Departament d’ Interior Relacions Institucionals i Participació Direcció General de Prevenció Extinció d’Incendis i Salvament GRAF

The SANT LLORENÇ SAVALL

FOREST FIRE

Operational Report

TYPE OF FIRE S2 Convection fire with southerly winds SYNOPTIC SITUATION Intrusion of hot air masses from south (Saharan winds) BURNED AREA 4.558 ha CAUSE Under investigation RISK LEVEL RISK MAP DMAiH, ALFA o INFOCAT

„ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ Bombers „ „ „ „

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

MAIN EVENT TIME DATE DURATION Detection 16:53 10/08/2003 Arrival 17:00 10/08/2003 7min Control 19:52 17/08/2003 171 h Extinction 16:00 19/08/2003 22.8 h

FIRE BEHAVIOUR

DATES Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue PARAMETERS 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Type of fire High intensity crown fire, with spotting Daily initial 35.937 Potential (ha) Burnt Area (ha) 1.332 1.832 1.394 % of Potential Area/hour 242,18 333,09 253,45 Rate of Fire Max Max Spread Max 33m/min 13,5m/min 6m/min (m/min)

Total Area Burnt 4.558 ha Total potential 20000 ha

RESOURCES AT SCENE

DATES Main UNIT Organization Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 UMC 6 14 12 11 12 8 4 2 1 BRP 57 71 72 66 65 40 19 12 2 BFP BRL 1 1 BUP 6 9 8 7 3 2 1 1

RESOURCES BNP 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 TERRESTRIAL TERRESTRIAL

Bombers HOTEL 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 Generalitat BRAVO 8 9 9 2 2 3 3 VICTORS 6 6 3 MEANS AERIAL GRAF and Professional firefighters 122 174 159 115 102 59 55 34 6 Volunteer 41 57 49 44 29 12 9 6 firefighters Seasonal firefighters 154 210 219 163 93 64 59 38 7 ADF DMAiH COSAR OCA MMA BRIF 1 Pàgina 2 de 23 HIGHLIGHTS The St Llorenç wildfire of August 2003 was one of this years’ large wildfires during summer. This wildfire burned almost 5000 ha in four days and the burned area potential was 20000 ha. This wildfire has affected urbanizations and villages and five people died in this fire. This was the first wildfire that was used extensively with using fire confinement exercises before the fire was extinguished. In this exercise the main key was input provided by the ADF Teams, which produced the required support. The correct assessment and identification of the fire pattern according type of fire and of fire spread at critical points, provided the opportunity to slow-down the fire and to confine it without extinguishing it. For the first time it was possible to avoid the opening-up of flanks during the day or at night during the extreme fire conditions. The main issues to consider: The St Llorenç fire was one of the large wildfires experienced during 2003 with a potential burned area of 20000 ha within a time frame of more than 10 days during conditions of extreme fire risk. The actual area burned, however, did not exceed 5000 ha. This wildfire changed many viewpoints regarding fire extinguishing tasks; especially with regard to the methods of fire management before extinguishing a fire. The 2003 campaign was entered with a detailed analysis of the situation experienced during 1994 and 1998, during other wildfires in Central Catalunya. The main conclusions drawn were that the key to fire control was the control and the capacity of the wildfire to create kilometres-long of fire front, which had to be contained in a continuous manner. The available fire fighting resources were in fact loosing ground against the area gained hourly by the fire, resulting in these resources loosing the initiative to contain this fire. During 2003 the confinement criteria used were based on implementing at each fire type/fire pattern of a treatment that restricted the extension of the fire by “removing the critical points” in order to confine the fire in a specific area In this way this does not grow continuously and the means of extinction won the initiative and can continue their extinction. This involves using maneuvers of confinement of the front of fire or using heavy machinery to stabilize the fire, and then the maneuvers of extinction. This is a cultural change that will take a long time to be assumed despite of to be efficient, because of the using of new maneuvers which looks chaotic by inexperienced onlookers. This change in fire fighting application methods is difficult to understand if you are not understanding how fire extinguishing systems are applied in practice. This new management tool to contain fire (called “fire spread restriction”) is a first step towards handling extreme wildfire situations, demonstrating the potential that forest management and their structures may have to cope with when fighting wildland fires. • Evacuation vs confinement: This fire killed five people trying to flee from this fire coming close to this home. This tragedy reopens the debate on the appropriateness of the methods that can be applied: Evacuation or confinement. By considering the dates of the mortalities that occurred during the past decades one will note that the majority of the victims died while they were trying to escape from the fire. It is necessary to consider this issue seriously and to see what situations are preferred when considering taking the one decision or the other. It is in this direction that we acknowledge the role of essential planning of self-protection of houses in forest environments. This can provide a guarantee to restrict fire spread rather than be Pàgina 3 de 23 forced to evacuate, the latter being rather complicated considering random variables such as weather, traffic accidents, road blockages, and panic situations....

• Towns and urban-interface areas: As a result of an important number of urban communities and areas are being affected by wildfire, including isolated country houses and urban cores within potential fire perimeters. A significant number of fire fighting resources are many times allocated to protect urban areas. Thus in this way resources for fighting wildfires are sometimes severely reduced. • Co-ordination between government and operational fire management: In a fire of such dimensions, extensive co-ordination procedures between the various departments will be involved. In addition, at operating level, the controlling body for such an emergency should organize a strategy that integrates not only the fire fighters, but also their need to include assistance in some way from inside and outside the region for fighting fires, such as rural agents and police. • Speed of extinction: We can differentiate between two different type of speed of fire- line extinguishment/control, thanks to the facilitation of resource placements/movements and with the helpful of the communication channels. The GRAF units (with the light units which collaborate with them) and the aerial fire fighting resources (MAER) were working on the No.18 radio channel at the time, and they were operational, extinguishing the fire at a fast speed. However, the hose lines also contributed significantly to the speed of fire containment, many times extinguishing (finishing-off) a fire perimeter line. It is necessary to refer to an important directive, drawn up by the GRAF units to move and assist in locating various different resources, from Bombers to external teams (e.g. volunteers units and ADF). This resulted in some profitable coordination and work co- operation, as it was now possible to introduce combined tasks of opportunities and to locate resources/teams faster to fire areas. With reference to controlling the fire with volunteers, it is necessary to mention that all the information about these participants should be collected before hand, such as where they are working for, and who will be in charge when contacting them (Incidence Command System). It was also found to be important to change of work strategy at night-time. To ensure that a wildfire doesn’t spread uncontrolled during the night, it is necessary to see to it that people continue to work and to use the evening hours to advantage, to finish-off and to stabilize the fire perimeter.

Pàgina 4 de 23 GENERAL ANALYSIS Fire Weather Conditions The drought: For reference we can compare the 2002 with the 2003 drought. As one can see, the drought indices in 2003 are higher and more extensive than in 2002. This also includes the higher drought accumulation rate during the period between July 20 th th and August 15. In addition, in 2003 the spring-time 11 of august 2002 11 of august 2003 Figure 1:Drought Code Maps period was very wet.

Synoptic map 850 hPa (temperature) This wildfire episode was caused by the wave- action from the south that was above Catalunya and which produced overheating and a fast drying rate of the vegetation between August 13 and August 17. This situation led to high temperatures above normal conditions and a low relative humidity, which made the fuel as good as permanently “available”. This period of 15 days, was the main cause that the situation created was very explosive with an almost constant available fuel Figure 2. Temperature to 850 hPa. Warm and dry Saharan air mass above Occidental Europe. Font: pattern throughout the landscape. www.wetterzentrale.de/topkarten

Window of Large Forest Fire One of the most important aspects of these heat waves, is the recovery of fuel humidity during the night. This is the most significant feature and marks the full availability of uncontrolled burning of vegetation day and night, without any problems, creating the opportunity for the wildfire to grow continuously. The period that the fuel humidity is not recovering is known as a “Large Wildfire Window”.

One can see a peak in this graph when there Mapa sinòptic 500 hPa (temperatura) – was a wind speed recorded of 17Km/h from a SW direction. Only this weather station recorded the increase (See the third graph). This weather station is situated within the wildfire area, and for this reason one can observe real-time weather conditions from the wildfire, which we can describe as the “fire atmosphere”. It is also possible to see this effect when the relative humidity decreases.

Figura 3. Temperature at 500 hPa. See: www.meteo.cat

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Figure 4.Images that explain the weather situation (Sant Llorenç Savall weather station) during days of fire. The station is located at the same village.

Topography, vegetation and fire perimeter

Perimeter at larger scale (mdt-relief) Perimeter at smaller scale (mdt-relief)

Figure 5: Wildfire perimeter regarding the macro-topography and the Figure 6: Perimeter of the fire with respect to terrain position of the representative weather station The Sant Llorenç Savall fire took place in a mountainous area with an altitude of approximately 400m, with average slope angles of around 10 to 15 degrees. This fire started in the Vall d’Horta valley, which is exposed to a S/SE wind direction with similar terrain features in the area where the second fire originated. This hilly-type of landscape encouraged the entry of a general intensive entry of an air mass from the south and subsequently the country experienced an extreme fire risk for ten days.

Figure 9: One problem is the lack of suppression of forest fuels near farms and houses. In case of Figure 8. Red pine (Pinus sylvestris) is the the fire is necessary to remove predominant tree species often accompanied by the trees fast which took decades Pinus nigra and Quercus ilex in the shadow. In the to grow and in this way to create sunny area, Pinus halepensis exists and in some a better/safer environment. areas Quercus ilex Figure 7. Ortophotoimage of the vegetation cover with the fire perimeter The dominant tree species in the area was Pinus halepensis, but in some parts Pinus nigra. This area the trees were approximately 40 years old and didn’t have any Pàgina 6 de 23 silviculture treatment to speak of. The shrub layer was typically Mediterranean and very dense, with species such as e.g. Erica arborea, Ulex parviflorus, Cistus monspeliensis, Cistus albidus and Buxux sempervirens. According to Rothermel (Rothermel, 1983) the vegetation can be classified as fuel model No.4 (Rothermel, 1983).

Figure 10: The fire started by spreading as Figure 11. The capacity of the main fire to launch Figure 12. The role of air support provides indicated by the red line and arrow, towards to spot fires, caused new re-ignitions outside the additional strength to attack fire fronts and allow Comabella Urban area, which land and air original fire perimeter attacking inaccessible areas, making it possible to means develop evacuation actions. deal with spot fires, fast.

FIRE BEHAVIOR

The fire started around 16:50 at the entrance to the Vall d’horta valley. The increased drought conditions - combined with the open and exposed south entrance - made a clear spread northwards possible right from the beginning, during the days that such a fire was enhanced by winds from the sea.

Usually a continuous, moving fire front is not created, but rather a front affected by convection from the fire itself, thus not a continuous fire front line. However, though this was again the pattern of fire development, the fire became one group of moving dots, which evolved simultaneously to create a continued fire front, with flame heights exceeding 15m, with numerous new points of ignition developing. At this point, we speak of “large forest fire behaviour”. The villages near the fire ignition area were the first priority for fire fighting teams, particularly the village of Comabella, which was on top of a slope right in front of the fire spread direction.

At first, the fire did not pass the road that connects St. Monistrol with Sant Llorenç, but it developed subsequently into a very intense fire with spotting potential. Spotting distances of between 200 and 500 meters were recorded.

At first it was a matter of preventing the fire from crossing the road that connects Monistrol with Sant Llorenç, but then the fire increased in intensity its ability to launch fire spots.

The high intensity of the moving fire front made it necessary to protect the many isolated villages and country houses along the affected area, as well as St. Lawrence, Monistrol de , , and Castellterçol.

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Figure 13. Smoke column of the fire front between “la Roca” Figure 14. Fire behaviour of the rear section of the fire descending from the “Serrat de Costa and “L’Orri”. Brassa”.

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Figure 15 Perimeter by Isochrones and Main Runs . Each isochrone has a number indicating the hour and the day (1 – first, 2 – second, 3 – third).

Pàgina 9 de 23 STRATEGY AND LOCAL ANALYSIS Local analysis: Note that this fire, as other fires in the area under these conditions behave as known fire history defined and identified, are known to fire fighters: At noon the fire spread from S to N. This spread direction changed to the west during the day and into the night when it this direction of fire spread changed again to a N to S direction, especially from 6.00 am until 10.00. After that time until midday, had to turn to retrieve the direction of maximum virulence which is S to N This process is as a result of the dynamics of the landscape, winds pattern at land and from the sea, which was produced by the warm wind-entries from the south around the valley of the Llobregat’s river, as normally occurs during summer.

SITUATION IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 10/08/2003 17:00 H Working from the fire ignition area, The ignition of the fire the flanks were attacked to prevent at St. Llorenç (1). The an increase in the width of the head fire entered central fire. in a Northerly Protect the residential areas (2) within direction. This pattern the area of the start, and the village was also followed during (3). the Solsones fire in Create a close-up fire along the road 1998. to St. Llorenç de Calders to Monistrol. 10/08/2003 19:20 H Continue to attack the flanks from the The fire burned across fire ignition area. Also started flank the road from St. attacks from the road in both Llorenç to Monistrol de directions (7). Calders (4). Protection burning applied to save an The fire entered the inhabited area (9). Applied burning Figure 16: Day 10 *17:46h. area and from an anchor point with a indirect threatened the village fire, as far as Granera, from the Black and surrounding urban Forest (8). Burnout applied to restrict area of Granera (5) and the progress of fire spread towards Monistrol. (6) in the area of Rossinyol (10).

SITUATION 10/08/2003 23:30 H Confined the fire perimeter. Fire fronts remained active, but without linear growth of the fire perimeter. The fire did not have a prominent axis of fire spread direction and it did spread concentrically. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY Working with direct attack with water on all flanks accessible Figure 17: Day 10 *23:30h. and with hand tools, in the area of Montcau (11).

Pàgina 10 de 23 Situation: 11/08/2003 03:00 H Start of the fire at Gallifa (12) Implementation Strategy Both flanks were attacked to prevent the fire from growing in size, as there was a threat of two fires developing from the main fire. Burnout applied to prevent the smoke column from curving and creating serious spotting problems (13) Figure 18: Day 11 *03:00h.

Situation Implementation Strategy 11/08/2003 10:00 H Suppress actions, anchor flanks and head Fire stabilized. The fire rekindled along a large portion of the fire perimeter but there was no other major active along the fire fronts. 11/08/2003 14:00 H The two new fire fronts developed (and behaved) fast into a large forest fire Resproust at Gallifa situation and spread towards the area of Granera (5), which is isolated and can be (14) and also at St. regarded as “self-protective”. Attacks applied in both resprouts sites. Responded to Llorenç (15) protect residential areas. Teams attacked the fire to contain both head fires. Attacked fires from both flank sides in both cases, attempting to stop both fire heads from amalgamating.

Figure 19: Day 11 *10:00h. Figure 20: Day 11*14:00h.

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Situation 12/08/2003 07:00 H The two head fires were brought under control. The teams started to extinguish the fire and started mopping-up operations. The fire spins now and expects a progress toward NS to St. Llorenç The two fires (St. Llorenç and Gallifa) had been confined (16) early in the evening (2:00 pm approx) and the down-slope Figure 21: Day 12* 07:00h. spreading fire front now progresses along a continuous perimeter line.

Implementation Strategy Concluded controlling the head of the fire to avoid any flaring, around midday, when the wind speed became stronger. Fire containment was now extended towards the village of St. Llorenç and near road from Gallifa to St Llorenç. (17).

12/08/2003 12:00 H Continue working to attack the fire area of St. The risk for the people of St. Llorenç has been solved. Llorenç-Gallifa. With a clear advantage along the The fire was brought under control in the stubble road, where the fire spread could be restricted, fields. this should be applied there. The right flank (burning down slope) continued to Confined the fire front towards Monistrol, along spread eastward, and outflanked the fire perimeter the river/road. from the previous day, from the Gallifa fire. Reinforced teams at Mura's head fire front to Resumption occurred in the Monistrol area (18) which prevent further flare-ups from occurring, which spread towards the town and urban communities. The could spread across the creek “Monistrol Calders”. fire threatened to cross the road and started to spread towards .

SITUATION Implementation Strategy 13/08/2003 03:00 H Strengthening the work at Fire stabilized. the head of the fire and the anchor perimeter. 13/08/2003 17:00 H Direct attack against the fire front, also at the anchor New active fire suppression perimeter. activities in the area of Mura.

Figura 22.* p3. Spoting fire behaves.

Strategy, Organization and Operations.

Day 10: Vall d’Horta, fire with high intensity spreads towards the Comabella’s urban area. (1). Protected houses with land means and have rescued people from the air (MAERS). Using burnout applications (17:40) the two head fires have been converted in only one head fire (Torrent casa Galí) which became weak because, of the existing infra-structures in landscape (L’Otzet, El Rossinyol, Crta B-124) (2). During this night, the fire front was Pàgina 12 de 23 attacked at the left flank with hoselines and hand tools, until this flank was closed-up. (Roca Mur) (3).

A second resumption occurred, which developed in an upslope fire in Gallifa at 03:23. This fire developed into a spotting fire. When this fire was neutralized with a burnout (1), the head of this fire was surrounded with hoselines, along the left and right flanks of this fire.

Figures 23 and 24: Fire perimeter during the 10th day.

Day 11: When the fire perimeter was stabilized during the night from the 10th to the 11th with hoselines, there were 11 further resumptions recorded along the fire perimeter (between 12:25 to 20:21). These spots were burning independent and in isolation. At some stage MAER’s was also working on the flanks (1) (where water was available in adequate supplies), using burnout tactics at the head fires, to convert these perimeters into flank fires (2). There were also hoselines available to ensure that the fire perimeter remained under control. (3) Hand tools were then also used to finish off the fire perimeters (4)

Day 12: The third day, there were only four resumptions in all along the fire perimeter, during all day, thanks to all the work done to stabilize the fire perimeter. This unstable perimeter had been converted to a stable and secure perimeter. The burnouts, long hoselines were required all along the fire perimeter (1) and hand tools were used in difficult terrain (2).

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Figure 25: Situation on the 11th day Figure 26: Situation on the 12th day

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Figura 27: : Location map of the operative action performed in order to the status of final perimeter now under control (see legend)

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Table 1: DATA TABLE OF FIRE RUNS. (* see FR in the map)

Distance Time-period Rate of fire Wind speed Slope (meters) (minutes) spread (km/h) and steepness (m/min.) wind (degrees) direction. FR1 2500 100 25 2 - S 15 FR2 1000 30 33 2 - S 25 FR3 1000 60 16 1 - S 15 FR4 2500 180 14 1 - SW 15 FR5 1100 110 10 1 - NE 20 FR6 800 240 3 2 - S 10 FR7 600 240 2,5 1 - SW 15 FR8 1300 240 5,5 2 - S 20 FR9 600 240 2,5 0,5 - NW 25 FR10 900 600 1,5 2 - S 15 FR11 1500 120 12 2 - SE 25 FR12 1000 120 8,5 2 - SE 25 FR13 850 120 7 2 - S 20 FR14 1250 120 10,5 1 - SE 15 FR15 900 240 4 0,5 - NW 15 FR16 1500 120 12,5 2 - S 25 FR17 1600 120 13,5 1 - SE 10 FR18 600 120 5 1- NE 15 FR19 530 300 2 1 - SW 10 FR20 530 300 2 1 - SW 10 FR21 700 120 6 1,5 - N 20 FR22 700 180 4 2,5 - SW 20 FR23 900 300 3 2,5 - SW 15 FR24 680 120 5,5 2,5 - SW 15 FR25 700 20 35 2 - S 20

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Figure 28: Perimeter where shows the most important tasks related to the fire behavior.

Pàgina 17 de 23 REFERENCES Rothermel, R.C. 1983. How to predict the spread and intensity of forest and rangefires. Odgen, EE.UU. U.S. Forest Service.

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ANNEX 1 Meteorological Station situated in the village of Sant Llorenç Savall.

Relative Barometric T.U. Temperature Wind direction Wind speed Humidity pressure Radiation Precipitation oC Degrees m/s % hPa W/m2 mm 10/08/2003 00:00 16,5 43 0,5 74 0 10/08/2003 00:30 16,5 43 0,5 74 0 10/08/2003 01:00 16,7 44 0,5 72 0 10/08/2003 01:30 16,7 44 0,5 72 0 10/08/2003 02:00 16,6 45 0,6 74 0 10/08/2003 02:30 16,6 45 0,6 74 0 10/08/2003 03:00 16,3 50 0,3 75 0 10/08/2003 03:30 16,3 50 0,3 75 0 10/08/2003 04:00 17,3 34 0,7 67 0 10/08/2003 04:30 17,3 34 0,7 67 0 10/08/2003 05:00 18,1 353 0,4 63 0 10/08/2003 05:30 18,1 353 0,4 63 0 10/08/2003 06:00 24 14 1,1 43 0 10/08/2003 06:30 24 14 1,1 43 0 10/08/2003 07:00 29,9 194 0,9 30 0 10/08/2003 07:30 29,9 194 0,9 30 0 10/08/2003 08:00 32,4 194 1,4 24 0 10/08/2003 08:30 32,4 194 1,4 24 0 10/08/2003 09:00 33,7 194 1,9 21 0 10/08/2003 09:30 33,7 36 1,9 21 0 10/08/2003 10:00 34,9 36 2 18 0 10/08/2003 10:30 34,9 43 2 18 0 10/08/2003 11:00 35,4 43 1,7 16 0 10/08/2003 11:30 35,4 216 1,7 16 0 10/08/2003 12:00 36 223 2,3 16 0 10/08/2003 12:30 36 226 2,3 16 0 10/08/2003 13:00 35,6 200 1,8 20 0 10/08/2003 13:30 35,6 200 1,8 20 0 10/08/2003 14:00 35,4 201 2 19 0 10/08/2003 14:30 35,4 201 2 19 0 10/08/2003 15:00 34,5 222 3 21 0 10/08/2003 15:30 34,5 222 3 21 0 10/08/2003 16:00 32,7 231 4,7 22 0 10/08/2003 16:30 32,7 231 4,7 22 0 10/08/2003 17:00 31,4 215 3 23 0 10/08/2003 17:30 31,4 215 3 23 0 10/08/2003 18:00 30 180 1,4 28 0 10/08/2003 18:30 30 180 1,4 28 0 10/08/2003 19:00 28,7 130 0,7 32 0 10/08/2003 19:30 28,7 130 0,7 32 0 10/08/2003 20:00 25,6 154 0,4 39 0 10/08/2003 20:30 25,6 154 0,4 39 0 10/08/2003 21:00 24,8 214 1 39 0 10/08/2003 21:30 24,8 214 1 39 0 10/08/2003 22:00 24,7 209 0,5 34 0 10/08/2003 22:30 24,7 209 0,5 34 0 10/08/2003 23:00 21,7 50 0,2 42 0 10/08/2003 23:30 21,7 50 0,2 42 0

Pàgina 19 de 23 Relative Barometric T.U. Temperature Wind direction Wind speed Humidity pressure Radiation Precipitation oC Degrees m/s % hPa W/m2 mm 11/08/2003 00:00 20,6 52 0,3 46 0 11/08/2003 00:30 20,6 52 0,3 46 0 11/08/2003 01:00 20,2 48 0,3 48 0 11/08/2003 01:30 20,2 48 0,3 48 0 11/08/2003 02:00 20,5 7 0,3 48 0 11/08/2003 02:30 20,5 7 0,3 48 0 11/08/2003 03:00 20,2 71 0,2 48 0 11/08/2003 03:30 20,2 71 0,2 48 0 11/08/2003 04:00 18,6 42 0,2 54 0 11/08/2003 04:30 18,6 42 0,2 54 0 11/08/2003 05:00 18,7 55 0,2 54 0 11/08/2003 05:30 18,7 55 0,2 54 0 11/08/2003 06:00 21,6 55 0,2 45 0 11/08/2003 06:30 21,6 55 0,2 45 0 11/08/2003 07:00 28,1 212 0,7 32 0 11/08/2003 07:30 28,1 212 0,7 32 0 11/08/2003 08:00 32,7 126 0,8 21 0 11/08/2003 08:30 32,7 126 0,8 21 0 11/08/2003 09:00 33,5 103 1,4 19 0 11/08/2003 09:30 33,5 103 1,4 19 0 11/08/2003 10:00 33,5 103 1,4 18 0 11/08/2003 10:30 0 11/08/2003 11:00 35,1 231 1,7 16 0 11/08/2003 11:30 0 11/08/2003 12:00 35,8 188 1,7 15 0 11/08/2003 12:30 0 11/08/2003 13:00 35,1 181 1,8 16 0 11/08/2003 13:30 0 11/08/2003 14:00 33,3 144 1,7 19 0 11/08/2003 14:30 0 11/08/2003 15:00 32,7 118 1,6 17 0 11/08/2003 15:30 0 11/08/2003 16:00 31,9 175 1,7 16 0 11/08/2003 16:30 0 11/08/2003 17:00 31,8 118 1,6 18 0 11/08/2003 17:30 0 11/08/2003 18:00 31,1 120 1,2 21 0 11/08/2003 18:30 0 11/08/2003 19:00 28,5 125 0,5 26 0 11/08/2003 19:30 0 11/08/2003 20:00 23,4 69 0,1 38 0 11/08/2003 20:30 0 11/08/2003 21:00 21,1 50 0,2 45 0 11/08/2003 21:30 0 11/08/2003 22:00 19,8 68 0,2 48 0 11/08/2003 22:30 0 11/08/2003 23:00 19 44 0,3 46 0 11/08/2003 23:30 0

Pàgina 20 de 23 Relative Barometric T.U. Temperature Wind direction Wind speed Humidity pressure Radiation Precipitation oC Degrees m/s % hPa W/m2 mm 12/08/2003 00:00 18,4 41 0,3 45 0 12/08/2003 00:30 18,4 41 0,3 45 0 12/08/2003 01:00 18,3 45 0,4 45 0 12/08/2003 01:30 18,3 45 0,4 45 0 12/08/2003 02:00 18,4 50 0,4 36 0 12/08/2003 02:30 18,4 50 0,4 36 0 12/08/2003 03:00 18,4 55 0,4 35 0 12/08/2003 03:30 18,4 55 0,4 35 0 12/08/2003 04:00 17,8 186 0,2 39 0 12/08/2003 04:30 17,8 186 0,2 39 0 12/08/2003 05:00 18,5 31 0,2 41 0 12/08/2003 05:30 18,5 31 0,2 41 0 12/08/2003 06:00 22,1 40 0,7 32 0 12/08/2003 06:30 22,1 40 0,7 32 0 12/08/2003 07:00 27 212 0,6 22 0 12/08/2003 07:30 27 212 0,6 22 0 12/08/2003 08:00 31,7 292 1,3 12 0 12/08/2003 08:30 31,7 292 1,3 12 0 12/08/2003 09:00 32,8 8 1,3 12 0 12/08/2003 09:30 32,8 8 1,3 12 0 12/08/2003 10:00 34,2 20 1,4 11 0 12/08/2003 10:30 34,2 20 1,4 11 0 12/08/2003 11:00 36,1 233 1,6 11 0 12/08/2003 11:30 36,1 233 1,6 11 0 12/08/2003 12:00 37,2 234 2,4 11 0 12/08/2003 12:30 37,2 234 2,4 11 0 12/08/2003 13:00 37,4 207 2 12 0 12/08/2003 13:30 37,4 207 2 12 0 12/08/2003 14:00 37,1 181 1,8 13 0 12/08/2003 14:30 37,1 181 1,8 13 0 12/08/2003 15:00 36,3 206 1,8 13 0 12/08/2003 15:30 36,3 206 1,8 13 0 12/08/2003 16:00 35,5 200 1,6 13 0 12/08/2003 16:30 35,5 200 1,6 13 0 12/08/2003 17:00 32,6 214 1,2 16 0 12/08/2003 17:30 32,6 214 1,2 16 0 12/08/2003 18:00 29,5 227 0,9 20 0 12/08/2003 18:30 29,5 227 0,9 20 0 12/08/2003 19:00 27,5 226 0,8 23 0 12/08/2003 19:30 27,5 226 0,8 23 0 12/08/2003 20:00 23,1 38 0,3 30 0 12/08/2003 20:30 23,1 38 0,3 30 0 12/08/2003 21:00 21,4 47 0,2 34 0 12/08/2003 21:30 21,4 47 0,2 34 0 12/08/2003 22:00 20,6 41 0,3 36 0 12/08/2003 22:30 20,6 41 0,3 36 0 12/08/2003 23:00 20,6 33 0,2 37 0 12/08/2003 23:30 20,6 33 0,2 37 0

Pàgina 21 de 23 Relative Barometric T.U. Temperature Wind direction Wind speed Humidity pressure Radiation Precipitation oC Degrees m/s % hPa W/m2 mm 13/08/2003 00:00 22,9 44 1 32 0 13/08/2003 00:30 22,9 44 1 32 0 13/08/2003 01:00 20,7 50 0,2 38 0 13/08/2003 01:30 20,7 50 0,2 38 0 13/08/2003 02:00 19,3 42 0,2 40 0 13/08/2003 02:30 19,3 42 0,2 40 0 13/08/2003 03:00 18,8 47 0,3 39 0 13/08/2003 03:30 18,8 47 0,3 39 0 13/08/2003 04:00 18,5 44 0,3 40 0 13/08/2003 04:30 18,5 44 0,3 40 0 13/08/2003 05:00 18,6 47 0,2 38 0 13/08/2003 05:30 18,6 47 0,2 38 0 13/08/2003 06:00 23,2 53 1,2 30 0 13/08/2003 06:30 23,2 53 1,2 30 0 13/08/2003 07:00 30,5 54 1,4 19 0 13/08/2003 07:30 30,5 54 1,4 19 0 13/08/2003 08:00 32,9 58 1,7 16 0 13/08/2003 08:30 32,9 58 1,7 16 0 13/08/2003 09:00 35,2 108 1,1 14 0 13/08/2003 09:30 35,2 108 1,1 14 0 13/08/2003 10:00 36,5 172 1,3 12 0 13/08/2003 10:30 36,5 172 1,3 12 0 13/08/2003 11:00 37,7 132 1,4 10 0 13/08/2003 11:30 37,7 132 1,4 10 0 13/08/2003 12:00 38 165 1,7 10 0 13/08/2003 12:30 38 165 1,7 10 0 13/08/2003 13:00 38 144 1,7 11 0 13/08/2003 13:30 38 144 1,7 11 0 13/08/2003 14:00 37,8 190 1,9 10 0 13/08/2003 14:30 37,8 190 1,9 10 0 13/08/2003 15:00 37 167 1,6 9 0 13/08/2003 15:30 37 167 1,6 9 0 13/08/2003 16:00 35,7 219 2 10 0 13/08/2003 16:30 35,7 219 2 10 0 13/08/2003 17:00 32,9 213 1,3 12 0 13/08/2003 17:30 32,9 213 1,3 12 0 13/08/2003 18:00 29,9 219 1 17 0 13/08/2003 18:30 29,9 219 1 17 0 13/08/2003 19:00 28,3 219 1,2 19 0 13/08/2003 19:30 28,3 219 1,2 19 0 13/08/2003 20:00 25,3 201 0,4 25 0 13/08/2003 20:30 25,3 201 0,4 25 0 13/08/2003 21:00 22,2 44 0,3 30 0 13/08/2003 21:30 22,2 44 0,3 30 0 13/08/2003 22:00 21 43 0,3 31 0 13/08/2003 22:30 21 43 0,3 31 0 13/08/2003 23:00 20 35 0,3 32 0 13/08/2003 23:30 20 35 0,3 32 0

Pàgina 22 de 23 Relative Barometric T.U. Temperature Wind direction Wind speed Humidity pressure Radiation Precipitation oC Degrees m/s % hPa W/m2 mm 14/08/2003 00:00 20,5 54 0,3 32 0 14/08/2003 00:30 20,5 54 0,3 32 0 14/08/2003 01:00 20,6 31 0,7 32 0 14/08/2003 01:30 20,6 31 0,7 32 0 14/08/2003 02:00 20,8 23 0,8 32 0 14/08/2003 02:30 20,8 23 0,8 32 0 14/08/2003 03:00 24,8 3 1,3 25 0 14/08/2003 03:30 24,8 3 1,3 25 0 14/08/2003 04:00 20,7 38 0,9 32 0 14/08/2003 04:30 20,7 38 0,9 32 0 14/08/2003 05:00 21,1 39 0,7 31 0 14/08/2003 05:30 21,1 39 0,7 31 0 14/08/2003 06:00 22,1 238 0,3 30 0 14/08/2003 06:30 22,1 238 0,3 30 0 14/08/2003 07:00 29,9 70 0,8 18 0 14/08/2003 07:30 29,9 70 0,8 18 0 14/08/2003 08:00 32,1 62 2,1 13 0 14/08/2003 08:30 32,1 62 2,1 13 0 14/08/2003 09:00 35,2 25 1,3 11 0 14/08/2003 09:30 35,2 25 1,3 11 0 14/08/2003 10:00 36,6 261 1,4 10 0 14/08/2003 10:30 36,6 261 1,4 10 0 14/08/2003 11:00 37,8 162 1,4 10 0 14/08/2003 11:30 37,8 162 1,4 10 0 14/08/2003 12:00 38,3 215 2,2 9 0 14/08/2003 12:30 38,3 215 2,2 9 0 14/08/2003 13:00 37,8 219 2,3 10 0 14/08/2003 13:30 37,8 219 2,3 10 0 14/08/2003 14:00 37,4 225 2,3 11 0 14/08/2003 14:30 37,4 225 2,3 11 0 14/08/2003 15:00 35,7 225 3,3 12 0 14/08/2003 15:30 35,7 225 3,3 12 0 14/08/2003 16:00 35,6 190 1,3 12 0 14/08/2003 16:30 35,6 190 1,3 12 0 14/08/2003 17:00 32,4 212 1,11 13 0 14/08/2003 17:30 32,4 212 1,1 13 0 14/08/2003 18:00 29,7 169 0,5 16 0 14/08/2003 18:30 29,7 169 0,5 16 0 14/08/2003 19:00 25,2 131 0,2 24 0 14/08/2003 19:30 25,2 131 0,2 24 0 14/08/2003 20:00 22,4 51 0,2 31 0 14/08/2003 20:30 22,4 51 0,2 31 0 14/08/2003 21:00 20,9 42 0,4 37 0 14/08/2003 21:30 20,9 42 0,4 37 0 14/08/2003 22:00 20,1 58 0,3 36 0 14/08/2003 22:30 20,1 58 0,3 36 0 14/08/2003 23:00 19,9 43 0,6 33 0 14/08/2003 23:30 19,9 43 0,6 33 0

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