Building for Climate Change Resilience CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT | JULY 8-13, 2007

Building Climate Change Resilience in Urban Areas and Among Urban Populations in Low- and Middle- Income Nations

DAVID SATTERTHWAITE, SALEEMUL HUQ, MARK PELLING, HANNAH REID AND PATRICIA ROMERO-LANKAO

This draft was prepared for the Rockefeller most of the urban population live in cities or Foundation. The text draws heavily on a series smaller urban centres ill-equipped for of background papers that are acknowledged in adaptation – with weak and ineffective local the references; this paper and the accompanying governments and with very inadequate provision Annex incorporates sections of text drawn for the infrastructure and services needed to directly from these papers and so parts of this reduce climate-change-related risks and draft are by Debra Roberts (case study on vulnerabilities. A key part of adaptation is Durban’s adaptation strategy), Jorgelina Hardoy adapting infrastructure and buildings, but much and Gustavo Pandiella (background paper on of the urban population in Africa, Asia and Latin Argentina), Karina Martínez, E. Claro and America have no infrastructure to adapt – no all- Hernando Blanco (background paper on Chile), weather roads, piped water supplies or drains – Aromar Revi (background paper on India), and live in poor quality housing in floodplains or Patricia Romero-Lankao (background paper on on slopes at risk of landslides. Most international Latin America), Cynthia B. Awuor, Victor A. agencies have long refused to support urban Orindi and Andrew Adwerah (background paper programmes, especially those that address these on Mombasa) and Mozaharul Alam (background problems. Section IV discusses innovations by paper on Bangladesh/Dhaka). However, the full urban governments and community organizations text of this report has not yet been reviewed by and in financial systems that address such all these authors. This draft was also able to draw problems, including the relevance of recent on preliminary chapters on disasters and disaster- innovations in disaster risk reduction for preparedness for a new Global Report on Human adaptation. But it also notes how few city and Settlements that is being prepared by the UN national governments are taking any action on Human Settlements Programme and the authors adaptation. Section V discusses how local are grateful to this. The authors are also grateful innovation in adaptation can be encouraged and to Alex de Sherbinin and Nicole Volavka-Close supported on a national scale and the funding for comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. needed to support this. Section VI considers the mechanisms for financing this and the larger To reduce the length of this paper, the details ethical challenges that achieving adaptation given in many of the examples were cut – but raises – especially the fact that most climate- these are included in the Annex. change-related urban (and rural) risks are in low- income nations with the least adaptive capacity, Abstract including many that have contributed very little This paper discusses the possibilities for to greenhouse gas emissions. adaptation to climate change in urban areas in low- and middle-income nations. These contain The Big Issues: A Summary a third of the world’s population and a large The last fifty years have brought a 600% increase proportion of the people and economic activities in the urban population in low- and middle- most at risk from sea-level rise and from the heat income nations and a much increased waves, storms and floods whose frequency and/or concentration of people and economic activities intensity climate change is likely to increase. in low-lying coastal zones or other areas at risk Section I outlines both the potentials for from flooding and extreme weather events. Low- adaptation and the constraints, with Section II and middle-income nations now have most of discussing the scale of urban change. Section III the world’s urban population and most of its considers climate change’s direct and indirect largest cities. Even Africa, long-considered a impacts on urban areas and discusses which rural continent, has two-fifths of its population in nations, cities and population groups are urban areas – and a larger urban population than particularly at risk. This highlights how North America. The last fifty years have also prosperous, well-governed cities can generally brought a very large increase in the number of adapt, at least for the next few decades, assuming urban dwellers living in poverty, lacking global efforts at mitigation successfully halt and provision for the basic infrastructure and services then reverse global greenhouse gas emissions. But that should protect them from environmental

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health hazards and disasters – and which should usually easily adapted to. You cannot fund a pro- form the basis for protection from most climate- poor adaptation strategy if the city government change related impacts. Around a billion urban refuses to work with the poor, or sees their dwellers live in poor quality, overcrowded homes, neighbourhoods and enterprises as ‘the housing in ‘slums’/informal settlements that lack problem’. adequate provision for piped water and most other forms of infrastructure; a high proportion The vulnerability of these low-income urban are on sites at high risk from flooding or dwellers to climate change is often ascribed to landslides. their poverty – but it is far more the result of local government failures or limitations, which in For most prosperous and well-governed cities, turn are linked to the failure of national adaptation to the likely risks from climate change governments and international agencies to for the next few decades does not appear support urban policies and governance systems problematic. This centres on adapting buildings that ensure needed infrastructure is in place, and and infrastructure to these increased risks and preparedness for extreme weather and, where good disaster preparedness. But you cannot adapt needed, sea level rise. Most international infrastructure that is not there. Hundreds of agencies have chosen to avoid investing in urban millions of urban dwellers have no all-weather areas. There are also larger issues related to the roads, no piped water supplies, no drains, and no self-interest of the richest, most powerful nations electricity supplies and live in poor-quality that have prevented or constrained democratic homes on illegally occupied or subdivided land, processes in many low- and middle-income which inhibits any investment in more resilient nations, but these are beyond the scope of this buildings. A high proportion are tenants with paper. very limited capacities to pay rent – and landlords with no incentive to invest in better It is unrealistic to discuss building cities for quality buildings. Low-income urban dwellers climate change resilience without considering are also very constrained in any capacity to move this large deficit in basic infrastructure and the to safer sites, because of their need to be close to reasons why these are not acted on by most city income-earning opportunities and the lack of or municipal governments. Thus, this paper alternative (safer) sites. gives considerable attention to understanding the urban contexts where adaptation has to take This means that hundreds of millions of urban place and what these imply for the possibilities of dwellers in low- and middle-income nations are successful adaptation. at risk from the direct and indirect impacts of The linkages between this topic and the other climate change. Most of this risk is associated topics are obvious. Actually, the discussions on with development failures, especially the health and on shelter, water and sanitation are incapacity of local governments to ensure on adaptation too; so is a large part of the provision for infrastructure and for disaster-risk discussion on urban planning. Better quality reduction and disaster-preparedness. Or they housing and provision for water and sanitation refuse to do so in ‘illegal settlements’, even when (which has to include provision for drainage) is a third or more of the population (and one key part of adaptation; achieving this will workforce) live in these. Much of the urban also require more competent, accountable urban population and most urban governments have a governments. Addressing health issues means not very low adaptive capacity to all environmental only better health care (which should include hazards, including low adaptive capacity for emergency-response capacity for extreme weather climate variability and climate change. This events) but also reducing environmental health makes large sections of the urban population very risks, thus reducing many of the risks that climate vulnerable to any increase in the frequency or change is likely to bring and the vulnerability of intensity of storms or increased risk of disease or low-income populations to these. To do this constraints on water supplies or food price rises – requires more competent and accountable urban which in wealthier, better governed cities are governments. A large part of urban planning

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should be focused on providing lower-income conflicts and no economic or political stability. groups with legal alternatives to informal Building this competence, capacity and settlements by increasing the supply and reducing accountability in high-income nations was a the cost of land for housing and supporting slow, difficult, highly contested process, which infrastructure on suitable sites; this too is at the did not have to deal with climate change and core of city adaptation to changing risk patterns which was much helped by prosperity and related to climate change. economic stability. Many of the nations or cities most at risk from climate change lack the There are innovative policies and practices political and institutional base for adaptation – underway that show that adaptation is and for addressing the development deficiencies possible – but not many of them. There is also which underpin their lack of adaptation capacity. the shift from disaster response to disaster Even if we can conceive of how this might be preparedness, as well as disaster risk reduction addressed, it is difficult to see how existing that has great relevance for resilience to climate international institutions as they are currently change; but as yet, this has not influenced many configured can do so. city and national policies. There are nations where the competence, capacity and Discussions of adaptation must take into account accountability of city and municipal the profound unfairness globally between those governments have increased considerably, who cause climate change and those who are providing the needed adaptive capacity – but most at risk from its effects. With regard to most are in middle-income nations. And even people, it is the high-consumption lifestyles of here, it is difficult to get much attention to the wealthy (and the production systems that climate change adaptation from most city meet their consumption demands) that drive governments and most ministries and agencies at climate change, but it is mostly low-income higher levels of government within their urban groups in low- and middle-income nations with policies and investments. Most have more negligible contributions to climate change that pressing issues, including large backlogs in are most at risk from its impacts. Most larger provision for infrastructure and services, and companies and corporations can easily adjust to much of their population living in poor quality new patterns of risk induced by climate change housing. They are also under pressure to improve and move their offices and production facilities education, health care, security – and are also away from cities at risk. But cities cannot move. looking for ways of expanding employment and And all cities have within them the homes, attracting new investment. Neither national nor cultural and financial assets, and livelihoods of local (city and municipal) governments will their inhabitants, much of which cannot be engage with adaptation to climate change unless moved. it is seen as supporting and enhancing the achievement of development goals. The key issue is how to build resilience to the many impacts of climate change in tens of An analysis of private investment flows into thousands of urban centres in low- and middle- urban areas in low- and middle-income nations income nations with programmes that: shows their potential to help fund some forms of 1. support and work with the reduction of infrastructure improvement and adaptation – but risks to other environmental hazards, not in the infrastructure most in need of including disasters (there are strong improvement and adaptation and not in most of complementarities between reducing risk the nations and cities where adaptation is most from climate change, non-climate change urgently needed. related disasters, and most other environmental hazards); It is very difficult to conceive of how to get pro- 2. are strongly pro-poor (most of those most poor and effective adaptation in nations with at risk from climate change and from other weak, ineffective and unaccountable local environmental hazards have low incomes, governments, many of which also have civil

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which limits their autonomous adaptive One final point that needs stressing: the capacity); inappropriateness of conceiving of ‘the problem’ 3. build on the knowledge acquired over the as a lack of funding. Certainly, new funding last 20 years on reducing risk from disasters sources are required to address backlogs in in urban areas (there have been important infrastructure and services and build adaptive advances in this); capacity. But for most cities, the problem is as 4. are based on and build a strong local much a lack of local government competence, knowledge base of climate variabilities and capacity and accountability to those who are of the likely local impacts from climate most at risk. Within discussions on climate change scenarios; change adaptation, there is still a search for 5. encourage and support actions that reduce figures on the funding needed for adaptation; for risks (and vulnerabilities) now while instance, how much will it cost to protect coasts recognizing the importance of measures from a 50 cm sea-level rise or climate-proof key taken now to begin the long-term changes lifeline infrastructure? Within discussions of needed in urban form. These measures development and disaster risk management, there must also address changing spatial has been a move away from this approach, in distribution of urban populations to reduce recognition of the many other factors that vulnerability to risks that may only influence what can be done. become manifest several decades in the future (urbanization processes in most nations have a momentum and drivers that are difficult to change – but at present this is mostly increasing risks to climate change and so can be considered maladaptation). 6. recognize that the core of the above is building the competence, capacity and accountability of city and sub-city levels of government and changing their relationship with those living in informal settlements and working in the informal economy; and that recognize the importance within this of supporting civil society groups, especially representative organizations of the urban poor; 7. recognize the key complementary roles that are required by higher levels of government and international agencies to support this (and that recognize that this requires major changes in policy for most international agencies that have long ignored urban issues); 8. build resilience in rural areas as well as urban areas, given the dependence of urban centres on rural production and ecological services and the importance for many urban economies and enterprises of rural demand for producer and consumer goods and services.

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction 7 The potentials for adaptation 7 The constraints on their implementation 8 Climate change and other risks 10

II. Background 13 The dimensions of urban change 13 The scale of urbanization 13 The growth of large cities 13 Vulnerability and resilience 13 Understanding vulnerability 13 Urban contexts pose particular challenges for governments 16 The continuum of risk from everyday to catastrophic disasters 18 Extreme weather events and risk-accumulation processes 19

III. Understanding Cities’ And The Urban Poor’s Vulnerabilities To Climate Variability And Change 19 The vulnerability of cities to climate change 19 Flooding 20 Storms, sea-level rise and coastal urban populations 21 Constraints on water supplies and other key natural resources 23 Higher temperatures and heat waves 26 Other climate-change-related health risks 27 The particular problems facing urban populations in small island nations 28 Identifying drivers 28 What drives urban change? 28 Government roles 32 Government and the public good 32 Identifying trends 34 Trends in urban disasters from extreme weather events 35 Cities and high-risk sites 35 Status report on the urban poor 37 Effects of increased climate variability and change on the urban poor. 39 Which groups among the urban poor are most at risk? 41 How are the urban poor presently adapting to the added challenge of increased climate variability and change and the associated environmental stresses? 42 Conclusions 43

IV. Identifying Innovative Local/City Adaptations To Climate Change 44 Start with what you have, build on what you know 44 Financial systems that encourage adaptation 47 Urban management/governance 48 Innovations in Durban and other cities 49 Infrastructure adaptation and investment 51 Upgrading slums and squatter settlements 52 Community-based adaptation 52 Disaster risk reduction planning 54 Tools and methods 55

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V. Understanding Scales For Action 57 Getting the needed scale of response 57 The different levels where action is needed 57 National level action 57 Challenges of drawing up and implementing national adaptation programmes of action 58 Key challenges 58 Lessons from NAPAs 58 Long-term changes in urban centres to reduce risks 59 Decentralization 60 Costs of adaptation 61 Introduction 61 Adaptation to sea-level rise 61 Adaptation costs (with a focus on infrastructure and buildings) 63 Funding for adaptation 65 NAPA estimates 66 Adaptation to water stress or scarcity 66 Adaptation that meets the needs of the urban poor 67 Existing and potential links between adaptation and mitigation 69

VI. Next Steps And Questions 70 Mechanisms for financing adaptation 70 Donor ‘climate-screening’ of investment portfolios 72 Conclusion: Some final reflections on the distribution of costs 73

Tables Table 1: Different degrees of poverty in urban areas 38 Table 2: Examples of adaptation in practice 46 Table 3: The different local contexts through which national governments and international agencies can pursue ‘good governance’ for adaptation 49 Table 4: Characteristics of mitigation and adaptation 70

Boxes Box 1: Definitions of terms 11 Box 2: What are disasters 15

Annex 76

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I. Introduction able to function as urban centres; for instance, The lives and livelihoods of hundreds of creating stable sites for buildings, putting in millions of people will be affected by what is place the infrastructure that all cities require, done (or not done) in urban centres with and ensuring provision for water and for regard to climate change over the next 5 to 10 managing wastewater and storm and surface years. Urban centres are key players, both in runoff. Successful and healthy cities are proof the generation of greenhouse gases and in of the adaptation capacities of their strategies to reduce this generation, especially governments, citizens and enterprises. In any dependence on carbon-based fuels.1 They also well-governed city, there is already a great concentrate a large proportion of those most at range of measures in place to ensure that risk from the effects of climate change – and buildings and infrastructure can withstand the enterprises that generate most of the extreme weather events and water supply world’s GDP. While the need for city and systems can cope with variations in freshwater municipal governments and civil society groups supplies. Good environmental health and to act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is public health services should also be able to well-established – and with many city cope with any increase in other climate- governments in Europe, North America and change-related health risks in the next few other regions already acting on this – the need decades, whether this is through heat waves, to reduce urban residents’ vulnerability to reduced freshwater availability, or greater risks climate change is not. In addition, most of the from communicable diseases. urban centres (and nations) that face the highest risks from the negative effects of Thus, it is easy to envisage a process by which climate change are those with almost negligible urban planning and management ensure contributions to the greenhouse gases in the planned adaptation, with developments and atmosphere; most also have serious constraints investments in and around each urban area on their adaptive capacity. reducing risks for inhabitants, enterprises and infrastructure to climate-change-related The potentials for adaptation impacts. So, over time, this adapts the building As the IPCC Fourth Assessment notes, urban stock, the industrial base, the infrastructure and centres and the infrastructure they concentrate the spread of urban development to the risks – and the industries that are a key part of many these changes bring. The tools and methods such centres’ economic base – are often capable required to do this are well-known and their of considerable adaptation to reduce risks from effectiveness has been demonstrated in many the direct and indirect impacts of climate locations; for instance, adjustments to building change.2 All large urban centres have had to codes, land subdivision regulations and make very large ‘adaptations’ to environmental infrastructure standards, combined with land- conditions, site characteristics, natural resource use planning that restricts buildings in high-risk availabilities and environmental hazards to be areas and makes special provision to cope with extreme events, including the use of insurance to spread risk. There is also a well-established 1 Romero-Lankao, Patricia (2007), Are we missing literature on the importance of integrating the point? Particularities of urbanization, adaptation into disaster-preparedness in and sustainability and carbon emissions in Latin American cities, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. around urban areas. For large, well-established 19, No. 1, pages 157-175. cities, there are often particular problems with 2 Wilbanks, Tom and Patricia Romero-Lankao with adjusting existing buildings, infrastructure and Manzhu Bao, Frans Berkhout, Sandy Cairncross, land-use patterns to the new or heightened Jean-Paul Ceron, Manmohan Kapshe, Robert Muir- risks that climate change will or may bring, but Wood, Ricardo Zapata-Marti et al (2007), Chapter these can generally be addressed by long-term 7: Industry, Settlement and Society, IPCC WGII policies which make these affordable by Fourth Assessment Report, 58 pages. spreading the cost over long periods and by

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making use of potential synergies between long-term process of support and funding for reducing climate change risks and other adaptation, assuming none of the high-impact environmental risks. Most of the risks from but uncertain catastrophic climate changes climate change are heightened risk-levels for takes place, which will produce the needed risks that are already present. adaptations without high costs in most locations. Certain cities face far more serious In addition, all low-income and most middle- risks than others, but it is possible to envisage income nations have what might be considered an international funding system that gives an advantage in that much of their special attention to helping them adapt. It is ‘urbanization’ is to come in the next few also possible to envisage national adaptation decades; since it has not happened yet, it can strategies that encourage and support urban be planned and managed in ways that development away from the areas most at risk accommodate the increased risks that climate from climate-change related impacts. Most change is likely to bring. These ways can governments and many international agencies include measures to channel new urban growth have officially endorsed recommendations to away from high-risk sites – for instance, from move in this direction, as in, for instance, the cities or city sites at high risk from moderate Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 or the sea-level rises and from storm surges. There are Habitat Agenda. some particular worries with regard to the impact of the needed measures on housing and The constraints on their implementation basic services for low-income groups; higher It would be a mistake to assume that the above building and infrastructure standards and land- – a logical, justifiable, fundable process driven use restrictions (including avoiding new by good science – provides a viable roadmap for constructions on flood plains) could mean action. The examples of evolving good rising land and housing prices and much practice in this paper are very unusual and it is reduced supplies of cheap accommodation, but important to understand why this is so. It is special measures can be taken to ensure easy for national governments to sign sufficient supplies of well-located, serviced land declarations at international conferences that for new housing. It is also easy to envisage this recommend all the needed measures and then process addressing hazards unrelated to climate ignore them. change; for instance, improved drainage and provisions for coping with occasional heavy, The best indication of the constraints on concentrated rainfall, which have long been implementing adaptation comes from the last risks (and often produce serious flooding). So 50 to 60 years of ‘development’. In the 1950s, it adaptation to climate change is integrated into was easy to envisage a process by which programmes to reduce risks from disasters and international funding for ‘productive activities’ other environmental hazards. It is also easy to and the infrastructure it needed allied to envisage this process incorporating measures ‘technical assistance’ would rapidly reduce that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There is poverty and ‘under-development’ in Africa, evidence from various cities in low- and Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. middle-income nations of discussions within Yet more than five decades later, the number of their governments on what local adaptations people suffering extreme poverty is much larger may be needed to underpin good long-term than it was in the 1950s. Indeed, there was a planning for and investment in adaptation; for need to launch the Millennium Development instance, the example of such processes in Goals in 2000 precisely to focus attention on Durban, South Africa, described later. the vast scale of unmet needs, despite four ‘development decades’. In the 1970s, many Thus, when problems of urban areas’ international agencies committed themselves adaptation to climate change are considered, to a new focus on ‘meeting basic needs’ with independent of current conditions and detailed costings of what additional funding government structures, it is easy to map out a this would require; four decades later, the

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number of people lacking access to most ‘basic sanitation and drainage).4 One other needs’ is higher than it was in the 1970s. indication of the scale of urban problems is the Today, there are more urban dwellers living in number of people living in illegal settlements very poor quality, overcrowded housing lacking because they cannot afford to buy, build or rent basic infrastructure and services in low- and legal accommodation. High proportions of middle-income nations than their entire urban urban dwellers living in informal settlements population in 1975.3 have become the norm in urban areas, not the exception. Estimates for 2000 suggested that Most cities in low- and middle-income nations more than 680 million urban dwellers lacked have much of their physical growth and adequate provision for water and 850 million or economic expansion taking place outside of any more lacked adequate provision for sanitation.5 official plan and outside official rules and Statistics on infant and child mortality rates for regulations. Most new housing is also built urban populations show that these are often 5- outside these. In part, this is because large 20 times what they should be, if families had sections of the population could never afford a adequate incomes, reasonable quality housing house that met official standards (often the and good health care.6 There are also many standards themselves are unrealistic and their case studies focusing on low-income urban implementation cumbersome and costly). In populations that show very large health part, it is because of a very large mismatch burdens from diseases easily prevented or cured; between the growth of urban centres’ economic for instance, diarrhoeal diseases, intestinal bases and populations and the competence, parasites, TB, malaria, dengue fever and acute capacity and accountability of local respiratory infections. government structures. There are important exceptions, as described later, but they are There is not much point in discussing how city exceptions. These might be held up as or municipal governments can adapt to protect examples of ‘best practice’ but the political and the populations within their jurisdiction from economic circumstances that underpinned risks arising from climate change when they their good practice are rarely transferable. have shown so little inclination or ability to protect them from other environmental In urban centres in Africa, Asia, Latin America hazards. There are really two separate issues and the Caribbean, over 900 million people here, although they often act together. The live in accommodation that is of poor quality first is the incapacity of urban governments in (with particular problems in relation to poor terms of their powers and the resources at their quality structures, overcrowding, insecure disposal. This in turn relates to the refusal of tenure and inadequate provision for water, higher levels of governments to allow them the powers and resources they require to address

4 UN–Habitat (2003a), The Challenge of Slums: 3 Recently released World Bank statistics suggest Global Report on Human Settlements 2003, Earthscan. that the proportion of people that are poor fell London. between 1990 and 2004, in Africa, Latin America 5 UN–Habitat (2003b), Water and Sanitation in the and the Caribbean, even if the number increased; for World’s Cities: Local Action for Global Goals, Asia, the number and the proportion were reported Earthscan, London. to have fallen. But this is using the widely 6 For a review of infant and child mortality rates in discredited “$1 a day” poverty line; for large sections urban areas, drawing on the Demographic and of the urban population; this is an inappropriate Health Surveys, see Satterthwaite, David (2007a), In poverty line because the cost of basic non-food pursuit of a healthy urban environment in low- and necessities is significantly higher than this; see middle-income nations, in Marcotullio, Peter J. and Satterthwaite, David (2004), The Underestimation of McGranahan, Gordon (editors), Scaling Urban Urban Poverty in Low and Middle-Income Nations, Environmental Challenges: from Local to Global and IIED Working Paper, IIED, London, 69 pages. Back, Earthscan Publications, London, pages 69-105.

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local needs, and the long-established disinterest Many factors helped create this: for instance, in among most international agencies in most urban centres, the unrealistic minimum supporting urban development and urban standards demanded for housing and plot sizes. governance reforms.7 The second is the Many standards in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia antagonistic relationship between urban are still based on regulations created under governments and most low-income groups; this colonial rule and originally instituted for use also relates to urban governments’ lack of only within areas of the colonial city that were accountability to their urban populations. The inhabited by ‘non-natives’. Under colonial rule, antagonism is strongly reinforced by urban these were never seen as measures to be elite’s vision of what they see as a modern city implemented for entire city populations. But and by real estate interests who want access to the issue is not that these are inappropriate, but land currently occupied by informal that they are still used because they serve the settlements. The urban poor are not seen as interests of those in power. The mechanisms for critical parts of the city economy, but as their enforcement are also often expensive and holding back the city’s success. Official urban open to corrupt practices. Ironically, poverty policies so often increase their vulnerability to may be lower in cities where regulations are not environmental hazards and climate shocks enforced than where inappropriate regulations rather than reducing them,8 and so are best are enforced. For any growing city, what is conceived as maladaptation. worse than expanding ‘squatter settlements’ is government authorities preventing squatter There is also not much point in discussing how settlements, which will mean poor families to adapt urban planning and its regulatory doubling and tripling up within the existing framework to reduce people’s vulnerability to housing stock. climate change when planning and regulation enforcement will only serve those with power One key issue within this is how land use and be used to evict and dispossess poorer planning and regulations in any city influence groups, whenever it serves those in power to do the supply of land for housing. These can act to so. Tens of millions of urban dwellers are greatly reduce or increase the price and forcibly evicted from their homes each year, availability of legal housing because of mostly without compensation or with regulatory influence on the price and inadequate or inappropriate compensation.9 availability of land with infrastructure and services. Thus, how land use planning measures respond to climate change risks has very large 7 See for instance Satterthwaite, David (2001), implications for the possibilities of low- and Reducing urban poverty: constraints on the middle-income households to buy, build or rent effectiveness of aid agencies and development banks good quality, legal accommodation with and some suggestions for change, Environment and infrastructure in areas that are not at risk from Urbanization, Vol 13, No 1, pages 137-157, and floods or landslides. Where governments have Tannerfeldt, Goran and Ljung, Per (2006), More the competence and capacity to support locally Urban, Less Poor; An Introduction to Urban appropriate land-for-housing development and Development and Management, Earthscan subdivision regulations, this improves housing Publications and Sida, London, 190 pages. conditions and greatly widens housing 8 Hardoy, Jorge E. Diana Mitlin and David possibilities for low-income households, as seen Satterthwaite (2001), Environmental Problems in an Urbanizing World: Finding Solutions for Cities in in, for instance, the city of Ilo (whose Africa, Asia and Latin America, Earthscan innovations are described later). But this is an Publications, London, 448 pages. unusual exception, as are the political 9 For a summary, see du Plessis, Jean (2005), The conditions that produced it. growing problem of forced evictions and the crucial importance of community-based, locally appropriate Climate change and other risks alternatives, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 17, With the focus that the Rockefeller Foundation No. 1, pages 123-134. requested on urban areas in low- and middle-

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income nations, it makes no sense to discuss created/exacerbated the risks and how these their vulnerability to climate change and can be acted on. responses to it separate from their vulnerability to extreme weather events or disasters that are In addition, we cannot consider the not caused by climate change. The tsunami in ‘adaptation’ that cities such as Mumbai must Asia demonstrated the vulnerability of so many make with regard to climate change coastal cities (or of specific populations within independent of the fact that nearly half the them) to the risk of flooding/storm surges, even population live in ‘slums’ lacking sewers and though the tsunami was not caused by climate drainage infrastructure – and regular solid change. The same is true for most of the waste collection systems (so garbage blocks devastating floods that many cities have drains). Central to any discussion of a city’s experienced in the last 10 to 15 years. The key vulnerability to climate change is a discussion here is to understand how the processes that of how and why city authorities refuse to (or shape urbanisation create or exacerbate risk to are not allowed to) invest in infrastructure and a range of hazards, including those that climate services in ‘slums’/informal settlements. We change will introduce or is likely to increase. end with a discussion of the vulnerability of One can also draw on a good, new literature cities and of specific groups within them to identifying ‘risk-accumulation processes’ within environmental risks/extreme weather current patterns of urban development – and events/floods/water shortages and how climate the need to shift attention from change is likely to increase/extend/change this. ‘disasters’/events to the processes that

Box 1: Definitions of terms Adaptation to (human induced) climate change: Actions to reduce the vulnerability of a system (e.g. a city), population (e.g., a vulnerable population in a city) or individual to the adverse impacts of anticipated climate change due to emission of greenhouse gases. In this paper, vulnerability is applied only to people or collections of people (e.g., the population of an urban area). Adaptation to climate variability is actions to reduce vulnerability to short-term climate shocks (with or without climate change). Often adaptation to climate change will also result in adaptation to climate variability as a co-benefit. However, individual adaptation can undermine collective resilience or compromise collective adaptive capacity.

Adaptation and mitigation linkages: Mitigation (i.e., the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions) results in avoiding the adverse impacts of climate change in the long run (at least the incremental impacts resulting from the greenhouse gases not emitted), while adaptation can reduce the unavoidable impacts in the near term (but cannot reduce them to zero). Failure to mitigate will lead eventually to failure of adaptation, hence adaptation and mitigation are not alternative strategies, but complementary ones that need to be pursued together. But as this paper discusses, most of the people and places at greatest risk from climate change are not those with large historic or current contributions to greenhouse gases. Failure to mitigate sufficiently in high-income nations will create ever more adaptation failures, mostly in low- and middle-income nations, including many with insignificant contributions to climate change. The political consequences of this will be enormous.

Adaptation deficit: Lack of adaptive capacity to deal with the problems of climate variability (let alone any future climate change impacts). In many cities and most smaller urban centres, the main problem is the lack of provision for infrastructure (all-weather roads, piped water supplies, sewers, drains, electricity, etc.) and the lack of capacity to address this. This is one of the central issues in regard to adaptation because most discussions on this issue focus on adjustments to infrastructure – but you cannot climate-proof infrastructure that is not there. Funding for ‘adaptation’ has little value if there is no local capacity to design, implement and maintain the needed adaptation.

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Ada ptation in situ: Actions that enable vulnerable populations to successfully adapt to climate change (and climate variability), including adaptations made by or supported by local governments. In most instances, vulnerable urban populations would prioritise in-situ adaptation because their current home and location were chosen for their access to income-earning opportunities.

Adaptive capacity: Inherent capacity of a system (e.g., a city government) population (e.g., low-income community in a city) or individual/household to undertake actions that can help avoid loss and speed recovery from any impact of climate change. Elements of adaptive capacity include knowledge, institutional capacity and financial and technological resources. Low-income populations in a city will tend to have lower adaptive capacity than the rich/high income population. There is also a wide range amongst city and national governments in their adaptive capacities, relating to the resources available to them, the information base to guide action, the infrastructure in place, and the quality of their institutions and governance systems.

Autonomous adaptation: Adaptations that occur without any specific planning (e.g., by companies or individuals).

Climate change risk: Additional risks to people and their livelihoods/investments (e.g., buildings, infrastructure, etc.) because of the potential impacts of climate change. These risks can be direct as in larger and/or more frequent floods or more intense and/or frequent storms or heat waves, or less direct as climate change negatively affects livelihoods or food supplies (and prices) or access to water needed for domestic consumption or livelihoods. Certain groups may face increased risks from measures taken in response to climate change – including adaptation measures (for instance, measures to protect particular areas of a city from flooding which increase flood risks ‘downstream’) and mitigation measures (for instance, emphasis on new hydropower schemes that displace large numbers of people).

Limits to adaptation: Adaptation can reduce the adverse impacts of climate change considerably but cannot reduce them to zero. Thus, there are limits to adaptation. Also certain places become permanently beyond adaptation (e.g., coastal zones inundated by sea level rise) and the number of these places (and the populations at risk) rises without successful mitigation.

Maladaptations: Actions or investments that enhance vulnerability to climate change impacts rather than reduce them. This can include the shifting of vulnerability from one social group or place to another; it also includes shifting risk to future generations and/or to ecosystems and ecosystem services. In many cities, investments being made are in fact maladaptive rather than adaptive. Removing maladaptations is often the first task to be addressed even before new adaptations.

Planned adaptation: Adaptations that are planned in anticipation of potential climate change. Generally, government agencies have key roles in providing the information about current and likely future risks and providing frameworks that support individual, household, community and private sector adaptation. However, governments often do not fulfil this role and civil society organizations may be the initiators and supporters of this.

Resilience: Resilience is a product of governments, enterprises, populations and individuals with strong adaptive capacity. It indicates a capacity to maintain core functions in the face of hazard threats and impacts, especially for vulnerable populations. It usually requires a capacity to anticipate climate change and plan needed adaptations. An entity’s resilience to climate change and variability interacts with its resilience to other dynamic pressures, including economic change, conflict and violence.

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II. Background more than twentyfold.14 There are also the large demographic changes apparent in all nations The dimensions of urban change over the last 50 years that influence urban The scale of urbanization10 change, including rapid population growth rates Urban areas in low- and middle-income nations in much of Latin America, Asia and Africa after have more than a third of the world’s total the Second World War (although for most these population, nearly three quarters of its urban have declined significantly), and changes in the population (see Annex Table 1), and most of its size and composition of households and in age large cities. They contain most of the economic structures.15 activities in these nations and most of the new jobs created over the last few decades. They are The growth of large cities also likely to house most of the world’s growth in Two aspects of the rapid growth in the world’s population in the next 10 to 20 years.11 With urban population since 1950 are the increase in regard to climate change, they house a large the number of large cities and the historically proportion of the population and the economic unprecedented size of the largest cities. Just two activities most at risk from extreme weather centuries ago, only two cities had more than a events and sea-level rise; this proportion is million inhabitants: London and Beijing (then increasing. called Peking). By 1950, there were 75; by 2000, 380 and most were in low- and middle-income Half of the world’s current population of around nations. The size of the world’s largest cities has 6.4 billion people lives in urban centres12, also increased dramatically. In 2000, the average compared to less than 15 percent in 1900.13 size of the world’s 100 largest cities was around Many aspects of urban change in recent decades 6.3 million inhabitants, compared to 2.0 million are unprecedented, including not only the inhabitants in 1950 and 0.7 million in 1900.16 world’s level of urbanization and the size of its While there are examples of cities over the last urban population, but also the number of two millennia that had populations of one countries becoming more urbanized, and the size million or more inhabitants, the city or and number of very large cities. The populations metropolitan area with several million is a of dozens of major cities have grown more than relatively new phenomenon, London being the tenfold in the last 50 years; many have grown first to reach this size in the second half of the 19th century.17

Vulnerability and resilience 10 The analysis of urban change and its drivers in this Understanding vulnerability paper is drawn from Satterthwaite 2007b, op. cit. There are many examples throughout history of 11 United Nations (2006), World Urbanization cities adapting, even in extreme environments. Prospects: the 2005 Revision, United Nations This shows the considerable capacity of their Population Division, Department of Economic and populations, enterprises and governments to Social Affairs, CD-ROM Edition – Data in digital adapt to known conditions, given economic and form (POP/DB/WUP/Rev. 2005), United Nations, New York. 12 According to the most recent United Nations statistics, the transition to more than half the world’s 14 Satterthwaite 2007b, op. cit. population living in urban areas will occur in 2008 – 15 See Montgomery, Mark R.; Stren, Richard; Cohen, but this transition may have occurred some years ago Barney; Reed, Holly E. (eds.) (2003), Cities as many governments understate their urban Transformed; Demographic Change and its Implications in populations by classifying most small urban centres as the Developing World, The National Academy Press, rural. Washington, D.C., 518 pages. 13 Graumann, John V. (1977), Orders of magnitude of 16 Satterthwaite 2007b, op, cit. the world’s urban and rural population in history, 17 Chandler, Tertius and Fox, Gerald (1974), 3000 United Nations Population Bulletin 8, United Nations, Years of Urban Growth, Academic Press, New York and New York, pp. 16–33. London.

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human resources and access to knowledge.18 This community resources (e.g., the quality and also implies the potential to adapt to many inclusiveness of community organizations that aspects of climate change, especially the more provide or manage safety nets and other short- gradual changes. However, many urban centres and longer-term responses). But in urban areas, it are at risk from the kinds of extreme weather is also much influenced by the extent and quality events that climate change is likely to of infrastructure and public services and the exacerbate, as can be seen in the mortality, entitlement to resources and services by morbidity and economic costs that these have vulnerable populations. The two factors that generated in the last few decades. The contribute to vulnerability, the risk of being background paper on climate-change risk in killed, injured or otherwise harmed and the India made the comment that ‘vulnerability has coping and adaptation capacity, are largely typically contributed more to overall risk in determined by the development context.20 The Indian cities than hazard-exposure’.19 This is development context has a strong influence on worth considering more generally in that so households’ income, education and access to much of human cost of extreme weather events information, on people’s exposure to in urban centres in low- and middle-income environmental hazards in their homes and nations comes not from the ‘hazard’ or the workplaces, and on the quality and extent of ‘disaster event’, but from the inadequacies in provision for infrastructure and services. provisions to protect urban populations (or particular sections of the population) from it. For Extreme weather events do not produce disasters instance, in many urban centres, the lack of without vulnerable populations. But the provision for drainage (and for maintaining vulnerabilities of particular city populations to existing drains) means that relatively minor climate change are difficult to assess because rainstorms cause serious flooding. these vulnerabilities are so specific to each location and societal context and, as yet, they Vulnerability to climate change in this paper is cannot be reliably estimated from the larger scale understood to mean the potential of people to be aggregate modelling of climate change.21 killed, injured or otherwise harmed by the direct or indirect impacts of climate change. This is Of course, the increasing frequency and growing most obvious with regard to risk from extreme human and economic cost of disasters such as events (storms, floods, etc.), but it includes risk storms and floods in urban areas do not give us from less direct impacts such as declining any precise information about the likely future freshwater availability or livelihoods dependent cost of climate change. But disaster loss data on climate-sensitive resources. Of course, within provide a good starting point for estimating costs any vulnerable population, there are differentials and give an idea of the vulnerability of urban in risk levels (influenced by, for instance, age, populations to certain physical events that are health status and gender), in how much they are likely to become more common and/or more affected and in coping capacities. Vulnerability is intense in many places. In addition, there has a product of exposure of people to such changes been an important change in how urban disasters and limited or no capacity to cope (the are understood; they are seen as failures to immediate responses) and adapt (longer-term understand vulnerabilities and act on them, responses). In all instances, capacity to cope and relevant for understanding how to build cities’ adapt is influenced by individual/household resilience to climate change. resources (e.g., asset bases and knowledge) and

18 Wilbanks, Romero-Lankao et al. (2007), op. cit. 19 Revi, Aromar (2007), Climate Change Risk: A Mitigation And Adaptation Agenda For Indian Cities, Paper prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation's meeting on Building for Climate Change Resilience, 20 Wilbanks, Romero-Lankao et al. (2007), op. cit. Taru, New Delhi, 23 pages. 21 Ibid.

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Box 2: What are disasters? Disasters are defined by events that result in large numbers of people killed or injured or large economic losses. The conventional view is that they are caused by exceptional or unusual events, including ‘natural’ disasters. However, over the last 30 years, this has been questioned. Disasters have come to be viewed not as unusual or natural events but as failures of development. They occur because of little or no attention to reducing vulnerability. Storms, floods, droughts and heat waves need not be disasters, if vulnerabilities to these have been much reduced.

The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), which holds the only publicly accessible global disaster database, defines disaster as ‘a situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to national or international level for external assistance’. To be entered into the EM-DAT database, at least one of the following criteria has to be fulfilled: 10 or more people reported killed; 100 people reported affected; a call for international assistance; and/or declaration of a state of emergency.22 Other databases use different thresholds for inclusion; for example, Swiss Reinsurance includes only those events with at least 20 deaths, while DesInventar includes any reported event regardless of the scale of loss.23

Disasters are usually classified by their triggering event as either natural or technological. Natural disasters include geophysical disasters such as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, and hydro- meteorological disasters such as avalanches, landslides, droughts, famines, extreme temperatures, floods, fires and windstorms. Technological disasters include industrial and transport accidents.24

Many researchers working on disasters have pointed to the inadequacy of this simplistic categorization between natural and technological disasters. Allan Lavell points to the key distinction between natural hazards, socio-natural hazards (natural hazards that are socially induced), anthropogenic pollutant hazards and anthropogenic technological hazards – and the extent to which the scale and nature of most ‘natural disasters’ have been much influenced by human activities.25 As noted already, there is no disaster without a vulnerable population.

Cities by their very nature concentrate people space for evacuation and emergency vehicle and their homes, physical capital, industries and access, and the potential for the spread of wastes, making them dangerous places to live and communicable disease. A high proportion of work and their populations vulnerable to extreme lower-income groups may settle on hazardous weather events or other physical events that sites such as ones at risk from floods or landslides, have the potential to be disasters. But this is best but they do so because no safer land is available seen not as inherent to cities but as the product to them, while also lacking access to the means of inadequate planning and governance. to reduce their vulnerability. Concentration produces risk through, for instance, the dangerous conjunction of Urban contexts generally increase risk of what residential and industrial land uses, the lack of Allan Lavell termed ‘concatenated hazards’.

22 CRED EM-DAT; see http://www.em-dat.net/. See also International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2002), World Disasters Report: Focus on Reducing Risk, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 239 pages. 23 Pelling, M. (2005) Disaster data: building a foundation for disaster risk reduction, In, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report 2005, pages173-180 24 Ibid. 25 Lavell, Allan (1999), Natural and Technological Disasters: Capacity Building and Human Resource Development for Disaster Management, Mimeo, 32 pages.

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Primary hazard leads to secondary hazard (e.g., complex relationships between this mix of floods create water-supply contamination), as hazards and the many interrelated components of well as natech events where natural hazards urban poverty (which include not only the urban trigger technological disasters. On the ground, poor’s inadequate incomes and limited asset bases the impacts of natural and technological hazards but also very poor quality housing, lack of basic including pollution events overlap and infrastructure for providing water, sanitation, compound one another, one of the defining drainage and garbage removal, and lack of civil challenges of urban disaster risk management. and political rights). This greatly increases the But this same concentration of people and vulnerability of the urban poor to most enterprises in urban areas also means economies environmental hazards, including most of those of scale or proximity for many of the measures related to climate change. Certain urban that reduce risks from extreme weather events, characteristics have relevance for understanding for instance, in the per capita cost of measures to risks from extreme weather events:26 lessen the risks (e.g., better watershed • concentrated populations due to management or drainage reducing the scale of concentrated labour markets/income- floods), reduce the risks when the event occurs earning opportunities for non- (e.g., buildings better able to withstand floods agricultural activities (which is what and early-warning systems to allow special underpins virtually all urban centres); measures to be taken), and respond rapidly and • land markets unrelated to the land’s effectively when a disaster is imminent or agricultural potential with land costs happens. There is a greater capacity among a often pricing most or all low income proportion of city dwellers to help pay for such groups out of official land-for-housing measures, if they are made aware of the risks and markets. Large sections of the urban the measures are shown to be cost effective. population acquire land and build Most of the impacts of climate change do not add housing outside of the official system of new risks but increase risk levels for such hazards land use controls and building standards already evident without climate change, such as that are meant to reduce risks and stop extreme weather events/floods/heat settlements on land at risk from floods waves/shortages of freshwater. Well-governed and storms; cities have already made provisions to reduce • related to the above, large sections of their vulnerabilities to these. But most urban the population in housing constructed growth in the small and large centres of low- and informally, with no attention to health middle-income nations is happening without and safety standards and no regulatory ‘good local governance’ and so without the framework to protect tenants (it is provisions needed to reduce risks, often with common in cities for large sections of processes that increase risks and the number of the low-income population to rent people at risk. accommodation, often whole households living in one room or many Urban contexts pose particular challenges for adults sharing a single room); governments • high density populations plus Most urban contexts are different from most rural concentrations of their solid and liquid contexts in the spatial concentration of hazards wastes (a particular problem if no (and the number of people at risk from them), sewers/drains and waste collection the number of hazards (e.g., the range of service remove these). Many provisions infectious and parasitic diseases that can spread for disaster avoidance (e.g., thicker rapidly among concentrated populations, the close proximity of people, industries and 26 Based on list in Bull-Kamanga, Liseli, Kade Diagne, industrial wastes), and their mix and potential for Allan Lavell et al. (2003), Urban development and exacerbating each other (e.g., floods the accumulation of disaster risk and other life- contaminating water supplies, which leads to threatening risks in Africa, Environment and water-related disease epidemics). There are also Urbanization, Vol. 15, No. 1, pages 193-204.

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walls), response (access for emergency and encourages for the population, especially vehicles), or reducing disaster impacts those most at risk. One of the most powerful (readily available open spaces not at measures of the quality of urban governance is risk from falling buildings) are not the extent to which it reduces or removes the possible in crowded low-income differentials in risk from serious injury, illness or settlements; premature death between high- and low-income • large, impermeable surfaces and groups in regard to both disasters and concentrations of buildings which environmental hazards. disrupt natural drainage channels and accelerate run-off; Most urban research does not engage with • Patterns of urban form and buildings disasters. If disasters are understood as unusual that do not take current and future events (usually natural events) that require from hazards into account generate increased the state a capacity to rapidly respond to them, scales and levels of risk from floods, these do not appear to be within the realm of landslides, fires, and industrial accidents conventional urban research. If disasters are (particular for groups at risk); understood to be caused by urban development, • Industrialisation, inadequate planning or the scale of their impacts and their frequency and poor design generating secondary increased by urban development, and socially or natech risks; constructed with their impacts conditioned by • Changes in the region around cities existing social and spatial segregation, it is more that cause or exacerbate risks (e.g., poor difficult for urban research to ignore them.27 watershed management; often a Indeed, any urban researcher with an interest in particular problem for city governments poverty and vulnerability needs to integrate an as the watershed lies outside their understanding of the current or potential impact jurisdiction); of extreme weather events into their work. • City governments and urban economies unable to cope with sudden The changes in understanding of what causes movements of people into a city in disasters noted above – with disasters recognized response to crises elsewhere (linked to as failures of development – have changed the extreme weather events nearby or understanding of how to avoid them or greatly conflict). reduce their impact.28 This change in thinking has great relevance for reducing the vulnerability Urban development is often a large creator of risk of city populations to climate change. The focus for much of its population, but higher income on hazard-prone areas and the increasing groups and larger or more prosperous enterprises magnitude of losses (and on engineering and are able to avoid most or all such risk. There are structural solutions) has shifted to the complex clearly very large differentials within most urban urban processes that increase risks, for instance centres in people’s exposure to risks from extreme the range of ‘risk-accumulation’ processes which weather events. We need to understand the role are increasing the vulnerability of large sections of the state in this, and whether it acts to create of their population to floods or landslides. This or contribute to these differentials or to modify and reduce them. Good local governance is the 27 Lavell, Allan (2001), Environmental Degradation, main means by which such differentials to risks Risk and Urban Disasters: Issues and Concepts - from extreme weather events and many other Towards the Definition of a Research Agenda, Mimeo. environmental hazards are reduced. This can 28 See for instance the work of La Red in Latin occur through government demands made and America and the work of Peri-peri and AURAN in enforced on private enterprises (e.g., Africa described in Bull-Kamanga et al 2003, op. cit. construction standards, occupational health and See also work of Allan Lavell, Ben Wisner, Terry safety, pollution control, waste management, Cannon; Pelling, Mark (2003), The Vulnerability of payment for infrastructure and services, disaster Cities: Natural Disasters and Social Resilience, preparedness, etc.) and what it provides, supports Earthscan Publications, London, 212 pages.

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also means a shift in who is seen as responsible to health burdens and to poverty than disasters), for addressing disasters. For instance, the armed but this means that they miss the potential links forces may be given central responsibilities for between risk reduction for everyday hazards and responses to disasters, but they can do little to small and large disasters. reduce risk from disasters in urban areas. There is a recognition of the need to integrate disaster risk One way to get some idea of the likely costs of reduction into all departments of government climate-change-related disasters would be an and to support community-government analysis of the impact of disasters on urban partnerships in identifying and acting to reduce populations caused by triggers whose intensity or risks. As later sections make clear, these two frequency climate change is likely to increase. issues are also at the core of reducing Unfortunately, the records on the impacts of vulnerability to climate change. But as yet, only disasters on urban populations are very rarely has this change in understanding of what inadequate. Only data by EM-DAT, Munich causes disasters meant a change in policies on Reinsurance and Swiss Reinsurance have global disaster management. Local, national and coverage. EM-DAT data is not disaggregated to international agencies with responsibilities for urban areas (it is only held at the national scale) conventional disaster management lack the skills and it only registers large disasters (see Box 2), and capacities to do so, and often the motivation while the MunichRe and SwissRe datasets do to change, especially if their budget depends on have some spatially fixed data but their focus is disasters to respond to. Addressing the more on insured and economic losses than on developmental failures that underpin urban human loss. Geo-referenced data are available disasters is more difficult, especially for from a growing number of national databases international agencies, and comes up against following what is known as the DesInventar powerful vested interests. Meanwhile, few methodology (including 16 countries in Latin powerful urban actors benefit from risk-reduction America and the Caribbean and states in the initiatives for those living in informal U.S., India and some neighbourhoods in Cape settlements. Town).

The continuum of risk from everyday to All of these datasets are undermined by the lack catastrophic disasters of an internationally agreed definition of a A good adaptation agenda for any urban area disaster event, or range of events at different needs to understand all the environmental risks levels of impact, and of systematic data collection to which its population (or subsets) is exposed mechanisms. For these datasets, data are drawn and their interconnections. When serious illness from the news media, NGO reports and or injury or premature death, disruption to declarations of emergency. Thus, small disasters livelihoods and loss of property occurs, this is are often not recorded, as these are not always a disaster for some persons. But a disaster necessarily reported in the media. The classification must meet certain official criteria; DesInventar methodology seeks to include ‘small for instance, ten or more people killed or 100 or disasters’ that EM-Dat does not record. An ISDR more seriously affected. Disaster managers study found a very large discrepancy between generally focus only on events officially classified official lists of disasters and the number of as disasters, so non-disaster events (and small disasters recorded by DesInventar. For instance, disasters, those with less than ten persons killed) in Colombia, 87 disasters were recorded by EM- are not considered. They do not see the links DAT, but there were 2,200 more disasters that between non-disaster events and disasters and were not registered that met official criteria for the risk accumulation processes that are common what constitutes a disaster and 13,000 other in urban areas that usually increase disaster and smaller disasters. A database in Cape Town that non-disaster risks. Meanwhile, urban sought to record all events registered over 12,500 development policy makers often focus on non- incidents, which contrasts with the 600 disaster risks, which in most urban areas in low and middle-income nations contribute far more

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identified large events and declared disasters.29 poverty and risk. The need for every urban Almost half of these are in informal settlements. centre to have strong locally generated data on An analysis of disaster events in Mexico, 1970 to risks and local analyses of risk and risk 2001, sought to document all events with at least accumulation processes is central to facilitating one mortality and found that floods were the adaptation, and is discussed in more detail in most common disaster, and a quarter of all deaths section V. from flooding came from events with less than four deaths; i.e., much too small to be included in III. Understanding Cities’ And The Urban international disaster datasets.30 Poor’s Vulnerabilities To Climate Variability And Change Extreme weather events and risk-accumulation processes The vulnerability of cities to climate change What is worrying about the above studies in IPPC 2007 noted the following, all with high particular cities is that they show the very large confidence: scale of injury, death and loss of property caused by extreme-weather events or accidental fires The most vulnerable industries, settlements and that went unregistered as disasters or were societies are generally those in coastal and river excluded by the criteria used to define a disaster. flood plains, those whose economies are closely Such detailed local studies are needed in all linked with climate-sensitive resources, and those urban centres, not only to show the health and in areas prone to extreme weather events, other costs from extreme weather events especially where rapid urbanization is occurring. (including ‘small’ disasters whose aggregate impact may be larger than events classified as Poor communities can be especially vulnerable, in disasters) but also because: particular those concentrated in high-risk areas. • the number, territorial spread and They tend to have more limited adaptive impact of disasters/small disasters may be capacities, and are more dependent on climate- increasing rapidly; sensitive resources such as local water and food • risk from these may graduate in time to supplies. larger events as populations and their vulnerabilities increase in the areas close Where extreme weather events become more to the hazard sources and as hazards intense and/or more frequent, the economic and grow in size and potential intensity; social costs of those events will increase, and • developing an ability to intervene to these increases will be substantial in the areas prevent small disasters or limit their most directly affected. Climate change impacts damaging impacts can also serve to spread from directly impacted areas and sectors to develop a capacity for doing so for larger other areas and sectors through extensive and events.31 complex linkages 32

Small disasters from extreme weather events that For cities, perhaps the most obvious increased are recurrent, such as floods that happen every risk from climate change comes from the likely time there is heavy rainfall, can also undermine any community’s resilience and its capacity to 32 Adger, Neil; Aggarwal, Pramod; Agrawala, Shardul; make the investments and adjustments needed to et al. (2007), Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation protect against larger disasters. Such and Vulnerability: Summary for Policy Makers, Working undermining may lead to a general acceptance of Group II. Contribution to the Intergovernmental risk or a failure to critique the association of Panel on Climate Change; Fourth Assessment Report, IPCC Secretariat, WHO AND UNEP, Geneva, page 29 Bull-Kamanga et al. (2003), op. cit. 7. See also Wilbanks, Romero-Lankao et al. (2007); a 30 Data source is DesInventar table drawn from this with examples of current and http://www.desinventar.org/desinventar.html projected climate change impacts on industry, 31 Lavell (1999), op. cit. settlements and society is in Annex table 3.

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increase in the number and intensity of extreme Flooding weather events such as heavy rainstorms, Urban areas always present some risk of flooding cyclones or hurricanes. The cities most at risk when rainfall occurs. Buildings, roads, are those where these events are already infrastructure and other paved areas prevent common, although there is some evidence of the rainfall from infiltrating into the soil and produce geographic range of some extreme weather events more runoff. Heavy and/or prolonged rainfall expanding. Coastal cities will be doubly at risk as produces very large volumes of surface water in sea-level rise increases hazards from coastal any city, which can easily overwhelm drainage flooding and erosion. For any city, the scale of systems. In well-governed cities, this is rarely a the risk from these extreme weather events is also problem because good provision for storm and much influenced by the quality of housing and surface drainage is easily built into the urban infrastructure in that city and the level of fabric, as well as complementary measures to preparedness among the city’s population and key protect from flooding; for instance, the use of emergency services. For small and large coastal parks and other areas of open space as the places settlements the integrity of coastal ecosystems to accommodate flood waters from unusually and in particular protective mangrove and serious storms. But in poorly governed cities, this saltmarsh systems will also influence risk. City does not happen; it is common for buildings or dwellers in high-income nations have had risks infrastructure to be constructed that actually in relation to injuries and deaths much reduced obstruct natural drainage channels. For instance, by decades of investment in housing and in Dhaka, buildings often encroach on or fill in infrastructure, and economic/financial losses drains, and many natural drains have been filled much reduced by insurance. But the devastation up to construct roads.34 Mombasa faces of New Orleans by Katrina is an example of how comparable problems.35 In cities or there are still exceptions, both in the lack of neighbourhoods with inadequate solid waste and investment in flood defences coupled with drain management, garbage and plant growth can degradation of coastal environments and the quickly clog drains with localised flooding from inadequate institutional capacity in emergency even light rainfall. In Georgetown, Guyana, this services; it also illustrates the higher led to 29 local floods between 1990 and 1996.36 vulnerabilities of lower-income groups. Climate change has the potential to increase Although in high-income nations, buildings and flooding risks in cities in three ways: from higher infrastructure are often built to withstand sea levels and storm surges; from heavier rainfall extreme weather events of an intensity judged to or rainfall that is more prolonged than in the be very unlikely (e.g., once in a thousand years), past; and from increased river flows, for instance these can still be overwhelmed by the increased through increased glacial melt. The IPCC intensity of storms or of associated rainfall. In Working Group II noted that heavy precipitation many cities, there is evidence of what used to be events are very likely to increase in frequency a ‘once in a 100 years event’ becoming more and will augment flood risk and the growing common. In addition, cities are also vulnerable evidence of increased runoff and earlier spring to any damage to the larger systems on which peak discharges in many glacier- and snow-fed they depend; for instance, for water supply and rivers.37 For some cities and regions, climate treatment, transport and electricity (and thus everything that depends on electricity, including 34 33 Alam and Golam Rabbani (2007), op. cit. lighting, pumping and communications). 35 Awuor, Cynthia B., Orindi, Victor A. and Adwerah, Andrew (2007), Climate Change and Coastal Cities: The Case of Mombasa, Kenya, background paper. 36 Pelling, M. (1997) What determines vulnerability to 33 Wilbanks, Romero-Lankao et al. (2007), op. cit; floods: a case study in Georgetown, Guyana, Kreimer, A., Arnold, M. and Carlin, A. (eds.) (2003), Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 9, No. 1, pages Building Safer Cities: The Future of Disaster Risk, World 203-226. Bank, Washington, D.C. 37 Adger, Aggarwal, Agrawala et al. (2007), op, cit.

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change is likely to reduce annual average rainfall, other areas in Indonesia) suffered very serious but greater extremes in individual rainfall events floods in February 2007. Yet for every flood large mean that overall flood hazard may not be enough to get noticed internationally, there are reduced. hundreds not reported but that kill and seriously injure many people and destroy or damage many For all cities, future flood risk will be influenced people’s homes and assets.39 as much (if not more) by land use practices in surrounding watersheds (flooding in adjacent In Latin America, floods are the most frequent watersheds can disrupt communications and weather disaster and they often overwhelm the force people to migrate to the city), and by solid- physical infrastructure, human resilience and waste management, land use and drain social organization of cities.40 Events such as the maintenance in the city. For many cities, future December 1999 flash floods and landslides in risk can be reduced in the face of climate change Caracas killing nearly 30,000, or the floods by appropriate management and governance. resulting from hurricane Stan in 2005 (more However, without urgent and significant than 1,500 deaths) and Mitch in 1998 (around investment, climate change will add additional 18,000 deaths) show that the poor in these flood hazards onto drainage systems that are countries are the most likely to be killed or unable to cope with current rainfall. harmed by extreme weather-related events.

A study by ActionAid, Unjust Waters, In addition to flood hazard, higher average and documents the lack of provision in six African more extreme rainfall events associated with cities for reducing flood risks or for managing climate change will also generate increased floods when they happen.38 Floods are already landslides and mudflows, and in alpine areas, having very large impacts on cities and smaller avalanches. Such events are usually localised and urban centres in many African nations, for like floods are a primary trigger for local disasters. instance the floods in Mozambique in 2000, The consequence is that the impact of these which included heavy floods in Maputo and events and local flooding on cities is greatly other urban centres (see Annex Box 6), the underestimated. floods in Algiers in 2001 (around 900 people killed, 45,000 affected); heavy rains in East Storms, sea-level rise and coastal urban Africa in 2002 that brought floods and mudslides populations forcing tens of thousands to leave their homes in The IPCC states that Rwanda, Kenya, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda and the very serious floods in Port Harcourt and Coasts are projected to be exposed to increasing in Addis Ababa in 2006. Discussions with risks, including coastal erosion, due to climate residents in informal settlements in various cities change and sea level rise. The effect will be found that flooding is more frequent and intense exacerbated by increasing human-induced and often occurring in places previously not at pressures on coastal areas41 (very high confidence). risk. They also showed how local governments are doing little to address this. Many millions more people are projected to be flooded every year due to sea-level rise by the In Asia, the serious floods that have affected 2080s. Those densely-populated and low-lying Dhaka were noted already (see also Annex Boxes 1 and 2). Mumbai had floods in 2005 which left 39 See for instance Nchito, Wilma S. (2007), Flood over 1,000 dead and massive damage to people’s risk in unplanned settlements within Lusaka, homes, livelihoods and asset bases. Jakarta (and Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 2. 40 Confalonieri, U., Menne, B., Akhtar, R., Ebi, K., Hauengue, M., Kovats, R.S. Revich, B. and 38 This report can be obtained from ActionAid, Woodward, A. (2007) Chapter 8: Human Health, including being downloadable from its website IPCC WGII Fourth Assessment Report. www.actionaid.org. 41 Adger, Aggarwal, Agrawala et al. (2007), page 6.

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areas where adaptive capacity is relatively low, and under all the climate change scenarios.44 The which already face other challenges such as problems with coastal flooding will be much tropical storms or local coastal subsidence, are more serious if certain potentially catastrophic especially at risk. The numbers affected will be events whose probability is uncertain were to largest in the mega-deltas of Asia and Africa while happen; for instance, the accelerated melting of small islands are especially vulnerable42 (very high Greenland’s ice sheet or the collapse of the west confidence) Antarctic ice sheet.45

It is difficult to estimate with any precision how There also appears to be increasing population many people are at risk from the increased concentrations in low-elevation coastal zones in frequency and intensity of extreme-weather most nations.46 China provides the most events and the sea-level rise that climate change dramatic example as it is the nation with the will bring. The first detailed analysis of the largest number of urban and rural dwellers in the number and proportion of urban dwellers (and low-elevation coastal zone and it still has a very total populations) living in the low-elevation strong trend towards increasing population coastal zone was published recently.43 This zone, concentration in this zone. Increasing trade and the continuous area along the coast that is less market-driven movements, often supported by than 10 metres above sea level, represents 2 government incentives, are still attracting people percent of the world’s land area but contains 10 to the coast. The coastal provinces of China percent of its total population (i.e., over 600 experienced a net in-migration of about 17 million people) and 13 percent of its urban million people between 1995 and 2000, creating population (around 360 million people). Almost pressures in an already crowded coastal zone.47 two thirds of the world’s large cities with more than 5 million inhabitants fall in this zone, at Many cities in Africa are also at risk from sea least partly. Low-income and lower-middle level rise and storm surges. Half of the income nations have a higher proportion of their continent’s 37 ‘million cities’ are within or have urban population in this zone than high-income parts within the low-elevation coastal zone. nations. The least developed nations, on average, Banjul, Lagos and Alexandria are among the have nearly twice the proportion of their urban cities most at risk although many others are also population in this zone, compared to high- likely to face much increased risks from storms income nations. Figures 1 and 2 in the Annex and flooding but because of the lack of local give the ten nations with the largest urban analysis, the scale of these risks has yet to be populations and the largest proportion of their documented.48 Many Asian cities are also urban population in this zone. particularly at risk. Asia has many of the world’s largest cities/metropolitan areas that are in the Obviously, only a proportion of those within this floodplains of major rivers (e.g., Ganges- zone are at risk from the sea-level rises that are Brahmaputra, Mekong and Yangtze) and likely within the next 30 to 50 years. Estimates cyclone-prone coastal areas (Bay of Bengal, for sea level rise vary from 18 to 59 cm up to the South China Sea, Japan and Philippines). The end of the 21st century; these will certainly IPCC has emphasized how river deltas are among multiply the number of people flooded by storm surges. One estimate suggested that 10 million 44 Nicholls, R. J., (2004). "Coastal flooding and people are currently affected each year by coastal wetland loss in the 21st Century: Changes under the flooding and that the numbers will increase SRES climate and socio-economic scenarios." Global Environmental Change, Vol 14, No 1, pages 69-86. 42 Adger, Aggarwal, Agrawala et al. (2007), page 7. 45 Adger, Aggarwal, Agrawala et al. (2007). 43 McGranahan, Gordon, Deborah Balk and Bridget 46 McGranahan, Balk and Anderson (2007), op. cit. Anderson (2007), "The rising tide: assessing the risks 47 McGranahan, Balk and Anderson (2007), op. cit. of climate change and human settlements in low- 48 http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/regional/index.htm; elevation coastal zones", Environment and Urbanization, IPCC Special Report on The Regional Impacts of Climate Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 17-37. Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability

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the world’s most valuable, heavily populated and Domingo, Kingston, and Havana, those on vulnerable coastal systems.49 Mexico’s Caribbean coast; and Central America, as we have seen from Hurricane Mitch. A sea Mumbai, Dhaka and Shanghai are also very surface temperature rise of 2o to 4o C, as expected vulnerable to storms and sea-level rise.50 Large in the Indian Ocean over the century, is sections of these cities are only 1 to 5 metres expected to induce a 10 to 20 percent increase in above sea level. Much of central Mumbai is built cyclone intensity.51 Since cyclone formation on landfill; the city developed on seven islands frequency in the Bay of Bengal is about five times with these islands becoming joined into a single that of the Arabian Sea,52 India’s east coast is land mass over time, as the city expanded. clearly at risk. The high concentration of Mumbai is also likely to suffer from more serious population, especially on India and Bangladesh’s storm surges and increased frequency and eastern coast, has led to extremely high intensity of extreme weather (cyclones) as a vulnerability in this region, with large loss of life result of climate change. The likely long-term and property. The 1999 Orissa super cyclone trend of sea-level rise is likely to prove very killed over 10,000 people and devastated damaging, as this combined with storm surges buildings, lifeline infrastructure and economic may make large areas of the city uninhabitable. assets across 10 coastal and six inland districts, Perhaps not surprisingly, it is mostly low-income which included a number of towns and cities households living in informal or illegal affected by a mixture of devastating storm surge, settlements that face the greatest risks from cyclonic winds and coastal flooding.53 Cyclone flooding. and storm surge could have a devastating impact on large urban centres including the mega-cities In Latin America, the coastal plain of northeast Mumbai and Chennai and several million-cities South America is very low-lying, generating risks and important ports.54 for major settlements from northeast Brazil to Venezuela. The coastal zone of Guyana holds 90 Constraints on water supplies and other key percent of national population and 75 percent of natural resources the national economy; its highest point is 1.5 IPCC Working Group II noted that by 2050, meters above sea level with much residential annual average river runoff and water availability land, including the capital Georgetown, below are projected to increase by 10 to 40 percent at high-water sea level. In many Caribbean states, high latitudes and in some wet tropical areas, and between 20 and 50 percent of the population decrease by 10 to 30 percent over some dry resides within the LECZ. regions in mid-latitudes and in the dry tropics, some of which are presently water-stressed areas. There is some evidence that hurricane force winds will become more frequent and intense 51 and possible also that the hurricane belt will Aggarwal, D. and Lal, M. (2001): Vulnerability of move southwards. Highly urbanised coasts most Indian Coastline to Sea Level Rise. Centre for at risk include Vietnam in Asia; Gujarat in west Atmospheric Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, New Delhi. and Orissa in east India; the Caribbean, 52 including major urban settlements like Santo IMD (1979), Tracks of Storms and Depressions in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea 1877 to 1970. New Delhi; India Metrological Department (1996). 49 Chapter 6 on Coastal Zones and Marine Ecosystems Tracks of Storms and Depressions in the Bay of Bengal in IPCC (2001), Climate Change 2001; Impacts, and the Arabian Sea 1971 to 1990. New Delhi; TARU Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Cambridge University (2005), Disaster Management Plan Blueprint for the Press, Cambridge, 1032 pages. Hazira Area Development Committee, Gandhinagar. 50 de Sherbinin, Alex, Schiller, Andrew and Pulsipher, 53 TARU/BMTPC (1998), Rapid Damage Assessment Alex (2007), The vulnerability of global cities to of Cyclone Affected Areas of Kachchh & Saurashtra climate hazards, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 19, in Gujarat, Taru, New Delhi. No. 1, pages 39-64; Alam and Golam Rabbani (2007), 54 GSDMA/TARU (2005): Gujarat Vulnerability and op. cit. Risk Atlas, Gandhinagar, TARU, op. cit.

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In some places and in particular seasons, changes that already face serious problems obtaining differ from these annual figures. Drought-affected sufficient freshwater supplies.61 This means a areas will likely increase in extent.55 need to adapt water consumption practices and supply systems, as well as drainage systems, In Africa ‘by 2020, between 75 million and 250 sometimes within systems that already have million people are projected to be exposed to an serious deficiencies. For instance, at least 14 increase of water stress due to climate change’ 56 African nations are already facing water stress or (high confidence). In Asia, ‘Freshwater water scarcity and many more are likely to join availability in Central, South, East and Southeast this list in the next 10 to 20 years.62 There is Asia, particularly in large river basins, is already a failure to manage water resources well projected to decrease due to climate change in much of this region, independent of climate which, along with population growth and change; around half its urban population already increasing demands arising from higher standards lacks adequate provision for water and sanitation, of living, could adversely affect more than a although this is far more linked to inadequate billion people by the 2050s’ 57 (high confidence). governance than to water shortages.63 Any reduction in the availability of freshwater resources caused by climate change will be Agriculture remains the largest user of freshwater particularly problematic for those who live in resources within virtually all national economies; areas already suffering water scarcity or water however, the water demands from urban stress, with poorer groups likely to be most enterprises and consumers have become affected.58 During the last century, mean increasingly important in most nations. In precipitation in all four seasons of the year has addition, many major cities have had to draw tended to decrease in all the world’s main arid freshwater from increasingly distant watersheds, and semi-arid regions: northern Chile, the as local surface and groundwater sources no Brazilian Northeast and Northern Mexico, West longer meet the demand for water, or as they Africa and Ethiopia, the drier parts of Southern become depleted or polluted. In many coastal Africa, and Western China.59 If these trends cities, local groundwater supplies have been continue, water resource limitations will become depleted to the point where saline intrusion more severe in precisely those parts of the region limits freshwater supplies.64 where they are already most likely to be critical.60 Around half of Africa’s and Asia’s urban Many cities and their water catchments will get population lacks provision for water and less precipitation (and have more constrained sanitation to a standard that is healthy and freshwater sources), which is particularly convenient. For Latin America and the problematic for growing cities and large cities Caribbean, more than a quarter lack such provision.65 Hundreds of millions of urban

55 dwellers face great difficulties in getting the Adger, Aggarwal, Agrawala et al. (2007), page 5. water they need, every day; around one billion 56 Adger, Aggarwal, Agrawala et al. (2007), page 8. 57 lack access to good quality toilets; tens of Adger, Aggarwal, Agrawala et al. (2007), page 8. millions have no access and so defecate in the 58 Romero Lankao, P. (2006) ¿Hacia una gestión sustentable del agua? Alcances y límites de la descentralización hidráulica en la ciudad de México in 61 Anton, Danilo J. (1993), Thirsty Cities: Urban Barkin, David (editor), La Gestión del Agua Urbana en Environments and Water Supply in Latin America, México, UdeG/UAMXochimilco, Mexico. IDRC, Ottawa, 197 pages; UN-Habitat (2006), op. cit. 59 Folland, C. K., et al. (2001), Projections of future 62 Muller, Mike (2007), Adapting to climate change: climate change, quoted in Wilbanks, Romero-Lankao water management for urban resilience, Environment et al. (2007), op. cit. and Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 99-113. 60 Rhode, T. E. (1999), Integrating urban and 63 UN-Habitat (2003b), op.cit. agriculture water management in southern Morocco, 64 Hardoy, Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2001), op. cit.; Arid Lands News Letter 45, quoted in Wilbanks, UN Habitat (2003b), op. cit. Romero-Lankao et al. (2007), op. cit. 65 UN Habitat (2003b), op. cit.

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open or into waste paper or plastic bags (‘wrap that could arise as a result of climate change, and throw’). 66 particularly drought and flooding. Water supply abstraction and treatment works are sited beside Thus, planning for adaptation for urban water rivers and are often the first items of supplies has to be done with a recognition of the infrastructure to be affected by floods. Electrical massive deficiencies in provision and the very switchgear and pump motors are particularly at large backlog in basic infrastructure that has to risk. In severe riverine floods with high flow be addressed – from the supply of treated water to velocities, pipelines may also be damaged.71 its provision, then collection once used and Sanitation can also be affected. Flooding often treatment. damages pit latrines (most of Africa’s and Asia’s urban population rely on pit latrines) and The IPCC noted the different ways in which floodwaters are usually contaminated by the climate variability and change affect urban water overflow from pit latrines or septic tanks, and supply and sewage systems.67 Increased often sewers. Toilets linked to sewers also temperatures generally mean increased water become unusable without a water supply. But demand – and if climate change reduces local note should be made that most urban centres in water sources, this generally leads to increased sub-Saharan Africa and in Asia have no sewers; demand on regional water supplies.68 Changes in those that do serve only a very small proportion precipitation patterns may lead to reductions in of the population.72 As the IPCC noted, the river flows, falling ground water tables and, in main significance of sanitation here is that coastal areas, to saline intrusion in rivers and sanitation infrastructures (or the lack of them) ground water. Detected declines in glacier are the main determinant of the contamination volumes in parts of Asia and Latin America will of urban flood water with faecal material, reduce river flows at key times of the year; for presenting a substantial threat of enteric instance, this will mean substantial impacts on disease.73 water flows to cities located in the Andean valleys (and also reductions in hydroelectric Predictions can be made over likely changes in generation).69 Climate-change-related melting of precipitation and freshwater availability for large glaciers could seriously affect half a billion people regions with considerable confidence – for in the Himalaya-Hindu-Kush region and a instance for Southern Africa – but much less so quarter billion people in China who depend on for individual cities. For cities, knowing likely glacial melt for their water supplies.70 changes are important not only because of the fresh water supplies they need (and the long lead The IPCC also noted the dramatic impacts on time for planning and building new supply water supplies likely under extremes of weather facilities) but also for how these changes might affect agriculture, other natural-resource-related

66 activities, and food supplies and prices. For UN Habitat (2003b), op. cit. instance, in India, the most serious climate 67 Wilbanks, Romero-Lankao et al. (2007), op. cit. 68 change risk to its economy and people is the Wilbanks, Romero-Lankao et al. (2007), op. cit. increased intensity, frequency and geographical 69 Magrin, G., Gay, C. with Cruz Choque, D. Jiménez, J.C. Moreno, A.R. Nagy, G., Nobre, C. Villamizar, A. (2007), Chapter 13 - Latin America, IPCC WGII 71 Wilbanks, Romero-Lankao et al. (2007), op. cit. Fourth Assessment Report, 63 pages; Vergara, W. 72 Hardoy, Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2001), UN (2005) Adapting to Climate Change. Lessons learnt, work Habitat 2003b, UN Habitat (2006), Meeting in progress and proposed next steps for the World Bank in Development Goals in Small Urban Centres; Water and Latin America, World Bank, LCR Environmentally Sanitation in the World's Cities 2006, Earthscan and Sustainable Development Department Working Publications, London. Paper No. 25, 55 pages. 73 Ahern M, Kovats, R. S., Wilkinson, P., Few, R. and 70 Stern, Nicholas (2007), The Economics of Climate Matthies, F. (2005), Global health impacts of floods: Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge University Press, epidemiologic evidence, Epidemiologic Reviews, Vol 27, Cambridge, 692 pages. pages 36-46.

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coverage of drought; the primary impacts will With regard to other natural resources, many obviously be in rural areas where agriculture, tourist cities on the coast will have their tourist animal husbandry, and to a lesser extent forestry assets damaged because of flood damage to and fishing are significantly impacted, leading to coastal reefs and loss of beaches, although cycles of seasonal and distress migration and experience suggests that tourists will be protected increasing rural debt.74 For urban areas, drought and low-income residents and workers will suffer can mean drinking water shortages and increases the most. in food and biomass fuel prices that hurt the urban poor. It also has important second-order Higher temperatures and heat waves impacts: increasing seasonal and distress Most cities in Africa, Asia, Latin America and migration from rural areas and reduced demand the Caribbean will experience more heat waves; for secondary goods and services because of for larger, denser cities, the temperatures in depressed agricultural demand.75 In regions central ‘heat islands’ can be several degrees where climate change brings decreasing higher than in surrounding areas. Many will face possibilities for agriculture, local urban centres more problems with certain air pollutants as will suffer both as local supplies diminish and as concentrations of air pollutants may change in local farmers’ incomes (and thus spending on response to climate change because a portion of goods and services within these urban centres) their formation depends on temperature and decrease. Generally urban issues and rural issues humidity. This has particular importance for Asia are discussed as if they were somehow separate. and Latin America, which have most of the cities But a considerable part of the urban population with the highest levels of air pollution. in low- and middle-income nations derives its livelihoods from producing or selling goods and There is not so much work on the impacts of providing services to rural producers or heat stress in Africa or Latin America, but inhabitants. There are also the obvious rural- studies undertaken in North America, Asia and urban links for the many locally produced Europe found that heat waves are associated with foodstuffs that urban dwellers purchase and for all marked short-term increases in mortality.77 The industries that rely on crops or forest products as European heat wave of 2003 claimed 20,000 inputs. Urban or peri-urban agriculture often has lives, mostly amongst the poor and isolated particular importance, both for food supplies to elderly. In Andhra Pradesh, India, more than urban areas and for incomes for their producers, 1,000 were killed in a heat wave, mostly especially where there are markets for high- labourers working outside in high temperatures in value-added crops. So support to rural/peri-urban smaller urban settlements.78 populations and production systems to reduce their vulnerability to climate change is important With regard to urban heat islands, higher for urban food supplies and many urban temperatures occur in urban areas than in livelihoods and economies, just as protecting outlying rural areas because of diurnal cycles of urban economies and livelihoods is also absorption and later re-radiation of solar energy important for so many rural households whose and (to a much lesser extent) heat generation livelihoods depend on goods sold to urban from built/paved physical structures. These populations or whose income is in part derived increase the frequency and severity of heat stress from household members working in urban events in cities and can affect the health, labour areas.76 productivity and leisure activities of the urban population; there are also economic effects, such as the additional cost of climate control within 74 Sainath, S. (2002), Everybody Loves a Good Drought: buildings, and environmental effects, such as the Stories from India’s Poorest Districts, Penguin, New Delhi. 75 Revi (2007), op. cit. 77 Confalonieri et al. (2007), op. cit. 76 Tacoli (2006), op. cit. See also Annex Box 3 on 78http://www.heatisonline.org/contentserver/objecthan India’s ’Rurban’ transformation 2000-2050. dlers/index.cfm?id=3943&method=full

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formation of smog in cities and the degradation warmer average temperatures permit an of green spaces, and increased greenhouse gases if expansion in the area in which many tropical additional demand for cooling is met with diseases can occur. This is likely to include an electricity generated from fossil fuels. expansion in the area in which the mosquitoes that spread malaria, dengue fever and filariasis There is some evidence that the combined effects can survive and breed.82 Note, in particular, the of heat stress (e.g., urban heat island effects) and rapid spread of dengue fever in many nations in air pollution may be greater than the simple recent years, as the aedes mosquito adapts to additive effects of the two stresses.79 There are urban conditions. In India, malaria is expected to again different vulnerabilities to the health expand its range horizontally and vertically from impacts of climate-related extremes and air its currently endemic range in eastern and pollution within urban areas. Local factors, such northeastern India to western and southern as climate, topography, heat island magnitude, India.83 Given that Indian cities have become income, access to health services and the major reservoirs of vector-borne diseases such as proportion of elderly people, are important in malaria and dengue fever, it can be expected that determining the underlying temperature- the morbidity risks would increase. However, all mortality relationship in a population.80 Winter the above health risks are evident for much of mortality and morbidity in high altitude and the urban population without climate change. colder cities depend on the quality of households’ home heating, the health of the populations, and Sometimes where extreme weather events the conditions of prevention and treatment of generate new health hazards and cause disruption winter infections.81 to public health services, they can lead to increased disease incidence. Hurricane Mitch in Other climate-change-related health risks Central America in 1998 resulted in increases in The text above has pointed to a range of health- cases of malaria, dengue fever, cholera and related risks arising from climate change, leptospirosis.84 Populations with poor sanitation including direct risks (e.g., physical hazards from infrastructure and high burdens of infectious floods, storms, fires, heat stress) and less direct disease often experience increased rates of risks (e.g., climate change negatively affecting diarrhoeal diseases, cholera and typhoid fever livelihoods, food supplies or access to water, or after flood events. The transmission of enteric exacerbating air pollution problems). Climate pathogens is generally higher during the rainy change is also likely to bring: an increased season.85 burden of diarrhoeal disease; increased frequency of cardio-respiratory diseases due to higher 82 concentrations of ground level ozone related to Adger, Aggarwal, Agrawala et al. (2007), op, cit.; climate change; and altered spatial distribution of WHO (1992), Our Planet, Our Health, World Health some infectious disease vectors; for instance, as Organization, Geneva. 83 Bhattacharya, Sumana; Sharma, C.; et al. (2006). Climate Change and Malaria in India. NATCOM 79 Patz , J. and Balbus, J. (2003), Global climate Project Management Cell; National Physical change and air pollution: Interactions and their effects Laboratory, New Delhi. Current Science, Vol. 90, No. on human health. In Aron, J. and Patz, J. (eds.), 3, 10 February. Ecosystem Change and Public Health, Johns Hopkins 84 Vergara 2005 op cit., page 14. University Press, Baltimore, pages 379-402. 85 Nchito, M., Kelly, P., Sianongo, S. Luo, N.P., 80 Curriero, F., Heiner, K.S., Samet, J., Zeger, S., Strug, Feldman, R., Farthing, M. and Baboo, K.S. (1998), L. and Patz, J.A. (2002), Temperature and mortality in Cryptosporidiosis in urban Zambian children: An 11 cities of the Eastern United States. American Journal analysis of risk factors, Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg, Vol. of Epidemiology 155, pages 80-87. 40, No. 59, pages 435-437; Kang, G., B.S. 81 Carson, C., Hajat, S., Armstrong, B. and Wilkinson, Ramakrishna, Daniel, J., Mathan, M. and Mathan, V. P. (2006), Declining vulnerability to temperature- (2001), Epidemiological and laboratory investigations related mortality in London over the twentieth of outbreaks of diarrhoea in rural South India: century, American Journal of Epidemiology, in press. implications for control of disease. Epidemiol. Infect.,

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The particular problems facing urban and incapacities of governments; and the high- populations in small island nations risk sites on which many cities have developed. The IPCC Working Group II summary noted the As noted earlier, the key here is to understand following with very high confidence: ‘Small how the processes that drive or shape urban islands … have characteristics which make them change create risk to a range of hazards, especially vulnerable to the effects of climate including those that climate change is likely to change, sea level rise and extreme events’. create or exacerbate.

Sea-level rise is expected to exacerbate What drives urban change? inundation, storm surge, erosion and other Understanding what causes and influences urban coastal hazards, thus threatening vital change within any nation is complicated. infrastructure, settlements and facilities that Consideration has to be given to changes in the support the livelihood of island communities. scale and nature of the nation’s economy and its Climate change is projected by mid-century to connections with neighbouring nations and the reduce water resources in many small islands in wider world economy; also to decisions made by the Caribbean and Pacific, for example, to the national governments, national and local point where they become insufficient to meet investors and the 30,000 or so global demand during low rainfall periods. corporations that control such a significant share of the world’s economy. Urban change within all ‘Reduced rainfall in summer is projected for nations is also influenced by the structure of many islands in the Caribbean, so that it is government (especially the division of power and unlikely that demand would be met during low resources between different levels of rainfall periods. Increased rainfall in winter is government), and the extent and spatial unlikely to compensate due to lack of storage, distribution of transport and communications and high runoff during storms’. investments. The population of each urban centre and its rate of change are also influenced ‘Tourism is the major contributor to GDP and not only by such international and national employment in many small islands. Sea-level rise factors, but also by local factors – including the and increased sea water temperature will cause site, location, natural resource endowment, the accelerated beach erosion, degradation of coral population’s demographic structure, existing reefs and bleaching. In addition, loss of cultural economy and infrastructure (the legacy of past heritage from inundation and flooding reduces decisions and investments), and the quality and the amenity value for coastal users. Whereas a capacity of public institutions. warmer climate could reduce the number of people visiting small islands in low latitudes, it The immediate cause of urbanization86 is the net could have the reverse effect in middle- and movement of people from rural to urban areas. high-latitude islands. However, water shortages The main underlying cause is the concentration and increased incidence of vector-borne diseases of new investment and economic opportunities may also deter tourists’. in particular urban areas. Virtually all the nations that have urbanized most over the last 50 to 60 Identifying drivers years have had long periods of rapid economic Three drivers of increased vulnerability to expansion and large shifts in employment climate variability, change and hazards in urban patterns from agricultural/pastoral activities to areas are considered here: the drivers of industrial, service and information activities.87 In urbanization and urban change; the weaknesses low- and middle-income nations, urbanization is overwhelmingly the result of people moving in 127, 107 quoted in Confalonieri, Ulisses and Bettina Menne with Rais, Akhtar, Ebi, Kristie L., Hauengue, 86 Urbanization understood to be an increase in the Maria, Kovats, Sari, Revich, Boris, Woodward, proportion of national populations living in urban Alistair, et al. (2007), Chapter 8: Human Health, areas. IPCC WGII Fourth Assessment Report, 74 pages. 87 Satterthwaite 2007b, op. cit.

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response to better economic opportunities in the (drawing mostly on very out-of-date statistics) urban areas, or to the lack of prospects in their and no discussion on the great variation in the home farms or villages. The scale and direction scale and nature of urban development between of people’s movements accord well with changes nations and within nations (and how this has in the spatial location of economic opportunities. changed over time) and of what causes In general, it is cities, small towns or rural areas urbanization. Another paper looking at with expanding economies that attract most urbanization and natural disasters in the migration.88 By 2004, 97 percent of the world’s Mediterranean simply refers to urbanization GDP was generated by industry and services, being caused by push and pull factors, the most of which is in urban areas; around 65 structure of the economy and the stage of percent of the world’s economically active economic development,90 as if this explained the population works in industry and services and scale and nature of urbanization within each most live in urban areas. Most of the world’s nation. Both these papers and many others seem largest cities are in the world’s largest economies. to take as given that all nations are urbanizing Political changes have had considerable (which is not true) and that all urban centres importance in increasing levels of urbanization in face rapid population increases (which is also not many nations over the past 50-60 years, true as an analysis of urban change in any nation especially the achievement of political between two censuses shows). There are many independence (which often also meant the large cities, small cities and small towns in dismantling of apartheid-like colonial controls Africa, Asia and Latin America that do not have on the right of the inhabitants to live or work in rapidly growing populations. Mexico City, São urban areas in many nations) and the building of Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Calcutta government structures. These had particular and Seoul had more people moving out than importance for much of Asia and Africa, but had moving in as shown in their most recent inter- much less effect in most nations from the 1980s census period.91 onwards. Aggregate urban statistics are often interpreted as Do climate change specialists and disaster implying comparable urban trends across the specialists understand what drives and shapes world or for particular continents. But they urban change? With a few honourable obscure the diversity between nations and hide exceptions, the literature suggests that they have the particular local and national factors that a simplistic, often stereotyped ‘urban population influence these trends. Recent censuses show explosion’ or ‘rural push-urban pull’ view of that the world today is actually less urbanized and urban change. This often fails to consider why less dominated by large cities than had been urbanization is taking place, what drives people anticipated. Analyses of urban change within any to concentrate in specific urban locations, and nation over time show the rising and falling what particular processes make the population of importance of different urban centres, the spatial each urban centre (or particular groups within it) influence of changes in governments’ economic vulnerable. For instance, in one paper rich in policies (for instance, from supporting import 89 insights about urban disasters and vulnerability, there is a very short section on the increase in 90 Brauch, Hans Gunter (2002), Urbanization and the urban population in developing countries natural disasters in the Mediterranean; population growth and climate change in the 21st century, in 88 There are important exceptions, such as migration Kreimer, Alcira, Arnold, Margaret and Carlin, Anne flows away from wars/conflicts and disasters. (eds.), The Future of Disaster Risk; Building Safer Cities, 89 Quarantelli, Enrico (2002), Urban vulnerability to Conference papers, The World Bank, Washington, disasters in developing countries: managing risks, in D.C., pages 170-183. Kreimer, Alcira, Arnold, Margaret, and Carlin, Anne 91 Hardoy, Jorge E. and Satterthwaite, David (1989), (eds.), The Future of Disaster Risk; Building Safer Cities, Squatter Citizen: Life in the Urban Third World, Conference papers, The World Bank, Washington, Earthscan Publications, London, UK, 388 pages; D.C., pages 237-262. Satterthwaite (2007b), op. cit.

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substitution to supporting export promotion), surprisingly, there is often an association between and of international trade regimes, the growing rapid urban change and better standards of living. complexity of multi-nuclear urban systems in and Not only is most urbanization associated with around many major cities, and the complex and stronger economies, but generally the more ever shifting patterns of in-migration and out- urbanized a nation, the higher the average life migration from rural to urban areas, from urban expectancy and literacy rate and the stronger the to urban areas and from urban to rural areas. democracy, especially at local level. Many of the International immigration or emigration has largest cities may appear chaotic and out of strong impacts on the population size of control, but most have provision for piped water, particular cities in most nations. But it is not sanitation, schools and health care that are well only changing patterns of prosperity or decline above their national average – even if the that underpin these flows; many cities have been aggregate statistics for each large city can hide a impacted by war, civil conflict or disaster, or by significant proportion of their population living the entry of those fleeing them. in very poor conditions. Some of world’s fastest growing cities over the last 50 years also have If our concern is what makes urban centres and among the best standards of living within their populations at risk from climate change, we need nation.94 A concern for development and for to understand why urban populations or reducing urban population’s vulnerability to risks subgroups within a population often concentrate (including those associated with climate change) in high-risk areas and why urban processes can should include a focus not only on large or fast- greatly magnify the size of the risk and the growing cities but also on smaller urban centres population at risk. It is common to see and urban centres that are not growing rapidly, urbanization listed as a driver of vulnerability, since these contain a high proportion of the but this is questionable for two reasons: first, in urban population.95 some locations, urbanization is associated with much reduced vulnerability to extreme weather There is often an assumption that agriculture events and other environmental hazards. should be considered as separate from or even in Secondly, urbanization is not so much a driver as a result of other drivers. Unlike other areas of climate change research (e.g., agricultural growth, but the validity of this paper’s conclusions vulnerability), no systemic methodologies and must be in question when it had no census data for any studies have been developed to understand urban African nation for 2000 (it relied on projections for all vulnerability in the context of multiple stressors; urban populations in 2000). See Potts, Deborah to address the determinants of vulnerability and (2006), Urban growth and urban economies in Eastern poverty in urban areas; and to explore the and Southern Africa: Trends and Prospects, in constraints and windows of opportunity to Deborah Fahy Bryceson and Deborah Potts (editors) increase the adaptive capacity/resilience of the African Urban Economies: Viability, Vitality or Vitiation?, 92 Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pages 67-98. urban poor. 94 See, for instance, Curitiba and Porto Alegre, both Although rapid urban growth is often seen as a among the most rapidly growing cities in Latin problem, generally the nations with the best America over the last 50 years, both with high standards of living; Menegat, Rualdo (2002), economic performance have urbanized most in Environmental management in Porto Alegre, the last 50 years.93 In addition, perhaps Environment and Urbanization, Vol.14, No.2, October, pp. 181–206; also Rabinovitch, Jonas (1992), Curitiba: 92 Romero-Lankao (2007), op. cit. towards sustainable urban development, Environment 93 Ibid. A World Bank paper published in 2000 (Fay, and Urbanization, Vol.4, No.2, October, pages 62-77. Marianne and Opal, Charlotte (2000), Urbanization 95 Satterthwaite, David (2006), Outside the Large Cities; without Growth:A not so uncommon Phenomenon, the demographic importance of small urban centres and World Bank, Washington, D.C.) claimed that sub- large villages in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Human Saharan Africa was an exception in that it had Settlements Discussion Paper; Urban Change-3, IIED, urbanized rapidly during the 1990s without economic London, 30 pages.

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opposition to urban development and that rural and local governance systems that act in the development is needed to help reduce rural- public good to reduce risk and vulnerability. urban migration. But successful rural development often increases rural-urban The other urban issue that needs highlighting is migration as higher-value crops and higher that many of the regions with the most rapid incomes among rural populations increase urban growth (and the largest in-migration flows) demand for goods and services in urban centres.96 are coastal areas that are at risk from sea-level Many major cities first developed as markets and rise and the likely increase in intensity and service centres for farmers and rural households, frequency of extreme weather events. The and later developed into important centres of example from China of the very large migration industry and/or services.97 Many such cities still flows towards cities in coastal areas was given have significant sections of their economy and earlier. The dynamics behind this will be very employment structure related to forward and difficult to change; and there is also a high backward linkages with agriculture.98 potential for government policies aiming to do so to seriously damage the economic prospects of Do urban specialists concern themselves with low-income nations and the livelihood urban populations’ vulnerability to extreme opportunities for low-income populations. In weather events? Again, with a few honourable virtually all nations, where private investments exceptions, the literature suggests that they do and enterprises choose to concentrate drives not – although this is part of a wider failure most urbanization.100 among urban specialists to give much consideration to the life-threatening or health- The challenge facing national governments is threatening risks to which urban populations (or how to encourage and support patterns of private particular groups within urban populations) are investment within national boundaries that are exposed in their homes, neighbourhoods and less concentrated in high-risk sites, just as all city workplaces.99 governments also have to address this within their own local jurisdictions. This task is best The key issue that needs consideration in done with the kind of long-term (several decades relation to adaptation is: Why have long) perspective that all political systems find metropolitan, city and municipal government difficult. This may be done in ways that damage structures not developed in step with rapid urban economic prospects; for instance, because the growth? This is more easily explained in the choice of safer city sites favoured with incentives many cities and smaller urban centres that lack a and infrastructure investments is determined by prosperous economic base. But a large proportion political factors.101 Perhaps more worrying is the of the urban population most at risk from climate likely emergence in some nations of government change lives in urban centres that have had very measures to address the effects of this (trying to rapid economic growth. The main reason is the control population movements to high-risk sites failure to develop local government structures rather than the private investment flows that underpin these movements): in effect 96 establishing a system of apartheid-like controls Satterthwaite, David and Tacoli, Cecilia (2003), on the rights of people to move within their The Urban Part of Rural Development: The Role of Small national boundaries justified by the need to make and Intermediate Urban Centres in Rural and Regional urban patterns less vulnerable to climate change. Development and Poverty Reduction, Rural–Urban Working Paper 9, IIED, London, 64 pages. 97 Garza (2002), op. cit.; Afsar (2002), op. cit., and 100 This is referring specifically to urbanization Satterthwaite and Tacoli (2003), op. cit. understood to be increases in the proportion of the 98 See Satterthwaite and Tacoli (2003), op. cit.; also population living in urban centres. Benjamin, Solomon (2000), Governance, economic 101 Note the long history of government policies to settings and poverty in Bangalore, Environment and promote the growth of smaller urban centres or Urbanization, Vol.12, No.1, April, pages 35–56. undeveloped regions that have been ineffective and 99 Hardoy, Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2001), op. cit. often very expensive.

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Some evidence for this can be seen already in • providers of ‘law and order’ which India where some residential areas are at risk should also act to protect low-income from new coastal zone regulations limiting groups from risk; developments close to the sea. This can also be • coordinators and supporters of links seen in inappropriate government policies after between disaster avoidance and disaster disasters which did not allow low-income preparedness – for instance ensuring households to return to their settlements and that all tasks above integrate with where land over time was transferred to higher- agencies responsible for disaster income residential, commercial or industrial use. response. The result is increased inequality and social tension without a reduction in disaster exposure. Where urban governments fulfil these key roles, One recent example of this is coastal buffer zone levels of risk for their populations and economies established in Sri Lanka, post-tsunami, forcing are much reduced and urbanization is associated the relocation of villages, disrupting livelihoods with much lowered risks. But where urban and generating social tensions; at the same time, governments only partially fulfil these roles – or tourist businesses have expanded their operations fail to fulfil them – levels of risk are much into ‘vacant’ land. increased.

Government roles The vulnerabilities of so much of the urban Urban governments should have a key role as risk population in Africa, Asia, Latin America and reducers for climate change as: the Caribbean to environmental risks including • providers of infrastructure and services those related to climate change are mainly to do (perhaps some contracted to private with lack of appropriate investment and action. enterprises); Many local politicians and city-government staff • guiders of where development takes view the poor and the areas where they live place; for instance, influencing where (‘slums’, informal settlements) as ‘the problem’ urban settlements develop and where rather than the adaptation of key parts of the they do not and what provision they city’s economy and labour force to the lack of have to avoid floods, fires, etc.; better alternatives. If local governments or • regulators of building design and higher levels of government see their path to construction (including support and economic success as bulldozing slums or major training for builders, especially those infrastructure programmes that displace large who are active in building within low- sections of the poor population, this will income settlements); generally be increasing poverty and increasing • regulators of hazardous activities that poorer groups’ vulnerability as they move to can produce disasters (industries, other areas at risk because these are the only transport accidents, etc.); areas where they can get housing or land for • influencers of land availability (land use housing. regulations, zoning and bureaucratic procedures for buying or obtaining land Government and the public good and what can be built on it; the quality The justification for having city and municipal of land use management influences the governments is that only they can act to address proportion of poorer groups having to certain key issues pertaining to the public good, live on hazardous/disaster-prone sites); such as ensuring provision for the infrastructure • encouragers/supporters of and services that are essential for health and household/community action that economic success, and controlling or regulating reduces risk (better quality housing, the actions and activities of individuals, safer sites, good infrastructure, good households or enterprises that are dangerous or disaster preparedness, etc.); that transfer risks or costs to others. This is not to imply that it is city government (or higher levels of government) that needs to provide all

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infrastructure and services or even to undertake where development would increase the whole all the needed policing of rules and regulations; urban centre’s vulnerability to climate change but they have to provide (and fund) the legal and impacts. Those who own the land may want to institutional framework that ensures these develop it, and the state may need to step in to happen with accountability to city populations represent the public interest. However, if less (usually achieved through city governments well-off residents currently occupy the land, overseen by elected politicians). there is a danger that compensation will be insufficient, and even that the public interest For climate change, locally accountable would not be deployed by evicting them. The government institutions acting in the public time dimension is important in such examples, good have particular importance for five reasons. since developers or early settlers will be thinking First, many of the needed measures are public short term, but are setting in place infrastructure goods in the sense that they will benefit and settlement patterns for the long term.102 populations, including future residents and those that do not contribute to these public goods. Of course, the possibilities of city governments Without government action, such goods will be ensuring the public good also relates to the underprovided. The second is that the policies and practices of higher levels of appropriateness of their regulatory framework government, and these have rarely provided (for land use, infrastructure and buildings) will adequate or appropriate support for the have a huge influence on the extent of development of local competence and appropriate adaptation to climate change; capacity;103 interrelated also is the reluctance or within this appropriateness is the need for such refusal of so many development assistance measures not to disadvantage lower-income agencies to engage with urban development and, groups and not to draw investment away from in their support for good governance, to other needed tasks or run up large debt burdens. recognize the importance of good local The third is that there are many no-cost or low- governance.104 But there also needs to be a cost measures which help ensure that any rapidly recognition of the complexities of changing growing city builds into its growth process greater political and institutional systems fast enough to resilience; markets and most individual and cope with such rapid change. The development community-initiatives will not act to reduce risks of competent, capable metropolitan, city and that are far in the future, but appropriate municipal governance structures able to address incentives and controls can make them act on environmental risks in today’s high-income these, without high costs. Most urban disasters nations was a slow and highly contested process. have 20 to 30 year risk-accumulation processes, A hundred years ago, most cities in Europe and which need to be identified and acted on. The North America had higher infant and child fourth is the very large economies of scale and proximity from citywide action (the total cost of all households and enterprises making provisions 102 for themselves would be much higher and much There are examples of city governments that have less effective). The fifth is that a reliance on combined watershed protection with measures to market mechanisms such as insurance or the improve conditions for those living in informal settlements in these areas – see van Horen, Basil capacity to purchase safe housing to produce the (2001), Developing community-based watershed needed changes will not serve those unable to management in Greater São Paulo; the case of Santo access the formal housing market or afford André, Environment and Urbanization, Vol 13, No 1, insurance, which in urban centres in low- and pages 209-222. middle-income nations means most of the 103 In most nations, there has been some increase. population and most enterprises. 104 Satterthwaite (2001), op. cit; Crespin, Julie (2006), Aiding local action; the constraints faced by donor An obvious example of the need for government agencies in supporting effective, pro-poor initiatives to act in the public good is measures to stop on the ground, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 18, development on a flood plain or some other area No. 2, pages 433-450.

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mortality rates than most cities in low- and exhibited a decreasing tendency.108 The middle-income nations today.105 growing number of urban disasters caused by extreme weather events is consistent Identifying trends with what the IPCC predicts; but here too Certain trends described already have obvious it is difficult to separate the relative implications for the topic of this paper: contribution of climate change from other • Rapidly increasing urban populations and factors. In part, this is because of the numbers of people living in informal growth in urban populations in high-risk settlements lacking provision for basic sites. infrastructure and services; 3. The frequency and intensity of tropical • Rapidly increasing concentrations of cyclones originating in the Pacific have economic activities and investments in increased over the last few decades.109 In urban areas with increasing concentrations contrast, cyclones originating from the in coastal areas in many nations; Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea have been • Most of the growth in the world’s noted to decrease since 1970 but the population over the next 10 to 20 years intensity has increased.110 In both cases, likely will be in urban centres in low- and damage caused by intense cyclones has middle-income nations.106 risen significantly in the affected countries, particularly India, China, In urban areas: Philippines, Japan, Vietnam and 1. There is the evidence of water stress Cambodia, Iran and Tibetan Plateau.111 affecting increasing numbers of urban centres and their surrounding regions. In some regions, this is linked to long-term trends in decreased precipitation or to 108 Sources quoted in Cruz and Harasawa (2007), op. reduced river flows. But in most regions, cit: Kanai, S., Oki, T. and Kashida, A. (2004), the contribution of climate change is not Changes in Hourly Precipitation at Tokyo from 1890 known and at least at present, it is likely to 1999. J. Meteor. Soc. Japan, 82, pages 241-247; to be more the result of rapidly growing Manton, M.J., Della-marta, P.M., Haylock, M.R., demand and inadequate water Hennessy, K.J., Nicholls, N., Chambers, L.E., Collins, management. D.A., Gdaw, A. Finet, Gunawan, D., Inape, K., Isobe, 2. The frequency of more intense rainfall H., Kestin, T.S., Lefale, P., Leyu, C.H., Lwin, T., events in many parts of Asia has increased, Maitrepierre, L., Ouprasitwong, N., Page, C.M., causing severe floods, landslides, and Pahalad, J., Plummer, N., Salinger, M.J., Suppiah, R., debris and mud flows, while the number of Tran, V.L., Trewin, B., Tibig, I. and Lee, D. (2001): rainy days and total annual amount of Trends in Extreme daily rainfall and temperature in precipitation has decreased.107 However, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific; 1961–1998, Int. J. Climatol., 21, pages 269–284. there are reports that the frequency of 109 extreme rainfall in some countries has Source quoted in Cruz and Harasawa (2007), op. cit: Fan, D.D. and Li C. X., 2005: Complexities of Chinese Coast in Response to Climate Change. Advance in Research on Climate Change,(in press). 110 Lal, M, (2001), Tropical Cyclones in a Warmer 105 Bairoch, Paul (1988), Cities and Economic World, Current Science, Vol 80 (9), 1103-1104. Development: From the Dawn of History to the Present, 111 Sources quoted in Cruz and Harasawa 2007, op. cit: Mansell, London, 574 pages. PAGASA (Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and 106 United Nations (2006), op. cit. Astronomical Services Administration) (2001), 107 Cruz, Rex Victor and Harasawa, Hideo, Lal, Murari, Documentation and analysis of impacts of and Shaohong, Wu with Anokhin, Yurji, Punsalmaa, responses to extreme climate events, Climatology & Batima, Honda, Yasushi, Jafari, Mostafa, Li, Congxian, Agrometeorology Branch Technical Paper No. 2001-2, Ninh, Nguyen Huu, et al. (2007), Chapter 10: Asia, 55 pages; GCOS, 2005: GCOS action plan for South IPCC WGII Fourth Assessment Report, 66 pages. and Southeast Asia; ABI (Association of British

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4. There is evidence of significantly longer heat wave durations observed in many The IPCC Working Group II chapter on countries. settlements noted some estimates for the impacts 5. There is evidence of sea-level rise in and of extreme weather events on nations’ GDPs, around many coastal cities and evidence of which include a 4-6 percent loss for Mozambique impacts related to sea-level rise, for for the flooding in 2000,115 a 3 percent loss for instance receding coasts. central America from El Nino, and a 7 percent loss for Honduras from Hurricane Mitch. These Trends in urban disasters from extreme national aggregations can obscure that for weather events112 specific regions or locales, the impact can be Worth noting is the scale of the devastation by greater, ranging from more than ten percent of some recent extreme weather events. The issue is gross domestic product and gross capital not that these are proof of climate change (which formation in larger, more developed and more is difficult to ascertain) but proof of the diversified impacted regions, to more than 50 vulnerability of cities and smaller settlements to percent in less developed, less diversified, more extreme weather events. A new United Nations natural-resource-dependent regions.116 Global Report that focuses on disasters describes the long-term global trends in increasing Cities and high-risk sites numbers of disaster events, in people affected and IPCC Working Group II noted how rapid made homeless by disasters, and in the economic urbanization in most low and middle-income impacts of disasters, especially on the poor. nations is often in relatively high risk areas and is These show the weaknesses in the ability of placing an increasing proportion of their governments and of the international community economies and populations at risk.117 The issue to protect their citizens from disaster risk and to then is why so many cities are on dangerous sites respond to disaster. Reviewing all disaster events at risks from storms and floods, which happened recorded on the University of Louvain completely independent of climate change, but emergency data (EM-DAT) database shows the climate change has increased the level of risk and number steadily growing from 1950 to 2006, and the number of people at risk. a large proportion in urban areas or affecting urban areas. Other sources suggest that the rapid Four reasons can be suggested for this.118 The first growth in the number of disasters is partly is that dangerous sites were attractive to those explained by the much increased size of the who originally founded and developed the city; urban population, including the prevalence of for instance, because of a good river or sea cities in hazard-prone areas.113 Another example harbour, a strategic location for trade or of the increasing impact of disasters comes from territorial control, a ready supply of fresh water, the expenditure patterns of the Asian Development Bank. During the 1980s, this bank earmarked 6 percent of loans for reconstruction; Change Research (2002) International symposium on in the 1990s this rose to 20 percent.114 disaster reduction and global environmental change. 20-21 June 2002, Berlin. 115 Cairncross, S. and Alvarinho, M.J.C. Insurers) (2005): Financial Risks of Climate Change, (forthcoming), The Mozambique floods of 2000: Summary Report, 40 pages. health impact and response in R. Few (editor), 112 This section draws directly from draft chapters for Flooding and Health, Earthscan, London, (in press). the 2008 Global Report on Human Settlements being 116 Zapata-Marti, R. (2004): The 2004 Hurricanes In prepared by UN Habitat which focuses on disasters The Caribbean And The Tsunami In The Indian Ocean: 113 Kakhandiki A. and Shah, H.(1998) Understanding Lessons And Policy Challenges For Development And time variation of risk. Crucial implications for Disaster Reduction, LC/MEX/L.672, Estudios y megacities worldwide. Applied Geography 18(1): pages perspectivas series, 35, 62 pages 47-53. 117 Wilbanks, Romero-Lankao et al. (2007), op. cit. 114 Lavell (2001), op, cit.; German Committee for 118 This section draws on Hardoy, Mitlin and Disaster Reduction/National Committee on Global Satterthwaite (2001), op. cit.

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or a fertile delta. Most of the world’s major cities not generally invest in sites that are risky, unless are on the coast or beside major rivers because the risk of loss can be reduced by insurance or by they were already important urban centres before the risk not actually threatening their production railways and road and air transport. Most relied (particular geographic areas and particular on river or seaports as their main transport and population groups – usually low-income groups communication link with other places; of course, are most at risk).120 In addition, if risks from ocean transport is still a key part of the climate change are seen as distant threats that increasingly globalized economy. may affect city sites 20 or 50 or more years in the future, these are not much discouragement to The second is that the original city site might invest, especially in successful cities. Dhaka, have been safe but the city outgrew this site and Mumbai and Shanghai have attracted much expanded onto land that is at risk, for instance private investment, despite their vulnerability to onto flood plains or up unstable hills or storms and sea-level rise. mountains. The third is that once a city develops, it rarely disappears, even if it More important is the potential impact on the experiences some disastrous flood or earthquake, urban economy and its employment because there are too many individuals, opportunities and on the local government’s tax enterprises and institutions with an interest in base if companies and corporations move when that city’s economy. The fourth is that in most risk-levels increase or after an extreme weather cities at risk from floods, the wealthier groups event. Even if such enterprises are not directly and most formal enterprises do not face serious affected by an extreme weather event, the risks. indirect effects: electricity, water supplies or climate-sensitive inputs disrupted; the delay in The spatial distribution of urban populations in deliveries of key inputs, or the difficulties in any nation is not the result of any careful plan to shipping goods to customers; the inconvenience guide urban expansion to safe sites. The main to senior staff, may encourage movement driver of city expansion (or stagnation or elsewhere or new locations chosen when contraction) is where new or expanding private enterprises expand. enterprises choose to concentrate or avoid. This is also largely true for how each individual urban It is possible to envisage a trend in new centre develops: the localities within and around investments by larger companies and the urban centre with the most rapidly growing corporations away from cities and city sites most populations are associated with where new or at risk from floods, storms and sea-level rise that expanding economic activities concentrate, will hardly affect their operations. They have although the physical growth of the urban centre long been adept at shifting production to is also influenced by where lower-income groups locations where profits are maximized and it is can (or cannot) get accommodation or land on easy for them to factor in risks from climate which housing can be built.119 change. But it is difficult to conceive of how many of the large, successful coastal cities most at So in seeking to understand the links between risk from storms and sea-level rise will manage. city development and risk from climate change, As described already, cities such as Mumbai, one of the key issues is: to what extent are Shanghai and Dhaka are very vulnerable to sea- private enterprises influenced in their choice of level rise. All are very large (each has well over location by climate-change related risks? 10 million inhabitants), all have had Obviously, formal sector private enterprises will considerable economic success in the last few decades, all have great importance to their 119 Torres, Haroldo, Alves, Humberto and de Oliveira, nations’ economies and cultures, all concentrate Maria Aparecida (2007), São Paulo peri-urban very large investments and economic interests. dynamics: some social causes and environmental consequences, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 207-233. 120 Hardoy, Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2001), op. cit.

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Most residents and smaller businesses have far populations or those in particular urban less possibilities of moving – and face far more settlements that show very large health burdens serious losses if the value of their properties from diseases that should be easily prevented or decline. Meanwhile, the movement out of larger cured: for instance, diarrhoeal diseases, intestinal companies and corporations also threatens the parasites, TB and acute respiratory infections. cities’ economic base and the livelihoods of those Annex Table 4 summarizes the scale of different who worked for these companies or provided aspects of urban poverty. goods and services to them or their workforces. The number of urban dwellers who are poor is Status report on the urban poor always much influenced by how poverty is At least 900 million urban dwellers live in defined and measured. If poverty is considered to poverty in low- and middle-income nations. encompass all those who have difficulties There are no precise figures because many aspects affording basic necessities and who are either of poverty are not measured. For instance, in homeless or live in poor quality, overcrowded or most nations, no data are available on two of the illegal accommodation, then in 2000, at least 900 most important indicators for assessing the scale million urban dwellers were poor123 and the of poverty: household incomes and the cost of numbers are likely to have risen significantly nonfood necessities. Most poor urban households since then (the urban population in low- and derive most or all their income from work in the middle-income nations has grown by around 300 informal economy for which there are no data on million since 2000).124 incomes. Of course, within these hundreds of millions of But there is strong evidence on the scale of urban people suffering urban poverty, there is poverty from other sources; for instance, from considerable variation, from those who are data on the number of urban dwellers with destitute and suffering from acute malnutrition to inadequate nutrition levels and the numbers those who are managing or at least largely living in housing of very poor quality (with avoiding extreme deprivation, as long as there is particular problems in relation to poor-quality no crisis such as a drop in their income, a rise in structures, overcrowding, insecure tenure and food prices or in other major costs such as rent inadequate provision for water, sanitation and for housing, or an income-earner being sick, or drainage). One other indication of the scale of injured. Table 1 illustrates this. urban poverty is the number of people living in illegal settlements because they cannot afford to buy, build or rent legal accommodation; in many cities, 30 to 60 percent of the entire population live in settlements that were developed illegally.121

Statistics on infant and child mortality rates for urban populations show that these are often 5 to 20 times what they would be if their families had adequate incomes, reasonable quality housing and good health care.122 There are also many case studies focusing on low-income urban

121 Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989) op. cit.; UNCHS (1996), An Urbanizing World: Global Report on Human Settlements, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York; Hardoy, Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2001), op. cit. 123 UN–Habitat (2003a), op. cit. 122 Satterthwaite (2007a), op. cit. 124 United Nations (2006), op. cit.

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Table 1: Different degrees of poverty in urban areas Degrees of poverty Aspects of poverty Destitution Extreme Poverty Poverty At Risk of Being Poor

Income Income Income just above Income below a Income just above a below the the cost of a realistic poverty realistic poverty line* cost of a minimum food line* but enough to minimum basket but far too allow significant food basket low to allow other expenditure on necessities to be nonfood essentials afforded

Housing with Homeless or Very little to spend More accommodation options, e.g., slightly access to living in a on housing, often more spacious, better quality rental housing or infrastructure very poor renting a room in capacity to self-build a house if cheap or free and services quality tenement or illegal land is available. The extent and quality of shack with or informal low-cost housing options are much influenced no provision settlement shared by government land, infrastructure and that is no- with many others services policies and investments cost – or close to no- cost. Typically none or very little Often some capacity to save, especially within Assets (although membership in a well-managed savings and credit schemes; community-based savings group may housing the most valuable asset for those who provide access to small amounts of manage to get their own home even if it is credit for emergencies) illegal Extreme vulnerability to food price Similar kinds of vulnerability to those faced by Vulnerability rises, loss of income or illness or people facing destitution or extreme poverty, injury, often also to discrimination although usually less severe; often vulnerability and unfair practices (from to running up serious debt burdens; always employers, landlords, civil servants, vulnerability to illness/injury and its direct and politicians, the law, etc.) indirect impacts on income

* A realistic income-based poverty line would be one that was calculated based on real costs in each city and which took into

account the cost of nonfood essentials (rent, transport to and from work and essential services, water, sanitation, health care, keeping children at school) as well as the cost of an adequate diet. Most poverty lines in low- and middle-income nations make no such provisions, which is why the scale and depth of urban poverty is consistently underestimated. SOURCE: Adapted from Satterthwaite, David (2004), The Under-estimation of Urban Poverty in Low and Middle-Income Nations, IIED Working Paper 14 on Poverty Reduction in Urban Areas, IIED, London, 69 pages.

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Effects of increased climate variability and not moved there (when so many studies show change on the urban poor that migration flows are logical responses to As described already, the main impacts of climate changing patterns of economic opportunity). change on cities, at least in the next few decades, One added vulnerability faced by large sections are to increase levels of risk to existing hazards. of the urban poor is that governments may clear For poorer groups, some of the impacts are very them off land sites deemed to be vulnerable to direct; for instance, more frequent and more (for instance) floods with inadequate or no hazardous floods. Some are less direct, such as provision for finding alternative accommodation reduced availabilities of fresh water supplies for that meets their needs. whole cities which impact on supplies available to poorer groups (or higher prices). Some are The IPCC notes the particular problems of very indirect – for instance as the direct or densely populated and low-lying areas where indirect impacts of climate-change related adaptive capacity is relatively low, and which weather events increase food prices or damage already face other challenges such as tropical poorer households’ asset base or disrupt their storms or local coastal subsidence. It also notes incomes. In considering the vulnerability of the how adaptation for coasts will be more poor to increased climate variability and change, challenging in low- and middle-income nations, there is a need to consider how this might because of constraints on adaptive capacity. negatively affect their income, their asset base, the prices they pay for necessities, their homes In general, the people most at risk from climate and the infrastructure and services on which they change are those living in affected areas who: depend. • are least able to avoid the direct or indirect impacts (e.g., by having good It is well known and well documented that in quality homes and drainage systems that most cities, the urban poor live in the riskiest prevent flooding, by moving to places urban environments: flood plains, unstable with less risk, or by changing jobs if slopes, over river basins and in coastal areas.125 climate change threatens their These are also usually the sites most at risk from livelihoods); climate change, as discussed. In addition, in • are likely to be most affected (for most cities, the urban poor have problematic instance, infants and older groups less relationships with local government, which is able to cope with heat waves); meant to be the institution that acts to reduce • Are least able to cope with the illness, these risks. In part, this is because most of them injury, premature death or loss of live in informal settlements (including many on income, livelihood or property caused by land occupied illegally) and work within the the kinds of impacts. informal economy (and thus not within official rules and regulations). In part, it is because of Poorer groups get hit most by this combination of the anti-poor attitudes among government greater exposure to hazards (e.g., living in officials and elites, so often based on makeshift housing on unsafe sites, lack of hazard- misconceptions; for instance, the assumption removing infrastructure, and less capacity to cope that they are unemployed when they work long (lack of assets, insurance, etc.), less adaptive hours within the informal economy, or that they capacity, less state provision to help them cope, are recent migrants when they have long worked and less legal protection or protection from and lived within the urban centre (in many insurance. Low-income groups also have far less cities, many having been born there), or that scope to move to less dangerous sites; indeed, the migrants would have been better off if they had more dangerous sites are often the only sites where lower-income groups can find housing they can afford or can build their own homes. 125 See Hardoy, Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2001), op. cit.

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Wealth allows individuals and households to should aim to improve resilience, but reduce risks: by having safer housing, choosing seldom achieves this; safer jobs or locations to live in, having assets 4. The extent to which poorer groups can that can be called on in emergencies, and buy, build or rent safe housing in safe protecting their wealth by insuring assets that are sites at risk. Although it should be through good 5. The degree to which local government governance that provision for risk reduction is creates an enabling environment for ensured for the whole city population and local civil society action to contribute disparities in risk between income groups towards addressing the practical aims reduced, wealthier groups often have more identified above. influence on public expenditures. It has long been common for middle and upper income There are different vulnerabilities to the health groups to be the main beneficiaries of impacts of heat- and cold-waves on the one hand government investment in infrastructure and and air pollution within urban areas on the services. If government does not provide these, other. Local factors, such as climate, topography, higher income groups have the resources to solve heat island magnitude, income, access to health this problem themselves; by developing their services and the proportion of elderly people, are own provisions for water, sanitation and important in determining the underlying electricity, or moving to private developments temperature-mortality relationship in a which provide these. Indeed, reconstruction population.126 Winter mortality and morbidity in post-disaster can offer real opportunities for high altitude and colder cities depend on the private gain and it has been argued that this is quality of households home-heating, the health one reason why disasters are managed through of the populations, and the conditions of post-disaster reconstruction rather than pre- prevention and treatment of winter infections.127 disaster risk management, which would favour more socially progressive policies to reduce the In India, the critical populations and elements vulnerability of the poor and enhance citywide most at risk in a typical city are: critical infrastructure such as drainage and • slum, squatter and migrant populations sanitation. resident in traditional and informal settlements, which are often located in The quality of government, both at national the most vulnerable locations; level and, as crucially, at local (district or • industrial and informal service sector municipal) level, influences the levels of risk workers, whose occupations place them from climate change facing those with limited at significant risk, which is then incomes or assets in several ways: accentuated by additional stressors such 1. The quality of provision for as climate change; infrastructure for all areas, which should • buildings, especially traditional and limit risks of flooding for the whole city informal housing stock that are area, not just for the wealthier areas; especially vulnerable to wind, water and 2. The quality of provision for disaster- geological hazards; preparedness, including warnings, • industrial units, their in-house measures taken to limit damage and, if infrastructure, plant, machinery and raw needed, good provision to help people materials; move to safer areas quickly; • lifeline public and private infrastructure, 3. The quality of planning for and which includes roads, bridges, railways, coordinating disaster response (for ports, airports and other transportation instance, rescue services and appropriate systems; water, sewage and gas pipelines; emergency and health care services) and reconstruction to help those who lost their homes and livelihoods, which 126 Curriero et al. (2002), op. cit. 127 Carson et al.(2006), op. cit.

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drainage, flood and coastal defence systems; power and telecommunication There are also large variations in the asset bases infrastructure and critical social that different low-income individuals or infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, households can call on to help cope with fire and police station and first emergencies and in the quality and extent of responder’s infrastructure; safety nets on which they can draw. There are • the natural environment, especially obvious variations in the speed with which including wetlands, riverine, estuarine different groups can move in response to and coastal ecosystems, surface and approaching risks (infants and younger children, groundwater systems.128 the disabled, and older people are slower) and in the possibilities of public information on what to Which groups among the urban poor are most do reaching them. at risk? Table 1 illustrates the range in degrees of Within low-income populations, women often poverty, which will influence vulnerability levels face particular vulnerabilities related to gender to almost all risks. Thus, there is considerable relations, because of the tasks they undertake or variation within low-income urban dwellers in the discrimination they face in accessing jobs vulnerability to climate-change, both in terms of (which also means lower incomes), resources (for the risks to which they are exposed and in terms instance property titles) or services. When of their capacity to cope and adapt. For instance, homes are destroyed or damaged, this often there are large variations between the affects women more than men as they undertake settlements in which they live in the quality of income-earning activities from home and so lose their homes, in the extent of provision for the income when the house or the equipment infrastructure, and in the risks facing their they used is lost. Where women take most settlements from flooding or landslides. Within responsibility for children, they are constrained informal settlements, tenants with low incomes in their capacity to move rapidly – for instance to are often particularly at risk, especially where the avoid flood waters. Women generally spend landlord does not live on the premises. Absent more time in and around the home because they landlords remove the link between those have most of the child rearing and house responsible for the quality of the housing and management tasks and/or work from home; in those who are at risk from it, and they usually some societies, women are constrained by social operate with no regulation to enforce health and norms from being able to leave the home. All act safety standards. The scale and exploitative to increase the risk if their homes and nature of large-scale landlordism in informal settlements are at particular risk from climate settlements is well documented in Nairobi, but shocks. This helps to explain why many climate- common in many other cities.129 Tenants have disasters have mortality rates among women less interest in risk reduction, especially those significantly higher than for men. who regard their stay as temporary. It is difficult to engage residents with short-term outlooks in For populations that have to move – either addressing longer-term concerns such as how to temporarily or permanently – it is rare for promote infrastructure improvements in transient women’s needs and priorities to be addressed or communities. even considered in the temporary or resettlement accommodation; the same is true for children and 128 Revi (2007), op. cit. youth. There are also case studies showing the 129 Amis, Philip (1984), Squatters or tenants: the particular disadvantages and risks that women commercialization of unauthorized housing in Nairobi, face, after disasters, highlighting instances of the World Development Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 87-96; Yapi- particular problems faced by women-headed Diahou, Alphonse (1995), The informal housing households and widows. sector of the metropolis of Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Environment and Urbanization, Vol.7, No.2, pages 11- It is also obvious that infants and young children 29; UNCHS 1996, op. cit. living in poor quality housing in informal

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settlements face a range of particular risks from higher levels of risk and to very little coping extreme weather events, both in the risks that capacity. these provide and in the inadequacies in responding to their needs and priorities, during How are the urban poor presently adapting to and after any disaster. This is part of a wider the added challenge of increased climate problem within cities and city neighbourhoods of variability and change and the associated failing to understand the needs, priorities and environmental stresses? competencies of boys and girls of different age Poorer groups in urban areas spend most of their groups.130 There is a growing literature on the lives adapting to changing conditions: changing inadequacies in provision for the needs of economic opportunities, changing political children and youth and their care-givers (mostly circumstances, changing risks to their homes, etc. women) in disaster preparedness and in post- But as discussed in detail already, their survival disaster settlements that has relevance for needs and economic priorities often conflict with adaptation; these include discussions of the risk reduction. In a case study in Indore (India), importance of involving children and youth in the inhabitants of a low-income settlement at development issues and of their very considerable high risk of flooding had developed their own individual and group competencies and temporary and permanent adaptations to capacities. flooding and were unwilling to move to safer sites because these would not be so well located with There are also the particular vulnerabilities that regard to income-earning opportunities.131 This many older men and women face that need does not mean that low- income households consideration; for instance, the greater risks that living on dangerous sites will not move, but it heat stress poses or limitations in the capacity to does mean that measures to relocate them must move rapidly as flood waters rise. Their fully involve such households in choosing vulnerability may also be linked to their alternative locations and setting the terms under isolation. As adaptation plans and processes get which the new sites are acquired and provided more locally rooted and more influenced by low- with infrastructure and services. income groups, so the particular vulnerabilities of different groups within the population relating to A case study in El Salvador showed the income levels, gender and generation should difficulties in getting appropriate risk reduction become more apparent. action for lower-income groups. Drawing on interviews and discussions with people living in Each city will have particular groups within its 15 disaster-prone slum communities and with population for whom even relatively minor direct local organizations, these difficulties became or indirect impacts of climate change will be apparent. Low-income households recognized particularly problematic because they are so that flooding and landslides were the most vulnerable to any added stress or shock. These serious risks to their lives and livelihoods, include groups that are already facing serious although earthquakes and windstorms, lack of job health problems; among them are those with opportunities and water provision and insecurity HIV/AIDS and/or TB that have no chance of due to violent juvenile crimes were also appropriate treatment; those with serious highlighted. These households invested in risk physical disabilities, orphans and child-headed reduction and on average spent 9 percent of their households; and those with no housing, including construction workers and children of the street. 131 Stephens, C, R Patnaik and S Lewin (1996) This is Their vulnerability is usually related both to My Beautiful Home: Risk Perceptions towards Flooding and Environment in Low-income Urban Communities: A Case Study in Indore, India, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 51 pages. For more details, see 130 See for instance Bartlett, Sheridan et al., (1999), Annex Box 7; also Annex Box 8 for details of Cities for Children: Children's Rights, Poverty and Urban adaptation to coped with floods in selected African Management, Earthscan, London, 305 pages. cities.

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incomes doing so. Many took measures to lower ignored; governments refusing to risks, such as diversifying their livelihoods or provide infrastructure to illegal having assets that were easily sold if a disaster settlements). occurred. Remittances from family members • An inability to perceive the problem working abroad were important for many (national agencies responsible for families, especially in providing support for disasters having a perception of disasters recovery after a disaster. But a complex range of as being rural and related to famine and issues limits their effectiveness, including the drought, whilst urban authorities do not individualistic nature of households’ investments, see preventing disasters as their the lack of representative community responsibility). organizations through which to design and • A lack of awareness of the value of the implement settlement-wide measures, and the assets lost by affected poor populations lack of support from government agencies (most (and of their importance to city residents viewed local and national governments economies). as unhelpful or even as a hindrance to their • No local data to demonstrate the extent efforts). Meanwhile, most of the institutions that of the problem (often related to supported social housing and housing finance institutional inadequacies). initiatives – local and international NGOs, • An inability to act and an absence of government agencies – did not consider risk structures to address the problem (for reduction. Although their programmes usually instance, local government being supported safer houses that reduced risks in the responsible for providing the event of a disaster, they did nothing to support infrastructure that should greatly reduce insurance or to enhance family or community risks but having a very small proportion capacity for recovery. There was a need to of total government funding). support a capacity to work collectively so each • An absence of political channels to household’s individual efforts contributed to allow vulnerable communities to community-wide risk reduction; also a need for demand action to reduce unacceptable local governments they could trust and often levels of risk. good professional advice on the cheapest ways to secure and protect homes.132 In addition to these, a critical constraining factor is found in the international and national Conclusions funding streams that provide a perverse The last 20 years have brought lots of lesson- incentive. Money is readily available for post- learning from disasters, lots of discussion on the disaster relief and reconstruction, but not for risk needed alignment of development and disaster- reduction and development. For example, in prevention/preparedness/response, good Guyana, international finance for the methodologies for identifying and assessing risks, maintenance of sea walls has been hard to come and good evidence for cost-savings from advance by and funding for incremental improvements is preparedness for potential disaster events. There similarly difficult. But following breaches in the is a need to understand why these are not more sea walls, funding is made available. effective at influencing policy and action. Why don’t governments act to reduce risk from Why don’t low-income communities act to extreme-weather events? reduce risk? • A conscious decision to ignore the • Dangerous sites are often the only places settlements most at risk (informal they can live and still access livelihood settlements and their inhabitants’ needs opportunities. • The infrastructure needed to reduce 132 Wamsler, Christine (2007), "Bridging the gaps: risks is expensive; in illegal settlements, stakeholder-based strategies for risk reduction and the inhabitants are unwilling to invest financing for the urban poor", Environment and in infrastructure because of the risk of Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 115-142. being evicted.

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• Failure to perceive how serious disaster • Acting to reduce risk often requires risk is until a disaster event occurs. actions undertaken in collaboration • Disasters (e.g., flooding) occur so regularly with many different agencies; funders that communities become accustomed to like simple, discrete projects, so it is living with risk rather than seeking to difficult to get funding for risk-reduction limit their scale and impact. projects which are cross-disciplinary, • Constraints on being able to act involving many agencies and integrating effectively (e.g., difficulty in getting many components (what are often agreement on action within a settlement referred to disparagingly by or in raising the funds needed to act international agencies as ‘Christmas tree effectively; or too many other pressures). projects’ because they have so many • The difficulties in getting support from different components). government (often related to weak local • Effective risk reduction strategies have governments, or unaccountable and to be locally determined, but official undemocratic governments on which it is development assistance agencies work difficult to apply pressure for support). primarily through national • National and local political structures that governments; such strategies often create incoherent and poorly coordinated involve long-term processes whose funding systems, from which it is difficult effectiveness may be hard to to get funding for coordinated, long-term demonstrate (for instance, it is difficult programmes. to prove how many lives have been saved or livelihoods protected by risk- Even after disasters, risk reduction is often reduction measures when an extreme ineffective. In reconstruction, external support weather event happens). may be readily available but with constraints. • Each international agency has its own Humanitarian agencies do not have programmes, criteria for allocating developmental skills or approaches that support funding, and project cycles (which helps and encourage local participation, leading to explain the poor integration among ineffective and inappropriate investments. them).134 Funding budgets from donors often have to be spent in a short time period, usually within 12 IV. Identifying Innovative Local/City months, and may be available to support longer- Adaptations To Climate Change term development processes. Start with what you have, build on what you know Why don’t international agencies act to reduce In the literature on climate change, adaptive risk? capacity is the potential of a system or population • Most international agencies deliberately to modify its features/behaviour so as to better avoid urban initiatives, usually justified by cope with existing and anticipated stresses.135 So questionable assumptions about the adaptation is about enhancing resilience or relative scales of urban and rural reducing people’s vulnerabilities to observed or poverty.133 • Many international agencies leave disaster management to other specialist disaster agencies or have weak links between their 134 The Paris accord is meant to address this but it does disaster departments and development nothing to encourage international funding aencies’ departments (with those budgets kept engagement with or support for local governments; see separate). Satterthwaite, David (2005), Meeting the MDGs in urban areas; the forgotten role of local organizations, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 2, pages 87- 133 Satterthwaite (2001) and Tannerfeldt and Ljung 112, and Crespin (2006), op. cit. (2006), op. cit. 135 McCarthy et al. (2001), Adger et al. (2004).

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expected changes in climate.136 Development local governments and so spur them to should increase adaptive capacity and reduce the appropriate action. vulnerability of low-income groups. Adaptive capacity will influence adaptation (the actual A distinction is usually made between adjustments made) although high adaptive autonomous adaptation and planned or ‘policy- capacity does not necessary translate into driven’ adaptation; see Table 2. Also between measures that reduce vulnerability. short-run and long-run responses (which in discussions of development and of disaster Discussions for urban areas highlight that those preparedness might be termed ‘coping’ and who have to adapt include governments, ‘adaptation’, although in other places, these are enterprises and households. Government synonymous). There is also the distinction agencies, and especially local government, are between reactive and anticipatory adaptation138, the most important for shaping the operating the former taking place in response to an extreme environment that influences the capacity for event, the latter being undertaken before a households and businesses to build adaptive perceived risk materialises. capacity and undertake adaptive action. In most urban centres in low- and middle-income nations, community organizations and local NGOs also have considerable importance in this, especially where they are influential in the construction and management of homes and neighbourhoods and in the provision of services within the informal or illegal settlements where government agencies provide limited infrastructure or services.

Adaptation is all about the quality of local knowledge and of local capacity and willingness to act by these groups;137 as described later, some of the most effective pro-poor actions to reduce vulnerabilities also come from partnerships among these groups, especially local government and community organizations. Most aspects of development increase adaptive capacity because they also increase local knowledge and local capacity to act. Successful development should also increase the incomes and asset bases of poorer groups and improve their health, which in turn increases their capacity to act to reduce their vulnerability. Development should also increase poorer groups’ capacity to influence

136 Adger, W.N., S.Agrawala, M. Mirza, C. Conde, K. O’Brien, J. Pulhin, R. Pulwarty, B. Smit, K. Takahashi, et al. (2007), Chapter 17: Assessment of Adaptation Practices, Options, Constraints and Capacity, IPCC WGII Fourth Assessment Report. 138 Bosello, Francesco, Kuik, Onno, Tol, Richard, and 137 Of course, this depends on the powers and supports Watiss, Paul (2007), Costs of Adaptation to Climate provided by higher levels of government and Change: A Review of Assessment Studies with a Focus on international agencies – as discussed in V. Methodologies Used, Ecologic, Berlin, 112 pages.

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Table 2: Examples of adaptation in practice Type of response Autonomous (by households, Policy-driven to climate change communities and firms) Short-run • Making short-run • Developing greater understanding of adjustments, e.g., reduce climate risks and vulnerabilities water use, spread the risk of • Improving emergency response loss through insurance Long-run • Investing in climate • Create or modify major infrastructure, resilience (much encouraged e.g., larger reservoir storage, increased if future effects are relatively drainage capacity, higher sea-walls well understood and benefits • Avoiding negative impacts, such as are easy to capture for land use planning to restrict household, community- developments in floodplains/at-risk organization or firm) coastal sites SOURCE: Based on Table 18.1 in Stern, Nicholas (2007), The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 692 pages.

From a temporal perspective, adaptation to change risks (again in ways that do not impose climate risks can be viewed at three levels, additional costs that are unaffordable). It is also including responses to current variability (which ensuring that planning and public sector reflect learning from past adaptations to investment decisions take account of climate historical climates), observed medium and long- change.140 To be effective, this has to not only term trends in climate; and anticipatory planning reduce the vulnerability of urban dwellers and in response to model-based scenarios of long- infrastructure, but also address the factors that term climate change. The responses across the generate both vulnerability and poverty without three levels are often intertwined, and might undermining mitigation.141 form a continuum.139 The lack of locally relevant information on climate variability and trends in It is also important to note the costs of nations is obviously a huge constraint on adaptation and the limits. Note the wording that adaptation. adaptation is to ‘better cope’ with stresses; it does not imply that adaptation allows avoidance of all Governments should have key roles in costs. While there are important adaptation in what they do and invest in, and in complementarities between good development what they encourage and support in adaptation and adaptation to climate-change risks, most by individuals, households, community adaptation implies opportunity costs, even if organizations and private enterprises. They there are often good cost-benefit ratios. In should ensure an appropriate and widely addition, although adaptation ‘can mute the understood information base about climate impacts of climate change, it cannot by itself change and its local impacts to encourage solve the problems posed by high and rapidly autonomous adaptation. Governments’ role is increasing temperatures. Even for relatively low also to establish the planning and regulatory amounts of warming, there are natural and framework to ensure effective land use planning technical constraints to adaptation – as is made (avoiding high-risk areas which as stressed earlier vividly clear in low-lying coastal regions. also means ensuring low-income groups can find Equally, without strong and early mitigation, the land for housing that they can afford that is not on a dangerous site), and to ensure that buildings and infrastructure take account of climate-

140 Adapted from Stern (2007), op. cit. 139 Adger, Agrawala, Mirza et al. (2007), op. cit. 141 Adger, Agrawala, Mirza et al. (2007), op. cit.

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physical limits to – and costs of – adaptation will and public authorities’.145 The extra costs of grow rapidly’.142 insurance can act as a disincentive for households or enterprises taking risks; for Perhaps more worryingly, adaptation depends on instance, building on high flood risk areas. much increased local competence and capacity Governments needed to set in place policies that and willingness to act by city and municipal provide individuals and firms with better governments, but official bilateral aid agencies information about climate change and a better and multilateral development banks were not set regulatory framework to help markets stimulate up to support this. Their whole structure and adaptation.146 mode of providing grants, soft loans (with grant elements) or non-concessional loans were never Particular challenges include the risks of adverse designed to support the kinds of pro-poor local selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is development that is central to good adaptation when only those who are certain, sooner or later, in low and middle-income nations. In part, this to suffer loss purchase insurance. For example, is the legacy of the 1950s conception of only those on floodplains buy flood insurance development assistance, which centred on capital and this works against the spreading of risk over a to help national governments invest in large population (as with fire insurance). Moral productive activities and infrastructure supported hazard is when insurance unintentionally by expert foreign technical assistance. Although encourages more risk taking (when those with the understanding of how international agencies insurance make less effort to avoid risk).147 can support development has changed greatly since the 1950s, the basic structure of how funds One area of growing interest is the use of are transferred from official donors to recipient insurance as a means of spreading and reducing national governments has changed much less. the losses from climate-related events for those This is a point to which the paper returns in who would not normally be considered as Section V. potential policy holders: low-income households and small businesses in low- and middle-income Financial systems that encourage adaptation countries.148 There is also an interest in the There is a long history of driving risk potential for public/private partnerships between management through pricing risk, providing governments and insurance companies to help incentives to reduce risk, and imposing risk- related terms on policies.143 Insurance can spread risks and reduce the financial hardships faced by 145 Adger, Agrawala, Mirza et al. (2007), op. cit. individuals and enterprises linked to extreme quoting Mills, E. and Lecomte, E. (2006): From Risk to events; it can also provide them with incentives Opportunity: How Insurers Can Proactively and for adaptation and risk reduction.144 ‘To increase Profitably Manage Climate Change. Ceres, Boston, 42 their capacity in facing climate variability and pages; CEA (2006), Climate Change and Natural change, insurers have developed more Events – Insurers contribute to face the challenges; comprehensive or accessible information tools’ Comité Européen des Assurances, Paris, France, 27 such as risk-assessment tools and ‘have fostered pages; ABI (2004), A Changing Climate for Insurance risk prevention through implementing and – A Summary Report for Chief Executives and Policymakers, Association of British Insurers, London strengthening building standards, planning risk 20 pp. prevention measures, and developing best 146 Stern (2007), op. cit. practices and raising awareness of policyholders 147 Burton, I. (2006) Climate change insurance, Tiempo: a Bulletin on Climate and Development, No; 58: 26. 142 Stern (2007), op. cit. page 469. 148 Mechler, R., Linnerooth-Bayer, J. and Peppiatt, D. 143 Kovacs, P. (2006): Hope for the best and prepare for (2006). Disaster Insurance for the Poor? A Review of the worst: how Canada’s insurers stay a step ahead of Microinsurance for Natural Disaster Risks in Developing climate change, Policy Options, Dec/Jan, pages 53–56. Countries. Provention Consortium, 144 Adger, Agrawala, Mirza et al. (2007), op. cit Switzerland/IIASA, Austria.

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realize this. This is important in view of the for infrastructure and services (including water, failure of purely market-driven processes to sanitation and drainage).151 provide adequate insurance at affordable rates. The use of private insurance is far lower in low- Micro-finance is another way of providing low- and middle-income countries than in high income groups with more control over their income countries.149 For example, only 150,000 finances and it can help poor people cope with houses out of 16 million (less than 1 percent) climate change impacts. It has been used to good had disaster insurance coverage in Mexico in effect by the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, 1998. The rate of insurance coverage for the whose pioneering use of group lending contracts Venezuela floods in 1999 only amounted for 1.4 with joint liability has reduced the problems of percent of total losses.150 As highlighted by moral hazard and adverse selection where events such as 2005 Hurricane Stan in Mexico households are too poor to offer collateral. But and Guatemala, individuals bear most of the cost group lending contracts will fall apart if everyone and manage it through the solidarity of family experiences the same crisis, so government and other networks, if at all. Some exploratory underwriting is necessary for them to be of any insurance schemes have been initiated in India use in the face of climate-change-related and Ethiopia, and the Bangladesh National disasters. There are also dangers in overstating Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) the value of micro-finance. Low-income groups included micro-insurance as a priority project, have very limited capacities to save and to pay but experience so far is insufficient to warrant and all loan schemes have dangers of locking large-scale deployment of insurance as a means of them into debt burdens they find hard or supporting adaptation to climate change. impossible to manage. It works best when it finances something that directly increases Another area of interest is in learning from income (micro-enterprise loans) or directly measures that low-income groups already employ reduces expenditures (in some circumstances, to spread risk and reduce their vulnerability. For better, safer housing with formal services can do instance, community-managed savings groups are so). very common in urban areas, although they take many forms. These typically allow their members Urban management/governance to have access to funds for sudden expenditures Those of us who live in cities in high-income like school fees or shocks from pooled savings. nations take for granted a range of local These can develop into larger networks of organizations that have importance for savings groups, which not only spreads the risks protecting us from environmental hazards and but also expands and extends the scope of what disasters, for resilience to potential disasters, and can be funded, and what can be negotiated from for adaptation. Virtually all urban centres in governments. Perhaps the best-known urban high-income nations have high adaptive examples are the federations of savings groups by capacity; virtually all their populations also have those living in slums or informal settlements. infrastructure and services that protect them These are active in fifteen nations and they are engaged not only in community-managed risk 151 management but also in many initiatives to Patel, Sheela, Burra, Sundar and D’Cruz, Celine improve housing and infrastructure including (2001), Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI); foundations to treetops, Environment and Urbanization, slum and squatter upgrading, to secure land Vol 13, No 2, pages 45-59; D'Cruz, Celine and tenure, to develop new housing that low-income Satterthwaite, David (2005), Building Homes, changing households can afford, and to improve provision official approaches: The work of Urban Poor Federations and their contributions to meeting the Millennium Development Goals in urban areas, Working Paper 16, 149 Wilbanks, Romero-Lankao et al. (2007), op. cit. IIED, London, 80 pages; Mitlin, Diana and 150 Charvériat C. (2000), Natural Disasters in Latin Satterthwaite, David (2007), Strategies for grassroots America and the Caribbean: an Overview of Risk, Inter- control of international aid, Environment and American Development Bank, Washington, D.C. Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 2.

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from environmental hazards (universal provision Most city and municipal governments have for safe, sufficient piped water supplies, provision almost no investment capacity, so the backlogs in for sewers and drains, all-weather roads, provision of infrastructure and services are still electricity) or help them cope when illness or growing. Most have political structures that have injury occurs (health care, emergency services). limited or no accountability to their citizens, Compared to virtually all cities in low-income especially the lower income groups who are most nations and most in middle-income nations, vulnerable to most external stressors. Many have existing buildings and infrastructure have been governments that actually increase the built and maintained to higher standards of vulnerability of most of their lower-income resilience. The powers and resources available to citizens. It is difficult to conceive of a city city governments are also much larger. And such government that is currently refusing to provide governments are held accountable through being half its population with basic infrastructure and supervised by elected politicians. Whatever the services and busily undertaking large forced limits and examples of government failures, there eviction programmes (so often justified by ‘city is much greater adaptation capacity. development’) as a government likely to invest in appropriate adaptation. Table 3 illustrates Earlier sections outlined the lack of adaptive how the competence and capacity of local capacity and the very large backlogs in provision governments influence what is possible and what for infrastructure and services in most urban local adaptation processes should get external centres in low- and middle-income nations. support.

Table 3: The different local contexts through which national governments and international agencies can pursue good governance for adaptation The quality of local government/governance Resources available From democratic and accountable local ... to undemocratic, to local government government structures … unaccountable and often clientelist local government Relatively well Local government can be the channel Long-term support needed for resourced, local through which external funding is governance reforms at all levels government channelled, including funding to support of government; also support institutions with the adaptation by households and private needed for local private and needed technical enterprises, funding for needed community provision both to competence infrastructure and support services (whether improve conditions and to build provided by community organizations, local pressure on government for NGOs, private enterprises or government better governance agencies) Poorly resourced Need for a strong focus on capacity building As above but with strong support local governments for local government and support for its for local private providers and lacking funding, a partnerships with civil society and local community provision within a strong local revenue private sector infrastructure and service long-term goal of supporting base and technical providers (including informal providers) more competent, accountable capacity and transparent local government

Innovations in Durban and other cities with more details in Annex Box 9).152 This is One of the most interesting innovations is the adaptation plans and processes in Durban, one of South Africa’s main cities (summarized below 152 This is based on notes and materials provided by Debra Roberts, deputy head of the Environmental Management Department at eThekwini Municipality. This includes drawing from a report that she

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not to pretend that this is a model. As the author Manizales was facing high rates of population of the background paper on which this drew growth and environmental degradation during notes, it is difficult for those in government with the last decades. Lacking the resources to buy responsibility for environmental management to into the official land market, the poor get and keep the attention of all the key sectors increasingly settled spontaneously or bought land within the city government on adaptation. But from illegal developers in areas at risk from floods it is an example of the kinds of local processes and landslides. From the 1990s, local authorities, that are needed to underpin adaptation. The city universities, NGOs, and communities worked has a programme considering future climate together to develop programs aimed not only at impacts with three phases: reducing risks, but also at improving the living 1. Reviewing and developing an standards of the poor and at protecting and understanding of global and regional regenerating fragile ecological areas. Households climate change science and translating were moved off the most dangerous sites but this into an understanding of the rehoused nearby and most such sites were implications of climate change for Durban. converted into eco-parks with strong 2. Developing a Headline Climate Change environmental education components. This was Adaptation Strategy for the city to part of a larger programme to improve highlight how key sectors within the environmental quality and make resource use municipality should begin responding to more sustainable in ways that engaged and unavoidable climate change. worked with citizens and community 3. Incorporating climate change into long- organizations.153 term city planning, which includes developing a model that will enable the The inhabitants of Ilo and seven consecutive simulation, evaluation and comparison of terms of democratic mayors engaged in the strategic urban development plans within process of creating community management the context of climate change. This seeks committees to collectively improve the living to develop a greater understanding of the conditions of the population and the quality of effects of climate change in Durban and the environment. These improved living allow a model-based assessment of the conditions in such areas as water, sanitation, effectiveness of alternative strategic electricity, waste collection and public space. approaches to mitigation and adaptation. Ilo’s population increased fivefold from 1960 to 2000. Yet, no land invasion or occupation of risk- There are other good examples of city prone areas by poor groups looking for housing governments taking steps to reduce vulnerability. has taken place, because local authorities Two that deserve attention are the cities of implemented programs (e.g., acquisition of an Manizales in Colombia and Ilo in Peru because urban expansion area) to accommodate Ilo’s they acted on one of the most difficult issues: to growth and to support the poor in getting decent avoid rapidly growing low-income populations housing.154 settling on dangerous sites, including those that will be most at risk from any increase in the 153 frequency or intensity of extreme weather events. Velasquez, Luz Stella (1998), Agenda 21; a form of joint environmental management in Manizales, Neither of these was driven by climate-change Colombia, Environment and Urbanization, Vol.10, No. considerations, but they illustrate the kind of 2, pages 9-36; Velásquez, Luz Stella (2005), The pro-poor adaptive capacity that is needed. Bioplan: Decreasing poverty in Manizales, Colombia, through shared environmental management, in Bass, commissioned: Hounsome, Rob and Kogi Iyer (2006), Steve, Reid, Hannah, Satterthwaite, David and Steele, eThekwini Municipality; Climatic Future for Durban Paul (eds.), Reducing Poverty and Sustaining the Phase II: Headline Climate Change Adaptation Environment, Earthscan Publications, London, pages Strategy, Final Report, prepared at the request of the 44-72. Environmental Management Deartment, eThekwini 154 Díaz Palacios, Julio and Miranda, Liliana (2005), Municipality, CSIR, Congrelli, 45 pages. Concertación (reaching agreement) and planning for

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found. However, the examples given above of A recent paper outlined the justification for the Durban and Cape Town show the kind of local city of Cape Town developing a Municipal discussion and research that provide the basis for Adaptation Plan and what this should entail.155 doing so. The city is at risk from projected climate-induced warming and changes in rainfall variability, Most fields of infrastructure management already which increases the need to adapt city-level incorporate measures to cope with climate operations to current climate variability and variability and extreme events including water, future climate change. To date, the main focus of sanitation, transport and energy management. adaptation planning in South Africa has been at Adaptation to climate change will typically the national level, and has not adequately involve increases in reserve margins and other addressed municipal-scale adaptation. types of back-up capacity and attention to system designs that allow adaptation and modifications Other examples can be given of improved without major redesigns and that can handle competence, capacity and accountability within more extreme conditions for operations.157 But it city and municipal governments, which almost is difficult to formulate these for any city without by definition increase adaptation capacity and a clear idea of current trends and likely future increase the possibilities of being ‘pro-poor’: for impacts. instance, the environmental and social programmes in Porto Alegre and many other Planning for such adaptation faces very large Brazilian cities and the importance within these infrastructure deficits. The poor quality of of participatory budgeting.156 However, such infrastructure and the lack of maintenance examples are mainly from middle-income nations characteristic of so many low- and middle- and usually in nations with important advances income nations are key determinants of dams in stronger local democracies and less anti-poor failing, and public hospitals, schools, bridges and attitudes among those in government. It is also highways collapsing during or after extreme difficult to get city governments to recognize the weather events. There are complex issues of need for action on adaptation (see Annex Box 10 quality control and accountability for public for case studies of this in Buenos Aires, Sante Fe works, such as the lack of transparency in and Mexico City). procurement, which frequently leads to corruption and poor quality work. Infrastructure adaptation and investment Decentralization has often transferred This section discusses what has been done and responsibility for infrastructure maintenance to what could be done in infrastructure adaptation; local authorities, but not the resources and the funding needed to support this is discussed in capacities to fulfil this. The collapse or damage to Section V. It had been hoped that examples buildings and infrastructure obviously increases would be found of city case-studies that discussed the indirect costs of climate disasters by the kinds of investment patterns needed for paralyzing economic activities and increasing adaptation, in the context of different IPCC reconstruction costs.158 The background paper climate-change scenarios, but no examples were on India outlined intervention priorities to reduce climate-change-related risks for urban areas159 that have relevance for all urban areas: sustainable development in Ilo, Peru, in Bass, Reid, Satterthwaite et al. op. cit, pages 254-278. 155 Mukheibir, Pierre and Ziervogel, Gina (2007), Building Retrofitting and Strengthening: A Developing a Municipal Adaptation Plan (MAP) for large proportion of a typical Indian city’s building climate change: the city of Cape Town, Environment stock is aged, dilapidated and partially and Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 143-158. 156 Menegat (2002), op. cit; Cabannes, Yves (2004), Participatory budgeting: a significant contribution to 157 Wilbanks, Romero-Lankao et al. (2007), op. cit. participatory democracy, Environment and 158 Charvériat (2000), op. cit. page 85. Urbanization, Vol. 16, No. 1, pages 27-46. 159 Revi (2007), op. cit.

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engineered, implying that they do not meet challenge which needs to be explored through a contemporary standards of building safety. series of pilot projects in different cities with Technical measures to strengthen and retrofit varying ecological systems. these buildings are well known, but have never been implemented at city scale. This would Upgrading slums and squatter settlements require considerable institutional and financial Perhaps the most important experiences in innovation and a well-thought-out set of making poorer groups less vulnerable to climate incentives and regulatory mechanisms to make it change in cities are those that have successfully possible. improved housing conditions, infrastructure and services within low-income settlements. There is Lifeline Infrastructure Strengthening: Building a 40-year experience with upgrading slums and the energy, water, wastewater, transportation, informal settlements, and although the extent of telecom and IT infrastructure for large cities success is very varied, where it works, it certainly typically takes many decades. Given current reduces poorer groups’ vulnerabilities to growth trends, this will happen in many Indian flooding/extreme weather. Many city million-cities over the next two decades. governments support ‘slum and squatter’ Appropriate climate-change-related risk upgrading; see for instance the large programme reduction measures are rarely integrated into the for this in Sao Paulo and in Rio de Janeiro. In design of these systems. Since they involve lumpy some nations, cities’ programmes receive investments and require massive annual considerable support from national government; expenditures on operations and maintenance, as in the Baan Mankong (secure tenure) adequate attention to least lifecycle risk-adjusted programme in Thailand, supported by the Thai costs, need to be made. Some services are best government’s Community Organizations provided by public providers in an appropriate Development Institute,160 and in the PRODEL regulatory frame, others, given quantum leaps in programme in Nicaragua.161 [This is a topic technology and distributed network covered in detail in Diana Mitlin’s background development, are better managed privately. paper]. Appropriate forms of regulation and management to reduce climate risk are yet to be Community-based adaptation162 conceptualized. The best upgrading programmes can be seen as good examples of community-based adaptation; Hazard Modification: A number of pre-colonial they may focus on addressing everyday hazards and colonial surge and flood protection systems and protection against extreme weather, but have been in operation in various parts of India. addressing climate change is often simply an The rapid pace of urban development has often extension to this. They are also a reminder of made these dysfunctional or irrelevant. Repairing how vulnerability to all environmental hazards is and strengthening strategic flood, storm surge strongly influenced by the adaptive capacities of and coastal defences are important city-level those exposed to them. The new enthusiasm to interventions. Detailed economic, social and map climate-change vulnerabilities sometimes environmental cost-benefit analysis are needed to assess whether these investments are 160 Boonyabancha, Somsook (2005), Baan Mankong; appropriate vis-à-vis relocation and other going to scale with 'slum' and squatter upgrading in adaptation options. Water-use efficiency and Thailand, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 17, No. conservation measures are the best strategic 1, pages 21-46. defence against drought on the demand side, 161 Stein, Alfredo (2001), Participation and apart from appropriate water management. sustainability in social projects: the experience of the Enabling the conceptualization and Local Development Programme (PRODEL) in implementation of institutional and technical Nicaragua, Environment and Urbanization, Vol 13, No regimes that can enable both vulnerability 1, pages 11-35. reduction and hazard modification to be 162 Jones, R. (2007) Community-based adaptation, implemented where needed, is a significant Tiempo 64 (forthcoming).

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forgets this. In many instances, adaptive capacity on a long and varied experience with the is a stronger determinant of the distribution of use of participatory tools and methods in vulnerability to climate change than differences urban and rural areas).164 in biophysical responses; for instance, in water • CBA should help development and resources, coastal areas or human health. disaster experts who are trying to learn more about incorporating climate In recent years, more attention has been paid to adaptation into their own activities; but community-based adaptation to climate change. this will need some work on shared But there is also uncertainty about its potential. concepts and languages as these differ How does this fit in with other, more established across climate adaptation, development development activities (such as community- and disaster discourses. based development and disaster planning) that • There is a need for action-oriented have track records and their own ways of research that investigates CBA at all working? What makes it different from other levels – and that considers its limitations forms of adaptation and what is particular to as well as its strengths. In urban areas, urban areas’ potentials and limitations? community-driven development can often install or improve infrastructure and Over the course of a workshop,163 agreement was buildings within the settlement; but this reached on a number of points: usually needs support from citywide trunk • CBA is generally applied in vulnerable infrastructure (roads, power supplies, water communities but it can be applied in any and sewer mains, main drains), which they community. cannot install. • CBA is about the community making choices, not having them imposed from As with the experience in the use of participatory above. It should enhance the choices tools and methods within development, care is available in present or future action. needed to ensure everyone’s involvement and • Adaptation responds to climate risks engagement. Experience to date suggests three assessed in a developmental framework, important stages for any CBA: (1) focus on rather than to ‘dangerous’ anthropogenic addressing current climate risks within a climate change as defined by the UN development context; (2) monitor progress and Framework Convention on Climate look outward; and (3) assess future development Change. options under climate change. These offer • Change processes such as environmental communities the opportunity to explore degradation, poor governance or loss of adaptation possibilities under different access to land and resources often development approaches. Many political, exacerbate risks faced by communities financial and social barriers will hamper this from climate-related causes. process. These barriers need close examination, • CBA should complement community- as do the strategies and mechanisms for based development and community- addressing them. One key element of CBA is focused disaster risk reduction, and draw that of improving the capacity of individuals and tools and methods from them. A wide communities to make choices about their own range of tools can be used creatively for futures. In many instances, this will involve communication within projects, including difficult decisions – for instance having to move drama, video, multimedia, intermediate – making all the more important that they technology, art and storytelling (drawing should be fully engaged in choices about where to move, when to move, and how the move should 163 The Second International CBA Workshop in be managed. Annex Box 11 has a case study of Dhaka was an initiative of the Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies, the International Institute for Environment and Development and the Regional and International Networking Group. 164 See various issues of PLA Notes.

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community-based adaptation in Cavite city in coordinates disaster-response activities in the 17 the Philippines. cities and municipalities comprising Metro Manila and still has a strong focus on the Disaster risk reduction planning emergency side. There is some experience to draw on from cities that have integrated disaster risk reduction into The Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative their development plans. For instance, in reviewed disaster risk management practices in Caracas, where large sections of the population seven cities (Bogotá, Istanbul, Kathmandu, live on slopes at risk of landslides, there is a long- Manila, Mumbai, Quito and Tehran). In all established programme, identifying which areas cities, considerable effort had been expended on and settlements are at risk and acting to reduce risk analysis; but far too little attention had been these risks.165 All cities need well-conceived given to acting on this. Generally, construction disaster risk management plans, both to reduce codes, standards and regulations were up-to-date disaster risk and to have in place appropriate but not the mechanisms to ensure compliance responses when they occur. Such plans should be and code enforcement. This requires political undertaken as an integral element of commitment, funding, professional capacity and development (mainstreaming risk reduction in buy-in from households and civil society to urban development decisions) and to tackle risk overcome resistance of the construction sector that has accumulated during the city’s growth and building owners. This is a major challenge (retrofitting houses, improving critical to the effectiveness of urban disaster- infrastructure). All provide opportunities and an management planning.167 institutional and organisational framework for integrating adaptation to climate change into It has been suggested that after large disasters, a urban planning. window of opportunity opens for political will for reform of urban planning systems and budgets. In some cities (such as Istanbul with its But there is little evidence to show that disaster Metropolitan Municipality’s Disaster preparedness and risk reduction become Coordination Center) disaster risk reduction institutionalised. All too often, the next planning has been possible as development development challenge or political agenda professionals are more used to considering risk replaces disaster risk reduction and the management measures. Here the challenge has opportunity is lost. After Hurricane Mitch, there been to bring together professionals, techniques was progress in introducing new legislation, but and priorities from engineering and social urban concerns were not fully addressed, development. In Cape Town, legislative especially the links between disaster management arrangements require local disaster risk and urban management, so urban planning was management plans but progress has been slow. not contributing to its potential in risk Here not development planners but emergency reduction.168 planners have responsibility for planning and implementing disaster risk reduction and they In many cities, civil society may be more feel uneasy, venturing into areas for which they receptive than local government to disaster risk 166 have little expertise. In Manila, the Metro Manila Disaster Coordination Council 167 Fernandez, J., Bendimerad, F., Mattingly, S. and Buika, J. (no date) Comparative Analysis of Disaster Risk 165 Jimenez Diaz, Virginia (1992), Landslides in the Management Practices in Seven Megacities, Earthquakes squatter settlements of Caracas; towards a better and Megacities Initiative, understanding of causative factors, Environment and http://emi.pdc.org/DRMlibrary/General/Comparative- Urbanization, Vol. 4, No 2, pages 80-89. analysis-DRM-in-7-megacities.pdf 166 Pelling, M. and Holloway, A. (2007) Legislation for 168 Gavidia, J. and Crivellari, A. (2006), Legislation as Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction, Tearfund, a vulnerability factor, Open House International, Vol. http://www.tearfund.org/webdocs/website/Campaignin 31, No. 1, pages 84-89, quoted in Chapter 11 of UN g/Policy%20and%20research/DRR%20legislation.pdf Habitat (2007), op. cit.

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reduction. The IPCC WGII noted various identifying specific predicted hazard scenarios examples of where disaster preparedness at the and measuring vulnerability and capacity.171 community level had helped reduce death tolls; for instance through new early warning systems Most vulnerability and capacity assessment work and evacuation procedures (and safe places has been undertaken at the local level. Many identified to which to evacuate); it also noted methodologies exist, most follow similar formats the unevenness in the effectiveness of such rooted in the use of either rapid appraisal and systems in reaching marginal populations. Even participatory methodologies (for instance time- where decentralisation has strengthened the line analysis, focus group discussions, wealth capacities of local government, it is difficult to ranking, transect walks, hazard and vulnerability get cross-department agendas such as disaster risk ranking exercises) or more statistically rigorous reduction working. Specific sectors managed at household surveys. The latter are often used by the local level like water, housing, transport and external agencies to feed into planning for education can be key allies in mainstreaming disaster risk reduction investments. The former disaster risk reduction and indeed may already be are usually initiated by external actors but can undertaking actions that could be described as include a significant element of local control reducing risk.169 But less is known about the including a presumption that any outcomes must development and application of disaster be analysed by local actors who also lead any management plans in smaller urban centers attempts to gain support for subsequent risk where the capacity of local government and civil reduction activities. A good example comes from society is limited. Evidence from the Indian the Dominican Association for Disaster Ocean tsunami suggests that these smaller Mitigation, which has worked with at risk settlements are less likely than larger centres to communities in Santo Domingo and smaller have disaster management plans and that in settlements in the Dominican Republic. This reconstruction citizens and officials will be less association trains local actors to undertake risk prepared and less able to work effectively with assessments and develop proposals for risk external agencies for local benefit. reduction initiatives. Local groups have subsequently had success in attracting Tools and methods government and donor support for local hazard Over the last decade, a number of international mitigation and infrastructure upgrading projects. initiatives and a wide range of local studies have The most important outcome is the enhanced developed tools and methods for identifying, skill and confidence that accrue at the local level mapping and modelling disaster risk, and its through this encounter with a participatory risk components of vulnerability, capacity and assessment methodology.172 hazard.170 These provide a strong base for building assessments of risk to climate change. Upscaling presents a particular challenge for Even if it is difficult to forecast how the local local assessment methods: how to connect local impacts of climate change will be felt in the data collection and planning visions with future, planning for needed adaptive capacity in municipal planning goals and strategies. relation to climate variability can start by Geographic information systems offer some scope for merging different data sources so that local assessments can be layered over citywide 169 Pelling, M. (2007) Making Disaster Risk Reduction Work, ProVention Forum 2007, ProVention 171 For a constantly updated collection and review of Consortium, community risk assessment and climate adaptation http://www.proventionconsortium.org/themes/default/ tools see pdfs/Forum_2007_report.pdf http://www.proventionconsortium.org/?pageid=32&pr 170 Pelling, M. (2006) Measuring vulnerability to urban ojectid=13 natural disaster risk: benchmarks for sustainability, 172 Pelling, M. (2003) The Vulnerability of Cities, Open House International, special edition on managing Eathscan, London and urban disasters, Vol. 31, No. 1, pages 125-132. http://www.desastre.org/home/index.php4?lang=esp

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assessments of vulnerability, capacity and hazard. the Holistic Vulnerability Index (HVI)175 This is useful for ground truthing citywide calculated only in relation to seismic risk. It assessments, which in rapidly expanding cities measures disaster risk as the probability of a loss are difficult and costly to keep updated. A occurring as a consequence of a seismic hazard potential alternative, and more process-oriented with a defined magnitude over a given time. HVI approach, is to build local assessments into includes indicators for physical and social deliberative planning mechanisms such as vulnerability, thus demonstrating to decision- community forums; here the focus is on building makers the need for work on both fronts. The democratic structures in local governance as index has been applied to various districts of much as it is about direct outcomes for risk Bogotá, Colombia, and results were considered in reduction. the preparation of the 2000 Urban Master Plan. Additional tools for comparing risk between One important experience in developing the cities have also been developed by the insurance information base for risk reduction is community- industry, although these focus on insured and managed enumerations and surveys. In many economic risk, and so have only partial relevance cities, federations of slum/shack dwellers and to planning for adaptation to climate change in local NGOs have undertaken large scale cities of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the enumerations and mapping in informal Caribbean. For example, the Munich Re’s settlements to provide the information needed Natural Hazards Risk Index for Megacities, for investment plans in infrastructure and which has been applied to 50 cities, identifies upgrading housing. These are often the first only one mega-city from low- and middle-income surveys, plans and maps produced for these nations, Manila, in its ten cities most exposed to informal settlements, even when such disaster risk.176 settlements have a significant proportion of a city’s population. They have also provided the The background paper on India noted an means by which the residents of these important new method that can help in settlements and their community organizations addressing these concerns: composite risk have engaged with local governments in assessment and mitigation planning. ‘This discussing development plans for their enables a geographically explicit estimation of settlements.173 There is also the experience of the probabilistic hazard risk; vulnerability and the Pakistan NGO, the Orangi Pilot Project imputed composite multi-hazard economic risks. Research and Training Institute which has Risk prioritisation by hazard, element at risk and supported detailed mapping of all informal location can thereafter be undertaken, assisting settlements in Karachi, again providing the basis in creating evidence based investment, regional for determining, designing and implementing and urban development policies and building a infrastructure improvements.174 bridge between public agencies, communities and the private sector’.177 At the city scale, disaster risk assessment methods have been developed. One example is

173 Weru, Jane (2004), Community federations and city upgrading: the work of Pamoja Trust and 175 Carreño, M.L., Cardona, O.D., Barbat, A.H. Muungano in Kenya, Environment and Urbanization, (2007), Urban seismic risk evaluation: a holistic Vol. 16, No. 1, pages 47-62; Patel, Sheela (2004), approach, Journal of Natural Hazards, 40 (1), pages Tools And Methods For Empowerment Developed By 137-172. Slum And Pavement Dwellers’ Federations In India, 176 Munich Re (2004), Megacities-Megarisks: Trends and PLA Notes 50, IIED, London. Challenges for Insurance and Risk Management, Munich 174 Hasan, Arif (2006), Orangi Pilot Project; the Re accessed from expansion of work beyond Orangi and the mapping of http://www.munichre.com/publications/302- informal settlements and infrastructure, Environment 04271_en.pdf and Urbanization, Vol. 18, No. 2, pages 451-480. 177 Revi (2007), op. cit., page 10.

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V. Understanding Scales For Action just a problem in African cities but also a major Getting the needed scale of response constraint on developing appropriate policy to At the risk of over-repetition, it should be clear support adaptation world-wide. In Latin that the largest constraint on getting the needed America, there has been progress in developing scale of response is the incapacity and/or the needed information based at national level – unwillingness of city and municipal governments for instance the increasingly reliable seasonal to act appropriately. If city and municipal climate forecasts to understand and predict the El governments cannot or will not act to greatly Niño and La Niña phenomena.180 Improvements reduce the vulnerability of their low income exist in climate monitoring and remote sensing population to everyday environmental hazards which provide better early warnings on complex and non-climate-change-related disasters and climate-related hazards.181 Different regional address backlogs in infrastructure and service networks have been established to predict provision, they are not likely to act on seasonal climate and climate extremes but this adaptation to climate change. It is also difficult work needs to be extended to support to conceive of how they could do so, if much of development within city governments of local the population within their jurisdiction is not knowledge and capacity. served by infrastructure. This unwillingness or incapacity is not easily acted on. It is National level action underpinned by a great range of factors, most of The Stern report noted that even in high-income which are not easily addressed. This is a point nations, only a handful of governments are that is perhaps still under-appreciated in moving towards implementing adaptation discussions of adaptation. There is still a strong initiatives.182 An initial review of what tendency among climate scientists to see governments in low- and middle-income nations solutions at scale achieved through much- are doing on adaptation produced the following increased, internationally supported investment tentative conclusions: budgets for cities and good technical advice. • Many governments are initiating or sponsoring studies of the likely impacts The different levels where action is needed of climate change, but most are made by While most adaptation in cities needs local natural scientists who lack knowledge, knowledge and capacity, higher levels of capacity and often interest in engaging government have critical roles in ensuring that with impacts on urban areas; this is even city governments have this knowledge and the case in nations where more than 90 capacity – and funding and expertise to draw on percent of the GDP is generated by if needed. One area that needs addressing is the urban-based enterprises and most of the information base to encourage and support population live and work in urban areas. action. The density of weather watch stations in • Many of these studies of climate change Africa is eight times lower than the minimum impacts are funded by international level recommended by the World Meteorological agencies, perhaps diminishing the Organization.178 Many nations are unable even to interest in these from national and monitor the climate, let alone forecast city/local governments? changes;179 the same is also true for most urban • There is an urgent need for locally done centres. There is a similar dearth of systematic studies because local context shapes collection of data on hazard events and impacts vulnerabilities and who is vulnerable from everyday to catastrophic events. This is not and adaptation possibilities. The absence of a strong information base on 178 Washington, R., Harrison, M. and Conway, D. (2004): African Climate Report: A report commissioned by the UK Government to review African climate science, policy and options for action, 180 Magrin et al. (2007), op. cit. December. 181 Adger, Aggarwal, Agrawala et al. (2007). 179 Stern (2007), op. cit. 182 Stern (2007), op. cit.

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what local impacts climate change is negotiations on climate change in recent years, likely to bring inhibits this. but it has yet to become a major policy issue within most governments in low and middle- A review of available literature and specially income nations, especially amongst the LDCs commissioned papers on India, Chile and (which are particularly vulnerable to the adverse Argentina show that many central governments impacts of climate change). More needs to be are beginning to do something about adaptation, done in terms of mainstreaming adaptation but this has yet to engage the interest of the within national policy making processes;186 but larger, more powerful national ministries or perhaps more to the point, unless adaptation is agencies or of city or municipal governments (for seen by national and city governments to be more details, see annex Box 12). The case study complementary to development agendas, it will of Durban is interesting for showing the not get considered. importance of locally generated study of ‘impacts’ rooted in local contexts and possibilities for Another key challenge is ensuring that NAPAs getting the attention of city government. It is don’t just become other policy documents, with also interesting to see the difficulties that those no translation into concrete support for in government working on environmental issues adaptation amongst the world’s poorest and most had in getting the attention of their colleagues; vulnerable communities.187 ‘Countries are already also worth noting is the extent to which recent bombarded with international obligations, which storms in Durban helped sensitise local place considerable strain on already overloaded politicians/civil servants.183 institutions with limited capacity, and which may well lead to duplication of effort and Challenges of drawing up and implementing reduction in policy coherence’.188 national adaptation programmes of action Lessons from NAPAs Key Challenges The Annex has a summary of urban projects The main concern expressed by teams developing within the NAPAs. In general, the projects National Adaptation Programmes of Action identified in the NAPAs submitted to date are of (NAPAs) was how to secure funding for the two types: (1) sector-specific projects, focusing activities they identified. Identifying key on water, agriculture and health; and (2) non- adaptation activities is only the first step to sector specific projects, which generally focus on helping poor countries and communities adapt to broad cross-cutting themes such as information climate change impacts. The teams were also development. Most projects and actions are concerned about how best to mainstream NAPA sector-specific and involve direct investment in projects into national development plans and adaptive actions. In addition to direct strategies.184 ‘At present, the adaptation process investment, building capacity and mainstreaming is generally channelled through the UNFCCC adaptation into planning are considered high focal points, which are normally based in priorities. Relatively few projects are concerned Ministries of the Environment. Such ministries with awareness, information or research. Lacking usually have limited influence with other line from the NAPA portfolio are institutional or 185 ministries and with the Ministry of Finance’.

186 Huq, S. Rahman, A., Konate, M., Sokona, Y. and Adaptation to climate change has become an Reid, H. (2003), Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate important priority in the international Change in Least Developed Countries (LDCs). IIED, London. 183 Roberts (2007), op, cit. 187 Osman-Elasha and Downing (2007), op. cit. 184 Osman-Elasha, B. and Downing, T. (2007), Lessons 188 Dalal-Clayton, B. (2003) The MDGs and Learned in Preparing National Adaptation Programmes of sustainable development: the need for a strategic Action in Eastern and Southern Africa. Unpublished approach. In Satterthwaite, D. (ed.) The Millennium Paper, Stockholm Environment Institute. Development Goals and Local Processes: Hitting the 185 Stern (2007), op. cit. page 498. Target or Missing the Point. IIED, London, pages 73-91.

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structural reform or financial mechanisms. This supporting factors; for instance, good may reflect the NAPA guidelines, which focus infrastructure and services and easy access to on urgent action rather than strategic government (perhaps an important source of development planning. The result is that projects business). These are obviously far more amenable are sectoral in focus without facilitating the to change than businesses (and workforces) that significant structural and institutional reform concentrate in coasts because of port activities, required to mainstream climate change into fishing and coastal tourism, for example. It is national policy and planning. Actions for also likely that insurance coverage will influence reducing conflict and empowering disadvantaged spatial locations for the businesses and communities are also not widely reflected in the homeowners that can afford insurance, as the NAPAs. costs of insurance rises in locations where the frequency and intensity of storms and floods are The NAPA process also contains many inherent increasing or are likely to increase and it may be biases. For example, it places less emphasis on the that insurance coverage will not be available in urban poor than the rural poor, and neglects increasing numbers of coastal locations. vulnerable social groups such as women and refugees.189 The lack of community-based There is also the difference in the speed with adaptation plans may be inherent in the agenda which climate change is changing risk maps and of the line ministries who often lead NAPA the likely speed of adaptation. The speed with projects. And the relative lack of urban projects which city systems change to reflect the new risk reflects the fact that Least Developed Countries map from climate change is likely to be slow, in do not have ministries that focus on urban issues relation to how rapidly this risk map is likely to (and perhaps more fundamental biases against change – especially if no global agreements are in urban initiatives from civil servants and place within the next few years to halt and then international agencies). reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. Partly this is because powerful economic and political Long-term changes in urban centres to reduce interests want to continue attracting new risks investment. Large cities, once developed, acquire So what long-term perspectives can guide a capacity to remain as cities, even as their settlement/urban development away from the economic base declines. There are surprisingly urban centres or urban zones most at risk from few ‘great cities’ from history that aren’t still storms and floods without threatening a nation’s cities, even if their relative importance may have economic success? One of the most important is changed. Did the obvious and well-documented removing a key constraint on new investments risk that New Orleans faced before Katrina cause away from cities on the coast – the weakness of many enterprises to move? New Orleans also local governments in urban centres or zones in faced an additional difficulty in that a high less risky locations. More effective city and proportion of its economic base is related to its municipal governments in urban centres or zones historic and rich culture, which cannot be outside the more risky locations will allow these moved. Venice is at high risk from sea level rise locations to compete for new investments, and and storms, but it cannot be moved. Nor can this has been a factor in developing less city- Alexandria. Many of the sites in coastal cities dominated urban systems in many middle- most at risk from sea-level rise are among the income nations such as Brazil and Mexico. most desirable residential areas and areas for Among the many new economic activities tourism and popular recreation. currently concentrating in coastal locations at risk from storms and sea-level rise, a significant There is also the issue of how the political proportion do not require a coastal location but economy of any city influences what is done and are concentrating there because of other what is likely to be done to reduce risks from climate-change-related impacts. A city as wealthy and successful as Mumbai has the 189 Osman-Elasha and Downing (2007), op. cit. resources that could have done far more to

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reduce risks from flooding (better drains, better garbage collection systems, ensuring poorer Decentralization groups could find land for housing that was not It is difficult to see city governments acquiring on land at high risk from flooding). Why this was the needed competence and capacity to act (and not done needs exploring, perhaps because most to so in ways that benefit poorer groups too) of the risks from flooding are borne by lower- without support from higher levels of income groups. But cities such as Mumbai can government. Brazil provides an interesting invest in protection against floods and sea-level example of a nation where major developments rise in ways that have strong ‘cobenefits’ with have been achieved in an urban reform process, development, improving the homes and since the promulgation of the 1988 Federal neighbourhoods of the millions of low-income Constitution. Developments include the 2001 households. They can greatly reduce risks by City Statute and the creation of the Ministry of ensuring that low-income households can find Cities and the National Council of Cities in and afford housing or land on which they can 2003. While recognizing the limitations in these build in sites less at risk from flooding. Or the innovations and the many issues that still need to city can ensure that its investments do exactly be addressed, this is an important example of a the opposite as informal settlements at risk of national government striving to provide city flooding are bulldozed with no measures taken to governments with the legal and institutional base provide their inhabitants with alternative they need to be more effective and more housing. Or if some provision is made for accountable to their citizens. Without this, it will rehousing, this further impoverishes those forced not be possible to reverse the spatial and social to move as they are dumped in distant locations, exclusion that has characterized most urban far from their sources of livelihoods and social development in Brazil in recent decades. 190 But networks. As the risks facing so many major without this, it will also not be possible for most coastal cities in Africa, Asia, Latin America and city-governments to be effective in reducing risks the Caribbean become evident, one of the associated with climate change in ways that also greatest worries is that this will draw attention benefit poorer groups. and investment away from the unfulfilled development needs. Most city and municipal governments get a very small proportion of the national investment Typical adaptation measures outlined in the budget, relative to the contribution of their background paper on India have a wider urban centres to GDP. For instance, in Peru, the relevance: national government only transfers 5 percent of 1. Relocation of particular settlements the national budget to the 2000 plus local within urban centres out of highly governments.191 In Mexico, there is a very large vulnerable areas, especially the inter- disparity between the fiscal capacity of the tidal zone, riverine and low-lying areas. federal government and of the states and 2. Changes in city economic structure to municipalities; the federal government gets close shift out of sensitive economic activities to three quarters of all tax revenues, while the and changes in systems of governance to states and municipalities get only 4.5 percent.192 enable more rapid response to climate [Lots more detail could be added on this; also on change risk within both the public and the extent to which national governments have the private sector using a mix of decentralized responsibilities to city and planning, market and financial municipal governments for infrastructure and instruments. 3. The relocation of a particular section of a city or the whole city to a new 190 Fernandes, Edesio (2007), Implementing the urban location. This would be unprecedented reform agenda in Brazil, Environment and Urbanization, except for reservoir submergence in Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 177-189. independent India. Hence, it would not 191 Diaz Palacios and Miranda (2003), op. cit. be an economic but a political issue. 192 Romero-Lankao (2007), op. cit.

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services but without the financial base to allow them to.] Adaptation to sea-level rise Adaptation to sea-level rise can include building Costs of adaptation coastal defences, realigning coastal defences by relocation landwards, abandoning coastal areas Introduction that are difficult or expensive to protect, ‘Only a few credible estimates are now available reducing energy of near shore waves and currents of the costs of adaptation in developing (various measures, including beach nourishment, countries, and these are highly speculative. In a offshore barriers, energy converters..) and coastal world of rapid climate change, it is increasingly morphological management; it can also include difficult to extrapolate future impacts from past modifying existing exposed settlements and patterns, so historical records are no longer infrastructure.195 General cost estimates are very reliable guides. Furthermore …, conceptually difficult and vary so much from location to this is a difficult calculation to solve: adaptation location; for instance, it is not possible to is so broad and cross-cutting – affecting extrapolate costs of parts of this eg dike building. economic, social and environmental conditions But many estimates have been made suggesting and vice versa – that it is difficult to attribute that coastal protection is able to reduce costs clearly and separately from those of general substantially the threat imposed by sea level rise development finance. Adaptation should be at a relatively low cost (for 1 metre sea level undertaken at many levels at the same time, rise). Studies showing that coastal adaptation including at the household/community level and could reduce the number of people at risk from many of these initiatives will be self-funded’.193 flooding (i.e. the number of people living in risk areas times the probability of flooding) by almost Even when impacts of climate change are not yet 90 percent at an annual cost of around 0.06% of discernible, scenarios of future impacts may GDP. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate already be of sufficient concern to justify building Change (IPCC) in its Fourth Assessment Report some adaptation responses into planning. In examined adaptation costs but were unable to some cases it could be more cost-effective to come to an aggregate figure for costs of implement adaptation measures early on, adaptation globally. The costs for coastal particularly for infrastructure with long economic protection have been estimated at over US$ life.194 When reviewing available literature, 1000 billion against a 1 metre sea level rise.196 there were various studies suggesting that the But this estimate is acknowledged to be at best cost of adaptation to climate change at least in an informed guess. the next few decades is not very great in relation to nations’ GDP, but this is mostly from wealthy There are some estimates for low- and middle- nations, where there are already the income nations – for instance one study infrastructure, services and good quality building suggested that the cost of coastal protection for a stock to adapt and much greater investment and 1 m sea level rise would range from a minimum of management capacities among local 0.01% of GDP per year in Latin America to a governments. If the cost of removing the backlog maximum of 0.2 percent of GDP per year for on basic infrastructure provision and in China.197 Direct protection costs against a 0.13 strengthening deficient buildings that will be m of sea level rise in 2030 is much smaller – needed for adaptation could be factored in, the costs would increase dramatically. 195 Bosello, Kuik, Tol and Watiss (2007), op. cit. 193 Stern (2007), op. cit. pages 501-502. 196 IPCC (2007); Tol (2002). 194 Shukla, P.R., M. Kapshe, and A. Garg, 2004: 197 Deke, O., Hooss, K. G., Kasten, C., Klepper, G., Development and Climate: Impacts and Adaptation and Springer, K. (2001), Economic Impact of Climate for Infrastructure Assets in India. Change: Simulations with a Regionalized Climate- ENV/EPOC/GS/FD/RD(2004)3/FINAL,OECD, Paris, Economy Model, Kiel Institute of World Economics, 38 pages. Kiel, 1065 pages.

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0.001% in Latin America to 0.035% in India.198 Other studies suggest ‘high levels of coastal There is a need for greater clarity on this. protection’ are possible (for instance more than Economic analyses may suggest that cities such as 70 percent of the threatened coast) but the Dar-es-Salaam or perhaps Montevideo in usefulness of such calculations might be in doubt Uruguay are not viable because of being on the if the 20-30 percent of the coast that is not easily coast and being very vulnerable to flooding/sea protected included most of the major cities. level rise and the investments needed to protect Another study looking at the cost of coastal them from floods/storm surges likely in the next protection, of fixed capital lost and land lost 50 to 100 years are far beyond the likely suggested that a scenario of optimal protection investment capacity. But these cities are so against a sea-level rise of 50 cm by 2100 would central to the current and future development represent 0.1 percent of total expenditures in prospects of these nations and to the well-being 1990 for East Asia, 0.07 percent for South East of large sections of their population; they also Asia and 0.05 percent in ‘the rest of the world’.199 contain most of the asset bases for large sections of the population. And these cities are being However, some other studies suggest that the cost threatened by climate-change to which their of protecting the cities in low and middle income populations contributed very little. These raise nations most at risk from sea level rise ‘is not moral issues to which this paper returns. worth the cost’; for instance, the benefit-cost Similarly, it is no doubt correct to suggest that for ratio for the vulnerable coast-line of Dar es some countries, the efficient level of coastal Salaam in terms of monetized avoided protection can be low or even zero202 but this damage:cost of the intervention for a sea level suggests that there will be very large adaptation rise of 0.3-1 metre was less than 0.2 – whereas for costs or countries with much of their coastal area protecting the coastlines of Poland and Uruguay, beyond any realistic possibility of adaptation – the cities of Tallin and Parnu (in Estonia) and and these are almost always nations which have the Zhujian Delta in China this ratio was contributed and currently contribute very little between 2.6 and 20.200 But Dar es Salaam is to greenhouse gas emissions. These too have central to the economy and future economic moral issues that cannot be buried in aggregate prospects of Tanzania; it is much its largest statistics showing low adaptation costs. In concentration of industry and services and its addition, what appears as a relatively small cost major port and airport. Studies looking at the in relation to a continent’s GDP can hide very economic efficiency of coastal protection large adaptation costs for particular cities.203 suggested that for Senegal, ‘important area protection’ can be a cost efficient strategy- so for Papers discussing the costs of adaptation can Senegal’s current and future development recommend that these should include not only prospects, one hopes that Dakar is within this the direct costs of implementing the adaptation, area; this same study suggested that important but also the costs of enhancing adaptive capacity; area protection would not be cost efficient for for instance, the managerial capacity and services Uruguay or Venezuela.201 that need a greater capacity, and the transition 204 costs. This is correct, but the difficulty is that in many nations, the political possibilities of this 198 Deke, Hooss, Kasten et al. (2001), op. cit. 199 Darwin, R. and R.S.J. Tol (2001), Estimates of The Economic Effects of Sea Level Rise, Environmental and Responses, Journal of Coastal Research, Vol. 14, pages Resource Economics Vol. 19, pages 113-129. 262-284; Volonte, C.R. and Arismendi, J. (1995),Sea 200 Smith, J. B. and Lazo, J. K. (2001), A summary of Level Rise and Venezuela: Potential Impacts and climate change impact assessments from the US Responses, Journal of Coastal Research, Vol. 14, pages Country Studies Programme, Climatic Change Vol. 50, 285-302, quoted in Bosello, Kuik, Tol and Watiss pages 1-29, quoted in Bosello, Kuik, Tol and Watiss (2007), op. cit. 2007. 202 Bosello, Kuik, Tol and Watiss (2007), op. cit. 201 Volonte, C.R. and Nicholls, R.J. (1995), Uruguay 203 Wilbanks, Romero Lankao et al., (2007), op. cit. and Sea Level Rise and: Potential Impacts and 204 Bosello, Kuik, Tol and Watiss (2007), op. cit.

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happening are very limited; this is not just an the cost of adapting new investments to protect issue of costs. them from climate change risks and there will be major impacts that will occur even with Adaptation costs (with a focus on infrastructure adaptation.207 This also takes no account of the and buildings) cost of providing infrastructure to all the Two sources give rather general cost-estimates for locations that have very deficient or no adaptation. The first examines the additional infrastructure. It does not include reducing costs of making new infrastructure and buildings exposure to current climate change risks. Since more resilient to climate change in OECD this is only the cost to governments, donors and countries; this could range between $15 billion to foreign investors of climate-proofing their new $150 billion each year (.05-.5% of GDP) with planned programmes and investments, it higher costs possible with the prospect of higher represents a fraction of the needed measures. temperatures in the future; this assumes that additional costs of 1 to 10% of the total invested There are some estimates for the adaptation costs in construction each year are required to make for certain cities in high-income nations. These new buildings and infrastructure more resilient to are worth reviewing because they suggest that climate change.205 But this is not a methodology cost-estimates based on ‘real adaptation plans’ for that can be applied in most low- and middle- particular cities and localities will produce very income nations. To arrive at such an estimate, different estimates for adaptation costs compared there is a need to know the total investments in to the OECD and World Bank estimates. construction. There is very little data on this in low- and middle-income nations. Even the New Orleans: in the early stages of rebuilding, estimates that exist are likely to be misleading for state officials suggested that the cost of providing two reasons: first, there are the (often very large) the city with protection from a category 5 deficiencies and backlogs in infrastructure hurricane was about $32 billion.208 investments and deficiencies in the building For London, the increased cost of maintaining stock; how can an estimate be arrived at for flood defences over 100 years because of climate adaptation for infrastructure that does not exist? change was estimated at $3 billion to $6 billion Secondly, official construction investment to £3 billion. 209 statistics rarely consider the investments made by Venice: A $2.6 billion scheme to protect the city households and community organizations, even from rising tides is being implemented but the when (as is often the case) these are responsible current design is only able to cope with around for most new housing and most housing 20 cm more of sea level rise.210 improvement. These three cities have basic infrastructure in The second source for general cost estimates place serving all households and businesses and a comes from the World Bank, which has building stock subject to regulations on safety. If estimated the added costs for adaptation to climate change needed for aid flows ($1billion to $4 billion a year), foreign direct investment ($1 figures in Stern and the figures in the original billion to $4 billion a year) and gross domestic document. 207 Stern (2007), op. cit. investment ($2 billion to $30 billion a year). 208 Hallegatte, S. (2006): A cost-benefit analysis of the This means total adaptation finance per year of 206 New Orleans flood protection system, (Regulatory $4 billion to $37 billion. This only includes Analysis 06-02), Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, quoted in Stern (2007), op. cit. 205 Stern (2007), op. cit. 209 Environment Agency (2005): Evidence to the 206 World Bank (2006): Clean Energy & Development: Stern Review on the economics of climate change, Towards an Investment Framework, Annex K, reported in Stern (2007), op. cit. Washington, D.C.: World Bank quoted in Stern 210 Nosengo, N. (2003): Save our city!, Nature, Vol (2007), op. cit. Note some disparities between the 424: pages 608-609, quoted in Stern.

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the adaptation costs for urban centres in low- and need for the international loan.211 In Karachi, middle-income nations needs to include the costs the work of this local NGO (The Orangi-Pilot of remedying their infrastructure deficiencies – Project Research and Training Institute) and of for instance in water supply and sanitation the Urban Resource Centre has highlighted how systems, all weather roads and storm and surface other internationally funded infrastructure drains – the costs are likely to be far higher than projects are generally far more expensive than those implied by the World Bank. There are those funded by local sources. In part, because hundreds of large cities (most on the coast) and banks have little interest in keeping down loan tens of thousands of smaller urban centres facing costs and their functioning depends on large loan basic infrastructure and lacking local portfolios. If the Asian Development Bank governments with the capacity to remedy these proposal for Karachi had been taken as an deficiencies. It is worth recalling the examples of example of needed adaptation, it would imply the major cities with high vulnerability to storms/sea need for very large scale funding by international level rise described in III. agencies. If the initiative finally implemented serves as the example of needed adaptation, it There are estimates available for the cost of needed no external funding – and no loan (and addressing deficiencies in infrastructure and so no loan repayment required from the Pakistan services for all low- and middle-income nations – government). This is not an isolated example; and sometimes these are sufficiently there are many other examples of infrastructure disaggregated to allow some discussion of what investment, service improvement and upgrading proportion might be needed for urban areas (and the building stock that are increasing the one set of estimates was specifically for ‘slums and resilience of cities to climate change in ways that squatter settlements’ in urban areas). These serve poorer groups that are largely or entirely suggest that hundreds of billions of dollars are funded by local sources – typically a mix of needed to address existing deficiencies in individual and household contributions and infrastructure and services. But before presenting government funding. One good example of this these figures, some words of caution are needed. was mentioned already; the nation-wide slum Estimates for the cost of needed infrastructure and squatter upgrading programme in Thailand and building modification and for what role which is almost entirely funded by a combination international development assistance should of government and community and household have vary a lot. This is illustrated by the different resources.212 costings attached to a programme to improve and upgrade sewers and storm drains in Karachi. One Three examples will be given here of estimates set of estimates, prepared by the Asian for addressing different aspects of the backlog in Development Bank suggested a total cost of infrastructure provision (the Annex has more around US$100 million, with $80 million of this details of these). The first is the cost of to be funded by a loan from this bank. A local remedying existing deficiencies in provision for NGO that had been working for 20 years in water, sanitation and drainage. Based on the supporting community-based construction and deficits in provision outlined earlier and management of sewers and drains came up with assuming an average cost per household of an alternative plan that they claimed was not providing water and sanitation is $200-$400 per only far more effective (it built on existing sewers household213 with the total costs for the whole and drainage systems constructed by households and communities rather than seeking to replace 211 Hasan, Arif (1999), Understanding Karachi: Planning them) but also far cheaper. In the end, the local and Reform for the Future, City Press, Karachi, 171 plan was chosen – and implemented, at a fifth of pages; Hasan (2006), op. cit.; Hasan, Arif (2007), The the cost of the original proposal and with no Urban Resource Centre, Karachi, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 275-292. 212 Boonyabancha (2005), op. cit. 213 It is impossible to estimate the real costs because they vary so much from place to place and within each

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system being twice this (for instance to cover Dwellers216 focus specifically on the cost of water abstraction and treatment and trunk upgrading slums and squatter settlements and for infrastructure) and the total cost of remedying building good quality alternatives to these for existing deficits is at least $42 billion. This does expanding urban populations up to 2020. These not include meeting the need of hundreds of are also unusual in that they also consider the millions of new urban dwellers expected in the cost of the supporting infrastructure these would next decade. Obviously, the proportion of this require. This report suggests that the average that could be funded by local and national cost per person for upgrading was US$665 – governments would differ greatly between these although this cost varied considerably by region regions – and between nations. Among some (see Tables in the Annex for more details). This middle-income nations, there are also major estimate included funding for land purchase and improvements in provision that are largely transfer, housing improvement, network funded without external assistance – for instance infrastructure, bulk infrastructure, schools and the expansion in provision in Brazil214 and health clinics, community facilities, planning Mexico.215 There are also good examples of high- and oversight, and community capacity building. quality provision cheaper than $200 per To achieve the Millennium Development Goal household for water and sanitation but these target of significantly improving the lives of 100 rarely include the cost of the trunk infrastructure million slum dwellers, this would cost US$66.5 (the water mains and the trunk drains) which billion. Obviously, if this was to be more these need. ambitious and significantly improve the lives of all slum dwellers, around ten times this amount Reviewing estimates for investment needs per would be needed. Building good quality person for meeting the Millennium Development alternatives to ‘slums’ through assisted self-help Goals in five nations (see Annex Table 5 for housing for 570 million people needs around more details), the additional funding needed to $227 billion. The net conclusion from the remove the backlog in infrastructure in urban above is that several hundred billion dollars areas in low- and middle-income nations would would be required to fill the current deficits in come to hundreds of billions of dollars. The and around urban areas in infrastructure and usefulness of this exercise in costing can be services and upgrade the worst quality buildings. questioned – especially in its implication that it This is a cost that almost all estimates for is a lack of international funding that is the main adaptation costs have not considered. constraint on meeting the Millennium Development Goals, ignoring political and Funding for adaptation institutional constraints. But it does highlight One important issue is where the funding for the high monetary cost of addressing current adaptation can come from – including that deficiencies in infrastructure and services. needed to address the deficits discussed above. Also, within this, the relative roles of The estimates from the Millennium Assessment’s international agencies, national governments, Taskforce on Improving the Lives of Slum local governments, the private sector and households and community organizations. In discussions of this to date, perhaps the roles of place, depending on who designs and implements it. A international agencies have been given too much ‘high-income’ nation solution with 24 hour service of attention, in part because there are so little data piped supplies to drinkable standards and a flush toilet is generally much more than this; some innovative on government investments (especially those of programmes that have provided good quality water and local governments) and on household sanitation cost less than this. investments. In most middle-income nations and 214 Heller, Léo (2006), Access to water supply and sanitation in Brazil: historical and current reflections; 216 UN Millennium Project (2005), A Home in the future perspectives, Background paper for the 2006 City, The report of the Millennium Project Taskforce edition of the Human Development Report, 51 pages. on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers, Earthscan 215 UN Habitat (2006), op. cit. Publications, London and Sterling Va, 175 pages.

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many low-income nations (including China), aid groups (for instance most roads/bridges and storm represents a very small proportion of total and surface water drainage). government expenditures217 and urban areas get very little attention from most aid agencies. NAPA estimates There is a hope that private investment can have Of the first nine countries to submit their an important role – but this too may be given too NAPAs, estimated project costs totalled much attention. Existing data on private sector US$178m. Based on this, the cost of meeting just flows to housing and infrastructure in low- and the most urgent and immediate priorities of the middle-income nations since 1990 show that 49 Least Developed Countries would be around most is concentrated in forms of infrastructure for US$1bn. The NAPA process to date shows that which private enterprises can most easily charge the cost of adaptation could be very high, to the all users – for instance in telecommunications extent that it could not be met by a single source and electricity. These are also forms of of funding. Few NAPA projects have an urban infrastructure where the costs of reaching focus; the costs of some of those that do are customers and of controlling their access are included in Annex Table 8. lower. The types of infrastructure that often most need investment for adaptation capacity – Adaptation to water stress or scarcity drainage systems, ports, roads, railways - get a For urban areas, adaptation to water stress or low priority. So too does water and sanitation.218 scarcity that climate change may bring or Large private investment flows had been exacerbate needs to be reviewed in light of the expected into water and sanitation, especially very large deficiencies in provision for water and with the support given by many international waste-water management that were outlined agencies to privatisation and private sector earlier. Water scarcity is rarely the main reason involvement – but generally the international why provision for water is so inadequate in cities. companies that became important in this did not There is no association between nations facing bring major new capital sources to this.219 Most water stress and nations with the largest private investments in urban infrastructure are inadequacies in provision for water (for rural and concentrated in wealthier nations in wealthier urban populations).221 Many large cities where regions; sub-Saharan Africa and the least provision for water (and sanitation) is very developed nations, which most need such inadequate have little or no overall shortage of investments, get a very low proportion.220 Both freshwater resources.222 Many case studies for now and in the future, it is difficult to see how particular cities with water shortages also show private investments can have a major role in the that these are more the result of poor poorest nations and in nations with poor management than of water scarcity.223 Generally, economic performance (which include many that the cities with the best managed provision for are most at risk from climate change) and in water and sanitation are the ones with the those kinds of infrastructure which are public greatest adaptation capacity. goods and are particularly important for protecting the poorest and most vulnerable Obviously, any planning for better meeting present or future needs for water needs to

217 The World Bank (2006), 2006 World Development 221 McGranahan, Gordon (2002), Demand-Side Water Indicators Online, The World Bank, Washington DC Strategies and the Urban Poor, PIE Series no. 4, IIED, 218 Briceno-Garmendia, Cecilia, Antonio Estache, and London, 67 pages; UN Habitat (2003b), op. cit. . Nemat Shafik (2004), Infrastructure Services in 222 UN Habitat (2003b), op. cit; also Connolly, Developing Countries: Access, Quality, Costs and Policy Priscilla (1999), Mexico City: our common future?, Reform, Policy Research Working Paper Series 3468, Environment and Urbanization, Vol 11, No 1, April, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 33 pages. pages 53-78 and Anton, Danilo J. (1993), Thirsty 219 Budds and McGranahan (2003), op. cit. Cities: Urban Environments and Water Supply in Latin 220 See for instance Briceno-Garmendia, Estache and America, IDRC, Ottawa, 197 pages. Shafik (2004). op. cit. 223 UN–Habitat 2003b and 2006, op. Cit.

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consider how climate-change may influence future water availability and the extent of supplies and demand – not least because most adaptation possibilities. Mike Muller illustrates water infrastructure is planned for a long life (50 this by noting the two main options for to 100 years) and for most cities, there are long increasing water supply to Johannesburg (South lead times (and often high costs) for schemes Africa’s industrial heartland and largest city); which significantly increase freshwater supplies. both cost over a billion dollars and will take up to ten years to plan and build. Climate change is Lessons from the past 40 years of development likely to influence the unit costs of water and assistance have shown that good provision for other aspects for both schemes but it is not water and sanitation is not only about certain how.225 infrastructure. It is also about local capacity to make appropriate choices in regard to the Adaptation that meets the needs of the urban technology used and the institutional forms for poor building and managing it. This includes a local The very substantial costs of addressing the capacity to innovate, when conventional deficiencies in infrastructure and services for methods do not work. It is also about finding ‘slums’ and informal settlements and supporting local possibilities for all those who need water to better quality housing for low-income urban get their needs met – and the informal private dwellers was noted earlier; the total costs sector (water vendors, kiosks, small-scale piped represent hundreds of billions of dollars and are suppliers….) often has considerable importance. so far from what international agencies can In many settings, it is also about local provide – or would be prepared to provide (as possibilities for partnerships between government most give little or no priority to urban). agencies, private enterprises, community organizations and, often, local NGOs – or at least The Stern Report is unusual among discussions of an acceptance by government of the role of other climate change in its explicit recognition that service providers.224 climate change adaptation in low- and middle- income nations has to reduce the vulnerability of As with adaptation for extreme weather, it is low-income groups. If ‘development’ had been difficult to suggest costs for making water and more successful in reducing poverty over the last waste water systems resilient to the likely impacts five decades, adaptation costs would be much of climate change when there are such large lower. Stern notes the key areas of development backlogs in the infrastructure to provide safe, action that will help reduce vulnerability to the sufficient freshwater supplies (and manage the effects of climate change: disposal of waste water). Discussions of • Progress on achieving income and food adaptation in high-income nations usually factor security and on overcoming the in demand-management as an alternative to structural causes of famine/insecurity; increasing supplies but in most cities in low- and • Building robust education and health middle-income nations, there is a need to systems, including eradication of increase supplies to provide a less intermittent, malaria, cholera, and other diseases better quality service and extend piped supplies associated with water; to those unserved. • Better urban planning and provision of public services and infrastructure; and There are also many difficulties facing water • Better gender equality. managers as the uncertainties within each locality of likely changes in temperature, rainfall, To this might be added the need to change evaporation, infiltration and run-off make it very relationships between local governments and difficult to factor climate-change into current poorer groups since much of the vulnerability of decisions. Yet decisions made now will influence poorer groups to environmental hazards/climate

224 UN–Habitat (2006), op. Cit. 225 Muller (2007), op. cit.

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change is rooted in the incapacity of local 2. The political innovations that have governments and often in their ‘anti-poor’ given low-income groups more influence attitudes and policies. over public investment decisions and brought greater accountability to them If city and national governments and in how government resources are international agencies do begin to factor climate- used.227 change related risk-reduction into their urban 3. The many examples of federations policies, how can this avoid further formed by groups of slum and shack disadvantaging the urban poor? How can the dwellers or homeless groups that are interests of those who live in the informal pushing pro-poor political changes and settlements and work in the informal economy also implementing many upgrading and come to represent a sufficiently potent political new-house developments. Some city force to get risk-reduction investments that and national governments have benefit them? How can the inhabitants of recognized that these can be powerful informal settlements most at risk from flooding and very effective partners in improving get to influence ‘solutions’? living conditions.228 Their innovations in providing the information base The adaptation literature talks in rather general needed for upgrading – the household terms about potential roles of micro-finance and enumerations and maps developed for of safety nets. Of course, both have important informal settlements at a city-wide scale potential roles in reducing vulnerability. But was noted earlier. what is needed is a discussion of how these can 4. The many civil society organizations be made available and by whom to whom. Again that can help ensure that city planning the obvious point – local governments who and investment are less anti-poor and regard much of their low-income population as anti-environment. For instance, the ‘squatters’ and ‘trespassers’ will not provide them Urban Resource Centre in Karachi has with safety nets. The limitations of micro- demonstrated its capacity to influence finance should also be recognized; however urban planning in Karachi; this is a efficiently it is provided, individuals and small NGO founded by teachers, households with low-incomes need to avoid debt professionals, students, activists and burdens wherever possible – and the costs of community organizations from low- many key adaptations, especially in relation to income settlements. This Resource housing (safer sites, better buildings, better Centre’s influence is from creating an infrastructure and services) will generally be information base about Karachi’s much higher than what low-income households development on which everyone can can afford, even with efficient micro-finance. draw, combined with research and analysis of government plans (and their However, there are examples of the kinds of pro- implications for Karachi’s citizens), poor actions that are possible: advocacy, mobilization of communities, 1. The precedents for the relocation of and drawing key government staff and those living in informal settlements in risky sites in which the inhabitants of 227 Menegat (2002), op. cit.; Souza, Celina (2001), these settlements and their own Participatory budgeting in Brazilian cities: limits and representative organizations were fully possibilities in building democratic institutions, involved in where, when and how they 226 Environment and Urbanization, Vol 13, No 1, pages were moved. 159-184; and Cabannes (2004), op. cit. 228 See case studies of federations in the Philippines, 226 Patel, Sheela, d’Cruz, Celine and Burra, Sundar India and Zimbabwe in Environment and Urbanization (2002), Beyond evictions in a global city; people- Vol 13, No 2, (2001); also Weru (2004), op. cit; managed resettlement in Mumbai, Environment and D'Cruz and Satterthwaite (2005), op., cit; also Urbanization, Vol. 14, No. 1, pages 159-172. www.sdinet.org for profiles of the different federations.

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the media into discussions. The network that this Resource Centre has built has successfully challenged many government plans that are ineffective, over-expensive and anti-poor and it has devised and promoted alternatives. It shows how the questioning of government plans in an informed manner by a large number of interest groups, community organizations, NGOs, academics, political parties and the media can force the government to listen and make modifications to its plans, projects and investments. Comparable urban resource centres have also been set up in other cities in Pakistan and also in other nations.229

One final issue in relation to adaptation that meets the needs of the urban poor is in relation to health care services and emergency services. As with infrastructure, it is difficult to estimate adaptation costs when existing provision (which has to be adapted to new risks) is so inadequate. There are studies suggesting changes in heath care expenditure in response to climate change do not represent a high proportion of total GDP – but this same source also noted how the adaptation costs will be higher in low-income nations where there is less capacity to afford them and that even low cost adaptation strategies ‘can be very costly in a low-income country’.230

Existing and potential links between adaptation and mitigation How can mitigation and adaptation strategies be bridged to address climate change vulnerabilities in cities? How does bridging the issues strengthen or weaken either or both agendas? Table 4 contrasts different aspects of mitigation and adaptation – and emphasizes the importance of local knowledge, local capacity and local action for adaptation

229 Hasan (2007), op. cit. 230 Bosello, Kuik, Tol and Watiss (2007), op. cit. page 56.

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Table 4: Characteristics of mitigation and adaptation Mitigation Adaptation Benefited systems All systems Selected systems Scale of efforts Global Local to regional Life time Centuries Years to centuries Lead time Decades Immediate to decades Effectiveness Certain, in terms of emission reduction; Generally less certain, especially where less certain in terms of damage reduction local knowledge of likely climate-related changes is weak Ancillary benefits Sometimes Mostly Polluter pays Typically yes Not necessarily Payer benefits Only a little Almost fully Administrative (Mainly) national (Mainly) local managers/authorities, scale/implementing governments/international negotiations households (and community bodies organizations) Sectors involved Primarily energy and transport in high- Potentially all income nations, forestry and energy in low/middle-income nations Monitoring Relatively easy More difficult SOURCE: Bosello, Francesco, Onno Kuik, Richard Tol and Paul Watiss (2007), Costs of Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review of Assessment Studies with a Focus on Methodologies Used, Ecologic, Berlin, 112 pages.

VI. Next Steps And Questions no real basis for adaptation. It is very difficult to The lack of attention to climate change conceive of how to get pro-poor and effective adaptation by almost all city governments and by adaptation in nations with weak, ineffective and the urban policies and investments of almost all unaccountable local governments, many of ministries and agencies at higher levels of which also have civil conflicts and no economic government in low and middle-income nations is or political stability. Many of the nations or cities not surprising. Where governments are most at risk from climate change lack the representative and accountable to poorer groups, political and institutional base to address this. they have more pressing issues, including large Even if we can conceive of how this might be backlogs in provision for infrastructure and addressed, it is difficult to see how existing services and much of their population living in international institutions as they are currently poor quality housing. They are also under configured can do so. pressure to improve education, health care, security – and are looking for ways of expanding Mechanisms for financing adaptation employment and attracting new investment. Several financial mechanisms exist under the Unless adaptation to climate change is seen to United Nations Framework Convention on support and enhance the achievement of Climate Change (UNFCCC) to support development goals, it will remain marginal adaptation, particularly in low and middle- within government plans and investments. income countries. The Global Environment Perhaps as importantly, the need for adaptation Facility (GEF) manages most of the funds. These highlights the importance of strong, locally include the Least Developed Countries Fund driven development that delivers for poorer with voluntary contributions from several high- groups and is accountable to them. Just as the income countries which has supported the extreme vulnerability of large sections of the development of NAPAs and is likely to assist urban populations to many aspects of climate LDCs in implementing their NAPA projects. change reveal the deficiencies in ‘development’. The Special Climate Change Fund is for all low- Unless these deficiencies are addressed, there is and middle-income countries and covers

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adaptation and other activities such as Development Mechanism projects (which technology transfer, mitigation and economic channel carbon-cutting energy investments - diversification. It is also based on voluntary financed by rich-country companies - to low and contributions from wealthy countries and has middle-income countries), plus voluntary started to support some adaptation projects in a contributions from high-income nations. The few countries. The Adaptation Fund is meant to Strategic Priority on Adaptation contains US$50 support ‘concrete adaptation’ activities. It was million from the GEF’s own trust funds to established under the Kyoto Protocol, whereas support pilot adaptation activities. The fund is the first two funds were established under the already supporting several adaptation projects, UNFCCC. Operating rules are under but it may not continue after the pilot phase. negotiation. The Fund is based on private sector replenishment though the 2% levy on Clean

Table 5: Status of UNFCCC/GEF funds for Adaptation Fund name Amount available (in US$ millions) Least Developed Countries Fund 48.3 received plus 104.8 pledged Special Climate Change Fund 40.6 received plus 61.5 pledged Adaptation Fund 5 (pledged by Canada) Strategic Priority on Adaptation 50 (over 3 years) Total (received and pledged) 310.2

A number of bilateral aid agencies, including those of Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, have allocated funding for adaptation activities, including research and some pilot projects. To date, bilateral donors have provided around $110m for over 50 adaptation projects in 29 countries.231 More bilateral development funding agencies are beginning to allocate amounts for adaptation although amounts are only likely to be in the tens of millions of dollars and are dwarfed by the allocations of funding for adaptation in their own nations. World Bank funding for adaptation totalled some $50m, between 2001 and 2006, channelled mainly through the GEF.232

Existing aid flows give little attention to the infrastructure needed for adaptation. Most bilateral donors give a low priority to ‘economic infrastructure’ – for instance for transport and communications and energy – and to water supply and sanitation; economic infrastructure generally gets less than 10 percent of bilateral agency commitments while water supply and sanitation generally gets less than 5 percent.233 Japan is the main exception but its aid programme has long been more explicitly structured to supporting improved infrastructure for its current or likely future main trading partners.234 The European Community’s aid programme and the development finance provided by the World Bank and the regional development banks generally give economic infrastructure a higher priority – although this still

231 Frankel-Reed (2006), cited in Burton, I., E. Diringer and J. Smith (2006) Adaptation to Climate Change: international policy options. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change: Virginia 232 World Bank (2006) Clean Energy and Development: towards an investment framework. World Bank Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development and Infrastructure Vice Presidencies. Washington, D.C. 233 Statistics on development assistance flows and priorities come from the statistical annex of the 2006 OECD Development Cooperation Report, accessed at http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/0,2643,en_2649_33721_1_119656_1_1_1,00.html 234 For more details of this, see Satterthwaite (2001), op. cit.

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constituted less than a fifth of the EC funding commitments and just over a fifth of the World Bank funding commitments in 2005.

In general, most bilateral and multilateral aid agencies have moved away from a focus on economic infrastructure – in part because of the difficulties they had in ensuring that infrastructure they funded was maintained. Many bilateral agencies now channel a considerable proportion of their funding to ‘budgetary support’ in the hope that this will increase recipient government buy-in and improve coordination between all the different international agencies. In such circumstances, obviously, if national governments prioritise the kinds of investments that help adaptation, this will increase donor funding to it. Donor support for ‘good governance’, if effective, might increase the competence and capacity of local governments to do so – but most support for ‘good governance’ is for national government, not for local governments.

In most middle-income nations and in India and China, the proportion of total funding into infrastructure that comes from aid agencies and multilateral development banks is likely to be relatively small. In many low-income nations, it is more significant, but often only because of so little investment by national and local governments. The scale of donor funding for infrastructure in relation to the deficits in infrastructure provision is very small.

Among the potential sources for funding adaptation are: An international air travel adaptation levy (a levy of $10 on each ticket could raised $8bn for adaptation each year); A levy on carbon trading (the principle of the 2% levy from the CDM which goes into the Adaptation Fund could be extended to other carbon-trading mechanisms. Likewise, a levy could be introduced into emerging national and regional carbon markets, such as the European Emission Trading Scheme); Carbon taxes in high-income countries (for example, Sweden introduced a carbon tax in 1991 and Japan has mandated a ‘household energy tax’ equivalent to $21 per ton of carbon); Ending fossil fuel subsidies (e.g., the UK government gives an effective annual subsidy of $17.5bn to the airline industry in waived taxes on fuel); and Corporate contributions (for instance from the fossil fuel industry).

A second challenge for those financing adaptation is the need to separate out the additional costs of climate change adaptation from ‘business as usual’ development activities. The difference between vulnerability to climate change and vulnerability to climate variability and other environmental vulnerabilities needs clarifying. These pose many practical challenges but are necessary in order to distinguish between the responsibility (and hence liability) of high-income countries to pay for the damage they have caused (according to the ‘polluter pays’ principle), and funds donated under the banner of philanthropy or charity. For this reason, funding for climate change needs to be in addition to existing aid flows. In practice, requirements for detailed additional costs (which are usually virtually impossible to ascertain) are being increasingly wavered in place of approximations.

Another key issue to be resolved is who and what should be prioritised for receiving international funds for supporting adaptation? Should some countries receive priority over others? Or should some sectors and communities be prioritised, and if so on what basis? These issues are still under discussion in the UNFCCC and the bilateral funding agencies themselves and have yet to be resolved.

Donor ‘climate-screening’ of investment portfolios Climate change has traditionally received little attention from international donor organizations. A review of 136 projects in Africa funded by the German donor GTZ found no references to climate

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change.235 A recent study revealed the magnitude of development assistance and aid in sectors potentially affected by climate risks.236 In Egypt and Bangladesh alone, from 1998 to 2002, between US$1-2 billion was directed towards sectors affected by climate change and climate variability. As much as 50-65% of development aid in Nepal was given to climate-sensitive sectors. Clearly, international donor agencies need to assess the extent to which their investment portfolios in low- and middle- income countries might be at risk due to climate change and take steps to reduce that risk. This is increasingly recognised and several bilateral and multilateral development agencies and international NGOs are starting to take an interest.237 At least six development agencies have screened their project portfolios both to ascertain the extent to which existing development projects consider climate risks, climate variability and change, and to identify opportunities for incorporating climate change explicitly into future projects. Most agencies already consider climate change as a real but uncertain threat to future development, but they have given less thought to how different development patterns might affect it.

Conclusion: Some final reflections on the distribution of costs When considering adaptation, it is easy to get lost in the details of what needs to be done – or in producing cost-benefit ratios for nations or regions that do not consider who bears the costs and where these are concentrated. Some examples were noted earlier of benefit:cost ratios suggesting that certain key cities were unviable – including cities that are central to the current and future development prospects of whole nations.

Discussions of adaptation must also remember the profound unfairness globally between those who cause climate change and those who are most at risk from its effects.238 This can be seen in three aspects. First, with regard to people, it is the high-consumption lifestyles of the wealthy (and the production systems that meet their consumption demands) that drive climate change;239 it is mostly low-income groups in low- and middle-income nations with negligible contributions to climate change that are most at risk from its impacts. Second, with regard to nations, it is within the wealthiest nations that most greenhouse gases have been emitted but mostly low- and middle-income nations that are bearing and will bear most of the costs. Third, with regard to cities, larger companies and corporations can easily adjust to new patterns of risk induced by climate change and move their offices and production facilities away from cities at risk. But cities cannot move. And all cities have within them the homes, cultural and financial assets, and livelihoods of their inhabitants, much of which cannot be moved.

There are figures to show the dramatic differences between nations in average contributions per person to greenhouse gas emissions; for instance, the 80-fold difference between that of the USA and many low-income nations. But these actually understate the scale of these differentials. Greenhouse gas

235 Klein, R. J. T. (2001) Adaptation to Climate Change in German Official Development: An Inventory of activities and opportunities, with a special focus on Africa, GTZ, Eschborn, Germany. 236 OECD (2003) Special Issue on Climate Change: Climate Change Policies: Recent development and long term issues, OECD Papers 4 (2), OECD) publications, Paris. 237 Agrawala, S. (2004) Adaptation, development assistance and planning: challenges and opportunities. IDS Bulletin Climate Change and Development, Vol 35, No 3, pages 50-53; Klein 2001, op. cit. 238 This final sections draws on Huq, Saleemul, Sari Kovats, Hannah Reid and David Satterthwaite (2007), Editorial: Reducing risks to cities from disasters and climate change, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 3-15. 239 This might be considered to understate the role of industry or particular sectors such as fossil-fuel powered electricity generation but their production (and the climate-change implications of their production) are underpinned by consumer demand, much of it from those with high-consumption lifestyles. It might also be considered to under-state the contributions of middle-income groups in high-income nations but these are among the wealthy, if the whole planet’s population is considered.

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emissions in high-income nations are kept down by the fact that they import many of the energy- intensive goods used or consumed by their citizens and businesses. In addition, a concentration on comparing ‘averages’ for nations obscures just how much the problem is driven by wealthy groups. The differentials in greenhouse gas emissions per person between rich and poor groups can be much larger than the differentials between rich and poor nations. For instance, the greenhouse gas emissions generated as a result of the high-consumption lifestyle of a very wealthy person is likely to be hundreds of thousands or even millions of times more than that generated by many low-income households in low-income nations.240

The very survival of some small-island nations and some low-income nations (or their main cities) is in doubt as much of their land area is at risk from sea-level rise, yet their contributions to global greenhouse emissions have been very small. There are also tens of millions of people in low- and middle- income nations whose homes and livelihoods are at risk from sea-level rise and storms yet they have made very little contribution to global warming. The economic cost of losing certain cities for which adaptation costs are too high may be relatively small for national economies – but what will happen to international relations as increasing numbers of people lose their homes, assets, livelihoods and cultural heritages to climate-change related impacts – especially when the main causes of this are strongly associated with the lifestyles of high income groups in high income nations and the reason for their losses is the failure among high-income nations to cut back their emissions? Would the US Government oppose the Kyoto Protocol’s modest targets for emission reductions if Washington DC, New York and Los Angeles faced risks comparable to those facing Dhaka, Mumbai, Lagos and Bangkok as a result of greenhouse gas emissions the US had not generated?

Adaptation plans must not in any way slow progress towards mitigation. It is obvious that adaptation will be easier and cheaper if greenhouse gas emissions are reduced – so both the amount of adaptation and the rate at which it must be implemented are lessened. Adaptation plans must also bring benefits to the billion urban dwellers that currently live in very poor quality housing, in tenements, cheap boarding houses and illegal or informal settlements. These billion people include a large part of the population whose homes and livelihoods are most at risk from climate change. A technology-driven, market-led response to climate change does little for them.

The key issue is how to build resilience to the many impacts of climate change in tens of thousands of urban centres in low- and middle-income nations: • that support and work with the reduction of risks for other environmental hazards, including disasters (noting the strong complementarities between reducing risk from climate change, non- climate-change-related disasters and most other environmental hazards); • that are strongly pro-poor (those most at risk from climate change and from other environmental hazards often have low incomes, which limits their autonomous adaptive capacity); • that build on the knowledge acquired on reducing risk from disasters in urban areas; • that is based on and that builds a strong local knowledge base of climate variabilities and of the likely local impacts from climate change scenarios; • that encourage and support actions that reduce risks (and vulnerabilities) now while recognizing the importance of measures taken now to begin the long-term changes needed in urban form and the spatial distribution of urban populations to reduce vulnerability to risks that may only become manifest several decades in the future; • that recognize that the core of the above is building the competence, capacity and accountability of city and sub-city levels of government and changing their relationship with those living in

240 Hardoy, Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2001), op.cit.

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informal settlements and working in the informal economy, and the importance within this of supporting civil society groups, especially representative organizations of the urban poor; • that recognize the key complementary roles required by higher levels of government and international agencies for support (and the major changes in policy required for most international agencies that have long ignored urban issues); • that also builds resilience in rural areas, given the dependence of urban centres on rural production and ecological services, and the importance for many urban economies and enterprises of rural demand for (producer and consumer) goods and services.

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Annex

This Annex contains the tables, boxes, figures and summaries drawn from background papers that could not be fitted within the main paper. Some of the referencing is incomplete.

Table of Contents

Tables Table 1: The distribution of the world’s urban population by region, 1950–2010 77 Table 2: Global extent and impacts of certain disasters by hazard type, total 1996-2005 83 Table 3: Selected examples of current and projected climate change impacts on industry, settlement and society and their interaction with other processes 85 Table 4: Estimates for the scale of urban poverty in low- and middle-income nations 88 Table 5: Examples of average investments needed per person over a ten year period (2006 to 2015) to meet the Millennium Development Goals (US$) 103 Table 6: Estimated per capita costs and total investment required to upgrade slums, by region, 2005–20, U.S. dollars per capita 103 Table 7: Average estimated investment per person required for building alternatives to slums – including provision for land, network and bulk infrastructure, housing, schools and health clinics, and community development, by region (U.S. dollars millions) 104 Table 8: The costs of urban NAPA projects 104

Boxes Box 1: Examples of cities at risk from floods and/or sea level rise 78 Box 2: River and inland flooding and extreme rainfall events in India 81 Box 3: India’s RUrban Transformation, 2000-2050 81 Box 4: Global impact of different kinds of disasters 83 Box 5: Cities facing serious water shortages 88 Box 6: The floods in Mozambique 89 Box 7: Low-income Households' Adaptation to Flooding in Indore, India 89 Box 8: Adaptation activities to cope with floods in African cities 90 Box 9: Durban’s adaptation plans and processes 91 Box 10: The lack of attention to adaptation in cities; the cases of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Mexico City 95 Box 11: Community-Based Adaptation – Cavite City, the Philippines 96 Box 12: Action on adaptation at national levels in Mexico, India, Argentina and Chile 98 Box 13: Estimates for the potential cost implications of climate change for cities in Africa 102 Box 14: Urgent and Immediate Adaptation Needs from NAPAs: Urban Projects 105

Figures Figure 1: Nations with the largest urban populations in the Low Elevation Coastal Zone 87 Figure 2: Nations with the highest proportion of their urban populations in the Low Elevation Coastal Zone (LECZ) 87

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Table 1: The distribution of the world’s urban population by region, 1950–2010 Projected Region or country 1950 1970 1990 2000* for 2010

Urban populations (millions of inhabitants) World 732 1329 2271 2845 3475 High income nations 423 650 818 874 922 Low and middle income (‘developing’) nations 309 678 1453 1971 2553 "Least developed nations" 15 41 110 166 247 Africa 33 85 203 294 408 Asia 234 485 1011 1363 1755 Europe 277 411 509 522 529 Latin America and the Caribbean 70 163 315 394 474 Northern America 110 171 214 249 284 Oceania 8 14 19 22 25

Urbanization level (Percentage of population living in urban areas) World 29.0 36.0 43.0 46.8 50.8 High income nations 52.1 64.6 71.2 73.2 75.2 Low and middle income (‘developing’) nations 18.1 25.2 35.2 40.3 45.5 "Least developed nations" 7.3 13.1 21.0 24.7 29.0 Africa 14.7 23.4 32.0 36.2 40.5 Asia 16.8 22.7 31.9 37.1 42.5 Europe 50.5 62.6 70.6 71.7 72.9 Latin America and the Caribbean 42.0 57.2 70.9 75.4 79.1 Northern America 63.9 73.8 75.4 79.1 82.2 Oceania 62.0 70.8 70.3 70.5 71.2

Percentage of the world’s urban population living in: World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 High income nations 57.8 49.0 36.0 30.7 26.5 Low and middle income (‘developing’) nations 42.2 51.0 64.0 69.3 73.5 "Least developed nations" 2.0 3.1 4.8 5.8 7.1 Africa 4.5 6.4 8.9 10.3 11.7 Asia 32.0 36.5 44.5 47.9 50.5 Europe 37.8 30.9 22.4 18.4 15.2 Latin America and the Caribbean 9.6 12.3 13.9 13.9 13.6 Northern America 15.0 12.9 9.4 8.8 8.2 Oceania 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7

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* The statistics for 2000 are an aggregation of national statistics, many of which draw on national censuses held in 1999, 2000 or 2001 – but some are based on estimates or projections from statistics drawn from censuses held around 1990. There is also a group of countries (mostly in Africa) for which there are no census data since the 1970s or early 1980s so all figures for their urban (and rural) populations are based on estimates and projections. SOURCE: Derived from statistics in United Nations (2006), World Urbanization Prospects: the 2005 Revision, United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, CD-ROM Edition – Data in digital form (POP/DB/WUP/Rev.2005), United Nations, New York.

Box 3: Examples of cities at risk from floods and/or sea level rise

ABIDJAN (Cote D’Ivoire): Abidjan’s population in the 1998 census was 2.8 million. A 1 metre sea level rise is likely to inundate 562 square kilometres along the coastline of the Abidjan region; lowland marshes and lagoons dominate the coastal zone. Average retreat will vary from 36 to 62 metres. Although some important areas of Abidjan lie on a plateau and may escape the direct effects of a 1 metre sea level rise, major economic centres including the nation’s largest port and much of the international airport are on land less than 1 metre above sea level.241 Around half a million inhabitants live in precarious housing in informal settlements; a high proportion of these are tenants.242

ALEXANDRIA (Egypt): An assessment of the vulnerability of the most important economic and historic centres along the Mediterranean coast (the cities of Alexandria, Rosetta and Port-Said) suggests that for a sea level rise of 50 cm, over 2 million people will have to abandon their homes, 214,000 jobs would be lose and the cost in terms of land and property value and tourism income lost would be over $ 35.0 billion. Alexandria alone has more than 3 million inhabitants. But it is not really possible to put a monetary value to the loss of the world famous historic, cultural and archaeological sites.243

BANJUL (The Gambia): Banjul has more than half a million inhabitants. Most of the city is less than 1 metre above sea level and flooding is common after heavy rain in the city, settlements established on reclaimed land in dried-up valleys and settlements close to mangrove swamps and wetlands. Problems with flooding are likely to increase under a warmer climate with an increase in the strength and frequency of tropical storms. In the coastal zones of the Gambia, a 1 metre sea level rise is likely to

241 Jallow, Bubu P., Sekou Toure, Malang M.K. Barrow and Assa Achy Mathieu (1999), "Coastal zone of The Gambia and the Abidjan region in Cote D'Ivoire: sea level rise vulnerability, response strategies and adaptation options", Climate Research, Vol. 12, pages 129-136; Attahi, Koffi (1992), "Planning and management in large cities: a case study of Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire", in UNCHS (Habitat), Metropolitan Planning and Management in the Developing World: Abidjan and Quito, Nairobi, pp. 31-82; Issa, Ouattara (2000), "From the practice of exclusion to the possibilities of integrating poorer groups in African metropolises", Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 12, No.2; Semboloni, Ferdinando (1999), "Planning the evolution of a city. A case study of Abidjan", Third World Planning Review, Vol.21, No.2, Pages 201-355; Dubresson, Alain (1997), "Abidjan: from the public making of a modern city to urban management of a metropolis", in Carole Rakodi (editor), The Urban Challenge in Africa; Growth and Management of its Large Cities, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, pages 252-291; Appessika, Kouamé (nd), The case of Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Case study for the Global Report, 2003, UN Habitat, Nairobi. 242 Yapi-Diahou, Alphonse (1995), "The informal housing sector of the metropolis of Abidjan, Ivory Coast", Environment and Urbanization, Vol.7, No.2, October, pp. 11-29 243 El-Raey, M. (1997), "Vulnerability assessment of the coastal zone of the Nile Delta of Egypt to the impact of sea level rise", Ocean and Coastal Management, Vol. 37, No. 1, pages 29-40.

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inundate 92 square kilometres. Shoreline retreat would vary from around 100 metres in the harder cliffed zone to 839 metres in the gently sloping, sandy plain near Sanyang Point.244

BUENOS AIRES (Argentina): The urban agglomeration of 14 million inhabitants with Buenos Aires at its centre is located on the banks of the Rio de la Plata. Floods are common; there were 35 floods in the metropolitan area from 1985 to 2003. With its close proximity to the Rio de la Plata, it is highly vulnerable to sea level rise and storm surges – and from flooding from intense rainfall, because of the inadequacies in provision for storm and surface drainage.245 In 100 years, the Rio de la Plata is expected to have average water levels between 60 cm and 1 metre higher than today and stronger winds and storm surges. Within the metropolitan area, the areas most at risk are the low lying lands of the lower basins of the rivers Reconquista and Matanza-Riachuelo and these have high concentrations of informal settlements.

COTONOU (Benin): Cotonou is Benin’s largest urban centre, its main port and a key part of the national economy; it has around 700,000 inhabitants. Large sections of the city economy and of its residential neighbourhoods are particularly vulnerable to sea level rise and storm surges. The continued advance of the sea, coastal erosion and the rise in sea level, exacerbated by human activity on the coast, have medium- and long-term consequences that are already threatening vulnerable communities and disrupting the least-protected sensitive ecosystems. Some roads, beaches and buildings have already been destroyed by the coastline’s regression in the last ten years.246 In addition, provision for drainage is inadequate; the city has no sewer system and only a small proportion of solid wastes are collected; in addition, most of the population lives in informal settlements.247

DHAKA (Bangladesh): Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, has over 10 million inhabitants and is central to Bangladesh’s economy (and its economic success in recent years). Its population has grown than 20fold in the last fifty years. This is a city already very vulnerable to flooding, especially during the monsoon season – as shown major floods in 1954, 1955, 1970, 1980, 1987, 1988, 1998 and 2004; the 1988, 1998 and 2004 floods were particularly severe with very large economic losses. These were mainly caused by the spill over from surrounding rivers. Large sections of the city are only a few metres above sea level. Much of Bangladesh outside of Dhaka is also very vulnerable to floods – and the combination of sea level rise and increased frequency and intensity of storms that climate change is likely to bring greatly increases these risks.248

LAGOS (Nigeria): With a total population of around 10 million inhabitants,249 Lagos has very inadequate provision for basic infrastructure to cope with flooding. ‘Normal’ rainfall brings flooding to many areas of the city, largely as a result of the inadequacies in provision for sewers, drains and waste-

244 Jallow et al 1999, op. cit. 245 Hardoy, Jorgelina and Gustavo Pandiella (2007), Background paper on climate change and cities in Argentina, Paper prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation's meeting on Building for Climate Change Resilience. 246 Dossou, Krystel and Bernadette Glehouenou-Dossou (2007), "The vulnerability to climate change of Cotonou (Benin): the rise in sea level", Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 65-79. 247 Dedehouanou, Houinsou (1998), "Coping with house waste management in Cotonou", Environment and Urbanization, Vol.10, No.2, October, pages 191-208 248 Alam, Mozaharul and MD. Golam Rabbani (2007), "Vulnerabilities and responses to climate change for Dhaka", Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 81-97. 249 Many sources suggest that Lagos has a much larger population than this – but these may over-state its population. The preliminary census data for 2006 suggest that Lagos State in which the city is located had 9 million inhabitants. The 1991 census suggested that Lagos urban agglomeration had around 5 million inhabitants. The movement of the federal capital to Abuja will also have taken away one of the key drivers of Lagos’s growth.

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water management. Any increase in the intensity of storms and of storm-surges is likely to increase such problems; much of the land in and around Lagos is less than 2 metres above sea level. The site on which Lagos is built is not well suited to a city this size; when the colonial government moved the capital here, no-one would have anticipated a city growing to such a size. But it is far more the lack of good local governance that makes so much of its population and enterprises at risk of flooding. In many areas, roads have been built without complementary gutters for rain water. Where a drainage system exists, it is often not properly constructed and maintained. The lack of solid waste collection compounds the problem as wastes block gutters and drains. In addition, many buildings have been erected in ways that block storm- water routes. Little attention is given to clearing the drains, in advance of periods of the year when rain is expected. Many low-income settlements are built in areas at high risk of flooding (many on stilts), largely because safer sites are too expensive.250

MOMBASA (Kenya): Kenya’s second largest city (over 700,000 inhabitants) and the largest seaport in East Africa serving many counties other than Kenya. Estimated 17% of Mombasa’s area (4,600 hectares) could be submerged by sea-level rise of 0.3 metres251 with a larger area rendered uninhabitable or unusable for agriculture because of water logging and salt stress. Sandy beaches, historic and cultural monuments and several hotels, industries and port facilities also negatively affected. Mombasa already has a history of disasters related to climate-extremes including floods which cause serious damage and often loss of life nearly every year.252

PORT HARCOURT (Nigeria): An extreme 10-hour rainfall in July 2006 drove 10,000 residents at of their home and caused widespread traffic chaos. The Niger delta frequently experiences flood problems that are aggravated by structures such as the Port Harcourt-Patani-Warri highway that cuts across natural drainage lines and acts as a barrier to floodwaters.253 Blockage of channels by debris and obstruction of floodways by new construction were seen as the main obstacles contributing to Port Harcourt’s flooding. The city has more than a million inhabitants.

250 http://allafrica.com/stories/200704020193.html; Aina, Tade Akin (1995), "Metropolitan Lagos: population growth and spatial expansion; city study", Background paper for the Global Report on Human Settlements, 31 pages. Akin Aina, Tade Florence Ebam Etta and Cyril I. Obi (1994), “The search for sustainable urban development in metropolitan Lagos, Nigeria”, Third World Planning Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, pages 1-18; Iwugo, Kenneth O. Brian D'Arcy and Robert Andoh (2003), "Aspects of land-based pollution of an African coastal megacity of Lagos", Paper presented at Diffuse Pollution Conference, Dublin, pages 14-122 to 14-124; Adeyinka Sunday, Okude and Taiwo Olalekan John (2006), "Lagos shoreline change pattern: 1986-2002", American-Eurasian Journal of Scientific Research, Vol. 1, No. 1, pages 25-30; Nwafor, J. C. (1986), "Physical environment, decision- making and land use development in Metropolitan Lagos", GeoJournal, Vol. 12, No. 4, pages 433-442. 251 Mahongo, S. (2006) ‘Impacts of Sea Level Change’, presented at the ODINAFRICA/GLOSS Training Workshop on Sea-Level Measurement and Interpretation. Oostende, Belgium, 13-24 November, quoted in Awuor, Cynthia B., Victor A. Orindi and Andrew Adwerah (2007), Climate Change and Coastal Cities: The Case of Mombasa, Kenya, case study prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation 252 Awuor, Orindi and Adwerah 2007. op. cit. 253 Abam et al., 2000

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Box 4: River and inland flooding and extreme rainfall events in India

After drought, the most important climate change risk in India is increased riverine and inland flooding especially in northern and eastern India (and adjoining Nepal and Bangladesh). Tens of millions of people are currently impacted by flood for three to six months of the year, in eastern India. Increased precipitation and higher peak monsoon river flows due to glacial regression could exacerbate the situation for tens of millions more. This is largely due to the high population densities, across this region, combined with very high vulnerability due to a mix of poorly designed and executed flood management systems, complex land and water tenure regimes and high levels of poverty, which over the last few decades has severely degraded the coping capacity of millions of people. (Ref. )

Climate change is expected to increase the severity of flooding in many Indian river basins, especially in the Godavari and Mahanadi basins, along the eastern coast.254 Floods are also expected to increase in north-western India adjoining Pakistan, and in most coastal plains in spite of upstream dams.

Extreme precipitation is expected to show a substantial increase over a large area over the west coast and in central India.255 Gujarat, one of India’s most prosperous states, has simultaneously experienced severe flooding for three consecutive years starting 2004, causing large economic losses in to its cities due to extreme precipitation in upstream catchments. REF

The devastating Mumbai floods of 2005 were caused by an extreme weather event. The bulk of the city services were shutdown for almost five days with no contact via rail, road or air with the rest of the country. Over 1,000 people lost their lives.

SOURCE: Revi, Aromar (2007), Climate Change Risk: A Mitigation And Adaptation Agenda For Indian Cities, Paper prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation's meeting on Building for Climate Change Resilience, Taru, New Delhi, 23 pages.

Box 5: India’s RUrban Transformation, 2000-2050

Vulnerability has typically contributed more to overall risk in Indian cities, than hazard exposure. It is therefore important to understand ongoing transformation processes that are rapidly altering India’s urban landscape, changing livelihood opportunities and income and wealth distributions which in turn alter the vulnerability profiles of many urban communities and stakeholder groups and their capacity to adapt to long-range risks like climate change.

India will experience one of the most dramatic settlement transitions in history over the next 40-50 years as its urban population grows from about 300 million to around 800 million. India has about 30 percent of its population living in urban areas in 2007 but given a billion-plus population, its urban population is one of the world’s largest – even exceeding that of the USA. Climate change risk to India needs to be seen in the perspective of an ongoing dual transition: a demographic transition that will see India’s population peaking at about 1.6 billion in the 2060s, and a simultaneous RUrban transition,

254 Gosain, A.K., Rao, Sandhya; et al (2006). Climate Change Impact Assessment on Hydrology of Indian River Basins. IIT and INRM Consultants Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. Current Science, Vol. 90, No. 3, 10 February. 255 Rupa Kumar, P. , Sahai, A.K. et. al (2006). High-Resolution Climate Change Scenarios for India for the 21st Century. Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology, Pune. Current Science, Vol. 90, No. 3, 10 February.

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which will see an addition of almost 500 million people to an estimated 7,000 to 12,000 urban settlements over this period.

Almost as many will continue to live in some 600,000 villages. By 2025, three mega urban regions: Mumbai-Pune (50 million), Delhi National Capital Region (over 30 million)and Kolkata (20 million) will be among the world’s largest urban concentrations.256 By this time, India could have the world’s largest urban population and the world’s largest rural population.

A pragmatic risk mitigation and adaptation strategy will have to be closely linked to the dominant contemporary role of cities in India’s economic resurgence. Urban India overtook rural India in its GDP share in the late 1990s, in spite of having less than 30 percent of the national population. This has been further increased, with rapid economic growth in the city services and manufacturing sectors, post-2000. Average urban per capita incomes are now over three times those in rural areas.257 India’s agriculture currently contributes only 18 percent of the nation’s GDP, while providing livelihoods support to close to 60 percent of the population. And as importantly, India’s rural areas provide the biomass and ecosystem services that enable city metabolisms to function in the first place.258

Migration in India, is constrained by a number of factors including a crisis in urban formal sector livelihood generation in an era of globalization; dismal living and working conditions in cities; high poverty levels driven by high costs of living; poor improvements in rural education till the late 1990s and a slow process of social transformation, that would normally have enabled a greater mobility of the backward castes and women, thereby altering demographic and migration dynamics across demographically dominant northern and eastern India.

Climate change could in unexpected ways, catalyse the ongoing agrarian crisis in rural India259 which causes rapid rural to urban migration, driven by an increase in extreme event frequency and intensity and the expansion of drought in semi-arid areas; drought and flooding in the very-dense Indo-Gangetic & Brahmaputra plains and coastal flooding and drought in the coastal plains.260 These scenarios have only been broadly articulated, but not systematically investigated in fine-grained GIS-linked models.261 Hence, most projections on this count can only be seen as speculative at this point of time.

It is possible, that climate change induced drought and resource conflict may force the pace of rural- urban migration over the next few decades. Alternatively, severe stresses induced in urban areas due to a

256 Revi, 2006, Dyson, T. and Visaria, P. (2004) “Migration and Urbanisation: Retrospect and Prospect” in Dyson, T., Cassen, R and Visaria, L. (Eds.) Twenty-First Century India, Population, Economy, Human Development and the Environment, Oxford, New Delhi; Census of India (2006) Population Projections for India and States 2001-2026. New Delhi. 257 RBI, 2006 258 Revi, 2006 259 Sainath 2002, op. cit. 260 Gosain, A.K.; Rao, Sandhya; et al (2006). Climate Change Impact Assessment on Hydrology of Indian River Basins. IIT and INRM Consultants Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. Current Science, Vol. 90, No. 3, 10 February; Mall R.K., Gupta; Akhilesh, et. al (2006). Water Resources and Climate Change: An Indian Perspective. Current Science, Vol. 90, No. 12, 25; Ramesh, R. and Yadava, M.G. (2005). Climate and Water Resources of India. Physical Research Laboratory, Ahmedabad. Current Science, Vol. 89, No. 5, 10 September. 261 Rupa Kumar, P., Sahai, A.K. et. al (2006). High-Resolution Climate Change Scenarios for India for the 21st Century. Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology, Pune. Current Science, Vol. 90, No. 3, 10 February 2006.

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mix of water scarcity, environmental services breakdown, flooding and consequent water borne disease and malaria epidemics combined with a rapid rise in health expenditures could lead to a decelerating migration trends, as observed in many regions since the 1980s. Hence, it would be important to explore this potential climate change induced bifurcation behaviour more thoroughly. In addition, maintaining two-ways flows of food, biomass, water, livelihoods, products and services across the RUrban continuum are crucial to India’s medium long-term sustainability and the mitigation of climate change-related risks in both cities and their embedding countryside. Source: Revi, Aromar (2007), Climate Change Risk: A Mitigation And Adaptation Agenda For Indian Cities, Paper prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation's meeting on Building for Climate Change Resilience, Taru, New Delhi, 23 pages.

Box 6: Global impact of different kinds of disasters

Table 4 compares the global impact of different kinds of disasters between 1996 to 2005. Only events which exceed a minimum threshold of 10 deaths, 100 people affected or a call for international assistance or declaration of a state of emergency were included. Events like droughts, famines and forest fires that are mostly situated in rural areas were not included in table 4. Floods were the second most frequently reported disaster and affected the greatest number of people (1.3 billion people) and killed 391,610 people. Many of the transport disasters were caused by ships/boats sinking.

Table 2: Global extent and impacts of certain disasters by hazard type, total 1996-2005 Number of Mortality People affected Economic damage events (thousands) (US$ millions, 2005 prices) Avalanches/landslides 191 7,864 1,801 1,382 Earthquakes, tsunamis 297 391,610 41,562 113,181 Extreme temperatures 168 60,249 5,703 16,197 Floods 1,310 90,237 1,292,989 208,434 Volcanic eruptions 50 262 940 59 Windstorms 917 62,410 326,252 319,208 Industrial accidents 505 13,962 1,372 13,879 Miscellaneous accidents 461 15,757 400 2,541 Transport accidents 2,035 69,636 89 960 SOURCE: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium

In regard to ‘large’ disaster incidence and impacts by region, 1996-2005:

Africa (urban and rural): 290 flood-disasters with 8183 people killed, 23 million people affected and economic losses of $1.9 billion. Flood disasters were the most frequent ‘natural’ disasters and also the ones that produced the highest mortality. They were second to earthquakes/tsunamis for the scale of economic losses and second to drought/famine in people affected. Windstorms were less numerous (74) but they killed 1535 people and affected 3.9 million over this period.

Americas (urban and rural): 281 flood-disasters killed 38,028 people, affected 9.5 million and caused economic losses of $27.9 billion. Windstorms were more numerous (321) and they killed 28,110 people and affected 25.3 million; they also had much the largest economic losses ($234.7 billion). Climate variability has become a major development issue for Latin America. El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and hurricanes are key sources of climate events, frequently coupled to other environmental

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impacts on urban areas. E.g. two extremely intense episodes of El Niño (1982-83 and 1997-1998) together with land use changes resulted in floods, droughts, landslides and other disasters killing people and impacting the population, infrastructure and economic activities of such urban areas as Havana, Quito, the Panama Canal watershed and Asuncion.262 The incidence of disasters related to weather has increased by 2.4 times during 1970-2005, and it is expected to increase in the future.263

Asia (urban and rural): 472 flood-disasters with 42,570 people killed, 1.3 billion people affected. These were the most common ‘natural’ disasters and also those with the most people affected and the highest economic losses ($129 billion) – although deaths from earthquakes/tsunamis (364,651 deaths) and from droughts/famines (216,923 deaths) were much higher. Obviously, the mortality from earthquakes/tsunamis was much influenced by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami with around 230,000 deaths. Windstorm-disasters were the second most frequent ‘natural’ disaster with 31,900 deaths, 289 million people affected and $62 billion in economic losses.

262 Glanz 2001 263 Magrin et al 2007: 6

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Table 3: Selected examples of current and projected climate change impacts on industry, settlement and society and their interaction with other processes Climate Evidence for current Other Processes Projected Future Zones, Groups driven Impact/ Vulnerability /Stresses Impact/ Vulnerability Affected Phenomena a) Changes in extremes Tropical Flood and wind land use/population Increased vulnerability Coastal areas, cyclones, casualties & damages; density in flood- in storm-prone coastal settlements, and storm surge economic loses; prone areas; flood areas; possible effects on activities; regions transport, tourism, defences; settlements, health, and populations with infrastructure (e.g. institutional tourism, economic and limited capacities and energy, transport), capacities transportation systems, resources; fixed insurance buildings & infrastructures; infrastructures insurance sector Extreme Erosion/landslides; Similar to coastal Similar to coastal storms Similar to rainfall, land storms plus plus drainage coastal storms riverine flooding; settlements; drainage infrastructure floods transportation Infrastructure systems; infrastructure Heat or cold Effects on human Building design Increased Mid-latitude waves health;social stability; and internal vulnerabilities areas; elderly, requirements for temperature in some regions and very young, energy, control; social populations; health and/or very poor water and other contexts; effects; changes in populations services institutional energy requirements (e.g. water or food capacities storage), infrastructures (e.g. energy transport) Drought Water availability, Water systems; Water resource Semi-arid and livelihoods, energy Competing water challenges in affected arid regions; poor generation, migration, uses; energy areas; shifts in areas and transportation in demand; water locations of population populations; areas water demand constrains & economic activities; with human induced bodies additional investments water scarcity in water supply b) Changes in means Energy demands and Demographic and Shifts in energy Very diverse, but Temperature costs; urban air economic demand; worsening of greater quality; changes; land use air quality; impacts on vulnerabilities in thawing of permafrost changes; settlements and places and soils; tourism and technological livelihoods depending populations with recreation; retail innovations; air on melt water; threats more limited consumption; pollution; to Settlements / capacities and livelihoods; loss of institutional infrastructure from resources for melt capacities thawing permafrost adaptation

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water soils in some regions Precipitation Agricultural Competition from Depending on the Poor regions and livelihoods, other regions Region, vulnerabilities populations saline intrusion, /sectors. Water in some areas to effects tourism; water resource of precipitation infrastructures, allocation increases (e.g. flooding, tourism, energy but could be positive) supplies and in some areas to decreases (see drought above) Saline Effects on water Trends in Increased Low-lying coastal intrusion Infrastructures groundwater vulnerabilities in areas, especially withdrawal coastal areas those with limited capacities and resources Sea level rise Coastal land uses: Trends in coastal Long-term increases Same as above flood development, in vulnerabilities of risk, water logging; settlement and low-lying coastal water infrastructures land uses areas

c) Abrupt Analyses of potentials Demographic, Possible significant Most zones and climate economic, and effects on most places groups change technological and populations in the changes; world, at least for a institutional limited time developments

Dark shading with text in italics indicates very significant in some areas and/or sectors; light shading indicates significant; no shading indicates significance is less clearly established

SOURCE: Wilbanks, Tom and Patricia Romero-Lankao with Manzhu Bao, Frans Berkhout, Sandy Cairncross, Jean-Paul Ceron, Manmohan Kapshe, Robert Muir-Wood, Ricardo Zapata-Marti et al (2007), Chapter 7: Industry, Settlement and Society, IPCC WGII Fourth Assessment Report

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Figure 1: Nations with the largest urban populations in the Low Elevation Coastal Zone

90,000,000

80,000,000

70,000,000 60,000,000

50,000,000

40,000,000

30,000,000 20,000,000

Population in the LECZ 10,000,000 0

a a n a s i a A sh in d si S am and ypt nd In U l a Ch ne ade tn ai Eg rl Jap o l ie h g V T he Ind t Ban Ne

Figure 2: Nations with the highest proportion of their urban populations in the Low Elevation Coastal Zone (LECZ)

100

75

50

25

0

% urban population in the LECZ l i s in d ia ds a m ut me ana r ega o lan h Na ilan n rina hama r t Liber e jib u Guy a Ba ie D the V Tha S S B e N

SOURCE AND NOTES: These figures were prepared by Gordon McGranahan, Deborah Balk and Bridget Anderson from the GRUMP database; see McGranahan, Balk and Anderson 2007, op. cit. For figure 2, countries with an urban population of fewer than 100,000 were excluded

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Table 4: Estimates for the scale of urban poverty in low- and middle-income nations Type of poverty Numbers of urban Notes dwellers affected Inadequate income in 750-1,100 million No accurate figures are available on this and the relation to the cost of total varies, depending on the criteria used to set basic needs the poverty line (the ‘income-level’ required for ‘basic needs’) Inadequate or no More than 680 million for These estimates are drawn from a recent, detailed provision for safe, water and 850 million or global UN review of individual city/urban studies. sufficient water and more for sanitation 264 sanitation Under-nutrition 150-200 million In many Asian and sub-Saharan African nations, 25-40% of urban children are underweight.265 Living in housing that is 924 million Based on a recent global UN review of the overcrowded, insecure proportion of people living in ‘slums’266 and/or of poor quality Homelessness (i.e. living c. 100 million UN estimate.267 There are also large numbers of on the street or sleeping people living on temporary sites (for instance in open or public places) construction workers and often their families living on site) that are close to homeless

Box 7: Cities facing serious water shortages

Delhi: The National Capital Region faces a severe water shortfall and is competing with irrigated agriculture upstream. Drinking water is being transported to meet the demands of this city of 15 million, from over 300 km and yet unaccounted for water losses are over 40 percent in the city. Rising temperatures and therefore energy demand for cooling, increasing precipitation variability, a lower number of rainy days, an unsustainable mining of groundwater and a heavily polluted river system could make the Delhi mega-urban region with a projected population of over 30 million unsustainable, in spite of the rapid growth in its income and wealth.

264 UN–Habitat 2003b, op. cit. 265 See later section on this 266 UN–Habitat 2003a, op. cit 267 UNCHS 1996, op. cit.

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Mexico City: Buildings and infrastructure are sinking as a result of the overexploitation of the aquifers under the city. The water distribution network loses 40% of the water. Although it has a relatively high annual rainfall, the city has to import around a third of its raw water from neighbouring river basins (Cutzamala and Lerma), which also involves pumping this water up nearly 1000 metres with very high energy costs.268 A more intense hydrological cycle is resulting in more severe episodes of drought and floods (GDF 2004), which will further constrain poor sectors’ access to fresh water (Romero Lankao 2006) and increase the vulnerability of at least 24,000 people located in risk-prone areas (GDF 2004: 56-57).

Box 8: The floods in Mozambique

The floods in 2000 in Mozambique killed at least 700 people, displaced 650,000 and affected 4.5 million. More than 70% of all flood deaths were from urban areas, especially in the commercial hubs of the urban centres of Xai Xai and Chokwe. Large sections of the urban poor within Maputo, Xai-Xai and Chokwe suffered most as they lived in informal settlements in ravines, on slopes subject to landslides and in low lying areas. Many factors had contributed to the risk – including deforestation and spontaneous occupation of plots and the building of roads in unsuitable areas The 16 year civil war also destroyed vital infrastructure while pushing people to urban areas (there were 3 million internally displaced people) and many settled on flood prone areas, with no knowledge or tradition of coping with flooding.

The flooding reached disastrous proportions when torrential rain brought on flooding in three rivers that flow within Maputo and Gaza provinces. One month later with systems already saturated, the heaviest rains for 50 years inundated the country for three days, exacerbating the flooding that had already begun in Maputo and Matola. The renewed flooding destroyed roads and bridges, isolating areas within these two cities. As flooding continued, cyclone Eline hit Inhambane and Sofala provinces, increasing the water in the Limpopo river and creating waves up to 3 metres high and flooding cities of Chokwe and Xai-Xai.

This was also a very severe glow to economic growth for one of the world’s poorest nations. Maputo is the hub of the nation’s industrial production while Matola is a major industrial centre and primary port and Xai-Xai is a provincial capital and important for fishing and tourism. SOURCE: UN Habitat (forthcoming), Global Report on Human Settlements focusing on disasters

Box 9: Low-income Households' Adaptation to Flooding in Indore, India

In many low-income communities in Indore, flooding is perceived as a natural, seasonal event and households take steps to limit the damage it does. Those who live on land sites adjacent to small rivers which are also key storm drains are particularly at risk. But these sites have the advantage of a central city location. They have economic advantages because they are close to jobs or to markets for the goods these households produce or collect (many earn a living collecting waste). The land is cheap and because it is in public ownership, they are less likely to get evicted. These sites have social advantages

268 Romero-Lankao 2007; Connolly, Priscilla (1999), "Mexico City: our common future?", Environment and Urbanization, Vol.11, No.1, April, pages 53-78.

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because they are close to health services, schools, electricity and water. Most inhabitants have strong family, kinship and community ties with other inhabitants. Some residents noted that the sites are considered safer for children because narrow streets made them inaccessible to motor vehicles.

Households and small enterprises made both temporary and permanent adaptations to flooding. These include raising plinth levels and paving courtyards, using landfill, using materials which resist flooding, choosing furniture that is less likely to be washed away and ensuring that shelving and electric wiring are high up the walls, above expected water levels. Roofing may not be attached to a house so it can be quickly removed if the structure is in danger of being swept away. Many households also have suitcases ready, so valuables can be carried away.

Residents had also developed flood prediction and protection systems and contingency plans for evacuating persons and possessions. In one settlement (Shekha Nagar), residents' first response to the threat of severe floods is to move the elderly, children and animals to higher ground. Then they move electrical goods such as televisions and radios. Then other lighter valuables and cooking utensils are moved, with clothes being moved last as these are more easily replaced and not damaged by flooding. The more established residents have also learnt how to use the state system of compensation for flood damage and this can provide a perverse incentive for residents to build houses in the most vulnerable and dangerous areas. SOURCE: Stephens, Carolyn, Rajesh Patnaik and Simon Lewin (1996) This is My Beautiful Home: Risk Perceptions towards Flooding and Environment in Low-income Urban Communities: A Case Study in Indore, India, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, 51 pages.

Box 10: Adaptation activities to cope with floods in African cities

In the slums of Nairobi, responses to flooding include: bailing water out of houses to prevent damage to belongings; placing children initially on tables and later removing them to nearby unaffected dwellings; digging trenches around houses before and during floods; constructing temporary dykes or trenches to divert water away from the house; securing structures with waterproof recycled materials; relocating to the highest parts of the dwelling that residents think are secure; or using sandbags to prevent the ingress of water.

“When the rain and the floods come, women and children suffer. You can be locked up for up to two days with the flood. Sometimes we take our children out from the room to the rooftop. Then people bring boats to evacuate others.” In the Alajo community in Accra, Ghana, people dealt with the June and July 2006 floods in a variety of ways such as using blocks, stones and furniture to create high places on which to put their most critical valuables during floods; putting goods on top of wardrobes and in the small spaces between ceilings and roofs; sharing such high places with others who have no similar ’safe’ sites; or temporarily moving away from the area to stay with friends and family.

Similar strategies were adopted by individuals in slums in Kampala, Uganda. In addition, some residents undertook collective work to open up drainage channels, others temporarily moved to lodges and public places like mosques and churches until the water level receded or constructed barriers to water entry at the doorsteps. Some also made outlets at the rear of their houses so any water entering their homes flowed out quickly. Essentially these are all individual coping strategies. Sometimes people share protective storage or accommodation on higher ground. Spontaneous community action to unblock

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drainage channels is relatively rare. No coordinated action for emergency shelter or rapid response to flooding appears to exist in these cities. SOURCE: Douglas, I. and K. Alam (2006) Climate change, urban flooding and the rights of the urban poor in Africa: Key findings from six African cities. ActionAid International, London. Available at: http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/urban_flooding_africa_report.pdf

Box 11: Durban’s adaptation plans and processes269

Discussions within Durban on adaptation to climate change are at an early stage, seeking to determine what should be done to reduce vulnerability. This is being led by the Environmental Management Department of eThekwini municipality (the local authority responsible for managing Durban) but it seeks to engage all sectors; this Department has also begun to lead by example – for instance considering how to redesign the city’s open space system to make it (and the globally important biodiversity it contains) more resilient to climate change pressures.

The Environmental Management Department has been aware of climate change issues since its establishment in 1994270 but given the major post-apartheid development challenges that Durban faces – and the restructuring of local government – it took several years before climate change emerged as an issue of significance on the city’s agenda. At present, the adaptation actions being taken outside those of the Environmental Management Department are not a direct response to climate change but a spin off of actions taken to address more mainstream concerns – for instance better management of water resources. However, some departments are being proactive – for instance the health authorities are looking at changes in the distribution of malaria under various climate change scenarios.

The first investigation into the feasibility of establishing a climate protection project was in 1999 – but a lack of resources and the need to deal with other ‘higher priority’ issues meant little action after the initial investigation. In 2001, some external support from US AID to the national government’s Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism for a South African programme to address global climate change included a component to engage a group of South African cities. This was done through city governments’ participation what was then known as the Cities for Climate Protection Campaign, managed by ICLEI – although this focused on mitigation rather than adaptation. This supported the preparation of the first greenhouse gas emissions inventory in Durban and supported the initiation of a buildings energy efficiency pilot project which audited 11 municipal buildings and the implementation of no or low cost energy efficiency measures in two of them. But there was little internal institutional momentum built around these – as is often the case with externally mediated and funded interventions (see also the relevance of this point in relation to India)..

In 2004 the Deputy Head of the Environmental Management Department ran a series of seminars on climate change for municipal officials, after participating in a four month environmental management programme in the USA (which had provided her with the first opportunity to engage with the science

269 This summary is based on notes and materials provided by Debra Roberts, deputy head of the Environmental Management Department at eThekwini Municipality.. This includes drawing from a report that she commissioned: Hounsome, Rob and Kogi Iyer (2006), eThekwini Municipality; Climatic Future for Durban Phase II: Headline Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, Final Report, prepared at the request of the Environmental Management Deartment, eThekwini Municipality, CSIR, Congrelli, 45 pages. 270 It was initially named the Environmental Management Branch

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of climate change and its impacts). Discussions at these workshops highlighted the fact that the climate change debate happens largely at the global level and very little work is done in translating this into an understanding of local level impacts. Municipal officials are unlikely to act, if they have little idea of what climate change means for their city. In response to this, , the “Climate Future for Durban Programme” was initiated, with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (a parastatal research organization) in 2004..

This programme has had three phases: 1. Reviewing and developing an understanding of global and regional climate change science and translating this into an understanding of the implications of climate change for Durban 2. Developing a ‘Headline Climate Change Adaptation Strategy’ for the city to highlight how key sectors within the municipality should begin responding to unavoidable climate change 3. Incorporating climate change into long-term city planning; the municipality and CSIR are working with the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (in the UK) to develop a model that will enable the simulation, evaluation and comparison of strategic urban development plans within the context of climate change. This seeks to develop a greater understanding of the effects of climate change in Durban (and of greenhouse gas emissions) and allow a model-based assessment of the effectiveness of alternative strategic approaches to mitigation and adaptation.

The report on the Headline Climate Change Adaptation Strategy271 was completed in 2006, following detailed discussions with municipal line departments. Based on general trends predicted for Durban, the focus was - To discuss in more detail sectoral climate change impacts, Durban’s vulnerability to these impacts and plausible adaptation options - gain insights into how the various departments within the municipality engage with the issue of climate change adaptation - identify departmental initiatives (both current and future) that will facilitate adaptation - highlight research opportunities

Since this Headline Climate Change Adaptation Strategy was produced, the city has had several major storm events in 2007, resulting in extensive infrastructure damage. For instance, particularly high tides and waves along the coast in March 2007 damaged municipal infrastructure which needs R60 million to repair (and a further R 60 million if damage to private property and infrastructure were factored in). Although this cannot be attributed to climate change, it began sensitising the government to the possible severity of impacts from the increased frequency and/or intensity of extreme weather events that climate change is likely to bring. This led to the proposal that a Shoreline Management Plan be developed as a matter of urgency, to manage and defend the coastline and its infrastructure.

For Durban, the Headline Climate Change Adaptation Strategy includes a detailed table with predicted changes and likely effects of climate change, 2070-2100, which listed key impacts on infrastructure, health of population, food security and agriculture, water, tourism/business and biodiversity/coastal zone. This makes clear the relevance of climate-change issues for virtually all departments and agencies within the municipal government. Below is a summary of the key likely impacts for Durban and some of the adaptation options. It is worth reviewing the complete document because this illustrates the importance

271 Hounsome and Iyer 2006, op. cit.

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of locally-generated adaptation strategies – and shows the kind of document that all urban centres need. So much of what needs to be done and what can be done is defined or strongly influenced by local contexts. In addition, local politicians and civil servants are unlikely to act on climate-change unless its immediate relevance for their city and their sectoral concerns are made evident.

Human health: Some impacts are direct, eg heat waves and extreme weather disasters; others are through disturbances to ecological processes eg infectious diseases, freshwater supplies, food availability. Vulnerability of certain groups to these. Recognition that the municipal government would have to respond to greater risks of heat-related deaths and illnesses, extreme weather (note the vulnerability of sewage networks to flooding and the vulnerability of informal settlements to flooding); potential to reduce air quality; impacts of changes in precipitation, temperature, humidity, salinity… on quality of water and vector borne diseases. Need to educate public, develop community responses, ensure electricity can cope with peaks, promote more shade, water efficiency… develop extreme climate public early warning system and research and training for environmental health

Water and sanitation: Durban already faces constraints on water supplies with water resources already under threat. Need for Integrated Water Resource Management plus adaptive responses on both the supply and the demand side. The water and sanitation agency is already taking some adaptation options to reduce the volume of freshwater needed. Arguably, for Durban, adaptation for changes in water availability is the most important adaptation measure. Need to evaluate capacity of water infrastructure to supply water within an uncertain climatic future so it can cope with variable rainfall, increased flows during flooding events and also understand future demands.

The range of adaptation measures that should be investigated include increasing water absorbing capacity of urban landscape, making improvements to urban drainage, increasing height of natural shoreline stabilization measures, utilizing storm water retention/detention ponds and constructed wetlands, adjusting storm sewer design, land use planning and zoning to avoid locating structures/buildings in risky areas (need here too for mapped in resetting one in 50 year flood lines). There are also a range of water demand reduction measures that effectively increase available supplies – including working with industry

Coastal zone: coastal environments, settlements and infrastructure are exposed to a range of marine and land-based hazards such as storms, associated waves and storm surges, river flooding, shoreline erosion and influx of bio hazards eg algal blooms. Possible that that these existing impacts will intensity under climate change.

Possible impacts of climate change on Durban’s coastline particularly as regards sea level rise has already been incorporated into the work of the municipality’s Coastal, Storm Water and Catchments Management Department, over the last two decades and this is expected to continue. Mapping of 1:100 and 1:50 floodlines for 90% of rivers has been completed, within a programme to inform citizens and support adaptation. New developments need catchment management plans to ensure excess run off is contained on site. Development set back lines and potential erosion lines have been identified that incorporate 1:50 sea storm and a 50 year sea level rise prediction. Concern that port does not have development setback lines.

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The mapping programme that is underway will show sites at risk; from this there is a need to develop plans to manage flood risks, identify communities most at risk and support responses or relocation; avoid future developments in flood prone areas.

The municipality is investing in developing the city’s coastline in support of tourism. There are various key development areas along the coastline planned for the next 10-20 years. Rises in sea level could affect these developments, if not properly taken into account. Natural systems in Durban are capable of adapting to a 20 cm rise272 – but they may need to cope with much more than this.

Biodiversity: need to understand and address issue at local level; perhaps the first step is to develop a stronger knowledge on the likely impacts on biodiversity from the many changes that climate-change will bring.

Key infrastructure at risk: need for built systems to endure greater exposure to extreme weather events. Extreme precipitation. Windstorms. Infrastructure design is generally based on past climatic conditions – but these are no longer accurate indicators for planning, maintenance and upgrades. New guidelines needed for municipal infrastructure to ensure safety and quality of life and reduce long term costs.

Electricity supplies: should have no problem in adapting to gradual change but problems from extreme events. Electricity agency with no written policy but has responded to various initiatives. Needs to review how to cope with some climate change effects, needs to engage in mitigation.

Transport: perhaps necessary to revise road construction standards, avoid routes at high risk of flooding; also note the many measures available to reduce emissions within transport.

Food security and agriculture: support needed for local agriculture and attention to the impacts of climate change on commercial agriculture.

Disaster risk reduction: Durban has disaster management strategies but these have largely focused on technological disasters (the city is an important industrial centre, including petro chemicals) and flooding; these have not engaged with the need for extreme weather disaster management strategies or city health emergency response plans in response to climate change. There is also a need to shift from being responsive to disasters to being pro-active in minimizing hazard, reducing exposure and susceptibility, and enhancing coping and adaptive capacity. Need for more attention to early warning, more resistance in construction, the avoidance of risky sites and attention to accidents in potentially dangerous industries.

Cross sector municipal activities: Need to build awareness, encourage policy changes, have strong public education and outreach. Support local research and institutional capacity. Support community- based adaptation.

272 Turpie et al 2002

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Box 12: The lack of attention to adaptation in cities; the cases of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Mexico City

BUENOS AIRES: The urban agglomeration of 14 million inhabitants with Buenos Aires at its centre extends from Zárate – Campana to Berisso–Ensenada and located on the banks of the Rio de la Plata. The Parana river delta is just to the north of Buenos Aires, and parts of it are within Tigre and San Fernando municipalities which are municipality which is part of Greater Buenos Aires. Floods are common occurrences in Buenos Aires; there were 35 floods in the metropolitan area from 1985 to 2003. With its close proximity to the Rio de la Plata, it is highly vulnerable to sea level rise and storm surges – and from flooding from intense rainfall, because of the inadequacies in provision for storm and surface drainage. The Rio de la Plata hydrodynamic is set by the discharge of its tributaries (mostly the Paraná and the Uruguay), sea surge and winds. Floods in the Rio de la Plata are associated with the phenomenon known as “sudestadas” (south easterlies) characterized by persistent, regular and strong winds coming from the south east that help increase the river level by an effect called apilamiento which blocks the water coming from the river into the ocean. More south easterlies are likely under climate change and will create more flood situations. In 100 years time, the Rio de la Plata is expected to have average water levels that are between 60 cm and 1 metre higher than today and stronger winds and storm surges. The areas with the higher risk are the Paraná Delta, the coastal zone that goes from Berazategui – Quilmes to Berisso – Ensenada (south of the metropolitan area) and the southern region of the Bahía Samborombón. Within Buenos Aires metropolitan area, the areas most at risk are the low lying lands of the lower basins of the rivers Reconquista, and Matanza – Riachuelo and these lands have high concentrations of informal settlements.273 Buenos Aires has also had a significant increase in annual rainfall over recent decades and increasing numbers of intense rainfall (over 100 mm in 24 hours).274 An ambitious plan to address flooding in Buenos Aires is underway, with support from the World Bank; this has not taken into account climate change variables; the claim is that there is not enough information to allow this. One long-term worry is the threat to the Paraná Delta which is an important part of Buenos Aires’s economy and also important as a natural flood control mechanism; the growth of the delta has slowed and erosion and floods may destroy it.275

273 Hardoy, Jorgelina and Gustavo Pandiella (2007), Background paper on climate change and cities in Argentina, Paper prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation's meeting on Building for Climate Change Resilience. This was prepared based on a review of available literature and discussions with key informants, including academics working on climate change issues and staff from different government departments. The authors are with IIED-America Latina and both work closely with local governments on social and environmental issues. For the information presented here, it draws principally on Re Mariano y Ángel Menéndez (2007) Impacto del Cambio Climático en las Costas del Río de la Plata in Revista Internacional de Desastres Naturales, Accidentes e Infraestructura Civil. Vol. 7, Número 1, Abril de 2007. Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto Universitario de Mayagüez, Puerto Rico. www.uprm.edu/civil/revistadesastres/Vol7Num1/2%20Re%20y%20Menendez.pdf; Frers Cristian. El Cambio Climático Global y su influencia sobre la República Argentina. Impacto del Cambio climático en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, http://www.internatura.org/estudios/informes/el_cambio_climatico.html; Czubaj Fabiola (2007) Conclusiones del panel intergubernamental de las Naciones Unidas . Expertos advierten sobre los efectos del cambio climático en la Argentina, La Nación, Sección Ciencia y Salud, pág. 16, 11 de abril de 2007. 274 Drawn from Hardoy and Pandiella 2007, op. cit. For the information presented here, it draws primarily on Atlas Ambiental de Buenos Aires, http://www.atlasdebuenosaires.gov.ar; Rebagliati Ricardo (2003), Plan Director de ordenamiento hidráulico y proyecto ejecutivo para el arroyo Maldonado del Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (2003) in Contactar, Ciudades Saludables, No 11. 2003. www.revistacontactar.com.ar/plan_director_nro11.htm 275 El Delta crece menos de los esperado (2006), Centro de Divulgación Científica de la Facultad de Ciencias exactas y Naturales de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA), http://www.conicet.gov.ar/index.htm

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SANTA FE: The city of Santa Fe in Argentina (with a population of over 400,000) has increasingly expanded onto the Río Salado floodplain. To defend itself from floods, it had to create embankments and dykes to keep the water out. A flood in 2003 meant 130,000 evacuees (1/3 of the city population), 23 official deaths (local sources suggest at least 100 more than this), 180 cases of leptospirosis, 200 cases of hepatitis and losses estimated at around US$ 1 billion. Among the factors contributing to the flood are increased rainfall (and more intense storms) and deforestation and land use changes around the city – but the flood caught the city authorities completely unprepared. Floods in 2006 2007 also caught the government unprepared; there were several deaths, tens of thousands of people who had to evacuate, highways and roads flooded, and bridges down. A third of the city was turned into shallow lake – the same part of the city hit by the 2003 flood. The director of a local foundation noted that “there has always been heavy rains in the city of Santa Fe;" he also noted that the contingency plan for flooding was just on paper and no one really knew what they were supposed to do. The pumps did not work because of lack of proper maintenance and vandalism. He complained that local authorities favour the urbanisation of at-risk areas by bringing piped water and electricity to the neighbourhoods, "where they have their loyal voters." But they fail to follow up with preparations for emergencies and the do not maintain the pumps and drainage systems.276

MEXICO CITY: Since 2000, authorities in Mexico City related climate change to air pollution and developed an integrated understanding of synergies between mitigation and pollution control. But little attention has been given to enhancing Mexico City’s adaptation to floods, heat stress, water scarcity and other hazards which according with the authorities will be aggravated by climate change.277 Furthermore, city’ authorities lack the institutional capacity (e.g. human resources, money, and power) to deal with climate related hazards.278

Box 13: Community-Based Adaptation – Cavite City, the Philippines

Cavite City is on a peninsular, surrounded by three bodies of water: Bacoor Bay, Canacao Bay and Manila Bay. Its population in 2003 was 103,936, about half of which is on the coast. Coastal communities have been adversely affected by climate variability and sea-level rise to varying degrees and are highly vulnerable to long-term climate change. Cavite City experiences an average of 2 tropical cyclones (within a 50 kilometre radius) every year. The eight tropical cyclones that struck between 1994 and 2001 displaced 39,955 people. Cavite City is also affected by drought (for example in 1968-69, 1982-83, 1987, 1991-93 and 1997-98) and increases in sea-level (+0.183m in 1970-80; +0.142 in 1981- 90; +0.122 m in 1991- 2000). Currently, some 10% of the population is vulnerable to sea-level rise, but a one metre increase would put around two thirds of the population at risk.

276 Drawn from Hardoy and Pandiella 2007, op. cit. For the information presented here, PROYECTO DE LEY - Diputado Eduardo Di Pollina - Ley Nacional Indemnización Inundaciones Santa Fe; www_partidosocialista_com_ar - inundaciones santa fe.htm; Valente Marcela (2007) CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO – INUNDACIÓN SANTA FE: AGUAS VIOLENTAS, DESIDIA HUMANA, Buenos Aires, Apr 2, 2007 2006 (IPS) in: http://www.proteger.org.ar/doc621.html 277 (SMA 2004) 278 (Romero Lankao 2007b).

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Impacts of climate variability and sea level rise include: coastal erosion, siltation and sedimentation, storm surges and flooding of urban areas, saltwater intrusion into groundwater resources and existing waterworks, degradation of water quality, and inundation of brackish water in estuarine areas

Socio-economic group Impact Degree of impact Small fishers Decrease in fish catch. More damage to Very high livelihoods and assets Shellfish growers Decrease in shellfish production. More Very high damage to assets and livelihoods Micro entrepreneurs/self Decrease in sales/profits. Relatively less High/moderate employed damage to assets and livelihoods Employed Increase in commodity prices. Relatively Moderate less damage to property/assets Better off Decrease in production and income. Less Low damage to property/assets

Many autonomous adaptation strategies have positive outcomes for those adopting them, but limits in what they can achieve and they are not effectively integrated into existing local development plans. These include: - Accommodating sea-level rise by building houses on stilts - Strengthening/reinforcing the physical structure of houses - Moving to safer places during calamities - Placing sandbags along the shorelines - Borrowing money from relatives or from money lenders (at very high interest rates) - Engaging in alternative income generating activities locally or in other areas or changing occupation

Various government planned adaptation strategies (relief assistance, resettlement, shoreline protection measures, etc.) have reduced the vulnerability of coastal households, but the measures are inadequate and costly (US$ 2.15 million per kilometre of shoreline protection structures, and US$ 4.2 million for drainage systems). Consultation workshops, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews revealed that communities feel they only have poor to fair human, physical and financial capacities. People expressed significant concern over climate risks, and proposed several adaptation strategies, many of which were non-structural, capacity-enhancing measures.

Insert diagram: proposed framework for mainstreaming community-based adaptation strategies into the integrated coastal zone management process.

Ways forward

Policy And Institutional Reforms: ƒ Develop and implement a climate change adaptation-sensitive government and integrated coastal zone management policy and plan that integrates land and sea use zoning, alternative livelihood development and eco waste management;

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ƒ Evaluate and prioritise proposed structural and non-structural options, including the provision of secure property rights and micro-finance/insurance schemes that enhance the adaptive capacity of vulnerable groups; ƒ Review existing government Calamity Fund allocation to cover disaster preparedness/local adaptive capacity development; and ƒ Examine potential synergy of existing local institutional mechanisms for disaster risk management, fisheries/aquatic resource management, and community-based adaptation.

Capacity Development Build local capacity on climate change adaptation and integrated coastal management through: awareness/knowledge; participatory risk/vulnerability/adaptation assessment and planning; legislation and regulation; building a multi-sectoral integrated coastal zone management body; organizational and management leadership development; alternative livelihood development; programme/project development and management; law enforcement; resource mobilization; and micro-finance/insurance. Also, mobilize NGOs and local academic/research institutions to provide support for community organizing/mobilization, participatory risk and resource assessment and policy advocacy.

Improving Knowledge Management ƒ Establish community-based monitoring and surveillance systems to measure changes in coastal areas for input into vulnerability and adaptation assessments, and planning and establishment of community early warning systems. ƒ Conduct further research to advance understanding of the interrelationships between vulnerability, adaptation and climate variability and change, with specific focus on the following: socio-economic impacts of climate hazards; links between poverty, vulnerability and gender concerns; and documentation, sharing and promotion of traditional knowledge, skills and practices that enhance adaptation.

SOURCE: Faustino, R. (2007) Mainstreaming Adaptation Towards Integrated Coastal Management: The Case of Cavite City, Philippines. Presentation by Dr. Ramon Faustino Jr. Assistant Director, Conrado Benitez Institute for Sustainability, Philippines at the Community Based Adaptation Workshop, Dhaka, 24-27 February.

Box 14: Action on adaptation at national levels in Mexico, India, Argentina and Chile

Mexico: Interest in climate change in Mexico emerged during the 1990s at the federal level, with the launching of the country study. The country endorsed the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 under the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. In 2000, the federal government launched the National Strategy of Climatic Action, and in 2004 created the Mexican Committee on Projects for Reducing Emissions and Capturing Greenhouse Gases to participate in the Clean Development Mechanism. Yet, these unities lack influence over the key secretaries, ministries and offices that need to act for adaptation.

India:279 The Indian government made a late start in engaging with questions of climate change. This is largely because of its pre-occupation with pressing poverty, economic and social development and political challenges in the post-Rio period, when climate change began creeping onto the global policy

279 Revi 2007, op, cit.

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agenda of a few nations and multinational firms and became an interest for an expanding community of researchers and environment and development international NGOs.

India has undertaken four national technical assessments of climate change risks, impacts and mitigation options since 1992. These shared three common features: they were largely externally funded and driven; they were coordinated by the Ministry of Environment & Forests which is far from being the politically most powerful ministry of the central government; and they were primary focused on the ‘science’ of climate change driven strongly by the IPCC agenda and therefore weak in engaging with the complex nature and intensity of vulnerability in India, which is probably the most critical factor in risk mitigation.

The great missed opportunity of the last 15 years was the joining-up of the climate change adaptation and mitigation agendas with the rapid development of natural hazard risk assessment, management and mitigation capacity after a series of devastating disasters in the 1990s and the early 2000s. A series of moderately successful post-disaster reconstruction and linked mitigation programmes, especially after the Orissa supercyclone (1999), the Kachchh earthquake (2001) and the Indian Ocean tsunami (2005) have dramatically altered perceptions and the institutional and technical capacity to address vulnerability reduction and risk mitigation. The 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami and the devastation it wrought along India’s eastern coast also brought to the fore the need for the integrated management of India’s coastal zone to balance environmental and biodiversity conservation, livelihood and economic development and risk mitigation concerns. A series of Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plans are now in progress along with a review of the principles and norms by which the Coastal Regulation Zone needs to be managed. This will provide an important stepping stone for a more evidence-based set of climate mitigation and adaptation measures for coastal India.

The other important post-2004 development is the reappearance of an urban development, urban renewal and governance agenda, as a significant public policy agenda. The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was initiated in 2005 to target 60 of the largest and most important cities with a $10 billion challenge fund that addresses infrastructure development, urban poverty and improvements in urban governance. It is hoped that more rational urban infrastructure development with a strong pro-poor focus would help address some of the structural vulnerabilities of many million cities and state capitals. But as yet, there is no independent sub-component that addresses either urban vulnerability or risk mitigation, and no sign of a climate change-related response.

An important post-1990 factor in Indian cities is the emergence of city-level political processes, community and people’s movements, which contest from ‘below’ for ‘space’ for the poor within many cities. This has grown partially from a greater political consciousness following the devolution of political and administrative power to Urban Local Bodies by a Constitutional amendment in the 1990s. This has also encouraged greater NGO and judicial activism on a range of environmental questions, ranging from local greening and forest conservation to air and water pollution. This has had little impact on the most pressing environmental health concerns in cities that affect most of the low-income population. These currently fractured forces could if adequately mobilized, provide a base for future city- wide Community Based Risk Mitigation (CBRM) efforts that are crucial to the success of climate change risk mitigation and adaptation.

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Chile:280 There is a growing interest within government, among academics and within the media in climate change and related issues – but there is some way to go before there is the information base that encourages national and local governments to consider adaptation and the political will to begin doing so.

The National Commission for the Environment (CONAMA) has the key role in regard to climate change, taking actions to comply with the UN Framework on Climate Change (UNFCC). Since 1998, CONAMA has been working on a National Action Plan on Climate Change which is structured around adaptation, mitigation and the creation and reinforcement of national capacities.

In the National Strategy for Climate Change, approved in 2006, the specific objectives for adaptation are: a. evaluation of the environmental, economic and social impacts of climate change; b. definition of adaptation measures; and c. implementation and follow-up of these measures.

After reviewing available literature and consulting the main stakeholders about adaptation, it seems that there is a good level of information related to the evaluation of environmental impacts but on the related economic and social impacts, no relevant information was identified.

Various studies of vulnerability to climate change and adaptation have been done. The first, in 1998, covered agriculture, water resources and forestry. The second was on coastal areas and fishing resources and focused on Concepcion, a coastal urban conglomerate with around one million inhabitants. It sought to value the costs of sea level rise and is among the few documents that consider possible impacts at the urban level. The most recent official analysis is a Study of the climate variability in Chile for the XXI century, specifically for the period 2071-2100. The analysis provides detailed information on the vulnerability of each of Chile’s five main regions to climate change impacts, especially changes in temperature, sea-level rise, precipitation, forestry and agriculture. It considers two possible emission scenarios: a moderate and a severe as suggested by the IPCC. CONAMA suggests that the definition of adaptation, implementation and follow-up measures will be addressed once there is more information on social and economic vulnerability. Current studies on environmental impacts appear to be enough to start a process of awareness creation and institutional mainstreaming in the most vulnerable regions. Specific plans and actions to reduce vulnerability are, in general, absent and seem to be the next step for the government.

Concern about climate change has been growing within other institutions, as expressed by media coverage and the increasing number of studies and initiatives taking place. Many institutions such as universities, research institutions, NGOs and international organizations have been active in organizing workshops to discuss the vulnerability of the country and possible adaptation measures281. In addition,

280 This draws on Martínez, K., E. Claro and H. Blanco (2007), "Actions to reduce vulnerability to climate change impacts: the case of Chile", Paper prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation's meeting on Building for Climate Change Resilience, Rides, Santiago, 9 pages. This was prepared based on a review of available literature and discussions with key informants, including academics working on climate change issues and staff from the government and international agencies. 281 Two workshops organised by the National Ecological Institute, UNDP and GEF on “Climate Change, Disasters and Adaptation”, organized by the Ecological Politics Institute on December 2004 and May 2006 in Chile.

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some ministries and public bodies related to the sectors potentially affected by climate change (energy, weather, agriculture, forestry and biodiversity) have developed programmes and studied initiatives that could reduce vulnerability.

CONAMA is aware that the longer the costs of adaptation are unknown, the higher the consequences and costs of inaction. But no government institutions see investment on adaptation measures and infrastructure as a priority. Some Latin American governments have been reporting to the UNFCCC on activities or pilot projects to reduce vulnerability but as yet, the government of Chile has not done so. There is an urgent need to remedy the lack of information regarding adaptation costs and social and economic impact analysis. There are no concrete examples of on-going, planned government measures or investment projects (at the local or regional level) to address vulnerability. Much work needs to be done, particularly in developing social and economic impact studies, and involving regional and local actors in the preparation of the National Action Plan.

Argentina:282 Climate change and its implications for some aspects of development in Argentina (especially agriculture) has received a lot of attention in the media and some attention from the national government and from academics and NGOs – but there is little detailed discussion of what is needed for adaptation and little of the discussion on climate change is considering the vulnerability of urban areas. The national government has signed key protocols and conventions and it participates in international meetings. It has created a Unit to deal with climate change issues within the Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development and this has various national programmes – for instance on the impacts of climate change, on reducing emissions, on alternative energies, on energy efficiency, on bio fuels, on environmental education and on national climate change scenarios. But as in many other nations, there is a need to translate the growing evidence showing what changes are required into the plans and investments of the key secretaries, ministries and offices that need to act for adaptation. In addition, in general, environmental issues have not got much attention from the government in the past; this is beginning to change as environmental issues begin to show up in local government agendas but these are local environmental concerns relating to (for instance) provision for water and sanitation or pollution control or disasters that have long been risks. Provincial and local governments have never shown much interest in addressing vulnerabilities to disasters; the government system has always reacted to disasters, never investing in the adaptations that would lessen their impact. This does not augur well for the kind of long-term investments and adaptations needed to reduce vulnerabilities related to climate change.

There is a group of academics, mostly from the natural sciences, that are doing studies of the impact of climate change on Argentina, within future scenarios. All agree that there will be effects due to climate change – and there is a growing body of work on the likely impacts of climate change. For the heavily populated coast, this means increased rainfall, changes in wind patterns and more floods. Floods in the Rio de la Plata affect large regions and are associated with storm surges; climate change with its combination of sea-level rise and more adverse weather conditions may increase their severity and/or frequency. Many urban centres in Argentina including large areas in and around the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires are vulnerable to severe flooding and climate change is likely to make this worse. But the inadequacies in local government action to invest in the measures needed to reduce such floods (and

Additionally, an international project (Canada-Chile) on institutional adaptation to Climate Change, focusing on dryland regions has been coordinated in Chile by University of La Serena (http://www.parc.ca/mcri/index.php). 282 This is drawn from Hardoy and Pandiella 2007, op. cit.

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these have long happened, unrelated to climate change) have long been evident. Much of the physical growth of Buenos Aires and of several other cities is over flood plains. The research and discussions and the media coverage of climate change have not produced the basis for government technicians and local governments to discuss what changes are needed. Climate change is not considered in the 2006 Urban Environmental Plan of the city of Buenos Aires (so there is no mention of plans for adaptation) or of the 2003 Hydraulic Plan of the city.

Box 15: Estimates for the potential cost implications of climate change for cities in Africa

Assuming: A 30 per cent reduction in average stream flow with unit cost of water going up more than 40 per cent; where waste is disposed into a stream, if stream flow is reduced by 30 per cent, the pollutant load must be reduced by 30 per cent, so to achieve lower pollution levels, wastewater treatment costs double. A 30 percent reduction in electricity production.

Applying these assumptions, and using unit costs derived from actual project experience, the costs of adapting existing urban water infrastructure in Africa have been estimated at between US$ 1.05 to 2.65 billion annually (which includes urban water storage, waste water treatment and electricity generation but not the cost of rehabilitating deficient infrastructure

The costs of new development are also likely to rise by US$ 1-2.55 billion a year. In general, the marginal unit cost of water resources development for water supply to urban areas increases with each new increment of supply. It is therefore conservative to assume that the costs of adapting to climate change for new developments will be similar to those for existing systems.

There will be additional costs incurred in the construction of roads and storm drainage, from the loss of use of land that is threatened by floods, and for additional flood protection for existing settlements. These and other indirect effects are site-specific and less easy to cost on a regional level. SOURCE: Muller, Mike (2007), "Adapting to climate change: water management for urban resilience ", Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 99-113.

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Table 5: Examples of average investments needed per person over a ten year period (2006 to 2015) to meet the Millennium Development Goals (US$) Bangladesh Cambodia Ghana Tanzania Uganda Hunger 47 83 67 83 60 Education 177 187 193 137 153 Gender equality 27 27 27 27 27 Health 207 223 253 350 333 Water and sanitation 50 53 77 70 47 Improving the lives of slum 30 33 23 33 23 dwellers Energy 193 150 153 157 117 Roads 213 213 103 217 200 Other including large 100 100 100 100 100 infrastructure projects, higher education, national research…. TOTAL (US$) 1047 1067 993 1147 1060

MDG finance gap 587 617 597 717 590 Shortfall of ODA for direct 573 437 403 563 470 MDG support over 2002 level NB This is drawn from Sachs, Jeffrey D. and the UN Millennium Project (2005), Investing in Development; A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, Earthscan Publications, London and Sterling, VA, 224 pages, but the original listed figures for individual years for 2006, 2010 and 2015. To get the figures above, an average was taken of these three annual figures and it was multiplied by 10.

Table 6: Estimated per capita costs and total investment required to upgrade slums, by region, 2005–20, U.S. dollars per capita Component of Arab states, East Asia Latin South Southeast Sub-Saharan upgrading Turkey and and America & Central Asia Africa, Egypt Iran Oceania Caribbean Asia and Sudan Construction of 472 338 488 306 324 125 basic house Purchase of land 80 38 7 32 34 14 of transfer Relocation 55 20 27 11 15 14 Provision of 235 51 235 51 51 145 networked infrastructure Provision of bulk 71 15 71 15 15 44 infrastructure Construction of 12 10 18 10 10 12 schools and clinics Construction of 15 10 15 10 10 10 community

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facilities Planning and 268 81 230 121 126 117 oversight Capacity building 121 56 109 56 58 48 Total cost per 1328 619 1200 612 643 528 person Number of people 4 20 8 30 7 31 (million) Total cost (US$ b) 5.3 12.4 9.6 18.3 4.5 16.4 SOURCE: UN Millennium Project (2005), A Home in the City, The report of the Millennium Project Taskforce on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers, Earthscan` Publications, London and Sterling Va, 175 pages.

Table 7: Average estimated investment per person required for building alternatives to slums – including provision for land, network and bulk infrastructure, housing, schools and health clinics, and community development, by region (U.S. dollars millions) Item East Latin North Oceania South- South- Sub- Western Asia America Africa Central east Saharan Asia & Carib. Asia Asia Africa Land 50 97 105 50 43 45 18 105 Networked 58 306 265 58 58 58 164 265 infrastructure Bulk 17 92 80 17 17 17 49 80 infrastructure Housing 169 195 292 169 131 200 77 292 Schools & clinics 10 18 12 10 10 10 12 12 Community 30 71 75 30 26 33 32 75 development Average 334 780 829 334 285 363 352 829 investment per person (US$) SOURCE: UN Millennium Project (2005), A Home in the City, The report of the Millennium Project Taskforce on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers, Earthscan Publications, London and Sterling Va, 175 pages.

Table 8: The costs of urban NAPA projects Country Project Cost (US$) Bangladesh Enhancing resilience of urban infrastructure and industries to 2,000,000 impacts of climate change including floods and cyclone Bhutan Glacial Lake Outburst Flood Hazard Zoning (Pilot Scheme - 232,493.12 Chamkhar Chu Basin) Burundi Stabilisation of River Dynamics of River Courses in Mumirwa 2,030,000 and Imbo Comoros Improvement of water quality for rural and urban populations 80,000 Comoros Fight against malaria in populations from the rural and urban 175,000 areas with a high rate of malaria Comoros Use of non-metallic local materials for the construction of low 1,025,000

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price housing Mauritania The study and monitoring of water quality in three cities: Magta 1,000,000 Lahjar, Tintane and Wompou Mauritania The implementation of a safeguard plan for the town of 2,091,000 Nouakchott and its infrastructures Mauritania The protection and reinforcement of the dune bar along the 1,018,000 coastline in Nouakchott Samoa Zoning and Strategic Management Planning Project in Apia, the 400,000 capital of Samoa

Box 16: Urgent and Immediate Adaptation Needs from NAPAs: Urban Projects

NAPAs (National Adaptation Programmes of Action) provide a process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs with regard to adaptation to climate change. These urgent and immediate needs are those for which further delay could increase vulnerability or lead to increased costs at a later stage. The steps for the preparation of the NAPAs include identification of key adaptation measures and selection of a prioritised shortlist of activities. NAPAs also include short profiles of projects and/or activities intended to address urgent and immediate LDC adaptation needs.

The rationale for NAPAs rests on fact that LDCs are amongst the most vulnerable countries to the adverse effects of climate change, in part because of their low capacity to adapt. As of April 2007, 14 of the 49 LDCs had submitted their NAPA to the UNFCCC: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Comoros, Djibouti, Haiti, Kiribati, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Samoa and Senegal. Of these, priority sectors covered by the assessments, and consequently those that are going to be the focus of the proposed NAPA projects are health, agriculture, water resources and forests. Although the NAPA assessments involved different population groups, more emphasis was placed on the rural poor. Stakeholder groups such as farmers, herders and fishermen were targeted, and less attention given to the urban poor.283 The following urban projects have been extracted from the NAPAs available in English from the UNFCCC website (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Comoros, Kiribati, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger and Samoa).

Bangladesh

Title: Enhancing resilience of urban infrastructure and industries to impacts of climate change including floods and cyclones

Urban infrastructure in the major cities of Bangladesh will be adversely affected by climate change impacts, especially floods and cyclones. These need to be made more resilient to withstand those impacts. The project aims to enhance resilience to climate change (including floods and cyclones) in urban and industrial sectors in major cities through capacity building and policy and awareness-raising activities. Activities include:

283 Osman-Elasha, B. and T. Downing (2007) Lessons Learned in Preparing National Adaptation Programmes of Action in Eastern and Southern Africa. Unpublished Paper, Stockholm Environment Institute.

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Developing better building codes for the building industry and infrastructure in potentially vulnerable areas Developing better industrial waste management and community-based safe dumping places for pollutants Developing better early warning systems

Bhutan

Title: Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) Hazard Zoning (Pilot Scheme - Chamkhar Chu Basin)

The Chamkhar Chu River has its source from the glaciers of Gangkar Punsum and the Monla Karchung ranges. A total of 557 glacial lakes with a total area of 21.03 square kilometres drain into the Chamkhar Chu River which flows though the valley of Jakar, a key tourist destination with many local businesses, hotels, shops and cottage industries. The Bumthang District is also one of the most important Buddhist pilgrimage destinations in the Himalayas with many historical monuments, temples, monasteries, and religious sites. Plans to move the town of Chamkhar to Dekiling do not adequately consider GLOF threats. Neither do other activities in the valley. Hazard zonation at this critical stage in the valleys development would better prepare people in the event of a GLOF event. The main objective of this project is, therefore, to prepare a hazard zonation map for GLOF (from Khaktang to Chamkhar town) where the main settlements and development activities are occurring.

Burundi

Title: Stabilisation of River Dynamics of River Courses in Mumirwa and Imbo

The Imbo lowlands and Mumirwa are very sensitive to lateral and vertical erosion, particularly during periods of heavy rainfall. This erosion can lead to landslips and alluvial deposits, which are likely to increase with climate change. Urban areas, in particular the town of Bujumbura, are particularly vulnerable to erosion, which must be reduced or prevented to preserve both public and private infrastructure in the area. Rainwater needs the channelling of rivers and torrents to protect the urban bridges, roads, buildings and other infrastructure, and to ensure viable sanitation. Activities include: Enhancing meteorological and hydrological observation networks; Conducting a study of river dynamics in connection with precipitation conditions; Establishing a town planning and development master plan of the lowlands taking into account the risks related to precipitation fluctuations; Establishing plans for the correction and stabilization of rivers and the protection of the infrastructure; Conducting work to correct and stabilize these rivers, starting with those that cross the town of Bujumbura; Developing public safety legislation for disaster situations; Mapping the zones at risk and proposing land use standards in these zones.

Comoros

Title: improvement of water quality for rural and urban populations

River water provides most of the water resources on the islands of Anjouan and Mohéli. The quality of this water has fallen due to its scarcity, overexploitation due to increasing need, and the effects of

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erosion. Contaminated water causes frequent cases of hepatitis and typhoid fever, which have killed many islanders. In Grand-Comoro, tank water is also poor and rising sea levels have increased the salinity of underground water resources. This project aims to provide communities with access to drinking water to preserve their health in the context of climate change induced precipitation fluctuations and degradation of water quality. Activities will include: Setting up water treatment infrastructure Providing training on water treatment Setting up protection perimeters around water sources Improving public awareness on water hygiene

Comoros

Title: the fight against malaria in rural and urban areas with high rates of malaria

Malaria is a major public health problem in the Union of the Comoros. Because of temperature rises it now occurs at altitudes that used to be spared. It is the main reason for medical consultation and hospitalisation in the health facilities, and is responsible for 25% of deaths recorded for children under five years). Children and pregnant women are particularly vulnerable. The project aims to enable rural and urban communities to fight the climate variability-induced geographic spread and intensification of malaria. Activities will consist of: Eliminating the larva shelters inside and around houses Reducing the proliferation of mosquitoes in the water mains by introducing larva-eating fish Educating and mobilizing communities to promote behaviour that is conducive to the prevention of and fight against malaria Encouraging the distribution and use of long lasting impregnated mosquito nets

Comoros

Title: use of non-metallic local materials for the construction of low price housing

About 25 to 60% of Comorian families in Grand Comoro, Anjouan and Mohéli live in cob or straw houses with a wooden frame. Such houses are vulnerable to bad weather. The increase in cyclone frequency and other extreme climatic events during the last few years has already led to significant material losses and damaged the lives of many families. Access to concrete housing is limited to privileged families due to the high costs of this method of construction. Such houses can resist rain and last for several decades whereas straw constructions must be renewed every year. Using new locally produced materials will decrease construction costs and provide poor populations in risky areas with more resilient decent housing. Comfort and security will increase for these people, as well as sanitation facilities (which will also be produced locally).

Mauritania

Title: The study and monitoring of water quality in three cities: Magta Lahjar, Tintane and Wompou

Maghta Lahjar, Tintane and Wompou obtain their drinking water from boreholes. The continuous drought and the exploitation of water tables have reduced water levels and flow into boreholes and led to water quality deterioration. This project aims to improve knowledge of water resources and identify

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new ones, monitor water quality, improve water resource management and help anticipate crisis situations. Activities include: Establishing monitoring networks; Establishing a methodology for collecting and processing data; Implementing new hydro-geological and geophysical investigations to identify new water resources; Creating new water capture devices; and Connecting new boreholes to drinking water networks.

Mauritania

Title: The implementation of a safeguard plan for the town of Nouakchott and its infrastructure

In recent decades, the Nouakchott coastline has experienced accelerated urbanization due to the deteriorating climate which has caused crises in rural areas. Nouakchott currently accommodates over 25% of Mauritania’s population, and a large part of its industry (fish processing, tourism, construction, etc.), commerce and other socio-economic infrastructure. Most of Nouakchott’s suburbs and much of its economic infrastructure (some of which is vital to national development) is in low areas susceptible to flooding. Climate change could therefore affect communities, homes, infrastructure and the whole economy of the region and country. This project therefore aims to: Introduce and enforce town planning standards that take climate change into consideration, for example by revising plans to accommodate sea level rise; Draw up a development plan for the Nouakchott coastline; Provide security for over 80% of Nouakchott inhabitants located in risky areas by building a 1.5-2 metre high and 5-6 metre wide breakwater along the whole of the west front of Nouakchott; Relocate over 60% of the infrastructure established on the dunes, and orchestrate a planned removal of all infrastructure in sectors susceptible to climate change effects; and Create awareness amongst contractors and subcontractors about appropriate construction methods in risky areas.

Mauritania

Title: The protection and reinforcement of the dune bar along the coastline in Nouakchott

The sand of the coastal bar provides Nouakchott with its only natural protection from heavy storms. Yet this sand is currently overexploited and the dune bar has been weakened in various places. The bar has also been weakened by uncontrolled development. With climate change likely to increase the frequency and intensity of storms, this will likely result in heavy flooding in most town districts. This project therefore aims to Introduce and make operational a supervisory structure to protect the coastline bar; Reconstruct and cover in vegetation over 80% of the weakened coastline dunes; Create awareness in the Nouakchottt population of the dangers of the dune bar giving way and what measures people should take to protect themselves.

Samoa

Title: Zoning and Strategic Management Planning Project

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Apia, the capital of Samoa, is the centre of all utility services and operations and houses 22% of the population. Its coastal location makes its infrastructure and government assets vulnerable to the storm tides and strong winds that characterise tropical cyclones. Urban growth in Apia and its adjoining areas is predicted to continue to rise. The unplanned expansion of Apia cannot be ignored as environmental problems are already increasing. Such problems include domestic and industrial waste disposal; overcrowding and lack of privacy; flooding caused by building on flood prone and poorly drained lands; dead animals such as cattle and dogs; reclamation of coastal lands and mangrove destruction; septic tank effluent flowing into the groundwater and coastal ecosystems; and, impacts of urban areas on water quality and land resources. Several villages now form one linear strip of urban development between Apia and Faleolo. The same pattern is also evident in Salelologa. People living here have access to urban services, transportation, electricity and telecommunications. But centralizing services in Apia and increasing coastal populations means infrastructure and communities are vulnerable to sea level rise and extreme weather events such as tropical cyclones.

The Planning and Urban Management Act 2004 provides legal grounds to implement an integrated system of urban management and planning for sustainable development and environmental management. Zoning typically specifies the areas in which residential, industrial, recreational or commercial activities may develop. But the Act needs to consider developments/structures that: are adaptable, flexible and movable; can cope with changing sea levels; account for water availability; and are resilient to extreme storm events and high temperatures for extended periods.

This project aims to: Integrate climate change policies and methods into all Sustainable Management Plans at national, regional, district and site specific levels; and Mainstream climate change policy into the planning and urban management agency’s plans, policies and development assessment reports.

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