•4 f

SKAGIT PROJECT TIME LINE

1917 ScL receivea oermit -From US Deot= oi- Aqriculturs (US Forest Service) to build Skagit ..

191S Construction of low Gorge starts.

1919 Newhalem dam construction starts.

1 -7 Newhalem dam produces power.

1924 Gorge construction completed and power produced.

FPC issues license for (Skagit Project #553)

Work on Diablo Bam starts (world-'s tallest dam).

Power prcdiuced from Diablo Dam (world's largest ope rat i nq hydroelsctr'i c generator >

,937 Roes (Ruby) Dam work starts.

1942 International Joint Coimmission (Canada/US) approves project

Negotiations with Canada to allcw flooding of upper^ Skag i t by Ross Dam. (CAVNA J \o.r\ i94£ Reconstruction of Gorge Dam starts.

Ross Dam produces power. High Ross construction f1rst p reposed,

1953 High Go r g s Dam starts.

1954 Canada over long—term flooding: of Lipperl^Skaqit areas — no agreement reached so annual negotiations r e q u i r e d.

1957 NCCC founded.

1961 Gorge High Dam completed.

1967 City Light attempts to negotiate a compensation schedule with over flocding of the upper Skagit but does not receive forma1 agreement.

Form5J__C£iilsideration of raisinq Ross Dam ba-gi no-. Hfl- tiU WpoZc^=^E^n^^5Tl RfeAA3^ J JL '~\ NCCC begins formal ibpgosition. ^ "^o^eLO^ j

WCNJP V>J&^ i:)(3 WJUXAA^^^/^CL is^\t A^

North Cascades National Park and Nat i Q na1 Rec reat ion Area estab1i s bed i o F-!un Duu ka.q iti SDD11 erS (KQ3S) fcunded> ROSS and Province of BC opposition increases.

1970 &-2 vote of Seattle City Council authorizes SCL to file for aimend.Tisnt of original FPC license to allow construction of High Ross. 1973 SCL Draft Environmental Impact Statement released

1974 F' u b 1 i c hearings - Administrative Law Judge hear i ngs

1977 FPC approves 1icense amendment to allow High Ross,

Original FPC license r u ns out.

Province of BC makes offer to SCL to sell replacement electrical generating capacity.

SCL files application for new license for Skagit Project including High Ross

197i SCL files revised application for new license.

NCCC/RQSS and others file appeals in , D.C. District Court of Appeals.

1979 Agreement in concept on replacement power package.

FPC accepts SCL license application — NCCC and others intervene.

1980 Court of Aopeals denies NCCC and other's appeal.

NCCC "declares victory" and leaves the legal arena when deadline for final appeal to the US SuDreme Court e >; p i r e s.

FBRC permit for High Ross Dam becomes effective,

Province of BC appeals IJC 1942 decision.

1931 Interim Flow Agreement for fisheries signed.

19S2 IJC rejects BC appeal but places i-year moratorium on construction of High Ross.

IJC estabiishes a Joi nt Consultat ive Group to faci1itate negotiat 1ons in good faith among part ies. ± 9S3 Agreement signed between Province of- BU \t Hydro and SCL).

1984 Formal ratification of agreement by Canada/US Treaty. BC sells hydropowe r to SCL. High Ross not built. Agreement duration until year 2066.

S k a g i t E n v i r o n m e n t a1 Endowment Comm i e s i on established. NCCC Board Chairman Patrick D. Soldsworthy appoi nted^member of U.S. deleaation.

1988 FERC places SCL on timeline for completion of relicensing.

1991 Agreement among intervenors and SCL on mitigation package.

Based on The Wild Cascades, various issues; Paul C. Pitzer, Buildino the Skagit, The Galley Press, Portland, OR, 1978; John C Gibson, "The Evolution of the High Ross Dam Settlement", Ihe_Ngrthwest_. Enylrc « Vol. I, No. 2, 1985;; Seattle City Light, Offer of Settlement: Hydroeiectric Project FERC No. 553, April 1991; NCCC correspondence with Seattle City Light; and discussions with Tom Brucker, NCCC Board member and attorney, and Patrick D, Goldswcrthy, NCCC Chairman of the Board NCCC AND RELICENSING OF THE SKAGIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT k (FERC 4?D53) - ROUND II OT

This is the -First o-f a three oart series oF artiptes on the Skagit HydrceTectic F'rcject - Round II. R ,. you will recall, began with NCCC opposition to rais ss Dam and •Further flooding Big Beaver valley and the ian Skagit, Details of that heroic battle are in orev sues of The NiJ-d Ca_Bc§ds;B and will be recounted in Harvey Manni no's forthcoming bocik. In Round II we discLxss the resumpt i on of negotiations with Seattle City Light <^CL) and t he " so good — successful mitigatio„ n pack-ao,e worked out for rel icensind^ This first i nst al Imenty^ b^^d^& at the ^^"'d^ 1itigation in the late 1970s, documents the resolution of the High Ross issue and describes the study stage of the present relicensing. The second instalIment wi11 review issues in the negotiatiorfS and the deveopment of NCCC strategy for the settlement o r o c e s s. The third i nstallment will cover the settlement and its implementetion.

PART I

NCCC emerged from its legal battles with the Federal Energy Regulatory CDfrimission (FERC) declaring victory in 1980. However, the nature of this victory was odd. Ne lacked a court decision blocking High Ross. FERC decided that High Ross Dam could be built. The expenses of the fray were substantia1 even with the generous heIp of 1awyers Rick A r ambu r u and Tom Brucker and the tireless techn i caI work of Eiick Brooks and Ted Beck. How was this a victcr-y? Because without NCCC intervention. High Ross Dam would have been built. However, due to passage of time and NCCC hammering on the lack of merit for the proposal, political and environmental ooposition in the U.S. and especially in Canada, had elevated the issue to an internationai level and forced reevaluation of the High Ross ^ {\jOyL

A decline in the rats of increase in energy demand and the availabi1ity of lower cost alternatives to High Ross construction worked in favor of rethink:ing the SCL 3-^ proposals. These arguments were essentially those maintained by NCCC in its years of dogged resistence fr*- the Seattle City Council, FERC, and the U.S. Court of Appeals. NCCC s voice of reason had to wait to be heard unti1 it was echoed by the uti1ity, city, and other "independent" (read non-conservationist) economists and eng ineers who eventually crafted the settle.ment.

\m the beginning, the hasic NCCc position was the ollowino:

High Ross wou 1 d be an environijvAnta 1 disaster for y^Ross^ Lake National Recreation Area^^^aed^he upper Skagit in

d-04-CDu 2- There were o^^^^r, lower-co^j oations a^/ailable to Seattle City Liaht -For long—t'srTr~snergv' suooly than High Ross. ' ' ' ' " ^ 3. SCL energy deETiand projections were In-Flated and they overstated the need for High Ross. . Can3.da would receive the brunt o-F flooding fro raising the"^ SLag-^i-t but i*ae getting very little compensation for its sacriticBS. ^ U^zn^C while it was not intended that wav, NCCC intervention to block High Ross on its merits resulted in sufficient delay for Canadian objections to feed into a change of governments in British Columbia. The new government refused to allow flocdino of the Skagit but was willing to negotiate a solution in the form of power supoL

Anp1diec,,^ltsr native

In the early 19S0s, emphasis was on achie-ving agreefTient bet'ween SCL and EC Hydro to avoid having to build High Ross. Everyone forgot that the Skag it Project relicsnsi ng was st111 i noomplete. The only act ion taken to mit igate the impacts of the operations of the projects was an interim flow agreement (1931) that sought to provide better conditions for anadromous fish in the Skagit. While important, this measure did not go very far to compensate for the wi1dlife, recreational, cultural and aesthetic losses duetto the three dams and reservoirs and, transmission corridc^p-^ fetlfe^

A good example of the kind of environmental damage that was being imposed by the Skagit Project could be seen in the enormous fluctuation (90-^- feet) of Ross reservoir._ In the mid~19S0s NCCC tried to get SCL to improve conditions for recreational activities and visual quality in Ro-ss ^e??r- reeervoir. Under '"normal" operations, the reservoir level was usually low at the beginning of fishing season and by Labor Day the reservoir was si ready on its way down. NCCC requested that SCL bring the lake level up ear 1ier and keep it high through the end of summer.

NCCC >*ofei^be "informed" by SCL that there was not enough water in the system to accommodate recreational and aethet ic interests, but we always suspected thatCt^^y^i11ing the reservoir earlier meant the(t joverproduction of power during the wi nter and dropp i ng the reservoir i n the summ^r^ generated revenues from sale of power to California or other parts of the power grid. Fiscally, these SCL actions may have made sense but the real costs were to the environment and its other users, NCCC requests for evidence that alternat i ve reservoir operat Ion aqproaches were-H:nfeasibl e or too costly were met by SCL wTth excuses like* Jt costs too much to perform the ana1ysist we lack the cata to answer you r quest ion^y^jor, you would not underetand. (Mavbs we u n d e r e-1 o o d At i

Internat ional Treatv

In i9S4, Canada and the U.S. apDroved/A Treaty recognizing agreement between SCL and BC Hydro tf/ allow a. long term tranefer of electricity from Canada^i^in lieu of pavment by SCL of the eGu i Va 1 ent capital cost of cone-1ruct i ng increased qenerating capacity. More imoortantiy, the agreement eetabliehed an Environmental Endowment Fund of approximately five mi 11 ion dollare < plus annual contr ibut ions tled to power production) to be administered by a joint Canada/US Commission charged:

a> To ccnsorvo and orotoot i^/i 2 dornosE- and i'Ji Idl ifa habitat; b? To anhanco rocraational opaortuni t iOE in tho Skagit VaJIoy; c ) To acqu i ro c?i nor a 1 or t i /nbor r i ghts cons iot ont wi ± h conEorvation and rocroational aurpoEos; d) To conduct studios o-f need and foasibi I ity of projo-cts: o) To plan for and construct hiking trails, foot bridgos, intororotivo displays and tho like; f) To cBuso tho romoval of stumns and snags in Ross Lake and on the shorolino as doomod appropriate, and tho groo-oing and contouring of the shore! i ne, consi stent with t-ji 2 dl ifo habitat protoctions; and g? To connect, if feasible, hianning FrovinciaJ Park and the National Park by a trail systeo.

The Skagit Environmental Endowment Commission (SEEC) provided funding for a variety of projects in the Skagit basin. J;jCCC Board Chairman, Patrick D, Go3^d5WO,rijTv_was---—- p o f rrtel^ mem be r of i^X^^^d^Le^HXqru/^ Howev-er, this actiVity was not intended as mitip^ion for the imgacts of the Skagit Project. Since the e>i^7^ratian of the SCL license'for the Skagit Project in 1977, FERC had given SCL annual extensions. In 19S3, even FERC got tired of SCL delay and put the utility on notice that it must conduct a series of studies necessary to complete its application for relicensinq in a timely manner. This prompted the start of Round II in the Skagit relicensing saga.

C h a n g e o f C o n d i t i o n s

Round I of the relicensing can be characterized as a bitter fight over the High Ross Dafn proposed amendment. Formal interventions were filed with FERC by NCCC, Tribes, and state and federal resource management agencies. What was at issue? Fundamentally, it was the mitigation of impacts of wholesale conversion of a wild river to a tame one. At one t ime this was seen as an enormous advantage. Fifty years later, the cost to the environment and to society became obvious. If thi5_ is^jgot 1£.__SCL were_,pr,Qpqsina,,^,tg_^^^b the Skagit Project todayJ.

In the mere than 50 years that had passed since the Federal Power Commission (FPC) granted the original license, many changes had taken olace. The oassage c-F major environfTiental legislation set a vastly dir-ferent scene For licensing o-F hydroelectric projects than that of the i920s. In the 1920s the main issue was allocation of the sites among private and pu.bl ic ut 11 it iess want i ng to develop the hydroelectric potential and to a lesser extent to control floodiing. By the late 19SGs many more interests were identified and governmental regulation had adopted a much different ^ approach. The National Environmental Protection A c t'1969 meant that FERCs decision on relicensing must divulge the environmental impacts of the action and propose ways to mitigate t>rSm= In addition, other laws like the EndanqepexJ Species Aot^ IpJI, the National Historic Rreservation nqerj f 1966, Fish and Wildlife Coordination Acmt934, etc. woAfu^ o 'J now have to be incorporated in the FERC^decision. ux

Besides these national changes in legislation. Congress- established Ross Lake National Recreation Area (RLNRA) <196a) in recognition of the scenic splendor of the are-a. RLNRA is a giant chunk cut out of the heart of North Cascades National Park because SCL could prevail on Senator Jackson and other members of the Washington congressional r'5juLAx'^''^r"^^^^'^^^'^'^^ ^••'^"' ^^'^ park. The Washindton PAU-tv^ \s Wilderness Act C19SS) placed most of the terrestrial portions of RLNRA under statutory Wilderness. Still, the Skaqit prejectereservoirigy(were exc 1 udid. at the request of SCL, from Wilderness designation. Even outside the p-ark areas, the 1 mpc1ance of the Skagit for wildlife is widely r-scognized - Wild and Scenic River designation, Skagit River Bald Eagie Reserve, etc. The importance of the Skagit River for Tribal -fisheries and sports fisheries is incredible even in their currently diminished status.

Probably the most important change affectinq Round II of the reliceneinq occurred in the staffing and leadership of SCL. The increased environmental regulation that affected hydroelectic operations in the late 1960s and early 1970s and (^S^ SCL continual problem-s of compliance with them, prompted the creation of a new Environmental Aff-airs Department (EAD) in 1974. Its professional staff was charged with working within SCL to ensure compliance. Still a weak member in the power structure of SCL, EAD earned grudqinq acceptance for its expertise in guiding the utility throuqh the increasing Iy complex technical environmenta1 regulatory maze. EAD also garnered resoect from conservation organizations for its honest brokering of environmental issues. Change in tep level leadership at SCL had brought Randy Hardy to the suoerintendent's desk. Whether or not he agreed with it= he understood the change in conditions and recognized that Round I of the relicensing had been an exercise in -FrL:stration. He saw the Dotentia 1 benefits that could be had by considering a wider range of alternative solutions than those seen by the Power Buoply and Planning and Engineering Departments of SCL. He also was a fnanagen who relied on each of his Deoartments to do its job - including EAD. When the FERC order cams. Hardy aligned his staff and not only said go to work - but said to go to work with all parties who have an interest in the—r-ql icensinq and put together a mitigation package to whicih all agree on before submitting it to FERC. V. 'J

Proposal

When NCCC received the SCL corresnondencs invitixig our participation in the studies for the relicensiTig the first reaction was a iTiixture of "1 wonder what they ar-e'"up to now?" and "Why should we do their work for them?". After the initial meetings with EAD we started to change our tune. It appeared that SCL was serious in wanting to perform the studies on the issues that the interveners thought should be studied and that SCL wanted the studies performed at a standard that met intervenor demands, EAD was to be in charge of the studies and the later development of mitigation measures. After lengthy discussions with the NCCC legal advisors from Round I, NCCC agreed, in principle, to part ic ipats in the studies.

Gnce we agreed to participate our second rsactidn was, "What have we gotten ourselves into"? Remembering the extreme demaKds" orr^tTme/''aT)' organizational resources that the High Ross Round I re^rfensinq required, we were loathe to commit to endless series of meetings. As an organization of volunteers, who could represent us at all the meetings? NCCC was the only intervener which had no one employed to do this job. Wasn't our chief role that of the critic. It wasn't our job to forge the solution — we sheu.Id point the way. This could be done outside the process - we can review the documents and comment.

FERC required studies on the following subjects:

i , Recreat ional faci1 it ies and needs 2. Visual quality 3. Wildlife 4. Higratory fisheries 5. Res1 dent f isheries (i n reservei r) 6. Erosion and slope stability 7. Archeological and historic propert ies S. Rare, threatened or endangered soecies of flora and fauna 9 = C 11 Li r a 1 a n d t r a d i t i Q n a 1 p r Q p e r t i a s

It was abundaritly clear, that the wav the studies Gct per-For-rrsed and the way that NCCC and others carticipated would determine the outcome of important issues. SCL would be unlikely to protect NCCC interests. FERC would be unlikely to protect issues of importance to NCCC. There was no quest ion that we (NCCC) must participate. With that sett led - what was NCCC strategy? See the next issue c-F The Wild Cascades C A N A D A