The Damnation of a Dam : the High Ross Dam Controversy

THE DAMYIATION OF A DAM: TIIE HIGH ROSS DAM CONTROVERSY

TERRY ALLAN SIblMONS

A. B., University of California, Santa Cruz, 1968

A THESIS SUBIUTTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

Geography

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

May 1974

Name: Terry Allan Simmons Degree: Master of Arts

Title of Thesis: The Damnation of a Dam: The High Ross Dam Controversy

Examining Committee:

Chairman: F. F. Cunningham

4 E.. Gibson Seni Supervisor

/ /( L. J. Evendon

/ I. K. Fox ernal Examiner Professor School of Community and Regional Planning University of British Columbia PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University rhe righc to lcnd my thesis or dissertation (the title of which is shown below) to users

of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library

of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying

or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed ' without my written permission.

Title of' ~hesis /mqqmkm: The Damnation nf a nam. ~m

-Author: / " (signature )

Terrv A. S.imrnonze

(name )

July 22, 1974

(date) ABSTRACT

In 1967, after nearly fifty years of preparation, international negotiations concerning the construction of the High

Ross Dan1 on the Skagit River were concluded between the

Province of British Columbia and the City of Seattle. Under the terms of the agreement the dam would raise the level of Ross Lake by 122 feet flooding additional portions of the Ross Lake National Recreation Area in Washington and of the upper Skagit Valley in British Columbia. The purpose of raising the height of the dam is to provide additional hydroelectric capacity in order to meet peak period demands in Seattle. Only two years after the conclusion of the negotiations, a major international controversy erupted over the proposed dam construction. This study examines the history of the High Ross Dam controversy and of hydroelectric development on the Skagit River in order to explaln why this controversy arose. This controversy focuses upon the essential resource issue: is the environmental impact caused by the further flooding of the Skagit Valley justified by the additional electric power received by Seattle? The, present study addresses this general question by comparing the decision making processes in British Columbia and Washington and argues that the controversy results from the introduction by the conservation movement in Washington and British Columbia of a set of public interests in environmental issues which previously had not been articulated.

iii Data, found in many scattered places, are taken from primary and secondary documents, field work, personal interviews, and from materials arising from the author' s position as a participant observer.

This study documents a convergence in'the development of the conservation movement between British Columbia and

Washington in 1969. It is argued that the emergent climate of opinion allowed the conservationists in both areas to launch cooperative efforts to challenge Seattle's priority for the exploitation of the upper Skagit River region and the right of

Seattle City Light to expropriate the upper river system for its own use. The conservationists therefore revived the High

Ross Dam issue by creating a public debate, the existence of which depended upon the articulation of diff er5nt environmental value judgements and consequent resource management options.

In the light of the trends identified, the study concludes by appraising the future of hydroelectric development on the Skagit River. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This thesis is about people and dams. The dams may be damnzd; but the people must. he thanknd for their part in the preparation of this thesis. Thousands of lives have been touched by the High Ross Dam controversy. This thesis reflects their experiences. Many of them have been consulted. In particular, I wish to thank Kenneth Farquharson and the members of the ROSS Committee and Patrick Goldsworthy and the North Cascades Conservation Council for their assistance and access to their files. I am grateful to Edward Gibson for his encouragement and advice. TABLE -014' CONTENTS Page

Chapter One Introduction 2

The Thesis 2

The Perspective 3

The Data 8

The Method 10

The Organization 12

Part One Genesis

Chapter Two From Mineral Claims to Water Claims: Early Obstacles to Hydro~lectricDevelopment 18

Mining Activity 19

Early Settlement and Condemnation 21

Land Tenure in the B, C. Skagit Valley 23

Conclusion 24

Chapter Three City Building in the Wilderness: J. D. Ross and the Skagit River Development 27

Electrical and Political Power- A Grand Speculative Venture 27

City Building and the Origins of Seattle City Light 29

J. D. Rosk 33 Municipal D3velopment on the Cedar River 36 -The Battle for the Skagit River 39

Early Planning on the Skagit River 44

The Gorge Dam 48

The Diablo Dam 49

The Ross Dam

Conclusion Page

I versy I Early Negotiations- Ignorance Compensation for Timber The International Joint Commission 1 The Skagit Valley Land Act i New Considerations-Downstream Benefits The 1967 Agreement

Conclusion

Chapter Five The Creation of Controversy: The Role of the Conservationists I The Conservation Movement as a Movement The Conservation Movement in Historical Pattern

The Conservation Movement- Its Variety of Ocganizat ions

1 Run Out Skagit Spoil.ers North Cascades Conservation Council i Comparison of Two Organizations The Creation of the High Ross Dam Controversy in British Columbia The Campaign to Create the North Cascades National Park

Conclusion I Part Three Synthesis

vii Chapter Six Public Forum for Damnation: The Int ernat ionai Joint Commission

Development of the Controversy

The International Joint Commission Referencs and Public Hearings

Legal Considerations Seattle City Light1s Submission

Support for Seattle City Light Opposition to Seattle City Light

The Hearings in Perspective

The Final Report of the International Joint Commission

Conclusion

Chapter Seven Conclusions

Summary

Prospects Concluding Observations

Bibliography

Appendices

A. Onomastic Notes

Terminology

Ross Dam/Skagit Valley Conservat ion/Environment/Ecology

Preservationist

viii Page

B. Letter By Alex Robinson, April 1, 1931 198

C. International ~ointComrnissiorl Order of Approval 201

D. Agreement Between the Province of British Columbia And the City of Seattle 204

E. Threats to the North Cascades National Park 211

"Threat to Cascades", Letter by Grant McConnell, JU~Y20, 1969 211

11 North Cascades Dam ~hreat",New York Times, February 23, 1970 213

Do You Want THIS In Your Brand-New National Park And Recreation Area? 215

F. The 1971. International Joint Commission Hearings 216

Summary of Submissions to the International Joint Commission, 1971 216

Persons Presenting Briefs Or Testimony At The International Joint Commission Public Hearings 222

Text of Reference to the International Joint Commission '-LA33~ Figures Page

Proposed High Ross Project, Location Map 7

Project Area 17 North Cascades National Park, Ross Lake and Lake Chelan National Recreation Area 227 CHAPTER I Tntrodu~t~ion

. . . the historical achievement of science and tech- nology has rendered possible the translation --of val- -ues into technical tasks -- the materialization of values. Consequently, what is at stake is the re- definition of values in technical terms, as elements in the technological ends, would then operate in the project and in the construction of the machinery, and not only in its utilization. Moreover, the new ends might assert themselves even in the construction of scientific hypotheses -- in pure scientific theory. From the quantification of secondary quali- ties, science would proceed to the quantification of values. --- Herbert Marcuse1

Were it situated almost anywhere else, the Skagit would be a major international river. While the Skagit is the largest river to flow into the Puget Sound, it has remained until re- cently remote and dwarfed in its significance by its neigh- boring continental giants, the Fraser and the Columbia, in one of the best watered regions of North Amsrica. Today, however, the Skagit River is the subject of several international natural resource management issues with significant implications for bilateral policy. The most important these issues currently concerns the High Ross Dam or Skagit Valley controversy. That is whether or not the City of Seattle, Department of Lighting, known commonly as Seattle City Light, should raise the height of Ross Dam 122.5 feet in order to provide more head for the generat ion of of peaking capacity . Despite its history of trapping, mining and hydroelectric development, the Skagit River country remains isolated. Its character is rugged and .wild. The Skagit is a full, fast, but regulated river. It rises in the mountains of Manning Provincial Park and flows approximately 125 miles to the shores of Puget Sound near Mount Vernon, Washington. It drains about 3105 square miles. Although about 13 percent of the total watershed area, about 400 square miles, lies in British Columbia, 94 percent of the runoff originates in Washington. The distance from the ocean and the configuration of the mountain ranges cause the upper basin to be drier. The basin has an average annual rainfall of 71 inches with an annual runoff of about 30 inches from the upper basin and of about 140 inches from the tributaries nearer the coast. The average annual runoff, measured at Marblemount, is about

The Thesis

This is a comparative study of the international decision making process concerning the High Ross Dam. After nearly fifty years of preparation, international negotiations for the

High Ross Dam were completed between the Province of British Columbia and the City of Seattle in 1967. But two years later, a major international resource controversy erupted. This study examines the history of the High Ross Dam controversy in order to explain why this controversy arose. The thesis advanced is that this controversy results from the introduction by the conservation movement in Washington and British Columbia of a set of public interests previously unarticulated in relation to this issue.

A convergence in the development and history of the conservation movement in British Columbia and in Washington in 1969 created a climate of opinion which allowed conservationists to launch cooperative efforts to challenge the city's priority for the exploitation of the upper Skagit River region. In particular, they have challenged the right of Seattle City Light to expropriate the upper river system for its own use. The conservationists have reopened the High Ross Dam question by creating a public debate based upon different culture environment value judgements and consequent resource management options. This study discusses the social, political, and historical themes which provide the fundamental basis for the controversy rather than the tangible management problems emphasized during most of the public debate. -The Perspective Dams represent more than a sophisticated pile of bricks and mortar. Most discussions about dams emphasize the physical, biological and engineering attributes of the structure and the economic consequences of their construction. It may be a truism that engineers build dams because that is what they are trained and paid to do. Water works have bzen notori- ous features of pork barrel politic^.^ But there exists a number of more basic socio-cultural themes within the natural resource decision making process which deserve more attention.

A dam has meaning beyond onels technological ability to construct it and beyond a dam1 s direct impact upon the physical environment. A dam is more than a physical object; it is a symbol, a configuration of ideas. Alternatively, the absence of a dam also is symbolic of the impact of human values upon the landscape. Most certainly, engineers will build their dams; but they must have the will as well as the ability to build. The decision to build or not to build a hydroelectric dam is a direct expression of cultural values upon the landscape. 4

The construction of a hydroelectric dam is a direct statement about man1 s relationship with his environment. As an inteilectuai theme and as a basls for practical action, the problem of culture- environment relations, necessarily, has a long and complex history. Like most themes that are broadly identifiable within the history of ideas, the origins of our attitudes and values about nature can be traced through Genesis, Plato, Aristotle, Herodotus and others. Accordingly, a complete analysis of the values inherent in man1 s role in changing the face of the earth requires an understanding of a vast variety of men and ideas ranging from Lucretius, Augustine, Bacon, Copernicus, and Rousseau to more modern figures such as

Marsh, Powell, Muir, and Pinchot. In this regard, the High Ross Dam controversy is rooted deeply in the fabric of our culture. 5 Attitudes and values toward man's relationship with his environment arc fundarxntal contextual ~lements. The fundamental cultural and philosophical issues of culture environment relations do not change. These themes are expressed, in turn, as socio-cultural themes in the form of abstract resource management principles. These socio-cultural themes of resource management change very slowly, if at all. Certainly, they have not changed in essence since the Ross Dam was first conceived in 1904. Although these socio-cultural themes may not be articulated explicitly, they remain the basis for the resource conflict. Although all parties to this controversy are asking essentially the same question; that is, should the High Ross Dam addition be built, the places under dispute are defined differ~ntly.~ Natural resource management conflicts exist because various interested parties wish to exercise different resource management options. These options can be complementary; but they are often incompatible. Resource options can change rapidly. There have bken several different ways of exploiting the Upper Skagit River region. The kinds of options available depend upon many economic, social and environmental variables. The range of resource management options changes as these variables change and as the images of the landscape change within the contemporary socio-political context. Landscaps change is not necessarily constant or consistent. Landscape change occurs because individuals, groups and institutions who desire this change are able to articulate their

desire fcr this change through the political decision making process. The term r I political" here is used in the broad

societal sense; it need not be restricted to the policies of governments. In 1931, the British Columbia Minister of Lands

stated, 11 B. C. interests will not be injured by the scheme." But in 1973, the British Columbia Attorney-General proclaimed

that he would resign if the High Ross Dam were built.

Governmental policy is a product of the great variation in the opportunities for political expression by the principal

parties to the controversy over time. This dramatic shift in attitude on part of the British Columbia government is indi-

cative of the great shift in the character of the High Ross

Dam question created by the efforts of the conservation

movement. This change in the capabilities for political ar-

ticulation of environmental values is shown by the history of the High Ross Dam controversy.

This project has been redefined by the introduction of

new protagonists in the controversy. There are many themes

interwoven into the fabric of the debate, which vary according

to the immediate circumstances and these themes often overlap

with each other. In general, however, there are four major vantage points from which to view this project. / These are the American pro-High Ross Dam, the American anti-High Ross

Dam, the Cmadian pro-High Ross Dam, and the Canadian anti- High Ross Dam perspectives, which, in turn, are paired off Figure 1 Proposed

LEGEND High Ross Project, -6- INTERSTATE HIGHWAY Location Map FEDERAL HIGHWAY SCALE IN MILES

STATE HIGHWAY I0 0 10 20 during the debate relative to the location of the protagonists

and whether 01- not the two parties are allied in common cause. --The Data This study is based upon data derived by historical and anthropological methods for the purpose of asking a geographi-

cal question. The data are divided into five classes. These are primary document s, secondary documents, field work, personal interviews, and participatory observation.

A large collection of primary documents has been assembled and examined. Virtually all of the information regarding the rscent events in the High Ross Dam controversy are in the form of primary documents. Heavy reliance is placed upon these unpublished documents. The author has in his possession one of the most cornplete collections of Ross Dam material, especially as it relates to the British Columbia side of the controversy. The working papers and correspondence of the Run Out Skagit Spoilers, commonly known as the ROSS Committee, are at the core of this collection. In addition, much of the working files and corkespondence of the North Cascades Conservation Council have been made available. Various documents from Seattle City Light, the Seattle City Council, the Federal Power Commission, the International Joint Commission and the Washington State Ecological Commission have been consulted. The accounts of the High Ross Dam controversy reported by the Vancouver -Sun, the Vancouver Province, the Victoria Colonist, the Victoria Times, the Seattle Times and the Seattle Post-Intelligmcer have been surveyed. Other newspapers and t works of popular journalism relating to this situation have been consulted as available. There are no published scholarly accounts of the High Ross Dam controversy. However, a wide range of historical, political, anthropological, geographic and natural resource management literature has been consulted for purposes of background and perspective.

Formal interviews have been conducted with a number of participants in the controversy. Countless informal discus-

sions have been held with informed individuals concerning the

fate of the High Ross Dam project over the past four and a half years.

Understanding of this issue has been aided greatly by personai observations of tile study area. Thc entire Shgit

Valley in British Columbia has been visited. Most of the

trails of the Ross Lake National Recreation Area including

Big Beaver Creek have been hiked. An enlightening day was

spent on Seattl2 City Light's Skagit Tour which includes the Ross powerhouse and most of its facilities on the Skagit

River. Adjacent areas in the North Cascades National Park and the Chilliwack Valley in British Columbia have been visited.

There is no substitute for personal inspection of an area under dispute . The most important source of data and of generalizations about the character of the High Ross Dam controversy is participatory observation. The author has been actively involved in this controversy since its revival in 1969. He has been one of the principal members of the ROSS Committee and as such has participated in and observed the process of decision making and of strategy planning within the inner circles of the conservationist opposition. Virtually all the important participants in the controversy are known personally. Board of Directors meetings of the North Cascades Conservation Council have been attended. He attended hearings of the International Joint Commission and the Washington State Ecological Commission in addition to a variety of other relevant gatherings. In the tradition of anthropological fieldwork, he has been deeply immersed in this situation while remaining a detached objective observer as much as is p~ssible.~The author's position that the High Ross Dam should not be built has been clear and consistent throughout his period of participation and research.

Nevertheless, he feels that he has been able to assess the data honestly and objectively. --The Method The method of organization and of analysis for this study is historical. The view of historical explanation is holistic and pluralistic. No single type of causal factor is decisive.

The evidence is contextual. The historical task is to observe the process of events and the evidence of human consciousness, consciously or subconc iously inherent in those events. Collin@voodls distinction between being inside and outside events is instructive in this regard. The historian, investigating any event in the past, makes a distinction between what may be called the outside and the inside of an event. By the outside of the event I mean everything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements: the passage of Caesar, accompanied by certain men, across a river called the Rubicon at one date, or the spilling of his blood on the floor of the Senate-house at another. By the inside of the event I mean that in it which can only be described in terms of thought: Caesar's defiance of Republican law, or the clash of constitutional policy between himself and his assassins. The historian is never concerned with either of these to the exclusion of the other. He is investigating not mere events (where by a mere event I m,Oan one which has only an outside and no inside) but actions, and an action is thz unity of the outside and the inside of an event. History is general and particular. Explanat ion in history relies upon one's view of the general processes of human nature and upon the individual reflective judgement of the historian. History is both the record of observations and an interpretation by the observor. The historical method provides a synthesis for the understanding of observed patterns and uniformities. 10 The prevailing historical perspective used here is relativistic. This study is more an interpretation of historic facts than an exposition of them. The ruling historical concept is the notion of I1 climate of opinion". Climate of opinion refers to a set of fundamental assumptions and attitudes both implicit and explicit which are current among at least a segment of society at any given time. Similar terms are the notion of 11 a spirit of an age" and the feeling of an idea "being in the air". The core elements of the High Ross Dam

controversy vere major factors in the establishment of the

climate of opinion for natural resource management decisions on the Upper Skagit River. And, in turn, this historical

context became part of the present. 11

Culture history, especially in the writings of Kroeber and of Bagby, has been helpful in an effort to gain perspectives on the relationship between culture and history and on the overall patterns of ideological and technological change. 1 P Organization

This study is divided into three parts: genesis, metamorphosis, and synthesis, The High Ross Dam controversy

continues to evolve. But, the focus of this study rests with

the metamorphosis which began in 1969.

Genesis,comprising the second, third and fourth chapters, provides the historical context of the High Ross Dam controversy.

The second chapter discusses the early mining activity and homesteading in the Skagit River area. It shows that the pattern of economic domination by the city of Seattle of this

region was set early. The history of land acquisition and

condemnation and the purchase of the Whitworth Ranch in the

British Columbia Skagit Valley demonst rate the early intentions

of Seattle City Light to develop the hydroelectrical potential of the Skagit River.

Chapter three examines the history of Seattle City Light, the role of J. D. Ross within this institution, and the history of the Skagit Kiver develop~nentprogram. This chapter shows that the principal values expressed by the

Skagit River project are city building and municipal ownership of public utilities.

Chapter four examines the history of the international negotiations between the Province of British Columbia and the City of Seattle concerning the fate of the Skagit Valley. The

1941 hearing and the consequent 1942 order of the International

Joint Commission and the 1967 agreement between the province and the city are reviewed. This chapter demonstrates that although the province had no objection to this project in principle, the status of these negotiations and the position of the province changed several times. It shows that there was very little public debate about, or influence upon these discussions. Metamorphosis, chapter five, examines the creation of the

High Ross Dam controversy in 1969. It reviews the character of the conservation movement and the structure of the principal opponents to the High Ross Dam project, the ROSS Committee and the North Cascades Conservation Council. This chapter explains why this controversy arose anew after the completion of international negotiations in 1967. It demonstrates that a convergence in the development and history of the conservation movement in British Columbia and in Washington in 1969 created a climate of opinion which allowed the conservationists to launch cooperative efforts to stop this project. Synthesis, chapters. five, six and seven, examines the history of the High Ross Dam controversy and the process of public debate since 1969. Chapter five examines the character and development of the resource management issues involved in this controversy. The 1971 public hearing of the International Joint Commission has been the most comprehensive public form during this controversy to date. This hearing and the consequent report by the commission are reviewed as a microcosm of the debate. Chapter six states the conclusions of this study. Footnotes for Chapter I. l~arcuse1964:231-232. Emphases are in the original.

2~ederalPower Commission 1973:2-52.

3~ee,-e. -g., Clusen 1973.

*see, -e. -g., Wagner l972a and 1972b.

S~ee,e. g., Collingwood 1945; Glacken 1967, 1970; Tuan 1966, 1968,-1970; and White 1967, 1973.

6~ discussion of the importance of place names and some terminological reservations are found in Appendix A.

7~ee,-e. -g., Keesing 1971 and Garfinkel 1966.

'The quality of objectivity demanded by scientism is illusory for all knowledge is culturally mediated and historically situated. The false ideal of detached, impersonal inquiry must be replaced by an ideal of a critical, homocentric spirit of inquiry in keeping with an immanently humane epistemology. See Scholte 1971. The relationship between mediated knowledge and historical context has been expressed well by Merleau-Ponty . Actually, historical consciousness invites us to shift the very notion of the relationship of the mind to its object. Precisely the inherence of my thinking within a certain historical situation, which is its own, and beyond this one its inherence in other historical situations that interest it- since the former is originary with regard to the objective relationships science tells us about- makes the understanding of the social an understanding of myself, calls for and authorizes a --view of inter- subjectivity as being --my own, which is forgotten by science while utilized by it, and which is the specific field of philosophy. If history envelops us all, it is up to us to understand that whatever we can have of the truth is not to be obtained in spite of our historical situation but because of it. Considered superficially, history destroys all truth, though considered radically it founds a new idea of truth. As long as I hold the ideal of an absolute spectator before me, of knowledge without a point of view, I can see my situation only as a principle of error. But having once recognized that through this situation I have become part of all action and all knowledge that can be meaningful for me, and that it contains, in gradually widening horizons, all that can -be for me, then my contact with the social in the finitude of my situation reveals itself as the origin of all truth, including that of science; and since we have an idea of truth, since we are in the truth and cannot escape it, then the only thing left for us to do is to define a truth within the situation. Knowledge will be founded upon the irrefutable fact that we are not in the situation as is the object in objective space, and that is for us the principle of our curiosity, our research and interest in other situations as variants of ours, and in our own lives, illuminated by fellowmen, as variants of the lives of others. Finally it is that which unites us to the totality of human experience no less than that which separatss us from it.

sCollingwood 1946: 213. losee, e. g., Collingwood 1946, 1965; Harris 1971; Smith 1964 and Wzlsh 1958.

''see, -e. -g., Becker 1932.

12see, -e. -g., Kroeber 1944 and Bagby 1963.

CHAPTER I1

From Mineral Claims to Water Claims: Early Obstacles to Hydroelectric Development

The Skagit River has remained remote, rugged and wild throughout its history. The upper reaches of the Skagit were hunted most likely by the Salish of the Fraser Valley from time to time. Some early trappers were familiar with the Skagit Valley. Enough beaver were in the area for the Hudson' s Bay Company to discourage settlement and prospecting there. How- ever, after the demise of the Hudson's Bay Company's influence, this region became part of Seattle's hinterland. Most miners and travellers entered the area from the west. Gold fever brought more people along the Skagit and its tributaries in search of their personal cure in the last half of the nineteenth century. A few miners stayed to homestead the area until they were bought out or driven out by those who would stake claims on water rights rather than gold at the beginning of the century. These early settlers were major obstacles to hydroelectric development. But, the Forest Service and the hydroelectric development investors would not allow them to remain. One by one they were forced out. There w&s no room for resource conflicts. Gold mining opened the region for the water claims prospectors and the electric companies as Seattle City Light, in turn, would provide access for the recreation users. 1 Mining Activity Mincrs stimulated by the Colville gold rush of 1855 and activity in the Fraser Valley in 1858 travelled through the

Skagit Valley. But, the first serious influx of European inhabitants into the area came with the first of several minor gold rushes in 1880. Mining activity, sporadic as it was, brought people into the Skagit, especially along the Ruby Creek and Thunder Creek between 1877 and 1910. The yield in gold and in silver was relatively low for the efforts required in such an isolated area. The only fortunes made were on paper. In Seattle, the commercial advantages of mining activity were apparent. These early mining activities set the basic pattern of political and economic influence for the Skagit River. Seattle- based interests controlled the region. Canadian interests gave the region little or no attention. the northern access the watershed -via the Fraser Valley remained important. In December 1879, fearing competition from Victoria merchants, a meeting of Seattle merchants was held. According to the Bellingham Bay Mail, a prominent citizen of the day, Judge Orange Jacobs was explicit about their merchantile prospects.

1 I Suppose that five thousand men fit out in Seattle; it is safe to estimate that each one will spend at least fifty dollars for an outfit, tools, provisions, etc.; this would put from two hundred thousand to half a million dollars in circulation in a short time, and the consequences of such an amount, added to the usual spring business, would make things in Seattle fairly boom. "2

The Seattle merchants did capture the mining supply market. Then as now, the easiest way to reach the northern end of the upper Skagit Valley was -via British Columbia. This fact pre- cipitated the first international controversy in the Skagit Valley. But the crisis was averted by the acquiescence of Canadian customs officials. They allowed the miners to travel to the Skagit mines, -via Fort Hope or Chilliwack with their possessions in bond. As the Bellingham Bay Mail reports,

I I This is quite a concession and convenience to those going in from northern routes.113 The Victoria merchants lost out; but there was little to lose. Placer gold was in limited supply.

Only six to seven hundred miners participated. After the summer of 1880, the large monetary investments of hard rock mining were required. The first gold rush failed. A similar burst of enthusiasm ended in disillusionment in 1893.

Typical of the corporate history of mining along the Skagit

River was the Ruby Creek Mining Company. After several years of operation in the area, it proposed to mine the gravel beds at the confluence of the Skagit River and Ruby Creek. After spend- ing over $300,000 on their camp and equipment, including heavy cast iron hydraulic equipment, which had to be hauled in by pack animals, Ruby Creek Mining received about $3,000 return in gold. The buildings were sold and converted into a road house, the Ruby Creek Inn. This site is presently under water. 4

Interestingly, in 1913, several mergers, stock promotions and bankruptcies later, the Ruby Creek Mining Company as the

British Mining Company tried to switch from mining gold to

11 mining1' water,'but soon found that all the potential water 21. power locations on the Skagit were already posted. Unable to diversify, the British Mining Company followed its predecessors into oblivion. " Most mining ventures were unproductive; the mines and their settlements were abandoned. In time most of the evidence of their activities deteriorated and became overgrown.

But, mining did open the Skagit area for a limited number of farmers and roadhouse operators. Early Settlement and Condemnation Although these homesteaders were a varied lot, they shared the common fate of being forced to move out or to sell out to the power companies with the active encouragernsnt of the Forest Service. An act creating the Washington Forest Reserve, including the Skagit valley above Goodell1s Landing (~ewhalem), was signed in 1897. Then, the Forest Homestead Act of 1906 brougilt tile settiers under the dlrect regdlathn and zdministra- tion of, the Forest Service. This act allowed each homesteader to claim up to 160 acres for agricultural purposes provided the tract did not contain valuable timber stands. However, each settler was required to satisfy the Forest Service that he had lived on the land for five 'or more years prior to 1906. Some were given title; others were evicted; a few received annual special use permits for specific commercial purposes. A few of the most remote inhabitants were ignored. August Dohne operated a roadhouse and farmed at the current site of Newhalem. Since his claim was perfectly valid, his homestead was approved soon after application in 1908. However, after the Skagit Power Company expressed an interest in the Gorge site for an hydroelectric development, the power company and the Forest Service disputed his claim and otherwise subjected

Dohne to legal harassment in an attempt to force him to sell. Ultimately, the property was bought through a condemnation proceeding after Dohnefs death in 1918 by Seattle City ~ight.' Similarly, Glee Davis was established at Cedar Bar near Diablo. In addition to his homestead, Davis worked for Seattle

City Light during the construction of the Gorge power project.

In January 1927, Seattle City Light condemned the Davis property.

After two years of legal battles, Davis and his family moved to

Sedro Woolley with a meager $15,000 settlement.

Farther up the river still, above Big Beaver Creek, John McMillan settled in 1884. He never applied for a claim on his property, but it was so remote that he was never bothered by the Forest Service. McMillan and his wife managed to avoid the government until his death in 1922 when the claim was abandoned. Farther up Big Beaver Creek lived Tommy Rowland who was less fortunate. After settling there in 1895, he sold vegetables and hay to miners. A religious fanatic, Rowland believed that he was an incarnation of the Prophet Elisha and he called his home "~ew Jerusalem." Miners thinking that Rowland was hiding a rich gold mine bshind his madness lured Rowland to Sedro Woolley where he was placed in the local mental hospital. After the conspirators had been disappointed, Rowland escaped and returned to the isolation of "New Jerusalem." A few years later, the Forest

Service returned him to the hospital and burned the homestead. Both the McMillan place and "~ew~erusalem" are beneath Ross

Lake. Currently, the only privately held lands in the Skagit

Valley are held by Seattle City Light. Other land users, such as Diablo Lake Resort and the Ross Lake Resort, operate through permits issued by the National Park Service which acquired administration of the area with the conversion of th'e Forest Service lands into the North Cascades National Park and the

Ross Lake National Recreational Area. Land Tenure --in the Skagit Valley -of British Columbia Likewise, Seattle City Light is the major private land owner in the Skagit Valley of British Columbia. The use pattern of the Skagit Valley has been similar to that of the United

States portion. Trappers and miners have visited the area. Currently, there is a registered trapline in the valley super- vised by the British Columbia Fish and Wildlife Bran~h.~There are mining claims on both sides of the valley. A crown reserve on all minzral claims below 1800 feet was established in 1966 by Order in Council. lo Nevertheless,, there has never been any viable mineral exploitation in the area. Hunting, fishing and other recreational pursuits have taken place in the area over the years. But the valley was isolated and little known.

Access was difficult until the Silver-Skagit Road was built in 1946 in order to remove the timber cleared from the Ross reservoir site.

The only permanent settlement in the Skagit Valley Was the Whitworth Ranch. Henry Whitworth used th~meadows of the valley to graze cattle in the lg20fs. Seattle City Light entered into negotiation with Whitworth in 1927 and purchased the two lots of 320 acres each, Lot 221 and Lot 222 in 1929 for $20,000. Half of Lot 222 is inundated when the present

Ross Lake is at full pool. Lot 221 is about 2.7 miles north of the international border on the east side of the river. Lot 221 is known as the Whitworth Meadow. The only other privately held land in the valley is Lot 867 which consisted of 40 acres northeast of the proposed reservoir and will not be flooded.'* After the purchase of the Whitworth Ranch in 1929, Seattle City Light was the only party to have an active interest in the fate of the

Skagit Valley in British Columbia. The occasional hunters, fishermen, and rum runners made little impact upon the valley.

Sporadic negctiaticns between the Provinciel Government and the

City of Seattle received little public attention. The area received little note until the rise of conservationist opposition to the High Ross Dam in 1969. The British Columbia valley re-

mained uninhabited and remote. Conclusions

The focus for hydroelectric development on the Skagit

River always has been in Seattle. The Province of British

Columbia was approached about the possible inundation of the

Skagit Valley by J. D. Ross in October 1926, the year after the

Seattle City Council approved the overall development plan for the river. However, interest in the hydroelectric potential had begun some twenty years previously. In the conflict between the homesteader and the Forest Service, the hydroelectric power companies played an important part as was seen in the case of August Dohne. The Forest Service clearly approved construction of large hydroelectric power projects which were considered worthwhile investments benefitting many people and wise conservation measures. With these values in mind, Forest Service officials clearly felt justified in closely questioning claims on Federal land by individuals. In the end the Forest Service philosophy and the power companies predominated as all of the homesteaders, in one manner or another, were evicted from their homes on the Upper Skagit. The way was clear for development of the area into Northwestern Washington1s largest hydroelectric power site. 13 The early mining activities provided information about the water power potential for the Skagit River. Mining ventures, roadhouses and homesteads aided access into the area. The settlers had little recourse to the administrative policies of the Forest Service and the legal efforts of the power companies. Hydroelectric development required most of the flat valley land. Little room was left for other users when the valley became a reservoir. After the dozen or so settlers left the Skagit Valley, Seattle City ~i~htbecame the Forest Service's only tenant. After the purchase of the Whitworth Ranch in 1929, Seattle City Light remained the only active interest in the British Columbia Skagit Valley. Footnotes for Chapter -11.

'Portions of this chapter rely heavily upon Paul Pitzerls -A History of the Upper Skagit Valley 1880 - 1924, an M. A. thesis iK~=ory at the University of Washington, 1966. 2~itzer1966~8. 3~itzer1966~10. 4~itzer1966:19. 5~itzer1966: 28. 6~itzer1966: 50-53. 7~itzer1966:43. 8Pitzer 1966:54. '~uncan testimony, Seattle City Light 1973: I: 5. l OIJC 1973a: 108.

"~etter from J. Nelson to P. Goldsworthy, November 5, 1970.

2~~~ 1971a: 53. 13pitzer 1966~61. CHAPTER I11

City Building in the Wilderness: J. D. Ross and the Skagit River Development

Electrical and Political Power -- -A Grand- Speculative Venture The harnessing of the swift, abundant waters of the

Pacific Northwest was a grand speculative venture, a project with much to gain and much to lose. Most large, economically viable hydroelectric sites have been developed in North America during the last half century. Very little hydroelectric potential remains today.2 Yet, at the turn of the century, the era of hydroelectric power was just beginning. The supply of cheap hydroelectric power and the potential for economic growth and political power based upon that energy seemed unbounded. The desire for electrical power and political power merged in the city of Seattle with the question of private versus public ownership of public utilities. This issue was a major force in municipal politics from 1889 when the city council first discussed the creation of its own lighting plant for street lighting until 1952 when Seattle City Light finally obtained monopoly control. In 1902, when the first municipal lighting plant was established, the Seattle Electric Company, later to become the Puget Sound Light and Power Company, held a near monopoly on electric power distribution in the city. Puget Sound Light and Power was a subsidiary of the large Stone and Webster, also owned the Skagit Power Company after 1912. Stone and Webster and Seattle City Light were bitter enemies. Both sought the destruction of the other. This competition stimulated much political controversy both in terms of the ideological

question of public versus private ownership and in terms of the public management policies. The City of Seattle, Department of Lighting has always been a controversial agency. Even after the continued existence of

the agency was no longer in doubt, the management of City Light

often took the form of a crusade against private ownership of utilities. J. D. Ross promoted public ownership throughout the

United States with missionary zeal. To this day, City Light

remains a force unto itself within city hall. Indeed, Ross and his policies were important factors in the recall of two mayors.

The electrical services provided the citizens of Seattle were a

means to an end as much as they were an end in itself. ' The

task of City Light was to promote demand for and to obtain

cheap power for the economic growth of Seattle and the political

growth of City Light. Although the ultimate energy demand

came to exist as Ross had foreseen, Rossr primary reason for

claiming the water power rights on the Skagit River was not

the necessity of generating electricity. The Skagit River

development plan was an attempt to monopolize the hydroelectric

power potential of the region's largest river and, thus, to

weaken and eventually to force his competition out of business.

The issue in Ross1 mind was not kilowatt hours but control of

the economic and political future of the utilities in the city

of Seattle by the public sector. Interest in the hydroelectric potential of the Skagit

River was first, expressed. by Charlns Freema,n, an Anacortes engineer, in 1904. Freeman formed the Skagit Power Company with Denver financial backing the next year. In 1907 the first water power claim on the Skagit was filed on the Gorge Dam site.

His notice of claim stated:

The purposes for which said water is appropriated are irrigation, mining, manufacturing, power plants and supplying cities, towns and villages for the purposes of generating electricity for commercial purposes. 5

Ross and Seattle City Light did not desire to possess

these water rights until 1912 and did not gain control of them until 1917. The reasons for this delay had as much to do with

the distribution of political power within Seattle as it did the

distribution of hydroelectric power within the Pacific Northwest.

City Building --and the Origins -of Seatt.le City Light Since its introduction during the 1880'~~the desire for

electricity, particularly,cheap power, has been a major political and economic force in Seattle. Abundant and cheap power was seen

as the means for a bigger and better future for Seattle. Pro- , gress was its most important product. Initial expectations were

high and competition was fierce. As it neared completion of

its hydroelectric generation plant, for example, the Snoqualmie

Falls Power Company added to the optimism and boosterism of the

11 city building" movement with a full advertisement in the

Seattle Argus of December 1898.

GOOD HORSE POWER now available. Seattle1s dream for years has now been realized, and this renowned cataract for the first time in history will be the useful agent of mankind, transmitting energy from the Mountains THIRTY MILES TO SEATTLE.

CHEAP POWER will make Seattle the Manufacturing and Industrial Metropolis of the Pacific States.

With an unrivaled geographical location, with four transcontinental railways to insure commercial supremacy, with raw materials at her door, Seattle has only needed abundant and cheap power to outstrip San Francisco.

The cost of power is the basic element in the cost of every manufactured article. With Snoqualmie Falls Power Seattle will do the Manufacturing of the coast, the Orient and Alaska and will in consequence, add directly 50,000 people to her population in five years. . . . Eastern Factories contemplating a change in location will do well to address the Seattle Chamber of Commerce or the Snoqualmie Falls Power Co. 6

The origins of Seattle City Light are a product of historic

and geographic circumstances. The Department of Lighting was a

logLcal outgrcvth of the water system. The city already held water rights. The water works were operating reasonably well.

Since Seattle was situated near several practical dam sites, the

hydroelectric potential of the water system was not overlooked.

A municipal dam on the Cedar existed where the engineering

capabilities for electrical generation were present. Seattle was much more able to establish its own independent electrical

system than were comparable cities such as San Francisco which also had extensive municipal water supply systems.

The comparative advantage of location, notwithstanding, the city required the necessary capital and political will in ordzr to expand its municipal services. The municipal ownership

movement was strong at the turn of the century. A major element of the "city building" ethic of the time, urban reform was the goal rather. than socialism. The people desired more efficient and more inexpensive service. There were widespread feelings that the city could buy power and distribute it for a lower price. For example, Mayor W. D. Wood claimed in 1897 that if the municipality were to establish its own lighting distribution system the cost of street lighting would be reduced and that their entire capital costs would be covered within a three year period.

The Seattle Argus in 1899 complained that the lighting service

was the worst, possibly, furnished to any city in the United States. It is, in fact, no service at all, the lights being so weak that they are absolutely u~eless.~ While it may have been an exaggeration to say that the service in Seattle was the worst in the country, it apparently was inferior to that of Tacoma's municipal system. The relative success of the city's traditional rival seriously injured the local civic pride.

But the most important element in municipal ownership campaign was the distrust of the large, private corporations that operated the electrical services. In an era when great fortunes and empires were built, corporate power was feared, especially where natural monopolies or near monopolies were likely to appear. The lucrative municipal franchises issued to these corporations for the operation of public utilities were associated often with political scandal and corruption. Indeed, one of the historic ironies of the High Ross Dam controversy is the fact that the dislike of "foreign" capital and of "foreign" domination of the local electrical corporations was a significant factor in the desire for public ownership. In this case, of course, the "foreign" capital came from Boston, New York, and Denver. The eastern barons were draining Seattle of its local capital, or so it was thought. The proponents of public ownership believed that the city would prevent corruption, improve the service and keep the profits and the capital at home.

In the beginning, municipal electrical services were restricted to the operation of the street lighting system which was administered within the Water Department. The Department of Lighting was not established until 1910. Growth of demand and movement into the private sector in September of 1905 caused rapid expansion of the city's physical plant and of its bonded indebtedness. Between 1905 and 1910 the Cedar Falls hydroelectric plant had its capacity increased from 2,400 kw to

40,000 kw. Bond issues in 1906, 1908, and 1910 totalling

$~,~OO,OOOfirmly established the seriousness of the reformist experiment. In the City Light annual report of 1910 the agency called it self "growing instituion, thoroughly prosperous and with every prospect of a successful future. "'L. B. Youngs, the Superintendent of the Water Department was pleased with the progress of these early years. Viewing the plant . . . not as an institution intended to pile up surplus revenue, but merely as an agency to fix and maintain a just and reasonable rate for electrical services, it has fulfilled its mission in the most satisfactory manner. There has been no attempt to crowd out the other companies, but only to fix a rate which would of necessity in the competitive market have to, be met by a.ll competitors. 9 The municipal ownership supporters had reason to be pleased.

But, not ail were as enthusiastic. ---J. D. Ross Being a public institution, the young agency was directly responsible to the City Council as the board of directors and

the Mayor as the chief executive officer. Every action and motive of the department were open to public, -i. e. political, scrutiny and debate. Every major development was reviewed by the city council and the bond issues were subject to ,the direct approval of the voters. Bond issues were particularly obvious

opportunities to question the wisdom of City Light's policies.

For example, The Seattle Times January 31, 1905 edition exclaimed

in a banner headling: "CITY LIGHTING PLANT A FAILURE!". The

Seattle Star promptly replied, "SOUR GRAPES". The Cedar Falls hydroelectric plant was having difficulties. The Seattle Times

viewed these troubles as signs of the lack of leadership of the city administration as well as improper construction of the

plant. According to the City Engineer, R. H. Thomson, the plant did have some flaws in the starting up process at the

plant. The Seattle Star countercharged thatthe Seattle Times was trying to please Seattle Electric Company by trying to discredit public ownership.

This particular dispute has special significance because

it was the occasion of the first public appearance of J. D. Ross in the political arena. Ross was hired as the chief electrical engineer on the city's engineering staff by Thomson in 1903. It was Ross who was responsible for the construction'of the plant and the installation of the generators in question. Ross issued a major point by point attack upon the Seattle Times1 accusa- tions. And he accused them of trying to prevent the sale of bonds which had previously been approved in order to pay for the capital costs of the new plant. At the end of his long and vigorous rebuttal, Ross concluded with a statement which fore- told his beliefs in the ideas of "city building" which he would advocate so frequently.

11 What a city needs for her industrial growth is plenty of power at reasonable rates, and if this is given by a muncipality, or if a muncipal plant can hold prices at a reasonable figure, as it does, and to this fact is due most of the articles written against muncipal plants, then the object of the people in instituting such a concern is attained. I1 10 Ross, however, was to wait another six years before he was to become the Superintendent of the Department of Lighting.

Characteristically, Ross was appointed superintendent after a long and bitter controversy. When the Department of

Lighting was established in 1910, the Superintendent, L. B.

Youngs, remained in charge of the water works and, thus, created a vacancy at the top of the City Light management.

Major Hi Gill appointed Richard Arms who had been an employee of the Seattle Electric Company. Although Arms was obviously fully qualified for the job, his appointment and subsequent brief period of administration were attacked vigorously. His opponents, including Ross, questioned some of his management policies and the desirability of having a person so closely identified with the private electric industry in the post. In

February 1911, Hi Gill was recalled as Mayor. The principal issue during the recall campaign was the question of an open versus a closed town. But the Arms7 controversy was also a significant factor in the demise of the colorful Mayor. The

Seattle Union Record stated that the success of the recall action would not have been possible were it not for the number of votes lost to the retiring mayor because of the retention of Arms as Superintendent of Lights. 11 George Dillings, the new Mayor, accepted Arms1 resignation and appointed Ross.

James Delmage Ross was born in Chatham, Ontario in 1872. 12

He taught school in a number of small towns in Ontario.

Abandoning the classroom for the adventures of gold mining, Ross wandered through the Yukon and Alaska before establishing an electrical contracting firm in 1902 in Seattle. However, finding private enterprise not to his liking, he joined the city engineering staff within a year. Ross remained the Superintendent of Lighting fdr twenty-eight years until his death in 1939 with the exception of the period between his being fired by Mayor

Edwards in 1931 and Edwardsf subsequent recall and Ross7 ' rehiring a few months later. Ross was known as the "Father of

City ~ight.I' His personality dominated the organization. In many respects, he is still very influential as he overlooks the products of his life's work from his portrait on the wall.

J. D. Ross was a man of vision. Upon formal appointment as superintendent, he set his goals.

I1 Some day we will have a network of municipally owned light plants in this country. The Seattle plant's success is going to help bring it about. I1 1 3

His enthusiasm and loyalty to the cause of public ownership was absolute. Ross received favor primarily from two sources. One was a large group of civic minded citizens, princi- pally small businessmen, who favored a moderate position on the utility issue. They supported the public plant, but they were content to regard the city operated utility only as a source of cheap electric current for residentiallighting, and as a means by which local private utility rates could be regulated through limited competition. The second group, a coterie originally designated as the lPatrons of City Lightt and later as the Friends of City Light1 centered about J. D. Ross and worked diligently to bring into being Ross1 . . . vision of what might be and should be. . . . This small group of church and labor leaders, liberal minded businessmen and news- paper publishers, and intimate associates of Ross, desired to boost their city by making available an abundant and cheap supply of hydroelectric power. And it was against this back-drop of divided sentiment and sub-rosa political intrique, that Ross endeavored to carry out his city building plans. 14

J. D. Ross believed that "the market for electricity is what you make it1'and that "the union of the people in promoting the use of electricity is the condition we wish to reach. I I He was virtually worshipped by his employees as City Light where a strong esprit -dz corps was built around the personality and idealism of its leader. 15 Municipal Development --on the Cedar River

A major test of Ross1 leadership in the early years of his administration was his ability to expand the generating capacity of his physical plant. Simultaneously, of course, he was promoting growth of demand. City Light depended upon both fuel oil burning thermal plants within the metropolitan area and an hydroelectric plant on the Cedar. And it had hopes for developments elsewhere. The capacity of the thermal plants was limited and inadequate. Hydroelectric development was imperative. Unfortunately, the development of the Cedar River was a fiasco. The as yet uncompleted Skagit River projfzct was still in the distant future. Seattle was late in entering the hydroelectric field. Originally, it was a power distribution system and was not intended to generate its own power. Later, valuable time was lost by concentration upon the water resources of the Cedar River and by failure to anticipate the rapid growth of future demand. Speculative interest in the hydroelectric potential on the Skagit River began in 1904. But Seattle City Light showed no formal interest in this river until 1915. Water power resource sites were the key to the control of the future of the industry. This was clear to all concerned. But, to Ross, more than business competition was at stake. He feared the political power of his competitors and he feared for the survival of his organization. In the City Light annual report for 1912-13, he expressed his concern. Without more power the usefulness of the municipal plant as a competitive factor will soon be at an end; with an abundance of cheap power its service to the city may be multiplied many times, and it may become a powerful factor in bringing to Seattle the industrial supremacy of the Pacific Coast, as well as ful- filling its primary purpose of supplying the many conveniences of electricity to the homes, shops and offices of our citizens at rates as cheap as they can be made. 16 Later the same year, during an address to the annual convention of the League of Washington Municipalities, Ross was more par- tisan and more explicit. The only solution is to get control of these water powers, and develop them for the community. Every one lost now is used by the enemy as an extra weapon in fighting the municipal plant idea and an extra weapon to produce money for political power and tbossisml .I7 City Light's first venture in hydroelectric development was an embarrassment. A masonry dam constructed on the Cedar

River began in 1908 represented a collective gamble which was lost in the rush to increase generation capacity. The essential problem was the site; it was chosen without proper geologic testing. Engineering reports in 1912 demonstrating the inferiority of the location were not prepared until after the city was committed to the construction of the dam. The dam was weak; many questioned whether or not it would hold. The public image of the lighting department was damaged seriously.

W. J. Grambs, an official of the Puget Sound Traction, Light and Power Company was able to write that

the masonry dam on Cedar River is a colossal and costly blunder for which municipal ownership theorists are wholly responsible. 18

Proponents of private power a,ttributed the blunder to the I1 insane desire" of city officials to increase the capacity of their power plants. In 1918, during efforts to test the effectiveness of the repairs on the dam, the north bank of the river washed out causing a flood of water to flow into the Snoqualmie River which destroyed the town of Edgewick, the tracks of the Milwaukle Railroad, and the sawmills of the North Bend Lumber

Company, Although ac lives were lost, the city of Seattle was required to pay $362,000 in damages. And, the professional competency of City Light's administration continued to be seriously questioned. For instance, as Ross prepared to begin construction on the Gorge Dam, the Seattle Times declared in a headline: "Let' s Avoid Another Cedar Dam ~lunder". 20 Ironically, the troubled waters of the Cedar were to aid

City Light in their vital struggle for the acquisition of the water rights on the Skagit River. Failure of the projected energy to come on line from the Cedar forced an over-reliance on the oil burning, thermalplants in the city. This dependence became critical when the industrial boom caused by the advent of

World War I created Seattlefs first "energy crisis". -The Battle -- for the Skagit River 5. D. Ross considered the possibility of developing the hydroelectric potential on the Skagit River first in 1912, but he abandoned the idea temporarily when the Skagit Power Company was purchased by Puget Sound Traction, Power and Light Company.

The principal assets of Skagit Power Company were Forest Service power development permits. . Charles Freeman, the original pro- moter of Skagit power, sold his water rights to Puget Sound the next year. The Seattle Electric Company merged with the Puget Sound Traction, Power and Light Company. The Skagit Power

Company was operated as a subsidiary of Puget Sound which was a subsidiary of Stone and Webster, a large holding company based in

Boston which owned several public utilities throughout the United States. In 1918 Puget Sound Traction, Power and Light Company sold its transit assets within Seattle to the city. It still operates in Northwestern Washington as Puget Sound Power and Light Company. The Forest Service regulated the development of water power prior to the creation of the Federal Power Commission in 1920. There was little question of the desirability of hydroelectric development at that time. Flooding of the lower Skagit Flats was a major problem. Dams were perceived as good natural resource management, as wise conservation. The Forest Service followed Gifford Pinchot l s famous definition of conservation. II Conservation means the greatest good to the greatest number and that for the longest time. rlr 2 1 Conservation meant the wise V' use of the public natural resources for the benefit of man.

Resources were to be used in such a way as to allow the people to live an abundant, happy life. This was in keeping with Ross1

"city building" values. The wild lands values expressed during the High Ross Dam controversy fifty years later were not apparent. No one disputed that dams should be built, only who would build them and who would benefit. City Light shifted attention to sites on the Sauk and

Suiattle Rivers near Darrington. It filed with the Department of Agriculture for the power rights there which had a potential of about 125,000 kw. Although priority was obtained, no serious plans were made. Ross still had his eyes on the Skagit which had a potential between 500,000 and 600,000 kw. The Skagit 41.

power Company held the permits on the Skagit. However, they had failed to make any tangible progress toward construction. In October of 1915 Ross wrote the District Forester in Portland to complain about this lack of progress and the fact that valuable government water sites were sitting idle. Ross believed that Stone and Webster was trying to monopolize the hydroelectric potential. City Light, of course, continued to hold and to make no progress on the Sauk and Suiattle project.

The Forest Service throughout this period appeared to be more concerned about the rapid development of the hydroelectric potential than in the debate concerning private versus public ownership. They questioned the sincerity of all power companies. 22 The Skagit Power Company permits expired in 1917. In

January of 1917, the Fcrest. Service wrote City Light saying that their project on the Sauk and Suiattle would no longer be considered because Ross was actively looking for other site. How- ever, most sites were too small or claimed already. On July 20, 1917, City Light applied for a permit on the Skagit in direct opposition to the Skagit Power permits which were being reviewed.

The Forest Service was not satisfied with the firmrs performance.

Ross applied great pressure to have the permit revoked. The virtues of public ownership and of "city building" continued to be emphasized. However, a wartime I! energy crisis" provided a fresh and timely argument. Ross1 appeal was on behalf of the future of a city. We feel that if we are denied the Skagit site our plant and system will no longer be the city builder that it has been of the present standing and success of our city plant; it will be crushed to the wall and our competitor will have us bottled up .at every turn as they now openly boast. . . . Our appeal is from 350,000 citizens who are trying to build their city as against one financial concern which is trying to prevent us from so doing by filing on sites and holding them without development or buying them when we call for bids in good faith. 23

During World War I, Seattle experienced an economic boom, a period of expansion and prosperity. Sixty thousand people arrived to work in the new shipyards and factories. City Light's facilities were strained due to the failure of the Cedar River. Valuable fuel oil was being used in the thermal plants. Ross realized this fact and made use of the wartime fuel shortage in his arguments with the Secretary of Agriculture. In a letter to City Engineer A. H. Dimock, Ross said,

It is unnecessary to say that the use of fuel oil is nok expensive but it is against fuel conservation . . . It is, therefore, very urgent that we begin to install immediately the 25,000 kw plant which we require (for the ~kagit),not only to relieve the oil situation but to take care of the future growth that apparently is to be enormous. 24

The fuel oil supply had little to do directly with the potential development of hydroelectrical power . The Gorge Dam which hardly could be considered an emergency wartime measure was not completed until 1924. Nevertheless, this was part of the sales pitch that Ross used during his meeting with the Secretary of

Agriculture in Washington, D. C. in September 1917. The

Federal Fuel Administration needed City Light's cooperation.

The fuel shortage was a significant element in the negotiations between Ross and the federal government. In addition, the Wilson administration was sympathetic to the purposes of public ownership for rate regulation. C. E. Hamlin, Chairman of the Capital Issues Committee of the Federal Trade Commission which regulated capital expenditures during the war said that failure to permit Seattle City ~i~htto maintain full strength would eliminate a very important factor in fixing of rates for power in the district. . . . I fear very grave injury to the consumer of the district might occur. 25 Ultimately, Ross convinced the federal government of the importance of the Skagit project; they were not willing to risk the demise of this municipal ownership experiment. In December of 1917, the Secretary of Agriculture, David F. Houston, wrote the Skagit River Company informing them that their permits would not be renewed. He suspected that the company had acted in bad faith with the government. They had

failed to show any signs of progress. 26 At about the same time, he wrote Hugh Caldwell, Corporation Counsel for the City of Seattle informing him of the decision. Houston said that the Department of Agriculture was primarily concerned with the quickest and most complete utilization of the Skagit. The success of the city's application would depend upon its ability to show sincere intentions to develop the river and to provide adequate financing. 27 Ross was victorious; the competition had been eliminated. Ross wrote the Mayor of Seattle, Ole Hanson,

It I am convinced more and more each day that the concern that loses the Skagit will be relegated to oblivion sooner or later."28 In a 1918 press release, 'Ross boasted, Only one light and power concern can outlive the competition for there is only one Skagit River. It will be the survival of the fittest.*' The victory was, however, only a partial one. City Light possessed the water power rights on the Skagit. But, every management decision became subject to the approval of the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Power Commission after its creation in 1920. Seattle City Light began in 1918 a massive hydroelectric development project, known officially by the-

d Federal Power Commission as Project 533. The High Ross Dam is ., only a small fourth phase of the construction of the Ross Dam which is the third dam in the project. The Gorge and Diablo dams were completed previously. Another small dam, Copper Creek, is planned for the indefinite future. The High Ross Dam controversy, is, in fact, only the latest and most international chapter of a long development history. This history is an integral part of the controversy in Seattle, but is little known in vancouver. Early Planning --on -the Skagit River Removing the water power permits, however, was only the first step in the controversial process of hydroelectric development on the Skagit. The Department of Agriculture and the people of Seattle did not share Ross1 zeal and optimism. The demeanor of Secretary Houston was cautious. City Light was given priority consideration on the Skagit. But, there were strings attached; the federal government wanted action. The implications of Houstonls letter of intent were clear.

An examination of maps and other data available indicates that such development as is immediately proposed could be made without interfering with the subsequent development of the remainder of the river of the city's operation for any reason should not extend beyond the lower site. The Department is willing therefore that the lower Skagit site should be the basis for calling for bids for the proposed plant and in the event the city will undertake to make the development, the Department will grant a permit to the city for that purpose. The Department will also grant the city until May 15, 1918 priority consideration for any further development of the Skagit River on the understanding that in the meantime the city will prepare and submit to the Department its proposed scheme for such deve10pmen-t.~~

The challenge had been made; the bluff had been called.

At the same time, the city was in the middle of a mayoralty campaign. The eventual winner, Ole Hanson, used "city building'' ideas familiar to Ross. For instance, he told shipyard workers, We want manufactories that will be permanent sources of income for our workers. . . . And an abundant supply of electricity can help us get them. 3 1

He supported the Skagit project in principle. But he was skeptical. The spectre of the Cedar Dam blunder remained.

I declared in my opening statement of my campaign for mayor that I would oppose the expenditure of any money on development by the city of the Skagit River power site until a complete survey and approval had been made by a competent board of engineers. 32

However, on the weekend of May 1, 1918, the new mayor visited the Gorge site. Upon his return from what might be described as the first "city Light Skagit our" , Hanson came out strongly in favor of the project despite the fact that no engineering studies had been completed. The greatest problem before us now is the development of a great power site. I hope to see the day when every man in Seattle will eat a breakfast cooked by electricity and every factory here will be run by electric power. 33

Further, he reiterated Ross1 visionary theme. Securing the Skagit River for Seattle free is such an unheard of thing that no wonder many gasp and groan at the spectacle. Beginning the development of a real power site which will supply our needs means the end of the domination of Stone and Webster interests not only in Seattle but in the entire Northwest. The only monopoly I am in f2ior of is a monopoly owned by the city of Seattle.

Ross continued to promote the Skagit as a war conservation measure. He claimed that the Gorge project could completed

in eighteen months in order to relieve the pressure upon the

fuel oil supply in the city.35 In January 1918, the City '

Council allocated an initial $5,000,000 for the development

of the Skagit or actually in this case, the Gorge site. This appropriation demonstrated the city's ability to finance such a project and set the construction process in motion. In May,

the city decided to build the project itself rather than place

the job out to bids because the project was so controversial that no qualified bidders could be found . Plans for a dam at Ruby Creek also were going forward. A preliminary permit for

the Ruby Creek dam was submitted. The Forest Service required that the entire hydrologic potential be used and that it not be wasted by inefficient small or isolated dams. The entire river system had to be considered. Ross moved rapidly to gain

momentum and support. Later, he was to comment upon these early preparations that the first Ruby Creek applications were designed to improve the appearance of the overall plans for the river and to improve the pace of negotiations with the Department of Agric~lture.~~

But, all was not well with the project. The essential engineering and geological data were lacking. The Skagit was still remote and unknown. Adequate transportation to the Gorge site did not exist. When the Seattle press reported that the

Skagit froze in the winter or alternatively, that the average runoff was insufficient to turn the turbines, Ross did not have the basic data necessary for rebuttal. Ross was required to hurriedly request the basic hydrological data from the United States Geological Ser~ice.~~

Other critics argued that the Skagit was not needed and was too costly. The dam sites were too remote and the weather was too severe in the winter. Objecting councilmen issued a strong statement in anticipation of the pending City Council approval.

The Skagit site may be much larger than the city needs or can afford to build. We doubt very much if the city of Seattle as a muncipality will ever have a market for 200,000 kilowatts. If this is true the Skagit project would bs a white elephant as a fully developed power site.38 Although many in Seattle today feel that the High Ross Dam project is a white elephant, this sentiment did not prevail when the City Council unanimously approved the Skagit project on

May 21, 1918.~" Actual construction of the Gorge Dam began in September 1919. A wagon road from Rockport was proposed; 48. a small sawmill and a small, temporary hydroelectric plant for Newhalem were planned. After much negotiation with the Forest

Service and the sale of $1,500,000 worth of .bonds, Secretary Houston granted a permanent power permit in December 1919. The project had just begun; but City Light finally had done enough work to show good faith. Over the next fifty years, City Light would spend more than $165,000,000 on three dams and associated

facilities. -The Gorge -Dam In early 1920, a railroad was begun between the Great Northern line at Rockport to Newhalem twenty-six miles upstream. This was the first good access to the area. This railroad was better able to carry heavy loads required and it was more secure and restricted to outsiders. Security was very important. Ross was paranoid and feared sabotage from his enemies. Many years

later after some wheel bearings on one of his railroad enegines were damaged by gravel in the wheel housings, Ross wrote his

head works foreman to complain that the incident was undoubtedly

caused by men working for "the Other company". The other company most likely was meant to be Stone and Web~ter.~' When the first

permanent employees were hired for the management of the Gorge

plant, only experienced City Light employees were appointed in order to avoid the infiltration of "spies11 .4 1 The city engineering department completed the Gorge power-

house in late 1923. Then, the generators were installed. But,

the project was delayed until the diversion tunnel was finished during the summer of 1924 after much difficulty and controversy concerning the reliability of the engineering design. F. D. \ Harman, the Chief Operator at the Cedar Falls plant, ref'used the offer to become the first superintendent of the Gorge powerhouse. He believed that the plant would not work properly and that the dam would wash out in the first high water.

Although his views were widely shared in Seattle, they were unfounded. 42 The first electricity from Gorge, 5,000 h, came on line on

September 14, 1924. Within a week the generating capacity was increased to 17,000 kw and President Calvin Coolidge had officially opened the powerhouse by telegraph from Washington, D. C.

The total cost of the initial Gorge Creek project was more than

$l3,000.,OOO. Today, after replacing this early diversion dam with a high dam completed in 1961 and other structural changes, the generating capacity has been increased to the present 175,000 kw. -The Diablo -Dam The Gorge Dam had one of the largest installed genzrating capacities on the west coast. Indzed, the initial two generators at Gorge more than doubled City Light system1s capacity over the previous year. 43 But, this was not enough. Immediately upon completion of Gorge, the planning for the Diablo Dam was commenced. Ross observed,

City Light has passed its small town stage. Its future construction must be of the most enduring and dependable kind. The next logical step . . . con- sidering our demand is the Diablo . . .44 TO.

The construction railroad was extended six miles from Newhalem to Diablo in 1327. Actual construction of the dam began in late 1927. The 389 foot high dam, which at the time was the world's highest arch-type dam, was completed in the autumn of 1930. The

Diablo reservoir has a storage capacity of 90,000 acre feet.

Generators were not installed until 1936. However, the four units currently operating there have a combined capacity of

161,000 kw. The impact of the down stream benefits were immediate. The further regulation and stabilization of the river lessened the threat of flood for the farmers of the lower Skagit. The additional storage capacity added 33,000 kw capacity to the Gorge powerhouse which then acquired a guaranteed maximum output of 56,500 k~.~~ The completion of the Diablo Dam and the beginning of the depression combined to end Seattle City Light's massive building program temporarily. The utility1s generating capacity was about 59,000,000 kw in 1917 at the beginning of the construction of the Skagit project. In 1931 with the use of the Gorge and

Diablo dams, the system provided 384,000,000 kw. But, at the same time the number of consumers had doubled and the average residential consumerls demand had increased four fold.46

The practical impact of City Light's '1 city building'' policies as expressed through the development of the Skagit were apparent.

Shortly before the completion of the Diablo project, Ross wrote

'1 The Skagit is a life works with me. The third phase of the

Skagit project, the Ruby or Ross Dam, had only begun and would outlive Ross himself.

The Ross Daul C--- The Ross Dam site was one of the first tnajor power sites to

be claimed. Plans for a dam at Ruby Creek were filed by Ross with the Secretary of Agriculture in 1917 in order to demonstrate

the comprehensiveness of City Light's plans on the Skagit.

Active consideration of the Ruby Creek site began in 1925. The

original application for a water power license filed with the Federal Power Commission on November 8, 1926 included the 7-

- i

Ruby Creek project. Nevertheless, the Ruby Creek Dam and its /

international implications did not become widely known to the

public until the development of the High Ross Dam controversy in

1969 The first phase of the Ross Dam was begun in 1937. The

dam was designed with a unique concrete waffle facing in order

to accommodate future additions on the top of the first stage. The original plans called for the incorporation of each earlier

stage until the 1725 feet height is achieved. This first phase was completed to an elevation of 1365 in 1940. The second phase was begun almost immediately in 1943 stimulated by increased power demands of the World War I1 industrialization.

But, step two was not completed until 1947 at an elevation of 1550. The third phase was finished in 1949 at the 1615 feet

level which is the present level. The Ross power house was

constr.ucted between 1951 and 1956. The first generators went on line there in 1952. Presently, there are four units in operating which produce 90,000 kw each. The controversial High

Ross Dzc addition is, in fa

The Skagit River hydroelectric development was conceived more than seventy years ago. Seattle City Light has had a direct interest in the fate of the river since 1912. The goals set for this development by J. D. Ross at that time remain the principal elements of motivation for Seattle City Light during the High

Ross Dam controversy. Originally, Ross saw the Skagit as the key to the control of hydroelectric development in Northwestern

Washington. By monopolozing the hydroelectric potential of the

Skagit, Seattle City Light, and thus, not its principal competitor, Puget Sound Light and Power, acquired the power necessary

..I to develop facilities and to expand its service. Electric power meant political power.

Rosst primary goal on the Skagit as with the management of Seattle City Light as a whole was the dzvelopment of electricity by the public sector. Secondly, the massive development of the Skagit provided the large amounts of relatively cheap electrical power necessary for the economic growth of the City of Seattle. "City building" was a major motivation for the development of the Skagit. The desire for economic growth and for cheap power remains, but the era of "city building" has past. The Skagit project was a product of the climate of opinion of its times. The goals 53 set by Ross for the project were achieved. In this regard, th2 further construction of the project, in particular the High

ROSS addition, is no longer of much importance except as a form of institutional pride. Today, Seattle City Light is on the defensive. The major issues raised in the present controversy are those of the opponents of the dam. Seattle City Light's triumph, the construction of the dams, is the transformation of its values of sixty years ago into immobile concrete monuments. Their failure rests within this success in their inability to cope with changing resource opt ions within a new socio-polit ical context . Footnotes -for Chapter -111.

his chapter is indebted to four 14. A. 2-~heses from the University of Washington, Pitzer 1966, Dick 1965, Sparks 1964 and McNabb 1968.

2See, e. g., Moore 1968. 3~lthougha dead issue for many years, British Columbian opponents of the High Ross Dam were warned by their allies in 1970 not to mention the fact that Seattle City Light was a public institution within the City of Seattle. Perhaps, the issue of public versus private ownership of electrical utilities is not quite dead yet. Since B. C. Electric had been taken over by the Social Credit government in 1961, this has no longer been an issue in British Columbia. The British Columbia cons$rvationists had not intended to raise the issue and they have not done so nor has anyone else for that matter. 4~ee,-e.g., Dreher 1940.

'Dick 1965: 94.

12~hehistoric irony is obvious. One of the major elements of discontent from the Canad.ian point of view is the loss of sovereign land to the Americans. One can only speculate to the degree of dismay felt by the more nationalistic and anti- American opponents of the High Ross Dam project when they learn that the chief architect of the "land grab" was a Canadian. 7Di~k1965: 144. l 8Dic k 1365: 147. 19~ick1965:148.

20~i~k1965: 137.

*'See, -e. g., Van Hise 1910: 379. 22~eeDick 1965: 154 and Pitzer 1966:79.

23~parks1964: 26.

24 Sparks 1964 : 27.

25Di~k1965:170. 26~parks1964:29. 27Pitzer 1966: 83.

8~parks1964 : 20. 2s~parks1964:20. 30~parks1964: 32.

31 Sparks 1964: 34. 32~parks1964: 35. 33~parks1964: 36. 34~parks1964:39. 35~parks1964: 49. 36~itzer1966:86. 37~itzer1966: 90.

38~parks1964 :39. 39~itzer1966: 92. 40~itzer1966:101.

41~itzer 1966: 117. 42~itzer1966: 117.

CHAPTER IV

The Selling of a River Valley: The Beginnings of an International Controversy

The Skagit is an international river. But international water management questions were not involved until preparations for the Ross Dam began. Gorge and Diablo dams have no international impact upon the river. ' However, any potential development above the 1585 feet mark, the elevation of the river at the international boundary line, has obvious international implications. The first direct physical impact of Seattle City Light's Skagit development upon the British Columbia river followed the construction of the third phase of the

Ross Dam in 1949 at a height of 1615 feet. But, the international discussions concerning this ununda- tion began a quarter of a century before. These discussions continue to this day between the Province of British Columbia and the City of Seattle. The impact of the Ross reservoir in the

British Columbia Skagit 'Jalley is presently the subject of hotly contested political debate.. This has not always been the case. Prior to 1969 most of these discussions have been quiet administrative tasks. There was almost no public knowledge or discussion of the situation. Those who questioned the project had little impact as a review of these negotiations show.

Seattle City Light s position vis-a-vis negotiations concerning the fate of this land has been consistent. Put simply, its expressed desire has been to obtain permission $ I; to flood the valley. The only real issue for it has been how

much this privilege would cost in direct compensation for loss of land and/or in improvements upon the altered landscape. The

provincial government, however, has held several different

perspectives toward the value and meaning of the valley.

At various times, the provincial government's position has L.

varied from ignorance and apathy, to concern about timber values in the valley to worries about the legal precedents of selling downstream benefits and the implications of the Skagit negotiations for the Columbia River Treaty and Protocol. However,

there is no evidence that the province ever doubted the

wisdom of ultimately granting an easement for the valley to

Seattle. Early Negotiations -- Ignorance The province was informed initially of Seattle City Light's

intentions by J. D. Ross who handled the negotiations personally

in a letter dated October 26, 1926. This letter formed part of

the original application for licensing before the Federal Power

Commission which was approved the next year. In 1929, the

Whitworth Ranch was purchased. The Provincial Cabinet placed a

crown reserve upon 6,350 acres in the valley which included the

5,200 acres of surface area of the proposed reservoir at elevation 1725 in 1930 after Seattle City Light had the area legally surveyed. Negotiations were progressing. The project caused none of the political controversy in British Columbia that it had caused for years in Seattle. The public took little or no notice of the project*

The Skagit remained remote. The Hope-Frinceton Highway was only then being constructed. Accurate knowledge of the Skagit was meager. The provincial government did not appear to have any objections to the project in principle. The project had no

direct impact upon the lives of the people of the Lower Mainland.

Their is no direct link between the history of the development of the Skagit River and the history of the development of hydro-

electric power in British Columbia. There were no British

Columbian power plans for the development of the Skagit. But this project parallels the development of the Lower Mainland hydroelectric potential, for example, at S%ave Falls and Ruskin by the British Columbia Electric Company.

The Vancouver Board of Trade raised the first public questions concerning the Ross Dam in March 1931 when it wrote to the provincial Attorney-General R. M. Pooley. The Board of Trade

stated that the Skagit Valley contained about 400 square miles and was practically shut off from the rest of the province by mountain ranges. It did not know the potential value of the valley itself, but it was concerned about the mineral potential to the west.* The Board of Trade wrote in response to pending legislation in the Legislative Assembly.

We do not know that any representations have been made to the Provincial Government or that a corporation within the laws of the province has made any move to- wards acquisition of the area of land affected; but there is now before the legislature an amendment to the Land Act that would appear to have for its object just such a grant. . . . If such a grant were made and the proposed works constructed outside of provincial jurisdiction, it would appear to mean handing over in perpetuity a large area of our province to a foreign country. 5

The Board of Trade knew little about the Skagit. But, the reaction was immediate; the rumors were confirmed. And, the facts behind the flooding of the Skagit Valley were disclosed for the first time to the public. B. P. Stockton, a

Vancouver barrister, reported that he held two parcels of private land in the Skagit under his own name as an agent for Seattle City Light.' The first government reply came with the reassurances of the Minister of Lands, N. B. Lougheed. "B. C. interests will not be injured by the s~heme."~The minister reported that the matter had been under negotiation since 1926 and that the usual procedures for purchase and taxation would be followed. If there were any disagreements, the International

Joint Commission would be asked to protect Canadian interests. G

ow ever, contrary to the impression which Mr. Lougheed gave, the ,/ role of the ~nternztional'Joint Commission is not to defend or to represent the interests of British Columbia. It is a quasi- judicial body empowered to mediate disputes and to carry out studies. Nevertheless, for Lougheed, there was no cause for alarm. The government was negotiating quietly with Seattle. The most complete description of the Ross Dam project was published as a Letter to the Editor of the Vancouver Province 4 on the day after Lougheedf s statement. Signed by Alex Robinson of Vancouver, it was a clear and concise statement of Seattle City Light1s intentions written by one of its associates. Then as now, the principal defenders of the Ross Dam project were employees or associates of the agency. This lengthy rebuttal to the Board of Trade's complaint was the first accurate information to reach the public. This letter illustrated Seattle City Light's position vis-a-vis British Columbia land very well. The major ideas contained in this statement as will be seen remain major elements in Seattle City Light's policy to this day. The tone was straight forward and solicitious; the goal was explicit. The letter stated that the Board of Trade has made "many erroneous and misleading statements" and that they had appealed to the government 11 in haste". Robinson continued to describe the project and the negotiations. ,Seattle had offered to buy the land and to pay any stumpage or royalty required. The land to be flooded and access routes had been surveyed. The timber had been assessed at low value. British Columbia would be compensated for all costs.

All labor in Canada would be done by Canadians. A railroad was suggested along the Silver-Skagit route that would open the area up for economic development of all kinds. In conclusion, Robinson appeals to the critics from the Board of Trade to join Seattle City Light in the crusade against the "power trust".

@he full text of this letter is found in Appendix B.) Apparently, the Board of Trade was embarrassed into silence. There was no more public debate concerning the matter that year. Although both the provincial government and Seattle seemed to be willing to make a deal, the negotiations dragged out. The next public mention of the project came almost exactly two years later. Th? City Council of Seattle apprcved

$18,500,00 in 30 year construction bonds for the Ross Dam. The city promised to employ 15,000 men of whom 1,000 would work on the dam itself. In the depth of the depression this was optimistic news. Construction began in 1937. But the two parties had not agreed yet; nor had the Vancouver press learned where the doomed valley was. The Vancouver Province described it as being southwest of Princeton indicates the remoteness of the alley.^ Compensation -for Timber As the Ross Dam was being constructed, negotiations continued. The Ministers of Land changed as did the perspecti of their negotiators. By the 1940's they knew where the valley was and their primary concern was compensation for the timber in the valley. For instance, while announcing that they would be present at an International Joint Commission hearing concerning the Ross Dam, the Minister of Lands, A. Wells Gray, stated "that there was little settlement in the area but considerable timber on crown lands. 11 1 o The evaluation of timber supply in the valley was the major obstacle at that time.

Negotiations progressed slowly, but amicably. As anticipated by a previous Minister of Lands, the Ross Dam project was referred to the International Joint Commission. Approval by it is required under the terms of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. 63. -The International Joint Commission The International Joint Commission is a quasi-judicial body authorized under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to mediate boundary disputes. Its initial purpose was to prevent and/or to adjudicate disputes regarding boundary waters. However, the commission is empowered"to settle all questions concerning trans- boundary relations. One of its most important decisions involved the Trail smelter question. Air pollution from Comincols lead and zinc smelter at Trail, B. C. was damaging farmers' crops in Washington. After years of study and deliberation, the farmers received compensation. Cominco was ordered to reduce the amounts of effluent being produced. This world famous case is a landmark in international environmental law. In recent years, the role of the commission has broadened considerably from its traditional concentration upon water works and related issues. For instance, it has dealt with the question of the pollution of the Great Lakes and the future management of the Point Roberts,

Washington enclave. I3 The commission is a major instrument in bilat era1 relations between the United States and Canada. This highly respected, but controversial body is one of the earliest and most successful institutions of its kind.14 The commission is independent of both governments. But at the same time, it can act upon only those matters which are referred to it by the Department of State of the United States and the Department of State for External Affairs of the Government of Canada. The terms of reference, whether the question be a matter of study such as the 1971 Ross Dam reference or a matter for arbitration such as the 1941 Ross Darn application, are determined jointly by the two governments. The exact meaning and intent of these references are crucial. And, as in the case of the 1971 Ross Dam reference, it can be quite restrictive. This bilateral agency has a completely dualistic organization. The commission has six commissioners, three from each country, who are appointed by their respective governments. There are two chairmen who preside when the commission is in session in their respective countries. Likewise, there are two secretaries, who administer the affairs of the commission from offices in Ottawa and in Washington, D. C.. Normally, hearings are held in both countries where citizens from either country are welcome. Great stress is placed upon the bilateral character of the commission and the virtues of good neighborliness. In general, the International Joint Commission is a successful institution within its terms of reference. P A hearing concerning Seattle City Light's application for approval of the Ross Dam project was held on September 12, 1941 in Seattle. Approval is required under Article

IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty. The negotiations between

B. C. and Seattle were incomplete and were not the direct concern of this hearing. The commission left the matter of compensation open and referred the question back to the City of Seattle and the Province of British Columbia for further negotiations as per paragraph one of the Order of Approval dated January 27, 1942 which authorized the project. (see

Appendix C.) This hearing, unlike its counterpart twenty years later, was a quiet administrative affair.

The fate of the Ross Dam proposal was never in doubt. Only three commissioners were present. For unknown reasons, only one hearing was held; there was no hearing held in Canada. 16 The hearing was advertized poorly by present standards. No members of the general public were present. The primary concern was the presentation of preliminary engineering data. Very little was known about the project prior to this hearing by any one other than those directly involved. Notice of the hearing could have been overlooked easily by the public.

Notice was given to a number of American and Canadian officials.

But, apparently, little effort was made to spread the word. The Minister of Lands, A. Wells Gray's announcement of the hearing the day before was reported in the press by a one column inch story next to the obituaries in both the Vancouver -Sun and the Victoria Times. l7 The Game Commissioner, J. G. Cunningham, should have been informed of the hearing by the

Premier or by Mr. Gray. He was not. Instead, he learned of the hearing from his counterpart in Washington. Official notice was published in the Canada Gazette, in the "~egal Notices" of the Vancouver Province on August 18, 1941, (p. 18), on August 25, 1941 (p. 20) and on September 2, 1941 (p. 22) and in the "Legal ~otices"of the Vancouver -Sun on August 19, 1941 (p. 18), on August 26th (p. 22) and on September 2nd (p. 22). These notices were in small print in obscure locations.

Most of the hearing was occupied by a sketchy and confused description of the Ross Dam proposal by Seattle City Light officials. A crucial map of the Skagit Valley in British Columbia was not prepared properly. Much discussion concerned the proper location of the 1725 contour line. l8 Confusion surrounded the status of the negotiations between B. C. and Seattle. This was caused in part by the informal, personal nature of the negotiations conducted by the late J. D. Ross.lS The Government of Canada was represented by the District

Engineer, Dominion Water and Power Bureau, Department of Mines and Resources from Vancouver who restricted his remarks to technical inf~rmation.~'A representative of the Department of External Affairs had no statement to make. He had not studied the details of the project. 2 1 he Province of British Columbia was represented by the Comptroller of Water Rights. He read into the record a statement submitted by A. Wells Gray.

The Government of British Columbia does not oppose the application of the City of Seattle but submits that any approval given by the Commission should contain the following conditions:

That such approval be given conditional on the applicant making suitable and adequate provision for the protection and indemnity of all interests in British Columbia that may be injured by the construction or operation of the works to be constructed by the applicant.

That the Commission reserve jurisdiction to make a further order or orders with respect to the construction or operation of the said works. 22 Mr. Wells requests were granted in the Order of Approval of

The Comptroller continued to comment upon the impact of the flooding upon the land and upon the nature of the past negotiations re-enforcing his previous prepared remarks. I would like to add that it must be appreciated that the flooding of this land will undoubtedly affect the revenues of the province of British Columbia, not only in the lands, the forest, the waters and the meadows, but also in the fisheries. . . . For that reason, it is desireable that the Commission see to it that these interests are adequately protected. I should also like to say, in reference to the negotiations which were carried on about 1931 or 1932 by the late Mr. Ross, that while these arrangements did not terminate in an agreement, they were conducted very freely and I think generally the conditions were more or less set out. I do not anticipate . . . there should .be very much difficulty in the respective departments coming to an understanding. 23

One of the major reasons for the cordial acceptance of the J Ross Dam proposal was the fear of energy shortages. Canada was at war. The United States expected to join its allies soon.

Like the original neg~tiationsconducted by J. D. Ross in 1917 with the Department of Agriculture, City Light's position with the Federal Power Cornmission was placed within a military context. The Ross Dam proposal was viewed as a wartime emergency measure. Accordingly, Canada, the ally at war, could not object to the dam. The following testimony illustrates this feeling.

Mr. Wilson (counsel for City of ~eattle): In other words, Mr. Hoffman, in view of the present national emergency we do not know how much power and what facilities are going to be required, and we want to be prepared to proceed to increase our plant to take care of that situation if it develops? Mr. Hoffman (superintendent of Lighting, City of ~eattle): Yes, sir.. Mr. Stanley (~omrnissioner):. . . under the present exigent conditions you do not anticipate any great difficulty, if you deem it advisable, in reaching an amicable understanding between the city of Seattle and the province of British Columbia ? Mr. Hoffman: No, sir, I do not.** Again, the Skagit River development was viewed as an immediate source of cheap and abundant energy for expanding Seattle industry. The Ross Dam was justified as an emergency project in times of crisis during both world wars. The same logic continues today in the rhetoric of the so-called energy crisis

Significantly, the only reservations expressed at the

1941 hearing to the project as a whole came from the

Game Commissioner, J. G. Cunningham. He was not prepared to make a statement. He did not know the details of the project and had not seen a map showing the extent of the flooding in the Skagit Valley until the time of the hearing. He was concerned with the future of sports fishing in the valley. 11 It is one of the best fly fishing streams in the whole of British Columbia. But, he did not know what impact the flooding would have on the fishery. Further study was needed. The Game Commission conducted a survey of the impact of the flooding following the hearing. Concern was expressed regarding the loss of a registered trap line in the valley and the loss of sports fishing. The major goal was to determine the amount of compensation required."" Prior to the issuing of the final Order of' Approval, the Ciiairriian of the Canadian Section of the International Joint Commission, Charles Stewart, wrote the Premier of British Columbia, informing him of the meeting scheduled for that purpose in Montreal.

I am anxious to protect British Columbia and think it wise to inform you about this meeting in order that, if you think it desirable, you may make further representations, which will receive the consideration of the International Joint Commission before a final Order is passed. 27 No further objections were raised by the province. The Order of Approval was issued on schedule.

Cunningham' s observations anticipated the controversy which arose in 1963. Recreational users of the Skagit Valley, especially fly fishermen, constitute a major force of opposition

-7 7 -181 1. .,? to the High Ross Dam proposai. lrie 1y4~~i~d~~j~g lasted less than two hours. There was no real controversy. The press from British Columbia apparently was not present. The Victoria Daily Colonist, the Vancouver Province, and the Vancouver -Sun all ran the same story verbatim from the Associated Press Service. The hearing was described as reaching an "amicable agreement". The

Vancouver -Sun, however, placed the account of J. G. Cunningham's testimony in bold black type for emphasis. Also, the Victoria Daily Colonistls cut line described the Skagit River as a 'I backwater". The Skagit RTver remained remote, as a backwater.

But, at least some of the media remained sensitive to the fact that land was being flooded by Seattle's dam and that the fishing and other wildland ben~fitswould be lost. After reviewing the background of the proposal, the Order. of Approval confirmed the application to construct the Ross Dam.

However, this approval is subject to three conditions. (1)

Seattle is required to provide adequate compensation to British Columbian interests. The impounded water was not to have crossed the border until an agreement was confirmed between B. C. and

Seattle. (2) The commission reserved the right to review the terms of this order and the negotiated agreement and to manage the natural water levels as necessary. (3) The commission created the International Skagit River Board of Control, a two man engineering panel, to provide technical advice for them. The fundamental decision to build Ross Dam had been made formally. The Province of British Columbia had no objections to the project. With the exception of its influence within the International Joint Commission, the Government of Canada had no role in the decision. Responsibility for the management of water/ and land resources rest with the provinces under the British North America Act." Although City Light had yet to convince the City Council of Seattle, the Washington State Ecological Commission, and the Federal Power Commission of the wisdom of the project, no further formal permits or licenses were required from Canadian authorities after the approval in 1942. No formal avenues of Canadian citizenst participation in the decision remained. Only a very complex and undesirable legal argument on the part of the Canadian officials can reverse the decision. The Skaglt Yalley Tand Act CL -- Governmental negotiations and construction of the dam

continued following the commission1 s approval. Seattle City Light was anxious to complete the agreement as soon as possible. Seattle was willing to purchase the land outright or to buy an easement upon it. Quite clearly, the province was not able to determine for itself the proper compensation. In June 1945 Seattle let a contract for the clearing of the forested reservoir site on the Washington side. Three hundred million board feet of timber were to be transported to market over a six year period -via the Silver-Skagit Road which was constructed for this purpose. 30

Yet, the Minister of Lands and Forests, E. T. Kenney, found

it necessary to begin a new study of the forest resources in the Skagit Valley a year and a half later. Preparations by the gov2rnment for negotiations were intensified during the

fall of 1946. The minister himself visited the area. His principal concern was the amount of merchantable timber that would be eliminated. 31 These timber stands had been cruised years before; but the data were out-of-date. Seattle had asked, again, for a bill of damages for the flooding. 32 This flurry of renewed activity resulted in the introduction of the Skagit Valley Land Act by the lands minister at the v beginning of the 1947 Legislative Assembly session. 33 This act which was assented to on April 3, 1947 is short and simple. It set forth the conditions for the government's permission to flood the valley and the goals for the continuing negotiations. The Skagit Valley Lands Act reads in part:

2. The City of Seattle is authorized to cause Lot 1103, Yale District, to be flooded, under such conditions and restrictions as may be decided by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council; and such land, when flooded, shall be deemed to be improved land, and as such shall be subject to taxation under the provisions of the "Taxation Act". 3 The provisions of Section 2 shall not come into effect until The City of Seattle has paid to the Province such sum of money, as compensation for damages, as may be agreed upon between the City and the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, which sum may include an amount of money agreed upon in lieu of rentals or other current charges. Seattle was given legal permission to flood the valley in principle. An easement was granted. But they continued required. The provincial government could never determine the value of the timber and other resources in the Skagit Valley. -New Considerat ions -- Downstream Benefits Significantly, at the same time as permission was being granted, the British columbia Government was beginning to have second thoughts. The primary concern of the government was the revenue to be derived from the natural resources of the valley. However, after World War 11, the development of large scale, international water resource projects became more important. The Skagit was a small, remote river of relatively little significance. J3ut the Columbia was a major continental river with great potential for hydroelectric development. They became more cautious when it was realized that any action on the Skagit might set a precedent for international negotiations J' concerning the Columbia. After inspecting the Skagit Valley,

E. T. Kenney, the Minister of Lands, was unusually non-committal.

B. A. McKelvie reported in the Vancouver Province that the government intends to move cautiously in this matter, as it may become a precedent for other applications for use of B. C. st,reams and lakes along the border as holding grounds for U. S. power corporations. 34

From this time until the signing of the agreement of 1967, the negotiations between British Columbia and Seattle were over-

shadowed by the lengthy, complex negotiations concerning the

Columbia Fiver Treaty. The Skagit Valley negotiations were not concluded by Mr.

Kenney and the Coalition government as many had hoped. Seattle felt that a settlement for $255,508 cash for the damages in the valley had been reached in 1952. But, this arrangement evaporated with the advent of social Credit. 3 5 But, the Social

Credit government was "not cognizant" with an oral agreement which Seattle claimed it made with the previous government. The Minister of Lands, Robert Sornrners, claimed that there was no record of an agreement in his files. 36

the Spring Seattle City Light lost its patience. The third phase of the Ross Dam had been constructed. Genera- tors had been installed. Only the construction of the fourth phase, the High Ross, remained. Seattle was worried because reservoir water was already across the boundary line covering about 500 acres. Strictly speaking, this impoundment was illegal. Eeattle appealed to the IntemaLional Joint Corrmission to mediate the stalled negotiations. They met in special executive session on April 8, 1954 to consider the fate of the Skagit.

The terms of the 1942 Order of Approval were not being met. seattle was represented by a city counsel and by Senator J. W. deB. Farris, a prominent, Liberal Vancouver laywer. They urged the International Joint Commission to settle the dispute as quickly as possible. British Columbia explained its reasons for delay. The meeting was essentially a discussion of the general distribution of downstream benefits. After the hearing, Lt. -Col.

Eric Pepler, an assistant attorney-genera1,stated that British

Columbia thought it was "an amicable" meeting. 37 The Province of British Columbia feared that a case settlement on the Skagit such as the one almost achieved in 1952 would prejudice negotiations concerning the Libby Dam on the Kootenay

River and the Columbia River dams. They no longer wanted cash. In order to establish an important precedent for other international water projects, the province wanted a direct share of the downstream benefits. That is a portion of the electrical power generated by the Ross Dam. Being linked with the Columbia River proposals, it was clear that the begotiations on the Skagit had become greatly more complex. Seattle City Light was in serious trouble, Expansion of the Ross Dam could not wait until the Columbia situation, especially the Libby Dam, was settled.

There is no direct relationship between the operation of the hydroelectric development on the Skagit River and the development on the Columbia River by British Columbia Hydro and power Authority and the Bonneville Power Authority. Since the

Skagit negotiations were delayed until 1967, they had no direct influence on the Columbia River developments. But the character of the negotiations between Seattle and British Columbia were shaped by these more important deliberations in the region. The

Columbia River Treaty is a complex affair in itself.38

A quick solution had to be found. British Columbia could demand that Seattle City Light lower its reservoir thereby draining the controversial 500 acres of British Columbia. This would disrupt the no-rmal operating procedures established for Ross

Dam. No progress had beel ;iic _;e in the International Joint Commission hearing. Then Congr essman Thomas Pelly of Washington ,,/ proposed a compromise. Iie fibs=.-----&.L ~cd that tine

will not permit extensive delay in reaching a decision, and they (th2 British Columbia officials) will therefore be amenable in a temporary arrangement which would permit the city to flood beyond the boundary for one year, or until such time as a permanent arrangement can be reached. 3 s A temporary cash settlement allowing the flooding in the Skagit

Valley was offered which did not prejudice the final results of $/, the negotiations. Robert Somners, the Minister of Lands, reacted coolly to Pellyl s compromise. He stated that he was waiting for a proposal from Seattle. And, he reminded them that the

Order of Approval requfr~dthat no flooding was to occur prior to a firm agreement being signed. He was not prepared to finalize the negotiations. Further study was necessary; he had no record in his file from the previous administration showing their basis for a settlement. Provincial economists and engineers were examining the situation. 40 Nevertheless, Pellyl s compromise suggest ion was successful. A temporary agreement was reached a month later which avoided the controversial elements of the stalled negotiations. Robert

Sornmers stated that the settlement was signed as I Ia favorff. It did not prejudice any formula for downstream benefits . British Columbia was especially concerned about the fate of the Libby Dam at this time. The contract did, however, legitimize City Light's reservoir. The agreement allowed Seattle to flood 635 acres for $5000 a year on a "temporary" basis until March 31, 1955. This settlement was to be renewed annually until the final 1967 agreement was signed. 4 1 This interim settlement solved Seattle's immediate needs. But negotiations continued slowly. Eventually, it became clear that no agreement was possible until after the Columbia River Treaty was ratified. British Columbia was opposed to a final settlement beCause it feared that the Skagit negotiations would set the pattern for the Columbia River project. Attorney- General Robert Bonner said, They want a lump sum payment in settlement of the Skagit. We have opposed this because of its influence on the Columbia.** This represented a major shift in emphasis. The interim settlement was reviewed and approved annually. But, the real negotiations were postponed. 43 The fundamental terms of the agreement were to be derived from the Columbia River negotiations.

Federal ~fficialsWnrn awarn of the Ross Dam project, but considered it of little importance. The Hon. Howard C. Green, secretary of State For External Affairs 1959 - 1963, was not aware of any relationship between the Ross Dam and the Columbia River Treaty. He does not recall this matter ever being brought to his attention during his term in office.44 The Hon. Alvin

Hamilton, Minister of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources between 1957 and 1960 and the Chairman of the federal- provincial Columbia River Policy Liasion Committee remembers the Skagit River being mentioned by his advisors during general briefings. But, it was never of any importance. Although it was mentioned, the Skagit was never discussed at any length and does not appear in the minutes of the Columbia River Policy Liaison Committee. * --The 1967 Agreement After the Columbia River Treaty and Protocol were finalize"; in 1964, B. C. felt free to enter into serious negotiations with

Seattle. However, the terms of reference had changed radically.

It was the Province of British Columbia which was committed to a lump sum payment after Premier W. A. C. Bennettf s dramatic turnabout after the signing of the Columbia River Treaty which required the negotiation of the Protocol. They wanted money; downstream benefits in the form of electrical power were no longer desired. Five years later, after forty years of discussion, the requirements of the 1942 Order of Approval was satisfied by the signing of the 1967 agreement by the Mayor of Seattle and the Minister of Lands, Forests and Water Resources. (see

Appendix n. )

The 1967 agreement calls for an annual rental payment of

$34,566.21 paid by the city to the province for 99 years in

exchange for permission to flood the Skagit Valley; i.e., an easement to inundate the valley to the 1725 feet elevation level or approximately 5,180 acres. In addition a buffer zone to the 1740 feet elevation was provided for management purposes.

The province was also given the option of obtaining payment in the form of electrical power at the rate of 3.75 mills (based upon the U. S. dollar) per kilowatt hour supplied at an annual load factor of at least 65 percent delivered to the international boundary line. This provision allowed a hedge against inflation,

if necessary. But, the actual amount of power is very small.

Seattle was required to delineate the ground, to clear the land prior to inundation, and to replace the Silver-Skagit Road and to make other improvements of the reservoir shoreline. All labor employed by these activities was required to be residents of the Province. In general, the Province reserved all rights

for itself other than the right to generate hydroelectric power and to manage the reservoir within the Skagit watershed.

The 1967 agreement is the most important document in the

High Ross Dam controversy. It defines the working relationship between the Province of British Columbia and the City of ~eattle./ It formalized the tacit understanding in operation for forty years. Any reasonable person could have expected to file this document away and forget about it. The long negotiations were the final preparations for the construction of the high dam were being finished. Most importantly, there was no opposition to the project i'rom British Columbian interests.

The development of the Skagit River conformed with the goals of the province on the Peace and Columbia Rivers. The federal government had had virtually no role in the matter. The

International River Improvements Act had not been applied. The provincial government had passed the Skagit Valley Lands Act. The 1967 agreement complied with the requirements of the 1942 Order of Approval. As long as British Columbia was satisfied with the settlement, the International Joint Commission would not reconsider this ref ercnce. The Canadian decis ion-making process was complete. No formal administrative procedures remained for opponents of the dam in Canada.

Conclusions

The fate of the Skagit Valley was never in doubt from the day that J. D. Ross first request was received in 1926. A tacit understanding existed between the provincial government and the city that the flooding would be allowed. The 1967 agreement should have been approved during the early 1930's.

The or Tginal negotiations were delayed by the financial pressures of depression, by the loss of the personal services of J. D. Ross during the New Deal and ultimately, by his death. The provincial government ; attitude toward the Ross Dam project was passive. That is to say, while the various lands ministers did not oppose the project, none showed any real enthusiasm for it. seattle City Light always showed the initiative. Their desires and purposes were consistent and clear.

The principal cause for frustration during these negotiations was the indecision and incompetence on the part of the various lands ministers. Although the ultimate decision was not in doubt, the provincial perspective toward the Skagit Valley changed several times. The ministers never seemed to have a full grasp of the facts concerning the valley. 1 Surveys of the natural resources of the area were never complete; the economic and engineering reports used to assess the costs of the flooding were lost. At first, the Skagit Valley was remote and unknown as the petition by the Vancouver Board of Trade illustrates.

During the late 1930's and the 1940' s the primary concern was the value of the timber in the area. With the advent of negotiations concerning the Columbia River development, the Skagit River took on greater importance for the province. A settlement on the Skagit would set a precedent on the Columbia. B. C. desired a share of the downstream benefits; i.e., a portion of the peaking power generated by the dam. Then, after W. A. C.

Bennett's great reversal on the terms of the Columbia River

Treaty which required the negotiation of the Protocol, the Province demanded a cash payment. These perspectives changed; but, they all view the valley as a direct source of revenue, a natural resource to be exploited.

There was no important opposition to the project. But, the few objections that were heard did anticipate the controversy that developed a few years later. The Vancouver Soard of Trade wanted to exploj-t the resources of the area; they disliked the alienation of the land for its use by foreign interests. The Game Commission questioned the impact of the reservoir upon the fish and wildlife population of the area; they wished to protect the interests of the fish and the fishermen. These few objections that were heard did anticipate the controversy that would develop a few years later when the general public became aware of the full implications of the 1967 agreement. The arguments against the High Ross Dam project L/ existed. But, they were not articulated well. Effective means to raise questions about this project were not apparent. The

British Columbia-Seattle negotiations remained a quiet, administrative procedure outside the political arena. Footnotes -for Chapter -IV

'1f these two dams have any influence upon the character of the river within British Columbia, it is very minor. The Washington State Game Commission did not object to the construction of the Gorge Dam. A fish hatchery was planned, but not built when it was determined that few salmon spawned above the Gorge site. ( Pitzer 1966: 103) 2Nelson testimony Seattle City Light 1973: I:10.

=F'urther information regarding the history of B. C. hydroelectric development can be found in Ingledox 1945; Siemens 1968; Taylor 1965 and Maiden 1947. More general accounts of the social and political history of British Columbia can be found in Ormsby 1958; Robin 1972, 1973 and Sherman 1966. A summary of the present electrical energy situation in the province and its prospects for the future can be obtained in the reports of the B. C. Energy Board of 1971 and 1972. Efford and Smith 1972 is also quite helpful.

41n fact, 400 square miles is about 256,000 acres, an over- estimation of the amov~ltof land involved by a factor of forty. Although there was no road, access into the Skagit Valley -via the route of the present Silver-Skagit road was relatively easy. Flooding of the valley would have no direct impact upon potzntiz? zinerzl reserves,

5~ancouverProvince "say Seattle Plans to Flood B. C. Skagit ~rea",March 26, 1931, p. 1. This amendment to the Land Act was passed eventually as the skagit Valley Lands Act on April 3, 1947. 6~ancouverProvince I I Skaagit Power is Objective of ~eattle", March 29, -m4. 7~ancouverSun Lougheed Favors Seattle Bid For Skagit ~roperty",March31, 1931, p. 1. 8~ancouverProvince 11 Lougheed Discounts Danger of lood ding" , March 31, 1931, p. 1.

S~ancouverProvince I1 Seattle Power Project Would Use B. C. Water $18,000,000 Skagit River Development Would Employ 15,000 Men" , March 31, 1933, P. 7. 10~ancouverSun "~owerDam May Affect B. C. ~imber",September 11, 1941, P.16. li~hePreliminary Article of the Boundary Waters Treaty reads: For the purposes of this treaty boundary waters are defined as the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting waterways, or the portions thereof, along which the international boundary between the United States and the Dominion of Canada passes, including all bays, arms, and in- lets thereof, but not including tributary waters which in their natural channels would flow into such lakes, rivers, and or the waters of rivers flowing across the boundary.

The Skagit River is clearly a boundary water. I2see, -e. g., IJC 1936-40 and Murray 1972. 13see, e. g., IJC 1970 and 1973.

14~orfurther analysis of the IJC as an institution, see, e.g., Chacko 1932; Bloomfield and Fitzgerald 1958; Berber 19597 Bourne 1971; McDouglass 1971 and Smedresman 1973.

15~rticleIV of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 reads: The High Contracting Parties agree that, except in cases provided for by special agreement between them, they will not permit the construction or maintenance on their respective sides of the boundary of any remedial or protective works or any dams or other obstructions in waters flowing from boundary waters or in waters at a iower level than the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary, the effect of which is to raise the ,natural level of waters on the other side of the boundary unless the construction or maintenance thereof is approved by the aforesaid International Joint Comrnis sion.

'=letter from D. G. Chance to T. L. Perry, June 15, 1971, author1s file.

17~ancouverSun "~owerDam May Affect B. C. ~imber",September 11, 1941, p.16 and Victoria Times "B. C, Watching Skagit Power plan1', September 11, 1941,. 11. 26~etterfrom F. R. Butler to L. J. Burpee, September 23, 1941, author1s file.

27~etterfrom Charles Stewart to John Hart, January 8, 1942, author1s file.

28~ictoriaDaily Colonist t 1 Agreement on Water Levels, Joint U. S. , Canadian Commission Settle Skagit River Rackwater" , September 14, 1941, p. 39 and Vancouver Province "~kagit River Backed Into canadall, September 13, 1941, p. 39. 29~heGovernment of Canada achieved some jurisdiction over management of internatliouai rivelXsby the enactment of the International River Improvements Act in 1955. However, the legality of --post de facto applica.bility of this act in the Ross Dam case IS questionable.

30~ancouverSun "~eattleHydro to Affect B. C. ~iver"June 9, 1945, p. 28, 31~ancouverSun ca am to Flood 7800 Acres of B. C. c and", September 1946, p. 12. 32 Vancouver Sun "~eattleto Pay R. C. for ~loods",November 15, 1946, p. 27 33~ancouverSun 11 Seattle to Flood Skagit River Area", March 26, 1947, p. 11. 34~ancouverProvince I1 Kenney Completes Skagit Dam ~urvey", September 30, 1946, p. 10.

35~ancouverProvince 11 Skagit River Border Dispute to be Settled in Washington", April 9, 1954, p. 12.

36~ancouverProvince "B. C. Awaits Seattlels Ross Dam ~roposal", May 13, 1954, P* 11. 37Vancouver Province 11 Skagit River Border Dispute to be Settled in Washington" ,. April 9, 1954, p. 12. 38~heliterature concerning the Columbia River Treaty and Protocol is extensive. Accounts of that situation which dominated hydroelectric development during the 1950' s and 1960% can be found in Bocking 1972; Wilson 1973; Krutilla 1967; Waterfield 1970, 1973 and the Canada Departments of External Affairs and Northern Affairs and Natural Resources 1964. 39~ancouver-Sun " Temporary Pact Urged for Ross Dam, Normal Operation Handicapped by Failure to Reach ~ecision",May 11, 1954, P. 19. 40Vancouver Sun I I B. C. Waits Seattle Word on Ross am", May 13, 1954, p. 1r

41~ancouverSun "~eattlePays B. C. for Land Flooding, Temporary Settlement- In Skagit River Power project", June 30, 1954, p. 27 42~ancouver-Sun "parley on Skagit 'Key' to Columbia, B. C. to Fight Settlement Demand in Ottawa as Setting precedent", October 9, 1958, p. 13.

I I 43~ee,P. g. , Vancouver Province Agreement on Flood Pay okayed", April 13, 1959, p. 6 and Vancouver Province "~loodTerms okayed", May 10, 1962, p. 3. 44~ersonal communication, Howard Green, January 30, 1974.

45~ersonalcommunication, Alvin Hamilton, February 1, 1974. CHAPTER V

The Creation of Cont,roversy: The Role of the Conservationists

one who habitually endeavors to contemplate e true state of things, the political state can hardly be said to have any existence whatever. It is unreal, incredible, and insignificant to him, and for him to endeavor to extract the truth from such lean material is like making sugar from linen rags, when sugar cane may be had. Generally speaking, the political news, whether domestic or foreign, might be writtsn today for the next ten years with sufficient accuracy. Most revolutions in society have not power to interest, still less alarm us; but tell me that our rivers are drying up, or the genus pine dying out in the country, and I might attend. -- Henry David ~horeau'

It is contended in this chapter that the revival of the High Ross Dam question in 1969 is the product of two core eie- ment s within the conservation movement. These two elements are the rise of the conservation movement in British Columbia of which the ROSS Committee is a part and, the history of the campaign to create the North Cascades National Park which was led by the North Cascades Conservation Council. These two elements are products of both the climate of opinion present in British Columbia and Washington during the last five years and the overall, general history of the conservation movement. These principal factors in this controversy are examined as catalytic agents in the public debate as a whole. The persons responsible for the creation of the High Ross Dam controversy are members of the Vancouver-based --ad hoc coalition, the KOSS Committee, and the North Cascades

Conservation Council whTch has headquarters in Seattle. The character of these two groups is described for they are

Seattle City Light's principal protagonists. A wide variety

of individuals and groups is involved, most of whom are part of the North American conservation movement. The High Ross Dam controversy is a product of the conservation movement. The character of the conservation movement as a social movement is reviewed. This movement has provided ,/ the mean to articul.ate objections to the High Ross Dam project within the political process.

Unless otherwise noted, the data and observations in this chapter concerning the nature of the conservation movement and the character of the ROSS Committee and the North Cascades Conservation Council are derived from the personal experience and participatory observation described in the introductory chapter. -The Conservation Movement --as a Movement The conservation movement is a particular kind of social

movement. A movement is the voluntary association of people to

promote a common ideology or to seek solutions or satisfaction of specified common problems or goals. These common ideologies and goals give the movement social force and distinguish it from other more strictly social organizations. Ideology is the only thing which effectively distinguishes a movement from any other voluntary association. Thus, within a religious moveirmit, a sharp distinction iriust be made betweel-1 the theological attributes of a Sunday service and the social attributes of a church sponsored Tuesday night bridge club. Like a religious movement, the conservation movement has within it elements of theology and of socialization. Movements, by definition, are more than gatherings or social clubs; they have ideological motivation and goal oriented activities.

As the political expression of current beliefs concerning man1 s relationship with his environment and/or the "wise" management of natural resources, the conservation movement has a wide variety of ideological stances which may or may not be mutually compatible. Thus, game wardens and sport hunters may cooperate with other groups of conservationists in the development of wildlife management policies; but they may disagree completely with each others1 motives. For instance, one group may desire to maintain the deer population in order to shoot them and the other group may wish to preserve the deer and other wildlife 'populations in order to maintain the integrity of wildlife for its own sake. The management of petroleum and natural gas reserves by government and by industry is done under the name of conservation. Political officials, business execu- tives, and wildlife biologists all claim that they support conservationist goals. Yet, often, they promote different and conflicting views.

The conservation movement does not have an absolute, consistent ideological base; at least, it is not articulated. This weak ideological base is a major source of tension within the movement. Note well, however, that this is more than a question of what or who is "ideologically pure". Nor is it merely a matter of eliminating spurious claims. Despite the well known efforts of several contemporary conservation leaders, the theoretical basis for the movement remains vague. Although the specific goals remain varied, the comprehensive concept of environmental quality has broadened and unified the general philosophical perspective of the conservation movement. The concept of environmental quality is part of the development of the so-called environmental movement that has transformed much of the conservation movement. J. Michael McCloskey, the Executive Director of the Sierra Club and one of the most pronlineni; leaders of thz conszrvzticz azvement, has observed this recent transition. In a sense, th~conservation movement is now in 7" the process of being swallowed up into a larger and newer movement - an environmental one. This latter movement is an amalgamation of many others: the consumer crusade, including the corporate reformers; the movemmt for scientific responsibility; a revitalized public health movement; birth control and population stabilization groups; pacifists and those who stress participatory democracy in which decisions are made consensually; young people who stress simplicity in life styles and who call for personal action and ecological responsibility in living; and other groups searching for a new focus for politicz. While many of the long-term goals of these organizations are similar, the new movement lacks cohesion with respect to what comes first: mass education, major life style changes, simplified institutions, or traditional pragmatic efforts at piecemeal reform. 4 Basic differences of opinion exist; at the same time, most of ihese inter%& groups arc able to work together. Coalitions are formed; overlapping memberships and directorships are common. The bPa;?rder and larger groups like the Sierra Club which contains elements of' the points of view that McCloskey described serve as clearinghouses for reform. The greatest internal battles concern priorities of action rather than long term goals and principles. There is strength in diversity and variety only as long as unity of purpose is maintained. Interestingly, some of the most prominent names in the environmental movement are essentially leaders of these newly combined causes for reform. Ralph Nader is a major advocate of consumer and corporate rcform. Barry Commoner, Donald Chant and many of the anti-pollution leaders started in the movement for scientific responsibility and for improved public health.6 Paul Ehrlich and his Zero Population Growth groups are part of a long history of family planning and population control groups. The Greenpeace Foundation as the name implies has merged environ-

mental concerns with pacifist goals and methods. s Conservation groups in the United States in the early 1970's found themselves in opposition to the war in Indochina largely as a result of the devastation of defoliation programs. It is clear that persons who otherwise would not speak to one another are allied

together under a common banner of environmental reform. In sum, it can be said that activities within the conservation rnovzment are particularly important as a representative instance of action by the public at large in governmental decisiol-i mking. Movsmcfit c, as associations of peep] e with common idzologies and goals, have certain real and/or potential constituencies. Although not catholic, the conservation movement's membership is extremely diverse. Consequently, there is presently an amazing degree of social, political and ideological flexibility within the expanded conservation movement. In this regard, the immediate historical roots of the movement during the Progressive Era are significant. To gain further understanding of the High Ross Dam controversy these immediate historical roots require more examination. -The Conservation Movement -in Historical Pattern The historical patterns within the conservation movement rest upon common values expressed in varied socio-political contexts. The contemporary conservation movement is a product of the settlement of a new continent during a time of rapid

economic, political, social and technological change. A poor and empty land is now a rich and full land.6 Despite these changes, the basic patterns of public and private management of the landscape have not changed significantly. The conservation movement may therefore be seen as one of the current mani- festations of the desire to control or to influence the destiny of the exploitation and thc distribution of natural resources. Although the basic socio-political and technological stratsgies of the conservation movement have varied, the basic arguments of the conservation movement as a cultural force, as a communicator of ideas about the environment have remained very similar.

All hydroelectric contra-jersies see^ to follo~the same basic patterns that are inherent in the High Ross Dam controversy. Thus, one may interchange the elements of debate concerning hydroelectric dams from one particular time and place to another by changing the proper nouns and some of the technical details. These inherent similarities are part of the historical patterns and cultural fabric of natural resource decision making. The fundamental structure of the High Ross Dam debate is very similar to that of the Hetch Hetchy Dam controversy at the

beginning of this century. At the core of that conflict was the philosophical debate between John Muir, the writer and naturalist, and Gifford Pinchot, the Chief of the United States Forest Service. Their personal views are symbolic of the wide philosophical differences within the conservation movement. Muirls foremost concern was the preservation of the natural landscape for its own sake. Pinchot is best known for his definition of conservation as the wise use of natural resources which he applied to the management of the national forests. The philosophical traditions of Muir and Pinchot are continued by the North Cascades Conservation Council and Seattle City Light as forthcoming description of their views will show.

The Hetch Hetchy Dam was built by the city of San Francisco in the Hetch Hetchy Valley within Yosemite National Park as part of the city's public water supply system. The Hetch Hetchy Dam was part of the same visions of city building which stimulated the creation of the Skagit River development by the city of seattle. Built in a new national park, the Hetch Hetchy Dam was the subject of a lengthy controversy between conservationists

led by John Muir and city officials who desired to provide for

the growing demand for water in San Francisco. This classic in

conservation history has many parallels with the High Ross Dam

case. Indeed, as will be discussed later, the tragedy of Hetch

Hetchy, has been referred to as part of the argument against

the High Ross Dam.7 Another example of the patterns and uniformity within the

history the conservation movement occurred accident coincidence. During the months prior to the International Joint

Commission hearing on the High Ross Dam in 1971, unrelated

research by a member of the ROSS Committee led to the Rainy

Lake reference or docket. One of the fruits of this research was a quotation from the final report of this reference which was given to David Brousson, a spokesman for the ROSS Committee,

for inclusion in his submission. This quotation, written thirty- seven years before, summarized the entire thrust of the ROSS Committeef s presentation.

The Commission also sympathizes with the aims and the objects of those who advocate that this beautiful, natural sanctuary, emblematic of peace and unmarred by the hand of man, should be set apart as a memorial. park to commemorate the more than a century of peace, goodwill and common ideals that have existed between the English speaking peoples that live side by side on the northern half of this continent, and the commission is particularly desirous that nothing in this report should present any obstacle to, or in any way interfere with,the governments of the two countries into a treaty for this purpose. Brousson went on in his presentation to conclude:

Those words comk from the con:lusions and recommendations of the Final Report --of the International Joint Commission, Rainy-- Lake Reference, --May .. 1,- -1934.-- I do not suggest they exactly, or completely describe the Ross Lake-Skagit Valley situation, but those words do present, even 37 years later, a point of view for consideration of this Commission. IF THIS IS THE KIND OF THINKING DONE BY THE COMMISSION IN THE YEAR OF 1971, I HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT YOU WILL GIVE THE SKAGIT VALLEY A SECOND CIIATJCE.

A discrete smile of appreciation of the historical conver-

gence flashed across the faces of several of the commissioners when Brousson read this quotation. Neither the 1971 commissioners nor the ROSS Committee wanted another .international peace park.

But, the request for the preservation of wildlands as park was

clear. The Rainy Lake reference contains statements regarding

the wilderness and recreational values of the Boundary Waters

Canoe Area/Quetico Provincial Park region which could be used

easily today. On an individual level, similar patterns prevail in terms

of the daily conduct of the natural resource issue. For example, at an early news conference held jointly by the ROSS Committee 11 and the North Cascades Conservation Council which introduced i the international aspects of the High Ross Dam controversy to the Seattle media, there was a very friendly exchange between

one of the participants and one of the reporters. Being an experienced reporter, he knew the right questions to ask and

the conservationists, also being experienced, knew exactly how

to respond. This ritualized exchange was not for the benefit

of either participant but for the sake of the readership. The conservationist received his press coverage and

the reportery got his stor..Y . However, the point. is that both knew exactly what the other was going to say. The cultural pattern of the arguments change very slowly; but the basic patterns, implicitly and subjectively known, provide the fundamental framework for the natural resource controversy when one arises. From time to time, the patterns of history converge to create a renewed vigorous conservation movement that is able to challenge well established goals and institutions. However, even when the climate of opinion is conducive, press conferences and public hearings are not haphazard events; they are well planned and organized by the parties in the controversy. The ROSS Committee and the North Cascades Conservation Council have major roles in the management of the High Ross Dam controversy. However, before discussing the nature of these two organizations, it is useful to place them within the context of the wide variety of conservation organizations present. The Conservation Movemmt - Its Variety of Organizations - . - - Each conservation organization has its own style, public image, modus operandi, and special interests. Organizations, like individuals, have personalities and personality conflicts.

Conservation groups are faced with a wide variety of potential concerns; but their resources are limited. Thus, political issues are chosen according to the interests of the members and their ability to handle them. Accordingly, a11 issues are created; 311 issues are rnana,gnd. Political strategy depends upon the nature of the issue, the political climate, and the political and philosophical attitudes of the conservation leadership.

A typology of conservation organizations in the public sector has been devised based upon the author's observations of such groups in North America. Nine types have been identified according to size, organizational structure, geographical area, and function. They ar2 the oligarchy, the dispersed hierarchy, the localized assembly, the specialized social, the confederation, the coalition, the foundation, the --ad hoe, and the non-conservation public affairs organizations. Oligarchical organizations usually cover large geographical areas, are run by boards of directors and perhaps an executive director and a staff, and have a dispersed membership which has a little or no power in deciding the policies of the organization. The Wilderness Society and Friends of the Earth are examples. Disperszd hierarchical organizations are similar to oligarchical ones with the exception that the members have a direct voice in the affairs of the organization. The members of the board of directors are elected by the membership. The organization is pyramidal in structure. Policy is set on the local level with the approval of the higher unit. It is essentially a representative democracy in structure. The Sierra Club is an example. The localized assembly covers a small geographical area, has a small to medium-sized membcrshlp, is led by an executive committee of three to twelve persons, tends to specialize on a narrow range of interests, tends to lack permanence and experience, and relies heavily on the talents of a small number of persons. The localized assembly type is quite common and is characteristic of most of the newer so-called "ecology" organizations. The specialized social group is usually small and is similar in structure to the localized assembly. But it has a highly specialized interest or activity such as camping, hunting, fishing, or nature study. It is primarily an outdoor social club and not a political organization. Nevertheless, it will ally itself with the more activist groups but usually will not take a position of leadership. The local rod and gun club is an example. Such organizations are usually permanent and consider themselves as long time conservationists. The confederation covers a large geographical area and brings together localized assemblies or specialized social groups. It may have a staff which represents its members and does the actual conservation work. It is governed by representatives from the local member groups and is usually weaker than the othnr centralized types of organizations because it must depend more heavily on the support of the local club. The Federation of Wcstern Outdoor Clubs and the British Columbia Wildlife Federat ion are examples. The coalition is a highly specialized type of organization.

~t is a conf ederatiorl of organi~atioiisand somctirns indS vi duals which band together in order to consolidate power and money for

a particular purpose. As we will see, the ROSS Committee is such a coalition. Foundations are non-profit, tax deductible organizations which promote research and/or conservation education. Normally, they do not participate directly in the political process.

Resources For the F'uture and the Conservation Foundation are notable examples of indcpendent research institutions. Other foundations, like the Sisrra Club Foundation, provide a direct, but non-political, supportive role. In the United States, the tax sheltered money that the foundations handle can not be used for purposes of influencing legislation. Most conservation

organizations as non-profit, public interest groups can qualify for tax deductible status. However, this can only be done at a political cost. The Sierra Club, for example, lost its tax status as governmentzl punishment for fighting too vigorously against dams on the Colorado River. However, at present the leaders of the Sierra Club do not want the tax status back because they feel that the possible gain in donations would not offset

the conscious and subconcious constraints placed upon their policy making process by the Internal Revenue Service's regulations concerning lobbying. The position of the Government of Canada regarding lobbying by non-profit organizations is less well defined. Despite the restrictions placed upon conservat ion organizations by tax laws, foundation grants are important sou.rces of funds. 10 The --ad hoc organization is a temporary, highly specialized type of localized assembly dedicated to one particular issue or it is a coalition or front organization established to handle one particular issue. --Ad hoc groups have lives of their own. Some are short lived. Others transform themselves into permanent organizations. In addition to the above mentioned types of organizations, there is a number of non-conservation, public affairs groups which will from time to time take public stands on particular conservation issues. They make excellent allies for large scale operations where broad public support is needed. Having surveyed the variety of organizations, the specific 'form of the ROSS Committee can be placed in context. --Run Out Skagit Spoilers Run Out Skagit Spoilers is an --ad hoc coalition of existing conservation organizations; it has no individual members. It exists for only one reason. That is to prevent the construction of the High Ross Dam project by Seattle City Light. For example, during an early news conference in Szattle, a leading member of the group stated,

We will not stop fighting (against the dam) until the last cubic inch of concrete is poured. 11 The ROSS Committee unlike many --ad hoc organizations will not evolve into another organization or adopt another issue. The original members of the committee were the British columbia Wildlife Federation, the Alpine Club of Canada, the varsity Outdoor Club, the Society for Pollut.ion and Environmental Control, the British Columbia Mountaineering Club, the Simon Fraser Outdoor Club and the Sierra Club of British Columbia.

Subsequently, the Varsity Outdoor Club withdrew. But, they

were replaced by the Alma Mater Society of the University of British Columbia. In addition to the charter members, the Totem Fly Fishers and the Lower Mainland Wildlife Association both of which are members of the British Columbia Wildlife Federation and the British Columbia Fzderation of Naturalists joined the coalition. In fact, these organizations sponsor the work of the committee rather than to participate in it directly. The ROSS

Committee operates almost ~utomonouslyof its member organiza-

tions. It has a public image as a separate organization. Although it is an organization of organizations, it is managed independently by a small group of individuals. This inner circle consisted originally of representatives of the member organizations. However, this has evolved into a small group of independent individuals. The committee of representatives is called together only when it is necessary to make major policy decisions. This small core of activists has never numbered more than a dozen. Awareness of the High Ross Dam controversy among British Columbia conservationists began in April 1969. ' Knowledge of the issue grew during the summer and fall when the British

Columbia Yildlifn Federation and the Sierra Club promoted the issue as a major project. A meeting was called in November in order to bring a growing number of concerned individuals together. The formation of the coalition was agreed upon at that time. The ROSS Committee was organized and subsequently, formally announced in December. The principal role of the Ross Committee has been to provide leadership and coordination for all aspects of the Canadian opposition to the high dam project. It has provided a clearing- house of information, has planned most of the political strategy involved and most importantly, has maintained a continuous source of opposition and interest in the issue. There have been I many ebbs and flows of public interest and involvement. The development of information and experience needed to conduct this campaign has been an exhausting task. The ROSS Committee does not have any control over the actions of others who might wish to participate in this issue. However, once the group became identified with it, there has been a strong tendency for it to have nominal rights over the management of the issue. In particular, other organizations would consult with the ROSS Committee or defer action to it. The latter is especially true for individuals and groups outside the Lower Mainland. Thus, the High Ross Dam controversy in British Columbia has been managed by a small group of individuals with the institutional backing of the formal members of the coalition and the passive support of many other individuals and organizations.

The ROSS Conunittee has had two su5sidiary organizati.ons.

They are the Skagit Defense Fund and the Skagit Valley Study

Group. Both were set up and managed by the ROSS Committee

for special purposes which could not be handled by the committee

itself. The Skagit Defense Fund was established in the spring of

1971 as a means of raising money in order to support the work of the ROSS Committee. The principal purpose of this separate operation was to provide an avenue for tax deductible donations

for the committee. The ROSS Committee does not have federal tax deductable status. The British Columbia Wildlife Federation agreed to receive donations on bchalf of the Skagit Defense Fund and to administer a trust account for it. Although some general operating costs were covered by this fund, the major reason for its existence was to provide funding necessary to prepare for forthcoming International Joint Commission and Federal Power Commission hearings. Most of the costs of the

International Soint Commission hearing were covered by an Opportunities For Youth grant. The preparation for and participation in the Federal Power Commission hearing were estimated at a minimum cost of $10,000. These expenses depend upon the

comprehensiveness of the submission and the actual amount of participation. The submission is essentially a compromise between what ought to be and what can be afforded in terms of time and money. Even with a minimal submission, intervention requires attendance of an attorney.

Thz Skagit Deferrs~!Fund remains a dormant arm of the ROSS committee. It has been used sporadically. The fund has had modest success. However, public donations are received at a rate proportionate to the current level of public interest and of the feeling of urgency. Fund raising is only successful when the level of media coverage is high enough to maintain interest. The fund raising campaign of the Skagit Defense Fund was virtually destroyed by the election of the New Democratic Party and by

Robert Williams', the Minister of Lands, Forests and Water

Resources, declaration that the new government would not allow the High Ross Dam to be built in the fall of 1972. People would not donate money to a dead issue. But, in fact, the monetary requirements of the Federal Power Commission hearing remain still. Most of the money needed by the ROSS Committee has come from its member organizations and from small private donations. Fund raising is a difficult task with unreliable results.

One stop gap means of funding conservation activities has been government grants from the Opportunities For Youth program. The Skagit Valley. Study Group is such a case. This group was established by the Sierra Club for the summer of 1971 with funds received from this program. This group consisted of eight students working under the supervision of Professor

Ian Effort at the Institute of Resource Ecology of the University of British Columbia. During a two month period, these students studied the upper Skagit Valley and wrote a comprehehsive report, -The Future --of the Skagit Valley, which was submitted to the International Joint Commission as supplementary documentation for the 1971 hearing. l3 This document is not a definitive study, but it remains a valuable reference for those interested in the flooding of the Skagit Valley. This study group was the only opportunity that the ROSS Committee has had to prepare a complete statement of the arguments against the dam. The ROSS Committee formalized otherwise informal alliances and provided the focus for the High Ross Dam issue. The organization continues today in its effort to stop the dam. It is an excellent example of the capacity for people to form effective coalitions in the time of need. North Cascades Conservation Council While a new coalition was formed in British Columbia in

T 1 -1 * order to challenge Seatiie City hlgnb, a very effzctive, independent, regional oligarchy, the North Cascades Conservation

Council, already was pres-ent in Washington. It was formed in 1957 by a 1 I dismal little group in Auburn worrying about the North Cascades 11 . 1 4 The North Cascades Conservation Council is made up of citizens who are greatly disturbed over the accelerating damage to the scenery of the North Cascades. It is a civic organization with a membership of over 1500 individuals who reside primarily in Washington State. It is a non-profit conservation organization formed for the purposes of securing the protection and preservation of scenic, scientific, recreational, educational, wildlife, and wilderness values of the North Cascades of Washington from the Columbia River to the Canadian border. 15 It is a general conservation organization with a regional focus. It has concerned itself with a wide variety of issues within the North Cascades. These include wilderness preservation, forest practices, mining, recreation, highways and hydroelectric dams. For the principal conservation watchdog for the area, the High Ross Dam is only one modest issue. The North Cascades Conservation Council is run by a board of directors of 27 persons, a third of whom are elected annu-ally, who meet three or four times a year to discuss the organization's business and to set policy and priorities, The membership has no formal voice in these activities, unless they participate directly in a project. A bi-monthly publication, The Wild

Cascades, is published.

As one of the most important regional conservation organizations in the United States, it has gained much distinction from the high quality of its board of directors and the experience of its members. Many of the leaders of the North Cascades Conservation Council have been prominent in conservation affairs in the Pacific Northwest for over twenty years. Many have held important pos jtions with other major organizations. There are several overlapping directorships with the group's principal allies such as the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, the Mountaineers, and the Friends of the Earth creating invaluable personal contacts. The North Cascades Conservation Council is a well established and has been highly successful. An archetype of the regional conservation organization, it is ons of the principal groups responsible for the creation of the North

Cascades National Park. This organization has one subsidiary, the North Cascades

Foundation. This foundation was established as a non-prof it, tax-deductible organization in 1971. Its purpose is to supplement the work of the N3C in protecting the North Cascades by engaging in non-legislative activities. In this way the Foundation could qualify under Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 16

This foundation provides a continuous source of funds to be used by the council for a wide variety of issues.

Opposition to the High Ross Dam project is an outgrowth of and continuation of' the efforts establish the North Cascades National Park. The efforts of the North Cascades Conservation Council on this project has been led by a dozen major participants. As with the ROSS Committee, it has provided the leadership and focus for the issue. At the same time, it has been allied with a number of other organizations and individuals. Comparison --of Two Organizations The ROSS Committee and the North Cascades Conservation Council have work3d together since the creation of the High

Ross Dam controversy in 1969. There is regular consultation and flow of information between the two groups. They have shared ideas, information, talents and strategy which enables them to be much more effective than they would have been separately. Each is able to gather information and to interpret the political situation on their respective sides of the bord~r. One of the continuing difficulties has been the relative ignorance and lack of confidence in dealing with the other country's political and social context. The cooperation between

these two srganizatio~sres!!! ts from more than the common bond of a common cause. In recent years, conservationists have been communicating with each other on both sides of the bordzr on a number of issues. This is part of the general pattern of north-south flow of information on the Pacific Coast. Other common areas of cone ern have included park policy, forest practices, oil spills

and offshore oil drilling. l7 Naturally, there have been many personal informal contacts along the Pacific Coast. The most important organizational links have been within the Sierra Club.

At the time the Ross Dam controversy was beginning, the Sierra Club leaders in Washington and in B~itishColumbia sat on a common executive for the Pacific Northwest and Western Canada. Several of the principal participants in the ROSS Committee and the North Cascades Conservation Council were already acquainted through the Sierra Club. The principle of international cooperation in the movement is well established in Northwestern North America. The North Cascades Conservation Council is a fully structured organization; it is a well established force of conservation in Washington. Within it, there is a large reservoir of experience. On the other hand, the ROSS Committee is an --ad hoc loosely organized group. Although a number of the leaders of the ROSS Committee had been involved with other issues, their experience was relatively limited in 1969. Certainly, the ROSS Committee has been learning from its activites; but, it has none of the depth of experience within thz conservzticn movement that was available in Seattle. Despite these differences, both organizations have been able to function successfully. Both have enjoyed wide support. Both have provided the major focus of the issue with their respective jurisdictions. Both have been able to function well together and to coordinate the opposition to the high dam project. The purposes of these two organizations aside from opposition to the High Ross Dam project itself are quite similar. The basis for both organizations rests in the desire for preservation of wildlands, better outdoor recreation opportunities and the promotion of park lands. 1'These common causes are at the root of the High Ross Dam controversy. On the British Columbia side, it is part of the rise of the conservation movement in general and on the Washington side, it is a continuation of the campaign for the creation of the North Cascades National Park. The High Ross Dam controversy is but a battle in the larger war between the conservationists on the one hand and the developers and managers of natural resources on the otheT. -The Creation -----of the High Ross Dam Controversy -in British Columbia In order to place the actions of the ROSS Committee in its socio-political context, this study must consider the development of the High Ross Dam issue in British Columbia. This conflict became important in 1969 because the climate of opinion established by renewed interest in conservation principles and issuesprovided a means for political articulation for those who felt strongly about the future of the valley. This section surveys the changes in the climate of opinion concerning hydroelectric dams in British Columbia which led to the creation of the High Ross Dam controversy. In addition, this section will show that the Skagit Valley is a focal point of concern for environmental issues along the border. Moreover, the Skagit Valley problem is only part of a larger set of issues in the region established by four interrelated perspectives expressed among those who oppose Seattle City Light in British Columbia. The signing of the 1967 agreement between the City of Seattle and the Province of British Columbia was a quiet administrative event. There was no public controversy and little public knowledge of the situation. For instance, Robert Strachan, who was the leader of the British Columbia New Democratic Party and the Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly between 1956 and 1969 was not aware of these negotiations or of the 1967 contract until shortly before 23 he retired.- Knowledge of the High Ross Dam project was restricted largely to those directly involved in tfie project. As the history of the Columbia River Treaty and High Ross Dam negotiations show, there was little vocal opposition to the

idea of dams in general or to dams on the Skagit and/or Columbia

Rivers in particular. The climate of opinion in the province favored large sca1.e hydroelectric power developments as part of the genera,l atmosphere of economic boom. Dams were viewed as the key to regional development. Thus, the large developments on the Peace and Columbia raised little or no objections to the dams as Arguments concerning the virtues of what ultimately became the Columbia River Treaty and Protocol largely rest upon the specific technical and economic details of the various dams considered at the time. Only the local residents in the Kootenays questioned the desirability of the Columbia

River project as a whole in principal. Surely, if the Columbia

River dam proposals could not raise large scale public interests in the fate of British Columbia rivers, the smaller Skagit would not cause much concern. After the British Columbia two rivers policy on the Peace and 'Colum-bia had been implemented, however, basic changes in the public attitudes toward hydroelectric dams began to appear.

Some of the adverse consequences of hydroelectric power developments became better understood. The failure to clear the reservoir. site for the Bennett Dam and the Duncan Dam was noted with alarm. The ghostly images of the stump forest on Stave Lake were recalled. Displacement and resettlement caused by the High Arrow and Libby Dams continued to be matters of controversy and concern, especially in the Kootenays. Many people in British Columbia had come to appreciate more the social and environmental costs of these dams. In these respects, the High

Ross Dam controversy builds upon the experience of the Columbia River Treaty debate. Defense of thz Skagit Valley can be viewed as a gznzral rercny-idsra+ion of the desirability of dams stimulated, especially, by dissatisfaction of the results on the Columbia.

As the climate of opinion changed, the manner of political expression changed. Those opposed to the flooding of the Skagit

Valley had greater opportunities to unite with other like minded individuals and groups because the basic concept of opposition had become acceptable among a larger proportion of the population. As has been previously discussed, the ROSS Committee has provided the principal Cocus and leadership in this regard.

Dams are no longer viewed exclusively as stimuli for a booming economy. Opposif,ion to the High Ross Dam became plausible. As opposition to the project has developed, four general / perspectives have emerged in order to provide the basis for the articulation of environmental issuzs. They are interrelated and are represented simultaneously by various individuals and groups. They are the vested interests of the recreational users of the SkagitrValley; the desire for preservation of wild lands; the use of the Skagit Valley as a focal point for a variety of environmental concerns along the border and the lack of comparative advantage for 3ritish Columbia created by the dam. Each of these elements of concern is discussed in turn.

The first line of opposition to the High Ross Dam project in British Columbia is th: recreation user of the Skagit Valley.

The Skagit Valley is a light to medium density recreational area suitable for all ages. The primary recreational activities of the area are fishing, carripLng, hiking, ccinoeing, and hunting.

These uses would be destroyed or reduced by 'the' increased y-eservoir. The character of the recreational experience would be greatly altered. Put simply, these users are the persons to be displaced by the raising of the level of the Ross reservoir.

The protest by the outdoor recreationists was anticipated by the inquiries and reservations expressed by J. G. Cunningham and the British Columbia Game Commission during the 19141

International Joint Commission hearing. Cunningham pointed out that the Skagit River has an excellent reputation as a fly fishing area. He was worried about the impact of the increased flooding upon fish spawning. Nany still worry about this impact; the fly fishing is more important than ever. In 1950,

Bruce Hutchinson digressed during a survey of serious trout fishing locations on the Fraser River to comment on the Skagit.

Its icy waters, in my experience, provide the ultimate in trout fishing, as to both quantity and quality. 22

The statements by Cunningham and Hutchinson reflect the continuity of the conservation movement.

Ironicially, the Skagit Valley did not become generally known and accessible until after World War 11. In 1946, Seattle

City Light built the Silver-Skagit Road for the purpose of haul- ing logs cleared from the Ross reservoir site. This road allowed the valley todevelop informally into a major regional recreation- a1 area for the Lower Mainland. At the same time, other suitable locations remain relatively inaccessible or are flooded for other hydroelectric projects.

The raising of the dam will replace a riverine fishery with a lake fishery. It is deeply feared that the quality of

\ the trout fishing will decline. Certainly, the quality and quantity of fly fishing will diminish. More flat water boating and lake fishing would be created. Family camping in the forest and meadows, and on river banks would be replaced by shoreline resort developments. The core of the opposition to the high dam project con-

sists of users of the area. As history shows, Seattle City

Light gained practical control of the valley in 1929. But its access road allowed a new set of vested interests, the outdoor recreationists to gain political control, if not legal control over the fate of the area. While the recreational users of the Skagit Valley have provided a major force of opposition, the desire for preservation of wildlands is of equal significance. The fish are as important as fish in the river for their own sake as food or as objects of sport. The Skagit Valley is a major natural area. Contrary to the impression left by many during this controversy, the area under question is not a wilderness area. Ths history of the Slcagit River region recalled earlier demonstrates that man's impact on the natural landscape in the area has been extensive. The lower end of the valley is covered with water. Much of the forest has been logged. The meadows have been grazed by cattle. The entire area has felt the impact of recreational use. On the other hand, the valley is an ecotone, an ecological transitional zone, between coastal and interior ecosystems. Ecological reserves have been established by the province for a stand of Ponderosa pine and a cluster of California rhodo- dendron. Wildlife and vegetational variety are abundant. The valley provides a pleasant outdoor experience in natural sur- roundings amongst the high peaks of the North Cascades. Thus, despite man's impact, the dominant character of the landscape is wild and natural. While not wilderness in the strict sense, the area is perceived as wilderness; and, in fact, the most important motivation of the opponents of the high dam proposal is the desire for preservation of wild lands. The users of the valley do not want a larger reservoir; they wish the valley to remain natural both for their continuous use and for its own sake. The submission by the Fnvironmental Systems Community Association (ESCA) to the 1971 International Joint Commission hearing illustrates this well. The sixth sense has fueled the Skagit controversy which is now far more than a quibble over prices. The felt inadequacy of the price to be paid by Seattle to British Columbia is a reflection of a far deeper con- viction, and that is the abiding belief of many people both in B. C. and Washington State that the High Ross Dam is a thing which should not be built because the Skagit and Big Beaver Valleys are things which should be preserved. In this paper, ESCA maintains that the sixth td7' sense, environmental consciousness, is the authentic inner voice of a ccmmu-l~ty. It is just as important, in guiding conduct, as the inner voice of the individual that will warn against driving down a& isolated road in deep snow. It is the reason why many who have never been to the Skagit wish to save it. After all, the costs and benefits have been set out, the sixth sense must weight heaviest of all the intangibles in the scales of judgement. It is logic of the social' early warning system that many wish to save the Skagit because they do not wish to see any more pictures of people weeping over the bodies of dead birds covered with oil. ESCA hopes to show that the voice of Everymnls environmental conscience is also the authentic voice of reason. The High Ross Dam is a mistake both in the perspective of ecology and in the more limited range of social vision of economics, recreational sociology, and international law. 23 However the theme Is expressed, the desire for the preservation of the natural landscape (even if it is not completely natural) is the common unifying theme throughout the arguments of the opponents of the hi@ dam proposal. Preservation of the natural landscape is at the roots of the motivation of the conservation movement. Whether it be a child sighting a deer on the valley floor or a botanist studying the complex ecotone of the region, the common element is the human relationship with the natural environment. This intangible can not be replaced by the most skillful landscaping of a reservoir shoreline. The roots of the entire High Ross Dam controversy are in this fact.

Quite apart from the issues of wild land preservation and fish and wildlife management, there remain some concerns of uniquely Canadian origin. The people of British Columbia will look upon any disadvantageous effects of the raising of the reservoir with great disfavor because of the manner in which the decision maklng process has been conducted. This feeling of discontent is, in part, a reflection of increasing Canadian nationalism. ButJ there is a number of more important, specific factors. The basic nature of this project is that Seattle will receive all the benefits from this development in the form of peaking power. British Columbia will be compensated for its significant costs, in theory, if they are calculated and negotiated correctly. However, the fact remains that no significant benefit will accrus to British Columbia other than more reservoir area. The signing of the 1967 agreement ended the Canadian decision making process in this matter. It is strongly felt by many opponents of the dam in British Columbia that this contract was negotiated poorly and that it is not valid morally. The low price of compensation set at approximately $6.67 per acre per year is a source of continuing anger. In this regard, many members of the public share with the Vancouver Board of Trade of 1931 the resentment of a poor business deal as much as anything dse. Canadian opponents to the project are forced to argue their case today not in turns of the will of the people of British Columbia who are overwhelmingly against the dam, but in terms of the narrow technical merits of the project within the terms of reference of the Federal Power Commission. This level of resentment toward Seattle and the Social Credit government of the day has been high. It is a contributing factor to the rise of the opposition to the dam. The High Ross Dam offers

British Cnlurnhi-a no comparative advantages. All legal rights J' were surrendered with the signing of the 1967 agreement. The final decision will be made under American law. In addition to the basic merits of the, High Ross Dam controversy, the battle over the future of the Skagit Valley has served to focus attention upon a broader range of conservation issues along the British Columbia-Washington boundary line. In this regard, the Ross Dam issue has been managed as part of a long term conservation program with emphasis upon wild lands preservation, outdoor recreation, and general environmental quality. This fact has been obscured, however, by the massive amounts of time, energy, and money necessary for the High Ross debate. Indeed, it has detracted from other issues in the province.

Much of the value of the British Columbia Skagit Valley rests with its relative location within the North Cascades adjacent to the North Cascades National Park. While the United

States has madaged its border lands as a national park and as wilderness area, British Columbia has given these uses low priority. The idea that the British Columbia portion of the Skagit River basin ought to be part of a park was suggested very early during the High Ross Dam debate, 24 The ultimate park proposal for the Skagit Valley took the form of a 312 square mile national or provincial park extending some 100 miles from Cultus Iake eastwards along the border in- 118. eluding the Chilliwack Valley, the Skagit Valley, Manning provincial Park, a proposed Ashnola wilderness area and the cathedral Lakes Provincial Park. The Salish Park would create an international park complex adjacent to the Mt. Baker National

Forest, the North Cascades National Park, the Ross Lake National Recreation Area, and the Pasayten Wilderness Area. These parks were to have a relationship similar to that between the Waterton

Lakes and Glacier National Parks along the Alberta-Montana border. Linked closely with the fate of the Skagit Valley, the

Salish Park was offered as a possible solution for the Canadian government. The statement by Kenneth Farquharson, a principal member of the ROSS Committee, then Chairman of the Sierra Club of Britis Columbia, illustrated the arguments for the Salish Park. He stated that national park status would protect the Skagit

Valley from the dam. Creation of a park would give the federal government an opportunity to act in this situation.

If we took unilateral action, we might feel we have to give some compensation, something that would be useful to the people of Seattle. A park in the Skagit would be a wonderful and unique recreational area easily accessible to the Lower Mainland and to Seattle. It would have more points of access than Garibaldi or Golden Ears parks. . . . We would get the complete ecological system from the coastal rain forest to the Okanagan grassy high land. . . . We have contacted Ottawa, and we were told that any national park area has to have unique values in terms of scenery, recreation, access and the like, and we have to be able to show evidence of this. We believe the Skagit meets these conditions. It's (the Salish park) got canyons, rivers, mountains - something for everybody. The area immediately to the south is much the same and it has already been declared a national park. 25 The Salish park proposal has not been a successful one. parks Canada was uni nterestnd. The provincial government has remained unenthusiastic. But, this proposal has served its initial purpose by raising the general level of awareness of park and wild lands preservation issues in a positive manner.

As the High Ross Dam controversy has evolved, however, the effort in opposition to Seattle City Light has taken precedent over the the Salish park proposal. These efforts have taken much of the resources that would have otherwise been devoted to the large park proposals. The Skagit Valley remains a separat z, high priority matter of concern.

At the same time, the park proposal has received support associated with the Ska6::i'c Valley debate. For example, an endorsement of the goals of the ROSS Committee by the City of

Kamloops brought support. for the Salish park concept as well.

The Kamloops City Council has gone on record as protesting the flooding of this area for power storage purposes. The Council would like to submit the sug- gestion that this area be set aside as a National Park adding to the string of border parks extending from the Peace Arch Park to Manning The Salish park concept has been split effectively into three parts. Each seeks establishment of additional park land

in the Salish region. The first of these, of course, is the

Slragit Valley. The others are the Chilliwack Valley and the

Ashnola and Cathedral Lakes Provincial Park. Major park proposals have come fro13 the North Cascades Conservation Council and jointly from the Sierra Club and the British Columbia

Mountaineering Club. 27 Efforts to enlarge the Cathedral Lakes Provincial Park by the addition of the Ashnola area have been led by the Clianagan .Simill%mzer\, Parks Socie+~~"3 and the Sinrra club and others. 2" The Salish park concept is still alive; but the Salish park proposal has been transformed into a strategy for enlargement of the existing parks rather than for the creation of one big park. 29 In conclusion, the High Ross Dam controversy is the product of the changing climate of opinion in British Columbia concerning environmental value judgements. In turn, this issue has served as a catalyst for other environmental concerns. The major elements of the opposition to this dam project are -the interests - of the current recreational users of the valley, the desire for preservation of wild lands, the lack of comparative advantage for the province, and the promotion of larger park proposals such as the Salish park concept. Although the Salish park concept has not been successful, wild land preservation and outdoor recreation interests continue to be promoted in addition to the opposition to the High Ross Dam in particular. The High Ross Dam is viewed as one problem among many in the region. Comparison between the situation in British Columbia and in Washington shows an interesting contrast. Although interest in Salish park and related park acquisition proposals in the region was stimulated by the High Ross Dam controversy, the reverse is true in Washington. As the next section will show, the High Ross Dam issue is an outgrowth of the history of park acquisition in Washington. -The Campaign -to Create -the North Cascades National Park In Washington, the High Ross Dam controversy is part of a different socio-political and historical context. The High Ross Dam controversy is a continuation of the campaign to create the North Cascades National Park. This conflict results from the failure to cope with the general issue of hydroelectric development in the national park area. Hydroelectric dams in national parks have caused major controversies throughout the history of the United States National Park Service. The Hetch Hetchy

Dam in Yosemite National Park, various dams proposed for the

Grand Canyon National Park, the Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado

River and the proposed dam in the Dinosaur National Monument in Utah have been classic conflicts. The High Ross Dam follows the same basic historic patterns as these controversies.

In 1906, the Mazamas, an outdoor and conservation club in the Pacific Northwest " . . . heartily endorsed the project of making a national park and perpetual game reserve" of the North

Cascades region." The history of the campaign to create the North Cascades National Park is as long as complex as the history of Seattle City Light's Skagit River development project. The North Cascades National Park, the Ross Lake and Lake Chelan National Recreation Areas and the Pasaytsn Wilder- ness Area were established along with modifications to the boundaries of the Glacier Peak Wilderness Area by act of Congress on October 2, 1968. This act was a major victory for the conservationists. But, the passage of Public Law 90-544 did end the controversy concerning the management of these lands.

The boundaries were drawn on the basis of compromises made in

the Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation of the

committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the House of ~epresentativesin order to avoid conflict. On this basis,

valuable timbered valleys, Seattle City Light's actual and potential development sites and portions of the North Cross-

State Highway were left out of the national park. The question of the right of Seattle City Light to build the High Ross Dam

remained unanswered; the controversy was postponed. 31

There are three sections of Public Law 90-544 that are especially relevant to the High Ross Dam controversy.

Section 101- In order to preserve for the benefit, use, and inspiration of present and future generations certain majestic mountain scenery, snowfields, glaciers, alpine meadows, and other unique natural features in the North Cascades Mountains of the State of Kashington, there is hereby established, subject to valid existing rights, the North Cascades National Park.

Section 201- In order to provide for public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment of portions of the Skagit River and Ross, Diablo and Gorge Lakes, together with the surrounding lands, and for the conservation of the scenic, scientific, historic, and other values contributing to public enjoyment of such lands and waters, there is hereby established subject to valid existing rights, the Ross Lake National Recrea- tion Area.

Section 505- Nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede, repeal, modify, or impair the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission under the Federal Powsr Act (41 Stat, 1063)~as amended (16 U. S. C. 791a --et seq. ) , in the recreation areas.

Seattle City Light as the principal owner of the "valid existing rights1' in the Ross Lake National Recreation Area was The Federal Power Commission was left the task of making the final decisions regarding the hydroelectric projects there (see figure 3). The North Cascades National Park complex, which includes the Ross Lake and Lake Chelan National Recreation Areas as one management unit, was created after over fifty years of inter- mittent political debate and after ten years of intensive controversy. The park complex was established largely through the efforts of the North Cascades Conservation Council and other conservation groups. The park was oppos2d actively by the forest industry, mining interests, and the United States Forest

Service. Seattle City Light made it clear that it was neutral as long as their vested interests were protected. All of this land had been managed previously by the Forest Service. The primary moiive foi- ths azticns sf the conservationists was the lack of faith in the policies of the Forest Service and the desire to have wilderness areas established in this region. The High Ross Dam was not considered directly during this

debate. The High Ross Dam, the Copper Creek Dam and other modifications of the Skagit River development planned by Seattle were known. However, Seattle City Light was concerned primarily about the fate of its Thunder Creek diversion dam project.

Within the context of the entire campaign to establish the park, the Thund~rCreek dam and by implication the High Ross Dam were minor issues. Section 50'5 of PuSlic Law 90-544 bypassed the

issue and the Ross Lake National Recreation Area boundaries were drawn explicitly to avoid conflict with future Seattle

City Light intentions. Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall testified before the subcommittee on Parks and Recreation of the Committee on

Interior and Insular Affairs of the United States Senate in support of the national recreation area concept on the Skagit River. The Ross-Diablo-Gorge Lakes and park of the Skagit River Valley is established as a national recreation area for administration by the National Park Service between the two units of the national park. This, it seems to us, offers a flexible and sound approach-using the new tools that we have developed in recent years. This is an area that is to be developed. The Ross Lake Reservoir built by the city of Seattle was one of the early hydro projects built in the Northwest. This is also going to be a vital access area to the new national park. The basic reasons supporting a national recreation area to permit future raising of' Koss Lake and more diversified and intensive recreational use of this area than is normally the custom within a national park.32

Testimony by John Ndson, Superintendent of the City of

Seattle, Department of Lighting at these same Senate hearings articulated the concerns of Seattle City Light. Besides the three dams and powerhouses which now operate on the Skagit River, Seattle City Light has had plans for a number of years to raise Ross Dam elevation to 1725 feet, which would mean the raising Ross Lake about 1.25 feet, and develop two other si-&zs within the Skagit watershed. All three contemplated projects would enhance the recreational possibilities in the area. . . .33 In conversations with officials from the National Park Service, we have been assured that it would not be a problem for us to construct the Thunder Creek project with the natLonal park. IIowever, we still feel that as a safeguard the legislation providing for the national park should include authority for us to construct the dam and tunnel and provide the area for the reservoir at Thunder Creek. . . . 34 Our concern over the various proposals for parks, recreation areas, wilderness areas, et cetera, have been of three kinds of concern. Probably the first concern we have had is the concern over what effect, if any, changes of administration or changing rules might have over the problems of operating and maintaining a hydroelectric facility, you might call it the bread and butter problsms that you get associated with an operation of our kind. We have had, over a number of years, a very fine working relationship with the Forest Service, but we also find in our conversation with the National Park Service people that there seems to be no problem of the kind I am speaking of, the kind you get in operating and maintaining a facility. The operating facilities that we have lie entirely within the proposed recreation area. There would be no operating facilities in any of the other areas. As I said a moment ago in conversation with the representatives of the Park Service, we find no area of disagreement as far as those matters are concerned. The second area of our concern has been over our role in the field of recreation. As you know, we have been interested for many years in having people visit our projects and visit the area generally and, in connection therewith, have developed tours which are quite popular with our people and others and we have also participated in building of roads and the establishment of boat transportation, et cetera. We have also been concerned about the appearance of the whole area and think we have done some things that are quite nice in the development of the grounds and the illuminated waterfalls, rock gardens, and things of this kind. 35 Seattle City Light did not participate in the North Cascades National Park debate other than to protect its own existing vestsd interests on the Skagit River. While it did support developments for outdoor recreation in the region, was clear that its view of outdoor recreation with colored waterfalls and rock gardens differs considerably from those of the conssrvationists who desired wilderness.

After the ~stablishmentof the North Cascades National park and the Ross Lake National Recreation Area, the Forest

Service was no longer involved in any potential controversy concerning the High Ross Dam. The National Park Service has remained strictly neutral. It claims that it can live with either the present reservoir or the higher one. The Park

Service uses Section 505 of Public Law to avoid involvement in the High Ross Dam controversy.

The conservationists did not concentrate upon the Thunder

Creek proposal or the High Ross Dam proposal although they did oppose them during the campaign to create the North Cascades

National Park. There were many other fundamental issues. They did not want to alienate Seattle City Light completely. All the emphasis was on the Thunder Creek dam and tunnel. The impact of this project was thought to be a greater threat to the wilderness character of the park than the High Ross Dam.

Seattle City Light clearly placed higher priority upon the

Thunder Creek dam. And, the conservationists at that time did not know the value of Big Beaver Creek well. 37 Ultimately, Seattle City Light opted to abandon or at least to postpone the Thunder Creek project

because of the opposition which developed and the apparent acquiescence of conservation groups to High Ross if' Thunder Creek were foregone by the City. . .3 8 The conservationists may hzve placed a low priority upon the High Ross Dam until 1969; but the existence of the High Ross Dam controversy demonstrates that there has been no acquiescence. Most of the basic themes of the present. controversy were present during the debate concerning Thunder Creek. Seattle City Light would have to be extremely naive and/or ignorant of the history of the conservation movement to think that it could trade the Thunder Creek project for the High Ross Dam project. In 1969, the impact of the High Ross Dam upon the surrounding wilderness and the new national park became a major theme in the argument. Although this theme is not mentioned often in terms of the practical resource management options available, it seems to remain an influence upon the debate. Ths attitudes of the conservationists were clear throughout the national park debate. In general, they desired the largest area of wild lands as possible within the prevailing political terms of referenc?. For instance, Margaret Miller, a major opponent of the High Ross Dam within the North Cascades Conservation Council, stated during the 1967 Senate hearing: I am in favor of the largest national park in the North Cascades that we can obtain because I am convinced that is the only way we can successfully save some of our natural environment. . . .3 9 Mrs. Miller has provided much of the biological data concerning the natural environment of the Big Beaver Valley. Thomas H. S. Brucker, an attorney who has represented the North Cascades Conservation Council throughout the High Ross Dam debate, supported the national park and greater wilderness area. My thesis is that wilderness is invaluable to those who are there, to those who yearn to be there, and to those who have no desire to go there but who know it is there. I say .that because we can see today the results of our unconcern as to the necessity of keeping our urban complexes decent places in which to live. . . . Let us, then, notrepeat the same error and pollute and despoil our shrinking wilderness for that is irreplacable. It is not a product that money can restore. 40 The conservationists have not been willing to trade the wild lands for kilowatts. A statement in regard to the Thunder Creek proJect by Brock Evans, then the Northwest Representative of the Federation of Outdoor Clubs and a principal opponent of the High .Ross Dam, illustrates this perspective. The essence of our position with regard to this project is that we believe that there are alternative v" sources of power but there are no alternatives to a prime wilderness valley. . . . In due course, we in the Northwest will soon run out of good hydroelectric sites and will soon run out of good hydroelectric sites and will have to turn to other sources for powx supply. We believe that in the case of Thunder Creek this decision can be made now, especially since it is such a small project. We believe that this decision is one for the Nation as a whole to make, since Federal lands are involved and a national park is being considered. We believe that not only can the Nation forgo developing this small part of the theoretical hydro power potential of the North Cascades National Park but that the citizens of Seattle who presently' pay one of the lowest electrical rates in the United States can also forgo this small addition to the system. 4 1 Precisely the same basic argument is being used by those who oppose the High Ross Dam. Although the question of the High Ross Dam was side- stepped by most participants in the national park debate, the congressional hearing records show that the issue remained a minor, but vital one, Most congressmen avoided the topic. everth he less, some strong feelings against the hydroelectric

*rejects and hy inference the Ross Take recreational area concept were heard. Congressman John Saylor, a major congressional leader of conservationist causes, made an uncharacteristically strong statement during the house hearings on the North

Cascades National Park. As far as I personally am concerned, if it is a question of water for human consumption, this is one thing. If it is a question of building a dam up there for power, this is an entirely different matter. As far as I am concerned, this (~hundercreek) neednl t be built. As far as I am concerned, I would just eliminate the whole area;', I am sorry that I have never been privileged to be in this area, but if it is an area as good as the pictures say it is then I am for preserving it for the people and not to take care of an outfit to produce electricity. 42

Saylorls remarks echo Evan's statement, But most of the dialogde was ncre restrained and lees explicit. Morris

Udall is a congressman from the State of Arizona and the brother of the Secretary of the Interior. He generally has been a supporter of conservation causes, but he has favored dams on the Colorado River to supply water for his arid state. The following dialogue between John Nelson and Udall anticipates the fundamental basis for the High RQSS Dam debate.

Mr. Udall: Mr. Nelson, I came here with no preconcep- tions and I am not familiar with the area as I should be, perhaps, but on the first page of your statement yau advocate raising Ross Dam, constructing Thunder Creek Dam and constructing Copper Creek Dam and Powerhouse. Mr. Nelson: Yes, sir. Mr. Udall: Are these damsites within the boundaries of the national park under the bill approved by the Senate? Mr. Nelson: These sites are within the boundaries of the recreation area; yes, as passed by the Senate. Mr. Uda11: Well, the Senate bill creates a national park. Mr. Nelson: These would be outside of the national park that would b? created by the senate bill? Mr. Nelson: Yes, sir; but within the recreation area as passed by the Senate. Mr. Udall: Would they be within the wilderness area? Mr. Nelson: No, sir. Mr. Udall: They would be outside the wilderness areas that have been proposed in this area? Mr. Nelson: Yes. Mr. Udall: I am rather sensitive about this. We have a large hole in Arizona called the Grand Canyon and there was some controversy about building dams there that you may have heard of. (Iaughter).43 This exchange was more than a matter of semantic clarifica- tion. The difference between a national park and a national recreation area as administrated by the National Park Service is bas2d upon narrow administrative criteria. Most people not totally familiar with the agency1s management policies could not distinguish the difference. Despite the technical distinctions, the fact remains that the Ross Lake National Recreation Area boundaries would have been drawn on the reservoir's shoreline and most of its surrounding area would

have been classified as wilderness, if Seattle City Light's requirements had not been anticipated. It is no accident that'one of the opening rounds of the controversy in 1969 was a letter to the editor of the New York

-Times -- by Grant McConnell complaining about the threat to the new North Cascades National Park caused by the proposed raising

of Ross Dam. He said that Seattle City Light would succeed unless 11 those citizens throughout the nation who brought about the creation of the park vigorously protest this new threat."

He went on t,o cite "the terribly irony" of the similarity between the City of San Francisco's Hetch Hetchy Dam and Seattle's plan "for destruction in our newest national park. I I

The full text of this letter is found in Appendix E. In a similar manner, the New York Times wrote a major editorial on the subject of the High Ross Dam on February 23, 1970. It followed the same arguments that werz in the letter from McConnell. Barely a year and a half ago, Congress established the North Cascades National Park in northern Washington State. Because of pressures from Seattle City Light, several scenic wilderness valleys were left out of the park. Now the motivation of this compromise has become clear. . . . The newly elected members of Seattle's City Council can best serve their community and the entire Northwest by voting down these stop-gap plans that would so needlessly destroy recre8.ttonal, scenic and scientific values. Congress ought to then add the valleys to the national park as was originally urged.

The full text of this editorial is in Appendix E. The North Cascades Conservation Council produced a full page advertisement in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer on

January 20, 1970 entitled "Do You Want THIS In Your Brand-New

National Park And Recreation ~rea?". "THIS" was a picture of stump forest left by a drawn down reservoir. This ad included coupons to be sent to the mayor, to the city councilmen who opposed the dam and to the city councilmen who supported the dam. The full page of text discussed the impact of the High

Ross Dam on the Big Beaver Creek and the available alternatives for power. It is found in Appendix E.

The letter and editoral in thc Nzw York Times and the el-ll page advertisement demonstrate the endurance of the basic theme that dams are not allowed in national parks. This theme remains a clear and precise one. But the advertisement was a transitional one in the argumentation. The national park argument is not used frequently. Resource managenent option issues such as alternative sources of power, the direct impact on fish and wildlife, power economics, and conflicting values for outdoor recreation are most commonly debated. Nevertheless, the history of the debate concerning the creation of the North Cascades

National Park shows that the High Ross Dam controversy is a battle in the same war. Now that many of the more basic issues in the North Cascades have been settled or are dormant, the question of hydroelectric development has become an independent issue. Conclusion The conservation movement as a social movement has gained renewed vigor 'in recent years. It has only a vaguely interrelated and incompletely developed ideology. Many diverse groups arid individuals are involved. Nevertheless, with some care the conservation movement is being moulded into a highly effective public voice for environmental quality. Despite the apparent change in modus operandi, the conservation movement has followed familiar historical patterns.

The High Ross Dam controversy is the result of a convergence of a particular set of historical patterns within the conservation movment. The persons responsible for the creation of this controversy are members of the ROSS Committee, a loosely organized --ad hoc group, and the North Cascades Conservation council, a fully structured, major regional conservation organization.

The creation of the High Ross Dam controversy in British Columbia reflects a changing climate of opinion concerning hydroelectric dams. The defense of the Skagit Valley is part of a general reconsideration of the desirability of and the environmental costs of hydroelectric dams based upon the social and political experience of the Columbia River Treaty debate and upon continuing dissatisfaction with the economic and environmental results of the British Columbia two rivers policy. In particular, opponents of the High Ross Dam in British Columbia represent four interrelated perspectives. These are the vested interests of the recreational users of the Skagit Valley; the desire for preservation of wild lands; the use of the Skagit Valley as a focal point for a variety of environmental concerns along the border and the lack of comparative advantage for British Columbia created by the dam. The High Ross Dam controversy is also a continuation of the campaign to create the North Cascades National Park. The present controversy results from the failure to cope with the general issue of hydroelectric dams in the national park area.

During the North Cascades park debate, the Thunder Creek dam and the High Ross Dam projects were minor issues. Today, the

Thunder Creek project has bn~ndropped and the High Ross Dam project has become a separate issue. The history of the North

Cascades park campaign and ths history of the relationship between dams and national parks in the United States have made this controversy virtually inevitable. Footnotes for Chapter V.

Thor eau 1867: 166. 2~heterm "conservation movement" is used throughout this thesis. A discussion of the reasons for this choice is found in Appen- dix A. 3~eeJe. -g., Gerlach and Hine 1970 and Toch 1965.

5~ee,-e. -g., Nader 1972 and Nader and Green 1973. 6~ee,-e. -g., Commoner 1966 and 1971 and Chant 1970. 7~ee,-e. -g., Ehrlich 1968 and Marsden 1972. 8~ee,-e. -g., Hunter and Kenziere 1972 and McTaggart 1973. 'The respective histories of the conservation movements and of natural resource management policy in the United States and in Canada understandably are significantly different. However, the similarities are more significant. The American conservation movement first flourished during the Progressive Era of the 1900' s. Canadians participated in and observed this activity in both countries and were influenced by it. The present links between conservationists in British Coiumbla and in Washington are both ideological and practical. Relations are strong and cooperative as the events of the High Ross Dam controversy illustrate. Further discussion of Canadian conservation history can be found in Burton 1972 and Thorpe 1961. The history of conservation in the United States is surveyed in Nash 1968. His extensive bibliography is an excellent guide to the American literature.

11See, e. g., Jones 1965 and Nash 1967.

13personal Communication, Richard Leonard, January 15, 1974. 14see, -e. -g., Wing 1973. 5~eattlePost-Int elligencer 11 Canadians Pledge Fight Over City Light Dam", January 7, 19'70, p. 6. ''see, -e. -g., Massey 1969. 17Adams --et al. 1971.

Isstatement by Patrick Goldsworthy, President of the North Cascades Conservation Council to the Hearings Before -the Subcommittee on National Parks -and Recreation of-- Committee -on Interior -ax Insular Affairs. House of Re~resentatives. 90th Cong. 2nd session, on H. R: wandreiated bills .'. . -m:m(hzafter ref e=e? t5 axeHouse hearings 1968) .

2l~ostinformation and ideas flow northward. In January 1969 when Platform A failed in the Santa Barbara Channel causing a large oil spill, a local ad hoc organization called G$t Oil Out or GOO was formed. This group served as a major source of information and adviae in Vancouver when oil drilling in the Straits of Georgia was rumored. A speaker, a film of the spill and clean up and technical information was provided from Santa Barbara. "When the Canadian government followed suit by banning oil exploration in the Strait of Georgia between Vancouver Island and the mainland of British Columbia, the channel spill became truly international in its effects. Santa Barbara citizens for Environmental Defense and GOO representatives had worked with Vancouver citizens anti-oil groups." (Easton 1972: 232)

22~ndeed,th2y have in effzzt territorial rights for the issue. 23~ersonalCommunication, Robert Strachan, February 22, 1974. 24~ersonalCommunication,.Robert Strachan, February 22, 1974. 25~ee,-e. -g., Sherman 1966 and Waterfield 1970.

30~ee,g. g., Vancouver Sun "sierra Club Aims At Park Expansion", November 28;-1969, p. 44.

~ancouverSun " ~kagitUrged As International park" , Dec ember 21, 1970, P.15.

32~etterto the ROSS Committee from J. J. Clark, May 20, 1971, authorf s file. 33see, e. g., The Wild Cascades 11 Sapper Park: A New Neighbor to thF NErthfT-;-~=ar~-~arch 1972, p. 9-13 and Feller 1973. 34See, e. g., The Wild Cascades I I Okanagan Similkameen Parks Society request expansion of Cathedral Lakes Class "A" Provincial Park", February-Mar ch 1972, pp. 14-19. 35Vancouver Sun "~ov'tUrged to Enlarge 2 B. C. parks", February 251974, p. 10.

38Statement by Stewart Udall during the Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Parks -and Recreation --o-mm on ParkscFation-- of the Committee on Interior -and Insular mrc~nedStates Senate, 90th Congress, first session -on S. 1321. . . 196-hereaftsr referred to as the Senate hearings 1967). 39Nelson, Senate hearings 1967:57. 40~elsonJSenate hearings 1967: 58.

41 els son, Senate hearings 1967: 59. 42~ersonalcommunication, Roger Contor, June 3, 1970. 43~ersonalcommunication, Brock Evans, January 15, 1974. 44~elsonTestimony, Seattle City Light 1973:1:27. 45~illerJSenate hearings 1967: 321. 46~rucker,House hearings 1968:532. 47Evans, House hearings 1968: 224. 48~aylor,House hearings 1968: 962. 49~elson,House hearings 1968: 95. CHAPTER VI Public Forum For Damnation: The International

Joint Commission Hearing

L The history of the High Ross Dam controversy from 1969 to

the present has been complex. There has been much public

debate through the media. However, the major foci of the controversy have been the various public hearings concerning the issue. $hen the 1967 agreement was signed, the formal decision making process was concluded in British Columbia> Neither the Province of British Columbianorthe Government of

Canada have ever conducted public hearings on this matter. The 1971 hearings held by the International Joint Commission

are the only public forum held within ~anada) Seattle City

Light has beei-1 i,equli-ed to I-eezlve approvzl frcr?, the Seattle

City Council, the Washington State Ecological Commission and the Federal Power Commission. The process of receiving these

approvals has provided the working framework for the contrcversy

and the forum for public debate. This chapter surveys this

process and examines the proceedings of the International

Joint Commission in detail. Development --of the Controversy Seattle City Light is not an independent agency. It is

formally the Department of Lighting of the City of Seattle. It enjoys the same relationship and the same obligations to

the Seattle City Council and to the people of Seattle as the managers of the water system and the sanitation system. The superintendent of Lighting is the chief administrative officer for the department of lighting; he is appointed by the mayor who is the city Is chief executive officer. The city council sets public policy for the department of lighting. Although the present mayor, Wes Uhlman, is against the High Ross Dam, he must follow the policy instructions of the city council in this regard. It has granted Seattle City Light permission to apply for a license to build the high dam from the Federal

Power Commission. In addition, the city council must approve the annual budget for the electrical utility. This budget includes funds for preparatory economic, engineering, and environmental studies necessary for the dam. Eventually, the councilmen must approve the sale of bonds for the construction of the proJzct. Accordingly, every time that the high dam project is on the council's agenda, a public forum is available.

In particular, there was a lengthy set of hearings during the spring of 1970 conducted by the Public Utilities Committee of the City Council. There are nine members of the council.

A sizeable minority on the council has been opposed to the dam. The High Ross Dam project was almost defeated at least once during such a meeting. It is believed commonly that the present councilmen stand four for the project, four against the project and one wavering in the middle. The last vote on this matter was five to four for the project.

The Washington State Ecological Commission is a regulatory body established by the State of Washington during 1970 in order to review environmental policies. This commission operates in conjunction with the Department of Ecology. The Director of the Department of Ecology serves as an -ex officio executive member. The commissioners, who are appointed by the

Governor of Washington, are responsible for the administration of the state' s water resources program. It was the commission' s task to advise the governor upon the desirability of the application of the city of Seattle to the Federal Power Commission to raise the height of Ross Dam. A major public hearing was held in March 1971 for this purpose. Subsequently, the Washington State Ecological Commission and the Governor of Washington, Daniel Evans, announced their opposition to the project and their intervention in opposition to the project before the forthcoming Federal Power Commission hearing.

Governor Evans said the state's decision to oppose the

High Ross Dam was

an encouragement for all industries to develop policies for protecting the environment . . . We aren't condemning anyone . . . We're all guilty of not having taken a good enough look at the environment in the past. But what we're saying is that we absolutely have to do a better job of total environment planning. . . . I just hope that as a result of the state's position paper, Seattle City Light and the city Council will take another look at the project. . . 1 The Director of the Dipartment of Ecology, John Biggs, described the High Ross Dam as a plan by an 11 opportunist company" with no environmental plans. Biggs said that his department would withdraw its objections

if it could kc provided with substantial assurances that, starting here and now, Seattle City Light would prepare itself to undertake a permanent and lasting program of energy production which gave at least equal value to the care and maintenance of a good environment. * Having examined the High Ross Dam project in detail and having held public hearings on the question, the state's policy has become one of firm opposition. In January of 1973, John Biggs wrote Mayor Uhlman describing the state governmentls position. May I, therefore, now advise you that the state1s / position of opposition is a full and final one, for the reason that our examination indicates that substantial and serious environmental disruptions of an irrevocable kind would result from the project. For this reason, it will be the intention of the state to express its opposition before the Federal Power Com- mission as a part of the proceedings pending before that body having to do with the Cc~~aissi~n'sapproval or non-approval of the project. 3

Although the opposition to the project the govbOrnor will likely have powers of moral persuasion the Department of

Ecology is an intervenor before the Federal Power Commission.

Governor Evark is prevented by state law from stopping the construction of the dam. Despite wide spread political opposition in the State of Washington, only the Federal Power Commission has the jurisdiction to evaluate the wisdom of the project. 4

The Washington State Ecological Commission hearing ~%rch 1971 was the first major forum for public expression other than the Seattle City Council. Although a significant event in itself, this hearing became a dress rehearsal for the

International Joint Cc~missionhearings which were held three months later. These two hearings were very similar in content.

However, their terms of reference and political impacts were quite different. One served to advise the Governor of Washington while the other was restricted to the study of the impact of the High Ross Dam in British Columbia. -The International Joint Commission Reference and Public Hearings The 1971 International Joint Commission reference and

consequent public hearings are discussed here in detail. This

reference was restrictive; but the debate it provoked was not. The public hearings were a microcosm of the entire High Ross Dam controversy. In addition, it has been the only forum at which the Canadian opponents of the dam have had an equal

standing. These hearings with their associated documentation and the final report of the International Joint Commission, Environmental -And Ecological Consequences -In Canada -Of Raising ----Ross Lake In The Skagit Valley -To Elevation 1725, remain the most comprehensive examination of the High Ross Dam situation

to date. Only the final report of the Federal Power Commission will be more complete. The International Joint Commission approved Seattle City Light's application to construct the Ross Dam under the Boundary

Waters Treaty of 1909 when it issued its 1942 Order of

Approval. The commission had overseen the protracted negotia-

tions between Seattle and British Columbia. If the High Ross Dam controversy had not occurred, the commission would not have reconsidered the matter. However, the strong opposition to the dam in British Columbia caused the Government of Canada to request during the winter of 1970 a re-examination of the project. The people of British Columbia had no forum for public expression and no formal means of address. It was felt widely that the Federal Power Commission would not consider fully the impact of the flooding in British Columbia. The International Joint Commission as an international quasi- judicial tribunal provided the means for a thorough investigation of the environmental impact of the project in British Columbia. And most importantly, it provided the public forum that the federal and provincial governments could not establish.

The Secretary of State and the Minister of External Affairs sent identical letters outlining the terms of reference of the 1971 Ross Lake study to their respective sections of the Inter- national Joint Commission April 7, Within a period of six months, the commission was requested

to investigate the environmental and ecological consequences in Canada of the raising of the Ross Lake to an elevation of 1,725 feet . . . (and) to make recommendations, for the protection and enhancement of the environment and ecology of the Skagit River Valley not inconsistent with the Commission1s Order of Approval dated January 27, 1942, the Agreement required thereby . . . dated January 10, 1967, and the purposes for which such Order of Approval was granted. The complete text of this reference is found in Appendix F. This reference was very controversial. No one was completely satisfied with it. However, its wording represents the compromise required between the two governments in order that the reference be made. The phrase fl the environmental and ecological consequences" is most inadequate. In strict terms, there can be no 11 eco- logical1' consequences because 11 ecologyf' is a branch of study or a theory concerning biological processes. At minimum, it is redundant because 11 environmentalf1 consequences can include literally everything in the world around us. For further terminological discussions, see Appendix A. The Commission interpreted the Reference as con- fining the inquiry to the direct ecological and environmental consequences in Canada of raising the reservoir, and the secondary ecological and environmental effects in Canada resulting from the direct environmental and ecological consequences in the United States. Thus, the present inquiry is not an assessment of High Ross Dam, nor is it a complete response to the sources of public concern. The cost of the necessary struc- tures, electricity generated, alternative sources of power available to the City of Seattie and the direct environmental consequenc es in the United States were excluded from the Commissionf s investigation by the terms of the Reference. Although questions have also been raised concerning the legality of the Commission's Order of Approval of 1942 and the British Columbia - Seattle Agreement of 1967, these questions are, likewise, outside the scope of the present inquiry. 5 Many critics felt that the reference was too restrictive because it required only examination of the impact of the high dam in Canada. Nevertheless, relevant information elsewhere on the Skagit River included virtually everything else. The commri.ssion was very flexible in this regard; no evidence was rejected as being irrelevant. Although the impact of the flooding in the Big Beaver Valley, for instance, was discussed in detail, the restrictive terms of the reference prevented a full examination of the environmental impact on the Washington sidc. The reference precluded the asking of 'the most fundamental question; -i. -e., whether or not the High Ross Dam ought to be built. Only the environmental impact could be considered, at least in theory. Furthermore, the commission refused to consider legal arguments presented by John Fraser for the ROSS Committee which challenged the validity of the 1942 Order of Approval and the 1967 agreement. The public hearings required by the reference were held in a high school auditorium in Bellingham on June 3, 1971 and in the Queen Elizabeth Playhouse in Vancouver on June 4 and 5. These hearings were well attended and well covered by the media.

All members of the public were given the opportunity to speak. In addition, written submissions and letters were received until August 3lst. Although individuals were welcome, the hearings were dominated by the unified testimony of Seattle City Light, the North Cascades Conservation Council and the ROSS Committee who present,ed t eams of witnesses. The hearings were lengthy, but lively. An indiscrete comment by Louis Robichaud, the Chairman of the Canadian Section and chairman of the hearings while in Canada, is indicative of the general public attitude during the hearings, especia1l.y in Vancouver. When nearing the end of the hearing on the third day, Robichaud warned of the lack of time available. The Chai17man, :h.RoSichaud: I might. say at. this stage that there are requests for 150 minutes, which is 2 hours and 112 and it is 5 to 12; we don't have the time. Most everything has been said; if you are going to be repetitious, we wish that you appear and just say I oppose the project but everything that I had to say was said alread~.~

A list of persons presenting briefs or testimony at these public hearings and a summary of the arguments put forth are found in Appendix F.

Legal Consid2ra-t ions

Although these hearings were in effect direct attacks upon Seattle City Lightt s plans, the reference precluded

direct intervention. Since the commission was not allowed to contravene the 1942 Order of Approval or the 1967 agreement, it had no power to halt or to impair the proposed High Ross Dam project. Ths. commission was reminded of this fact pointedly by Donald Burns, the counsel representing the

Department of State.

The question of whether or not the dam itself is to be, raised is not before the I. J. C. in this proceeding. . . . That approval was granted in 1942. . . . The question which is before the Com- mission in this proceeding is limited to environmental consequences in Canada. . . . And we have not asked the Commission to make a recommendation as to whether the amount of compensation which Seattle has agreed to pay British Columbia is sufficient or not, because the Commission in its order of approval, left the matter to be resolved by negotiations between the parties and those negotiations which were long and complicated, resulted in the agreement. . . .7 The counsel representing the Department of External

Affairs, ii. C. Kingstone, did not dispute Buns1 remarks. He did, however, elaborate upon his interpretation of the terms of reference. It (the terms of reference) emphasizes that the Commission is requested to investigate the environmental and ecological consequences in Canada of the raising of the Ross Dam and it also takes into account these words, "~akinginto account relevant information about environmental and ecological consequences elsewhere on the Skagit River and measures being taken or planned to protect or enhance the environment in these areas. It 8 While there was nothing unusual or remarkable about these interpretations of the reference, Burns highlighted the situation in a most undiplomatic manner. His remarks were immediately used to dramatize the frustrating wording of the reference for those who thought mistakingly that the commission could stop the dam. The most damning action came from the Vancouver Province. The front page headline the morning after the first day of hearings read "~ombshellat Bellingham hearing: IJC Powerless To Prevent Skagit Flooding, says U. S., City Session today academi,c exercise?". The commission was upset by its treatment in the press. Christian Herter, the Chairman of the United States Section, replied at the beginning of the hearing.

I would like to, for the sake of the record, comment briefly because I think it is very important to do so, on the headline that appeared in the ~rovince~thismorning. To wit the IJC is powerless to prevent the Skagit flooding. Is the cityts session today an academic exercise? I would like to say thz following; that the IJC from a technical point of view is powerless to prevent the Skagit flooding. Its mandate as a Commission is confined to reporting to the two governments on the environmental and ecological consequences in Canada of raising the Ross Dam. However, it can make a report and I can assure you that its report will be read by the Federal Power Commission which I would point out has not yet approved the application of Seattle City Light to complete the final stages of the dam. And I can also assure you that the report will be read with great care by the two governments, the United States and the Canadian Government. This is therefore, not an academic exercise. Far from it, it is the only mechanism available to either government to receive a report on the environmental and ecological consequences in Canada of the final stages of raising the dam. 9

Indeed, the major impact of the International Joint Com- mission's report has been to place data on the record and to provide a forum in Canada at that time. There were few illusions about the power of the commission. An editorial in the Vancouver -Sun expressed the prevailing mood of the people involved and the general public which remained overwhelmingly against the project. The hopes of many persons that the International Joint Commission is on the verge of a breakthrough from its decorous co-ordinating and advisory role to one of tough envirocinental policing will be dogged indeed if they survive through the Skagit hearing. . . . Alas, the profile presented by the commission in the early stages, anyway, of the cross-border hearing has been one of a captive fate, y,oked to the mistakes of history. . . . The restrictive terms of reference imposed on the commission, of course, were outrageous. . . . If this hearing is not 11 completely irrelevant, 11 as some have charged, whatever promise it initially offered is speedily diminishing. And the advice offered to the commission is not to t I allow your- selves to be emasculated by the terms of reference'' should be most seriously considered. Public respect is required if the IJC is to become the instrument of U. S. - Canadian environmental co-operation and control that thinking people on both sides of the bordzr so ardently desire. It will not earn this respect by lending itself to what already has been labelled as a whitewash job. 10 The fundamental legal problem, however, rests not with the narrow meaning of the 1971 reference. The ultimate difficulty rests with the implications of the original 1942 Order of Approval. Although the commission would not recon-

sider the original decision, the validity of the order remains in question. The major legalchallenge came from John Fraser, a Vancouver lawyer, on behalf of the ROSS Committee. He stated that the 1942 Order and the 1967 Agreement are invalid and that your present terms of reference do not pre- clude you from taking cognizance of such invalidity and re orting accordingly to your respective Govern- ment s. ?I

Fraser argued that the 1942 Order is a nullity because it delegates to the City of Seattle and the Province of British Columbia, the very duties which the Com- mission must perform under Article VIII of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. 12

That is, the commission delegated the powers to approve the terms of compensatioa and has avoided its responsibility to ensure adequate cornpensat ion.

Following from this, the 1967 agreement is invalid because it depends upon the 1942 Order. In addition, the 1967 agreement has never been formally approved by the commission. Fraser argued that the mere filing of the 1967 Agreement with the Commission cannot be construed as consideration and approval of the terms.. 13 ~ccordingly,regardless of the terms of reference during the

1971 investigation, the City of Seattle should be required to

submit a new application consistent with present circumstances.

Interestingly in a later written submission, J. Richard

Aramburu and Thomas H. S. Brucker, counsel for the North Cascades Conservation Council, argued that the 1967 Agreement was invalid because it is a violation of the compact clause of the United States Constitution.

Article 1, Section 9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution, commonly known as the Compact Clause, provides, in pertinent part, that "NO state shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with any State, or with a foreign Power." The 1967 Agreement is on its face an agreement between a body of the State of Washington, the City of Seattle, and a foreign State, i. e. the Province of British Columbia. 14

Throughout these legal arguments, the counsel for Seattle

City Light remained silent. But, the reaction from the com-

mission was immediate and hostile. The chairman of the hearing, LouYs Robichaud, was personally hostile; the inference was that the commission was not very interested in hearing

these arguments. The major reply at that time came from H. C.

Kingstone, the counsel for the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. Chairman, I just have a comment to make. First of all, I am fully acquainted with the argument Mr. Fraser has made, it has been made many times before. How~ver, I don't think this is the time to discuss the legal aspect of it. I would liketoemphasize the Government of Canada has treated the 1942 Order and the 1967 Agreement as perfectly sound legal documents and this has been our posture and I think that speaks for itself. 15

Fraser objected imrnediat ely. Mr. Chairman, it matters not a tittle to anybody in this room, the public of Canada, whether the Canadian Governmentls legal advisors decide that a particular ruling is valid, when it has never been properly tested or considered by the commission itself. If the argument here is to be considered, it must be considered and merely because the Canadian government comes along and says we have always considered it valid does not make it valid. ' Much to the dismay of the Government of Canada and the commission, this legal controversy was highlighted by the media. The front page of the Vancouver Province the next morning read 11 Despite U. S. Claim: IJC Has The Authority To Kill Skagit Project, Says I,awyerl'. The Department of External

Affairs is known to be familiar with these arguments. A long memorandum exists in their files. But, for unknown reasons, the Minister for External Affairs will not use it. No legal theory has been found that denies this argument.17 It is thought that these legal arguments are not used against Seattle City Light because it is feared that it would damage or weaken gularities in another docket to be uncovered. Seattle --City LightTs Submission Seattle City Light ignored these legal arguments. It approached these hearings from a position of confidence and strength. It were better prepared than its opponents. The terms of reference prevented the International Joint Commission from stopping the project. But they could cause it to be more costly. The major thrust of' Seattle City Lightfs testimony was that it was a "good citizen'' of the Skagit Valley and a provider of outdoor recreational facilities. The commission could have caused Seattle City light to improve its plans for clean up and for post-diluvian recreational facilities. Put simply, Seattle City Light stated its goal as the production of cheap, abundant power for the City of Seattle. The city needs the additional 272 mw in peaking power for the growing economy of Seattle.

Much emphasis was placed upon its role in providing mass outdoor recreation. The Skagit River development project did open the area up for recreational purposes. The first reasonable access was by the railroad constructed by the city. It built the road in 1943 which became the route for the Cross-

State Highway. And, on the British Columbia side, the Silver- Skagit road greatly increased accessibility and brought the region within easy reach of Vancouver. Seattle City Light has been cooperative with the United States Forest Service and the United States Park Service who have controlled the land around them. Most importantly, the department of lighting has provided the well known Skagit Tours which have allowed 30 to 40 thousand persons a year to visit the Skagit Valley and

Seattle City Light's electrical facilities. The Skagit Tours have been a popular feature since the 1930's. One of the star witnesses for Seattle, although not an official representative of the city, was Charles King of Bellingham. His description of his tour established a fine contrast between the natural waterfalls in the wilder Cascades and J. D. Rosst rock garden with colored outdoor lighting il- luninating the at erfall at. Newhalem. In my opinion, the Upper Skagit country consti- tutes one of the great hand works of God. Thanks to J. D. Ross, and the far seeing people of the City of Seattle, this great area has been opened up for the pleasure and enjoyment of hundreds of thousands and in a few years it will be millions of people. In early 1934 the elected county officials and legislators of four or five counties in the northwest sector of the state, were invited to come to Newhalem for an overnight visit with Mr. Ross. We all accepted and as a result were treated to one of the most impres- sive experiences imaginable. . . . The symphony of sound combined with the natural glories of the area made this one of many memorable moments were to receive within the n2xt 24 hours. . . . The trip included a delicious dinner in the attractive dining room, motion pictures of the development and many of the scenic highlights. We slept in comfortable beds in a series of dormitories and were awakened by birds singing over the communications system. . . . More hidden music was heard and as we passed an island, we noted a deer and two fawns frolicking in ths sunlight. At the same tim~the voice of John Charles Thomas could be heard singing I1 Home on the ~ange". When the great tenor reached the line, I I Where the deer and the antelope playtt the hundred or more sightseers were really in stitches. There was a high mark on the cliffs showing the height to which ROS~Dam would reach when finally completed. I formed the opinion then and there that the dam should be built and I still hold firmly to that same conclusion. The principal witness for Seattle City Light in regards to the direct terms of reference of the hearings was F. F.

Slaney. Slaney is the principal of F. F. Slaney and Company Limited, a Vancouver-based resource dev~lopmentand environmental management firm. As its environmental consultant in

British Columbia, Slaney had done virtually all of Seattle City Light's research into the environmental impact of the flooding of the Skagit Valley in British Columbia, and the potzntial for recre~~tionalfacilities and other irnpr0vement.s such as the relocation of the Silver-Skagit road after the fact. Most of his testimony was assembled in a submission entitled, 11 Environmental Investigations Skagit Valley In Canada And Indication Of Consequences From Raising The Level Of Ross ~ake". Slaney minimized the environmental consequences of the flooding and spoke of the advantages of a larger lake.

Slaney described his submission and pointed out the incomplete- ness of his data and his continuing research program. When questioned by the commission, he stated,

I don't think we said we wou1.d make a complete statement about the impact at this time. What we had said is that there would be no unusual or serious impacts. 19 Support -For Seattle City Light There were few independent supporters of Seattle City

Light's High Ross Dam project at these hearings. Besides Mr.

King, a r,epresentative from the Skcgit Soil and Water Conserva- tion District which includes the lower agricultural region of the Skagit River surrounding Mt. Vernon spoke in favour of the high dam because he believed that further flood control protection would be created. Wayne Dameron, who operates Ross Lake

Resorts which is a floating fishing and boating camp on Ross Lake, supported the high dam because it would increase boating and fishing opportunities on the lake. Also, K. C.

Bruce of Maple Ridge, British Columbia, who has a business collecting forest ferns in the Skagit Valley, declared his backing for the project. He had spoken to his local member of the

British Columbia Legislative Assembly, George Mussallem. His testimony was the typical of the position of Social Credit party and Government of British Columbia at that time.

As far as I am concerned, there was a business deal made some years ago and as a Canadian I am kind of ashamed that we are trying to welch on it.20

All of these witnesses testified in Bellingham.

As the remark by Louis Robichaud cited previously indicates, Seattle City Light enjoyed very little support in Vancouver. The only independent Seattle City Light supporter to appear in Vancouver was a representative from the Hope and District Board of Trade. Hope is the closest settlement to the Skagit Valley. In sum, his position was that

this area is required for recreational purposes and should be developed.

He meant flat water r~creation.2 1

Opposition -to Seattle.- -City Light The'vast majority of those present at these hearings did not support Seattle City Light. The opposition to the High

I Ross Dam project was led by the North Cascades Conservation Council in Bellingham and by the ROSS Committee in Vancouver.

Each presented a team of witnesses to testify upon various aspects of the project as did Seattle City Light. In addition, there was a number of individuals and organizations who testified independently. After the hearings, written statements were received. Most of these statements were in response to issues and questions rais2d at the hearings, but others came from individuals and organizations who had not attended. Over a hundred letters were received by the commission in opposition to Seattle's project. The North Cascades Conservation Council presented a team of seven witnesses. These witnesses covered the full range of issues present. However, the thrust of the testimony dealt with the necessity for medium and low density recreation and for the preservation of the natural landscape. In particular, the value of the western red cedar groves in the Big Beaver Valley were stressed. They described the intangible values of the region for recreation, aesthetic purposes, and scientific research which would be lost by the flooding.

For example, in reference to the Big Beaver Valley, Dr. Dale

Cole discussed the unknown value of that unique ecosystem. If we are required to put an environt~lelztaiprice for the production of electricity, I would argue that w'e should be aware of this price prior to a decision to construct rather than afterwards. The development of the High Ross project carries with it irreversible destruction of a massive ecological system, the magnf- tude of such change is largely unknown. 22

It was clear that the North Cascades Conservation Council differed considerably from Seattle City Light in its view of the kinds of outdoor recreation that ought to be available.

Although the issue was not discussed explicitly, the status of the land surrounding Ross Lake is still in dispute. This land is perceived as wild lands, as national park quality lands. This land has greater value to society as park land than does the additional kilowatts to be generated by the higher dam. Other less damaging alternative sources of peaking power are available. According to the protocol of such hearings, the first witness in Vancouver was a representative from the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Forestry, which is now part of the Department of the Environment. He stated that these hearings were being held at the initiative of the Government of Canada with the support of the Province of British Columbia. He stressed the lack of information available as to the impact of the flooding upon the Skagit Valley. Mr. Chairman, a certain amount of disconcerting evidence is already available, which is causing much concern in Canada about the nature and extent of the consequences of the proposed flooding. I should like to say quite frankly that the Canadian Govern- ment is worried about the environmental damage which seems likely to take place should further flooding occur in the Canadian portion of the Skagit Valle~.~" This was the strongest statement by the Government of Canada at that time despite the statements previously by Jack Davis the Minister of the Environment, against the project. The Province of British Columbia remained unrepresented at these hearings. Its position was that, unfortunate as it may have been, the 1967 agreement was a valid contract that could not be broken.

The Leader of the Opposition and Leader of the New Democratic Party, David Barrett, arrived at the hearing in Vancouver with Bill Hartley, the M. L. A. whose riding includes

the Skagit, and James Lorimer, a Burnaby M. L. A. But, they cancelled their appearances because Barrett felt that the reference. The Leader of the Liberal Party, Pat McGeer, did testify.

His remarks outlined the basic political objections from the opponents of the dam in regards to the 1967 agreement. The contract presents a binding problem to you. On the other hand the reason why you are here is because public opinion is so adverse to that contract. I think it is fair to say that particularly in British Columbia people are overwhelmingly opposed to the flooding of the Skagit Valley. And it becomes the responsibility of politicians such as myself to try and articulate for you why this is so because the people who are opposed to it are not ecologists or naturalists, they are simply people who love their land. The first thing is that we Canadians are not interested in more money. Our hope is that the J I. J. C. will find for us and for others a new sense of values, because up to now the considerations have Len UCC~strict zcono~iceonai3crat ions. 24

Most of the substantive testimony against the High Ross Dam project from Canadians came from the team of witnesses organized by the ROSS Committee. In addition to the legal arguments presented by John Fraser, a number of arguments were set forth concerning the value of the Skagit Valley in its present state and the adverse environmental impact of the flooding of the valley. The history of the 1942 Order of

Approval and the 1967 Agreement was reviewed, the values of the area as wild lands were described and the wide variety of recreational opportunities in the valley were outlined. It was stressed that the Skagit Valley is an unique area, an ecotone, containing a diversity of coastal and interior vegetation and wildlife within this transitional zone. The Skagit Valley is a major site for medium and low density recreation for residents of the Lower Mainland. A number of large fishing lakes are available; but there is no other flat river valley. The Skagit

River is especially valuable for fly fishing and for canoeing. John Massey, the President of the ROSS Committee and an avid fly fisherman, stated that the Skagit River was the only good fly fishing stream near the Lower Mainland. His dry wit made his position clear. British Columbia is blessed with many good fly fishing lakes but extremely few fly fishing rivers at all. By and large, lakes are fished from boats and rivers are fished by those who prefer to wade on foot and over 500 years of angling bibliography in our language clearly asserts fly fishing a river on foot is by far the higher art. 2 5 Put simply, according to the ROSS Committee, the flooding of the Skagit Valley would change an unique natul'ai landscape and recreational area into a common flat water reservoir and reacreation area. The Hearings In Perspective - - J" The International Joint Commission hearings were lengthy and detailed. A vast amount of information was presented; several major resource management themes were articulated. The major management issues in the High Ross Dam controversy are, put simply, (1) the impact on the flora and fauna and the future of wild lands management in the vicinity of the Ross reservoir,

(2) the relative merits of future recreation values and facilities with or without the increaseci reservoir, and (3) the nature of energy demands, use patterns and projections for the

City of Seattle and other msmhers of the Northwest Power Grid and the viability of alternative energy sources. These were the tangible issues around which the debate revolved. Most of the time and energy of the participants in these hearings was spent in the consideration of these management issues. Little mention was made of the more abstract issues discussed in the previous chapters. The question of the environmental consequences of the raising of the Ross Lake provides a means to assess the technical, environmental impact of the project. But, it has little to do with the motivation of the issue, with the overall socio-political and historical context of the High Ross Dam controversy. The ultimate expression of values upon the landscape rests in the mere existence or non- existence of the dam --per se, not in the distribution of its technological benefits or, conversely, in the maintenance of the wild lands. The High Ross Dam controversy is not a debate concerning the location of spring range of deer, the viability of trout spawning beds or the number of visitor-days in July of

recreationists on Ross Lake. At the same time, a wide range of issues such as these are the tangible questions of fact which

preoccupy the decision-makers at all levels of the debate. 26 -The Final Report --of the International Joint Commission The final report of the International Joint Commission, Environmental -And Ecological Consequences Canada Raising ----Ross Lake In The Skagit Valley -To Elevation 1725, appeared on flovember 15, 1971. This report remains the most comprehensive discussion of the resource management issues and the background to the High Ross Dam controversy to date. The report was divided into two parts. The first part is the report and recommendation of the cornmlssioners. The environmental impact, and possible measures for protection and enhancement of the area are discussed. In the second section, the background material for the reference is described and analyzed by the team of special advisors assembled by the commission. This background material 'includes a description of the public hearings, a status report on Ross Lake, an inventory of the resources in the area, and a description of the present use of the resources in the area. Then, the Skagit Valley with and without the High Ross reservoir are described, analyzed and compared. Having considered the environmental consequences of the raising of the level of Ross Lake, the commission made the following conclusions. The present characteristics of the environment would be (changed, but the new environment would retain many of the former characteristics. Those who appreciate and use the valley in its present state would inevitably suffer somewhat, although other people would find the new environment at least as pleasant. Measured either by the amount of use, or weighted by dollar values, the overall impact of changes in the total environment is not significantly large. This balance does not appear to be greatly changed by supplementing the assessment to take account of education, research and the option values of individuals. These undoubtedly favour preservation, despite the fact that the imbalance is not great. Furthermore, the Commission is of the opinion that the social preservation values are significant and should be taken into account in the decision- making process...... seen in a broad social context, the Skagit Valley is an uncommon and nonrestorable area and has important social values. 27 The commission went on to recommend to the Government of the United States, in fact the Federal Power Cornmission,'that it consider the following questions which were beyond the scope of its study. (a) Is there, in fact, an immediate need for additional power for the City of Seattle? (b) If so, are there alternative sources of such additional power to the projected High Ross Dam? (c) If such alternative sources do exist, are they more expensive than the projected High Ross Dam? (d) If so, will the benefits to the citizens of both countries from not raising Ross Dam more than offset the additional costs to consumers of electricity of such alternative source or sources of power? (e) If the additional power from High Ross Dam will meet the forecast needs of the City of Seattle for a limited iirne, and additioilai power sources wLll be added after that, what would be the cost of changing the sequence in which these projects are constructed, postponing the raising of Ross Dam until a decision on the total merit of the project could be made with greater certainty?28 They continued to recommend provisions for the protection and enhancement of the environment of the Skagit River Valley on the assumption that the dam would be built as instructed by its reference. There is need for mitigation measures to cover not only the protection and enhancement of the ecology and the natural environment, but also the protection and enhancement of the uses by various types of visitors. The type of works that could be undertaken include but are not restricted to spawning channels or hatcheries, beach improvement and camp grounds. The Commission recommends that these mitigative measurzs be fully studied before Ross Dam is raised, and that they be undertaken to the extent that the governmental agencies concerned find them feasible. . . . 29 The Commission recommends that forest geneticists be encouraged to investigate the vegetation in the proposed reservoir area and identify plant species with characteristics worthy of further scientific study. . . .30 Representative plants of most species found within the Skagit Valley exist both within and without the proposed reservoir area. The Commission recommends that access trails be provided or marked to plant communities of special interest in areas above the proposed reservoir, if the more easily accessible exam les of the same species have been flooded. . . . 3? A number of low elevation sites adjacent to the eastern shore of High Ross reservoir in Canada appear to be physically suited for pasture-type developments to replace spring range for deer. . . . No practical opportunities to replace losses to other wildlife species have been identified and no mitigative measures are recommended. . . . The Commission recommends that the fish losses be offset. . . .32 For the continuation of other reacreation activities, including general camping, swimming, boating, nature study, and for fishing on the reservoir, certain minimum undertakings are necessary. The mitigative or enhancing measures recommended for the Skagit Valley in Canada include: -- maintenance of reservoir levels within three feet of full pool during the summer recreation season from June 15th to September 10th of each year; -- clearing and grubbing of the reservoir site to a satisfactory distance below full pool; -- relocation of the road; -- development of campgrounds; -- beach improvement; -- establishment of boat launching points; -- continuous clean-up of debris and maintenance of shorelines until stability is re-established. It has been noted that some of these items are required in the agreement with British Columbia and others have been considered by the City of Seattle, in the process of negotiations. It is further noted that if these environmental effects were wholly within the boundaries of the United States all measures of this nature would likely be required by the licencing agencies. 33 The Commission . . . recommends continued studies to minimize the possibilities of overlooking mitigation opportunities, to take account of any unforeseen consequences of raising Eibss Reservoir, and to assess thc effectiveness of the mitigation measures undertaken. . . .34 The Commission recommends that the City of Seattle be required to forward this initial operating rule curve to the Commission and subsequently obtain its approval for any modifications that may be proposed. Under these circumstances the Commissionts International Skagit River Board of Control would monitor adherence to the op~ratingrule curve, and report to the Commission. 3 5

This report wa.s well received. Its recomniendations were passed on to the appropriate agencies in both countries. But International Joint Commission has no power of enforcement. The fundamental question of principle was excluded from the reference. Both sides of the controversy have used the text of the report to support their respective arguments. Conclusion

'The process of receiving apyr.ovais for the ITigl? R~ss%K project from these bodies has provided the working framework and public forums for the controversy. The most important of these forums has been the 1971 International Joint Commission hearings conce,rning the environmental and ecological consequences of raising the level of Ross Iake. Despite the fact that the commissionts reference was restrictive, these public hearings were a microcosm of the public controversy. These hearings were the conservationists' finest hour. This was the only opportunity that the Canadian opponents to the high dam have had to protest the project from a position of equal standing with Seattle City Light. The commission was a neutral body. The opponents of the dam were better able to take com- mnd of the situation, especially in Vancouver where the media and the general public were solidly against the dam. The hearings were informal and the level of preparation and sophi- stication necessary for participation was less than required, for instance, by the Federal Power Commission where formal prepared testimony and representation by counsel is necessary. These hearings were able to measure public opinion which was overwhelmingly against the dam. The submissions to the commission and research by the commissionf s team of special advisors enabled them to write the most comprehensive report of the situation to date from an independent source. The final report did not and could. not decide the fate of.the Skagit Valley. The commission1s conclusions were ambivalent; however, they showed reluctance to flood the area. The crux of the situation rests in the conflict between short term economic values and long term social values. Measured either by the amount of use, or weighted by dollar values, the overall impact of changes in the total environment is not significantly large. . . . However, at the same time, . . . seen in a broad social context, the Skagit Valley is an uncommon and non-restorable area and has important social values. 36 '

In this writer's opinion, it is fair to speculate that if the commissioners had been free to reconsider the 1942 Order of Approval and the 1967 agreement, they would have reversed their previous decision or they would have required prohibitively expensive mitigative measures. Th ese series of forums have provided a lengthy and detail:: d recor+ci of the High Eoss Dam controversy. Xost of public debate ha s concerned tangible management problems rather than the social, political, and historical themes discussed in earlier chapters which prov ide the fundamental basis for the controversy. -- -- Footnotes for Chapter -6

'~eattlePost-Intelligencer 11 Evans Explains Opposition To High Ross am", December 9, 1971, p. 4. 2~eattlePost-lntelligencer I1 Evans Explains Opposition to High Ross ~ain", December 9, 1971, p. 4.

3~etterfrom J. Biggs to W. Uhlman, January 29, 1973, author's file.

*As of this writing, preparations for the Federal Power Com- mission hearing are virtually complete, Although important, this hearing is beyond the scope of this thesis which in chronological terms ends at the end of the summer of 1971. In addition, the opposition of the Government of Canada, the opposition of the Province of British Columbia after the election of the New Democratic Party's government on August 31, 1972, the consequent federal-provincial negotiations regarding the status of the 1967 agreement and its proposed re- negotiation with the City of Seattle, are not discussed.

'O~ancouver- Sun 11 Test Time for The IJC", June 5, 1971, p. 4.

2~raser1971: 4. l3l?raser 1971: 8.

14~rarnburuand Brucker 1971: 7.

"IJC 1971b: 11: 130.

1971b: 11: 130.

17~ersol?al cor(lm~micat,ion, John Fraser, Augl~st14, 1973.

'IJC 1971b: I: 51-53. 24~~~l97lb: 111: 39. See, also, McGeer 1972: 123.

261t is not often that an author reviews his own book as a third party. However, the comments by Dr. Anthony Scott, a natural resources economist and a member of the Canadian Section of the International Joint Commission, illustrate the variety of issues examined in a situation such as the High Ross Dam controversy . However, the truth is that the study of conservation of an open-access natural resource requires the blend- ing of elements from the (economic) theories of con- suillei~-suiF~.~s,-..-- """'puuli~ ' ~GG~S, ~~pit~l, grmth, public choice and administration, plus the generation of economic, biological and physical data in proportions that few have yet found attractive. Two studies that illustrate the breath of the problems involved are Paul Davidson, F. Adams and J. Seneca, he Social Value of Water . . . The Delaware Estuary, 11 in A. V. Kneese and S. Smith, eds., Water Research (Ealtimore, 1966) , and the International Joint Commission, En- vironmental -and Ecological Consequences -in Canada -of Raising ---Ross Lake in the Skagit Valley . . . TWashington and 0ttawa,lcW (SCOtt 1973: 69)

Of course, from a non-economic point of view, there are many theories and perspectives that can be used in analysis of this controversy.

CHAPTER VII Conclusions

-summary This has been a comparative study of the international

decision making process concerning the High Ross Dam. It has demonstrated that the convergence in the development and history of the conservation movement in British Columbia and in Washington in 1969 established a climate of opinion which allowed the conservationists to challenge the sixty year old plans of '~eattleCity Light for hydroelectric developments on the Skagit River. More directly, conservationists have re- openzd the High Ross Dam question by creating a public debate based upon different cu-lture environment value judgements and consequent resource ~anagementoptions. Landscape change occurs because individuals, groups and institutions, who hold different attitudes and values concerning the definition and use of natural resources, are able to articulate their desires for change throu-gh the political decision , making process. The history of the High Ross Dam controversy demonstrates the capacity for the political articulation of

environmental values. If Seattle City Light loses its fight

'to raise the Ross Dam, it will be due to its failure to cope with changing resource options within a new socio-political context. The major issues raised during the present contuooversy are those of the opponents of the project. The purpose of the two principal opponents of the dam, the ROSS Committee and the North Cascades Conservation Council, are quite similar. The fundamental basis for both organizations

in the desire for preservation of wild lands, better opportunities for out door recreation and the promotion of park lands. In British Columbia the Skagit Valley is a focal point of concern relating to environmental issues along the border and to the general question of hydroelectric development throughout the province. The core of the opposition to the high dam project consists of users of the area. But the desire for the preservation of the natural landscape, even if it is not completely natural, is the common unifying theme throughout the arguments of the opponents of the dam. In the United States the High Ross Dam controversy is a continuation of the campaign to create the North Cascades National Park. This conflict results from the failure to cope with the general issue of hydroelectric development in the national park area. Hydroelectric dams in national parks have caused major controversies throughout the history of the United

States national park system. The High Ross Dam follows these historical patterns in some regards.

The High Ross Dam controversy has been structured by a series of formal procedures required by the City of Seattle, the Washington State Ecological Commission, the Federal Power

Commission and the International Joint Commission. These forums have provided a lengthy and detailed record of debate. How- 172. ever, most of the public debate has concerned tangible management problems rather than the social, political, and historical themes which provide the fundamental basis for the controversy. Prospectives The controversy continues; the fate of the High Ross Dam is still in doubt. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to predict that the High Ross Dam will not be built in the foreseeable future. The process of damnation has been too complete. Virtually no one outside the city of Seattle supports the project. The Government of Canada, the Province of British Columbia, the State of Washington, the Mayor of the City of Seattle, and many people throughout the United States and Canada oppose the project. Indeed, the fact that a controversy remains today in light of such objections is remarkable. The primary reasons for this endurance of the project are the institutional pride ai:d determination of Seattle City Light and the failure of the decision making process in Canada. Seattle City Light still must obtain permission from the Federal Power Commission and the Seattle City Council to build the dam. If these approvals are received, legal actions by the State of Washington and the North Cascades Conservation Council are almost certain. At the same time, no similar action is likely in Canada. Seattle City Light will continue to ride its white elephant until it drowns. At the same time, it will continue its energy conservation program and proceed with plans to build alternative sources of power for the city. Even a long enduring controversy such as this one must

' come to an end eventually, Assuming that the final decision

is such that the dam will not be built, a number of courses

, of action are likely. The boundaries of' the Ross Lake National

Recreation Area will be redrawn closer to the edge of the exist- . ing reservoir as was originally advocated by some of the conservationists. The Skagit Valley in British Columbia will be

, developed as a major regional park with medium and low density family recreation facilities in conjunction with Manning

Provincial Park and with recreational development in the Chilli-

w8ck Valley. These areas will be administered by the province

in cooperation with the United States National Park Service. Growing populations of Seattle and Vancouver and attraction of

national park status will create increasing recreational demand.

The North Cross State Highway and the Skagit Valley will be

joined ultimately by a passenger ferry on Ross Lake. The

Silver-Skagit Road will be paved and will become an alternative

route between Vancouver and Wenatchee providing a major corridor

for use and access in the region.

Conversely, if the High Ross Dam is built, Seattle City

Light will acquire its planned Ylcrement of peaking power. The

boating, camping and other re~rea~tionalfacilities will be

constructed. Numerous modifications such as the relocation of

the Silver-Skagit Road will be made. At the same time, many

important politicians in the United States and in Canada will be very embarrassad. In addition, as was the case with the 174.

getch Hetchy Dam, the construction of the High Ross Dam project

wjll ha gre9ted with much dismay and remorse by the opponents

Concluding Observations In conclusion, this study leads to the following considerations. The High Ross Dam controversy foll.ows a well established I tradition of hydroelectric dam debates. The essential issues ( have changed little; the historical patterns appear to hold in several respects. Arguments for and against large hydroelectric projects are virtually interchangeable. The High Ross Dam controversy, for instance, is structurally very similar to the Hetch Hetchy Dam debate. Basic natural resource perspectives and choices change very little over time. I However, the climate of opinion toward dams does change Socio-political viability of natural resource options ( Over time* I depends upon the capacity for the articulation of resource I values. Seattle City Light's plans for the High Ross Dam have I persisted in the face of repeated delays and growing opposition. 1 At the same time, the perspective of the province of British Columbia has changed five times when different resource priori- 1L I ties have predominated. The current High Ross Dam controversy ( exists because groups such as the ROSS Committee and the North I Cascades Conservation Council have been able to articulate the resource issues and values that were neglected previously. The present climate of opinion has permitted them to express their views concerning the desirability of the dam more distinct]-y and explicitly and thus, to raise questions previously expressed only weakly and obliquely. The High Ross Dam controversy has been subject to an unique ebb and flow of public debate which has shaped the character of the controversy. This controversy has been an active public issue. However, events during this debate have not been continuous. A week of great activity may be followed by months of inactivity. The principal causes of this pattern are the institutional requirements for governmental approval of the project and the process of public debate through the media.

Public debate can exist only when there is a public forum.

The efforts of the ROSS Connittee and the North Cascades Conservation Council have been structured around the requirements of and the opportunities presented by the International Joint Commission, the Washington State Ecological Commission, the Seattle City Council, and the Federal Power Commission. The Federal Power Commission, for example, provides an opportunity for the conservationists to persuade the commission that it ought not grant the required power license and to argue the issues before the public again. Seattle City Light, in turn, requires the license and amst defend its project. Although the issue may appear dormant to members of the general public, this hearing has required months of detailed preparation for the hearing. The conduct of the media is a vital element in the High

ROSS Da!. ron!rroversy. There ?;:o::ld be no contyovcrsy ijjitiiouL

active support from members of the media. Opponents of the dam

have received I I good press 1 I on the whole. Coverage has been extensive; it has been front page material many times. Media coverage, generally, has been carefully orchestrated in order to achieve maximum impact for the mutual advantage of the media and the conservationists. Although the governmental bodies provide the basic framework for the controversy, the media

establishes the essential ebb and flow pattern. A public controversy is in large part a media campaign,

An examination of the history of the High Ross Dam question shows that the attitudes and values expressed toward hydroelectric dams and their impact are at the root of the controversy, - The real controversy concerns basic principles relating to the I ( conflict of interests among the participants of this debate and does not concern the tangible management issues that are argued during the variou-s public hearings. The fundamental basis for this 'controversy rests with the social, historical and politjcal themes explained during this study rather than I questions of engineering, biology, and economics.

strict sense, there can be no conservation victories. A deci-

sion not to build the dam addition will not necessarily improve

the area from a conservationist point of view. It merely pre- ue12t~ further darnage. The best they can do is to maintain the --Stat4~~s qllO. Furthermore, a1though hydroelectric power generat ion projects are becoming increasingly less viable, the rapid growth of electrical demand may make this project more desirable in the future. Costs are relative. This fundamentally marginal project may become viable much in the same way that expensive, isolated frontier reserves of petroleum and natural gas have become in demand. In addition, as the areas served by the

Northwest Power Grid rely more and more on thermal generation, especially nuclear generatLon, hydroelectric power becomes more valuabl-e as peaking power. If the demand for and cost of energy becomes high enough, the High Ross Dam will become more profitable. As long as electrical power is generated and consumed, there will be a High Ross Dam controversy. SXLECTED EIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Public Documents

Adams, Paul -et --al. , 1971 -The Future --of the Skagit Valley, Vancouver, Report prepared for the Skagit Valley Study Group.

British Columbia Energy-- Board, 1971 Electric Power Requirements in B. C.: Projections ------to 1990, Vancouver, H. C. Energy Board. 1972 Report on Electric Energy Resources and Future Power SGply, British Columbia 1972-1990,- Vancouver British Columbia Energy Board.

Canada Department of External Affairs and the Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources, 1964 The Columbia River Treaty Protocol and Related Documents, Ottawa, Queen1s Printer.

Canada National Energy Roard, 1968 Energy Supply -and Demand Balances 1955-1967: Consolidation -of Historical-- Data, Ottawa, Queen's PY~R~~Y.

1969 Energy Supply -and Demand in Canada and Export Demand for Canadian Energy 1966-1990, Ottawa, Queen1s Printer.

Crafts, Edward C., ed., 1965 The North Cascades, A Keport --to the Secretary --of the Interior --andecretary -of Agriculture --by the North Cascades Study Team, Washington, Dept. of Interior and Dept . of Agriculture. International Joint Commission, 1936-40 Trail Smelter Quest ion, seven volumes, Ottawa and Washington, King's Printer. 1941 Application----- of the City of Seattle -For Approval -of Proposal To Raise The Water Level --of the Skagit River, State -of Washington, --at and above -the International Boundary, Hearing, Seattle, Washington, Septembzr --12, 1941-, volume 1, Ottawa and Washington, International Joint Cornmis sion. Order Of' Approval, --In the Matter --of the Application ----Of ?'he?itv of Seattle For Authority -To Raise The Water Level --of'the Skagit River Approximatel-y 130 ---Feet At the International Boundary Between The- United States and Canada, Ottawa and Washington, International Joint Commission. Rules of Procedure --- and Text of Treaty, Ottawa and ~ashinzon,International Joint Commission.

Agreement Between Her Majesty The Queen In Right --Of The Province of British Columbia ---And The City -Of Seattle, victoria, Province of British Columbia and City of Seattle, Washington Pollution ---of Lake Erie, -Lake Ontario --and the International Section ---of the St. Lawrence River, Ottawa, Information Canada.

Environmental And Ecol ogical Consequences In Canada -Of Raising ----Ross Lake In The Skagit Valley -to Elevat,ion 1725, Ottawa and Washington, International Joint Conmi s s ion.

Public Hearings, Environmental And Ecological Conse- quences In Canada Of Raising ----Ross Lake In The Skagit Valley -To'~levatioTl725, June 3-5, 1971, Bellinghsm and Vancouver, Transc.ript, Ottawa and Washington, International Joint Commission. Report --of the International Joint Commission on Solution --to the Problems Facing the ~esidentsaf Point Roberts, Ottawa and Washington, 1nternatGnal Joidt Commission.

Moore, Edwin A., 1968 -An Economic Analysis of Generation Patterns on Future Power Systems, ~tta,waT~ationalEnergy ~oard:

Seattle, Dspartment of Lighting, 1971 Environmental Investiga-tions, Skagit Valley -In Canada -And Indication -of Consecluences From Raising The Level ---Of Ross Lake, Vancorlver, 5'. F. Slanzy and Company. 1972 The Aquatic Envjronment, Fishcs -And Fishery --Ross Lake -And -The --Canadian Sks ~itRiver, Jnterirn K$port, v. 1, Seattle, Int~rnationalSkagit-Eoss Fishery Committee. Testimony -On Behalf Of Application ---Of City Of Seattle, ~P~artmentof ~i~htiE,--In The Matter --Of The Applica- tion Of ~he'?ii.~of' Seal.tle, Washington For Amendment ----- 7 -Of License -For Skagit River Ross Development Project --No. 553 Washington, 4 vols., Seattle, Seattle Department of Lighting.

J-, 11 Historical Perspective on the 'Resources For Tomorrowf ~onference",- In 6. H. Kristjanson, ed., Resources For Tomorrow, vol. 1, pp. 1-13, Ottawa, Queen1s Printer.

U. S. Department of Interior, National Park Service, 1970 North Cascades Complex, Master Plan/Public Meeting, Wilderness Proposal/Public Hearing, Washington, Park Service.

U. S. House of Representatives, Commj ttee on Interior and Insular Affairs 1968 Hearings ------on H. K. 8970 and Related Bills ---A Bill To Establish the North Ca~c-adesNational Park , , - -.-- . . 90th Congress, 2nd Sesc::on, Washington, Government Printing Office.

U. S. Federal Power Commission, 1973 Ross Development of Pro;j:>et --No. 553 Skagit River, Washington, ~raftEnvirojuaentalImpact Statement, Washington, Federal Powel. Commission.

U. S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 1966 Hearings --on the Study Team Report --of the Recreational Opportunities --in the State of Washington, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, ~ashington,Government Printing Office.

1: 1967 Hearings --on S. ----1321 A Bill To Establish The North E - I?? , 7. Cascades National Park . ... -90th Conaress,- 1st ;5, Session, Washing~on, Goverment Printing Office.

Washington State Ecological Cotrsnission, 1971 Hearing Regarding Proposal To Raise --Ross Dam, Transcript, Olympia, klashinaon State Ecological Commission. 11. Unpublished Monographs

~ramburu,J. Richard and Thomas H. S. Brucker, 1971 11 Brief to the International Joint Commission," Seattle, North Cascades Conservation Council.

Bianchi, Renato, l I 1938 An Economic Study of the Skagit Power Development, II M. S. thesis in Electrical Engineering, University of Washington.

Brousson, David, 1971 11 Brief to the Interna,tional Joint Commission on the Skagit Vallzy and High Ross am," Vancouver, ROSS Committee.

Dick, Wesle A,, 1965 'The Genesis of Seattle City ~ight,"M. A. thesis in History, University of Washington. Fra s er, John, 1971 "ROSS Committee Legal Brief to the International Joint Commission, 11 Vancouver, ROSS Committee.

Massey, John, 1969 "city of Seattle Department of Lighting, Skagit River Project : Hourglass Program, April 29, 1969, 11 Vancouver, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. . McNabb, David E., 1968 "The Private Versus Public Power Fight in Seattle 1939-1934 ," M. A. thesis in Communications, University of Washington, Pitzer, Paul, S' 1966 "A History of the Upper Skagit valley," M. A. thesis in History, Univ~rsityof Washington. it 41* $ Sommarstrom, Allan R., 1970 "Wild Land Preservation: The North Cascades sv.* 11 8' Controversy, Ph.D. thesis in Geography, University *- of Washington. I Sparks, William O., 1964 I' J. D. Ross and Seattle City Light 1917-193211, M. A. thesis in History, University of Washington.

Taylor, Mar D., 1965 'Development of the Electricity Industry in British ~olumbia,"M. A. thesis in Geography, University of British Columbia. 111. Newspapers -and Peri~odicals

Seattle Times 1969-74,

The Wild Cascades 1968-1974. CC- Vancouver Province 1925-1974, ~ancouver-sun 1926-1974.. Victoria Daily Victoria Times 1926-1974. I, t I IV. Manuscript Files

The working Tiles and correspondence of the North Cascades conservation Council I 968 - 1974. Books -and Articles

gagby, Philip, 1963 Culture -and History, Berkeley, University of Cali- fornia Press.

~ecker,Carl, 1932 -The Heavenly ---City of the Eight?enth Century Philoso- phers, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Berber, F. J., 1959 Rivers in International Law, New York, Oceana Publi- cations7

loomf field, L. M. and G. F. Fitzgerald, 1958 Boundary Water Problems -of Canada --and the United States, Toronto, Carsell Press.

cking, Richard C., 1972 Canadaf s Water: For Sale? Toronto, James Lewis and Samuel.

urne, C. B., 1971 " ~nternationalLaw and Poll.ution of ~nternational Rivers and Lakes", ----U. B. C. Law Review 6(1):115-136. Burton, Thomas L., 1972 Natural Resource Policy -in Canada, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart.

hacko, C. J., 1932 -The International Joint Commission Between -the United States --and the Dominion -of Canada, New York, Columbia University Press.

Fz*. Chant, Donald, ed., Q 1970 Pollution Probe, Toronto, Newpress. sen, Charles M, ed., 1973 Engineering a Victory --For Oura Environment: --A Citi- zenls Guide ---To The U. -S. -Army Corps -Of Engineers, San Francisco, Sierra Club.

.lingwood, R. G., 1945 ---The Idea of Nature, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1946 ---The Idea of History, Oxford, Clarendon Press. comnoner, Barry, 1966 Sciencz -and Survival, New York, iking Press. 1971 The Closing Circle, New York, Knopf.

reh her, Carl, 1940 I' J. D. Ross, Public Power ~agnate", Harperr s Magazine 181: 46-60.

Easton, Robert, 1972 Black Tide, New York, Delcorte Press.

Effort, Ian E. and Earbara M. Smith, 1972 Energy --and the Environment, Vancouver, Institute of Resource Ecology, University of British Columbia.

Ehrlich, Paul, 1968 -The Population Bomb, San Francisco, Sierra Club.

Feller, Micha,el, 1973 11 The ChTlliwack Valley, A Park Proposal for British Columbia", --Park News g(3): 30-38. Garfinkel, Harold, 1967 Studies -in Enti-~nomzthodology,Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.

Gerlach, Luther, and Virginia Hine, 1970 Paople, Power, Change: Movements -of Social Trans- f~rmat~ion,Indienpolis, Bobbs-Merrill.

Glacken, Clarence, 1967 Traces --on the Rhodian Shore, Berkeley, University of California Press.

1970 11 Manf s Place in Nature in Recent Western ~hought", -In Michael IIamilton, ed., This Little Planet, pp. 163-202, New York, Charles Scribnert s Sons.

Harris, Cole, 1971 11 Theory a,nd Synthesis in Historical ~eography", Canadian Geographer l5(3): 157-172.

Hunter, Robert and Robert Kcziere, 1972 Greenpeace, Toroilto, JkClelland and Stewart.

Hutchinson, Bruce, 1950 -The Fraser, Toronto, Clarke, Irwin and Co. ~ngledow, T., 1945 Hydro-Electric Power and Hydro-Electric Power Devt-3.l opnent, --in t;ha Tow nr Mari.nl and Coas t,al --Arna, of British Columbia, Vancouver, Engineering Institute of Canada.

Jones, Holway, 1965 ----John Muir and the Sierra Club, San Francisco, Sierra Keesing, Roger and Felix Keesing, 1971 -New Perspectives in Cultural Anthropology, New York, Holt, Rinehart anF;dinston. Kneese, Allen and Stephen Smith, ed., 1966 Water Research, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press. Kroeber, Alfred, 1944 Configurations of Culture Growth, Berkeley, University of California P~SS.

Krutilla, John, 1967 -The Columbia River Treaty: -The Economics --of an International River Sasin Develoument, Baltimore John Hopkins Press.

~eart'bokof- the ~ssociationof Pacific Coast ------Geographers 31: 79-89. J. Michael, "wilderness Movement at the crossroads: l945-l970", Pacific Historical Review 41(3) : 346-361.

Grant, 11 Prologue: Environment and the Quality of Political ~ife",-In Richard Cooley and Geoffrey Wandesforde- Smith, eds., Congress --and the Environment, pp. 3-15, Seattle, University of Washington Press.

Ian, 11 The Dev~lopmentof International Law With Respect to Trans-Boundary Water Resources: Co-operation for Mutual Advantage of Continentalism' s Thin Edge of the ~dedge?", Osgoode --Hall Iaw Journal 9: 261-311. McGeer, Patrick, 1972 Politics -in Paradise, Toronto, Peter Martin Associates. McTaggart, David, 1973 Outrage! -The Ordeal -of Greenpeace 111, Vancouver, T nn7,mi,-, 2. U. UuUbsLu.

Maiden, Cecil, 1948 Lighted Journey, the Story ---of the B. -C. Electric, Vancouver, B. C. Electric Co.

Marcus?, Herbert, 1964 One-Dimensional Man, Boston, Beacon Press.

Marsen, imrna P.. , 1.972 Population Probe, Toronto, Copp, Clarke Publishing Co.

Merleau- Ponty, Maurice, 1963 I1 The Philosopher and ~ociology", In Maurice Natanson, ed., Philosophy --of the Social ~cinces,pp. 487-505, New York, Random House.

Miller, Joseph, 1973 he North Cascades ~oundation",--The Wild Cascades February-March, pp. 26-27.

Murray, Keith, 1972 It The T! .I1 Smelter Case: International Air Pollution in the Columbia valley", -B. -C. Studies 15: 68-85.

Nader, Baiph, 1972 Unsafe --At Any Speed, New York, Grossman. Nader, Ralph and Mark J. Green, eds., 1973 Corporate Power -In America, New York, Grossman. Nash, Roderick, l967 "~ohnMuir, Williarn Kent, and the Conservative ~chism", Pacific Historical Review 34: 423-433. 1968 --The American Environment: Readings --in the History of Conservation, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley publishing co. Odum, Eugene, 1959 Fundamentals -of Ecology, Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders and Co.

Ormsby, Margaret, 1958 British Columbia: -A History, Toronto, Macmillan. Bobin, Martin, 1972 The Rush F'or Spoils, The Company Province 1871-1933, 7-- -loro1-1t0, KcCleilalld arid 5lewal.t. 1972 Pillars -of --Profit, -The Company Province 1934-1972, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart. sahlins, Marshall, 1964 "culture and Ehvironmznt" , In Sol, T., ed., Horizons -Of Anthropology, pp. 132-147, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co. scholte, Bob, 1971 11 Discontent in ~nthropology", Social Research 38(4): 777-807

Scott, Anthony, 1973 Natural Resources: -The Economics Conservation, Toronto, McClelland. and Stwart .

Sherman, Paddy, 1966 Bennett, Toronto, McClel land and Stewart.

Siemans, Alfred, ed., 1968 Lower Fraser Valley: Evolution --of a Cultural- Landscape, Vancouver, Tantalus Research Limited.

Smedresman, Peter, 1973 11 The International Joint Commis~ion(united States- Canada) and the International Boundary and Water Commission ( united states-~exico): Potential For ~nvironmentalControl Along the boundaries", -New York Journal -of lntzrnational ---Law and Politics 6(3) :499-531. Smith, Page, 1964 -The IIistorian -and History, New York, Alfred Knopf. Spoehr, Alexander, 1956 "Cultural Difrerences in the Interpretation of Natural Resources 11 , In William L. Thomas, ed., Man's Role the pp. -In Chancin~.-, .., ---- Facz of ths Earth,- -- 93-102, Chicago, University of' Chicago Press.

Thoreau, IIenry David, 1867 ------A Wzek On the Concord and Merrimaclc Rivers, Boston Houghton Kfflin and Co. ~och,Jans, 1965 'i'he Social Psycholog--7 of Social Movements, Indianapolis, hobbs-Merrill.

Turn, Yi-E'u, 1966 "blan and ~ature", Landscape l5(3): 30-36. 1968 "~iscrepanciesBetween Environmental Attitudes And Behavior: Examples From Europe and China", Canadian Geographer l2(3): 13-22.

1975 "Thz Trxtment of the Environment in Ideal and ~ctuality", American Scientist 58(3): 244-249.

Van Hise, Charles, 1910 The Conservation -of Natural Resources --in the United States, New York, Macmillan Co.

Vogt, Evon and Ethel Albert, 1966 People -of Rimlrock, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

Wagner, Philip, 19728, Environrnents ar,d Peoples, Englerzlood Cliffs, Prentice- Hall.

1972b " Cultural Landscapes and Regions: Aspects of Comrnuni- cation", In Pa,ul English and Robert Mayfield, eds., Man, space, and Environment, pp. 55-68., New Yorli, Oxfo~dUniversity Press.

Walsh, W. H., 1958 -An Introduction --to the Philosophy -of History, London, Hutchinson and Co.

Waterf ield, Donald, 1970 Continental Waterboy, Toronto, Clarke, Irwin.

1973 land Grab: --One Xan Versus the Authority, Toronto, Clarke, Irwin.

White, Lynn Jr., 1967 he Historical. Roots of Our Ecologic crisis", Science 155(3767):1203-1207.

19'73 11 Contin~.ingthe onv versa ti on", In Ian Barbour, ed., Western --l.!lan And Environmental 7-7-&thics, Reading, Mass., Addison-Kcsley Fublishing Co.

Wilson, James, 1973 Peoplc ---In The Nay, Toyonto, University of Toronto Press. .am, Philanthropl!y And The Environment, Washington, 7- Foundat ion, APPENDICES

Onomastic Notzs

Letter by Alex Kobinson, April 1, 1931

The 1942 International Joint Commission Order of Approval

The 1967 Agrzement between the City of Ssattle and the Province of British Columbia

Threats to the North Cascades National Park

The 1971 International Joint Commission hearings APPENDIX A

ONOMASTTC NOTES

1. Terminology Ross Dam was known as Ruby Dam, after Ruby Creek, before the death of J. D. Ross in 1939. Ross Lake, despite its name, is a reservoir. Unless otherwise clear from its context, Washington refers to the State of Washington, not the District of Columbia.

Similarly, Canada refers to the country as a whole or the

Federal Government in 0ttawa rather than British Columbia or the Provincial Government in Victoria in particular. There is a curious habit on both sides of the border to perr eive an incongruency of scale. That is to view the other country as a, country. For example, activities in Vancouver or Victoria are spoken of as activities of Canada or by Canadians by the people in Seattle in situations when the activities of the people of Portland or the government of Oregon would not appropriately be called American.

This situation causes diplomatic as well as semantic difficulties. Witness the testimony before the International Joint Commission in 1941. Mr. Meek (controller, Dominion Water and Power Bureau, Department of Mines and Resources, Ottawa) : Mr. Yoore ha,s stated, I think, that an agreement had been made with the Canadian authorities that the levels should not excezd 1-72??

Mr. Moore (~eattleCity ~ight): Yes Mr. Meek: Could you tell us with what Canadian authorities that acreement was reached?

Mr. Moore: May I refer to the application again? I have very little to offer along that line in addition to what is included in the application to the International Joint Commission.

Mr. McWhorter ( IJC Commissioner) : Perhaps Mr. Wilson cou-ld state whether or not a formal agreement has been entered into, and, if so, with what Canadian authorities.

Mr. Wil-son (counsel for City of ~eattle): I think I understand the purpose of the question. I participated in part of those -- they were with the provincial authorities. Perhaps in that statement the word "Canadian" is being understood. as refer- ring to the Dominion. I think the discussions between Mr. Ross and Mr. Glen Smith were with the provincial authorities at Victoria.

Mr. Moore: I would accept that correction.

Mr. Stanley ( IJC Cornmissioner) : Yl understanding is that the negotiations that are mentioned in the application were with the province of British Columbia. We discussed that matter at the time, and I suggested, knowing that there is a dual form of government up there, that the application state definitely with what government, whether provincial or national, the negotiations were made.

All the negotiations had been with the Provincial Government. This confusion also highlights the ignorance of the legal and political process in the respective foreign countries. There is a great reluctance on the part of the people in Seattle to deal directly with British Columbian legal and political struc- tures. The converse is also true. There appears to be no logical reason for this difficulty. 11. Koss Dam/Skagi.t Valley

'lhe onor~asticquaiitles of the Skzgit Ei~:zr CZ~be conrusin.- U mt, at the same time, they can be revealing. The variation rin the name of the basic issue being discusszd here, the High Ross

Dam or the Skagit Valley, is indicative of a basic shift in place definition at the international border. The entire issue is always referred to by Americans as the Ross Dam or High Ross

Dam issue. For example, the Seattle Times editorial on November 21, 1972 is entitled "~uildHigh Ross am" and an article in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer of December 6, 1972 is entitled, "B. C. Says Ross Dam Plan out." The Ross Dam is already built, but the addition of 122.5 feet would create the

High Ross Dam. References to the Skagit Valley are rare; but, they are restricted to problems related to the upper Skagit

Valley of British Columbia.

Canadians, conversely, conceive the issue as the SkagFt

Valley problem. For example, the Vancouver -Sun of November 16, 1973 spread across the front page in bold type "~kagitValley Pact Still ~al'id." The terms, Ross Dam or more rarely High Ross Dam, aye used in a general sense; it is more usual for a particular reference to the Ross Dam to mean the dam itself as a physical feature. An exception to this rule appears in the

British Columbia press from time to timc when they use news stories from American sources virtually verbatim from the wire servrices of' Associated Press and United Press International. The converse is not true in the Seattle prless. For ex.ample, the Vancouver Province of November 16, 1973 states "~olic~Council Tables Plan to Raise Ross Dam." This difference in terminoloey is more than an accident of political geography. It underlines a number of fundamental conceptual differences between the canadian and American parties to the dispute.

111. Conservation/Environnent/Ecology

The term, 11 conservation movement" is used throughout to identify the contemporary social movement. The term, 11 environmental movement" has gained wide use and favor during the past five years. It is no less meaningful and ambiguous than the former term. The usage here is primarily a matter of personal preference.

The term, I' ecology movement" and its variations are not at all appropriate. While the term 11 ecology" has gained a great amount of popularity and common usage, it is vulgarism. "Ecology" is a solid, particular scientific term. It has been said that ten years ago only biologists knew what ecology meant; now, everyone except the ecologists know what it means.

Usually ecology is defined as the study of the relation of organisms to their environment, or the science of the interrelations between living organisms and their environment. Bec,ause ecology is concerned especially with the biology of groups of organisms and with functional processes on the lands, in the oc3ans and in fresh waters, it is more in keeping with the modern emphasis, to define ecology as the study of the structure and function of nature (it being understood that mankind is a part of nature). In the long run the best definition for a broad subject field is probably the shortest and least technical one, as, for example, "the sclence of the living envi.ronment" , or simply 11 environmental biology. It (Odum 1959: 4) Ecology has come to mean the interrelationship of organisme including man within the environment. This is In itself meaningful. But the ecology movement, ecological crisis, and other such variations are not meaningful or legitimate. Ecology is a concept and a methodology. It has not been comprehended completely by the general public. Most people use the word 1I ecologyT1v~hen they actual-ly mean the word "environment". Ecology is not a thing; it is a process; it cannot be altered. Furthermore, the notion of an ecological crisis is extremely misleading. As a paradigm for environmental change, the process of ecological change may result in a disadvantageous position for IIomo sapiens.

But, if a crisis results, it is a crisis for man given his particular cultural norms. Ecology as a process of change is neutral to the cost or benefits of any given change for any give!? nrga~icm. The cnncept of' ec010- per SE, c=lnnot previde U'J' -- the necessary ideological or philosophical basis for the conservat ion movement.

The loose use of the term 11 ecology" is characteristic of the sloppy and often crude thinking behind much of the recent activity in this area. This lack of discipline and thought is one of the greatest internal threats to the viability of the conservation movement. The term I I conservation" is used because it does have firm historical and philosophical roots. This does not necessarily mean that conservation is easily defined or a

Completely adequate term. However, it is the best cormon label in use at this time. See, -e.g., Nash 1968. IV. Preservationist

?.!acy pnrconc use the. term, "preservati oni st", when thi.7 writer uses the term, 11 conservationist". This writer prefers to avoid the term because 11 preservationist" has been used often in a mocking and slanderous manner. A large number of people desire to preserve and to protect natural areas. Usually, it is necessary to strictly regulate or prohibit use of these natural areas by man and his economic exploits on the land. Natural areas, by definition, are not natural if man's impact on these areas is not minimized. Charges that persons who wish to preserve natural areas; i. e., the preservationlsts, are narrow minded, or misanthropic are sirnply not; true. But they are favorites of those who use th? wise use definition of conservation as a part of thei-r own management policies for the exploitation of these same areas. APPENDIX B

In a recent issue of The Province there appeared an article dealing with the construction of a dam on the Skagit River by the City of Seattle, and the consequent flooding of a considerable area on the British Columbia side of the international boundary line, which contained so many erroneous and misleading statements that I am sure you will welcome any information that will give you the facts of the case. I am satisfied that had you had knowledge of these facts this item as worded, would not have been published, nor would the Board of Trade have been in such haste to request the Provincial Government to veto the scheme insofar as it affected land in British Columbia.

The work of developing power on the Skagit River is a municipal project conducted by the city of Seattle, and has been underway for years. Two dams have already been constructed and power generated from one of these has been supplied to clients in Seattle for a considerable time at a figure that is a thorn in the flesh of the big private power corporation.

The location of the third dam is at the hea6 of' ihe canyon on the Skagit, near Ruby Creek and as the valley northward from that point is of a very easy gradient, it will create a reservoir thirty-five miles long, or better, conditional upon the city being able to complete the arrangements with the B. C. Government, which have been under consideration by the provinci.al department of lands for two years or more. In the negotiations relative to this matter, there has been no secrecy, no underhand methods followed, no private company forlned to handle the scheme, nor is there going to be. , On the other hand, there has been a straight offer to buy the land at the price placed upon it by the B. C. Government, pay what stumpage the government requires for the timber, as well as the royalty, and pay for any privately owned propnrty and other improvements at whatever figure may be agreed upon with the owners.

The land was surveyed by provincial land surveyors (Hawkins and 11orte) of Vancouver and pl-ans filed with the department at Victoria, and it is the settled pol-icy of the Seattle City power authorities to have all work on the British Columbia side of the line done absolutely by Canadians. The area of the projected purchase amounts to 6350 acres of which 5475 acres will be submerged when the dam is finished. This will extend some eight miles north from the international boundary line, instead of the twenty miles which seems to have worried the Board of Trade so much. Of the area to be submerged possi-bly 20 per cent is good land, the balance is totally worthless as far as agriculture is concerned, consisting largely of gravel and boulders, and as there is neither wagon road nor railway, and not likely to be any, there is little likelihood of this section of the country amounting to much for years to come.

There is, however, some good timber in small tracts which might aggregate one hundred million feet or more. This along with three or four hundred million feet on the American side, has all to be cut and burned or otherwise removed before the land can be flooded. In the hopes that this timber, along with the limits on Silver Creek, would be attractive as a logging propositLon, the writer in conjunction v~ith Mr. James Galbraith of New Westminster, had an engineer, Mr. W. G. McElhaney of Vancouver, make a ~rcliminzrgTnvest ?gat i on for a logging railway. His report indicates that construction cost would be very light, and that far from beimg "isolated by mountain chains, 11 as represented, an excellent pass is available, with grades easier than exist on many logging railways at present in daily use. Inasmuch as the new road to Princeton at present I under construction does not reach the lower Skagit by twenty miles, unless a railways is constructed, neither land, timber nor minerals is likely to yield any returns for many years to come; and it therefore seems good business to embrace this opportunity of getting something for it. The cost of the clearing oT this land vill probably exceed a million and a quarter, to say nothing of the stumpage, royalty and the cost of the land itself. Nor must we overlook the annual rental. In the aggregate this project represents a sum of money coming into British Columbia that should command respectful considerat ion these times - and there is this additional fact worth noting - as this lake will be navigable. It will provide a route to the railway at the dam for the shipment of pol-es, lumber and ore and thus give us a chance to develop that lower Skagit country. In a nutshell, th~redoes not sezm to be any valid reason why the land should not be sol-d, but very many sound reasons xhy it sho~ld;

In conclusion, there is one other fact that the Vancouver Board of Trade might well consider. The power project on the Skagit is a municipal undertaking, designed to give the citizens of Seattle City Light and power at reasonable rates. In this they have to face the strong opposition of the power trust of the United States who, by utilizing every device that well paid fertile minds can devise, are ceaselessly endeavoring to hinder its completion and destroy its ~~sefulness.The opposition embraces a campaign of propaganda that is more ingenious than creditabl:, and which, among people unfamiliar with the circumstances, may lead to very wrong conclusions; so that, before adopting any attitude, or deciding upon any action may affect this enterprise adversely, or otherwise, it may be advisable to investigate very close]-y the sources of any information relating to this project that may come before the board for its consideration.

Source: Vancouvzr. -Province I I Skagit Project ~xplained"

April 1, 1931, p. 6 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE I'OR AUT1-1OKITY TO RAISE TIiE IJATEE LEmIJ OF THE SKAGIT RIVER APPROXIblATELY 130 FEET AT THE IIYTERISATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEfl THE UI!JI'IIED STATES AND CANADA.

ORDEI, OF APPROVAL

WHEREAS an Application of' the City of Seattle bearing the date of Nay 26, 1941, was presented to and filed with the International Joint Commission on August 6, 1941., under the provisions of the Treaty of January 11, 1909, between the United States and Great Sritain, for authority to raise, by stages, the natural water level of the Skagit River 130 feet, to elevation 1725 feet above mean sea level at the international boundary, by progressively increasing the height of the Ross Dam on the Skagit River in Vha,tcom County, Washi-net on; and

WHEREAS the Skagit River rises in British Colurnbia west of the Cascade Mountai-ns, and after -FT r,i.ii nm qnn-rnvirn~fc~l T~ 29 rnilns thrnugh Rrit.%s?? r ~uiu.LII~~ u,yyrL v~~I~~~~ C.-LJ Columbia crosses the international boundary into the State of Washington, and after a further course of 135 miles, in the State of Washington, discharges into the Pacific Ocean through the Strait of Juan de Fuca; and is a stream crossing the international boundary within the meaning of Article IV of the Treaty of January 11, 1909; and

WHEREAS for many years the City of Seattle has been constructing, operating and maintaining a large water-power project on the Skagit River, of which the Ross Dam, located about 30 miles downstream from the international boundary, arid the reservoir created thereby, known as Ruby Lake, are essential features; and

WHEREAS the said Ross Dam has been constructed by the City of Szatt1.e to an initial or intermediate height sufficient to impound water to elevation 1'380 feet zbove mnan sea level, in accordance with plans approved by the Federal Power Cormission of the United Statss, which plans constitute a part of the license authorized hy that Commission for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the said water-power project; and the City of Seattle proposes in its Application to raise the dam by stages to an ultimate li~ibiitsi-ifficicnt to impound r;at~rto elevation 1725 feet above mean sea level, subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Cornmission; and

WHEREAS, af'ter due notice to all interested parties in the United States and Canada, the said Application cam? on for hearing in the City of Seattle in the State of Washington on September 12, 1941, when evidence was adduced by interested parties, and all such parties desiring to be heard were fully heard; and WHEREAS it appears that the raising of the natural water level at the international boundary by 130 feet would result in the flooding of approximately 5475 acres of land in the Province of British Columbia, Canada, the title to approximately 4835 acres thereof being held by the said Province; and

WHEREAS official representatives of the Province of British Columbia appeared bef'ore the Commission at the aforementioned Seattle hearing and stated that the Province would interpose no objection to approval of the Application by the Cornmission, provided the Commission snail require 11me City of Sesttlz reasonably and appropriately to compensat e the Province, and any other Canadian interests affected, for such damage to lands in Canada as may result from the raising of the natural water level of the Skagit River at and above the international boundary.

NOW THEREFORE THIS COMMISSION DOTII ORDER AND DIRECT that the said Application of the City of Seattle for authority to raise, by stages, the natural water level of the Skagit River at the international boundary to elevation 1725 feet above mean sea level, be approved and it is hereby approved, subject to the following conditions:

(1) The City of Seattle shall adequately compensate the Province of British Columbia, and any Canadian private interests that may be aff ected, for any damage caused in British Columbia as the result of any increase in the natural water lcvels of the Skagit River at and above the international boundary; provided that the Ross Dam shall not be raised beyond the height at which the water impounded by it would reach British Columbia unless and until a binding agreement has been entered into between the City of Seattle and the Government of British Columbia folq indcanifylng Eritish Columbia 2nd private interests in British Columbia for any injury that may be sustained by reason of the Cityrs operations on the Skagit River.

(2) The Commission expressly reserves its powers under the aforesaid Treaty further to exercise jurisdiction over effects on the natural water levels at and above the international boundary, and to amend this Order or issue additional Orders for the protection and indemnification of the Province of British Columbia, or any affected private interests in Canada, that may be found by the Commission to have sustained damage by reason of any violation of the terms of this Order; provided, that any such further Order shall be issued only after the Commission shall have received and considered a formal Application filed by the aggrieved party in accordance with the Commissionr s Rules of Praocedure, and after due notice has been given and opportunity oI' hearing afforded to all interested parties in the United States and Canada. (3) The Commission shall appoint an Engineering Eoard, to be lcnown as the International Skagit River Board of CoriLl.oi, Lo cunslet of t;io nzab.zrs, one to be dravin from the engineering services of the United States and the other from the engineering services of Canada. It shall be the duty of the Board to act as technical advisors to the Commission and to make such technical reports with respect to this rnatter as the Commission may require. Dated at the City of Montreal this twenty-seventh day of January, 1942.

A. 0. Stanley Charles Stewart

Roger B. McWhorter APPENDIX D

THIS AGRE~~~EII?'made this 10th day of January A.D. ~96~(

Betw een:

HER PNJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLIJMHIA (hereinafter called the II ~rovince"),as represented herein by the Minister of Lands, Forests, and Water Resources for the said Province

OF THE FIRST PART

AND

THE CITY OF SEATTLE, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Nashington, one of the United States of America (hereinafter called the 'I city" )

OF THE SECOND PART

WHEREAS the City made formal application dated iWdy 26th) 1941, to the International Joint Commission for authority to raise thz natural water level of the Skagit River, being a river flowing across the boundary between Canada and the United States, to elevation 1725 feet above mean sea level at the international boundary :

AND XHEREAS such raising of the river level will flood 6350 acres, more or less, of land within the Province, of which 5710 acres, more or less, are vested in the Crown in right of the Province:

AND WHEREAS after , publ.ic hearings the International Joint Commission by Order dated January 27th, 194-2, approved the application of the City subject to the following conditions inter alia :

Il nlhe City of Seattle shall adequately compensate the Province of British Columbia and any Canadian private interests that may be affected, for any damage caused in British Columbia as the result, of any increase in the natural water levels of' the Skagit River at and above the international boundary; provided that the Ross Dam shall not be raised beyond the height at which the water impounded by it would reach British Columbia unless and until a blnding agreement has been entered into between the City of Seattle and thn Govern!nent, of British Columbia providing for indemnifying British Columbia and private interests in British Columbia for any injury that may be sustained by reason of the City's operztions on the Skagit River. II The Conlmission expressly reserves its powers under the aforesaid Treaty further to exercise jurisdiction over effects on the natural water levels at and above the international boundary, and to amend this Order or issue additional Orders for the protection and indemnification of the Province of British Columbia, or any affected private interests in Canada, that may be found by the Commission to have sustained damage by reason of any violation of the terms of this Order; provided, that any such further Order shall be issued only after the Cornniission shall have received and considered a formal Application filed by the aggrieved party in accordance With the Com- missionls Rules of Procedure, and after due notice has been given and opportunity of hearing afforded to all interested parties in the United States and Canada. I I

AND WHEREAS the "~kagitValley Lands Act, 11 being Chapter 81 of the Statutes of Sritish Columbia, 1947, authorized the flooding of Lot 1103, Yale District, being part of the lands covered by this agreement, subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be decided by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council and subject to payment by the City to the Province of such sum of money as compensation for damages, as may be agreed upon, between the City and the Lieutenant Governor in Council:

AND WHEREAS negotiations have been conducted between the Province and the City to arrive at mutually satisfactory terms covering the flooding and compensation therefor, whether in cash, rental payments, delivered electrical energy, combination thereof, or otherwise: ANE WHEREAS it has been agreed between the Province and the City to execute this agreement to allow flooding of the lands to the extent and for a period hereinafter mentioned, pursuant to the Order of the International Joint Conmission aforesaid, the I1 Skagit Valley Lands Act," the "Iand Act" and all other powers of the Province thereunto enabling:

AND WHEREAS this agreement has been authorized by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council under Order No. 103 approved the 10th day of January, 1967, and by the City of Seattle under Ordinance No. 95451, approved the 11th day of January, 1967. THlS AGREEMENT WITNESSETH that in consideration of the matters hereinbefore recited and hereinafter provided for, the Province, subJect to the rights of holders of any prior tenures, does hereby permit and allow the City to flood for a period of ninety-nine years from the date of this agreement, those vacant and unalienated portions of the Skagit River watershed in British Columbia within or without the boundaries of Lot 1103, Yale Division of Yale District, up to elevation 1725 feet, North American Datum (1927) as established by the Geodetic Survey of Canada, and, in addition such added vacant and unalienated Crown Lands up to elevation 1-740 feet, North American Datum (1927) as established by thz Geodetic Survey of Canada, as the Province may consider necessary to properly contain the reservoir, having in mind possible land ero- sion as a result, of wave, ice or other Yactors inherent in e,cta'nlishment of' the reservoir.

THE CITY AGREES to pay to the Province as compensation for damages and in lieu of any other rentals and charges except those agreed herein to be paid, an annual rental based on the schedule of rentals currently in effect under the Kegulation and Tariff of Fees, Rentals and Charges under the "Water ~ct"as made by Order-in-Council No. 2771, approved on the 5th day of December, 1960, and amended by Order-in- Council No. 277, approved on the 1st day of February, 1962, for storage of water for power purposes and, in this respect, the said annual rental payment has been established and shall be Thirty-four Thousand Five Hundred and Sixty-six Dollars and Twenty-one Cents ($34,566.21) which sum shall be paid by the City in United States cu-rrency with the Tirst payment of such sum made on the date of this agreement and thereafter yearly and every year on or before the anniversary date of this agreem~nt; provided, however, that the Province may by notice in writing mailed by prepaid registered post addressed to thc City one year in advance take any such annual rental payment, payments or portions thereof in the form of electrical energy valued at 3.75 mills (based on United States currency) per kilowatt hour supplied at an annual load factor of not less than sixty-five percent and delivered at the international boundary at no cost to the Province over then existing transmission lines as agreed upon between the Province and the City.

THE CITY AGREES at its own expense to have de- lineated upon the ground, by survey carried out under instructions of the responsible officer of the Province, the boundaries of the Crown lands as from time to time and as finally determined by the Province as necessary to properly contain the reservoir as heretofore recited.

THE CIT'Y AGHEES to pay all taxes levied by or under au-thority of the Province upon the lands covered by this agreement, and any improvements thereon, provided that the City shall not be subject to forest protection tax.

THE CITY AGREES that, until such tims as it desires to carry out flooding of any timbered area, ownership of the timber on such area shall remain in the Crown in right of the Province and the Province shall have the right to make sales of such timber from time to time in accordance with the provisions of the II Forest ~ct"provided that to facilitate reservoir development by the City as and when required such sales shall be subject to cancellation on six months notice being given by the Province to the timber sale licencee. As and when the City determines to flood the whole or any portion of the area and any then existing timber sales hav~been duly terminated there shall be due and payable by the City to the Province as determined by the appropriate officer of the Province stumpage value and statutory royalty as of that date in respect to any mature timber and a value per acre in respect of any immature timber then remaining on the area. Volume of mature timber and acreage of immature timber shall be established by joint inspection conducted by the parties to this agreement.

THE CITY AGREES, before exercising its right to flood the area or any portion thereof to replace at no cost to the Province the access road established by notice at the Minister of Highways, dated January 9th) 1961, and. appearing in British Columbia Gazette of Janua,ry 26th) 1961, at pages 151 and 152 and presently situat2 within the area proposed for flooding, with another road, including any necessary bridges, running above the flood line for the full length of the reservoir within the Province, such other road to be in a locatjon, constructed to standards not lower than those of the road being replaced, and surveyed, al.1 to the satisfaction of the Province. If any portion of the road to be rel-ocated requires to be built over Crown lands the Province will at no cost to the City make avail-able such lands as may be necessary for the right-01'-way, pr-ovided that the City will pay stumpage and statutory royalty in accordance with the provisions of the II Forest ~ct"in respect to any timber thereon. If any portion of the road to be relocated requires to be built on lands then alienated from the Crown, the Province, upon the request of the City, will exercise such of its rights of expropriation as may be necessary, provided that thz cost thereof and the costs of acquisition of such lands together with statutory royalty as aforesaid shall be borne by the City.

THE CITY AGREES that at its own expense and prior to flooding any portion of the area covered by this agreement such area will be cleared of all forest growth and debris in a manner and to an extent as di- rected by the Province.

THE CITY AGREES that all labour employed by or on its behalf in connection with general development of the reservoir, including the clearing, the flooding and the disposal of debris within British Columbia, shall be restricted to residents of the Province.

TIIE PROVINCE AGREES that, during the term of this agreement, it will not divert any water of the Skagit River from its natural channel for any use other Lila11 consunptive use within the watershed of that river, such consumptive use to include use of water for domestic, municipal, stock-water, irrigation, mining or industrial purposes but does not include use for the generation of hydroelectric power.

THE PROVINCE AGREES to permit the City during the term of this agreement to dispose of within British Columbia accumulated debris resulting from the flooding authorized by this agreement or otherwise, provided that any such disposal shall be carried out in accordance with provisions of the I! Forest Act" and regulations made pursuant thereto, all to the speci- fication and direction of the British Columbia Forest Service.

THE CITY AGREES at its own expense (a) to maintain a clearing crew as requirsd to regularly dispose of by burning or otherwise all debris collecting in Ross Iake and deposited within the flooding arm in British Columbia; (b) to establish and maintain fire guards by such clearing crew; (c) to provide and maintain fire suppression equipment at all times to the satisfaction of the British Columbia Forest Service and to undertake initial forest fire suppression action in the area covered by this agreement.

TIIE CITY AGREES to indemnify and save harmless the Province from and against all actions, claims and damages whatsoever that may be brought or made against the Province by reason of anything done or omitted to be don? by the City, its servants, work- men or agents, in the exercise, or purported exercise, of the rights, powers and privileges conferred by the Province under this agreement or anyway arising out of or connected with the exercise, or purported exercise, of the rights, powers and privileges so conferred.

THE PARTIES MUTUALLY AGREE that the Province reserves for itself arid for any person or persons duly, authorized in its behalf its full right of access to both land and water in the area covered by this agreement and the right of entry thereupon and to the uss and o~cupa~tionthereof in any manner not inconsistent with the purpose for which the City requlres the area covered by this agreement.

IT IS FURTHER MUTUALLY AGREED by the parties hereto that in case of any dispute, difference or question arising as to any matter or thing connected with this agreenzent or the ier~ns01 the agreement or to any other matter not specifically dealt with herein, such dispute, difference or question shall be jointly referred by the said parties to a Board of Arhj.t.ration whose decision in all matters so referred shall be final and binding on the parties hereto. Any such Board of Arbi- tration shall be comprised of one arbitrator appointed,by each of the parties hereto and a third, who shall be chairfian, to be appointed by such two arbitrators.

IN WITNESS WHE3.EOP these presents have been executed by the Honourable Ray Williston, Minister of Lands, Forests, and Water Resources, on behalf of' the Province, being duly authorized so to do by Order of the Lie~itenant-Governor in Council aforesaid, and by the City ai'fixlng its corporate seal thereto by the hands of its proper officers in that behalf, being duly authorized so to do by Municipal Ordinance as aforesaid of' the said Clty. the presence

Ray Will-iston ~inist-erof Lands, Forests, and Water Resources

On behalf of the City of Seattle

Attest OF SEATTLE

City Comptroller By J. Braman - Mayor APPENDIX E

'rhre=l,t s to the Nol-t.)? Cascades National Park

1, "~hreatto cascades", Letter by Grant McConnell, July 20, 1969

To the Editor:

Less than a calendar year has passed since the President signed the act creating the North Cascades National Park, perhaps our greatest. Nevert,heless, this superb park is already being threa.tened with disaster by the proposed building of an addition-

125 feet added to the Ross Dam- that will destroy one of the finest parts of the park. Seattle City Light and Power is now pressing plans for this addition and may well succeed in getting authorization for construction unless those citizens throughout the nzticn vhc brcught ahout the crea-tion of the park vigorously protest this new threat.

The proposed addition to the Ross Dam will inundate the

Big Beaver Valley for approximately six miles. This valley is the prime route of access to the Picket Range, one of the major climaxes of the North Cascades and one of the great alpine regions of the United States. Moreover, this valley contains the finest forest and the largest trees of the park.

It is one of few areas in the park providing the vital !I living space" for the greatest number of visitors.

The prospective economic benftfits from the construction are plainly marginal. What is provided is primarily a 6

Per cent addition to the peaking power resources of the utility. 212.

The additional firm power will be small. The new amount of pown?-- provtdnd wi 11 not make a significant- contribution to the general power resources and, in any event, will shortly have to be supplemented by thermal and, later, by nuclear power. These benefits, moreover, will accrue to only one area of nation, while the costs will have to be borne by the nation. It is a terrible irony that not much more than a generation after San Francisco forced through the invasion of one of the great scenes of another park, Yosemite, by the building of the

Hetch Hetchy Dam and the destruction of its once superb valley, the publicly owned utility of Seattle is driving ahead with a similar plan for destruction in our newest national park.

Sou.rce: The New York Times 1 t Letter to Editor, Threat to Cascades", August 10, Section 4, p. 11. Earely a year and a half ago, Congress established the North Cascades National Park in northern Washington State.

Because of pressures from Seattle City Light, several scenic wilderness valleys were left out of the park. Now the motiva-

tion of' this compromise has become clear. The utility is pushing for approval of a $45 million scheme to raise the level of its existing Ross Dam by another 125 feet.

If approved, the enlarged reservoir would flood at least 20,000 acres of the new Ross Lake National Recreation Area - destroying some of the finest Skagit Valley ~cenery,as well as many of unspo5led streams, shoreline trails and the best areas for boat

camping. The project would inundate wild forests in the lower

Ruby Creek valley, w'ilicil leads ----up lnte the southern unlt cf

the national park, and would actually flood into the park itself.

Worst of all, the reservoir would wipe out 80 per cent of the nation's finest remaining stand of primeval Western red cedar,

situated in lower Big Beaver Valley. Biologists of both the

U. S. Forest Service and the Society of American Foresters consider this forest of utmost scientific value. Canadians have joined in opposing the addition to Ross Dam.

The reszrvoir, which already backs into British Columbia, would

flood 6,000 acres of' valuable recreational land along the

Skagit River- wiping out more beautiful forests and wildlife

habitat. 214.

This plan, together with a related proposal, would take

care of Seattle's growing power needs for only two or three ! additional years. After that longer-range sources of power *L . would have to be developed elsewhere. 4 The newly elected members of Seattle's City Council can best serve their community and the entire Northwest by voting : down these stop-gap plans that would so needlessly destroy recreational, scenic and scientific values. Congress ought then add the valleys to ths national park as was originally

urged.

Source: The New York Times, 11 North Cascades Dam ~hreat", February 23, 1970, ~ecm4,p. 10. Do You Want THIS

11I I11 Your Brand-New National Park And Recreation Area?

Tcrc's a hat \\!I1 11:lppi.n 1 , ,\" c<~,~>LA,pdr.,,l,%c ,n ,tX 13,: I<.. piwd\ ni.$r.hc\ rnd lhi. wdc \.,rir.I! el ).I.<, ".,,,<>:I. Id4 I ,r;c S,<>\L 01 \bC.l~~\Il led 'td.8n ,omc c.~m.twd hc w.cr l.~l~l~l!:dnvld SO', wll I><~wnd ntu rnllc* cf htus~;l~~nr.rr~1 mud 11~1, cicn ~hw$li11 I, ~oo- ,~dtrcd1~1 hi. h! lhr t,,lwr\$ trlur. f~ rc.?.kr,h h! rrdog4. ol he Smwl) t>f hwr~~.m1 ,xe.kr, .md L \ Imm1 \crmc 3) All )our ,hurr.iini. rrd~..tnJ nlu.11 13' !,wr ILrpt Lrinp- :round on Kor\ I .d r. ubil hr. pnc 4) 'dh uf 1rc;-ll~h.ng liclul \tir.rnir 4111 tw cone 5) And rhcn I! urll h t~nicfor (I,! L~yhrI<, do vliirthmg .hr anju,) \\ h! don't ihq Jo I! rtghl !he tir*, lt~ne' ( 11) Ltght >a!$ IIWACbwn p!anwn: cw mAc KCM Dm, mghcr e\cr rmir IQlk.and h.t~r.Inonc! cn>e~rcdm I, alrcd) llut uc. uuuld llhr to po~n,uut ha^ thrrc ha\? hcrn wmr :h.nge\ qln~c191 Y 'oms h.,d one, ~ndmmi. good ox\ - uhch all of ui. pari~cul*rl) Clr! L~ght,ought lo tale ma) ICC"UI,t.

NORTH CASCADES NATIONAL PARK

On the brd \I&. ur h~\rfar Ie's of our narurrl ur.klth left to rqusrrdrr I11.m ue hdd In I9I8 I1r llnw ue ucrr y\m; at Ira\l a, much thou~httv Li.cp~ngrhi. Pugrl Suund arcr lhc umtdcr- full) rtlraclw p1.1~r11 15. ar nc p~\cto pl.!onmf for lhc grwlh I1 .lllr.tCth On the gwd uJu. ~hrw.uc mcthdr of ynl.rmng pcwcr .#nil of lnrnaglnf 11, urr. lhal d1Jn.1 i.\irr in 1918 \lr.O~od\ that mrlr furthcr r.t\.t:lngvfuur ~rrcplrcc.~hlrP ~tu~al en\~rmmrr~t unnc,c.\rr) Ileluu. ur. ~OLTIIIL.W~Cof I~CW ~mclh~d~, \ww cotnh~nal>onof uhich nr rdd Ihii. ro we ( 11) 11:llr tn\r.\tl- patr, rulhcm 1h.m tr!lr>g 1,s hulld~vr.rhc.td u~hthr.lrdr.,~rurt~\c. crpcnwe. mL). dnd in rn) r.\cn! ~n.dcqu.~lcp1.m lui Iligh Ross I>.tm. ARcr all. rhrl clthtr rorpnratuc ur gwernrncnl ;~gcn~) would drcrm of bwno ~t,fulurc c,i*.r&kmion plan\ made nwrc than hft) jcdn ago''

A CLW OF Tlit ALTEK'i\'TI\ 1-S TO A Hl(i1ll.R KO\\ b\M Inw.4 ol spl.niling 5 15 rndl~m,,n I(~NIhin md lhrn II.I,- mp. In Ih*A 1c.r furllicr wiirrrr u>!lun tutr or thrci. \ear\ .rfcri romplcl~m.hcrc 4,. \~,rncvl rhr !IIII>~( 11) I ~ghlu#!l 11.111. 10

I h""' . I ,,, 5 < \ , ti \lac 1," I ;.------.I \o 5 I APPENDIX F The 1971 International Joint Commission Hearings

I. SUMMARY OF SURMISSIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COWIISSION, 1971.

The salient poi-nts in the submissions put forth by Counsel and consultants for the City of Seattle as well as the individuals who supported raising Ross Dam are summarized and paraphrased in the following paragraphs :

Ross Lake is within 2 1/2 hours driving range of 4 million people in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia and the Seattle Metropolitan a.rea. It is a multi-purpose reservoir operated for power, recreation, flood control and to a certain extent for downstream salmon fisheries. The sudden interest in this area has resulted from the inauguration of the High Ross project. Today's headlines demonstrate the controversy surrounding this project. A fifth of the 6,700 people who visited the Valley in Canada between October and December 1970 came as a result of the controversy over the flooded area.

Cheap abu_n_c?a.nt.pown.r has been one of the principle economic cards of the northwest. The proposed project will bring on line 272,000 kilowatts of peaking power, about 20 percent of Seattle's present peak load. Flood control benefits are important to those who live in the lower part of the Valley. The City is required to maintain 120,000 acre-feet of storage for flood control from October 1 to March 15 and to maintain a downstream flow of 1,000 c. f. s. for salmon fishery.

The six hour tours underwritten by the Department of Lighting of the City accommodate 30 to 40 thousand people annually. The City has provided many miles of trails along Ross Lake and several sus- pension bridges. In the event that the Dam is raised the existing campgrounds and trails around the Lake would be replaced and bettered by the City. Water- orientated activity seems to be the hub of the recreation. The plans for general public recreation r development, as proposed by the U. S. National Parks a Service, arc good and in line with the experiences I of the City of Seattle on Ross Lake. The agreement with British Columbia provides for payment of compensation by the City to the Provincs for all damages resulting from the increase in level of thc Reservoir from 1502 tc 1725 feet. Man has the capability of influencing changes in the ecosystems. Since he has been using the resources of the Skagit Valley for about 100 years, it is not an untamed wilderness. The proposed flooding would be an improvement over what exists there now. The present Canadian camping facilities are totally inadequate. There would be no unusual or serious environmental impacts.

As the population of the Lower Mainland increases, the recreational demand will expand. The larger Ross Lake would create opportumity for high density development of water-orientat ed recreation on and around the Lake leaving the forest and the River for low density use. The northeast shore should be set aside for recreation and the west shore as a park or wilderness area. The extent of human activity will largely depend on the improvement of the access road and a larger lakz. The present drawdown of 125 feet takes the water out of Canada leaving mud flats. In contrast the proposed maxirnum drawdown would be less than 57 m 7 . lrle piqoposed dyswdcdn of thrcc tc five feet during the summer would provlde a good shoreline condition and a lake in Canada between eight and nine miles long. There would be a magnificent inspirational view of the mountains. The extensive studies now in progress on behalf of the City of Seattle should provide a sound policy for balanced use. Studies are be:!.ng designed to determine which animal species utilize the proposed Ross Lake site and to describe the degree of their dependence on thz site. Emphasis has been placed on the more interesting and easily observed taxa such as deer, upland game birds, waterfowl and larger carnivores. Present studies are being executed by ssveral t eams of fishery biologists. The quanti- tative vegetation survey, being carried out in the summer of 1971, will yield information on tree cover, shrubs, herbs, grasses, mosses and lichens.

In a like manner the thrust of the arguments put forth by the opponents to raising Ross Lake are summarized and paraphrased in the following paragraphs: Their plea was for the conservation and preservation of the extremely valuable biotic mosaic of the Skagit Valley, the like of which they arpped could not be ~'oundelsewhere in eiiher. Xashington or. British Columbia. There would be greater Canadian awareness and concern for the fate of the Upper Skagit were the area better known. In 1942 the Skagit was considered as an isolated valley unrelated to its regional context; in 1971 it should be considered as a component of the Lower Mainland Region.

Ecology lies at the conceptual centre of a new set of principles in resource allocation based on the survival and good health of hunan and other communities. The Skagit offers an opportunity to develop these new rules. Ross Lake will alienate large groups of sub-systems of the live community, throw the food chains out of balance, and interrupt the interdependence with the possible consequence of collapse. A high value must be set on preserving the balance of natural ecosystems. The spring range for the deer in the region is limited to the valley floor. Flooding will eliminate those animals now living in the reservoir area because the alternative habitats are already occupied. There are no vacuums in nature. 'The existing envirori~rierlt Is a zc~tonc containing a diversity of both coastal and interior vegetation and should be preferred to the creation of a less diversified community. The Skagit has a fine mixed forest, a nearby wilderness and a long growing season. It is the northern limit of many plants and the only good transitional area in British Columbia. Environmentalists seek to describe intangibles while hydro-power supporters rely on sconomic categories and money expressions of value. Can dollars compensate the Canadians for the environmental damage?

Which will be the greater benefit to society in the long run -- an increment of power that will satisfy Seattle's needs for three years of the retention of the irreplaceable natural assets of the Canadian Skagit Valley? Alternatives for pro- ducing electricity are available. Is it really worth squandering a semi-wilderness valley and the life it supports and perpetuates for more cheap power for Seattle which now has one of the highest electrical power consumptions in the world? Skagit power production is now a minor item in the northwestern grid. About 95 percent of the parkland available in British Columbia is remote and inaccessible mountain terrain. The Skagit is the only flat bottom valley below an elzvation of 2,000 feet that is available as a park for the general public which is accessible in a semi-wilderness area and within three hours travel from Vancouver. It is most amenable for summer recreation with low rainfall, ample sunshine and warm summer temperatures. The Skagit Valley provides opportunity for a wide variety of high quality recreational pursuits for people of all ages -- camping, picknicking, hunting, fishing, hiking over flat lands, mountain climbing, and the enjoyment of the indisputable beauty of its natural setting. It is a place to introduce urban children to the meaning of the outdoors and the key to their learning is the diversity in the flat valley bottom and the wildlife sustained by the habitat which edges the valley. While Ross Lake offers limited boating in Canada the complimentary stream side recreation and campsite acreage are of great value and should not be sacrificed for reservoir orientated recreation. Water-based recreation should be subjected to a critical economic and ecologic examination so that which is rare and valuable is not traded for that which is common place or in surplus and of marginal value. Ey raising Ross Dam you are going to lose the recreational attraction that is there now without adding anything to the recreational value. British Columbia is short of flat parkland, not lakeshore. Regular strong afternoon winds make the reservoir unsafe for small boats. Ross Lake cannot be operated to stimulate a natural lake on a year round basis. Reservoir ,drawdown would expose three or four miles of ugly, slimy, barren, mud flats adjacent to the Skagit River Provincial Park. The Lower Mainland already has a large number of fishing lakes; rit does not need another drowned valley. Nowwhere in the Lower Mainland is there another stream more suitable for fly fishing as the nine miles immzdiately upstream from Ross Lake. The Canadian Skagit should be designated as an undeveloped park. It would act as a buffer to protect the wilderness areas. There is no need to develop a park today; no necd to make all our decisions now and ruin areas we will need in the future. /' Wilderness is part of our culture and heri- J tage. Fundamental to the awareness and the spiritual or re-creation values of nature and the role of humanity in it are the absence of the works of man. The Skagit is the last valley in British Columbia which bears few marks of man and which is accessible. Hence it can also provide a vital control for scientists to evaluate what we are doing to the disturbed environment. The mental and physical well-being of a nation depends greatly on the people bzing able to enjoy the type of exhilaration of the natural environment provided by the Skagit. As the population pressures build up we will need the Skagit to retain the psychologica,l roots that maintain life in Seattle and Vancouver. It is hoped that the Commission will find a new sense of values, something to do with the human spirit, because up until now the considerations have been strictly economic. The dollar value cannot be realistically placed on the present and future use of the Skagit Valley. There are a number of al-ternative sources of power available to Seattlz City Light which are more attractive than raising Koss Uam. A reasonably sophisticated comparison of such alternative sources is required.

The development of High Ross will result in the irreversible destruction of an ecological system. The magnitude of the loss is largely unknown. If flooded, the Canadian Skagit cannot be re-evaluated. A broad comprehensive study covering all seasons over a minimum period of five years would be required to know the environmental cost of the changes entailed in raising Ross Lake as proposed. The raising of Ross Lake is opposed because it is being done in ignorance. There would be opposition to any other project anywhere with a similar amount of ecological and environmental ignorance.

Thc Commission was reminded that in the case of the Skagit River Slooding there is a unique opportuni- ,/ ty, a rare chance to take a second look, in the light of today1s conditions and toaayls priorities at the consequences of' decisions made by some 30 years ago. The required licc>ncin@proceedings before the United States Pcder2al Power Cornmission would provide that sscond chance.

Source: Environmental and Ecological Consequenc es -in Canada -of Raising ----Ross Jake in the Skagit Valley, 1nternat)ional Joint Comission l9'71:44-119. 11. PERSONS PRESENTING BRIEFS OR TESTIMONY AT THE INTERNATIOTLTAL I JOIN1' COFWlISSlON PUE1,IC fIEARINGS

1i Where witnesses tesified at more than one hearing only cine I appearance is recorded hereunder. I June 3, 1971 at Bellingham, Washington. Arthur T. Lane, Counsel for City of Seattle Thomas Brucker for North Cascades Conservation Council+ Brock Evans for North Cascades Conservation Council Mrs. Margaret M. Miller for North Cascades Conservation Councll Dale W. Cole for North Cascades Conservation Council John Knowles for North Cascades Conservation Council Miss Mary Eysenback for North Cascades Conservation Council Patrick D. Goldsworthy for North Cascades Conservation Council F. T. Darvill, Chairman for North Cascade Committee, Skagit Environmental Council

5' Presentations in the name of North Cascades Conscrvation Council include:

Friends of the Earth Aero Club National Parks and Conservation Association Wilderness Society National Audubon Society Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs The Mountaineers Audubon Society from Bellingham Elk Park Association Seattle Audubon Society Skagit Environmental Council Washington Environmental Council Sierra Club

K. C. Bruce, Maple Ridge, British Columbia Charles E. King, Bellingharn, Washington Wayne Darneron, Ross Lake Resorts, Rock Port, Washington Robert Hulbert, Skagit Soil and Water Conservation District Joseph Miller, Bellevue, Washington Dennis Meers, President of T. lngledow and Associates Limited, Vancouver June 4, 1971 at Vancouver, British Columbia.

David Brousson, M. L. A., Vancouver F. Stone, Canadian Department of Fisheries and Forestry C. F. Murphy, Counsel for the City of Seattle F. F. Slaney, Consultant for the City of Seattle Conrad L. Wirth, Consultant for the City of Seattle John Fraser for ROSS Committee John Ma,ssey, Chairman of the ROSS Committee Peter B. Finlayson for the Lower Mainland Wildlife Association Gerrard Culhane for Environmental Systems Commnity Association A. J. Vancise for Hope and District Board of Trade D. Kanee, Vancouver Miss R. Mellander, West Vancouver Ian E. Effort, Vancouver Mrs. C. Thomas, Hope, British Columbia B. Metcalfe, West Vancouver

June 5, 1971 at Vancouver, British Columbia.

Patrick McGeer, bl. L. R., Leader Liberal Party in British Columbia V. C. Brink for Federation of B. C. Naturalists Ken Farquharson, Secr eta>ry of ROSS Committee R. 1.1. Rockcvzll for Society for Poll-ution and Environmental Corltrol Robin Harger for Environmental Systems Cornrnunity Association D. J. Huntley for Dogwood Canoe Club, Burnaby, B. C. Phillip E. Moase for Richmond Rod and Gun Club Weyner Dyck for Unit 2G Army Navy and Air Force Veterans Rod and Gun Club N. Purssel for Alpine Club of Canada, Vancouver Section Miss Betty Mussenden, Vancouver F. J. Bartholomew, Vancouver Geoff Warden, B. C. Wildlife Federation Mrs. C. Raith, Tappen, British Columbia Mr. C. Raith, Shuswap Rural Ratepayers Association, Tappen, British Columbia Doug Baker Irving II. Stone, Vancouver Hugh Parf itt , Vancouver

Statements received after the public hearings.

A. L. Newbould, Corporation Counsel for city of Seattle F. F. Slaney and Company for City of Seattle - detailed memorandum J. R. Aramburu for American Conservation Organizations Dale W. Cole for North Cascades Conservation Council P. D. Goldsworthy for North Cascades Conservation Council Miss M. L. Eysenback for North Cascas~sConservation Council Earl1 N. Murman of Pncif-ic Northwest Chapter of the Sierra Club R. W. Jepperson, President of North Cascades Audubon Society J. M. Peterson, President of Olympia Audubon Society Skagit Valley Study Group of Institute of Resource Ecology, University of British Columbia - a documented report entitled, The Future of the Skagit Valley K. G. Farquharson, Secraetary of ROSS Conunittee John A. Fraser for ROSS Committee V. C. Brink for Federation of H. C. Natura,lists Robin Hargzr for Environmental Systems Community Association J. Boyd of the B. C. Division of International Travel and Trailer Clubs of America C. L. Justice, President of B. C. Society of Landscape Architects Peter Walsh, Los Angeles, California 5. F. Franklin, Corvallis, Oregon Miss Nancy Anderson, Olympia, Washington Mr. and Mrs. P. D. Koch, Seattle Miss Janet A. Fisk, Bremerton, Washington Edward L. Meyers, Woodinville, rlJashingt,on James J. Poth, Seattle Leonard J. Co~'co~'an,West Vancouver E. Pritt, T?ance1.?vnr

In addition to the above over 100 letters were received through the mails expressing opposition to Seattle's plan to raise Ross Lake.

Source: Environ~ental--and Eco1oi;ical Consequences -in Canad-a -of -of Raising ----Ross Lake in the Skagit Valley, International Joint Commission l9'/l: 160- 162 (as amended by author) 111. I I ~zxtof Reference to the International Joint Commission".

On April 7, 1971, the Secretary or State for External Affairs, for the Government of Canada and the Secretary of State, for the Government of the United States, sent the following Reference to the International Joint Commission through identical letters addressed respectively to the Canadian and United States Sections of the Commission:

I have the honour to inform you that the Governments of Canada and the United States, pursuant to Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, have agreed to request the International Joint Com- mission to investigate the environmental consequences in Canada resulting from the elevation of the Ross Lake in the State of Washington frorx 1,602.5 feet above mean sea level to 1,725 feet above mean sea level, and to make such recornmendations as it may deem appropriate for the protection and enhancement of the environment and the ecol.ogy in the area of Canada affectzd by the elevation of the lake.

The Commission is requested:

(a) to investigate the environmental and ecological consequences in Canada of the raising of the Ross Lake to an elevation of' 1,725 feet above mean sea level, taking into account relevant informat ion about environmental and ecological cons5quences elsewhere on the Skagit River, and measures being taken or planned to protect and enhance the environment in these areas;

(b) in the light of its findings, to report on the nature, scope and impact of these consequences; to make recommendations, for the protection and enhancement of the environment and the ecology of the Skagit River Valley not inconsistent with the Commissionts Order of Approval dated January 27, 1942, the Agreement required thereby between the City of Seattle and the Province of British Columbia dated January 10, 1967, and the purposes for which such Order of Approval was granted. The Commission is request2d to submit its conclusions and recommendations to the Governments of Canada and the United States no later than six months from the date of this letter of reference. In the conduct of its investigation and otherwise in the performance of its dut.ies under this rae.rerunce, the Coliiiills'sluii may utliize the serv9ces of specialists in the environmental field and other specially qualified personnel of the technical agencies of' Canada and the Unitzd States, and will, so far as possible, make use of information and technical data heretofore acquired or which may become available in either country during the course of the investigation.

Source: Environmental --and Ecological Consequences -in Canada - of Raisinir, Ross lake in tl~c:,C:l.ragit Val ley, Internat j onal ------Joint Conmision 19'71:15'7-1.58. North Cascades

NATIONAL PAR