4 SKAGIT PROJECT TIME LINE 1917 191S 1919 1 -7 1924 ,937 1942 I94
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•4 f SKAGIT PROJECT TIME LINE 1917 ScL receivea oermit -From US Deot= oi- Aqriculturs (US Forest Service) to build Skagit .dams. 191S Construction of low Gorge Dam starts. 1919 Newhalem dam construction starts. 1 -7 Newhalem dam produces power. 1924 Gorge construction completed and power produced. FPC issues license for Diablo Dam (Skagit Project #553) Work on Diablo Bam starts (world-'s tallest dam). Power prcdiuced from Diablo Dam (world's largest ope rat i nq hydroelsctr'i c generator > ,937 Roes (Ruby) Dam work starts. 1942 International Joint Coimmission (Canada/US) approves Ross Dam project Negotiations with Canada to allcw flooding of upper^ Skag i t by Ross Dam. (CAVNA J \o.r\ i94£ Reconstruction of Gorge Dam starts. Ross Dam produces power. High Ross construction f1rst p reposed, 1953 High Go r g s Dam starts. 1954 Canada over long—term flooding: of Lipperl^Skaqit areas — no agreement reached so annual negotiations r e q u i r e d. 1957 NCCC founded. 1961 Gorge High Dam completed. 1967 Seattle City Light attempts to negotiate a compensation schedule with British Columbia over flocding of the upper Skagit but does not receive forma1 agreement. Form5J__C£iilsideration of raisinq Ross Dam ba-gi no-. Hfl- tiU WpoZc^=^E^n^^5Tl R<hnTAjH>feAA3^ J JL '~\ NCCC begins formal ibpgosition. ^ "^o^eLO^ j WCNJP V>J&^ i:)(3 WJUXAA^^^/^CL is^\t A^ North Cascades National Park and Ross Lake Nat i Q na1 Rec reat ion Area estab1i s bed i o F-!un Duu ka.q iti SDD11 erS (KQ3S) fcunded> ROSS and Province of BC opposition increases. 1970 &-2 vote of Seattle City Council authorizes SCL to file for aimend.Tisnt of original FPC license to allow construction of High Ross. 1973 SCL Draft Environmental Impact Statement released 1974 F' u b 1 i c hearings - Administrative Law Judge hear i ngs 1977 FPC approves 1icense amendment to allow High Ross, Original FPC license r u ns out. Province of BC makes offer to SCL to sell replacement electrical generating capacity. SCL files application for new license for Skagit Project including High Ross 197i SCL files revised application for new license. NCCC/RQSS and others file appeals in Washington, D.C. District Court of Appeals. 1979 Agreement in concept on replacement power package. FPC accepts SCL license application — NCCC and others intervene. 1980 Court of Aopeals denies NCCC and other's appeal. NCCC "declares victory" and leaves the legal arena when deadline for final appeal to the US SuDreme Court e >; p i r e s. FBRC permit for High Ross Dam becomes effective, Province of BC appeals IJC 1942 decision. 1931 Interim Flow Agreement for fisheries signed. 19S2 IJC rejects BC appeal but places i-year moratorium on construction of High Ross. IJC estabiishes a Joi nt Consultat ive Group to faci1itate negotiat 1ons in good faith among part ies. ± 9S3 Agreement signed between Province of- BU \t Hydro and SCL). 1984 Formal ratification of agreement by Canada/US Treaty. BC sells hydropowe r to SCL. High Ross not built. Agreement duration until year 2066. S k a g i t E n v i r o n m e n t a1 Endowment Comm i e s i on established. NCCC Board Chairman Patrick D. Soldsworthy appoi nted^member of U.S. deleaation. 1988 FERC places SCL on timeline for completion of relicensing. 1991 Agreement among intervenors and SCL on mitigation package. Based on The Wild Cascades, various issues; Paul C. Pitzer, Buildino the Skagit, The Galley Press, Portland, OR, 1978; John C Gibson, "The Evolution of the High Ross Dam Settlement", Ihe_Ngrthwest_. Enylrc « Vol. I, No. 2, 1985;; Seattle City Light, Offer of Settlement: Skagit River Hydroeiectric Project FERC No. 553, April 1991; NCCC correspondence with Seattle City Light; and discussions with Tom Brucker, NCCC Board member and attorney, and Patrick D, Goldswcrthy, NCCC Chairman of the Board NCCC AND RELICENSING OF THE SKAGIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT k (FERC 4?D53) - ROUND II OT This is the -First o-f a three oart series oF artiptes on the Skagit HydrceTectic F'rcject - Round II. R ,. you will recall, began with NCCC opposition to rais ss Dam and •Further flooding Big Beaver valley and the ian Skagit, Details of that heroic battle are in orev sues of The NiJ-d Ca_Bc§ds;B and will be recounted in Harvey Manni no's forthcoming bocik. In Round II we discLxss the resumpt i on of negotiations with Seattle City Light <^CL) and t he " so good — successful mitigatio„ n pack-ao,e worked out for rel icensind^ This first i nst al Imenty^ b^^d^& at the ^^"'d^ 1itigation in the late 1970s, documents the resolution of the High Ross issue and describes the study stage of the present relicensing. The second instalIment wi11 review issues in the negotiatiorfS and the deveopment of NCCC strategy for the settlement o r o c e s s. The third i nstallment will cover the settlement and its implementetion. PART I NCCC emerged from its legal battles with the Federal Energy Regulatory CDfrimission (FERC) declaring victory in 1980. However, the nature of this victory was odd. Ne lacked a court decision blocking High Ross. FERC decided that High Ross Dam could be built. The expenses of the fray were substantia1 even with the generous heIp of 1awyers Rick A r ambu r u and Tom Brucker and the tireless techn i caI work of Eiick Brooks and Ted Beck. How was this a victcr-y? Because without NCCC intervention. High Ross Dam would have been built. However, due to passage of time and NCCC hammering on the lack of merit for the proposal, political and environmental ooposition in the U.S. and especially in Canada, had elevated the issue to an internationai level and forced reevaluation of the High Ross ^ {\jOyL<Jt'^ A decline in the rats of increase in energy demand and the availabi1ity of lower cost alternatives to High Ross construction worked in favor of rethink:ing the SCL 3-^ proposals. These arguments were essentially those maintained by NCCC in its years of dogged resistence fr*- the Seattle City Council, FERC, and the U.S. Court of Appeals. NCCC s voice of reason had to wait to be heard unti1 it was echoed by the uti1ity, city, and other "independent" (read non-conservationist) economists and eng ineers who eventually crafted the settle.ment. \m the beginning, the hasic NCCc position was the ollowino: High Ross wou 1 d be an environijvAnta 1 disaster for y^Ross^ Lake National Recreation Area^^^aed^he upper Skagit in d-04-CDu 2- There were o^^^^r, lower-co^j oations a^/ailable to Seattle City Liaht -For long—t'srTr~snergv' suooly than High Ross. ' ' ' ' " ^ 3. SCL energy deETiand projections were In-Flated and they overstated the need for High Ross. Can3.da would receive the brunt o-F flooding fro raising the"^ SLag-^i-t but i*ae getting very little compensation for its sacriticBS. ^ U^zn^C while it was not intended that wav, NCCC intervention to block High Ross on its merits resulted in sufficient delay for Canadian objections to feed into a change of governments in British Columbia. The new government refused to allow flocdino of the Skagit but was willing to negotiate a solution in the form of power supoL<Tp^.id for by Seattle City Light investement in hy'droelectfrio capacity in Canada. Anp1diec,,^ltsr native In the early 19S0s, emphasis was on achie-ving agreefTient bet'ween SCL and EC Hydro to avoid having to build High Ross. Everyone forgot that the Skag it Project relicsnsi ng was st111 i noomplete. The only act ion taken to mit igate the impacts of the operations of the projects was an interim flow agreement (1931) that sought to provide better conditions for anadromous fish in the Skagit. While important, this measure did not go very far to compensate for the wi1dlife, recreational, cultural and aesthetic losses duetto the three dams and reservoirs and, transmission corridc^p-^ fetlfe^ A good example of the kind of environmental damage that was being imposed by the Skagit Project could be seen in the enormous fluctuation (90-^- feet) of Ross reservoir._ In the mid~19S0s NCCC tried to get SCL to improve conditions for recreational activities and visual quality in Ro-ss ^e??r- reeervoir. Under '"normal" operations, the reservoir level was usually low at the beginning of fishing season and by Labor Day the reservoir was si ready on its way down. NCCC requested that SCL bring the lake level up ear 1ier and keep it high through the end of summer. NCCC >*ofei^be "informed" by SCL that there was not enough water in the system to accommodate recreational and aethet ic interests, but we always suspected thatCt^^y^i11ing the reservoir earlier meant the(t joverproduction of power during the wi nter and dropp i ng the reservoir i n the summ^r^ generated revenues from sale of power to California or other parts of the power grid. Fiscally, these SCL actions may have made sense but the real costs were to the environment and its other users, NCCC requests for evidence that alternat i ve reservoir operat Ion aqproaches were-H:nfeasibl e or too costly were met by SCL wTth excuses like* Jt costs too much to perform the ana1ysist we lack the cata to answer you r quest ion^y^jor, you would not underetand. (Mavbs we u n d e r e-1 o o d At i Internat ional Treatv In i9S4, Canada and the U.S.