnic-nationalism, Pakistani nati'onalism, or both, may continue to be more relevant than other alternatives for mobilizing Baluch and ' projecting their identity,

264 NOTE.S 1) In English the term means the Islamic Democratic Union.

2) Notably the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, which was formed after the imposition of martial law to pressure President Zia to hold elections.

3) The PPP, the largest party, refused to join an electoral alliance because Its leader ship felt that It would be carrying the smaller parties and that they would have Influence within the affiance disproportionate to their popular support.

4) It was unclear from the interview whether he thought the government should con tinue to collect zaW in other forms or whether individuals should pay zi1sJ1vofuntarBy as a test of their dedication to Islam (see Mayer 1987:59-61 ).

5) This Is an impossibly high flgure given, as stated above (Chapter Five), the annual In come in Pakistan is Rs6840.

6) This is the standard demand of the ethnic-nationalist and left-leaning parties In Pakis tan regarding the division of authority within the state.

7) Some madrassas can give degrees up to the equivalent of a university Masters (which in Pakistan entails the same number of school years as a bachelors degree In the United States) in Islamic studies. Education in the madrassas is in Urdu, Arabic, and Persian, and, the mullahs told me, consists not only of Islamic studies, but also economics, politics, and science. ·

8) I asked the leaders of the JUI whether. as some people contend, the mosques receive money from Saudi Arabia. I was told that mosques affiliated with another religious party, the Jamlt-e-lslami (JI), do receive such funds but that JUI mosques do not. The JI Is Indeed closely aligned with Saudi Arabia while the JUI is more inde pendent and less conservative.

9) One of the JUi's successful candidates was even rumored to be a refugee from Af ghanistan.

1O) This compares with percentages from a total sample population of 564 polled In five cities (Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Hyderabad, and Ouetta) which showed 11 per: cent of respondents thought lslamization had been sufficient, 64 percent felt it had been insufficient, and 17 percent thought it had been excessive. The~ said it had selected 30 percent of its respondents from the "upper-class•, 40 percent from the "lower-<:lass•, and 30 percent at random.

11) Its full name was the Pakistan Awami Muslim League. was composed of dissident groups of the Muslim League and had a strong base in East Pakistan.

12) The Republican Party was a splinter of the Muslim League that represented mainly industrialists and landlords (including some Baluch sardars), and supported One Unit (Gankovsky and Gordon-Polonskaya n.d.;271-4).

265 13) Instead of the Basic Democracies in which an electoral college with limited eligibility chose members of an assembly with restricted powers (see Rizvi 1986:103-25).

14) See Afzal 1987:164-87; Rizvi 1986:146-66; and Ali 1970:172-85.

15) Williams repeats many of the charges made in the Pakistan government's White Paper, often by quoting it directly without acknowledging the fact or the source. Com pare for example the first paragraph of Pakistan (1974:44) with the first paragraph of Williams (1975:72), or the first paragraph of Pakistan (1974:13) with the last paragraph of Williams (1975:85). Williams expands upon the theme of separatism as the underly ing motive for the NAP's alleged actions. He contends for example that the NAP, along with the government of Afghanistan, sought the Soviet Union's support to establish a "land corridor of weak states affording access to the Arabian Sea• (Williams 1975:63), and that Soviet and East German experts trained Baluch guerrillas in Baluchistan with the knowledge and support of the NAP government (ibid.:91 ).

16) It is not clear what Awan's own role was during this period and it should be noted that his critical stance toward the PPP could have been influenced by the fact that his book appeared when martial law was still in force, and Bhutto was officialy held to be the cause of many of Pakistan's difficulties.

1 7) The nationalist portion of the BNA COll$isted of the main branch of the factionaJized Baluch Students Organization (BSO) and the Baluchistan National Youth Movement (BNYM), its political wing.

18) The BSO, the BNYM, and Bugti publicly appealed for peace (luring the Baluch/Pushtun rioting that took place shortly before the campaigning began. Mengal had worked with other ethnic groups in his less-than-successful Sindhi-Pushtun-Baluch Front as had the BSO in its participation in the Pakistan Progressive Students Alliance, ' a country-wide coalition of left-wing and nationalist student organizations. Rumors cur rent in Quetta before the election held that Bugti's (eventually successful) bid for the · chief ministership of the province had the support of the non-local (Punjabi and Mohajir) population of Ouetta. .

19) Burki (1980:57) writes that Pir Pagara was the leader of the Convention Muslim League though the J::lmUl's November 1988 Election Supplement (page 119) states that the Pagaras were members of the Qayyum Muslim League before they left to form their own faction of the League.

20) For an account of one of these see Lambrick (1972).

21) President Zia himself had opposed the U.N. efforts and this was another source of tension which probably contributed to his dismissal of Junejo.

22) Most of those who supported him were either the heads of Baluch "tributary states· or had positions of superior authority in the tribal structure of the Kalal state. They in cluded the Khan of Kalal, the Jam of Las Bela, Nawabzada Shahbaz Khan of Kharan, Nawab Ghous Buxsh Raisani, and Coda Khan Zarakzai. The last two were the chief of Sarawan and the chief of Jhalawan respectively.

266 23) The NAP government passed a resolution in the Baluchistan provincial assembly calling for an end to the sardari system.

24) These two successful candidates were Mir Chakar Khan Ohomki and Mir Humayun Marri.

25) At present women are permitted to vote in Pakistan.

26) Two alliances emerged in the provincial assembly, the BNA and the JUI were one, and the other consisted of the IJI, the PPP, and the PNP.

27) See for example the interview with Nawab Bugti in the February, 1989 .t::w.akl.

267 CHAPTER EIGHT

DISTURBING BOUNDARIES: CHANGING ETHNIC PROCESSES IN BALUCHISTAN

The preceding discussions of the economics, politics, and social developments In

Baluchistan provide a good background to an analysis of ethnicity in the region, and more particularly of the relations between Baluch and Pushtun in Ouetta. In the interac tion of these two groups can be seen the effects of detribalization or Its lack, political and economic competition and cooperation, and ethnic mobilization. I have explored these tendencies and have concluded that while ethnic identities are becoming more salient, tribal identities and Institutions are sti!I Important. In this chapter I wm con centrate on how ethnic mobilization is taking place in Baluchistan, and more particular· ly how it is affecting the territorial relations between Baluch and Pushtun. After starting with an historical outline of the relationships between these, the two major ethnic groups in Baluchistan, I will examine a hypothesis put forward by Fredrik Barth which at· tem,pts to explain why those relations took the form they did. Using his work and that of others I will then examine contemporary interaction between Baluch and Pushtun In light of each group_'s route to mobilization and its social structuring of space.

Baluch-Pushtun Relations In Historlcal Perspective As Baluchi-speaking tribes expanded north and eastward from Makran, the.y displaced and absorbed other ethnic groups in some areas, and in others they were absorbed by those Uving there (Spooner 1968:609, 624). The former tended to be the case along the northern boundary zone with Pushtun. While many Baluch bristle at the suggest.ion that Pushtun have any historic claim to the Bolan Pass or Sibl, Pushtun were in fact prior inhabitants of these areas, as well as Ouetta (ShAI), Mastung, the southern

268 Sulalman Range (now occupied by Marris, Bugtis and other Baluchl speaking tribes), as well as parts of the Indus Basin and Kachhl. (Prior residence does not, of course,

Justify irredentist claims In the present day). Some evidence for this Is present in at

Beruni's Jru1iA.completed around 1030 A.O. at the court of M11hmudof Ghaznl. He wrote "In the western frontier mountains of India there live various tribes of AfghAns, and extend [sic] up to the neighborhood of the Sindh Valley• (al Biruni 1964:208). Lunl sites a number of Persian sources which place the Pushtun In areas now Inhabited by

Baluch. The Tarikh-namaHerat, compiled around 1322 A.O., he says, refers to "Af ghanistan• as extending as far south as Rojan on the Kachhi Plain and Including forts In

ShAI and Mastung (Lunl n.d.:47, 53).

In a short article published in 1963 Barth discussed the historic spread of Baluchi speaklng tribes and the Baluch ethnic identity northward Into Pushtun areas of the

Sulalman Range and concluded that Its cause lay In the more inclusive tribal system of the Baluch. A similar phenomena has also taken place west of there, In Sarawan, where the Brahui language and ethnic identity has advanced relative to Pushtun. As

discussed In Chapter Two, the Baluch Immigration Into these northern areas Is thought to have begun In the 15th century (Spooner 1988:609). The process by which Baluch occupied Pushtun lands was piecemeal and gradual and in most cases Involved

military conquest and the absorption of Pushtun lineages or Individuals Into Baluch society (Barth 1981c:100). Barth's thesis will be examined in more detail later in this

chapter. Suffice It to say here that Baluch encroachment on Pushtun territory seems to

have slowed once the British pacified the area and has now probably stopped.

Uke many otherPushtun areas, this boundary region was for much of Its pre

Baluch history not Independent, but under the suzerainty of various Turkish and Mon

gol dynasties (Luni n.d.:50-5, 123). Until Ahmad Shah Durrani established an Afghan

269 empire centered in Oandahar around 1750, Pushtun areas were either under the con trol of groups from Central Asia or Persia, or decentralized and divided among autonomous tribes. Ahmad Shah was the first Pushtun to forge a kingdom out of the

Afghan tribes, though ironically Pushtun had on two occasions established dynastic rule over northern India. Beginning with Mahmud of Ghazni (circa 1000 A.O.) Pushtun mercenaries served in the various Turkish and Mongol armies which invaded and ruled northern India for over 500 years (Caroe 1986:120, 137, 164). Many settled there (as far east as Bihar and Bengal) as landlords or courtiers, and both the Khaljl (1202-1226 and 1296-1316 A.O.)' and Lodi (1451-1526) dynasties arose when Pushtun families gained control of the Delhi throne. The Lodi dynasty ended with the advent of the

Mughals (who themselves used Pushtun mercenaries), though Sher Shah Suri (1539-

1554) briefly reinstated Pushtun power.

The Durrani empire consolidated Pushtun tribes Into a sort of proto-nalional state, and the Kalat Khanate did the same for Baluch tribes as it reached Its greatest ex tent under Khan Nasir Khan in the second half of the 18th century, Though undoubted ly rivalries among Baluch and Pushtun tribes over grazing lands and other resources had been present for generations these two polities elevated the rivalry to one between centranzed tribal confederations. The strength of •national" identities should not be ex aggerated however, nor should the extent of the rivalry between the two polities.

Baluch and Pushtun tribes retained as much autonomy from their respective centers as was advantageous and possible (see Anderson 1987:77), and despite a siege of Kalat by Ahmad Shah in 1758, the ruling families of both states remained closely tied through treaties and marriage.

Rivalries took place in the boundary region between the two states and usually in volved local alignments of tribes rather than the states themselves. As Hager observes

270 l f. Inter-polity relations among tribally organized peoples are made through personal and individual accommodations between diverse normative orders at the ethnic boundary, rather than between the formal and specialized institutions of the state [Hager 1983:85). That this was the case along the Pushtun/Baluch bo,undary is indicated by Tate's reference to a battle above Hanna (near Quetta) between troops of Khan Nasir Khan and the Kakars (Pushtun) of the area.

Tahmas Khan, a subordinate Chief of the Sanatia clan of the Kakars, obtained distinction by his exploits against the Baluchis, between whom and the Kakars enmity had existed for a long time and had assumed the appearance of a national hatred" [Tate:Appendlx 9; see also Elphinstone 1969:450]. The Colonlal and Post-Colonial Eras British colonial rule for the most part ended overt competition in the ethnic boundary zone. The Suleiman area, Slbi, the Bolan Pass, and Quetta all fell within British

Baluchistan, that is under direct British rule. Barth notes that with its superior military

power, and its laws and administrative structures originating largely outside of local

dynamics, colonial rule often brought a sort of artificial peace which provided oppor tunities for inter-ethnic relations and a reduction in cultural differences (Barth

1969a:225). Anti-colonial political movements also subsumed ethnic differences. The

anti-colonial movement was split between those supporting the Muslim League which

advocated Muslim nationalism, and those sympathizing with the Indian National Con

gress and advocating either a united India or Independent ethnic states (Baluchistan

and Pushtunistan). In both cases energies were directed against the colonialists (or

those the ethnic nationalists thought would replace them), rather than against one

another.

Throughout the 19505, '60s and '70S the Baluch and Pushtun nationalist move

ments of Pakistan were united in the National Awami Party (NAP). As noted in Chapter

Three, in the first decades of the post-colonial era the colonial bureaucratic and legal

271 structures remained largely in place though they were manned by Pakistanis, mostly

Mohajirs and Punjabis. 'One Unit', which subsumed all sub-regions of West Pakistan into a single administrative unit led those opposed to it to unite and form the NAP. The

NAP's platform called for "cultural-racial" and geographical boundaries to coincide and for maximum provincial autonomy in a federal structure (Janmahmad 1989:316). In

Baluchistan the party leadership was in the hands of Baluch sardars (K.B. Marri, A. Men gal and A.K. Bugti) and politicians (G.B. Bizenjo), though Samad Khan Achakzai, a

Pushtun from the Chaman area was also influential.

Despite their mutual Interest in attaining greater autonomy from the center, dif. ferences between the Baluch and Pushtun nationalists within NAP emerged and grew more pronounced. According to one Baluch nationalist author, Janmahmad, tensions arose over 'Pushtunistan', the call periodlcally made by the government of Afghanistan, as well as some Pushtun nationalists in Pakistan, to unite Pushtun in some political structure. Moderate versions of 'Pushtunistan' call for the Pushtuns of Pakistan to be u_nitedin a single•province, while the most extreme for~s call for the Pushtun and

B.aluch areas of Pakistan to be joined with Afghanistan on the grounds that these lands constituted the former Durrani empire and that Afghanistan must have access to the sea (ibid.:368-369, see also Amin 1988:90). Many Baluch view such extreme versions of Pushtunistan as threats to their sovereignty. Again see Janmahmad who asserts that the "joint struggle against the Punjab from the political platform of the NAP could not diminish the Baloch suspicions of the long-term aims of the Pakhtoons, who coveted hegemony over Baloch land" (Janmahmad 1989:285). On the other hand

Pushtun in Baluchistan identify the source of the tensions in the NAP between the

Baluch and the Pushtun of Baluchistan as due to the Baluch sardars' dominance in the party, and their insensitivity to Pushtun aspirations and sensitivities.

272 Although the NAP government of the Northwest Frontier Province resigned In solidarity when, in 1973, the central government dismissed the NAP government In

Baluchistan, relations between the Baluch and Pushtun members of the party deteriorated until, In 1979, new parties were formed along ethnic lines. The differences between the two ethnic components of the NAP grew during the armed insurgency against the government of Pakistan following the NAP's dismissal. Though the Impetus for the insurgency came from the tribal leaders in the NAP, it was an action that the other Baluch leaders in the NAP initially supported (ibid.:304). Baluch supporters of the

Insurgency felt they were let down by the lack of support they received from the Push tuns of the NAP as well as from the government of Afghanistan. Though the Pushtun leaders of the NAP were Jailed throughout the fighting along with their Baluch com rades, nearly all of the combatants were Baluch. All of the fighting took place In Baluch areas and the Baluch population bore the brunt of the government's counter-Insurgen cy program which entailed the standard techniques of attacking not only the guerrillas but their supporters through attacks on villages, mass arrests, and torture. While

Baluch resented Pushtun for their lack of support during the conflict, Pushtun accused the Baluch leadership of being extremist and attempting military solutions for political problems when they were not adequately prepared for the consequences.

Barth's Thesis on Baluch Terrliorlal Advancement At this point it is useful to return to Barth's thesis on the causes of the territorial advance of Baluch ethnicity at the expense of Pushtun in order to examine some of the dif· ferences between the two groups and the nature of their contemporary relations. The

essence of his thesis Is that Baluch were able to encroach on Pushtun territory be

cause Baluch tribes are actively Inclusive of outsiders, and Pushtun tribes exclusive. In

many ways the two groups are quite similar. Both Inhabit ecological zones which allow

273 agriculture and require pastoralism, though in the more northern and cooler Pushtun region agriculture, not pastoralism, is the basis of most tribal economies. The Baluch and Pushtun tribal systems are both built on principles of patrilineality, honor, and obligation to provide protection (and hospitality) to family and guests (Barth 1981c:94-

7). Yet Barth finds differences In the socio-political structure of Baluch and Pushtun tribes and, as a corollary, in the social and legal status of land in each group.

Like others, Barth highlights the radical equality or "pure democracy" (Ahmed

1980:94-6) among Pushtun which finds its practical expression in the jirgA or councils of equals, and he contrasts it with the nested hierarchy of status and authority in

Baluch tribes which culminates In the office of the sardar. Among Pushtun tribes each segment or lineage "becomes corporate• through the ji[ga of male members "who sit together as agnates with equal rights (Barth 1981 b:97). At.each level in Baluch tribes the segment is represented by the hereditary leader (1akci}who stands under the authority of the sardar.2

Equalityand ExclusionAmong Pushtun As its major decision making body, the ji[ga, in its composition and functioning, reveals essential aspects of Pushtun society.

The relationship between members of a council is one of equals, with no speaker or leader; the equality is emphasized by circular seating on the ground and the equal right of all to speak. The body does not finalize its decisions in a vote: discussion and negotiation continue until the decision is unopposed and thereby unanimous and binding as a decision by each participant. ... It allows groups of men to arrive at joint decisions without compromising any participant's Independence; It produces binding corporate decisions about concerted action without dissembling the structure of egalitarian balanced segments through the introduction of any one's right to give commands {Barth 1969b:121-2]. Though eligibility for membership in the ji[ga varies between regions (Ahmed 1976:83;

Spain 1962:50), Barth contends that at minimum It requires patrilineal descent within a

Pushtun tribe and the ownership of land. His interpretation does not necessarily con-

274 tradict those who contend jirg.as consist of "elders" (Yapp 1983:153), or maliks, men who have the highest standing within the tribe (Ahmed 1976:74; 1983:91, 143-7)·3 ,for without land and blood ties It would-be impossible to attain status as elders or mallks

As discussed in Chapter One, access to tribal territory is an essential element of membership within the tribe. This is the case among Pushtun tribes, and even in areas where land has little economic value and the independent tribesman's income comes from such "imaginative• sources as smuggling, robbery, or government payoffs to desist from those pursuits, land ownership allows laying claim to the tribal charter

(Ahmed 1980:264). In Pushtun society land is Individually owned and ideally passed from a father to his sons among whom it is divided equally. Pushtun men "obtain ac cess to agricultural land and to grazing areas by virtue of agnatic descent; as a result descent units are also territorial units, and localities and districts tend to be named after the tribal segment inhabiting them" (Barth 1981 c:97; cf J. Anderson 1983:130-1 ).4 The importance of land ownership is so great that In some areas (e.g., Swat) only those who own land are considered Pushtun because without land one would have to either subordinate oneself to another by working on his land, or do other low status work as a client to a landowner (Barth 1965:24, 67).

In Pushtun society to be another's client means bearing "Inferior, non-tribesman serf status• (Barth 1969b:124), and even seeking protection from another or being a regular guest In his guest house (i.e., accepting his hospitality) Implies subordinate standing (Barth 1981c:98; 1965:54; see also J. Anderson 1983:135). Despite some temporary economic patron-client relationships between tribesmen which do not entail the client being considered inferior and subordinate, the degree of inequality inherent in such relationships in Pushtun tribes is unusual among Islamic tribes.5

275 Thus Barth concludes it is difficult and often undesirable for Pushtun tribes to absorb new members. Incorporation can either take the form of clientship or come about as a result of a decision by the jir.ga to accept the newcomers as equals. Clientshlp en tails servile status which ls often undesirable for the would-be client and the would-be patron. (This is true for the latter because the low productivity of most Pushtun areas means clients can add little economic value but they must be supported and protected, and they are therefore an expense and a potential source of conflict). In the case of in· corporation as equals, a unanimous decision must be reached by the jir.ga not only to accept the person or group, but to provide them with the land from which they derive status (Barth 1981c:100).6

Hierarchy and Inclusion Among Baluch For a number of reasons it is easier and more desirable for Baluch tribes to incorporate outsiders. The hierarchical structure of Baluch tribes places considerable authority with the sardar for settling disputes, providing protection, and directing social Hfe. Just as the emphasis on equality among Pushtun is unusual compared to other tribal popula tions in the Islamic world, so too .are the degree of hierarchy in Baluch tribes and the level of authority and status Baluch sardars hold (Spooner 1988:625). The sardar alone has the power to give his protection to newcomers, and need not consult a jir.ga to do so (Barth 1981c:100).

The dynamics of Baluch society seems quite different from those of the Pushtun, and, ironically, by not basing relations between tribesmen on the absolute equality of members, at some level Baluch hold less concern for the standing of individuals relative to one another.

The individual Baluch has a keen sense of his place in a hierarchical pecking order. Normative rules stressing the need for unequivocal defense of personal honor coexist with real behaviors that often vacillate between marked "machismo" and obsequious ness [S. Pastner 1988:170].

276 Baluch llr.gasoperate quite differently from Pushtun ones in that only men with a certain standing can speak in them and therefore, according to Barth, common tribesmen must have a patron speak for them. There is, however, no dishonor inherent in this or other patron-client relationships among Bal.uch tribesmen.

Judged by Pathan standards, clientship places a man among the despised failures, subordinates among independent commoners. Among Baluch, on the other hand, self-respect and recognition as an honourable commoner does not require this degree of assertion and autonomy; the costs by Baluch standards of being a client of a chief and a nobleman are very slight. (Barth 1969b:125] As Swldler observed among the Br,ahui of Sarawan, it is not uncommon for an In dividual to simultaneously be a client in a share-cropping relationship on one piece of land, and to be collecting his stiare of the output from share-croppers on land in which

he has an ownership share (Swidler 1973:302-3).

The importance and influence of Baluch sardars is in large part a factor of the number of their followers so they have incentives to increase the size of their tribes. In- corporation of outsiders is a long standing practice among Baluch and Brahul tribes.

Many lineages In these tribes have m~mories of their origins not only in other Saluch or

Srahui tribes, but in such other ethnic groups as Jatts (Sindhi), Rajputs, Kurds, and

Mongols, as wenas Pushtun. It is Saluch ethnicity and identity, not Just the Balucht speaking tribes, that have advanced relative to other groups, since the process has

been one of both military conquest and the absorption of the victims of that conquest

as Saluch.

Equality vs Hierarchy Although derived from a different situation, Kapferer's observations on the differences

between nationalism in what he terms 'Western egalitarian and Asian hierarchical

states• may add Insight to a consideration of the differences between Baluch and Push-

tun society. Kapferer's analysis derives from the work of Dumont, though he modifies the notion of hierarchy which Dumont sees as originating in purity and pollution, and

the subordination of power to status. Kapferer says that power (the king, not the priest

or brahman) can be determining in hierarchical states (Kapferer 1988:10; see also Dirks

1987:277-84). Within hierarchical societies individuals, and groups or nations are incor

porated in and determined by holistic principles. "The whole Is determinate of the parts

and their interrelatlon ...lower forms of existence are incorporated by higher forms and

transformed In accordance with those principles that determine the higher form• (Kap

ferer 1988:11 ). The state represents the encompassing, unifying force which sub

sumes, orders, and makes whole otherwise weak or destructive individuals and groups

(ibid.:211 ).

By contrast, in the ideology of egalitarian societies, Kapferer says, the individual

precedes society and is the fundamental element of it. While hierarchical societies fear the chaos that occurs with the dissolution of hieraichy, the danger to egalitarian In·

dividuals is that they will be absorbed and homogenized by more Inclusive orders such

as the state. An individual is equated with the nation or the people, which is distinct

from, in antagonism with, and superior to the state (ibid.:168, 187). In egalitarian

societies much is made of the boundaries around groups, I.e., the differences which dis·

tinguish who may be considered the same and thus equal.

Though not uniformly so in practice, Pushtun can be characterized as emphasiz·

Ing egalitarianism and individuality relative to Baluch.7 The high degree of internal

egalitarianism implies a need to distinguish between and separate Pushtun and non

Pushtun. By contrast, like the hierarchical state Kapferer describes, the Baluch are

able to incorporate non-Baluch if they are subordinate to hierarchical authority, i.e., if

they acknowledge the authority of the encompassing social order the sardar embodies.

This also relates to the fact that in Batuch tribes links to genealogical Baluch ancestors

278 enhance the prestige and standing of a lineage, i.e., while all members of the tribe are

Baluch, some are more Baluch than others.

rmpllcatlons and Extensions of Barth's Thesis Barth's argument is primarily a political one, and other analysts of Southwest Asia agree that politics Is the determining factor In ethnicity there. The political Institutions of each group (the Pushtun ji[ga versus the Baluch sardar) determine outsiders' relationship to the group, and therefore access to genealogy and land. It Is not, how ever, a purely political argument since economic relations and cultural values, e.g., the honorableness of clientshlp, also influence spatial relations and access to land. Yet political alignment Is pivotal. Anderson has expanded this notion by arguing that politics is the single dynamic in determining ethnic identity in Southwest Asia. He ar gues that because people there are generally multi-lingual and have access to multlple

Identities, ethnicity Is not based on language and culture as it is In Europe. It is In stead, he says, a matter of political alignment; ethnicity 'emerges In the Interplay of con tests to monopolize political life' (Anderson 1987:73, 86). Central to this process In his view is the role of states which attempt to exert their control and cultural dominance

.along the structural borders of authority while local groups at the same time attempt to

use their connections to the state In their local struggles (ibld.:75).

Anderson's thesis is open to criticism on a number of points. Ethnic identities are

not simply trousers that canbe changed at will, and presumably one gains some at tachment to the kin ties, traditions, and atmosphere of one's ethnicity. Even If these

are weak, the Baluch/Pushtun case shows that the flow of individuals across the perme

able boundaries around ethnic groups may be easier in some directions than In others

(Barth 19698). There are often incentives for excluding people from an ethnic group for

economic reasons, and as discussed in Chapter Four, economic inequalities which

279 map onto regions may create or exaggerate ethnic identities. Exclusive ethnicity is especially strong where the economically and politically dominant ethnic group's iden tity merges with that of the state (Williams 1969:434-5).

If rephrased to say that ethnicity is primarily political and that the role of the state is fundamental in its formulation, Anderson's contentions have considerable merit and are applicable beyond Southwest Asia. Barth too notes that within contemporary states ethnicity is played out in terms of politics and political control of opportunities (in education and the bureaucracy) rather than through the articulation of economic specializations defined in ethnic terms, e.g., caste in India (Barth 1969a:34; see also

Rothschild 1981:232). With this in. mind I would like to re-examine the question of eth nic boundaries in the context of the Pakistani state. The encroachment of Baluch into

Pushtun territory took place largely in a stateless setting (I say largely because the ad vance of Brahui tribes occurred in the context of the consolidation of Baluch and Push tun tribes Into proto-states) in which tribal political institutions and the economics o! pastoralism and small-scale agriculture prevailed. As Pakistan has established routes of access in the region, and as market relations have grown and the state has developed new political institutions, the conditions under which Baluch and Pushtun converge upon one another have changed. Under these conditions Pushtun readily in trude into Baluch territory and this is a source of the ethnic tensions between the two.

Routes to Mobilization I will start the discussion of Baluch and Pushtun territoriality with a brief examination of

Or ans' concept of the rank concession syndrome (ACS) and more specifically, witti his notion of •rank paths" or •avenues of mobility" (see Crans 1965:123-36; 1971:69-100,

147-9). Rank concession means the acceptance of social inferiority by groups en· cysted within an ethnically or culturally distinct society. The theory of the ACS holds

280 that the members of the encysted group concede that the dominant group holds not just superior power, but superior qualities which account for, if not justify, its dominance, and that having made such a concession the encysted group will emulate the dominant group. A possible outcome of such emulation is that those who have conceded rank will mobilize to adopt or match the successes of the dominant group.

Such mobilization follows two main paths or routes, the pursuit of political power and the pursuit of economic power (Orans 1971:94).

Such mobilization does not require rank concession, however, and in the case of the Baluch and the Pushtun though rank concession does not apply, the fact that each is on different routes of mobilization has important consequences. In their relations with one another Baluch and Pushtun are quite balanced. They share slmllar Institu tions and values, and though Baluch displaced Pushtun in the boundary zone, they did so by absorbing the Pushtun as equals, not encysting them as inferiors (as they have done with other groups). Neither can be said to have conceded rank to the other.

Even with Punjabis and Mohajirs, those ethnic groups which control and give their Iden tity to the state of Pakistan. both Batuch and Pushtun are likely to concede power, but not rank. The Pushtun can look to their past as conquerors and rulers of the Punjab and the rest of North India, and the autonomy· of many Pushtun tribes from the political control of any state or empire as proof of their social equality if not superiority. Baluch have similar memories. Like the nomadic groups who have seized imperial power In

India, Persia, and even China, they look to their nomadic heritage as one which ex· emplifies their independence, purity, and strength. Moreover it may be that Orans' RCS theory Is not applicable to groups such as the Pushtun and Baluch that. though they are technically encapsulated within the political boundaries of the state, control such

281 large and inaccessible territories that in reality they have a significant degree of autonomy.

Though neither can be said to have conceded rank, both are attempting to mobi lize themselves in absolute terms and relative to other groups, and within the context of

Baluchistan each is taking a different route to do so. Though neither route is entirely exclusive of the other, Baluch have followed a predominantly political one, while Push tun have followed an economic one.

Crans examines the implications of the two routes and argues that, in general, the political approach to mobilization engenders greater solidarity than does the economic one which tends to result in individual, not group success (Crans 1965:129).

He goes on to qualify and elaborate these conclusions by observing that the degree of economic stratification within society will influence whether or not political mobilization will promote solidarity since political competition between interest groups or classes too can be divisive (Crans 1971:99-100). He also observes that t~e state can enJer the picture in ways that either decrease the solidarity of groups by u,ndermining their in digenous institutions or pressuring them to adopt the symbols of the nation, or in crease it by creating institutions or offices open to them as members of the group

(Crans 1971 :149).

The Pushtun on an Economic Route The evidence of Pushtun economic success is widely evident in Baluchistan. The Push tun areas of the province, all of which were directly controlled by the British, saw the most development during the colonial era (Ali and Hussain 1986:65). Following bloody riots in Quetta and other towns in the Pushtun areas of Baluchistan at the time of Parti tion most of the Hindus and Sikhs left the area for India (Holland 1958:226-7). Hindus and Sikhs had controlled most of the wholesale and retail trade of Baluchistan, and

282 with their departure Pushtun merchants8 moved in to fin the vacuum. The position of

Pushtun merchants in the city was further strengthened in the late 1960s and early

1970s when Baluch and Pushtun were sharply critical of the central government and the Punjab, and the political climate caused some Punjabi merchants to leave. Push tun have also been successful in contracting, construction, and the professions, the

Baluch less so. Because their lands are in cooler areas where water for irrigation has been available, Pushtun in Baluchistan have been very successful in developing lucra tive orchard crops, most notably apples. Some Baluch farmers too have developed such crops, but to a lesser extent.

Pushtun economic success Is not limited to the Pushtun areas of Baluchistan or the NWFP. Their strategic location along the international border and along the most important trading routes to India, as well as their historic ties to various regimes and regions in northern India have provided networks, traditions, skills, and access to economic niches throughout the subcontinent. 9 Hughes describes a thriving colony of

Pushtun traders known as the Bibis established in Kalat in the 19th century (Hughes

19n:30-1).

You will find Pathans all over Pakistan and India. They man coastal vessels between obscure Indian Ocean ports, they serve as police officers in East Bengal, household servants in Bombay and New Delhi, customs"agents on the Malabar Coast, gun-run ners In Kashmir, and bank guards in Beoares. {Spain 1962:221 Money-lending is another activity Pushtun have a reputation for and so is transportation. Pushtun control most of the bus transport in Karachi for example. Several Push tun transporters who answered my survey said they earned the money to purchase their vehicles through such activities as lending money, or selling cloth or tobacco In other parts of Pakistan. Pushtun are also well-represented in Pakistan's bureaucra~ and military (Amin 1988:187).

283 Politically the Pushtun have been less successful if success is gauged in terms of unity and self-determination. The international border between what is now Afghanis tan and Pakistan was Imposed following the second Anglo-Afghan war and many Push tun still feel it has unnaturally divided and weakened them. During the colonial period a powerful Pushtun ethnic-nationalist movement in the NWFP, the Khudai Khidmatgar, was allied with the Indian National Congress in calling for Indian independence. When independence was to take the form of Partition the Khudai Khidmatgar shifted to demand an autonomous state for the Pushtun, but it lost out to the upsurge of religious sentiment created by the Muslim League and its call for the creation of Pakistan (Ritten berg 1988:239-56). These two political tendencies were also present among the Push tun of Baluchistan. The split between those who emphasize Pushtun ethnic-nationalism and closer ties to Afghanistan, and those who. emphasize Islam and allegiance to Pakistan has persisted among the Pushtun. In addition, among the ethnic nationalists serious rifts have developed between the Pushtun of Baluchistan and those of the NWFP.

Within Pakistan the Pushtun population is divided between a number of ad ministrative units. Not only are they divided between the two provinces of Baluchistan and the NWFP, but some tribes live in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or

Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). In the provinces Pakistan civil and criminal law prevails, while in FATA and PATA tribal and customary law holds sway (see

Ahmed and Titus forthcoming). In Baluchistan ethnic-nationalist sentiment has not been as strong among Pushtun as it has been among Baluch which Is evident from the fact that the Jamiat 'Ulema-6-lslam (JUI) has consistently won most seats in the elec toral contests in Pushtun districts. Pushtun ethnic-nationalist politicians such as Wali

Khan of the NWFP and Samad Khan of Baluchistan have had some success but it is

284 much more limited than that of their Baruch counterparts who also have standing as powerful tribal leaders.

Baluch on a Political Route By contrast Baluch have been more successful mobilizing politically than they have economically. With a majority of the province's population, and thus of the seats _Inthe provincial assembly, Baluch politicians have monopolized what little open political life the center has permitted in Baluchistan. Except for the darkest days of Zia's marital law when military figures were appointed and one short-term exception during the Bhutto era, 1°over the past two decades either the Governor or the Chief Minister of Baluchis tan has been Baluch. Batuch political success is not simply a matter of numbers, how ever. The Institution of the powerful sardar in Baluch tribes has created a tendency for powerful and dynamic leaders to emerge at the ethnic-national level as well. No Push tun tribal figures can claim the respect or following of the Baluch tribal/political leaders such as Marri, Mengal, or even Bugti. While the following of these men is strongest among their tribesmen, It extends beyond to all Baluch.

Another factor In Baluch political success is the squeaky wheel effect. Their armed insurrection against the government, the ultimate political act, has gained the

Baluch a certain amount of respect as well as attention. As the PPP government did during the conflict of the 1970s, in the 1980s the martial law government proposed a number of development projects for Baluchistan and wooed the province's tribal elite

(Harrison 1981 :169; Amin 1988:176-7, 203; Ali and Hussain 1986:66). The province received further attention and aid from the international community as a result of the civil war in Afghanistan in large part because Pakistan and other governments feared the prospect of It igniting another uprising among Baluch. While certainly not all of this aid was directed toward Baluch areas (much of it was in fact spent In Pushtun areas

285 where most of the refugees are concentrated), and while many Baluch consider that which has been spent inadequate to fundamentally change the living conditions of the majority, Increasing numbers of schools, tube wells and other facilities, as well as such major development projects as the Bela-to-Turbat road are being developed in Baluch areas.

To meet the demands of Baluch and Baluchistani Pushtun for better repre sentation, the central government has taken members of both groups into the upper levels of political power in Pakistan. Individuals from both communities have been ap pointed to head ministries in the central government. More Baluch have received such appointments however, and seem to have been better able to capitalize on them.

Despite, for example, the fact that Pushtun hold the majority of seats on Quetta's city council. it elected a Baluch mayor following municipal elections in 1987. Many local observers felt that the Influence of Baluch politicians In Islamabad was Instrumental In the outcome.

The extent of Baluch political success or unity should not be exaggerated. As among the Pushtun there have constantly been differences among those who sought to cooperate closely with the government and those who sought greater autonomy (the ethnic-nationalists). Baluch popular sentiment was largely aligned with the nationalists

·1nthe 1960s and 70s_though even then the NAP had to form an alliance with Pushtun of the JUI to organize a workable majority in the Provincial Assembly. Within the

Baiuch nationalist camp the leaders were all strong personalities with independent tribal constituencies and so differences among them have at times developed into serious and destructive rifts. In many ways the outcome of the guerrifla war was a sig nificant political setback for Baluch ethnic nationalists since it was militarily contained, and the subsequent disillusionment and splits in the leadership have created greater

286 disunity. Also the region's Increasing incorporation into the state, the funnellng of

development funds Into the area, and the limited development that has taken place

there have created the economic differentiation that Crans suggests Is destructlve'of

the solidarity political moblUzation can create. Nevertheless, the pariod of the NAP

unity has created an Ideal, a vision of all Baluch united under strong, legitimate leaders,

which many still long to recreate.

Stereotypes and Moblllzatlon I have suggested that Baluch are on a political route to mobilization and Pushtun are

on an economic one, and further evidence of this Is the stereotypes each group holds

of the other. In utilizing stereotypes as data It is necessary to be cautious and recog

nize that behind them lie 1) a certain amount of arbitrariness, 2) the fallacy that the

presence of a stereotyped trait In some Individual Implies that the entire group shares

the trait and/or the fallacy that the presence of a trait among some segment of a group

Implies that any particular member of the group has it, and 3) the Ideological expres-

, sion and Justification of relations of inequality (Ueberson 1985:128-31; WIiiiams

1989:431 ). Nevertheless, because they can reflect power differentials, and the status

and position of groups within society, it follows that stereotypes are not entirely random

In their content. Stereotypes about Blacks and Jews in the United States can be equal

ly demeaning, limiting, and inaccurate but they will not be identical. While they do not

reflect the Inherent qualities of the group's members, they will reflect the history, social

position, and avenue of mobilization of each group as perceived by the dominant

group.

Among the stereotypes they hold of one another, both Baluch and Pushtun In

Quetta identify Pushtun as economically successful, and the Baluch as having strong

tribal values, though each group interpreted those 'objective' traits differently. A num-

287 ber of studies have shown that the denotative or. core traits that make up stereotypes

are most widely shared (even by members of the group against whom the stereotype is

directed) and persistent, whereas their connotations, i.e., the value placed on those

traits, vary through time and between individuals (Cauthern et al. 1971:110, 119). Thus

several Pushtun informants asserted that their group's economic success is due to

hard work, an aptitude for education, and their lack of regard for (presumably

'backward') tribal Institutions. On the other hand their economic success was inter

preted by Baluch as a sign of greediness and a lack of honor. For example, one

Baluch informant said most Pushtun would kill their own brother for money, an assess·

ment which combines greed with a want of tribal values. Similarly several Pushtun

depicted the lack of Baluc:tl economic success as caused by their laziness. By con

trast, In their evaluation of themselves, Baluch often emphasized the high value they

place on honor. For example Baluch informants frequently asserted that no Baluch

woman would ever dishonor herself by working as a prostitute, even If She were des

titute. While some Baluch are highly critical of the power of the sardars, many or most

Baiuch view loyalty to the sardar as an expression of tribal values and therefore

. honorable, while Pushtun informants described It as a symptom of their backwardness

and subservience. This is not to say that Pushtun do not value honor, nor Baluc:tl

economic success; It Is a matter or priorities and emphasis.

These stereotypes are reminiscent of ones the British held for both groups. As

told to me by the son of a Baluch sardar, the colonial formula for ruling the 'races' of

the area was "Lead the Punjabis, intimidate the Sindhis, buy the Pushtun, and honor

the Baluch. (For a different version of this maxim see Duncan 1987:16). The

stereotypes of the Pushtun are reminiscent of those of other economically successful

288 groups, especially Jews In Europe. In his book an American consular official evoked an Image of the Pushtun money-lenderwhich conjures up the worst of those.

For a hundred years there has been scarcely a village in all the subcontinent tliat did not know the Pathan money-lender,with his bag of coins, his long knife, his wicked smile, and his interest rates ranging upwards from fifty per cent a month" [Spain 1962:22-3). Pushtun are, in fact, often depicted as having genealogical links to the tribes of Israel, not least by Pushtun historians. The linkage Is purportedly through Afghana, a grandson of Saul (Talut) brought up by David (Daud). Caroe contends the source of these traditions is probably a Pushtun courtier of the Mughal Emperor Jahangir (Caroe

1986:4-5; Neamatullah1976:23).

In Islamictribes honor for males is bound up with, among other Ideals, political control through hospitality, the control and appropriate use of force, control of one's women, as wen as maintaininga distance from mundane economic pursuits (Ahmed 1980:94,261-4; Dresch 1989:39,120; Gavrlelides1987:160; C. Pastner 1988:251).

Since they emerge from the tribal context, ideals of honor reflect tribal values and ~ , · ._.• stltutions that are seen as more pure than'those the educated or urbanized must ae>",/ cept (J. Anderson 1983). The Baluch sardars representa bridge between the wot1dot. the tribe and that of the city, the market, and the state. Baluch sardars represent and : , . symbolize the tribe, the sardar's standing Is part of Its honor (Ahmed 1987:38;see also · •.•·'!:.;:·~·· ' .• _~;·It~'; . 4-.>.,,.;',.•; C. Pastner 1988:249-50). While a minority of the urbanized have totally rejected tribal ;_ · ,;; , ·, '-~-./,:;$.~. values for more cosmopolitan ideologies such as fundamentalist Islam or Marxism, ,\, ·J-';i:i'?': . '}?fk"'~ . most Baluch who consider sardars creations of the British and puppets of Islamabad,a · y. <;,. - \ . -'~V.~1-?: common opinion of the educated, neverthelessalign themselveswith those sardat8 . ";,::,.,;.;;,' . .. ,, ·.. ·'" •,;-..,. '.·t:·,.· who lead and represent the ethnic-nationalistparties. Though they undoubtedly act In. ·(·' ·.•;;.·. ' . .~,-t; ....~ large part to serve their own interests,those sardars are also able to expr~ the'.,'...... !~'!-\'il(f '~,.,..'.::~~),· \';l,. demands of Baluch against the various forces assailingthem In a way which also e,n.:·" ';

289 phasizes the strengths and cultural Identity of the Baluch . .The perpetuation of honor

as a positive and central value among urbanized Baluch indicates, if not a greater

reliance on tribal ties or Institutions than Pushtun, at least that the source of Baluch

strength is their mobilization behind politic111figures who attain their standing Initially

from the tribal sphere and retain strong links to it.

Baluch and Pushtun are not organized, conscious corporate groups, i.e., they

"do not have any effective reality as collective social actors" (Geertz 1979:145), but are

instead identities within which and through which people mobilize themselves in

dividually and in groups. Nevertheless the aggregate effect of those mobilizations can

be discerned. Mobilization often takes place relative to what Is perceived as the collec

tive existence or successes of other ethnic groups. Effectively Baluch (not 'the Baluch')

tend to exert more control over the politics of Baluchistan, and Pushtun over more of its

economy, so a sort of balance of power exists in the province. There are, of course,

. wealthy Baluch and politically powerful Pushtun, and there is a degree of overlap and

interpenetration of what are not entirely separate spheres of life.

A number of examples Illustrate this. A Baluch ltehad member complained after

the riots of August, 1988 that while Baluch control the highest political offices of the

provincial government, at the intermediate level of the administration, I.e., the point at

Which people's lives are directly affected by deputy commissioners and deputy superin

tendents of police, Pushtun (and Punjabis) predominate. Although such claims are cons.

tradicted by the government's own figures which show Baluch and Pushtun equally

represented in those grades, they are wldespre~d. 11 On the other hand, control of the

political process often translates into access to economic resources in Pakistan. After

Zia dismissed the national and provincial governments in the spring of 1988, they were

placed in the control of caretaker ministers who were in power when elections were

290 held later in the year. The caretaker Chief Minister of Baluchistan was Baluch and from a district near Sindh. It was said {by members of the administration as well as the public) during the elections that he was diverting flood-relief and dev·e1opmentfunds to his district In order to bolster his chances for election.

Territoriality and Routes to Moblllzatlon What appears as a balance between Baluch and Pushtun can not be thought of as equilibrium. Many Pushtun feel that their economic success in Baluchistan warrants more political power, and Baluch that their political strength should lead to economic development. As Bloch has written, •a society, like a mind is woven of perpetual Inter· action• (quoted In Dresch 1989:320), and in that interaction people constanUy extend the limits of what Is possible, or attempt to. In the attempts of Baluch and Pushtun to extend themselves, the opportunities created by each group's route to mobilization In· fluences the degree and nature of their access to the territory of the other.

Tribal political practices, productive relations, and cultural values all contribute to the social construction and utilization of space. Unlike In states whe,- Impersonal market forces or bureaucratic hierarchies determine the social use of space, In the tribal setting households and lineages do so at the community level (Sack 1986:57;

Pehrson 1966:72, 75). Socially defined space in turn influences social relations be tween people within tribes. These can differ between tribes and this becomes par ticularly evident in situations of cultural contact when competition over land and the

Identity of people sharpens. Differing social structures and social structuring of space by Baluch and Pushtun tribes gave them differential access to territory.

Tribal territoriality has brought about an ethnic definition of space In Baluchistan.

The distribution of population in the province is such that there Is a cultural boundary

(which runs through Quella as discussed above, Chapter Three) to the nortn of which

291 are the Pushtun and to the south of which are the Baluch. This Is to say that In the mountainous areas {if not on the Kachhl Plains where the situation Is more complex)

Baluchl- and Brahui-speaklng villages are not interspersed with Pushtu-speaking ones.

As mentioned above, Leach argues for such intermingling In highland Burma (Leach

1967:46-8). This Is not to say that there Is an unambiguous dividing line or that there are no Pushtun living In Baluch territory (see Barth 1961a}. Rather, there are few If any concentrations or settlements of Baluch In Pushtun territory or vice versa. 12 This notion might be disproved by a systematic census but it is probably accurate, and It fits the perceptions of many Baluchlstanls I Interviewed who see territory as ethnic.

Spatial relations between Pushtun and Baluch have changed since the creation of Pakistan, most especially In the past two decades. The ethnic division of territory Is a function of tribal and proto-state relations, and it was frozen by the British when they established their indirect rule over the area. The ethnic boundary has remain largely In place despite Baluchistan's (partial) encapsulation and penetration by the state and

'' f> capitalist. relations. In the changed circumstances, however, the economic mobllfzatlon of Pushtun is giving them access to Baluch territory! and not vice versa. The old Baluch expansion In Pushtun areas was tribal, gradual, and entailed shifting the cuitural}llnguls tic boundary northward. In contrast, Pushtun expansion takes advantage of the social and infrastructural changes In the province. It involves individual entrepreneurs operat ing within territories considered Baluch and it has been rapid. It takes the form of Push tun contractors building roads In Baluch territory, Pushtun merchants operating stores

in Baluch villages, and even Pushtun farmers purchasing irrigated lands in Baluch

areas.

It is this encroachment which underlay the te,nsions that lead to the riots at

Quetta's bus stand, and the transport Industry is the best place to view the conver-

292 \ .•.:.r.fi~·~ gence of economics and territoriality. As my study of bus transporters shows, In most - ,.. , ,·

cases Pushtun operate the buses in their area and Baluch in theirs. The exceptions to · :·-{~fJ·.~ ,,.. . this rule are important because with one partial exception the Baluch were not operat- '. . ,"' Ing In Pushtun territory, but Pushtun were operating in Baluch areas. Most slgn~:rf ;ttrrtr Pushtun operate half or more of the buses on the economically most Important route;·:::;_-,,,{if:"' ·

that from Quetta to Karachi, a city with a very large Pushtun population. ·.; ." ~} -:--;.... :, In addition the survey shows that on average Baluch transporters have been run- -~'::'~rI ."•r• • f,-..•"''.· _.''nlng their b~ses longer than Pushtun transporters. The average for all Baluch bus • }ol;:_ ..~£:(;' --~... : owners was 13 and a half years and for the Pushtun five years. On the Ouetta-to-•:<, r: ' • ,· ·".f ···'>:"~ .. Karachi route Baluch transporters had been running their buses for an average of~ '-·.· ..;. .-::a.·, years, Pushtun transporters for only four years. To operate a bus on any route a.,,.,; .·,u.~~· transporter must obtain a permit from the provincial government. On most routes .·.. :,: '~ permits have long since been Issued and so to enter the transport game one must,b ·,·"· .·· the permit of someone who Is already in it. Several Pushtun transporters bragged that ·J.· ·. they are buying out the Baluch and taking over their routes. By contrast Pu~n ie•3{f;f· > ,· ·;. ~.:~~--,··~:,_. lance to Baluch transporters operating on the routes in their territory was a contributing · , [f ::i:~~

l ·' • factor In the first transport riots.

Space and Refugees Another element in the territorial advance of Pushtun has been the Influx of Afghan

refugees as a result of the civil war in Afghanistan. Nearly a million refugees, most of

whom are Pushtun, are now living in Baluchistan. A number of large refugee camps

are located in or near Baluch territory (most notably Panjpai near Noshki and Girdl

Jungle near Chaghi) and the sheer presence of such large numbers of people In such

a marginal environment has had a devastating Impact. The magnitude of their

presence can be Judged by the fact that with a population of 100,000 the Surkhab

293 refugee camp near Pishin Is the second largest city in Baluchistan. There are few restrictions on the movement of the refugees within Pakistan. As described in Chapter

Four, after leaving the camps Afghan refugees are moving into formerly Baluch neigh borhoods in Ouetta and others are setting up squatter colonies aro~nd the city. The government is also settling refugees in smaller numbers throughout the province, and others are simply setting out on their own to leave the border areas.

In some ways the refugees have reinforced the existing tendency of Pushtun economic mobilization since, as non-citizens, they can not participate In politics. This is not to say that they are a politically neutral force. Many have access to we·ai:><>nsand some give support to local religious parties such as the JUI and the Islamic Youth

Force in non-electoral and electoral politics. Their main impact has nevertheless been economic. In the camps the refugees are subsidized by the Pakistan government and the international community through rations, medical treatment, and training. The camps, though, are like any town or city, and the econ9mics of supplying them is a major source of Income. Pakistani Pushtun and Baiuch can participate In that trade though most of it seems to be in the hands of the refugees themselves. For example refugees can not legally purchase the route permits which allow men to operate buses and trucks on .Baluchistan's roads, but they are allowed to operate if they are servicing the camps. In Ouetta the refugees have proven to be very adaptable, working for wages lower than Pakistanis are willing to and leasing shops from local residents in order to operate businesses which service not only the refugee community but Pakis tanis and foreigners as well.

Attitudes toward the refugees in Baluchistan is mixed. The people of Ouetta (and

Pakistanis In general) have had a great deal of sympathy for and patience with them.

Giving succor to those who have left their homes for the sake of Islam Is an Important

294 tradition dating back to the Prophet's flight from Mecca to Medina. There Is opposition too, however. Baluch and Pushtun ethnic-nationalists are ideologically aligned with the government In Kabul and so they look unsympathetically upon the refugees whom !hey call deserters (bhagOrA).In an Informal survey often Baluch shop owners along Sarlab

Road I found an equal number of positive and negative attitudes toward the refugees.

The positive responses were nearly always in terms such as "They are mostly poor people like us who are just trying to make a living•. Somewhat surprisingly the negative attltudes were not putin economic terms even when I hinted at It. People expressed anti-refugee sentiments because of what they perceived as the greater Instability In their lives, most commonly Illustrated by the spread of kalishnikovs (machlne guns) and heroin.

Social Space Pushtun economic success has given them access to physical space but the spatial metaphor can also be extended to social space. A job in Baluchistan's bureaucracy, or attendance In the .local university, medical school, or law college have a spatial dimen sion. They are 'positions', 'openings', 'seats', or 'reserved places' which one 'flUs',

'gains entrance to', or 'occupies'. This social space Is also perceived In ethnic terms.

Most Baluchistanls. have the notion that places should be filled In a way which reflects the ethnic makeup ofthe province, and that quotas are an appropriate means for doing

so. Quotas reflect actual, not only abstract spatiality, since they are not literally alto-

cated on an ethnic basis, but on a territorial one. Seats are reserved for districts (and

for rural vs urban areas) which are ethnically defined. Access to the Institutions of the

state is a contest for social space which the state Itself mediates.

In this sphere Baluch advantages In terms of population, and by extension, politl-

cal power should translate Into greater access to this social space. Though no figures

295 are available on the ethnic makeup of the student body in higher education In Baluchis tan, Baluch do hold the largest share of the positions in the provincial administration.

Political power too can lead to the ability to define space. For example, as discussed above, despite the larger Pushtun population of Quella, a Baluch politician became the city's mayor in 1988. In an attempt to secure future political advantage the mayor at tempted to Incorporate several Baluch villages to the south of the city within Its limits while leaving several Pushtun villages with their unincorporated status. The move was at least temporarily blocked by Pµshtun councilmen who challenged its legality in court.

Conclusion Along with previous ones, this chapter has shown some of the dynamics giving In- creased salience to ethnic identities in Quella and Baluchistan, and It has shown some of the ways ethnic mobilization Is taking place there. As argued less directly In the chapters on the state and bus transportation, the assertion of ethnicity is Intimately bound up with access to and control of space, which I am defining here as land and positions within institutions of social authority. In earlier periods competition over space and the assertion of Baluch and Pushtun identities occurred mainly In local set tings through small-scale, tribal Institutions. In the context of the nation-state factors that link the region to external ones (e.g., markets, roads, bureaucracies, elected as semblies) shape the expression of ethnicity and the efforts to control space.

It ts not enough to say, however, that ethnic-nationalism is a likely response to in corporation within an aspiring nation-state or a developing capitalist economic system, for the specific Institutions, practices, and values of different tribal societies (even ones as similar as Baluch and Pushtun) can generate varying responses to those conditions.

The past and the ancestors led to the present, and they, along with the values, per-

296 sonalities, and habits generated by a particular tribal structure, have considerable In· fluence on the way tribesmen act as citizens, nationalists, and Muslims.

297 NOTES 1) It is debated whether the Khalji were Afghans or Turks. Caroe holds that the Khalji are related to the group of Pushtun known today as Ghalji or Ghilzai (Caroe 1966:61-2, 130; see also Frazer-Tytler 1967:52-4).

2) Barth notes that sardars are present among the southern Pushtun tribes but they lack the authority of their Baluch counterparts. Authority in southem Pushtun tribes too is held by the Jirga (Barth 1961c:96).

3) ·~ appears to be a semi-formal title in Pushtun tribes. This is indicated by the fact that In addition to being a title one earns or Inherits within the tribal context it is also a title given by the government to those they want to placate or Influence (see Ahmed 1976; 1963).

4) The correspondence between land and lineage may not always be as strong·as· . Barth contends. Anderson notes that among the Ghilzai Pushtun land Is distinct from particular lineages but the strain toward egalitarian status Inherent within land ownership Is apparent from his comments. ·

Particular segments may decline and merge with adjacent ones, or grow and dMde, simply by refocusing on another ancestor, for Imm are not at any level corporate with respect to land tenure. Real property is owned by individuals, inheriting from former proprietors, each constituting with its own household an Independent economic unit separately endowed with the same types of resources as any other (J. Anderson 1963:130-1, see also 137).

5) Compare this aspect of Pushtun social life with that of tribes In Yemen Dresch describes:

The boundary of the peace works a complete reversal of what is appropriate toward others ••.. Outside my peace you are potentially my rival and your honour Is opposed to mine, while Inside my peace your honour and mine coincide In that mine now depends upon my care for yours. (Dresch 1989:62)

It is Important to note that a tribesman may enter another's peace without demeaning himself. The asymmetry of the relation Is possible because It is not given but contracted and temporary. The protected person has a place of his ownand one day the man now gMng protection may be In it. A man who has no place of his own (a person born 'weak', or a subject share-cropper) is demeaned by always being under another's protection, and where a relation Is In other terms asymmetric but honour needs to be maintained (as, for instonce, where a powerful man has tribesmen attached to his household), the position is defined with due care: a shakyh's close adherents are his .lsb.lmmb.'companlons1 [sic] (ibid:64}.

6) It should be noted that Barth's conception of Pushtun society derives primarily from his fieldwork in Swat, a setting far north of the region under discussion here and one which Ahmed has shown differs considerably from It. Ahmed discerns two types of Pushtun society, that of the mountains which he considers to be less stratified and char

298 acterlzed by the principle Of OQ {honor), and that Of the more densely populated and fertile plains where stratification is caste-like In its elaboration and the principle Of Qallmg (taxes) prevails (Ahmed 1983:116-23; 1976:80-3). In the latter Pushtun con stitute the caste or class Of landowners, and because land is the basis of the economy, all others are their subordinate clients. In oaog areas such as the Baluch/Pushtun boundary area there may be less economic incentive to prevent outsiders from having access to land and therefore tribal membership. Despite this, Barth's main point Is valid, and as Ahmed has shown, the elite status of Pushtun tribes is not simply a matter of economics, but of political and military power, both of which extend from and are legitimized by genealogy and seniority (Ahmed 1980: 131-3, 262-4).

7) A vivid description of the emphasis on individuality in the Pushtun code of conduct, Pushtunwali, is given by Ahmed:

The democracy the Code implies Is in a sense real, no Pushtun Is master of another. He Is not bounden by tedious dally ritual or commensal rules that can defile him. He ,· . Interprets for action the fundamental requirements of the Code and the larger ones of Islam, often reduced to formal prayers, and apart from these ls largely free to organize . his life for himself. For instance, there is little societal shame attached to a smuggler, •.. · murderer or drug addict as there would be in any village society on the subcontinent. · · If he smuggles that is llii business, he recognizes no formal borders in his lands, they were neither made nor accepted by him; if he kills that is part of llli Code; If he takes opium that is llli weakness. Society may not approve but it will not act against him, as long as he does not violate the Code. [Ahmed 1980:96)

8) Along with Punjabi ones as described in Chapter Four. .·.:;·;,·.:(~,:~·:.\ 9) Nina Swidler has suggested In a personal communication that the reason Pushtun_.~-~;,i~;;t; have developed these far-flung economic networks may be the tendency for tribal ; · ·:.~':'\ Jocieties that are agriculturally-based like the Pushtun to produce excess population·~,+ 5¢'i'( · and thus out-migrants. · · ;,~;;::.;).

10) Bhutto appointed the sardar of the Barozal tribe, a Pushtun tribe of the Slbl area, ...., 1 • :. • • ,,. chief minister of Baluchistan, and he held that seat for around a year (1976-77). . ,, . · · · C 11) The Provincial Govemment's 1987 study (discussed In more detail In Chapter Fo . showed that of the 3,017 Provincial government employees In Grades 17, 18 and 19, · "':" 928 (or 30 percent) of them were Baluch and 776 (or 25 percent) were Pushtun. Rela-: live to Baluch, Pushtun do have a slight advantage in the upper two of these grades · {54 to 38 in Grade 19 and 130 to 123 in Grade 18).

12) There are one or two minor exceptions. Barth describes a small tribe of Pushtun living in Marri territory (Barth 1981c:101). t~'. »;-

299 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Toe answer to the question I have posed for the dissertation, I.e., whether more in·

elusive Identities are superseding tribalism among urban Baluch, is that tribalism retains importance in the lives of the Baluch of Quella both as a set of relationships

and Institutions, and as a model or Ideal of what social life should be. Other, more In· elusive identities or bases for social action are wearing at tribalism's prevalence, how·

ever, though they too are often perceived through tribal eyes, and manifested through tribal structures.

Toe persistence of tribes in Quella can be seen In such simple things as people's

names. Many nationalist activists advocate dropping tribal appellations and adopting

"Baluch" as a surname instead. But most people In the city continue to Identify themsel·

ves with their tribal names. Baluch in the city also say that they continue to be bound

by and act on such tribal obligations as uniting to defend members of one's tribe who

are in conflict, and by paying .biillt, contributions to meet the expenses of marriages, i. funerals, or other major events (see Janmahmad 1982:63-4). l I Baluch tribalism persists also through the continuing authority of sardars. While

sardars do not have an imposing presence in the lives of urban Baluch (one young

clerk at Baluchistan University told me for example that he had never even seen his sar·

dar) they can be and are called upon to perform what has long been one of their most

important functions, arbitrating disputes. Even in Quella where Pakistani civil law

prevails Baluch often avoid the police (nearly all of whom are Punjabi) and the courts

(which are seen as expensive, corrupt, and ineffectual), and call upon sardars to

resolve conflict aceording to tribal custom.

300 Sardars have also continued In the role which gained such Importance during the

colonial era, that of occupying the strategic position between an external government and tribes. Though at one point in the 1970s the government attempted to end its'Spe

clal relationship with the sardars and the subsidies it paid them, that relationship was

revived under the martial law government of General Zia (Ali and Hussain 1986:66). Be

cause the standing of the sardar derives not only from government patronage but from

his traditional legitimacy within the tribe, sardars will likely continue to be powerful,

especially in rural areas, even as the civil bureaucracy continues to expand Its

presence and elections at local, provincial, and national levels draw new people into

the government in Baluchistan.

Sardars too are adapting to changed circumstances and many are converting

their standing within tribes to electoral support, both as independents and as leaders

or candidates of political parties. Indeed, the degree of legitimacy the Baluch ethnlo

nationallst movement has achieved comes In part from the support some major sardars

have given It. By the same token a new type of political figure has emerged as the sar

dars associated with nationalist movement gain a following and status beyond the

boundaries of their tribes.

In Cuetta the Baluch population Is tribally heterogeneous and therefore no !Jingle

sardar can use his tribe as a base from which to become the dominant political figure

in the city. Leadership and authority among Baluch is instead divided among the sar

dars who live In or near the city and Baluch politicians and businessmen.

Middle-class activists in Cuetta hold an image of the Baluch which transcends

tribes, but they see that image through the lens of tribes. The members of the tribal

i1eW I interviewed claimed their purpose is to unify their tribe so that they can Improve

the welfare of all its members. Having done that they say they will strive for the unity of

301 all Baluch. Baluch unity is the stated goal of Baruch ltehad whose members see

divisions along tribal lines as a weakness of the Baluch. Though they criticize most sar dars for perpetuating these divisions and benefiting personally from them, they too see the nationalist sardars as their leaders. Sardars provide a model for the middle-class activists, for as they aspire to be seen as the leaders of Baluch they have attempted to take over the role of settling disputes and of intervening with the government

The social forces that result from Baluchistan's subsumption in the state of Pakis tan and that force Baluch to think and act beyond their tribes simultaneously pull them·

apart a.nd draw them together. The monetized economy of Pakistan reduces th& needs or opportunities for cohesive action among tribesmen. Economic pursuits in the Quet ta are a matter of Individual or family concern rather ttian the concern of Hneages. The lineage solidarity of one Baluch tribe In Quetta, the Lehr!, seems, however, to be one factor In the economic success.of Its members, though the causal arrows may run In the opposite direction. Economic and class differentiation among Baluch Increases as I Individuals succeed or fall In the market However the ethnic structure of the state in which certain ethnic groups (notably the Punjabis, and to a lesser extent Mohajirs and

Pushtun) are economically, politicaUy and militarily dominant creates pressures or In

centives for ethnic solidarity.

Similar to the situatlon·among nomadic tribes in Which herds are lndi\lldually

owned but grazing territory is a collective concern, in the city the effort to control social

space takes on an ethnic character. Even though livelihood is the responsibility of in

dividuals, quotas for jobs in the bureaucracy or for positions in the university and

professional schools, and the apportionment of seats In the provlnclal and natlonal as

semblies become the concern of the ethnic community. Baluchlstanis also perceive

physical space In ethnic terms, as revealed by the negative attitudes both Baluch and

302 Pushtun held about members of other ethnic groups operating buses on the roads

which traverse their lands.

Politically too forces which cause Baluch to look beyond tribes both u.nlte and •

divide them. I have suggested that the Baluch have found greater success through

political moblllzation than through economics. bne source of their political success Is

simply the distribution of population between provinces. Baluch numerical strength In

the province of Baluchistan provides them the opportunity to moblllze and rule as an

·"ethnic group. Another source of that success is the persisting strength of trlballsm with

Its emphasis on polltics and honor, and the fact that the hierarchical nature of Baluch

tribal society translates effectively Into party structure and discipline. Despite this,

recent election results show that what was once a strong ethnic nationalist movement

has become factlonallzed under the stress of Pakistani and International opposition to

Baluch mobilizatlon along the strain lines of tribe, religious affiliation, and short-term al·

liance strategies. In the context Of the capitalist state, ethnic mobilization competes

with tribal affiliation and other movements and Ideologies for the attention and pri'1"ary .": :-,

loyalties of Baluch.

Politically trlbeS are not so much being transcended as absorbed by ethnic-_

nationalism and other political movements. The ethnlc-natlonallst and the Pakistani

nationalist parties attempted to capitalize on ties of descent and tribal solidarity by at

tracting trlbal leaders to be their candidates in .the 1988 elections. WhHethis draws the

tribes into broader movements and processes, It also reinforces tribalism by making It

the medium of political life and sardars the pivotal figures between tribes and the

government. Having to compete for positions against one another and against can-

didates who run on non-tribal principles makes the nature of that relationship different ··.\, than when the basis of the sardars' authority was predominantly heredity, however.

303 The most notable group that does not seek the support of sardars Is not any secular movement, but politicized Islam. The candidates of the religious party which was successful in Baluchistan's elections were all lillJll.alls. Their victories reflect both the support among some Baluch for Islam, and diVlsions among_the·ethnic-nationalists since in each of the seats won by Islamic candidates the combined total of the secular candidates' votes was greater than that of the winner.

A leader of Baluch ltehad summed up his attitude toward tribes by saying that tribes are a source of identity (pajhach11n\,individuality (in!irAw).and land (mmin), whereas from Baluch ltehad and the leadership of the nationalist sardars come com munity or collective identity (iilimli). In this statement he equates community with eth· niclty, or nationality. Community is a compiex phenomena in states, however. From the village to the International arena ethnicity is a pervasive and inescapable fact of life, but people can emphasize or de-emphasize it In a number of ways. They can resist or accommodate, they can mobHize economically or politically, they can opt for more or less encompassing criteria for defining the group. These are not just choices but strategies given structural constraints. Even among the Baluch who Imagine that eth· nic-nationalism is the prime source of community, people differ on what that community

Is and how it should assert Itself. Some accept Pakistani nationality, others assert the community or identity of Islam, others that of class. Each of these Is in some sense a different type of 'ethnicity' with different cultural assumptions about where the com munity exists, who its enemies are, and what It must do to realize itself.

As people seek to fill the greatest social (and physical space) that is feasible for them, they generate the ideologies and attempt to create the social structures that would accomplish their aims. Given the differences in the interests and aspirations of people these ideologies will differ in their intention and scope. Some will look beyond

304 the immediately attainable to ideal or utopian goals (e.g., Greater Baluchistan, the

united .'.l.ullmilb.,true communism), others will advocate different ways to deal with imme

diate issues, and still others will be content to maintain the values and social structures

which have succeeded in the past {the lineage and the tribe). In Baluchistan those per

sisting, local or tribal identities undermine-grander attempts to mobilize, but those more

encompassing identities will in turn call into question the relevance and worth of

tribalism. in the midst of these tensions Baluch live their lives.

While tribalism may be becoming weaker it retains considerable strength, and eth

nic nationalism is not the only effective alternative to It. Both the persistence of

tribalism and the lack of a unified alternative may be temporary trends, however.

Defeats suffered by the Baluch nationalists in the 1970s, the subsequent repression by

the martial law government, and the civil war in Afghanistan which has been charac

terized by many as a lilW1,may have strengthened tribalism and politicized Islam at the

same time It weakened ethnic-nationalism. Future events in Pakistan and the Middle

East may alter these relationships, as no doubt will such internal developments in

Baluch society as the continuing spread of education and the growth of middle and

working classes.

305 ! I APPENDIX

Baluch Majority Seats In the Baluchistan F>rovlncialAssembly ™ Pac1)1ot Wiooec PB-4 Quetta IV JUI PB-5 Chagai UI PB-12 Loraiai Ill lndep. ~S) PB-18 Kohlu lndep. S) PB-19 Dera Bugti BNA (S PB-20 Jallarabad I WI (S) PB-21 Jallarabad II UI (S) PB-22 Jaffarabad/Tambo BNA PB-23 Tambo PPP PB-24 Kachhi I PNP PB-25 Kachhi II lndep.(S) PB-26 Kachhi Ill lndep. ($) PB-27 Kalat I lndep. (S) PB-28 Kalat II JUI PB-29 Kalat Ill JUI PB-30 Khuzdar I lndep. (S) PB-31 Khuzdar II BNA (S) PB-32 Khuzdar Ill UI PB-33 Kharan lndep. (S) PB-34 Las Bela I UI (S) PB-35 Las Bela II UI (?) PB.,36 Panjgur PPP PB-37 Turbat I BNA PB-38Turbat II BNA PB-39 Turbat Ill BNA PB-40 Gwadar PNP (S) Sardar or the close relative of a sardar. (?) Tribal status unknown.

Outcome of Selected Provincial Assembly Racea Quetta I Name party Abdul Kansi*(S) ANP 1,513 Aurangzeb Jogezai*(S) lndep. 1,357 A. Dotani* PMAI 4,544 Jamal Jogezai PPP 2,517 lnayataullah BNA 4,817 Gui Zaman UI 1,749 Maulvi Noor Muhammad UI 6,620 Naimattullah PNP 249 Others (19 candidates) 1,960 • - Pushtun ethnic-nationalist parties or candidates. (S) - Sardar or relative of sardar.

306 Quetta Ill

tilllmtl eadll Votes Parl Gui lndep. 867 MhmdZareen lndep'. 1,313 Haf12Mhmd JUI 1,393 Raja Nawaz PPP 2,540 Saead Hashmi UI 3,755 Shafique Ahmed lndep. 2,584 Fazl-ur-Rehman PNP 576 MhmdJamal 8NA 1,814 Mhmd Nawaz PMAI 336

Quetta IV Arbab Nawaz (S) UI 1,699 Amanullah ANP 2,873 Par! Gui (8) lndep. 2,043 ~dSadullah PPP 1,230 ul Hakim (8) PNP 1,837 lnayatullah JUI 6,748 MhmdYusaf PMAI 2,530 Var Mhmd (8) ' 8NA 2,993 Lashkarl Raisani (5)(8) lndep. 1,389 •.. Haji Bahadur Khan (5)(8) lndep, 1,166 i-,.. ,.,. Others (16 candidates) 1,955 (S) - Sardar or close relative of sardar. (8) - EthniCJl)y Baluch candidate,

Kalat II Shafi Mhmd PNP 35 Munir Ahmed 8NA 897 Arbab Mhmd Ali PPP 1,266 Prince Yaya Khan @ lndep, 1,345 Abdullah Jan (?) lndep. 3,626 Maulvi Mhmd Attaullah UI 5,179 Others (Four candidates) 1,558 @ - Khan of Kalat's brother. (?) - Tribal status unknown.

Kalat Ill

Maulvi Ghulam Mustafa JUI 2,662 Sarfaz Khan PNP 1,373 Noor Ahmad 8NA 1,143 Ahmad Khan (?) lndep, 2,405 Others (Five candidates) 988 (?) - Tribal status unknown

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